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Operation Castle Summary Report of the Commander, Task Unit 13

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Operation Castle Summary Report of the Commander, Task Unit 13 WT-934 (EX) EXTRACTED VERSION OPERATION CASTLE 410201 Summary Report of the Commander, Task Unit 13 Military Effects, Programs 1-9 Pacific Proving Grounds March – May 1954 Headquarters Field Command Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico January 30, 1959 NOTICE This isan extractof WT-934, OperationCASTLE, Summarv ,. ReDort of the Commander, Task Unit 13, which remains classifiedSECRET/RESTRICTED DATA as of thisdate. Extractversionprepared for: Director DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20305 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 15 May 1981 ---- .—— ——. ..— — —. —-——. READ INSTRUCTIONS – — REPORT DOCUKEHTATION PAGE BEFORE COk\PLETING FOR~ .— .— _ . REI>ORT 14UMBCR ]1 GOVT AC CC!\l OM HO i. FItCIPICMT”S CATALOc NUMBER WT-934 (EX) ———. ~ I ——— — lIILZ (-d =bffff~) S. TYPE OF RCPORT A PERIOOCOVERCO Operation CASTLE Sumnary Report of the Commander, Task Unit 13 - Military Effects, Programs 1-9 t. PERJORUIMG ORG. RiIPORT NUMBER WT-934 (EX) AUTHOR(*) ● . C9MTRACT OR CRAHT NUMmc~.J K. D. Coleman, Col. USAF, et al —— ~–PfRf=:U===RGAH IZATIOM NAME ANDAoo_Es~ 10. PROGRAM ELEuEMT.PROJCCT~T ASK Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, AREA t WORK UNIT MUKSERS Weapons Effects Tests —— 1. COUTROLLIWG OfFICE 14AuE A~D AOORESS 12. REPORT OATE Headquarters, Field Command January 30, 1959 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project II,NUMBEROF PAGES Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico ._——— — 14.}40?41To RI14G AGENCY NAME h AODRESS (If d: ff. r.nl l,om Con fro fI/n# Of f;..) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of fhl, ,.porfJ OECI_ASSIFICATIOH/DOWH GRAOING ._— —— = OISTRIBUTIOM s7ATEMEMT f~ff~f~ R*pOro S Approved for public release; unlimited distribution” —. la. SUPPLEKL14TAR$ NOTES This report has had the classified information removed and has been republished in unclassified form for public release. This work was performed by Kaman Tempo under contract DNAO01-79-C-0455 with the close cooperation of the Classification Management Division of the Defense Nuclear Agency. l!. KEY wORDS (Cc. nf; nu - o“ ,., .,,. id. ifne-CC.t.7 md Idsnflfy by ~rock ~u~~*r~ Operation CASTLE Multimegaton Air Blast Military Effects Radiation Exposure Shock Parameters Blast Damage Initial Neutron Gamma Radiation —. _—— —— .—— — _— 0. AC ST RACT (cmll”i,. .- ,. ..!,. .;4. If n.. ..ry ●“d Jd. nf, fy by t!ock r.”-~-~) Operation Castle consisted of six nuclear detonations at the Eniwetok Proving Ground during the period 1 March to 14 May 1954. Two were surface or near-surface land shots: one on a natural island and the other on a man-madeisland at the end of a causeway. The other four shots were fired on barges: two anchored in reef craters from previous shots and the other two anchored in the lagoon proper. The Department of Defense (DOD) military-effect program consisted of 37 projects divided among six planned programs and one program (biomedical) added in the field; in addition, one Los Alamos Scientific LASL) program (thermal radiation) was —.—concerned with an area of mllltary-e\$&%%!!st. _—. —.— .-c mnM ---- In general, the principal objectives of the military-effect programs were realized. The numerous changes in shot schedules together with the repeated delays due to unfavorable weather forced many revisions and last- minute improvisations in many projects’ plans. For some-notably those concerned with documenting fallout-much information was thereby lost; for other projects, such as those involving effects on aircraft, the repeated delays allowed completion of necessary maintenance between shots and resulted in almost 100-percent participation. Despite uncertain yields and delays, the blast program obtained a considerable amount of worthwhile data and achieved its objectives. Wave forms from the surface gages were nonideal in shape for both overpressure and dynamic pressure and demonstrated that water is not an ideal surface- it sometimes had been presumed to be ideal. Precursors as such were not detected. The uncertainly of the free-air data did not permit any definite conclusions regarding the effects of a nonhomogeneous atmosphere on the blast wave. Data from a megaton burst over a shallow water layer indicated that except for theclos.+in region, underwater pressures are of comparable magnitude to the direct air-blast overpressures at the same range. In contrast to results from Operation Ivy, studies at Castle indicated that surface water waves do emanate from the central region of the detonation and that refraction and reflection against reefs and shores can significantly affect their destructive capability. In the nuclear-radiation and fallout program, the unexpectedly high yield of Shot 1 caused destruction of much of the spare equipment on Site Tare, curtailing instrumentation on future shots; however, the important military significance of fallout over large areas beyond the blast- and thermal-damage envelopes was demonstrated dramatically. The realization that activity dissolved in sea water could be a measure of the fallout intensity provided the impetus for the water and aerial surveys that provided valuable data after Shots 5 and 6. In the blast-effect program, the instrumented, rigid concrete cubicle was exposed to a blast intensity from Shot 3 of only about a tenth of that predicted. Although the specific objective of that particular project was not accomplished, an evaluation of the blast-loading data therefrom made by Sandia Corporation showed that two loading-prediction procedures were reasonably good. The documentation of air-blast effects on miscellaneous structures was an unplanned project of opportunity-one initiated because of the damaging, unexpectedly high yield of Shot 1. Crater size data was obtained as planned, increasing considerably the reliability in predictions of craters produced by megaton weapons. Despite unexpected deviations from predicted yields for Shots 1 and 3, breakage data and other results on damage to natural tree stands were obtained. The underwater minefield-121 mines of various types set 180 feet deep and exposed to a 7.0 Mt surface detonation-gave data on the extent of neutralization of these mines by the detonation. Extensive data was obtained in the biomedical study of the individuals acciently exposed to significant amounts of fallout radiation. Total gamma dosages up to 182 r were received and produced the physical effects expected. The actual yield of Shot 1 was approximately 25 percent greater than the positioning yield used for the effects studies on aircraft in flight. An overpressure of 0.81 psi was recorded on the B-36; damage to the B-36 necessitated replacement of the bomb-bay doors, aft lower Plexiglas blisters, and the radar-antenna radome. The specific techniques used during Castle to predict thermal inputs and responses were inadequate for accurate, close positioning of the aircraft. The procedures utilized to predict blast effects at overpressures less than 1.0 psi were satisfactory. In general, good correlation was obtained between measured and predicted values. Results of contamination-decontamination studies with the two remote- controlled ships (YAG-39 and YAG-40) indicated that washdown effectiveness based upon the reduction of accumulated gamma dose averaged approximately 90 percent. Measured shielding factors on the YAG-40 were between 0.1 and 0.2 between the second and upper deck and varied from 0.03 and 0.05 between the upper deck and the hold. Results of the Strategic Air Command’s evaluation of interim indirect- bomb-damage assessment (IBDA) procedures indicated that current equipment and operating techniques were adequate. Scope photographs showed the typical horseshoe-shaped configuration during the early moments following time zero. The location of ground zero was established within an accuracy of 600 to 1,100 feet by determining the center of curvature for the horseshoe configuration. Computation of yields proved inaccurate. In the studies of the effects on the ionosphere, it was observed at the Parry Island ionosphere recorder that severe absorption occurred for several hours following all megaton shots. It appears that the duration of the disturbances was related in some manner to the yield of the device and was about inversely proportional to the distance. In the investigation of the problem of long-range detection of nuclear explosions, azimuthal errors with ~3 degrees were experienced in locating the source by utilizing the electromagnetic effects. Reception and identifica- tion of detonation pulses when the time of detonation was known to a milli- second were relatively easy; however, to do the same thing on a 24-hour basis with the detonation time unknown would have been much more difficult. It was found that more information is needed on techniques of discrimination. There appeared to be an approximate relationship between yield and the frequency at which peak energy occurs. The photography program obtained data that was more complete and accurate than any obtained on previous operations. Good measurements of cloud height and diameter over a 10-minute interval were compiled for the five shots photographed. FOREWORD This report has had classified material removed in order to make the information available on an unclassified, open publication basis, to any interested parties. This effort to declassify this report has been accomplished specifically to support the Department of Defense Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Program. The objective is to facilitate studies of the low levels of radiation received by some individuals during the atmospheric nuclear test program by making as much information as possible available to all interested parties. The material which has been deleted is all currently classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (as amended) or is National Security Information. This report has been reproduced directly from available copies of the original material. The locations from which material has been deleted is generally obvious by the spacings and “holes” in the text. Thus the context of the material deleted is identified to assist the reader in the determination of whether the deleted information is germane to his study.
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