Hansard of Oral Evidence
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T Y N W A L D C O U R T O F F I C I A L R E P O R T R E C O R T Y S O I K O I L Q U A I Y L T I N V A A L P R O C E E D I N G S D A A L T Y N (HANSARD) S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E O F T Y N W A L D O N K A U P T H I N G S I N G E R & F R I E D L A N D E R ( I S L E O F M A N ) L I M I T E D A N D T H E D E P O S I T O R S ’ C O M P E N S A T I O N S C H E M E B I N G E R - L H E H T I N V A A L M Y C H I O N E K A U P T H I N G S I N G E R & F R I E D L A N D E R ( I S L E O F M A N ) L I M I T E D A S Y S K E I M S O N K E R R A G H E Y C O A Y L F I R - V A I H A R G I D Douglas, Thursday, 2nd December 2010 All published Official Reports can be found on the Tynwald website www.tynwald.org.im Official Papers/Hansards/Please select a year: Reports, maps and other documents referred to in the course of debates may be consulted upon application to the Tynwald Library or the Clerk of Tynwald’s Office. PP07/11 TKSF, No. 8 Published by the Office of the Clerk of Tynwald, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas, Isle of Man, IM1 3PW. © Court of Tynwald, 2011 SELECT COMMITTEE, THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 2010 Members Present: Chairman: Mr J P Watterson, MHK Mr A Crowe, MLC Mr J R Houghton, MHK Clerk: Mr R I S Phillips, Clerk of Tynwald BUSINESS TRANSACTED Page Procedural ............................................................................................................................................255 Evidence of Mr J Aspden, Chief Executive, Financial Supervision Commission ..................255 Procedural ............................................................................................................................................270 The Court adjourned at 3.50 p.m. _________________________________________________________________ 254 TKSF SELECT COMMITTEE, THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 2010 Select Committee of Tynwald on Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander and the Depositors’ Compensation Scheme The Committee sat in public at 2.30 p.m. in the Legislative Council Chamber, Legislative Buildings, Douglas [MR WATTERSON in the Chair] Procedural The Chairman (Mr Watterson): Welcome, everybody, to the oral evidence session of the Select Committee on Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander. As we all know, the Select Committee was appointed on 16th July 2009 to investigate and report on the cause of the collapse of Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) Ltd; the role of the FSC in ensuring the proper management of 5 KSF (Isle of Man) Ltd to protect depositors’ funds; the credibility of the Depositors’ Compensation Scheme; and any other relevant matter; and report back by March 2010. The Committee has reported on the first two parts of its remit, and is now concentrating on the credibility of the Depositors’ Compensation Scheme, and any other relevant matter. Parts of its inquiries will focus on the action taken to try and save Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd. 10 Today, we have Mr John Aspden, Chief Executive of the Financial Supervision Commission, and further evidence sessions will take place later. Unfortunately, Mrs Downes has been unable to join us today on behalf of the Depositors’ Action Group, due to the adverse weather conditions. It is anticipated, but not certain, that she will join us at our next evidence session on 10th December. In case anybody is not aware of the members of the Committee: from my far left, rather 15 ironically, John Houghton MHK; the Clerk, Roger Phillips; and to my right, Alan Crowe, MLC. I am Juan Watterson, MHK, Chairman. EVIDENCE OF MR J ASPDEN Q1137. The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Aspden, for joining us today. Do you have any opening remarks to make, before we start on some questions? 20 Mr Aspden: Not really, Chairman. You kindly sent a request, back in August, for a submission from us, so we put in about a four page document on that, answering some of the key questions that you put at that time. I think that is fairly complete from our side, so I am happy to rest with that as an opener. 25 Q1138. The Chairman: Thank you very much. You will recall that we finished the last part of our enquiry at the eve of the collapse of Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander so, picking up the story at that point, those transcripts indicate that there was a view in the FSC and elsewhere that a straightforward liquidation might not be appropriate in the case of KSF. Can I ask you when plans for the potential recovery of KSF were 30 prepared and who was involved with that? Mr Aspden: Right. I am just interested in your opening remarks about the fact that there was ‘a view’ that liquidation might not be the most appropriate. I think, looking back, or thinking back, to that time, on the evening of the 8th, by which time, 35 of course, the UK bank had already gone into administration, when we actually sat in the office, as it were, on the evening of the 8th, deciding on courses of action and so forth, at that stage, of course, we were dealing with a situation that presented itself in front of us. We had not really had _________________________________________________________________ 255 TKSF SELECT COMMITTEE, THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 2010 the opportunity to look at any wider alternatives, at that stage. We certainly had not had the opportunity to take any substantial legal external advice, apart from who was with me at the time. 40 So I have to say, at the initial outset, as at that evening on the 8th, we were really looking probably not much further, at that stage, than submitting to the court – jointly, of course – for the appointment of a liquidator provisional, if only as a holding position. Now, of course, after that – and we can discuss this further – more people became involved, advisers were appointed, and then all the wider options started to emerge; but at the first stage, at 45 that very early stage, we were thinking, on that evening, really no further than how we were to respond to what had happened in London – because that is, after all, where a large part of the Isle of Man’s bank’s – the KSF (IOM) deposits – were, and how we should respond to that. I think, at that stage, we really felt no further than the fact that a liquidator provisional would be the best initial way of holding the situation. 50 The Chairman: Okay. Q1139. Mr Crowe: Can I just ask Mr Aspden, on the evening of the 8th, who was actually present for these discussions? 55 Mr Aspden: Well, through you, Chairman, basically I was there the entire time and then I had various people with me from time to time. This included a legal adviser from Callin Wild. It included a number of senior colleagues in the office, but that was really it. We made one or two additional phone calls but, in terms of personalities, that is who was there. 60 Q1140. Mr Crowe: You did not have Bank directors with you? Mr Aspden: We had no Bank directors with us. Now what we did do is, in the course of that evening, we needed to put through two or three 65 phone calls. We had two or three telephone exchanges with the Bank directors… well, in fact, it was not the Bank directors, I think it was their legal adviser in the room at the time. At any rate, one or other, but we did have some conversations on the telephone with them, because the issue at that stage was: would it be the Commission that petitioned the court or would it be a joint petition by the Commission and the directors of the Bank? So there were discussions but they were 70 primarily around that subject. Q1141. The Chairman: Can I ask you, at this point, why it was felt that joint submission would be better; why the FSC would be involved as part of the submission for a liquidator provisional, as opposed to just the directors putting in a winding up…? 75 Mr Aspden: I think it was a very important decision of ours that, considering we were actually making a regulatory response to what was happening, it was pretty fundamental for us that we needed to, at the very least, be a joint petitioner. 80 Q1142. The Chairman: So, when was an early view established that a sale of all or part of the business might be feasible, and was this something that you had a view on at that early stage? Mr Aspden: This, Chairman, is not something that we, on our own, had a particular view on. I think as you, of course, will know yourself, liquidations of banks are highly complex and, in 85 particular, the reason they are highly complex is because, when one liquidates a bank, typically one is unwinding a lot of counter-party transactions, a lot of secure transactions and a lot of arrangements with third parties.