Undoing Homogeneity in the Nordic Region; Migration, Difference, and the Politics of Solidarity; First Edition
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9 From welfare to warfare Exploring the militarisation of the Swedish suburb Suruchi Thapar-Björkert, Irene Molina and Karina Raña Villacura It is not my most immediate measure to send in the military, but I’m prepared to do what it takes to ensure that serious organised crime goes away. (Stefan Löfven, Swedish Prime Minister, to TT News Agency [Jakobson 2018]) Introduction The 2013 ‘suburban riots’ which were triggered by the police (SWAT) shooting of Lenine Relvas-Martins, a 69-year-old man in the Stockholm suburb of Husby, brought debates on social polarisation, segregation, and gentrification to centre stage, as well as highlighting the role of state functionaries in contributing to vio- lence. In the debates that followed, it became evident that the suburban areas of the Million Programme (including Husby) were specifically framed as an “anti-social and uncivilised [criminal] spatiality” (Ericsson et al. 2000, pp. 28, 29), and its resi- dents as “violent political subjects” (de los Reyes 2016, pp. 164, 166). In fact, these areas were stigmatised from the moment the new housing development programme was launched by the Social Democrats at the beginning of the sixties, as a key project within the Swedish welfare state model. While the aim was to construct one million dwellings nationwide, located mostly in the Swedish cities’ periphery, the sixties’ fear of modern urbanism in Sweden (Molina 1997) accelerated the raciali- sation of these areas by the media, framing them as non-Swedish, less civilized, and more dangerous than other urban neighbourhoods (Ericsson et al. 2000). A 2014 police report—‘A national overview of criminal networks that have a major impact within local communities’ (Rikskriminalpolisen 2014)—put forward the Swedish police’s identification of 55 areas (all part of the Million Programme) in which they considered local criminal networks to have a major negative impact on local spaces and communities. The report—which is devoid of any local perspectives—frames the suburbs through representa- tions of criminality and vulnerability. There is also an unexplained assertion of the existence of “parallel” societies with associated implications of self- segregation, isolationism, and failing citizens (Grundström and Molina 2016; also see Rikskriminalpolisen 2015). A 2015 follow-up report called ‘Vulner- able areas—social risks, collective ability and undesired events’, emphasises criminal vulnerability (associated mainly with violence and open drug 142 Thapar-Björkert, Molina, and Villacura dealings) and “criminal energy” (2015, p. 21), suggesting it be managed by a “high police presence” and “hotspot patrolling” in selected areas (Rikskrimi- nalpolisen 2015, p. 23)1. Associating these “vulnerable” areas (Rikskriminalpolisen 2015) with being controlled by criminals, and as spaces in which law and order needs to be re-established, becomes a “rallying slogan based on a fantasy of danger as well as reconquest, the image of danger magnifying the courage of those who face it, and that of reconquest justifying the action aimed at realizing it” (Fassin 2013, p. 37). In this regard, such a fantasy is propelled by the role assigned to disciplinary authorities (police, penal system, intelligence) as legitimate interpreters of social reality, and which has—in the post Keynesian global era—led to the “upsizing” of the penal sector at the cost of “downsizing” of the welfare sector (Wacquant 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, several government initiatives (in close collaboration with local councils, real-estate establishments, the District Administration Office (Stadsdelsförvaltingen), and the police) have been foregrounded in the Järva region, in the North West of Stockholm;2 a) installation of a “sound scare” system (SVT 25 November, 2016), initially in two of the neighbourhoods in the Järva region (Tensta and Husby), arguably to keep drug dealers at bay; b) the potential creation of “zones of frisking” (Tronarp 2017); c) strengthening surveillance through microphones and body cameras (Stockholm Direkt 2017); and d) bolstering the presence of police numbers with private security guards patrolling the region (Rin- keby-Kista Stadsdelsförvaltning 2017). These proposals are closely rela- ted to similar developments in other Nordic countries, for example, the recent 2017 decision made by the Danish government on the deployment of military forces to patrol borders and special places such as synagogues (Bülow 2017), in order to release police forces to combat gangs and organised crime in the cities (Rasmusson 2017). In this chapter, we argue that the suburban landscape is steadily being shaped through a shift in political discourse—from welfare to warfare—lead- ing to a steady militarisation of the suburbs. A central theme that governs this process is the monitoring and management of ‘problem’ ethnic collectives and urban peripheries that adhere to an “alternate social order” through dis- ciplinary regimes, and different forms of (im)mobilisation such as racial, ethnic, and religious profiling; identity controls; and draconian immigration laws (see Polisen 2017). Thus, processes of militarisation operate in tandem with practices and processes of securitisation, which entails the “production of security and security-related technologies and assemblages at various [socio-spatial] scales” (Low 2017, p. 367; Gluck and Low 2017). We extend this idea to argue that these modalities of security/insecurity in racialised residential areas inadvertently create a culture of impunity,3 which can be analysed through the lens of structural violence. Structural violence is ren- dered invisible as it is “perceived” as the status quo, but “experienced” (see Militarisation of the Swedish suburb 143 Price 2012) as stigmatisation; assaults on dignity and integrity; and the steady erosion of individual agency. Our arguments draw on in-depth interviews conducted during four months of intensive qualitative fieldwork in the Järva region in Stockholm, in 2018, by co- author Karina Raña Villacura. The respondents were identified through the snowball method, initiated through our contact with Husby Träff, a civil society organisation. We also accessed several other networks, which enabled us to have a more heterogeneous selection of respondents. The key actors were six official representatives from local authorities: the local housing company (1), the Police (3), the municipal Library (1), and the local administration office (1); five mem- bers of civil society organisations (Forörten I Centrum, Husby Träff,Rädda Barnen, Förorten mot Våld, Reactor); and 13 local residents. The interviews were taped, transcribed, and codified with the aid of the Atlas.ti software. The interviews were coded in relation to the main theoretical aims of the project, and its subsequent interview questionnaire. The main themes emerged from an ana- lysis of the interview data through a “grounded theory approach” (Strauss and Corbin 1999). To maintain anonymity, our respondents have been coded as: O– from an Organisation, L–local resident, and AO–Authorities/Officials working in the suburbs. Working in the field presented some methodological challenges, due to the current climate of fear and suspicion, which has been shaped through ongoing processes of racialisation and objectification (Patel 2012; De Leeuw, Cameron and Greenwood 2012). The interview material was analysed together with a total of ten articles in broadsheet and local newspapers,4 and seven official reports. Using interpretive content analysis, we identified both the “latent” (implicit) and “manifest” (literal) meanings in the texts (Krippendorff 2013). In addition, field notes were kept—these observations, experiences, and conversa- tions further informed our qualitative enquiry. They served to describe situations and make sense of them during the analysis stage. Globalisation of urban militarisation Scholars’ interest in the general relationship between militarism and welfare can be traced to the 1920s and 1930s, when the warfare industry was a central source of income for the national economy of the United States (Eisner 2000). Wehrle (2003) writes on the same matter, indicating that warfare more or less financed welfare, but as Gilmore (1998) notes, pressures from the capitalist class to minimise their contribution to social expenditures and welfare through taxes, marked the final shift at the end of the sixties: “With dimin- ishing options for a social Keynesian spending program, the mainstream of organized labor embraced military Keynesianism” (Wehrle 2003, p. 527). Gilmore (2007, p. 78) refers to the political–economic changes of the Amer- ican Keynesian state as a shift from the Keynesian “workfare”5 state to the Keynesian militarised “warfare” state. In the case of the US at that time, we have observed a circular sequence of transformations, from warfare to wel- fare, and back to warfare. This sequence of transformations seems to be 144 Thapar-Björkert, Molina, and Villacura applicable to the Swedish context, though from a different perspective. In Sweden, the military industry has supported a welfare system that was for- tified after the Second World War, through generating an income for the national Treasury (Glimell 2012); in other words, welfare provision has been sustained by warfare. In spite of the obvious differences between the two countries, these examples from the US and Sweden reveal that the relation- ship between welfare and militarism can transform and shift in different manners at different points in time, which reinforces Gilmore’s