Treasury yields and corp orate b ond yield spreads: An empirical analysis
Gregory R. Du ee
Federal Reserve Board
Mail Stop 91
Washington, DC 20551
202-452-3055
First version January 1995
Currentversion May 1996
previously circulated under the title
The variation of default risk with Treasury yields
Abstract
This pap er empirically examines the relation b etween the Treasury term structure and
spreads of investment grade corp orate b ond yields over Treasuries. I nd that noncallable
b ond yield spreads fall when the level of the Treasury term structure rises. The extentof
this decline dep ends on the initial credit quality of the b ond; the decline is small for Aaa-
rated b onds and large for Baa-rated b onds. The role of the business cycle in generating
this pattern is explored, as is the link b etween yield spreads and default risk. I also argue
that yield spreads based on commonly-used b ond yield indexes are contaminated in two
imp ortant ways. The rst is that they are \refreshed" indexes, which hold credit ratings
constantover time; the second is that they usually are constructed with b oth callable and
noncallable b onds. The impact of b oth of these problems is examined.
JEL Classi cation: G13
I thank Fischer Black, Ken Singleton and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve
Board's Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk for helpful comments. Nidal
Abu-Saba provided valuable research assistance. All errors are myown. The analysis and
conclusions of this pap er are those of the author and do not indicate concurrence by other
memb ers of the research sta , by the Board of Governors, or by the Federal Reserve Banks.
1. Intro duction
This pap er empirically examines the relation b etween the Treasury term structure and
spreads of corp orate b ond yields over Treasuries. This relation is of interest in its own right
b ecause it is essential to the calibration and testing of mo dels that price credit sensitive
instruments. More broadly, this investigation allows us to address the nature of the biases
in commonly-used indexes of corp orate b ond yields; biases induced by the way these indexes
are constructed.
Indexes of corp orate b ond yields are typically averages of yields on a set of b onds that
are chosen based on the characteristics of the b ond at the time the average is computed. For
example, to day's Mo o dy's Industrials Aaa-rated Bond Yield is to day's mean yield on a set
of Aaa-rated b onds issued by industrial rms that have current prices not to o far away from
par and have relatively long remaining maturities. Much academic work interprets changes
in yield spreads constructed with such indexes as indicativeofchanges in default risk. This
interpretation is sub ject to a number of p otential problems, twoof which are likely more
imp ortant than others.
The rst ma jor problem, as discussed by Due and Singleton (1995) in the context of
indexes of new-issue swap spreads, is that these are \refreshed" indexes. The change in the
yield from one p erio d to the next do es not measure the change in the mean yield on a xed
set of b onds, but rather the change in the mean yield on two sequential sets of b onds that
share the same features; in particular, that share the same credit rating. Hence using these
indexes to investigate intertemp oral changes in b onds' default risk is problematic b ecause
the indexes hold constant a measure of credit quality.
The second ma jor problem is that corp orate b ond yield indexes are often constructed
using b oth callable and noncallable b onds. Given the ob jectives of those constructing the
indexes, such as Mo o dy's, this is sensible. Until relatively recently, few corp orations issued
noncallable b onds, hence an index designed to measure the yield on a typical corp orate
b ond would have to be constructed primarily with callable b onds. However, yields on
callable b onds will be a ected by the value of the option to call. Variations over time in
yield spreads on callable b onds will re ect, in part, variations in the option value.
Other, less imp ortant problems that a ect most indexes of corp orate b ond yields in-
clude coup on-induced changes in duration and state taxes. Given all of these biases, how
appropriate is the assumption that changes in yield spreads for such indexes are driven by
changes in default risk?
I use month-end data on individual investment-grade b onds included in Lehman Broth-
ers Bond Indexes from January 1985 through March 1995 to examine how yield spreads vary
with changes in the level and slop e of the Treasury term structure. To illustrate the results
discussed in this pap er, consider the average month-t yield spread (over the appropriate 1
Treasury instrument) for a group of noncallable coup on b onds with identical credit ratings
and similar maturities. If the Treasury yield curve shifts down by 10 basis p oints b etween
months t and t + 1, the average yield spread on this group of b onds rises bybetween 0.6 and
3.6 basis p oints. In other words, the price increase in a corp orate b ond that accompanies a
given decrease in Treasury yields is b etween 6 and 36 p ercent less than it would b e if b ond
yields and Treasury yields moved one-for-one. The resp onsiveness of the spread is weak for
high-rated b onds (e.g., it is statistically insigni cant for Aaa-rated b onds) and strong for
low-rated b onds. Although these results are for coup on b onds, any coup on-induced bias in
these results is quite small.
I also conclude that, after adjusting for coup on-induced biases, changes in the slop e
of the term structure of Treasury yields are very weakly negatively related to changes in
yield spreads. Surprisingly, although b oth yields on Treasury b onds and corp orate b ond
yield spreads are linked to the business cycle (well-known facts that I con rm here), I nd
it dicult to explain the relation between yield spreads and Treasury yields in terms of
variations in default risk driven by the business cycle.
I nd that, compared with the results discussed ab ove, changes in yield spreads con-
structed with refreshed indexes of noncallable b onds have much weaker links to changes
in Treasury yields. This evidence indicates that refreshed indexes underreact to variations
in credit quality b ecause changes in credit ratings capture part of the variabilityof yield
spreads over time.
By contrast, changes in yield spreads constructed with indexes of callable b onds have
much stronger links to changes in Treasury yields b ecause the value of the call option
negatively varies with Treasury yields. For high-priced callable b onds, most of the variation
in yield spreads is caused byvariations in the value of the call option.
The next section discusses why the relation b etween yield spreads and Treasury yields
is imp ortant and reviews some previous research. The third section describ es the database I
use. The fourth section analyzes the relation b etween yield spreads on noncallable b onds and
Treasury yields. It also discusses p ossible biases induced by coup ons and state taxes. The
fth section attempts to interpret this relation in terms of default risk and the business cycle.
The sixth section explores the b ehavior of yield spreads constructed with b oth refreshed
indexes of noncallable b ond yields and indexes of callable b ond yields. Concluding comments
are contained in the nal section.
2. Yield spreads and the Treasury term structure: An overview
Prices of credit-sensitive instruments dep end on the covariances between discounted
future obligated cash ows and the probabilities of default at future dates. Hence in order
to parameterize pricing mo dels for credit-sensitive instruments, nancial economists must 2
understand the joint b ehavior of default-free discount rates and the market's p erception of
default risk. Roughly sp eaking, is the risk of default larger or smaller when the present
value of the obligated cash ows is high?
A number of mo dels price interest rate sensitive, default-risky instruments, such as
corp orate b onds and interest rate swaps, allowing for dep endence b etween the pro cess gen-
erating default and the pro cess generating interest rates. One class of mo dels follows the
path laid by Merton (1974) and mo dels default as a function of the value of the rm; changes
in the value of the rm can b e correlated with interest rates. This class includes the mo dels
of Co op er and Mello (1991), Abken (1993), Shimko, Tejima, and van Deventer (1993), and
Longsta and Schwartz (1995). They nd that the prices of these instruments can b e very
sensitive to the correlation b etween the rm's value and interest rates.
Another, more recent class of mo dels simply sp eci es a default pro cess without tying
default to the value of the rm. The probability of default can b e correlated with interest
rates, as in Lando (1994) and Due and Huang (1995). However, one reason this class
of mo dels was develop ed is that the mo dels are very tractable if default probabilities are
indep endentofinterest rates. Hence empirical implementation has concentrated on the case
of indep endence, as in Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1994) and Madan and Unal (1994). If
the evidence here indicates that indep endence is a p o or assumption, then a ma jor advantage
of this class of mo dels disapp ears.
Mo dels of noncallable zero-coup on corp orate b ond prices, such as Lando (1994) and
Longsta and Schwartz (1995), imply that variations over time in default risk are accom-
panied byvariations in yield spreads, hence patterns in the b ehavior of spreads can b e used
to make inferences ab out the relation b etween default risk and interest rates. Longsta and
Schwartz (1995) nd that spreads b etween Mo o dy's Bond Yield Indexes and Treasury b ond
yields are strongly negatively related to Treasury yields. However, over their sample p erio d,
Mo o dy's Indexes were largely comp osed of yields on callable b onds. I argue later that this
strong negative relation is driven byvariations in the value of the call option. Kwan (1996)
nds similar results (although his ob jective is di erent) using individual b ond yields, but
he also includes b oth callable and noncallable b onds in his analysis.
This call-option bias is avoided by Iwanowski and Chandra (1995), who examine the
relation between Treasury yields and yield spreads of noncallable b onds during the late
1980s and early 1990s. They nd a small negative relation b etween the level of the Treasury
yield and yield spreads, and no signi cant relation b etween the Treasury slop e and spreads.
However, they use refreshed yield indexes in their analysis. I argue later that this choice
underestimates the resp onsiveness of yield spreads to Treasury yields b ecause it cannot
capture changes in yield spreads on b onds that were upgraded or downgraded in the month.
(The Mo o dy's indexes used by Longsta and Schwartz are also refreshed indexes, but the 3
e ect of the call option dominates the e ect of the refreshed indexes.)
A related literature examines the return p erformance of low-grade corp orate b onds
relative to other assets. The advantage of lo oking at b ond returns instead of yield indexes
is that b ond returns are not sub ject to the problem of refreshed indexes. Cornell and
Green (1991) nd that returns to low-grade b onds are much less resp onsive to changes
in Treasury yields than are returns to high-grade b onds. They attribute this result to the
lower duration of low-grade b onds, owing to less restrictive call features and higher coup ons.
Although callability likely accounts for part of this result, I nd that low-quality noncallable
b ond yield spreads are very sensitivetoTreasury yields, and that this result is not driven
by high coup on payments. Hence part of the weak resp onsiveness of low-grade b ond returns
to changes in Treasury yields likely is driven by a negative correlation b etween interest rate
risk and default risk.
3. Database description
The Fixed Income Database from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee consists of
month-end data on the b onds that make up the Lehman Brothers Bond Indexes. The
version used here covers January 1973 through March 1995. In addition to rep orting month-
end prices and yields, the database rep orts maturity, various call, put, and sinking fund
information, and a business sector for each b ond: e.g., industrial, utilities, and nancial.
It also rep orts monthly Mo o dy's and S&P ratings for each b ond. Until 1992 the Lehman
Brothers Indexes covered only investment-grade rms, hence the analysis in this pap er is
restricted to b onds rated Baa or higher by Mo o dy's (or BBB by S&P).
The secondary market for corp orate b onds is very illiquid compared to the secondary
market for corp orate equity (sto cks), which p oses problems for reseachers who wish to use
corp orate b ond prices. Nunn, Hill, and Schneeweis (1986) and Warga (1991) discuss these
problems in detail. A useful feature of this dataset is that it distinguishes b etween \quote"
prices and \matrix" prices. Quote prices are bid prices established by Lehman traders. If a
trader is unwilling to supply a bid price b ecause the b ond has not traded recently, a matrix
price is computed. Because quote prices are more likely to re ect all available information
than are matrix prices, I use only quote prices in this pap er. For more information on this
database, see Warga (1991).
Much of the empirical work in this pap er uses yields on noncallable b onds. Unfor-
tunately for this area of research, corp orations issued few noncallable b onds prior to the
mid-1980s. For example, the dataset has January 1984 prices and yields for 5,497 straight
b onds issued by industrial, nancial, or utility rms. Only 271 of these b onds were non-
callable for life. By January 1985, the number of noncallable b onds with price and yield
information had risen to 382 (of 5,755). Beginning with 1985, the number of noncallable 4
b onds rose dramatically, so that the dataset contains March 1995 price and yield informa-
tion on 2,814 noncallable b onds (of 5,291). Because of the paucity of noncallable b onds in
earlier years, I restrict my attention to the p erio d January 1985 through March 1995.
4. An analysis of noncallable corp orate b ond yield spreads
In this section I examine the relation between Treasury yields and yield spreads on
corp orate b onds that have no option-like features. Therefore I consider only those corp orate
b onds that are noncallable, nonputable, and have no sinking fund option.
4.1. Data construction
I construct monthly corp orate yields, yield spreads (over Treasuries) and changes in
spreads for four business sectors (industrial, utilities, nancial, and these three combined),
four rating categories (Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa), and three bands of remaining maturities (2
to 7 years, 7 to 15 years, and 15 to 30 years). Hence 48 (4 4 3) di erent time series of
spreads and changes in spreads are constructed. Their construction is describ ed in detail in
the App endix and summarized here.
My measure of the month t yield spread for sector s, rating i, and remaining maturity
m is denoted S . It is the mean yield spread at the end of month t for all b onds with
s;i;m;t
quote prices in the sector/rating/maturity group. I de ne the monthly change in the spread
S as the mean change in the spread from t to t + 1 on that exact group of b onds.
s;i;m;t+1
Note that b onds that were downgraded b etween t and t + 1 or that have fallen out of the
maturity range b etween t and t + 1 will not b e included in the set of b onds used to construct
the month t + 1 spread S , but they will b e included in my measure of the change
s;i;m;t+1
in the spread from month t to month t +1. Most of the results discussed b elow use yields
and spreads based on all combined business sectors, hence I usually drop the business sector
subscript s.
Summary statistics for these time series of spreads and changes in spreads are displayed
in Table 1. Note that there are many months for which spreads for a given sector's Aaa-rated
b onds are missing, owing to a lack of noncallable Aaa b onds. Those observations that are
not missing are based on very few b onds. For example, an average of two b onds are used to
construct each nonmissing observation for long-term industrial Aaa b onds. Also note that
changes in mean yield spreads for the combined business sectors are typically p ositively
auto correlated at one lag. This p ositive auto correlation likely is the result of stale yield
spreads for individual b onds. 5
4.2. Test Methodology
In order to investigate relations b etween changes in yield spreads and changes in the
Treasury term structure, I need variables that summarize the information in the Treasury
term structure. Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) and Chen and Scott (1993) do cument
that the vast ma jorityofvariation in the Treasury term structure can b e expressed in terms
of changes in the level and the slop e. I therefore use the monthly change in the three-month
Treasury bill yield, denoted Y , and the monthly change in the spread between the
3m;t
30-year constant maturityTreasury yield and the three-month Treasury bill yield, denoted
SL for SLop e. These monthly changes are month-end to month-end changes so that they
t
are prop erly aligned with the corp orate b ond data.
To determine how corp orate b ond spreads vary with the Treasury term structure, I
regress changes in spreads on the future, current and lagged changes in myTreasury term
structure variables. The non-contemp oraneous changes are included to correct for non-
trading, an approach based on Scholes and Williams (1977) that is used byKwan (1996),
Cornell and Green (1991), and others. I therefore estimate regressions of the form
1 1
X X
S = b + b Y + b SL + e : (1)
s;i;m;t+1 0 3m;j 3m;t+1 j sl;j t+1 j i;m;t+1
j = 1 j = 1
This decomp osition of the Treasury term structure on the right-hand-side of (1) is
arbitrary in the sense that I could have measured changes in the level of the term structure
with changes in the 30-year yield instead of changes in the three-month bill yield. The form
of (1) implies that the prop er interpretation of the slop e co ecients is the e ect of a change
in the long yield holding the short yield constant.
4.3. Regression results
Table 2 rep orts OLS estimates of equation (1) for various maturities and credit ratings.
Tosave space, the only results displayed are those for all three business sectors combined.
Regressions are run separately for each maturity/credit rating group. I adjust the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated co ecients for generalized heteroskedasticity and two
2
lags of moving average residuals. The signi cance of asymptotic tests that the sums of
the co ecients on the leading, contemp oraneous, and lagged variables equal zero are shown
in brackets.
The results indicate that an increase in the level of the term structure corresp onds to
a decline in yield spreads. This relation holds for every combination of maturity and credit 6
rating. The p oint estimates imply that for a 100 basis p oint decrease in the three month
Treasury yield, yield spreads rise bybetween 6 basis p oints (medium-term Aaa-rated b onds)
and 36 basis p oints (long-term Baa-rated b onds). This relation is weak for Aaa-rated b onds
(it is statistically insigni cant for long-maturity and medium-maturity Aaa-rated b onds) and
strengthens as credit quality falls. Hence the covariances b etween changes in the level of the
Treasury curve and changes in b ond spreads are imp ortant in pricing non-Aaa corp orate
b onds. For such b onds, the average price increase in a corp orate b ond that accompanies a
given decrease in the level of Treasury yields is nearly 20 p ercent less than it would b e if
b ond yields and Treasury yields moved one-for-one.
Table 2 also rep orts that the relation b etween the slop e of the term structure and yield
spreads is weak. An increase in the slop e typically corresp onds to a decrease in yield spreads,
but this relation is economically and statistically signi cant only for long-maturity b onds.
Later I argue that this strong negative relation for long-maturity b onds is largely the result
of a coup on-induced bias.
There is no theoretical reason to b elieve that corp orate b onds spreads from various
business sectors should react the same waytochanging Treasury yields. In fact, given that
di erent sectors are a ected by macro economic uctuations in di erentways, it would b e
surprising to nd that b ond spread b ehavior was identical across sectors. To test whether
b onds spreads from my three business sectors (industrial, utilities, nancial) b ehaved simi-
larly, I jointly estimate equation (1) for each sector with Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR). I estimate 12 di erent SURs, one for each combination of credit rating and maturity
P P
2
band. The (4) test of equalityof b and b across the three sectors is rep orted
3m;j sl;j
j j
in the nal column of Table 2.
2
The test rejects, at the 5% level, the hyp othesis of constant co ecients across
the business sectors only for short-maturity Aaa-rated b onds, and this rejection is likely
spurious. As can be seen in Table 1, there are only 25 monthly observations available
to jointly estimate the regressions for these yield spreads. Hence from the p ersp ective
of statistical signi cance, there is no comp elling evidence that yield spreads for di erent
business sectors react di erently to Treasury yields. Perhaps more relevant is the economic
signi cance of the results. In results that are available on request, I nd that the estimated
co ecients for industrials and utilities are very similar, while estimated level and slop e
co ecients for nancials are somewhat larger than those for the other sectors. The average
P P
b for nancials is roughly 0.06 greater than the average b for other rms,
3m;j 3m;j
j j
P
while the average b for nancials is roughly 0.09 greater than the corresp onding
sl;j
j
average for other rms. Hence there is some weak evidence that yield spreads for nancial
rms b ehave somewhat di erently than yield spreads for other rms. In the remainder of
this pap er, I ignore this p ossible di erence and use only yield spreads constructed with all 7
business sectors combined.
4.4. An analysis of tax-induced biases
Returns to holding corp orate b onds are taxed at the Federal, state, and lo cal levels,
while returns to holding Treasury instruments are taxed at only the Federal level. As long
as the marginal investor faces a p ositive state and lo cal marginal tax rate, this tax wedge
will a ect the yield spread b etween corp orate b onds and Treasury b onds. The wedge also
a ects the covariance b etween the yield spread and Treasury yields.
A careful adjustment of yields for tax e ects is b eyond the scop e of this pap er. Because
taxes are paid on returns, not yields, a complete analysis requires emb edding taxes in an
equivalent martingale mo del of sto chastic interest rates and default risk, such as those
mentioned in Section 2. In this pap er I take a simpler approach.
I assume that the taxable return on b oth Treasury and corp orate b onds of a given
maturity m equals the Treasury yield for that maturity, denoted Y . Essentially, this
m;t
equates the Treasury yield with the realized return, whichisobviously inaccurate. Note that
I do not assume that the taxable return on corp orate b onds equals the corp orate yield|such
an assumption ignores the fact that the corp orate yield imp ounds the p ossibility of default.
In addition, I adopt a simple view of the tax system. I ignore any di erences among
tax rates on long-term capital gains, short-term capital gains, and ordinary income. I also
ignore tax timing issues. I simply assume there is one Federal marginal tax rate and one state
marginal tax rate denoted . Both tax rates are assumed to b e nonsto chastic. Corp orate
s
b onds are taxed at b oth the Federal and state level, while Treasury b onds are taxed only
at the Federal level.
Given these assumptions, the `after-tax' yield spread (denoted AT S )between corp orate
b onds and Treasuries is (supressing notational dep endence on the business sector):
AT S = S Y (2)
i;m;t i;m;t s m;t
Calculations of after-tax spreads are very sensitive to assumptions ab out marginal state
and lo cal tax rates. For example, the mean Treasury yield corresp onding to the maturityof
the short-term Aaa-rated b onds in my dataset is 7.34% and the mean spread for short-term
Aaa-rated b onds is 67 basis p oints. If the marginal investor has a 5% state and lo cal tax
rate, the mean after-tax spread on these b onds is 30 basis p oints. With a 7% tax rate, the
mean after-tax spread is only 16 basis p oints.
Similarly, the resp onsiveness of after-tax spreads to changes in Treasury yields also
dep ends on tax rate assumptions. To simplify the analysis of the bias in (1), assume that
the change in the m-maturityTreasury yield Y can b e written as a linear combination of
m;t 8
the change in three-month Treasury yield and the change in the slop e b etween the thirty-year
yield and the three-month yield:
Y = Y + SL (3)
m;t+1 m;1 3m;t+1 m;2 t+1
Obviously = 1 and = 0 for the three-month yield, while = 1 and
m;1 m;2 m;1
= 1 for the thirty-year yield. For maturities of three years or more, ranges from
m;2 m;1
1
1.1 to 1.3 and ranges from 0.8 to 1.0.
m;2
Also assume that the relation b etween after-tax yield spreads and changes in pre-tax
Treasury yields is linear:
AT S = + Y + SL (4)
i;m;t+1 0 1 3m;t+1 2 t+1
Substituting (2) and (3) into (4):
S = +( + )Y +( + )SL (5)
i;m;t+1 0 1 s m;1 3m;t+1 2 s m;2 t+1
P P
Equation (5) indicates that the sums b and b from equation (1) are
3m;j sl;j
j j
upward-biased estimates of the e ect of changes in Treasury yields on after-tax b ond spreads.
Because and are in the neighb orho o d of one for the maturities examined in this
m;1 m;2
pap er, the bias in b oth sums is roughly equal to . This bias can be large relative to
s
P
b , esp ecially for Aaa-rated b onds. Because of the p otential imp ortance of state
3m;j
j
taxes in the calculation of credit spreads, we need to have a go o d idea of the marginal state
and lo cal tax rate for the marginal holder of corp orate b onds b efore we can evaluate the
relation b etween after-tax spreads and Treasury yields.
Unfortunately for our purp oses, it is dicult to identify the appropriate marginal state
tax rate. Tax rates vary widely across states. In 1992, the highest marginal state and
lo cal tax rates on dividends, interest income and capital gains were as low as zero in a few
states and as high as twelve p ercent in others (Commerce Clearing House 1992). Severn
and Stewart (1992) make some heroic assumptions to argue that the marginal state tax
rate is no greater than ve p ercent, and likely in region of two to three p ercent. This is an
area where further research is needed, but careful investigation of marginal state tax rates
is b eyond the scop e of this pap er.
1
These gures are based on treating (3) as a regression equation and estimating it over
my sample p erio d using constant-maturityTreasury yields. 9
4.5. An analysis of coupon-induced biases
The building blo cks in mo dels of default-risky instruments are not spreads on coup on
b onds, but spreads on zero-coup on b onds (or, equivalently, forward rate spreads). However,
the yield spread on an m-maturity coup on b ond over an m-maturityTreasury coup on b ond
will di er from the yield spread on an m-maturity zero-coup on b ond over an m-maturity
Treasury strip if either the default-free term structure or the term structure of zero-coup on
b ond credit spreads is not at (Litterman and Ib en 1991).
As Iwanowski and Chandra (1995) note, coup on b ond yield spreads will also vary with
Treasury yields even if zero-coup on b ond yield spreads are unrelated to Treasury yields. For
example, an increase in the level of the Treasury term structure will shorten the duration
of coup on b onds. Because credit spreads are higher for longer-maturity instruments, this
decrease in duration will corresp ond to a decline in observed corp orate coup on b ond yield
spreads.
Here I investigate the empirical imp ortance of this coup on-induced relation between
2
Treasury yields and corp orate b ond yield spreads. To preview the results, I nd that
changes in the level of Treasury yields have a negligible e ect on yield spreads, but changes
in the slop e of the Treasury term structure can have a large e ect on yield spreads of
long-maturity instruments. This \slop e bias" app ears to explain much of the fact that, as
do cumented in Table 2, yield spreads on long-maturity instruments are more sensitive to
changes in the slop e of the yield curve (holding the short end xed) than are yield spreads
on shorter-maturity instruments.
I explore this issue by assuming that at a given instant, b oth the implicit Treasury
zero-coup on term structure and the zero-coup on yield spread curve for a particular rm or
rating class are linear in maturity. I then examine the comparative statics of changing the
level and slop e of the Treasury zero-coup on term structure. Hence instead of considering
changes in the slop e and intercept of the Treasury term structure over the p erio d of a month,
whichwould require a sto chastic mo del of the term structure, I simply consider instanta-
2
In an earlier version of the pap er I rep ort results for zero-coup on b ond yield spreads over
Treasury strips. However, relatively few zero-coup on b onds have b een issued by corp orations
(for example, no regressions could b e estimated for Baa-rated b onds) and the yields on these
b onds app ear to be contaminated by substantial transitory noise. The results, which are
available on request, are mixed. The change in the level of the term structure is negatively
related to spreads (except for long-maturity Aaa b onds), but this relation is statistically
insigni cant for all but short-maturity Aa-rated and A-rated b onds. The change in the
slop e of the term structure is not statistically signi cantinany regression. The overall lack
of signi cance may b e a consequence of a lackofpower owing to a lack of data. No regression
is estimated over all observations, and for two regressions, over half of the observations are
missing. 10
neous changes. Denote the continuously-comp ounded yield on a default-free zero-coup on
b ond with remaining maturity , measured in years, as r ( ). Denote the continuously-
comp ounded yield on a zero-coup on b ond issued by a particular rm with remaining matu-
rity as f ( ), hence the yield spread, denoted s ,isgiven by s( )=f() r(). The two
term structures are describ ed by (6).
r ( )=a +b ; s( )=a +b (6)
r r s s
Consider a Treasury b ond with coup on c (c =2 is paid every six months) and maturity
r r
m. This b ond has a continuously-comp ounded yield Y , where the \r " subscript denotes
r;c ;m
r
a default-free b ond. Some algebra reveals that the e ects on Y of changes in the level
r;c ;m
r
3
and slop e of the zero-coup on term structure are given by:
2m
X