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Nationality, Autochthony, and Politics in Spain's North African Exclaves

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Nationality, Autochthony, and Politics in Spain's North African Exclaves “This Project We Call Spain”: Nationality, Autochthony, and Politics in Spain’s North African Exclaves Daniel Koski-Karell A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2014 Reading Committee: Steven Pfaff, Chair Daniel Chirot Edgar Kiser Katherine Stovel Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Sociology ©Copyright 2014 Daniel Koski-Karell University of Washington Abstract “This Project We Call Spain”: Nationality, Autochthony, and Politics in Spain’s North African Exclaves Daniel Koski-Karell Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Steven Pfaff Department of Sociology This dissertation begins by uncovering a puzzle in Spain’s two North African cities: why are significantly fewer native-born and foreign-born residents of Melilla Spanish citizens than comparable residents of Ceuta, despite the two cities sharing many social, political, economic conditions? In addition, why are the lowest rates of Spanish citizenship in Melilla found in the census tracts with the highest concentration of Muslim residents whereas in Ceuta nearly all residents—regardless of religious categorization and birthplace—are Spaniards? Spurred by these questions, I then trace how variation in the constitutive elements of ethnic identity categories across the cities generate similar names of categories but differ- ent shared meanings of the categories, sub-national “Spanish” identities, and activations of the identities. I argue that the most influential variation in the constitutive elements regards imagined, historical collectives defined and differentiated by their relative power, or “political homelands.” In Ceuta, I identify the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Arabness,” or to use the generalizable terms, “titular” and “indigenous.” In Melilla, I identify the political homelands of “Spanishness” and “Amazighness” (or, “Berberness”), or to again use generalizable terms, “titular” and “autochthonous.” By drawing such dis- tinctions in political homelands, I mean to underscore the impact of double-colonization: in Melilla more so than in Ceuta, Muslims residents are tied to shared political memories of autochtony and being colonized by, first, invading Arab armies and settlers, and second, French colonizers and post-colonial pan-Arab nationalists. This dissimilarity in political homelands helps to produce different conceptualizations of being “Christian” and “Muslim” across the cities. The prevailing indigenous political homeland among Muslims in Ceuta helps to generate a “cultural identity” understanding of the Muslim category, which is more easily nested within the dominant Spanish category and reconciled with the Spanish nation state through its multicultural institutions. In contrast, the “national identity” understanding of the Muslim category in Melilla is less easily reconciled with other categories, as well as the nation state. These differing identities result in dissimilar behaviors when activated in specific contexts, such as the dominant “cultural identity” for Muslims in Ceuta leading to higher levels of Spanish citizenship and the dominant “national identity” for Muslims in Melilla leading to lower levels of Spanish citizenship. I evaluate my argument in the final part of the dissertation through an ecological in- ference analysis of the cities’ two most recent local elections, occurring in 2007 and 2011. Supporting the notion that a “cultural identity,” with its weaker ethnic boundaries, is preva- lent among Muslims in Ceuta, I estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Ceuta vote across ethnic lines—and for the mainstream center-right party— at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Melilla. In support of the argument that a “national identity,” with its stronger ethnic boundaries, is prevalent among Mus- lims in Melilla, I estimate that residents of census tracts with large Muslim populations in Melilla vote for the local party “of Muslim persuasion” at significantly higher rates than their compatriots in Ceuta. These findings are further bolstered using a second indicator: electoral volatility, a marker of more fluid ethnic boundaries, has been higher in Ceuta than in Melilla since the cities have become self-governing. This project provides several contributions to the study of ethnicity, ethnic politics, and Islam in Europe. To take one example, it stresses that ethnicity and nationality are not interchangeable, and that “ethnic groups” are not homogenous. This challenges the widespread use of nationality and ethnicity in the migration, ethnic studies, and political science literature. More generally, however, the project as a whole offers a detailed model of how research can approach ethnic politics when ethnicities are constructed and fluid, as is the case with today’s Muslim residents of Europe. Contents List of Figures xiv List of Tables xvi Acknowledgements xvii 1 Introduction2 1.1 Reflections on Ceuta and Melilla ........................ 2 1.1.1 Impressions from Ceuta ......................... 3 1.1.2 Impressions from Melilla......................... 6 1.1.3 Possible reasons for variation ...................... 8 1.1.4 A local explanation............................ 12 1.2 Terms, concepts, and meanings......................... 13 1.2.1 Enclave or Exclave? ........................... 14 1.2.2 The Maghreb or North Africa? ..................... 14 1.2.3 Arab, Berber, or Amazigh? ....................... 15 1.2.4 Spaniards, Europeans, Christians, or christianos?........... 18 1.2.5 Moroccans, North Africans, Muslims, or musulmanes? . 19 1.2.6 Immigrants or natives?.......................... 20 1.2.7 Groups or groupness? Or, what is the explanandum?......... 21 Approaches to studying identity and ethnicity............. 22 Groupness and the combinatorial approach .............. 25 1.3 Guiding questions and outline of the dissertation ............... 28 1.3.1 Chapter Two, “Citizenship: Ethnic Practice and Identities” . 28 1.3.2 Chapter Three, “History, Power, and Ethnic Categories in the Exclaves” ................................. 30 vi 1.3.3 Chapter Four, “The Politics of Autochthony: Ethnic Parties and Vot- ing Across Categories”.......................... 31 1.4 Conclusion..................................... 32 2 Citizenship: Ethnic Practice and Identities 34 2.1 Introduction.................................... 34 2.2 Citizenship as ethnic practice.......................... 36 2.3 Citizenship in the Exclaves ........................... 40 2.4 Ceuta and Melilla................................. 42 2.5 Data and measures ............................... 45 2.5.1 Citizenship ................................ 46 2.5.2 Place of birth............................... 46 2.5.3 Other measures.............................. 47 2.5.4 Covariates................................. 48 Educational attainment ......................... 49 Residency patterns of Muslims ..................... 50 2.6 Method ...................................... 51 2.6.1 Estimating citizenship and place of birth................ 51 2.6.2 Estimating citizenship and place of birth, considering age . 52 2.6.3 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering age and gender................................... 55 2.6.4 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering educational at- tainment.................................. 57 2.6.5 Estimating citizenship by place of birth, considering ethnicity . 57 2.6.6 The EI method.............................. 57 2.7 Results....................................... 58 2.7.1 Citizenship of Residents......................... 59 2.7.2 Citizenship and Gender ......................... 62 2.7.3 Variation within Ceuta and Melilla................... 63 2.7.4 Citizenship, ethnicity, and education.................. 65 2.7.5 Summary of findings........................... 75 2.8 Alternative explanations: economic incentives................. 76 vii 2.9 Discussion and conclusion............................ 77 3 History, Power, and Ethnic Categories in the Exclaves 81 3.1 Introduction.................................... 81 3.2 Ethnic structure ................................. 85 3.2.1 Descent-based attributes......................... 85 3.2.2 Repertoire of attributes for a population................ 87 3.3 Being titular, indigenous, or autochthonous .................. 91 3.3.1 Why power and autochthony matter.................. 95 3.3.2 Examples of indigenous and autochthonous political homelands . 101 3.3.3 Summary ................................. 105 3.4 Constructing ethnic identity categories..................... 106 3.4.1 The population repertoire........................ 106 3.4.2 Individual repertoires .......................... 108 3.4.3 Ethnic change............................... 114 3.5 Ethnic practice.................................. 117 3.5.1 The activation of categories....................... 117 3.5.2 Outcomes................................. 119 3.6 Conclusion and implications........................... 123 3.6.1 Conclusions................................ 123 3.6.2 Implications................................ 126 4 The Politics of Autochthony: Ethnic Parties and Voting Across Cat- egories 129 4.1 Introduction.................................... 129 4.2 Ethnic politics .................................. 132 4.2.1 Intersections of ethnicity and politics.................. 132 4.2.2 Ethnicity in Ceuta and Melilla ..................... 135 4.2.3 Hypotheses ................................ 139 4.3 The political landscape
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