ERIN MACDONALD -And

File Number: 34914

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL)

BETWEEN:

ERIN MACDONALD

APPELLANT/RESPONDENT (Appellant) -and-

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (NOV A SCOTIA)

RESPONDENT/APPELLANT (Respondent) -and-

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

INTERVENERS

FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (Pursuant to Rules 37 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

Public Prosecution Service of Canada Brian Saunders Atlantic Regional Office Director of Public Prosecutions Suite 1400 Duke Tower East Memorial Building, 2nd Floor 5251 Duke Street 284 Wellington Street Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 1P3 Ottawa, Ontario (per: James C. Martin and KIA OH8 Ann Marie Simmons) (per: Fran<;ois Lacasse) Tel.: (902) 426-2484 Tel.: (613) 957-4770 Fax: (902) 426-1351 Fax: (613) 941-7865 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener William D. Delaney, Q. C and Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Jennifer A. MacLellan Public Prosecution Service of Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Nova Scotia Barristers and Solicitors 1505 Barrington Street, Suite 1225 2600 - 160 Elgin Street Halifax, NS B3J 3K5 Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3 Tel. (902) 424-6795 Tel. (613) 232-1781 Fax (902) 424-0653 Fax (613) 563-9869 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellant Ottawa Agent for the Appellant

Hersh Wolch, Q.C. Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Wolch Dewit Silverberg & Watts Burke-Robertson Barristers and Solicitors 70 Gloucester Street 633-6th Avenue S.W., Suite 1500 Ottawa, ON K2P OA2 Calgary, AB T2P 2Y5 Tel. (613) 566-2058 Tel. ( 403) 265-6500 Fax (613) 235-4430 Fax (403) 263-1111 E-mail: E-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent Ottawa Agent for the Respondent

John C. Pearson and Michelle Campbell Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Attorney General of Ontario Burke-Robertson 720 Bay Street, 1Oth Floor 70 Gloucester Street Toronto, ON M5G 2K1 Ottawa, ON K2P OA2 Tel.: (416) 326-4600 Tel. (613) 566-2058 Fax: (416) 326-4656 Fax (613) 235-4430 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario Attorney General of Ontario Table of Contents

Page Number

PART I OVERVIEW and STATEMENT OF FACTS 1

1 i. Non-Investigative Safety Searches ii. Fault Element of the s. 95 Offence 1

PART II ISSUES 1

PART III ARGUMENT 2

A. Non-Investigative Safety Searches 2

i. Ancillary Powers Doctrine in Waterfield 4

ii. The Appropriate Constitutional Standard 7

B. Fault Element of the s. 95 Offence 9

PART IV COSTS 10

PARTV REQUEST TO MAKE ORAL ARGUMENT 10

PART VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 12

PART VII STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES 14 1

PART I- OVERVIEW and STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Non-Investigative Safety Searches 1. At issue is whether the police can lawfully enter private places to respond to a reasonably perceived threat to officer safety when there is no pre-existing intention to collect evidence or effect an arrest. 2. For the same policy reasons articulated by this Court in Godoy1 and Clayton,2 the police must be permitted to respond to danger, including officer safety. Such conduct is not a violation of s. 8 of the Charter where the response is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. This authority, found in Waterfield, is consistent with the exigent circumstances doctrine for criminal investigations, addresses the need for officer safety, and provides proper protection against unreasonable exercise of police powers. 3. Consistent with Godoy, the appropriate standard of review is whether the police response was objectively necessary and reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. In the alternative, if an evidentiary test is required, the reasonable suspicion standard achieves the proper balance between privacy and state interests. n. Fault Element of the s. 95 Offence 4. The Crown is required to prove an accused's subjective knowledge of the law only when that knowledge is a statutorily defined element of the offence. Requiring proof of an accused's knowledge of licencing conditions imposes an impossible burden on the Crown. Recognition of this difficulty is reflected in the unavailability of the ignorance of the law defence. Potential penal consequences should not inform the interpretation of the fault elements in a non-constitutional context. Proof that an accused knows the legal limits of the authorizing conditions is not an element of the s.95 offence. 5. The Director of Public Prosecutions accepts the facts as stated by the parties and takes no position on any factual disputes between the parties. PART II - ISSUES 6. The Director of Public Prosecutions intervenes to address two questions: 1) is there an independent common law authority to enter private places when officer safety is at risk, and if so, when can that authority be exercised; and 2) is the Crown required to establish

1 R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311. 2 R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725. 2

an accused's "complete, specific, subjective knowledge" of the licencing conditions to obtain a conviction for possession of a loaded firearm under s.95 of the Criminal Code? PART III- ARGUMENT A. Non-Investigative Safety Searches 7. Even a routine noise complaint can endanger the life of a police officer. This is but one example where police are required to respond to danger that is initially devoid of criminal law elements. Evidence of criminal conduct may be discovered in private places during such responses. Police powers must reflect this reality. Here, assuming the conduct at issue is a search, it was not unreasonable and did not violate s.8 Charter protections. 8. Canadian courts have recognized that a search will not be unreasonable under s.8 when the search occurs in response to a true emergency. Specifically, this Court in R. v. Godoy accepted that, in the context of911 calls, police have a duty to enter a private residence to properly investigate an "unknown trouble call". In Godoy there was no evidence of a crime prior to entry into the home, only an incomplete call for help. The issue in this case is an adjunct of the 911 situation where instead of a cry for help directed to a formalized response system, the danger unfolded during the exercise of routine police duties. Such situations require the same judicial response: these entries are constitutional. 9. Exigent circumstance exceptions, including officer safety, have long been incorporated into the law of search and arrest. This Court recognized early in its development of s. 8 jurisprudence that the demands of urgent police response cannot be assessed against the same constitutional standard as non-urgent police response. This is reflected in the often repeated admonition in Hunter v. Southam, that "where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, ... such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure ... ".3 Exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit, are well established exceptions to the warrant requirement to enter to effect an arrest,4 and to the knock and announce rule to execute a search warrant. 5 10. Subsequently, Parliament codified these constitutional mandates in several investigative provisions. For example, there are statutory exigent circumstance exceptions to search

3 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, p. 161. In R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, the warrantless search power in the former Narcotic Control Act was declared unconstitutional on this basis unless exigent circumstances made it impracticable to obtain one. 4 R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, p. 17. 5 R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142. 3

warrant requirements in the Criminal Code,6 under the Controlled Drugs and Substances AcP and in regulatory legislation.8 For arrest, there is an exigent exception to the warrant requirement to enter a dwelling.9 Recently this Court in R. v. Tse 10 recognized that Parliament could enact a provision that allows, without judicial pre-authorization, the interception of private communications where the police believe on reasonable grounds that the interception "is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any person or to property". The present constitutional limits relating to the use of sniffer dogs may be relaxed where the circumstances involve "explosives, guns or other public safety concems."11 11. But for Godoy, these exceptions apply in the context of focused criminal investigations where the pre-conditions for a warrant exist, but the inability to obtain the warrant before destruction of evidence or prevention of harm obviates the warrant requirement. Where there is no "arrestable" offence, the Feeney hot pursuit exception will not apply. 12. The common law authorizes officer safety searches when exercising certain police powers. Safety searches are authorized during investigative detention, 12 as incidental to arrest, 13 and while executing a search warrant. 14 13. But there is no statutory provision authorizing a safety search when police are only responding to danger, including police safety. 15 Indeed the police may be engaged in a criminal investigation but must react to danger despite an absence of sufficient grounds to execute a search or arrest. Any ensuing prosecution may result in a challenge to the police authority to enter, arrest, view, seize or include information gathered as grounds in a subsequent warrant application. 16

6 Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c. C-46, s. 487.11. 7 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c.19, as amended, s. 11(7). 8 See Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 49.1(3), and Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c.33, s. 220(4). 9 Criminal Code, supra, s. 529.3. 10 R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, in reference to s. 184.4 ofthe Criminal Code. The provision was determined to be unconstitutional but only to the extent that it lacked a notice requirement. II R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 sec 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, para. 18,per Binnie J. 12 R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; see also R. v. Plummer, 2011 ONCA 350. 13 Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158. 14 R. v. Chuhaniuk, 2010 BCCA 403, para. 55. 15The various declared states of emergency under the Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.) would not apply to the contexts described here, nor would similar provincial legislation. 16 There are also potential civil consequences for unlawful arrest and trespass.

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14. Outside of the 911 context, this Court has not identified a non-investigative search power in the post-Charter era. However there is significant support for it in this Court's comments regarding the police duty to respond to danger and protect the public in the criminal investigation context. It would seem odd indeed if the police had the authority to search without warrant to secure evidence or respond to a 911 cry for help, but not to push open a door to assess a reasonably perceived threat of a concealed weapon. 15. Three courts of appeal, 17 and the majority below, have recognized the existence of an authority for police to search without warrant, or requisite grounds, where reasonably necessary. Since Godoy, appeal courts have applied its reasoning and the ancillary powers doctrine in R. v. Waterfield. 18 Courts then proceed to determine whether on the facts of each case, the power was properly exercised. These cases reflect the reality that police must be able to exercise a limited common law power to reasonably react to danger. 16. Urgent circumstances justified entry into an apartment to secure weapons and ensure public safety (R. v. Golub and R. v. Farrah), entry to search for injured persons inside a potential active illicit drug lab (R. v. Jamieson), and accompanying a woman involved in a domestic violence incident into a residence to retrieve her belongings (R. v. Sanderson). Authority to enter was found to exist but not lawfully exercised when police belatedly entered to investigate a home invasion (R. v. Larson) and unnecessarily searched a knapsack in response to a 911 call involving weapons (R. v. Kelsy). Each case was a fact driven application of the exercise of a reasonably necessary search power. i. Ancillary Powers Doctrine in Waterfield 17. Since R. v. Stenning19 in 1970, this Court has utilized the Waterfield paradigm to gauge non-statutory police power. Waterfield was applied in Stenning to determine if police could enter a car dealership where they found a man outside beaten and received reports

17 R. v. Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.) applying exigent exception in Feeney, supra, to justify the search; R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605; R. v. Sanderson (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Jamieson, 2002 BCCA 411; R. v. Larson, 2011 BCCA 454; R. v. Farrah, 2011 MBCA 49; and seeR. v. Dupuis, 2006 QCCA 805. 18 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.). 19 R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631, pp. 636-637. 5

of the discharge of a firearm. 20 This Court said they could. The ancillary powers doctrine in Waterfied continues to be applied by this Court.21 18. Waterfield is a simple two part test that first asks whether the conduct at issue is within the general duty imposed on the police by statute or common law, and then whether the conduct was reasonably necessary to fulfill the duty. 19. The first hurdle of the test is easily met where officer safety is at risk. Police have a duty to protect the public. This includes reacting to danger involving themselves or others. This duty is reflected in statute22 and has been repeatedly recognized by this Court.Z3 Waterfield has generally been applied in the context of criminal investigations, often requiring " ... police officers to make difficult decisions in fast-moving conditions."24 This duty is not lessened because the actions of the officers are not grounded in evidence gathering or dominated by determining criminal liability. 20. Canadians rely on police to act in situations where officers' lives are at risk for the protection of the public as a whole. Protective powers must be available in such cases. In the context of a protective search following an arrest, Doherty J.A. identified this truism in Golub: "one cannot ask the police to place themselves in potentially dangerous situations in order to effect an arrest without, at the same time, acknowledging their authority to take reasonable steps to protect themselves from the dangers to which they are exposed." 25 Police have a general duty to protect the public, and while doing so, must be authorized to take reasonable precautions to ensure their own safety. 21. The second stage of the Waterfield test is fact driven, namely " ... whether the conduct, albeit within the general scope of the police duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated with that duty."26 In other words, was the conduct reasonably necessary?27 This is a multi-factored contextual analysis of the police conduct. Its application seeks to balance police conduct against interference with individual liberty. The factors adopted in

20 Waterfield was also applied to authorize police to detain an individual who insisted on entering an area secured for the safety of a visiting diplomat- R. v. Knowlton, [1974] S.C.R. 443. 21 SeeR. v. Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66, per LeBel J., paras. 73-76. 22 This case involved the Halifax Regional Police, therefore see ss. 35 and 42 of the Police Act, S.N.S. 2004, c.31. 23 R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, p. 32 and R. v. Clayton, supra, paras. 22-23. 24 R. v. Clayton, supra, per Binnie J., para. 97. 25 R. v. Golub, supra, para. 45. 26 R. v. Waterfield, supra, p. 661, and R. v. Aucoin, supra, per LeBel J. in dissent, para. 75. 27 R. v. Mann, supra, para. 39, 6

Godoi8 include the duty being performed, the extent to which the interference with individual liberty was necessary to perform the duty, the importance of the duty to public good, the liberty interfered with and the nature and extent of the interference. 22. Society expects police to protect themselves, the public, and a suspect, even if the suspect does not desire it. If the result is entry into a home or office without warrant, or search of an individual without sufficient cause, this is the social and legal trade-off for security. The "reasonably necessary" requirement ensures that the invasion of privacy accords with the degree of urgency. The protective safety search in Mann reflects that " ... s.8 Charter rights must give way to the specific, articulable and reasonable safety concerns that an officer harbours for him/herself and nearby members of the public".29 Protection afforded an officer during an investigative detention must also be afforded during non investigative duties when safety is put at risk. As stated in Mann, "[g]iven their mandate to investigate crime and keep the peace, police officers must be empowered to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of encounters experienced daily on the front lines of policing. "30 23. Non-investigative search powers are authorized in other common law jurisdictions. The United States has a broad authority defined as the "emergency aid doctrine". 31 State courts have also articulated an authority, for example in California: " ... where the officers' conduct is prompted by the motive of preserving life and reasonably appears to be necessary for that purpose."32 The United Kingdom, New Zealand and New South Wales have enacted specific legislation. 33 In the United Kingdom the provision applies for the purpose "of saving life or limb or preventing serious damage to property". The

28 R. v. Godoy, supra, para 18. 29 R. v. P l ummer, supra, para. 57. 30 R. v. Mann, supra, para. 16. 31 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385, 392 (1978), " ... the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.". 32 People v. Hill (1974), 12 Cal.3d 731, 754. 33 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, (U.K), ss. 17(l)(e), 17(2)(4); for a simple application of the statutory provision see Baker v. Crown Prosecution Service, [2009] EWHC 229 (Admin); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (N.S.W.), s. 9, and s. 36(l)(f) for motor vehicles, Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (N.Z.), s. 14, and see also Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), ss. 30(d) re: warrantless searches of the person where police reasonably suspect that person has something that may harm themselves or someone else. ------~

operative words in the New Zealand legislation are: "there is a risk to the life or safety of any person that requires an emergency response." 24. In a true emergency the balance will favour the interference with privacy interests. If, upon review, the police response is not found to have been sufficiently necessary to justify the breach of privacy, then the police will have acted unlawfully. The test must be focused on the nature of the risk, not on potential secondary motives. 34 The manner of execution can be scrutinized on review to ensure the response was reasonably exercised. The answer will lie in the factual determination at trial. ii. The Appropriate Constitutional Standard 25. Godoy expresses the appropriate test to respond to danger - was the response necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. The Attorney General of Ontario addresses this

ISSUe. 26. In the alternative, should this Court disagree, the constitutional standard to exercise this common law authority should not be more stringent than reasonable suspicion. 27. Courts have not definitively determined the existence and degree of a constitutional standard to act under the non-investigative search. Recently the issue arose in R. v. Kelsy where the Court of Appeal for Ontario identified the distinction between emergency evidentiary searches and safety searches, recognizing that "[w]hile there is a vague and ill-defined basis for search in exigent circumstances involving officer or public safety, even then there must be some reasonable basis for the search."35 The Court concluded that a public safety search, "at least requires something in the nature of reasonable suspicion or articulable cause to search ... ".36 The Court stated it was not to be understood as requiring reasonable grounds to justify an emergency search.37 28. In the knock and announce context, Cromwell J. in R. v. Cornell accepted the principle "that ' [s ]ection 8 of the Charter does not require the police to put their lives or safety on the line if there is ~vena low risk of weapons being present' .... "38 There the standard was defined as "reasonable grounds for concern." In R. v. Aucoin, Moldaver J., for the

34 Brigham City v. Stuart, supra, the only assessment is whether the response to rendering aid was reasonable. If the aid was reasonably required, alternative motivations do not tum emergency aid into an investigation invoking the Fourth Amendment. 35 R. v. Kelsy, supra, para. 52. 36 Ibid, supra, para. 54. 37 Ibid, supra, para 34. 38 R. v. Cornell, supra, para. 20. 8

majority, declined to endorse the dissenting position requiring reasonable grounds to believe officer safety was at risk to lawfully conduct a detainee pat-down search prior to detention in a police cruiser.39 29. In the 911 context, the emergency response power can be exercised where the interference with liberty is necessary and reasonable.40 No additional constitutional justification is required. Reasonable suspicion is an accepted constitutional standard for police powers in a variety of circumstances.41 The foreign legislation applies differing standards.42 30. In the context of officer safety searches, only pat-down searches during investigative detention require the more exacting standard that "the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that his or her own safety, or the safety of others is at risk."43 This is not consistent with this Court's recognition in other contexts of the necessity to protect police when " ... there is even a low risk of weapons being present. "44 31. To protect officer safety, nothing more than the standard of reasonable suspicion should be required. The appropriate constitutional standard is determined by a measure of the opposing interests of the state versus the preservation of privacy.45 The exacting constitutional standard of reasonable grounds to believe is required where law enforcement searches are directed at gathering evidence of crime. However, officer safety often arises in a fog of incomplete information. Evidence gathering belies the concept of emergency- a situation of potential danger and limited time to assess the risks.46 Judicial review must reflect this reality.

39 R. v. Aucoin, supra, footnote 3 to the decision ofMoldaver J. 40 R. v. Godoy, supra, para. 22. 41 For a review of Parliamentary and judicial use of the reasonable suspicion standard, seeR. v. A.M, 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569, paras. 77-79. 42 See footnote 34, supra. New Zealand, requires reasonable grounds; New South Wales, reasonable grounds to believe; Queensland, "reasonably suspects" for searches of persons and vehicles in defined urgent situations; United Kingdom, no defined standard but interpreted that "entry will be lawful where he [police] reasonably so believes" see Baker v. Crown Prosecution Service, supra, concurring reasons of Sir Anthony May, para. 26. 43 R. v. Mann, supra, para. 40. 44 R. v. Cornell, supra, para. 20. 45 R. v. A.M, supra, para. 81. 46 Wayne v. US., 318 F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir. 1963,per Berger, J.), "But the business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberations associated with the judicial process." 9

B. Fault Element of the Section 95 Offence 32. The majority decision on appeal significantly alters the interpretative principles for fault elements of criminal offences. In so doing, the Court undermines the policy reasons prohibiting reliance on ignorance of the law as a defence. 33. The Court below determined that the offence under s.95(1) requires, in addition to other elements, proof that 1) the accused does not have an authorization under which he might possess a loaded firearm in a particular place, and 2) "complete, specific, subjective knowledge" that the "accused knows his possession is unauthorized".47 The mens rea component was interpreted as commensurate with the "serious automatic consequences attendant upon conviction",48 namely in this case, a three year mandatory minimum penalty. If correct, this analysis impacts all full mens rea and regulatory offences involving "serious automatic consequences". Further, applying this reasoning would result in different mens rea elements for the same offence dependant upon the Crown's election. 34. Knowledge of the law is not a required fault element of an offence, unless specifically included in the wording of the offence itself. Otherwise every one is a law unto themselves and ignorance of the law is rewarded. There exist many offences where the accused's understanding of his 'legal rights' is justiciable such as the 'colour of right' defences for theft and damage to property.49 In the firearms context, Parliament has expressly required the Crown to prove the accused's subjective knowledge of his legal authority for some offences. For example, the weapons trafficking offence prohibits weapons manufacture or transfer, "knowing that the person is not authorized to do so under the Firearms Act or any other Act of Parliament or any regulations made under any Act of Parliament". 5° The s.95 offence contains no such requirement; ignorance of the law is not a defence. 35. Proving subjective knowledge of a breach of authorizing conditions creates an insurmountable burden for the Crown. Regulation is ubiquitous. "From cradle to grave, we are protected by regulations; they apply to the doctors attending our entry into this world

47 R. v. MacDonald, 2012 NSCA 50, reasons for the majority, paras. 84 and 95. 48 R. v. MacDonald, supra, para. 95. 49 Criminal Code, supra, ss.322 and 429(2). 5°Criminal Code, supra, s.99; see also s.lOO. 10

and to the morticians present at our departure."51 Those regulated act in accordance with a specific licence or licensing conditions set out in legislation. Many public welfare offences have significant penalties proportional to the potential harm for a breach. The majority below rests its justification for the knowledge requirement on "serious automatic consequences" which could include unlimited fines, incarceration and loss of licence to carry on the activity. Immigrants might be deported if found to have committed a criminal 2 offence or to have breached their entry conditions. 5 These are serious consequences. 36. The language employed by the majority below creates a risk of broad and inappropriate application. The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is a regulatory regime which also criminalizes possession and distribution of controlled substances subject to the regulations, including the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.53 Several of these offences have mandatory minimum sentences. Applying the logic of the majority, the Crown must prove the accused knew they were breaching their licence or the underlying regulations. This additional fault element is unjustified and will decrease effectiveness of the deterrent aspect of these offences. 37. There is no interpretive principle that supports the majority's decision in this case. Section 95 meets the constitutional standards for a full mens rea offence. Any concern over the implications of a significant consequence must focus on that consequence, but not by increasing the evidentiary and legal burden of proof on the Crown.

PART IV - COSTS 38. The Director of Public Prosecutions makes no submissions with respect to costs.

PART V - REQUEST TO MAKE ORAL ARGUMENT 39. The Director of Public Prosecutions requests permission to present oral argument at the hearing of the appeal.

51 R. v. Wholesale Travel, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, p. 22l,per Cory J. 52 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 c. 27, ss. 36 and 46. See also R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15. 53 Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001-227. 11

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

6C1James C. Martin

Counsel for the Intervener, Director of Public Prosecutions 8 May 2013 12

PART VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED Para.

1. Baker v. Crown Prosecution Service, [2009] EWHC 229 (Admin) 29

2. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) 23,24

3. Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 12

4. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 9

5. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385 (1978) 23

6. People v. Hill (1974), 12 Cal. 3d 731 23

7. R. v. A.M, 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 29,31

8. R. v. Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66 17, 21,28

9. R. v. Chuhaniuk, 2010 BCCA 403 12

R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 2, 19 (see Crown Respondent's Book of Authorities)

10. R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142 9,28,30

R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 19 (see Crown Respondent's Book of Authorities)

11. R. v. Dupuis, 2006 QCCA 805 15

R. v. Farrah, 2011 MBCA 49 15, 16 (see Crown Respondent's Book of Authorities)

R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 9 (see Crown Respondent's Book of Authorities)

R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 2, 8, 21, (see Accused Appellant's Book of Authorities) 29

12. R. v. Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.) 15, 16, 20 13

13. R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223 9

14. R. v. Jamieson, 2002 BCCA 411 15, 16

15. R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 10

16. R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605 15, 16, 27

17. R. v. Knowlton, [1974] S.C.R. 443 17

18. R. v. Larson, 2011 BCCA 454 15, 16

R. V. Mann, 2004 sec 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 12, 21, 22, (see Accused Appellant's Book of Authorities) 30

19. R. v. MacDonald, 2012 NSCA 50 33

20. R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 35

21. R. v. Plummer, 2011 ONCA 350 12,22

22. R. v. Sanderson (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) 15, 16

23. R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631 17

24. R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16 10

25. R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.). 2, 3, 15, 17, 21

26. R. v. Wholesale Travel, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 35

27. Wayne v. US., 318 F. 2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 31

OTHER REFERENCES

28. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (N.S.W.) 23,29

29. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.) 23,29

30. Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) 23,29

31. Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (N.Z.) 23,29 14

PART VII STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES

Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c.33

Search Perquisition

Where warrant not necessary Perquisition sans mandat

220 (4) An enforcement officer may 220 ( 4) L' agent de 1' autorite peut exercer exercise the powers described in subsection sans mandat les pouvoirs mentionnes au (3) without a warrant if the conditions for paragraphe (3) lorsque l'urgence de la obtaining the warrant exist but by reason of situation rend difficilement realisable exigent circumstances it would not be I' obtention du mandat, sous reserve que les practical to obtain the warrant. conditions de delivrance de celui-ci soient reunies.

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c.19

Where warrant not necessary Perquisition sans mandat

11(7) A peace officer may exercise any of 11(7) L'agent de la paix peut exercer sans the powers described in subsection (1), (5) mandat les pouvoirs vises aux paragraphes or (6) without a warrant if the conditions (1), (5) ou (6) lorsque l'urgence de la for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason situation rend son obtention difficilement of exigent circumstances it would be realisable, sous reserve que les conditions de impracticable to obtain one. delivrance en soient reunies.

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46

Trafficking Offences Infractions relatives au trafic

Weapons trafficking Trafic d'armes

99. (1) Every person commits an offence who 99. (1) Commet une infraction quiconque fabrique ou cede, meme sans contrepartie, ou (a) manufactures or transfers, whether or not for offre de fabriquer ou de ceder une arme a feu, consideration, or une arme prohibee, une arme a autorisation restreinte, un dispositif pro hi be, des (b) offers to do anything referred to in paragraph munitions ou des munitions prohibees (a) in respect of a firearm, a prohibited weapon, sachant qu'il n'y est pas autorise en vertu de a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any la Loi sur les annes a feu, de toute autre loi ammunition or any prohibited ammunition federale ou de leurs reglements. 15 knowing that the person is not authorized to do so under the Firearms Act or any other Act of Parliament or any regulations made under any Act of Parliament.

Punishment- firearm Peine : anne a feu

(2) Every person who commits an offence under (2) Dans le cas ou l'objet en cause est une subsection (1) where the object in question is a anne a feu, un dispositif pro hi be ou des firearm, a prohibited device, any ammunition or munitions prohibees ou non, quiconque any prohibited ammunition is guilty of an commet !'infraction prevue au paragraphe (1) indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for est coupable d'un acte criminel passible d'un a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, la peine punishment of imprisonment for a term of minimale etant :

(a) in the case of a first offence, three years; and a) de trois ans, dans le cas d'une premiere infraction; (b) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years. b) de cinq ans, en cas de recidive.

Punishment - other cases Peine : autres

(3) In any other case, a person who commits an (3) Dans tousles autres cas, quiconque offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an commet !'infraction prevue au paragraphe (1) indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for est coupable d'un acte criminel passible d'un a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, la peine punishment of imprisonment for a term of one minimale etant de un an. year. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 99; L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 99; 1995, c. 39, s. 139; 1995,ch.39,art. 139; 2008, c. 6, s. 10. 2008, ch. 6, art. 10.

Possession for purpose of weapons trafficking Possession en vue de faire le trafic d'armes

100. (1) Every person commits an offence who 100. (1) Commet une infraction quiconque a possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a en sa possession une anne a feu, une anne restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any prohibee, une anne a autorisation restreinte, ammunition or any prohibited ammunition for un dispositif pro hi be, des munitions ou des the purpose of munitions prohibees en vue de les ceder, meme sans contrepartie, ou d' offrir de les (a) transferring it, whether or not for ceder, sachant qu'il n'y est pas autorise en consideration, or vertu de la Loi sur les armes a feu, de toute autre loi federale ou de leurs reglements.

(b) offering to transfer it, 16 knowing that the person is not authorized to transfer it under the Firearms Act or any other Act of Parliament or any regulations made under any Act of Parliament.

Punishment - firearm Peine : anne a feu

Punishment- other cases Peine : autres

(3) In any other case, a person who commits an (3) Dans tous les autres cas, quiconque offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an commet !'infraction prevue au paragraphe (1) indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for est coupable d'un acte criminel passible d'un a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, la peine punishment of imprisonment for a term of one minimale etant de un an. year.

Immediate interception- imminent harm Interception immediate - dommage imminent 184.4 A police officer may intercept, by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or 184.4 Le policier peut intercepter, au moyen other device, a private communication if the d'un dispositif electromagnetique, police officer has reasonable grounds to believe acoustique, mecanique ou autre, une that communication privee s'il a des motifs (a) the urgency of the situation is such that an raisonnables de croire que, a la fois : authorization could not, with reasonable diligence, be obtained under any other provision a) l'urgence de la situation est telle qu'une of this Part; autorisation ne peut, avec toute la diligence raisonnable, etre obtenue sous le regime de la (b) the interception is immediately necessary to presente partie; prevent an offence that would cause serious harm to any person or to property; and b) une interception immediate est necessaire 17

(c) either the originator of the private pour empecher une infraction qui causerait communication or the person intended by the des dommages serieux a une personne ou un originator to receive it is the person who would bien; commit the offence that is likely to cause the harm or is the victim, or intended victim, of the c) I' auteur de la communication ou la harm. personne a qui celui-ci la destine est soit la personne dont !'infraction causerait des dommages, soit la victime de ces dommages ou la cible de ceux-ci.

Theft Vol

Theft Vol 322. (1) Every one commits theft who 322. (1) Commet un vol quiconque prend fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit, fraudulently and without colour of right converts ou detoume a son propre usage ou a 1'usage to his use or to the use of another person, d'une autre personne, frauduleusement et anything, whether animate or inanimate, with sans apparence de droit, une chose intent quelconque, animee ou inanimee, avec !'intention: (a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the a) soit depriver, temporairement ou owner of it, or a person who has a special absolument, son proprietaire, ou une property or interest in it, of the thing or ofhis personne y ayant un droit de propriete special property or interest in it; ou un interet special, de cette chose ou de son droit ou interet dans cette chose; (b) to pledge it or deposit it as security; b) so it de la mettre en gage ou de la deposer (c) to part with it under a condition with respect en garantie; to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or c) soit de s'en dessaisir a une condition, pour son retour, que celui qui s'en dessaisit peut etre incapable de remplir; d) so it d' agir a son egard de telle maniere (d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot qu'il soit impossible de la remettre dans l'etat be restored in the condition in which it was at ou elle etait au moment ou elle a ete prise ou the time it was taken or converted. detoumee.

Time when theft completed Moment ou le vol est consomme

(2) A person commits theft when, with intent to (2) Un individu commet un vol quand, avec steal anything, he moves it or causes it to move !'intention de voler une chose, ilia deplace or to be moved, or begins to cause it to become ou fait en sorte qu' elle se deplace, ou la fait movable. deplacer, ou commence a la rendre amovible. 18

Secrecy Secret

(3) A taking or conversion of anything may be (3) La prise ou le detournement d'une chose fraudulent notwithstanding that it is effected peut etre entache de fraude, meme si la prise without secrecy or attempt at concealment. ou le detournement a lieu ouvertement ou sans tentative de dissimulation.

Purpose of taking But de la soustraction d'une chose

(4) For the purposes of this Act, the question ( 4) Est sans consequence, pour 1' application whether anything that is converted is taken for de la presente loi, la question de savoir si une the purpose of conversion, or whether it is, at the chose qui fait I' objet d'un detournement est time it is converted, in the lawful possession of soustraite en vue d'un detournement ou si the person who converts it is not material. elle est alors en la possession legitime de la personne qui la detourne.

Wild living creature Creature sauvage

(5) For the purposes of this section, a person (5) Pour !'application du present article, une who has a wild living creature in captivity shall personne qui a une creature sauvage vivante be deemed to have a special property or interest en captivite est reputee avoir un droit special in it while it is in captivity and after it has de propriete ou un interet special dans cette escaped from captivity. creature pendant que celle-ci est en captivite et apres qu'elle s'est echappee de captivite.

Colour of right Apparence de droit

429 (2) No person shall be convicted of an 429 (2) Nul ne peut etre declare coupable offence under sections 430 to 446 where he d'une infraction visee aux articles 430 a 446 proves that he acted with legal justification or s'il prouve qu'il a agi avec une justification excuse and with colour of right. ou une excuse legale et avec apparence de droit.

Where warrant not necessary Cas ou le mandat n'est pas necessaire

487.11 A peace officer, or a public officer who 487.11 L'agent de la paix ou le fonctionnaire has been appointed or designated to administer public nomme ou designe pour !'application or enforce any federal or provincial law and ou !'execution d'une loi federale ou whose duties include the enforcement of this or provinciale et charge notamment de faire any other Act of Parliament, may, in the course observer la presente loi ou toute autre loi of his or her duties, exercise any of the powers federale peut, pour 1' accomplissement de ses described in subsection 487(1) or 492.1(1) fonctions, exercer, sans mandat, tousles without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining pouvoirs prevus aux paragraphes 487(1) ou 19 a warrant exist but by reason of exigent 492.1 (1) lorsque l'urgence de la situation circumstances it would be impracticable to rend difficilement realisable !'obtention du obtain a warrant. mandat, sous reserve que les conditions de delivrance de celui-ci soient reunies.

Authority to enter dwelling without warrant Pouvoir de penetrer sans mandat

529.3 (1) Without limiting or restricting any 529.3 (1) L'agent de la paix peut, sans que power a peace officer may have to enter a soit restreint ou limite le pouvoir d'entrer qui dwelling-house under this or any other Act or lui est confere en vertu de la presente loi ou law, the peace officer may enter the dwelling d'une autre loi ou d'une regie de droit, house for the purpose of arresting or penetrer dans une maison d'habitation pour apprehending a person, without a warrant !'arrestation d'une personne sans etre muni referred to in section 529 or 529.1 authorizing du mandat vise aux articles 529 ou 529.1 s'il the entry, if the peace officer has reasonable a des motifs raisonnables de croire que la grounds to believe that the person is present in personne s'y trouve, si les conditions de the dwelling-house, and the conditions for delivrance du mandat prevu a 1' article 529.1 obtaining a warrant under section 529.1 exist but sont reunies et si l'urgence de la situation by reason of exigent circumstances it would be rend difficilement realisable son obtention. impracticable to obtain a warrant.

Exigent circumstances Situation d'urgence

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1 ), exigent (2) Pour 1' application du paragraphe (1 ), il y circumstances include a notamment urgence dans les cas ou 1' agent circumstances in which the peace officer de la paix, selon le cas :

(a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that entry a) a des motifs raisonnables de soupyonner into the dwelling-house is necessary to prevent qu'il est necessaire de penetrer dans la imminent bodily harm or death to any person; or maison d'habitation pour eviter aune personne des lesions corporelles imminentes (b) has reasonable grounds to believe that ou la mort; evidence relating to the commission of an indictable offence is present in the dwelling b) a des motifs raisonnables de croire que des house and that entry into the dwelling-house is elements de preuve relatifs a la perpetration necessary to prevent the imminent loss or d'un acte criminel se trouvent dans la maison imminent destruction of the evidence. d'habitation et qu'il est necessaire d'y 1997, c. 39, s. 2. penetrer pour eviter leur perte ou leur destruction imminentes. 1997, ch. 39, art. 2. 20

Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14

Authority to issue warrant Delivrance du mandat

49.1(3) Where on ex parte application a justice 49.1(3) Sur demande ex parte, le juge de paix of the peace is satisfied by information on oath peut signer un mandat autorisant, sous reserve des conditions eventuellement fixees, (a) that the conditions for entry described in l'agent des peches ou le garde-peche qui y est subsection (1) exist in relation to a dwelling nomme a proceder ala visite d'une maison house, d'habitation s'il est convaincu, sur la foi d'une denonciation sous serment, que sont (b) that entry to the dwelling-house is necessary reunis les elements suivants : for any purpose relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act, and a) les circonstances prevues au paragraphe ( 1) existent; (c) that entry to the dwelling-house has been refused or that there are reasonable grounds for b) la visite est necessaire pour 1' application believing that entry thereto will be refused, de la presente loi; the justice of the peace may issue a warrant c) un refus a ete oppose ala visite ou il y a under his hand authorizing the fishery officer or des motifs raisonnables de croire que tel sera fishery guardian named therein to enter that le cas. dwelling-house subject to such conditions as may be specified in the warrant.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27

Serious criminality Grande criminalite

36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign 36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire national is inadmissible on grounds of serious pour grande criminalite les faits suivants : criminality for a) etre declare coupable au Canada d'une (a) having been convicted in Canada of an infraction a une loi federale punissable d'un offence under an Act of Parliament punishable emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ou d'une infraction a une loi federale pour 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of mois est inflige; more than six months has been imposed; b) etre declare coupable, a 1, exterieur du (b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada that, if committed in Canada, would Canada, constituerait une infraction a une loi constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament federale punissable d'un emprisonnement punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment maximal d'au moins dix ans; 21 of at least 10 years; or

c) commettre, a 1' exterieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, (c) committing an act outside Canada that is an constituerait une infraction a une loi federale offence in the place where it was committed and punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal that, if committed in Canada, would constitute d'au moins dix ans. an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.

Criminality Criminalite

(2) A foreign national is inadmissible on grounds (2) Emportent, sauf pour le resident of criminality for permanent, interdiction de territoire pour criminalite les faits suivants : (a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable a) etre declare coupable au Canada d'une by way of indictment, or of two offences under infraction a une loi federale punissable par any Act of Parliament not arising out of a single mise en accusation ou de deux infractions a occurrence; toute loi federale qui ne decoulent pas des memes faits; (b) having been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would b) etre declare coupable, a l'exterieur du constitute an indictable offence under an Act of Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Parliament, or of two offences not arising out of Canada, constituerait une infraction a une loi a single occurrence that, if committed in Canada, federale punissable par mise en accusation ou would constitute offences under an Act of de deux infractions qui ne decoulent pas des Parliament; memes faits et qui, commises au Canada, constitueraient des infractions a des lois federales; (c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and c) commettre, a 1' exterieur du Canada, une that, if committed in Canada, would constitute infraction qui, commise au Canada, an indictable offence under an Act of constituerait une infraction a une loi federale Parliament; or punissable par mise en accusation;

(d) committing, on entering Canada, an offence d) commettre, a son entree au Canada, une under an Act of Parliament prescribed by infraction qui constitue une infraction a une regulations. loi federale precisee par reglement. 22

Application Application

(3) The following provisions govern subsections (3) Les dispositions suivantes nSgissent (1) and (2): !'application des paragraphes (1) et (2):

(a) an offence that may be prosecuted either a) !'infraction punissable par mise en summarily or by way of indictment is deemed to accusation ou par procedure sommaire est be an indictable offence, even if it has been assimilee a !'infraction punissable par mise prosecuted summarily; en accusation, independamment du mode de poursuite effectivement retenu; (b) inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) may not be based on a conviction in respect of b) la declaration de culpabilite n'emporte pas which a record suspension has been ordered and interdiction de territoire en cas de verdict has not been revoked or ceased to have effect d'acquittement rendu en demier ressort ou en under the Criminal Records Act, or in respect of cas de suspension du easier - sauf cas de which there has been a final determination of an revocation ou de nullite - au titre de la Loi acquittal; sur le easier judiciaire;

(c) the matters referred to in paragraphs ( 1)(b) c) les faits vises aux alineas ( 1)b) ou c) et and (c) and (2)(b) and (c) do not constitute (2)b) ou c) n'emportent pas interdiction de inadmissibility in respect of a permanent territoire pour le resident permanent ou resident or foreign national who, after the l'etranger qui, a !'expiration du delai prescribed period, satisfies the Minister that they reglementaire, convainc le ministre de sa have been rehabilitated or who is a member of a readaptation ou qui appartient a une categoric prescribed class that is deemed to have been reglementaire de personnes presumees rehabilitated; readaptees;

(d) a determination of whether a permanent d) la preuve du fait vise a l'alinea (1 )c) est, resident has committed an act described in s' agissant du resident permanent, fondee sur paragraph (l)(c) must be based on a balance of la preponderance des probabilites; probabilities; and e) !'interdiction de territoire ne peut etre (e) inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) fondee sur les infractions suivantes : may not be based on an offence • (i) celles qui sont • (i) designated as a qualifiees de contravention under the contraventions en vertu Contraventions Act, de la Loi sur les • (ii) for which the contraventions, permanent resident or • (ii) celles dont le foreign national is found resident permanent ou guilty under the Young 1' etranger est declare Offenders Act, chapter Y- coupable sous le 1 of the Revised Statutes regime de la Loi sur ofCanada, 1985, or les jeunes • (iii) for which the contrevenants, chapitre 23

permanent resident or Y -1 des Lois revisees foreign national received a du Canada (1985), youth sentence under the • (iii) celles pour Youth Criminal Justice lesquelles le resident Act. permanent ou 1' etranger a reyU une peine specifique en vertu de la Loi sur le systeme de justice penale pour les adolescents.

Loss ofStatus Perte du statut

Permanent resident Resident permanent

46. ( 1) A person loses permanent resident status 46. ( 1) Emportent perte du statut de resident permanent les faits suivants : (a) when they become a Canadian citizen; a) I' obtention de la citoyennete canadienne; (b) on a final determination of a decision made outside of Canada that they have failed to b) la confirmation en dernier ressort du comply with the residency obligation under constat, hors du Canada, de manquement a section 28; !'obligation de residence;

(c) when a removal order made against them comes into force; c) la prise d'effet de la mesure de renvoi; (c. I) on a final determination under subsection 108(2) that their refugee protection has ceased c. I) la decision prise, en dernier ressort, au for any of the reasons described in paragraphs titre du paragraphe 108(2) entrainant, sur 108(1)(a) to (d); or constat des faits mentionnes a l'un des alineas 108(1)a) a d), la perte de l'asile; (d) on a final determination under section 109 to vacate a decision to allow their claim for refugee d) 1' annulation en demier res sort de la protection or a final determination to vacate a decision ayant accueilli la demande d' asile ou decision to allow their application for protection. celle d'accorder la demande de protection. 24

Permanent resident Effet de la perte de la citoyennete

(2) A person who ceases to be a citizen under (2) Devient resident permanent quiconque paragraph 10(1)(a) ofthe Citizenship Act, other perd la citoyennete au titre de 1' alinea 10(1 )a) than in the circumstances set out in subsection de la Loi sur la citoyennete, sauf s'il est vise 10(2) of that Act, becomes a permanent resident. au paragraphe 10(2) de cette loi.

Police Act, S.N.S. 2004, c.31

Responsibility for policing in municipality

3 5 (1) Every municipality is responsible for the policing of and maintenance of law and order in the municipality and for providing and maintaining an adequate, efficient and effective police department at its expense in accordance with its needs.

(2) In providing an adequate, efficient and effective police department for the purpose of subsection (1), a municipality is responsible for providing all the necessary infrastructure and administration.

(3) For the purpose of subsection (1 ), the service provided by a police department shall include

(a) crime prevention;

(b) law enforcement;

(d) emergency and enhanced services; and

(e) public order maintenance. 2004, c. 31, s. 35.

Powers of police officers

42 (1) A member of the Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a municipal police department, another police department providing policing services in the Province or the Serious Incident Response Team is a peace officer and has;

(a) all the powers, authority, privileges, rights and immunities of a peace officer and constable under the common law, the Criminal Code (Canada) and any other federal or Provincial enactment; and 25

(b) the power and authority to enforce and to act under every enactment of the Province and any reference in any enactment or in any law, by-law, ordinance or regulation of a municipality to a police officer, peace officer, constable, inspector or any term of similar meaning or import shall be construed to include a reference to a member of the Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a municipal police department, another police department providing policing services in the Province or the Serious Incident Response Team.

(2) Subject to this Act and the regulations, or any other enactment or an order of the Minister, the authority, responsibility and duty of a member of a municipal police department includes

(a) maintaining law and order;

(b) the prevention of crime;

(d) assisting victims of crime;

(e) apprehending criminals and offenders who may lawfully be taken into custody;

(f) laying charges and participating in prosecutions;

(g) executing warrants that are to be executed by peace officers;

(h) subject to an agreement respecting the policing of the municipality, enforcing municipal by laws within the municipality; and

(i) obeying the lawful orders of the chief officer,

and the person shall discharge these responsibilities throughout the Province. 2004, c. 31, s. 42; 2010, c. 68, s. 4.