Copyright and Citation Considerations for This Thesis/ Dissertation

o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.

o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.

o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original.

How to cite this thesis

Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017). PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

MBANWI HONORE FOKWA

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

POLITICAL STUDIES

at the

UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

SUPERVISOR: PROF YOLANDA SADIE

JANUARY 2019

DECLARATION

I, Mbanwi H. Fokwa, hereby declare that this thesis submitted for the D Litt et Phil in Political Studies to the University of Johannesburg is my original work and has not either in its entirety or in part been previously submitted to another University for a degree.

ABSTRACT

This study assessed the role of Cameroon’s democracy-advocating Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) (both formal institutions and informal groupings) in promoting democracy since the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections held in 1992 (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system). In other words, it endeavoured to establish whether approximately 25 years after the first multiparty elections CSOs are playing a role in championing political reforms and if not, to ascertain the reasons for their lack of commitment to the democratic future of the country. This is a qualitative study consisting of a literature analysis as well as 42 semi- structured personal interviews conducted from December 2017 to January 2018.

The study first assessed the state of democracy in Cameroon. Despite the fact that most of the formal requirements for democracy are contained in Cameroon’s Constitution, in practice, it falls short of meeting its essential elements. Besides abolishing his presidential term limit in 2008 by changing the Constitution, Biya, the president for 36 years, managed to sustain his power through patronage and clientelist networks, virtually exclusive control of political appointments and state institutions and on the other hand, by punishing detractors and curtailing political dissent. The Biya regime has considerable influence on the ability of CSOs to effectively play their role in the democratic process. It employs a variety of tactics to weaken and silence those that it regards with suspicion, which results in a restrictive environment for CSOs to operate in. On the one hand, Biya co-opts active civil society leaders into neo-patrimonial or patronage/clientelist networks and on the other, his government clamps down on perceived anti-establishment CSOs and civil society protests. CSOs are further weakened by the creation of ‘bogus’ CSOs to counter the influence of the ‘authentic’ CSOs in fostering democratic governance. Additionally, the anglophone/francophone crisis has created divisions within the CSOs, thus

iii constraining CSOs to challenge the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country. This is particularly the case with the CBA, the students’ unions at tertiary level as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church, which were active in the 1990s. Required government procedures to be met in order to establish new CSOs, is another method used by the government to restrict the establishment of CSOs that might challenge the government in one way or another. The government also restricts certain CSOs such as the former politically active Cameroon Bar Association (CBA) from engaging in political issues. Another way the government silences the critical voices from CSOs and suppresses dissent, is by utilising the ambiguous provisions of the anti- terrorism law, which was enacted in 2014.

The repressive environment has resulted in CSOs mostly working at micro-level within the system. They are concerned with their own parochial organisational goals which can be termed as ‘soft’ (less contentious) issues that demand less political wrangles with the authorities. In this regard, in terms of the electoral process, they have been sensitising the citizens to their civic right to register for elections and vote while some have also been involved in election monitoring. They are also involved in, for example, promoting women’s rights and their participation in politics; land rights for the vulnerable in society; championing the rights of detainees; promoting juvenile justice and the right to internet access; promoting peace by intervening in national and ethnic conflicts; holding the government accountable particularly in terms of the international agreements it has ratified; and promoting good governance such as empowering the population regarding budget tracking and enhancing service delivery as well as making efforts to curb corruption. Therefore, they are not engaged with broader (national) contentious democratic issues that threaten the regime or the political status quo.

Furthermore, given the repressive political environment, civil society activists have changed their tactics. In fear of being detained, they no longer speak out publicly against the government or organise demonstrations and protest marches. Besides the inherent shortcomings of these strategies, the leaders of CSOs are also handicapped in terms of their capabilities and abilities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this study is a strong testimony to the enabling grace of God, the most beneficent and the most merciful, whose hand worked through varying circumstances to make it possible for me to actualise my dream.

It is however, important to acknowledge my indebtedness to the following people whose influence is really appreciable:

 My greatest intellectual debt is owed to my supervisor, Professor Yolanda Sadie, whose intellectual acuity, understanding, guidance and patience came to bear to enable this work to come out this thorough.  I am deeply indebted to my brother, Beaufils Fokwa and his wife, Scholastica Akiy for making it possible for me to further my studies. In addition, I am especially grateful to my wife, Glory Kah who has been very patient, understanding, loving and encouraging particularly during the darkest hours in the course of my studies. In the same light, I cannot but mention my beloved mother, Mrs. Regina Fokwa for her moral and spiritual support.  My sincere thanks also go to all my respondents for their cooperation in allowing me to interview them which greatly contributed to the successful completion of this work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents page

Title page ………………………………………………………………………………...... i Declaration …………………………………………………………………………………...... ii

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………...iii

Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………...... v

Table of contents ……………………………………………………………………………..vi

Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………………….ix

Chapter 1 – Introduction, aim and scope of the Study 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 Aim of the study ...... 6 1.3 Literature review ...... 7 1.4 Research method ...... 26 1.5 Contribution to scientific knowledge ……………………………………………………29

1.6 Research structure ……………………………………………………………………….29

Chapter 2 – Civil society in the promotion of democracy: an analytical framework 2.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………….31 2.2 The origins of civil society in the democratic process ……………………………...32 2.3 The role of civil society in promoting democracy……………………………………..36 2.4 The methods employed by civil society in fulfilling its democratic role……………………………………………………………………………………………..43 2.5 The challenges encountered by civil society in promoting democracy ………....50 2.6 Conclusions……………………………………………………………… ……………...61

Chapter 3 – Political rule in Cameroon and the restrictions on civil society, 1966- 1992 3.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………..65 3.2.1 Background: Ahidjo’s one-party rule and its control of CSOs (1966- 1982).……………………………………………………………………………………68 3.2.2 President Biya’s political reforms in the 1980s……………………………………..74 3.2.3 The ‘third wave’ of democratisation and the resuscitation of civil society in the 1990s.…………………………………………………………………………………84 3.2.4.1 Multipartism, political changes and the clamour for political reforms………...... 88 3.3 Conclusions …………………………..……………………………………………………95

Chapter 4 – The state of democracy in Cameroon 4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………..97 4.2 Free and fair elections ……………………………………………………………….100 4.3 The rule of law and accountability …….……………………………………………….106 4.4 The media and popular participation ……………………………………………….111 4.5 Freedom and human rights……………………………. ………………………………114 4.6 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………………120

Chapter 5 – the efforts by civil society in promoting democracy in Cameroon and the challenges encountered 5.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………….123 5.2 The relation among civil society organisations ………..………………………….….125 5.3 The relationship between CSOs and the government ………………………..….…127 5.4 The status and leadership of CSOs …….………………………………………….....135 5.5 The commitment of CSOs in promoting democratic governance and the support from the population ……………………………………………………………………..138 5.6 The internal organisation and structure of CSOs……………………………………..139 5.7 The role of informal groups in Cameroon’s democratic process …………………..140

5.8 The role played by civil society organisations in the democratic process...... …..143

5.8.1 Enhancing the electoral process ...... 143

vii

5.8.2 Promoting women's rights and participation in politics ...... 145

5.8.3 Promoting land governance ...... 146

5.8.4 Championing the rights of detainees and the vulnerable ...... 147 5.8.5 Promoting peace ...... 148 5.8.6 Keeping the government in check ...... 149 5.8.7 Promoting governance-related issues ...... 151 5.9 Conclusions ...... 152

Chapter 6 – Conclusion 6.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………....156 6.2 Key findings of the study ……………………………….……………………………....158 6.2.1 The State of democracy…………….. ………………………………………………..158 6.2.2 The role of civil society organisations in Cameroon ……………………..………...160 6.3 Contribution to the field of study ………………………………………………………..162

Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..164

Appendix one ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………191

Appendix two ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………194

viii

ABBREVIATIONS

AAG Affirmative Action Group ACORD Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development AIDS Acquire Immune Deficiency Syndrome AMB African Media Barometer ARMP National Procurement Regulation Agency ASMODISA Association Mondiale de Défense des intérêts des Albinos (World Organisation for Defending the Interest of Albinos) AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIR Rapid Intervention Battalion BMM Brigade Mixte Mobile (Mixed Mobile Brigade) CACSC Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium CATTU Cameroon Teachers’ Trade Union CBA Cameroon Bar Association CDF Cameroon Democratic Front CDP Congress for Democracy and Progress CDU Cameroon Democratic Union CEMAC Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) CENER Centre National des Etudes et des Recherches (National Centre for Studies and Research) CEWOTU Catholic Education Workers’ Trade Union CFA Communauté Financiére Africaine (African Financial Community) CHRAPA Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy CND Centre National de documentation (National Documentation Centre) CNU Union Nationale Camerounaise (Cameroon National Union) COLETU Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions

COMINSUD Community Initiative for Sustainable Development CONAC National Anti-corruption Commission SOPECAM Cameroon Press and Publishing Company CPDM Cameroon People's Democratic Movement CPNC Cameroon People’s National Convention CPS Civil Peace Service CRTV Cameroon Radio and Television CSOs Civil Society Organisations CUC Cameroon United Congress DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EISA Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa EIP Electoral Integrity Project EIU Economist Intelligence Unit ELECAM Elections Cameroon EPRDF Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front ESAFF Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers’ Forum FBOs Faith-based organisations FGI Finders Group Initiative FGM/C Female genital mutilation/cutting FODEP Foundation for Democratic process FPTP First-past-the-post GBA Ghana Bar Association GCB Global Corruption Barometer GCE General Certificate of Education HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IBWO Indigenous Business Women’s Organisation IIAG Ibrahim Index of African Governance IMF International Monetary Fund KANU Kenya African National Union KNDP Kamerun National Democratic Party

LEFE Ligue pour l’Education de la Femme et de l’Enfant (League for the Education of Women and Children MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NCA National Constitutional Assembly NCC National Communication Council NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya NCOPA National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Associations NDI National Democratic Institute for International Affairs NEO National Elections Observatory NGOs Non-governmental organisations NIFA National Financial Investigation Agency NLC Nigerian Labour Congress NRM National Resistance Movement NUDP National Union for Democracy and Progress NUPENG National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers NWADO North West Association of Development Association OAU Organisation of African Unity PDG Gabonese Democratic Party PDGE Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea PEATTU President, the Presbyterian Education Authority Teachers Trade Union PEI Perceptions of Electoral Integrity PELUM Participatory Ecological Land Use Management PENGASSAN Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria PNDP National community development programme PPRD People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy PR Proportional representation RPP People's Rally for Progress SACEJ Southern African Centre for Economic Justice SAGPA Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance SANASO Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations

SAP(s) Structural Adjustment Programme(s) SAPSN Southern African People’s Solidarity Network SDF Social Democratic Front SED Secretary of State for Defence SEDOC Service des Etudes et de la Documentation (Department of Studies and Documentation) SFCG Search for Common Ground SNC Sovereign National Conference SONARA Société Nationale de Raffinage (The National Refining Company) TAC Teachers’ Association of Cameroon TFF The Fomunyoh Foundation TV Television UBSU University of Buea Students’ Union UC Union Camerounaise (Cameroon Union) UPC Union des Populations du Cameroun (Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) UN United Nations UNOWHURO Union of North West Human Rights Organisations US United States USA United States of America USAID United States Agency for International Development WaCameroon Women in Action Against Gender Based Violence WLSA Women and Law in Southern Africa ZCTU Zambia Congress of Trade Unions ZIMCET Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust

xii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION, AIM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Civil society has emerged as one of the key components enhancing democratic governance (Jobert and Kohler-Koch, 2008:i). However, it has different meanings in different contexts. Formulating a precise meaning of civil society that is universally acceptable is a herculean task since it is “an inherently lax and expansive concept, incorporating every social phenomenon that is not the state” (Beem, 1999:4; Eberly, 2000:5). For example, according to the Western conception which seems much narrower, civil society is regarded as the range of formal organised groups and institutions that are voluntary, independent of the state, are largely self-supporting, and have respect for the law (Diamond, 1994:5). On the contrary, in terms of the African notion which appears to be much broader, in addition to formal organisations, informal primordial groups based on tribe, kinship, family, and religion are considered as civil society (see Ekeh, 1992:191, 194, 196; Maina, 1998:136; and Kasfir, 1998:7).1

Concerning its role,2 Western scholars such as Diamond (2008:158) contend that a ‘spirited civil society’ plays a vital role in checking and limiting the potential abuse of state power. It creates avenues aside from political parties for the aggregation, representation, and articulation of interests. It provides traditionally excluded groups, for example, ethnic or racial minorities, as well as women, access to power that they have been deprived of in formal politics, particularly in the upper institutional strata (Diamond, 1994:8). Hence, through public participation, civil society strives to democratise the public space (Chipkin, 2002:2). The scope of political participation is broadened as citizens attempt to directly

1 The introduction provides just a brief overview of the meaning of civil society. A more comprehensive meaning of and the controversy surrounding the concept is provided in the literature review. 2 Also see the literature review below and chapter two for a detailed discussion on the role of civil society.

1 influence government decisions and policies – rather than only indirectly through the election of state officials (Ottaway, 2000:78). Civil society thereby serves as an alternative means of representation complementary to periodic elections and as an additional medium for enhancing democratic accountability, as well as transparency. It also redefines the rules of the ‘political game’ along democratic principles (White, 2004:14- 15). Central to the prospects for democratisation according to the Western scholars is therefore, the presence or absence of a vigorous and vibrant civil society (Gill, 2000:60).

In the African context, the presence of a vibrant civil society is vital since the essence of democracy is very problematic, particularly in terms of emancipatory politics. Therefore, civil society in the early 1990s (characterised by the transition to multipartism) served to among other things, enhance accountability, improve governance, sustain political reform, and foster a viable state-society relationship (Harbeson, 1994:1-2). It thus exposed the weaknesses and excesses of African authoritarian regimes (Norton, 2005:275). Bujra (2002:42) contends that an active and forceful civil society keeps government under control while a docile civil society permits government to become oppressive and dictatorial. In the face of oppression therefore, the credit sometimes goes to civil society for challenging arbitrary rule and thwarting autocratic designs (Norton, 2005:275). Consequently, civil society connotes the notion of emancipatory politics (Jayaram, 2005:15). It can act as an advocate of regime change (Harbeson, 1994:22). This often takes the form of political defiance, for instance, protest marches and strikes (Mbuagbo and Fru, 2003:134). However, in pursuit of its key objectives, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in many African states simultaneously adopt multiple roles such as being political norm setters, and brokers between government and society. These strategies are not static since there may be modifications over time depending on the circumstances (Harbeson, 1994:22-23). In Nigeria for example, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) has been one of the main custodians of the democratisation process. The NLC for instance, was one of the spirited pro-democracy forces in the country when the military government annulled the 1993 elections. In similar vein, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) called a general strike in 1993 in

2 reaction to the anti-labour policies of the government. The strike was labelled a “patriotic struggle” for accountability in government and economic emancipation. It became pandemic as it spread to other sectors by August of the same year (M’boge and Doe, 2004:35).

In the post-transition phase, CSOs in Africa have also continued to further the democratisation process by acting as advocates for genuine political reforms. They have also been serving as ‘watchdogs’ over governments in terms of protecting those rights and freedoms they strongly fought for. In Ghana for example, the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) has been unequivocal in its stance against bad governance and official abuses. It also has legal monitors who scrutinise government activities and decisions to check on their constitutionality. Furthermore, it studies all bills placed before parliament to determine any constitutional violations (M’boge and Doe, 2004:30-31). Likewise, in Zambia, the CSOs together with companies in the private sector have been meeting with government officials every three months to deliberate on among others things, strategies to enhance the country’s development. The CSOs also participate in several forums to monitor government activities such as the parliamentary portfolio committees which scrutinise government expenditure. These committees also request members of the CSOs and other stakeholders to provide suggestions on how the state can be better managed. Nevertheless, the extent to which the government takes these suggestions into consideration when formulating policy is contentious (Kaliba, 2014:11).

It is evident from the above brief overview that civil society has become an important political player in Africa’s democratisation process. Democracy-advocating CSOs3 in Cameroon in particular, have also been quite vibrant and vigorous in the wake of the third wave of democratisation. Among them are the Cameroon Bar Association (CBA),

3 Democracy-advocating civil society organisations include trade unions, student bodies, and non- governmental organisations that seek in a nonpartisan manner to advance the democratisation process and improve a political system. This can be achieved through, for example, anti-corruption efforts, voter education and mobilisation, human rights monitoring, and poll-watching (see Diamond, 1994:6; Sachikonye, 1995:7).

3 students and workers’ unions such as the University of Buea Students’ Union (UBSU) and the Teachers’ Association of Cameroon (TAC), as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church (Nkwi, 2006:95- 96). They were very instrumental in “opening and expanding the political space” (Awasom, 2005:211). These organisations made a strong contribution to the demise of the authoritarian and archaic system that had been in existence since 1961 and its subsequent replacement by a more liberalised system and transition from a one-party to a multiparty system in 1992 (Nkwi, 2006:96). They were also influential in the government’s decision in 1990 to decentralise the only university (at that stage) in the country – the University of Yaoundé. This led to the transformation of the Ngaoundere and Buea campuses into full-fledged universities with the later enabling more anglophone Cameroonian students to gain access to tertiary education than before since it is an Anglo-Saxon university. Similarly, in 1993 the General Certificate of Education (GCE) Board was established as a result of their struggles (Nkwi, 2006:98). The Board is responsible for managing the Cameroon GCE (Ordinary and Advanced levels) examinations mostly written by anglophone students. The efforts by these CSOs have resulted in the government’s willingness to address some of the issues that anglophone Cameroonians faced in terms of the educational policy of successive governments.4

Notwithstanding the significant role of civil society as illustrated above, about 25 years after the first multiparty legislative and presidential elections in 1992, Nkwi in 2006 notes that the vibrancy of civil society is almost non-existent as Cameroonian CSOs are fractured and lack homogeneity (Nkwi, 2006: 93, 99). Uniting the various segments of CSOs into a single dynamic movement that can advance democracy in the country is a daunting task (Forje, 1999:11). In 2008 there were more than 278 CSOs which operated legally in Cameroon (Nyambo, 2008:54). Despite their diversity, they can be classified into two broad categories. A first category consists of issue-oriented CSOs which promote the well-being of their specific members. These include: the African Synergy against AIDS

4 For details on the ‘anglophone problem’, see for example, Konings, 1996; Nkoum-Me-Ntseny, 1996; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997; Eyoh, 1998; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2004.

4 and Suffering, the Association Mondiale de Défense des intérêts des Albinos (the World Organisation for Defending the Interest of Albinos) (ASMODISA), and the Ligue pour l’Education de la Femme et de l’Enfant (the League for the Education of Women and Children) (LEFE). These organisations are believed to be effective in dealing with collective issues affecting their members (Nyambo, 2008:53-55). Their emergence is a response to international concerns triggered by globilisation such as environmental awareness and rights, community development, gender and empowerment, poverty alleviation, and meaningful employment (Nyambo, 2008: 54). The second group consists of democracy-advocating CSOs which, unlike the aforementioned organisations, are primarily concerned with promoting democracy. The main focus of this study is on this category of CSOs.

Democracy-advocating CSOs in Cameroon as mentioned above, have been quite vibrant and vigorous following the third wave of democratisation. Some of the ‘old generation’ CSOs5 as pointed out earlier are the CBA, students and workers’ unions such as the UBSU and the TAC, as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church. They made a strong contribution to political liberalisation and the establishment of a multiparty system. Today, in Cameroon, a plethora of ‘new generation’ democracy- advocating CSOs exist together with the above-mentioned ‘old generation’ CSOs.6 These include the Women in Action Against Gender Based Violence (WaCameroon), the Finders Group Initiative (FGI), the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy (CHRAPA), the Justice and Peace Commission (Archdiocese of Bamenda), the Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD), and the United Youths Organisation. However, it is evident that in comparison to the 1990s, CSOs in Cameroon (both the old and new generations) find it difficult to sensitise and encourage the citizens to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance (Mbuagbo and Fru, 2003:134). As pointed out above, by 2005 the vigour that characterised the activities of the ‘old generation’ CSOs had dwindled (Nkwi, 2006: 98,100). After more than a

5 These are Cameroonian CSOs that were instrumental in the early 1990s in the transition from a single- party to a multiparty system (as elaborated on in chapter three). 6 New generation CSOs in Cameroon are those that came into existence from the mid-1990s following the establishment of a multiparty system.

5 decade, scholars such as Mbuagbo and Akoko (2004:1) note that “Cameroon’s democratic train appears to be moving in the opposite direction…”. Current democratic deficiencies include (see chapter four for an elaboration): the absence of freedom and justice; the poorly managed elections; the lack of a system of checks and balances; and the undemocratic nature of state institutions; as well as the deep tensions and cleavages that exist among the diverse groups and forces in the country (see for example, Mbaku, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 2002; Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004; Awasom, 2005; Forje, 2006; Ndeh, 2011). According to the 2016 Afrobarometer national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance in Africa for example, just 6.9% of Cameroonians indicated that they are very satisfied with the country’s democracy (Afrobarometer, 2016). In addition, according to Freedom House (2016) ratings, Cameroon has a high score of 6 with respect to both political rights and civil liberties (with 7 being the maximum score on a scale of 1-7 in terms of violations), signifying its weakest performance in terms of democratic governance. Therefore, the country is regarded as ‘not free’ (Freedom House, 2016), which indicates that it is not a democracy. Compounding the situation is the failure of the state to effectively provide for the essential social and economic needs of the citizens and to guarantee their security (Ngolle, 1996:6-7; Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:5; Forje, 2006:87).

1.2 Aim of the study

Given the above brief background, this study aims to assess the role of Cameroon’s democracy-advocating CSOs (both formal institutions and informal groupings) in promoting democracy since the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections held in 1992 (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as mentioned above). In other words, it seeks to establish whether approximately 25 years after the first multiparty elections CSOs are playing a role in championing political reforms and if not, to ascertain the reasons for their lack of commitment to the democratic future of the country.

Specific issues to be addressed include the following:

 The nature of the relationship that exists between the state and democracy- advocating CSOs.  The amount of autonomy democracy-advocating CSOs have.  The nature of leadership in Cameroonian CSOs, particularly in terms of their commitment to advance the country’s democracy.  The sufficiency of resources (both financial and material) for the effective functioning of democracy-advocating CSOs.  The strategies/tactics adopted by CSOs in challenging the government (for example the use of social media, protest marches and political advocacy/lobbying).

An analytical framework for this study (see chapter two) is drawn from scholarly contributions on the role of, and challenges faced by CSOs in Africa. These include the work by Diamond (1994); Mamdani (1995); Monga (1996); Olukoshi (1998); Ottaway (2000); Nduwimana (2004); Kasfir (2004); and Mkandawire (2010) who for example, identify various factors, which have a bearing on the functioning of CSOs.

1.3 Literature review

Scholarly contributions on civil society can for the purpose of this study be divided into four categories, that is, the meaning and composition of civil society, and its relation with the state; funding of pro-democracy activities of civil society in Africa; the role of civil society in promoting and sustaining democracy; and civil society in Cameroon.

The meaning and composition of civil society, and its relation with the state

The first category consists of scholars who mainly focus on the meaning of civil society, its composition, as well as its relation with the state. In terms of the meaning, the scholars include Rakner (1992); Diamond (1994); Mamdani (1995); Monga (1995); Sachikonye (1995); White (1996); Beem (1999); Eberly (2000); Gill (2000); Khilnani (2001); Bujra and Buthelezi (2002); Post and Rosenblum (2002); Bujra (2002); White (2004); Jayaram (2005); Jobert (2008); Edwards (2011); and Bob (2011). Despite its significance in the

7 democratisation process as highlighted above, it is evident from the above-mentioned scholars that civil society is a contested concept. In this regard, Eberly (2000:5) remarks that conceiving a precise meaning of the concept that cuts across the different political spectrums is a daunting task. Beem (1999:4) further adds that in its contemporary usage, civil society is a concept that is expansive and lax as it encompasses almost all social phenomena that do not relate to the state. Similarly, White (2004:8) argues that despite the efforts by political theorists to provide a standard definition of civil society, the precise meaning of the concept that is universally acceptable remains elusive. Therefore, rather than functioning as a theoretical concept, it is essentially a pragmatic term used in different ways for different purposes (White, 2004:8). In similar vein, Eberly (2000:5-6) contends that its meaning is thus shaped by what civil society can achieve in the eyes of a specific group. In his opinion, many liberals for example, perceive civil society as a channel to enhance the participation of the community in public projects with the consequent improvement in a government’s performance. Others conceive the concept as a means of promoting democratic discussion, thereby broadening the ‘public space’, and checking public cynicism and distrust of government. Therefore, it can be inferred that civil society nurtures a sense of mutual obligation and social ties by uniting distinct individuals towards the achievement of shared goals which transcend their private interests. As a result, isolated individuals are weaved together into the fabric of a larger entity (Eberly, 2000:5-7).

Notwithstanding the shared goals of its members as indicated above, some scholars such as White (1996:179-185); Eberly (2000:5-8); Khilnani (2001:13); Jayaram (2005:16-19); Jobert (2008:3); and Edwards (2011:7) posit that what actually constitutes civil society is contentious. They maintain that it consists of any imaginable form of voluntary associations (White, 2004:8; Post and Rosenblum, 2002:1). Therefore, White (2004:10) cautions that it is necessary to distinguish between informal social networks based on clientelistic and patrimonial allegiance, and formal organisations; between those institutions whose activities reside predominantly outside the political system, and those that play specific political roles within the system (for example, advocacy or pressure groups); between illegal or secret organisations (for example, the Triads, the Mafia or the

Freemasons), and open or legal associations; and lastly, between associations that strive for the transformation of political regimes such as guerrilla movements, and those that assent to the political status quo. These distinctions he claims, are important particularly when examining the role of civil society in the democratisation process since some civil society organisations would be politically active while others would be docile. Similarly, whereas some would tolerate or support autocratic rule, others would endeavour to promote democracy. Furthermore, while some ‘progressive’ segments of civil society would prefer to champion a liberal democratic polity, others would seek an alternative markedly different from the liberal model (White, 2004:10-11).

Despite its expansive nature, Gill (2000:118-119) argues that a common attribute of CSOs is that they emerge in response to the desire of people to achieve collective interests within their communities. In other words, he opines that the association of people, the circumstances in their lives, and the challenges they face are the catalysts for the emergence of CSOs. This commonality of interest he declares, usually cuts across class boundaries and therefore, unite people to pursue their passions. Therefore, in his opinion, it can be assumed that civil society constitutes autonomous groups which coalesce the activities and views of individuals, and act as defenders and promoters of their interests even against the state (Gill, 2000:118-119). Thus, the contemporary usage of the concept assumes that an intermediate associational sphere between the public and the state occupied by organisations exists. It is further assumed that these organisations are autonomous from the state, and are voluntarily formed by members to defend or broaden their interests, as well as values (White, 2004:10). These assumptions are consistent with the ideals of liberal democracy as espoused by Diamond (1994:5) (see above) who regards civil society as the range of organised groups and institutions that are voluntary, independent of the state, are largely self-supporting, and have respect for the law. This according to Gill (2000:5), suggests that issues are discussed publicly. Thus, matters of public policy are being deliberated widely within the community instead of being the exclusive decision of the regime elites. Through these public discussions, autonomous groups are able to defend and promote the interests of their particular constituencies. Therefore, central to the existence of civil society is the recognition of its

9 legitimacy by the state and vice versa. Also, he adds, it is crucial that both (the state and civil society) should acknowledge the right of one another to function unhindered within specific defined fields of competence which should include the political sphere (Gill, 2000:5). It follows that in order for civil society to exist, autonomous groups must be capable of championing the ideals they embody in the political realm in particular, and the society in general. This implies that the presence of a network of groups which structure the private lives of individuals and pursue their interests in the public domain does not represent civil society unless such groups are capable of pursuing those interests in the political field (Gill, 2000:5-6).

It can be deduced from the above discussion that according to the Western perspective, civil society is conceived as the ‘public arena’ composing groups and private individuals/citizens who enjoy relative ‘distance’, or autonomy from government in the quest for their activities (Bujra, 2002:26). Furthermore, Howell and Pearce (2001:186) postulate that these individuals are rational and their common non-primordial interest is the major pull factor. This implies that informal organisations such as primordial groups based on kinship and ethnicity are not considered as civil society by the West as indicated below. Also integral to the Western conception of civil society is the sanctity of the individual and their inalienable rights, as well as the freedom to practise those rights, especially the right to join and exit an association. Great importance is attached to the democratic ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity which resonate with revolutionary social movements (Chatterjee, 2001:172; Goody, 2001:153; Bujra, 2002:27). These ideals according to Goody (2001:153), are considered as valuable ‘weapons’ for the weaklings which allow them to engage the state. However, Goody (2001:154) further avers that most states, even some of those that purport to be democratic, tend to covertly compromise or overtly reject these ideals. Therefore, the realm of civil society is perceived as different from the public sphere occupied by organisations like parastatals, the civil service, and the police and armed forces, which are publicly managed or funded and thus, subject to government directions or control (Bujra, 2002:27). In terms of the Western neoliberal perspective, a ‘spirited civil society’ not only plays a vital role in checking and limiting the potential abuse of state power, but it also redefines the rules of the ‘political

10 game’ along democratic principles (White, 2004:15). In short, central to the prospects for democratisation is the presence or absence of vigorous and vibrant CSOs (Gill, 2000:60).

Unlike the West where, as revealed above, there seem to be consensus among scholars on the composition of civil society, divergent views exist in India on whether associational groupings based on kinship and caste linkages reside in the domain of civil society. According to scholars such as Khilnani (2001:28), civil society is considered as a set of practices which facilitate the governing of human beings (Khilnani, 2001:28). Therefore, Oommen (2005:188) asserts that in a hierarchical and heterogeneous society such as India (contrary to the Western stance), the argument is that the fluid association of social groupings based on kinship and caste linkages, as well as on religious mobilisation should be acknowledged as legitimately residing in the domain of civil society. Concerning caste associations for example, it is alleged that while their political role has long been recognised, their social role is hardly noticed (Oommen, 2005:188). Notwithstanding the effectiveness of caste associations in terms of their social role, other Indian scholars such as Saberwal (2005:113) contends that religious and caste groups cannot be considered as civil society. This he argues, is because they are based on inherited identities instead of open membership, their deliberative processes do not employ the use of empirically grounded reason, and they utilise coercive means like stark violence and out casting (fatwa) to exercise control over their members. Nevertheless, he admits that these groups have been central to the public life of Indians in recent times. For example, they protect their members against the potential abuses of other more powerful castes, or such agencies as the state (Saberwal, 2005:113). Therefore, Oommen (2005:188) observes that civil society is widely used in India to denote the rise in popular movements against the state.

As to Africa and the Middle East which are characterised by similar associational groupings especially primordial groups (thus convenient to be discussed together), Ekeh (1992:193-194); Zubaida (2001:248); and Niblock (2005:487-488) affirm that associations in the form of non-state institutions and groups have been acknowledged as the basis of civil society. They also declare that the role of these associations in generating forces

11 which may counter-balance state powers has also been acknowledged. However, similar to India, they maintain that the intricate question arises whether neotraditional (primordial) groups such as those based on tribe, kinship, family, and religion should be considered as civil society (Ekeh, 1992:193-194; Zubaida, 2001:248; Niblock, 2005:487-488). Opponents of the view, mostly liberal writers like Rakner (1992:47); Gyimah-Boadi (1996:129); and Zubaida (2001:242) for example, assert that in contrast to formal organisations that mostly associate with the state, the above groups cannot be regarded as civil society since they avoid all contact with the state and stand apart from it. In addition, they contend that these groups are generally by nature patriarchal, authoritarian, and their membership is ascribed and not voluntary. According to them, the most essential requirement for civil society is that individuals are ‘modular’. This suggests that in practical terms, they are free to join or exit associations at will, unrestrained by any understandings of blood or relationship, as well as rid of awesome ritual. However, concerning neotraditional groups, these critics allege that individuals remain ‘caged’ within a system of repression, devoid of the rights which are central to freedom (Niblock, 2005:488-489). Concerning the Middle East, citing Islam which is the most popular religion in the region, they contend that many segments of the contemporary Islamic movement have authoritarian tendencies which are incompatible with pluralist democracy. This they claim, is evident in the nature of the religious-based society sought by Islamism (Zubaida, 2001:239).

On the other hand, proponents of the view that primordial units should be considered as civil society such as Ekeh (1992:191, 194, 196); Kasfir (1998:7); Maina (1998:136); Zubaida (2001:235, 240, 242); Nkwachukwu (2003:4-5); Niblock (2005:488, 491); and Cheeseman (2015:76-79) hold that the most active, durable and strongest associations outside government in Africa and the Middle East are specifically the neotraditional groups excluded from civil society by liberal scholars. They maintain that any conceptualisation of civil society that overlooks this fact is unrealistic and a ridicule of the notion that civil society can engender democracy (Ekeh, 1992:195; Fatton, 1995:72-73; Maina, 1998:137; Howell and Pearce, 2001:186-187; Zubaida, 2001:235; Nkwachukwu, 2003:4-5). As a result, they suggest a shift in focus from the liberal ‘conventional’ view

12 which dwells much on formal institutions and organisations to ‘an activity view’ of civil society. It is their contention that great injustice is committed to civil society in the Middle East and Africa due to the focus on the former. This is because many of the subtle transformative and exciting activities in both regions take place at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life but are easily dismissed as non-civic or ignored. These include spontaneous protests, indiscipline and laxity, as well as active non-cooperation with the state which they assume, are safer methods of indicating the disagreement of citizens with the government than more robust activities like burning effigies, placard- waving and planned protest marches (Maina, 1998:137; Howell and Pearce, 2001:185, 188). Consequently, in determining the scope of what constitutes civil society, Ekeh (1992:195) believes that the focus should not only be on activities with patent capability to challenge the state but also on those with latent capacity.

Therefore, for these scholars, neotraditional groups such as contemporary Islamic movements in the Middle East contribute enormously towards advancing democracy in the region. For instance, they posit that these movements are key participants in voluntary institutions and associations like syndicates and unions. Their engagement with politics and society is aimed at putting Islamic ideals into practice. They seek to convert others into their way of thinking, thereby exploring ways of effectively living the principles of shari’a. In pursuing these aims, they co-exist and engage with other ideas and forces in the democratic process, both in the social and political spheres. They also clash with authorities who attempt to limit or deny their autonomy in the pursuit of their interests (Zubaida, 2001:236-237). Therefore, in their view, if civil society is cherished primarily for its role in limiting the arbitrary power of government, it can be argued that it is absurd to exclude primordial communal and religious associations from the scope of what comprises civil society. They claim that the strength of tribal and religious allegiances provides associations of this nature a kind of protection which may be lacking in other civil associations. In other words, they have the inherent protection of effective power while other civil associations rely mostly on legal structures to safeguard their autonomy and are thus, easier to target through criminal licensing law, official harassment and slander, as well as prosecution of their leaders. Consequently, they contend that aware

13 of their capability to garner support from substantial sections of the population, most governments will be wary of confronting neotraditional groups (Maina, 1998:136; Niblock, 2005:490-491). Therefore, Zubaida (2001:243) remarks that the repression of formal civil and political associations is the impetus for individuals to continuously seek prosperity and security through affiliations to informal associations based on tribe, kin and religion. Furthermore, Maina (1998:138) contends that ethnic and tribal identity provide a political language which unites people in terms of what to pursue. He adds that this unity fosters a common ideology which nurtures political support around social discords (Maina, 1998:138).

Against this backdrop, they argue that the view postulated by liberal writers that religious and tribal communal associations embody a cage within which individuals are confined and controlled by religious and traditional leaders is preposterous. In their opinion, it ignores the extent to which individuals willingly decide to utilise these informal primordial groups to defend and foster their communal and individual socio-economic and political interests (Niblock, 2005:491). As an illustration, they assert that the religious-based associations in the contemporary Middle East which have great impact on the development of civil society are those seeking to improve or change the political and social conditions of individuals. According to them, they have witnessed a steady growth both in strength and numbers since the early 1970s. These include voluntary welfare and aid associations, as well as movements which have been established to champion an Islamic (or specific type of Islamic) socio-economic and/or political agenda. For example, they disclose that religious communal leaders in the less urbanised societies have often created parties or political movements to promote and defend the interests of their communities. This is evident in Sudan where prior to independence, the leadership of the Mahdist Ansar religious order transformed into leaders of the Umma Party, and have ever since retained that position (Niblock, 2005:494). Consequently, Zubaida (2001:236) argues that whereas the positive elements such as security for the individual and mutual support in these neotraditional groups can be supported and tolerated, the negative aspects like nepotism, extremism and factionalism should be discouraged.

Just as the composition of civil society is disputable, its relation with the state particularly concerning its autonomy, is also contentious. Villadsen (2016:4) for instance, notes that the debate about the relationship between civil society and the state is quite controversial. Most Western scholars such as Norton (2005: 278) argues that civil society cannot be isolated from the state. He further maintains that the government must play the crucial role of rule-maker, referee and regulator of civil society, notwithstanding the likelihood of opposition to the government from some elements of civil society (Norton, 2005: 279). Therefore, in his opinion, civil society is neither a substitute for government nor a panacea for societal problems (Norton, 2005: 279). Corroborating this view are John and Comaroff (2005: 283) who argue that “any thought of an autonomous civil society, whether narrowly or normatively conceived” is “a cheerful fantasy” (John and Comaroff, 2005: 283).

The majority of African scholars on the other hand, are of the opinion that civil society can be independent from the state. Sachikonye (1995:7) for example, postulates that civil society functions better if autonomous from the state. He adds that a major prerequisite for democratisation is the emancipation of civil society from the shackles of the state (Sachikonye, 1995:7). Similarly, M’boge and Doe (2004:23) assert that a common characteristic of authoritarian regimes is a “caged” civil society. In this regard, Sachikonye (1995:9) contends that some degree of freedom is required to enhance the capacity of civil society to play its role in advancing the democratisation process. Concurring with this view, Mamdani (1995:605) avows that whereas civil society may be state-organised, it is not necessarily state-controlled. However, as noted by other African scholars such as Bujra (2002:40-41) and Bujra and Buthelezi (2002:xii-xiii), most autonomous groups in Africa are deficient in terms of acting politically. For example, they argue that in contrast to democracy-advocating CSOs that are primarily concerned with advancing the democratisation process, developmental CSOs are non-political. They are essentially developmentally oriented and are engaged in development projects such as the provision of potable water at the community or national levels. In order to ensure that their projects are executed without hindrance, they assert that developmental CSOs therefore, cooperate with governments notwithstanding whether they are democratic or not (Bujra, 2002:40-41; Bujra and Buthelezi, 2002:xii-xiii). As a result, Gill (2000:6) alleges that they

15 mostly realise their goals without resorting to political activism. Nevertheless, such activism as indicated above, is a vital ingredient of what constitutes civil society (Gill, 2000:6). Concerning democracy-advocating CSOs, Bujra and Buthelezi (2002:xi-xiv) observe that unlike developmental CSOs, their relations with the state have generally been hostile, compelling them to be confrontational when dealing with government. However, they maintain that if a good working relationship exists between them, it will be a key indicator that democracy and democratic governance are deepening (Bujra and Buthelezi, 2002:xi-xiv).

In spite of the varied perspectives on the concept in terms of its meaning, composition and relation with the state, it is evident from the discussion thus far that civil society encompasses three elements: first, groups autonomous from the state which act as channels for people to organise and pursue their interests in the political domain (ie vis- a-vis the state); second, a public space where these interests are discussed and pursued; and third, (which seems not applicable to most African states) an acknowledgement by the state of the legitimacy of the activities of these groups, as well as the space where the activities are pursued. However, a public space and state recognition of the legitimacy of this space will be meaningless without the existence of these groups which are the ‘lifeblood’ of civil society. This implies that whereas civil society cannot exist without state recognition, the development of autonomous groups which are the essential elements of civil society, must pave the way for civil society to emerge (Gill, 2000:118).

Against the backdrop of the divergent views expressed above and considering the pre- industrial nature of African societies, as well as the transitional economic and political phase they are presently going through, and perhaps not certain of the outcome, some African scholars such as Bujra (2002:47) postulates that a model of African civil society different from the one that exists in the West may eventually emerge. However, the envisaged civil society he further maintains, may be linked to some form of ‘basic democracy’ which may not necessarily be liberal or socialist (Bujra, 2002:47). This thought is in line with the view of the OAU/AU which affirms the inalienable right of African countries “to determine in all sovereignty their system of democracy based on their socio-

16 cultural values…’ (UNDP document, quoted by Bujra, 2002:47). Thus, Monga (1995:359), another African scholar, alludes to the inherent inadequacy of utilising concepts originally devised for understanding the functioning of Western democracies to analyse situations in Africa. In this regard, Mamdani (1995:603) asserts that concepts of Western origins should be modified to suit the African context.

Therefore, civil society in this thesis consists of those institutions, organised groups and social movements which are voluntarily formed and in the words of Monga (2009:10) are working “within the prevailing value system to expand the boundaries of collective freedom and strengthen the democratic ideal in the polity" while, however, relying heavily on the financial largesse of the Western donor countries. Democracy-advocating CSOs on the other hand as earlier indicated, include trade unions, student bodies, and non- governmental organisations (NGOs) that seek in a nonpartisan manner to advance the democratisation process and improve a political system. This can be achieved through, for example, anti-corruption efforts, voter education and mobilisation, human rights monitoring, and poll-watching (see Diamond, 1994:6; Sachikonye, 1995:7). However, in determining the scope of what constitutes civil society, the focus would not only be on activities with patent capability to challenge the state, but also on those with latent capacity. Consequently, the conception of civil society in this study is not limited to formal institutions. It includes both formal institutions and informal groupings, as well as developmental CSOs that pursue or strive to address any democracy-related issue such as human and political rights, civil liberties, rule of law, and government accountability and transparency, as well as promoting democratic governance. As revealed above, most of the subtle transformative activities in Africa such as spontaneous mass protests, occur at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life but are easily ignored or dismissed as non-civic. Examples include the mass protests that took place in Burkina Faso in October 2014, Burundi in May 2015 and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2016 against a third term for the presidency (Yarwood, 2016:51-52). Current examples include the “fees must fall” mass protests by university students in South Africa that began in October 2015. Spontaneous mass protests in conjunction with some of the

17 formal CSOs as disclosed in chapter three, made a strong contribution to political liberalisation in Cameroon and the establishment of a multiparty system.7

Funding of pro-democracy activities of civil society in Africa

Closely related to the controversies surrounding the meaning and composition of civil society, and its relation with the state, scholars such as Pankhurst (1998); Carothers and Ottaway (2000); Al-Sayyid (2000); Jenkins (2001); Baylies and Power (2001); and Teshome (2013) have also examined the role of foreign (Western) donors concerning civil society in Africa.8 For example, according to Carothers and Ottaway (2000:6), numerous foreign donors with pro-democratic objectives are funding activities that are explicitly labelled as ‘civil society assistance’ in several African countries particularly those attempting transitions to democracy. However, Al-Sayyid (2000:49), contends that the public in the majority of African countries, especially the Arab states, view the assistance of Western donors such as the United States of America (USA) to emerging CSOs with suspicion. This, he argues, is because American assistance in particular, is riddled with inconsistencies and ironies – it excludes groups that the country disapproves of, although they may be the staunchest supporters of civil and political liberties (Al-Sayyid, 2000:50). In line with this view, Teshome (2013:993) asserts that the USA usually reduces or terminates aid for alleged human rights abuses, as well as democratic reversals only when the recipient states are neither strategically nor economically valuable to America. As a result, Al-Sayyid (2000:49) maintains that American aid is not regarded as an indication of the commitment of the American government to promoting democratic governance in Africa. Rather, it is perceived as a tool for advancing its foreign policy goals, particularly its economic ideal of a free market system. Therefore, in his opinion, which is consistent with the widely held view by African governments (discussed above), aid constitutes unacceptable interference by the USA in the internal affairs of African

7 The informal groups that this study has addressed are spontaneous mass protests/demonstrations. Other forms of informal organisations such as neo-traditional (primordial) groups based on tribe, kinship, family, and religion did not surface during the interviews as being active in Cameroon’s democratic process (see chapter five). 8 Donors include the German Foundations, the United States of America and the World Bank (Hearn, 1997:6-11).

18 countries, which compromises the right of their citizens to self-determination (Al-Sayyid, 2000:49-50).

Notwithstanding the contentions regarding the funding of pro-democracy activities of civil society in Africa, Kasfir (2004:118) claims that much effort and money have been spent by donors during the 1990s to organise ‘new’ CSOs in Africa following the third wave of democratisation that swept across the continent from the end of 1989. Similarly, Bujra (2002:23) reveals that around 1990 the donor community developed a Political Reform Programme9 for Africa with the notion that ‘good governance’ is vital for development and economic growth. He adds that loans to African countries from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as other bilateral aid were tied to this programme (Bujra, 2002:23). According to Kasfir (2004:118), the explicit objectives were to safeguard democratic gains already made, and to aggressively struggle for more. Furthermore, the presumption was that the programme would usher in liberal democratic institutions with the consequent development of good governance and the emergence of a democratic political system. A dynamic, robust civil society was also expected to be the outcome of the Political Reform Programme (Bujra, 2002:23).

The role of civil society in promoting and sustaining democracy

A third group of scholars deals with the role of civil society in promoting and sustaining democracy (particularly on the African continent).10 These include the work by Bratton and Van de Walle (1994); Harbeson (1994); Sachikonye (1995); Adejumobi (2000); Bujra and Buthelezi (2002); White (2004); and Teshome (2009). For White (2004:13), the political roles of civil society include undermining authoritarian governments, contributing to the establishment and sustainability of a democratic polity, and enhancing the quality

9 The Political Reform Programme was introduced as a parallel programme to the Economic Reform Programme, that is, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which had already been in existence since the early 1980s (Bujra, 2002:23). 10The role of civil society in promoting and sustaining democracy as indicated above, has been examined in detail in chapter two. Therefore, this section only provides a brief overview.

19 of governance. Sachikonye (1995:11) also underlines that civil society organisations can restrain states from engaging in coercive authoritarian actions with impunity. He further asserts that the democratic space can be broadened as a result of their resistance (Sachikonye, 1995:11). In affirmation, Harbeson (1994:22) as alluded to earlier, maintains that civil society can act as advocates of regime change. Concerning the transition process (in the early 1990s) for example, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994:461) note that between November 1989 and May 1991, 16 of the 21 cases of transition that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa were initiated by civil society while only five were spearheaded by incumbent state leaders.11 Corroborating this view, Adejumobi (2000:249) asserts that in several of those countries where the founding elections resulted in the ousting of the incumbent regimes such as in Cape Verde, the Republic of Benin, Malawi, and Zambia, the CSOs were relatively organised and vociferous. He further contends that they engaged the state in a ferocious political battle, championed the cause of political reforms, and stamped their influence on the course of the transition process (Adejumobi, 2000:249). For instance, they ensured that the incumbents overhaul the electoral laws to permit a level playing field for all the contestants. They also made sure that institutional electoral structures such as the media, the judiciary, the police and the electoral body were insulated from manipulation by the governing party or regime (Adejumobi, 2000:249).

However, in the period immediately after the transition process, Diamond (2000:200) asserts that in several African countries, civil society disintegrated and dwindled in terms of political significance. In his opinion, despite the blooming of civil society in a number of African countries, it has become weak and ineffective in others (Diamond, 2008: 256- 257). As a result, he observes that numerous problems exist in many countries with governments that came to power in multiparty elections following the third wave of democratisation (Diamond, 2000:191). He contends that the opposition parties for instance, have been denied any chance of taking over power since the incumbent parties have exploited institutional advantages in the new political dispensation (Diamond,

11 The five cases are Tanzania, Sao Tome, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and Madagascar (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:461).

2000:191). This has given rise to the dominant party ‘syndrome’12 such as in Ethiopia13 with concerns of corruption, loss of accountability, declining government response to public opinion, and the overall erosion of democratic principles (see Brooks, 2004:122; Weis, 2014:268). In light of these democratic deficiencies, Kasfir (2004:118) argues that it is apparent that many African states have entered an uncertain period after the initiation of the democratisation process. He adds that democracy, authoritarianism and practices of neo-patrimonialism that characterise most regimes are contradictory elements (Kasfir, 2004:118). In reaction to this seemingly paradoxical situation, Bayart (1986:118) cautions that a civil society that lacks democratic ideals does not guarantee the progress of democracy. Walzer (1991:302) succinctly puts it that “only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state”. In similar vein, Bujra and Buthelezi (2002:xi) maintain that the ability of civil society to advance the democratisation process depends on factors such as available material resources, its relationship with the state, and the character of its leadership.

The role of civil society in the post-transition phase, that is, since 2005 (the main focus of this study) has also attracted the attention of several scholars, particularly in terms of its alleged silence on democratic problems confronting several African countries. In the DRC for example, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) of Joseph Kabila has manipulated the outcome of both elections that have been held following the introduction of multiparty politics in 2006. Due to among other things, the disrespect for the constitution, the lack of democratic values, political corruption and impunity, the social and economic conflicts which have continued unabated with the consequent human rights

12 Dominant party generally refers to any party which has been at the head of national government for 20 years or more through regular elections. Statistics from the African continent indicate that a total of 16 current governing parties qualify as dominant among which are the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) in Cameroon, the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) in Burkina Faso, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) in Equatorial Guinea, the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) in Gabon, the People's Rally for Progress (RPP) in Djibouti, and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia (Weis, 2014:268). 13 Since 1995 that Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has won all the four elections that have been conducted in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 (African Elections Database, 2012).

21 abuses, as well as the lack of power invested in the judiciary, and the tilting of the political playing field in his favour; the Kabila regime has been perceived as falling short of the minimal requirements for democracy (see Matti, 2010:49; Ligny, 2011:44; Emify, 2014:103). Similarly, Makara (2010:81, 83) alleges that notwithstanding the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Uganda in the late 1990s, democracy has eluded the country. He maintains that among other things, the removal of the constitutional term limits on the presidency, unlimited patronage politics, and incumbency advantages evident in the unconstitutional use of state apparatuses and resources in the various elections are impediments to the progress of the country’s democratisation process (Makara, 2010:81, 83). They have also been the mechanisms utilised to perpetuate the continuous political dominance of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party of Yoweri Museveni (Makara, 2010:81, 83).

Amid the serious democratic shortcomings in the post-transition period as demonstrated above, some scholars have attempted to provide explanations for the perceived lack of action from CSOs on these issues. Obadare (2011:430) for instance, alludes to the present disillusionment in several African states concerning the ineffectiveness of CSOs. This he maintains, is partly a result of the expectation of the public for CSOs to succeed where the states have failed to address societal woes such as unemployment, corruption and nepotism, as well as undemocratic elections. Citing Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe as examples, he further purports that the public is justified in its disenchantment. In these countries he observes, numerous civil society activists have defected and become state bureaucrats. This he contends, makes them indistinguishable from politicians who merely wait for opportunities to exploit at the expense of the masses whose causes they claim to champion (Obadare, 2011:430-431). Kaliba (2014:11) also notes that CSOs in Zambia have adopted a reactionary approach in their engagement with the government. She adds that while the country’s CSOs easily mobilise into coalitions and play a significant role during moments of crisis, there is a lack of continuous rigorous engagement with the government after the crisis has abated. As an illustration, she refers to 2001 when President Chiluba wanted to revise the constitution in order to be eligible to run for a third term. Zambian CSOs she recalls, jointly resisted his scheme but went into slumber

22 immediately after victory was achieved (Kaliba, 2014:11). Similarly, in Malawi, Hussein (2009:364) observes that CSOs are fragmented and too feeble to effectively promote political pluralism. In his opinion, they are characterised by donor dependence and patronage politics, and lacking in terms of cooperation and coordination, as well as technical expertise which compromises their bargaining power with the government (Hussein, 2009:364). Likewise, in Zimbabwe, Aeby (2016:703) alleges that the influence of CSOs on the democratisation process has been inhibited by disunity, organisational disintegration, conflicting strategies and dwindling access to political elites, as well as government’s continued suppression of their activities and limitations on greater civic participation. In similar vein, Wood (2016:533) asserts that the major challenge encountered by CSOs in Kenya is the sustainability of the operating, legislative and political space at their disposal which is shrinking due to the manner in which CSOs are treated and regulated by the government. Concurring with this view, Alidu and Gyekye- Jandoh (2016:4) maintain that CSOs in Ghana before the restoration of democratic rule in 1993 functioned in a tough political climate, which suggests that the operation of civil society is invariably affected by the form of regime in a country.

Civil society in Cameroon

Scholarly contributions on civil society in Cameroon in particular, can be divided into those that discuss the role of CSOs in the democratisation process (leading to the transition to multipartism in 1992) and those that examine their role in the early post-transition phase, that is, around 2007. Concerning the former, they include Forje (1999); Temngah (2000); Yenshu (2001); Mbuagbo and Fru (2003); Awasom (2005); and Nkwi (2006). Mbuagbo and Fru (2003:136) for example, who maintain that CSOs in the period preceding transition faced political restrictions largely caused by the government’s reluctance to effectively liberalise national political life. This they contend, was a result of those in the regime with egoistic motives who were determined to maintain the status quo (Mbuagbo and Fru, 2003:136). Forje (1999:4) adds that the restrictions also resulted from two interrelated factors. First, the institutionalisation in 1966 of a monolithic political system and second, the abolishment in 1972 of the federal system of government. These he

23 argues, intensified the co-option of CSOs by the state resulting in their weakness and the authoritarian state that ensued (Forje, 1999:4-5). However, Awasom (2005:211) asserts that in the wake of the third wave of democratisation, CSOs in Cameroon became vocal and determined to open and expand the political space. He points out that among the first group of CSOs were trade unions and student organisations. He claims that they re- emerged as strong opponents of the government in reaction to among other things, the lack of professional jobs for university graduates, a severe deterioration in services at the lone University of Yaoundé (at that stage in the country’s development), and the overall deterioration of the economy (Awasom, 2005:211). These organisations as mentioned earlier, made a strong contribution to the demise of the authoritarian and archaic system that had been in existence since 1961 and its subsequent replacement by a more liberalised system and transition from a one-party to a multiparty system in 1992 (Nkwi, 2006:96). Although the above scholarly works were published about nine years after the transition to multipartism in 1992, most of these contributions focus more on the transition process than the post-transition phase.

A paucity of scholarly work exists on the role of CSOs in Cameroon in the post-transition phase, that is, since 2007 (the main focus of this study as indicated above). A few recent works (although about a decade ago) include those by Chouala (2007); Fokwang (2007); and Nyambo (2008). Regarding the legal framework that governs the creation of civil society for instance, Nyambo (2008:47) notes that the state has adopted a combination of repression and cautionary approaches in creating the legal space for CSOs (elaborated on in chapter five). He further remarks that Cameroonian CSOs in the post-transition phase reflect diversity and complexity in terms of their creation, their goals, their functioning and organisation, as well as their sources of revenue (Nyambo, 2008:46). Likewise, Chouala (2007:135-136) maintains that the tendency of most CSOs in Cameroon to empower the citizens to improve their lives has significantly tainted their capacity and consciousness, particularly in terms of adopting a critical approach in scrutinising government’s activities. Consequently, he claims that their political influence and mobilisation capacity are weak. Therefore in his opinion, the blossoming of CSOs in Cameroon (as earlier indicated) has not significantly altered public opinion, nor

24 established a favourable public space where critical discussion can be conducted in order to dislodge the present regime from its political hegemony (Chouala, 2007:136). As a result, he asserts that the tactics employed nowadays by Cameroonian CSOs (elaborated on in chapter five) are ineffective since they limit their potential especially concerning being ferocious in combating the socio-economic and political ills plaguing the country (Chouala, 2007:137).14 Shifting focus to youth participation in civil society, Fokwang (2007:308) contends that the Cameroonian youths have formulated alternative means of engagement in associational life through which their aspirations, anxieties and views on civic participation are developed and articulated. He further affirms that they are social actors whose participation in civil society is contingent on changing periods and contexts which redefine their modes of participation (Fokwang, 2007:308).

The current strategies and mobilisation capacity of Cameroonian CSOs as revealed above, are largely ineffective in alleviating the socio-economic and political problems facing the country. This concurs with the view expressed by Mbuagbo and Fru (2003:134) (see above) that in comparison to the 1990s, CSOs in Cameroon (both the old and new generations) find it difficult to sensitise and encourage the citizens to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance. However, as evident in the scholarly work particularly in the post-transition phase of Cameroon’s democratisation process, there appears to be a dearth of empirical studies in terms of providing an insight into why Cameroonian CSOs are ineffective in their efforts to deal with the country’s current multifarious democratic deficiencies. Besides, most of the work seems to focus on formal organisations while overlooking informal institutions and subtle transformative activities such as spontaneous mass protests. As discussed above, most of the subtle transformative activities in Africa such as spontaneous mass protests occur at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life and are easily ignored or dismissed as non-civic. A further shortcoming in the literature is the limited scholarly explanations for the difficulty encountered by Cameroonian CSOs in sensitising and encouraging the citizens to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance (given their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as indicated

14 See chapter four for the democratic deficiencies in Cameroon.

25 earlier). This study hopes to fill these gaps in the literature which are addressed in chapter five based on the findings from the interviews conducted.

1.4 Research method

This is a qualitative study based on both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include scholarly articles, newspaper articles and books while primary sources include government policy documents that are relevant to the study. In order to establish the role of democracy-advocating CSOs (see above), 42 semi-structured personal interviews were conducted. Two sets of respondents were interviewed: the first category was comprised of prominent individuals (independent analysts) that are regarded as politically knowledgeable on the subject under study, while the second group consisted of the representatives of the main CSOs. Prominent individuals were purposively selected by means of information from national newspapers such as The Guardian Post No. 0872 of 18 February 2016; The Guardian Post No. 0970 of 15 July 2016; The Guardian Post No. 1045 of 1 November 2016; The Guardian Post No. 1060 of 22 November 2016; The Guardian Post No. 1103 of 6 February 2017; The Cameroon Report edition 369 of 11 December 2017; The Guardian Post No. 1319 of 15 December 2017; and The Post No. 01881 of 8 January 2018. They were also selected through information from reliable intermediaries in the civil society and media sectors who preferred to remain anonymous. The snowball method was adopted in selecting the influential members of the main CSOs. Initial interviewees such as Father Tatah Mbuy (Director of Communications, Archdiocese of Bamenda); Fon Nsoh (Coordinator, COMINSUD, Bamenda); Gwain Colbert (Executive Director, A Common Future, Bamenda); Afu Stephens Kwah (President, the Presbyterian Education Authority Teachers Trade Union (PEATTU), North West Region, Based in Bamenda); and Melvin Songwe (CEO/President, the United Youths Organisation, Bamenda) were asked for referals to other representatives of the major CSOs.

A total of 42 interviews were conducted as pointed out above. However, after about 25 interviews, a recurrent theme began to emerge with data saturation becoming discernible. Interviews were conducted with nine prominent individuals among whom were Mbah

Ndam Joseph (Barrister at Law, Social Democratic Front (SDF) Member of Parliament,15 Deputy Speaker Cameroon National Assembly, Member CEMAC Parliament, Member Pan-African Parliament, Based in Batibo); Banlilon Tani Victor (Registrar, Lecturer, Department of Law and Political Science, the University of Bamenda); Ngepah Julius Billa (Vice Chairman and Political Adviser to the Balikumbat Electoral District of the SDF; and Ngong Song Jean Marie (journalist, The Rambler Newspaper, Based in Bamenda) (see bibliography II for a complete list of names). Also, 33 interviews were conducted with representatives of CSOs which, included the WaCameroon, the FGI, CHRAPA, the Justice and Peace Commission (Archdiocese of Bamenda), COMINSUD, and the United Youths Organisation. These organisations are based in the North West region and they work at micro-level within the system although some of their activities cut across the entire country (see chapter 5). They are involved in democracy promotion-related activities such as human and political rights, civil liberties, rule of law, and government accountability and transparency. Most of the respondents were willing for their names to be mentioned in the study, the exceptions being the representatives of the following CSOs: the Catholic Education Workers’ Trade Union (CEWOTU), TAC, the Cameroon Teachers’ Trade Union (CATTU), the University of Buea Students’ Union, the National Polytechnic Students’ Union, the Justice and Peace Commission (Archdiocese of Bamenda), and WaCameroon.

Interviews were conducted from December 2017 to January 2018. Due to the tense political atmosphere that characterised the interview period, it was not possible to travel across the entire country and to gain access to some of the interviewees who were suspicious of the motive of the study and sincerity of the researcher. However, this challenge was partly overcome by the use of reliable anglophone intermediaries who convinced the interviewees of the credentials of the researcher. A limitation of this study is that the selection of respondents was restricted to the North West region where the researcher was most familiar with the political terrain and therefore, could safely navigate

15 It is widely believed that the Social Democratic Front (SDF) is presently the major opposition party in Cameroon (The Cameroon Report, 2017:5).

27 through the politically contentious environment.16 Notwithstanding this limitation, the respondents seemed to be objective and tried to be as informative as possible and as alluded to above, after about 25 interviews, a recurrent theme began to emerge with data saturation becoming discernible. In addition, this is a qualitative study as stated above, to get some indications of the role of Cameroon’s democracy-advocating CSOs in promoting democracy since the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections held in 1992 (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as mentioned above). On average interviews lasted for 90 minutes with the shortest being 40 minutes and the longest approximately four hours since the respondents had a lot to discuss about the subject under study.

A semi-structured interview guide was used for all the interviews (see appendix I), which covered the following themes: the role of Cameroonian democracy-advocating CSOs in fostering democratic governance, the nature of relationships that exist among Cameroonian CSOs, the relation between these CSOs and the state, the commitment of the leadership of Cameroonian democracy-advocating CSOs to promoting democracy, and the challenges faced by CSOs in advancing democratic governance. All the interviews were recorded after permission was asked to do so and analysed in accordance with the analytical framework provided in chapter two.

Ethical considerations

In line with ethical requirements of the University of Johannesburg, each interviewee was required to read and sign a letter in which they gave their consent to be interviewed. The document included the purpose of the research and an assurance that they could terminate the interview at any time. It also guaranteed the confidentiality of those respondents that did not want to be identified. In such cases, pseudonyms were used (see appendix II for a copy of the ‘Interview consent form’).

16 The interviews were conducted against a backdrop of the attempt by the anglophone parts of Cameroon (North West and South West regions) to secede and form an independent entity. This engendered a spirit of fear, insecurity and mutual distrust in the populace (Ayang, 2017:3).

1.5 Contribution to scientific knowledge

It is widely acknowledged in scholarly work that civil society has played an instrumental role in the transition to multipartism and the democratisation process in Africa after many years of authoritarian rule. However, mindful of the lack of democratic development in a number of states typified by, for example, the violation of fundamental democratic principles, several scholars have questioned and highlighted the ineffectiveness of organised CSOs in challenging governments on the issues threatening democracy. This includes those CSOs that played a pivotal role in the transition to multiparty politics in a number of African states and in Cameroon in particular.

This study’s contribution to knowledge therefore lies at two levels. In the first instance, the study will broaden academic reflection within the democratisation literature on the role of civil society in Cameroon in particular, in the post-transition period amid serious democratic shortcomings in the country over the past two decades. The second major contribution of the study lies at the broader African level where this study can provide the basis, for explaining the role of or the perceived absence of civil society in the post- transition period in other African countries with severe democratic deficiencies (see chapter five for an elaboration).

1.6 Research structure

This study consists of six chapters with this chapter setting out the aim, scope and methodology of the study. It also provides an overview of the literature on civil society and its meaning. Chapter two develops a framework for analysis according to which the role of civil society in the promotion of democracy and its challenges in Cameroon are evaluated. Political rule in Cameroon and the restrictions on civil society (1966-1992) is discussed in chapter three. Chapter four focuses on the state of democracy in Cameroon since 1992. Chapter five (based on interviews) is devoted to examining the role of CSOs in countering the deterioration of the country’s limited democratic gains since 1992. Based on the interviews, explanations for their perceived lack of challenging

29 the present political dispensation are provided. A summary of the main findings is presented in chapter six.

CHAPTER TWO

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

While civil society may have experienced a steady erosion in the 20th century through conscious abandonment or neglect, it, however, regained its significance in the 21st century (Eberly, 2000:3). The concept became prominent in political and intellectual debate following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent global democratic openings that ensued. Throughout the 1990s, the concept sustained its prominence. A ‘spirited civil society’ became synonymous with the achievement of essential economic and social goals, good governance, and democratic values. Civil society therefore, became the ‘big idea’ for the 21st century. It enjoyed support among activists, theorists, and policymakers, as well as across the political spectrum worldwide such as in most of Europe, the United States and the majority of the developing world (Edwards, 2011:4-5).

In Africa in particular, as pointed out in chapter one, there were high hopes that CSOs would succeed where the states have failed in addressing societal woes such as unemployment, corruption and nepotism, as well as undemocratic elections. After about three decades confidence was lost in the assumed capacity of CSOs to promote democratic governance and stimulate economic recovery (Obadare, 2011:430). The general conception in several African countries is that accountability and a sense of responsibility are now rare, particularly concerning public institutions (Eberly, 2000:5). According to Edwards (2011:7), this disenchantment with civil society can be traced to the elastic nature of the concept (see chapter one), as well as the historical antecedents that led to its development. The first section in this chapter examines the origins of civil society in the democratic process. This is followed by a discussion on the role it plays in promoting democracy, and the challenges encountered in this process according to which a framework for analysing the role of civil society in Cameroon is developed.

2.2 The origins of civil society in the democratic process

Civil society like most other Western political concepts has its roots in Greek political philosophy (Kaldor, 2003:6). The first usage of the concept is credited to Aristotle (DeWiel, 1997:7). He discussed the politike koinona (political society or community) which refers to a society governed by a ruler who considers the public good to be more important than the ruler’s private interest (Kaldor, 2003:6). Politike koinona was later translated by Latin writers as societas civilis which in English means civil society (DeWiel, 1997:8). The concept in the 17th and 18th centuries became strongly associated with the idea of a social contract and the values of individual rights. As a result, a civil society was regarded as individuals getting together and formulating a social contract. This contract stipulated the existence of a state and the rule of law which both the citizens and the state had to respect. Therefore, the ruled and the rulers were all equal in terms of the administration of justice. Civil society was thus, indistinguishable from the state and was perceived to be a peaceful society where strangers were treated with civility as opposed to other societies marred by insolence and violence. The first person who used the concept to mean something different from the state was Hegel. He conceived civil society to be an intermediate sphere between the state and the family. Therefore, the state was considered as an arbiter that resolved the squabbles of civil society, while the civil servants were deemed to be the ‘universal class’ that acted in the interest of the public (Kaldor, 2003:6-7). However, unlike Hegel, Engels and Marx saw the state as subordinate to civil society. They contended that the state was an apparatus or instrument in the custody of the dominant elites (Kaldor, 2003:7).

Transcending the philosophical conception of civil society, the term experienced a facelift in late medieval-early modern Europe as a historical phenomenon. The concept became associated with social groups that were freed from restrictions imposed on them by absolutist and feudal systems. These groups emerged in commercial cities and towns where some members of the bourgeoisie like guildsmen and merchants were granted certain rights and privileges within the feudal system such as economic autonomy and privileges of local rule. Consequently, they started to reassert themselves after many

32 years of nullification of these rights and privileges by absolutism. They for example, became critical of the autocratic rule of the monarchy (Bernhard, 1993:308). The upshot was that some political forces within civil society by the 19th century strengthened in order to challenge the authority of the monarchy (Bernhard, 1993:308). Furthermore, an autonomous space for social actors emerged in the process of emancipation. The new public sphere was located between private or communal life, and the official public life of the nobility, the monarchy and the state. As time went on, the space was occupied by a variety of associations which included social movements and political parties, as well as professional and cultural unions. Some of these associations, particularly the political groupings, were able to organise themselves independently within this public sphere and forced the state to respect and recognise their existence. Therefore, they effectively utilised their independence from the state and exerted influence on the official public space thereby radically altering it. Other elements of society that were traditionally barred from political life were also able to organise themselves and defend their rights. The women’s suffrage movement in some states for instance, vigorously fought for enfranchisement (Bernhard, 1993:308-309).

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the concept witnessed momentous changes following its adoption by intellectuals and groups in Latin America and Eastern Europe agitating against autocratic regimes and states (Khilnani, 2001:16). After the demise of communism and the political events that resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the term assumed prominence that it had hitherto not enjoyed. Civil society became the rallying instrument for dissidents and therefore, vital in explaining and understanding the essence of dissident politics, particularly in terms of the call for the introduction of liberal democratic ideals (see Edwards, 2014:11; Jayaram, 2005:15). Consequently, civil society was regarded as a medium for achieving these ideals. For instance, it represented a mechanism for nurturing robust social movements that could overthrow despotic regimes or states (Edwards, 2014:11). As pointed out in chapter one, civil society connoted the notion of emancipatory politics (Jayaram, 2005:15). This was evident in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s, as well as other opposition movements in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (see White, 2004:7; Jayaram, 2005:15; Edwards, 2014:11).

Concerning Africa, the origins of civil society in the democratisation process has also been characterised by different phases and forces resulting in CSOs assuming several guises at different periods in the political history of the continent (Ottaway, 2000:77). During the struggle for independence for example, the driving forces behind civil society were the urban workers and middle class based mostly in the capital cities. They fervently fought for social justice and sovereignty (Bujra, 2002:31-32). However, civil society expanded to the rural areas immediately after independence was achieved. Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the rural population remained outside civil society, it nevertheless included the economically privileged elites in these areas. Similarly, in both rural and urban areas, civil society was largely divided along ethnic, regional and economic lines. Furthermore, in the immediate post-independence phase, there was an increase in CSOs particularly concerning co-operatives, political parties and social movements, as well as professional associations such as organised labour unions. While some of these groups were inherited from the colonial period, others were new. There were also several ethnic and cultural groups formed by the middle class and workers. A distinct characteristic of civil society during this period was the financial and managerial independence of the professional associations and social movements. Therefore, foreign NGOs were absent. Equally absent was financial assistance from the donor community (Bujra, 2002:32).

A difficult moment in the development of civil society in the post-independence phase was according to Mamdani (1996:21), the “moment of the collapse of an embryonic indigenous civil society, of trade unions and autonomous civil organisations, and its absorption into political society”. This moment therefore, was characterised by the overbearing power of the state and the acceptance of its developmental and equity claims by the fast-growing educated class. Consequently, most political movements were intimidated by the state and social movements were demobilised (Mamdani, 1996:21). Likewise, military rule and the single party system were the norms in the majority of African countries. Despite the fact that several urban political civil society forces experienced intimidation by the state, in many countries, however, people who had been suppressed or neglected (particularly in the rural areas) resorted to arms in their struggles against the state. This group of

34 people was later joined by many of the urban poor, as well as a significant number of the unemployed youth in both the urban and rural areas. Led by the educated elites, their struggles resulted in civil wars in various countries with the consequent disruption of the rural population, and the disintegration of the urban civil society and the state (Bujra, 2002:33).

However, in those countries that were free of civil wars, considerable tension existed. This was a result of the various protest movements that emerged in the urban areas mostly spearheaded by the educated class. These movements included open professional associations such as those composed of lawyers and workers, as well as underground political parties or movements. They demanded the introduction of democracy and political reforms. Among other things, they demanded constitutional reforms and national conferences. Similarly, in the 1980s, ‘developmentalist’ NGOs both indigenous and foreign began to emerge in several African countries. The former worked in close partnership with external donors and were almost completely dependent on their financial largesse. Also, worth noting, is the fact that the state had an ambivalent and sometimes hostile attitude towards both indigenous and foreign NGOs. However, this was more glaring concerning the indigenous organisations (Bujra, 2002:33-34).

Another crucial phase in the evolution of civil society in Africa relates to the economic crisis which started in the late 1970s and became quite serious in the 1980s. Almost everyone, including the middle class, were affected by the crisis. Nonetheless, those who suffered most were the urban poor and the rural people. A consequence of the crisis was that it led to the demand for economic and political reforms from external and internal forces. The upshot was the imposition by the donor community of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which started in the early 1980s. This was later followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the imposition of the Political Reform Programme (Bujra, 2002:34). The presumption as pointed out in chapter one, was that the programme would usher in liberal democratic institutions with the consequent development of good governance and the emergence of a democratic political system. A dynamic, robust civil society was also expected to be the outcome of the Political Reform Programme.

Therefore, the social and political movements, as well as the developmental NGOs that emerged during this period, gained strength as a result of support from external and internal sources. For instance, with support from the donors, CSOs in most African states, particularly those that were based in the urban areas, became vibrant both organisationally and vocally (Bujra, 2002:34).

It was against this backdrop that several African governments that were operating a single party system began to introduce liberal democracy with its associated institutions such as less controlled legislatures and judiciary, regular elections, multiparties, and a ‘free’ media. They also started to amend some of the laws that were perceived as seriously flawed especially in terms of their undemocratic nature (Bujra, 2002:35). However, as observed before, numerous problems exist in many African countries concerning the governments that came to power in multiparty elections following the third wave of democratisation. Therefore, civil society is perceived to play a pivotal role in the democratisation process. The next section thus examines the role of civil society in promoting democracy, particularly in Africa. As mentioned above, a framework for analysing the role of civil society in Cameroon will be developed from this discussion.

2.3 The role of civil society in promoting democracy

Civil society is crucial to any discussion on democratisation since it underscores the role of social forces in controlling, legitimising and defining state power (White, 2004:13). As mentioned in chapter one, the political roles of civil society include undermining authoritarian governments, contributing to the establishment and sustainability of a democratic polity, and enhancing the quality of governance. These roles are elaborated on in the subsequent discussion.17

17 Worth noting is the fact that in discussing the democratic functions of civil society, most African scholars like Kasfir (2004); Kew and Oshikoya (2014); and M’boge and Doe (2004) have tended to rely heavily on the work of Western authors such as Diamond (1994) whose thought as earlier indicated, is in line with the ideals of liberal democracy. Therefore, rather that citing from these African scholars, the subsequent discussion has drawn ideas directly from Diamond’s work.

The major democratic role of civil society is that it provides the basis for containing state power and therefore, fosters the control of the state by civil society forces. The political significance of this role is twofold: first, the democratisation process of autocratic states is enhanced, and second, the exercise of power by democratic states is monitored and restrained. For example, concerning the former, the mobilisation of civil society forces can be effective in exposing the abuses of undemocratic regimes and hence, undermining their legitimacy (Diamond, 1994:7). Without sustained pressure by civil society forces, autocratic governments will rarely permit open political activities, especially if the possibility of losing power is large. Therefore, the presence of vigorous CSOs is essential to fostering democracy in Africa (Kasfir, 2004:130). This role was very glaring in the wake of the third wave of democratisation that swept across the African continent from the end of 1989. Civil society came into the limelight as an important political player in the democratic transitions that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (Diamond, 1994:7). As indicated earlier, in several of those countries where the founding elections resulted in the ousting of the incumbent regimes, civil society forces were relatively organised and vociferous. They engaged the state in a ferocious political battle, championed the cause of political reforms, and stamped their influence on the course of the transition process (Adejumobi, 2000:249). In other words, they played a constitutive role in redefining the rules of the ‘political game’ along democratic principles (see chapter one) – therefore producing a new set of democratic norms which regulated the conduct of the elections and helped in levelling the playing field (White, 2004:15).

Concerning the monitoring and restraining of state power, civil society forces are also vital in curbing violations of the law and the potential abuses of democratic governments, thereby subjecting them to public scrutiny and containing their powers (Diamond, 1994:7). They can thus regulate the balance of power between the society and the state in favour of the former, hence triggering a sort of ‘balanced opposition’ that is required for sustaining democracy (White, 2004:13). As Diamond (1994:7) remarks, “a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it”. Indeed, the legitimacy of new democracies can be endangered by pervasive and blatant political corruption, especially during difficult and painful periods of economic

37 restructuring. This is so because many people have to endure the severe hardships that are associated with such moments. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of protracted periods of statist and arbitrary rule, new democracies often lack the bureaucratic and legal means to check corruption at the onset. Therefore, without a robust, free and nosy civil society to champion the cause of institutional reforms, it is likely that corruption would flourish (Diamond, 1994:7). Furthermore, by advocating that administrators and politicians adhere to high standards of public performance and morality, civil society can play a disciplinary role that is crucial in promoting and sustaining democratic governance (White, 2004:14).

Another important role of civil society is that it supplements the function of political parties in promoting political participation. In this way, it fosters the political skill and efficacy of democratic citizens, and enhances an appreciation of the rights, as well as the obligations of democratic citizenship (Diamond, 1994:7-8). The sensitisation of citizens about their democratic rights and obligations is particularly relevant in Africa where the majority of the populace are not benefiting from the democratic system. The electoral process for example, is seen as inconsequential apart from serving to put people into positions from which they then advance their own personal interests. Therefore, many people chose not to participate in elections (Dulani, 2004:13). Civil society thus, becomes vital in promoting the voluntary participation of citizens in political processes which is central to the functioning of a healthy democracy (Diamond, 1994:8).

Civil society is also an important arena for the nurturing of other democratic values and norms, such as a respect for opposing viewpoints, moderation, tolerance, and a willingness to compromise. The stability of these attributes is enhanced when they are nurtured through experience. Therefore, the involvement of citizens in civil society provides an opportunity for them to practise these democratic values, as well as develop skills in political contestation and advocacy. As a result, several civic organisations18 in the developing world are working with groups of adult citizens and directly in schools to

18 An example of these civic organisations is Conciencia, a network of organisations composed of women that started in Argentina and has spread to 14 other countries in Latin America (Diamond, 1994:8).

38 nurture these elements that are indispensable to the fostering of a democratic culture. These are achieved through interactive programmes that illustrate among other things, the means by which people can collaborate to solve the problems in their communities, the possibility for courteous deliberation among people of competing viewpoints, and the intricacies of reaching consensus in a group (Diamond, 1994:8).

Consequently, a civil society that is fairly pluralistic and operating in an economy that is relatively developed will most likely trigger a variety of interests that cut across the major polarisations of political conflicts, thus mitigating them. This is so because the emergence of issue-oriented movements and class-based organisations that are novel and distinct in character, unite new constituencies that cut across age-old ethnic, religious, partisan, or regional cleavages. Therefore, as individuals exhibit multiple interests and become members of different organisations to attain and defend those interests, they are inclined to interact with others whose opinions and political interests are also divergent. As a result, their diverse attitudes will mitigate the militancy of their various views, thereby generating a more sophisticated and expansive political stance. This will then stimulate a greater willingness to compromise due to a greater tolerance towards opposing points of view (Diamond, 1994:9).

A further way in which civil society promotes democracy as pointed out in chapter one, is by creating avenues for the aggregation, representation, and articulation of interests. It therefore, functions as a transmission-belt or an intermediary sphere between the society and the state in a manner that determines the relationship between the formal political system and individual citizens (White, 2004:14). For instance, it can facilitate political communication between state and society, thereby (as mentioned earlier) serving as an alternative channel of representation complementary to periodic elections and as an additional medium for enhancing democratic accountability and transparency (White, 2004:14-15). As a result, the scope of political participation is broadened as citizens attempt to directly influence government decisions and policies – rather than only indirectly through the election of state officials (Ottaway, 2000:78). It thus provides traditionally excluded groups, for example, ethnic or racial minorities, as well as women,

39 access to power that they have been deprived of in formal politics, particularly concerning the upper institutional strata. Hence, through public participation, civil society strives to democratise the public space (Chipkin, 2002:2). This function is better appreciated in those countries where women played prominent roles through various organisations and movements in the struggles against dictatorial regimes. However, after the transition to democratic governance, the social and political status of women deteriorated. This is evident in Eastern Europe where several states have reverted to the hitherto exclusionary politics. Therefore, it is only through organised and sustained pressure by civil society forces from below that social and political equality can be advanced, as well as the legitimacy, responsiveness and quality of democracy deepened (Diamond, 1994:8).

Closely related to the above, civil society also provides a strong foundation for democracy to thrive since it offers opportunities for influence and participation at all levels of government, especially at the local level. This is because the historically marginalised are predisposed to influence public policy and develop actual political skills, as well as acquire a sense of worthiness at the local level of government. As a result, the democratisation of local government has to be complemented with the development of civil society which is a basic component for the advancement of democracy and fundamental to the shift from clientelism to citizenship particularly in Africa (Diamond, 1994:8-9).

An additional democratic function of civil society is that it recruits and trains new political leaders. Some civic organisations are established with the deliberate intention of fulfilling this function.19 However, more often, training and recruitment are simply long-term by- products of CSOs that have been functioning successfully. As a result, the activists and leaders of these CSOs acquire self-confidence and skills that equip them for party politics and service in government.20 They for example, learn how to motivate and organise

19An example of such organisations is the Evelio B. Javier Foundation in the Philippines. It offers nonpartisan training programmes to elected state and local candidates, as well as officials. The focus of the programmes is not limited to fostering normative standards of public transparency and accountability but also underscores administrative and technical skills (Diamond, 1994:9). 20 Notwithstanding the virtue in this function, as remarked below, it is widely contended that most CSOs in Africa particularly those involved in democratic activism, are deficient in terms of institutional capacity since many of their prominent leaders have defected and become state bureaucrats (see Obadare, 2011:430- 431; Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:125).

40 people, negotiate agreements, raise and manage funds, debate issues, canvass for support, build coalitions, and publicise programmes. Similarly, their strengths lie in the work they do on behalf of their constituencies, what they perceive to be the public interest, and their articulation of convincing and clear policy alternatives. All of these enable them to attract a large and loyal political following. Social movements and interest groups may therefore, train, invigorate and propel to the limelight a richer crop of potential political leaders than might otherwise be done by political parties. Therefore, due to the traditional male dominance in terms of political power, civil society becomes a significant base for the training and recruitment of women, as well as other marginalised elements, into positions of authority. This function is crucial in revitalising and renewing the legitimacy of democracy particularly when the recruitment of new political leaders dwindles or stagnates within the official political parties (Diamond, 1994:9-10).

However, worth noting is the fact that numerous civic organisations pursue explicit democracy-building activities that transcend leadership training as highlighted above. For instance, there are many organisations that engage in nonpartisan election-monitoring projects that are vital in boosting voter confidence, deterring fraud, enhancing the legitimacy of election results, and in some instances, have safeguarded an opposition victory notwithstanding fraud by an incumbent government.21 The significance of this function was very evident in the founding elections that initiated democracy in countries such as Zambia, Bulgaria, Nicaragua, and Chile. Similarly, in the post-transition phase, several think tanks and democracy institutes22 have been working relentlessly in several countries to democratise political parties, reform the electoral system, enhance governmental accountability, promote an open and decentralised government, and strengthen the legislature. A number of human rights organisations have also been instrumental in promoting greater institutionalised respect for minority rights and individual

21 The 1986 elections in the Philippines and that in 1989 in Panama are classical examples (Diamond, 1994:10).

22 The Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) is an example of such democracy institutes based in Johannesburg. It has field offices in among others, Somalia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Kenya (EISA, 2015).

41 liberties, improved prison conditions, and fairer legal and judicial systems (Diamond, 1994:10).

A dynamic civil society also enhances the extensive dissemination of credible information, thereby assisting citizens to collectively pursue and defend their values and interests. Whereas civil society forces may sometimes temporarily triumph by the sheer might of raw numbers, for example in demonstrations and strikes, generally, however, except if their members are well-informed, it will be difficult for them to present a united front in defence of their interests or contest controversial government policies. This is particularly the case with debates on national security and military policies, as well as human rights issues, since the majority of the citizens in most developing countries have a limited knowledge of the intricacies involved in the policies and issues. Therefore, a free press may provide the public with alternative perspectives and a wealth of news on these subjects. However, independent CSOs still need to supplement this information with constant updates on government activities that are not contingent on what it may claim to be doing. By refuting absurd official stories therefore, human rights organisations for instance, make it difficult for repressive regimes to cover up abuses of power (Diamond, 1994:10).

In similar vein, civil society fosters democracy in terms of promoting the rule of law, and social rights and justice. This protective role helps to shelter and shield individuals whose rights are threatened by authoritarian states. Civil society fulfills this role by championing the rights of vulnerable groups in the official legal process. For example, it provides paralegal services to these helpless individuals who cannot have prompt and easy access to the courts. It also plays an advocacy role by clamouring for the implementation of existing laws, as well as the adoption of new institutional reforms and legislations that will promote social justice and the rule of law (Orji, 2009:92-93).

Similarly, civil society advances the democratic process by raising public awareness of policymaking and implementation, and urging for more transparency in government. Its activities in this regard include the publication and transmission of information on subjects

42 like public expenditure allocations, legal provisions, and the implementation of programmes and policies. In order to effectively perform these activities, CSOs often disseminate such information through existing or new media outlets, or directly by groups involved in the above fields. By enhancing transparency in government, civil society also contributes to poverty reduction. This is usually achieved by assisting citizens to scrutinise the provision of development resources to guard against their misappropriation by local elites and bureaucrats. Therefore, civil society plays a more activist role in this way since civic actors reinforce information gathering and transmission with public advocacy and mobilisation activities (Orji, 2009:94-95).

It is apparent from the above analysis that as civil society fosters the effectiveness, inclusiveness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as the legitimacy of a political system, it enhances the respect for the state by the citizens and promotes their positive engagement with it. Consequently, the ability of the state to elicit voluntary obedience from its citizens and therefore effectively govern, is bolstered. Furthermore, apart from just multiplying demands on the state, a rich associational life can also augment the abilities of groups to independently advance their own welfare and not to rely entirely on the state. Therefore, functional grassroots development efforts can be very instrumental in lessening the worry of expectations set on the state and thus, minimise the stakes of politics, particularly at the national echelon (Diamond, 1994:11).

In fulfilling the above democratic functions, civil society organisations adopt several strategies which can be broadly categorised as advocacy/lobbying, activism, monitoring (‘watchdog’), and providing pro-democracy services (capacity building). These methods are discussed in detail below.

2.4 The methods employed by civil society in fulfilling its democratic role

One of the methods employed by civil society in performing its democratic role is advocacy/lobbying. In Kenya for example, religious bodies such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) were highly critical of the autocratic rule of Daniel Arap

Moi, as well as the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). Anglican bishops like Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge and Mnasas Kuria were renowned advocates of regime change. They publicly opposed government’s findings on the causes of the July 1990 riots in Nairobi and lobbied for the release of two opposition politicians who were arrested for their alleged involvement in the riots. Similarly, in Malawi, a pastoral letter by the Catholic bishops in 1992 condemned government’s maladministration of the economy and political repression. Similarly, episcopal conferences and Christian groups in Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana were in the vanguard of the transition process in their respective countries (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:119).

Worth noting is the fact that these religiously-based civil-society forces were not only renowned for their strong advocacy of a democratic system which greatly contributed to kick-starting the transition process but were equally pivotal in guiding the process. For instance, in several landmark cases, the smooth transition to democracy is largely credited to the broad commitment, and political skills, as well as credibility of Christian bodies and their leaders. In most of these cases, they acted as ‘honest brokers’ in the acrimonious political wrangles between impatient democrats and intransigent autocrats. In Zaire (now the DRC) and the Republic of Congo, Roman Catholic prelates such as Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo and Bishop Ernest Nkombo respectively, were instrumental in the national conferences and transitions of their countries. Likewise, Archbishop Fanoko Kpodzro was appointed by President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo to head a sovereign national conference that had been convened to determine the country’s political future. By the same token, Bishop Isodore de Souza of the Republic of Benin chaired the interim High Council of the Republic which successfully managed the first multiparty elections in February 1991 and the subsequent transition to multiparty politics (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:119-120). Also, it should be acknowledged that CSOs have actively participated in the drafting of crucial documents that have served as a milestone in the country’s democratic process. In South Africa for example, CSOs contributed to the drafting of the constitutional framework for the new government following the dismantling of the apartheid system. The same applies to Zimbabwe where the Church and Civil

Society Forum in conjunction with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) participated in rewriting the country’s constitution (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:612).

The post-transition phase has also witnessed the advocacy/lobbying tactics of CSOs in protecting and expanding the gains made during the transition process. Faced with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and gender injustice, CSOs have lobbied for the rights of children and women, as well as for state-sponsored treatment of those infected. In southern Africa for instance, the Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations (SANASO) and the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa have successfully lobbied governments to effectively respond to the pandemic. Similarly, CSOs such as the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (SAGPA), Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), Women for Change in Zambia, and Gender Links have successfully lobbied governments to execute gender-orientated development and health programmes, as well as increase the positions that women occupy in government and strategic institutions. Furthermore, in the DRC where armed men have raped over 200,000 women since 1998, CSOs such as Search for Common Ground (SFCG) are effectively partnering with the armed forces to stop gender violence, particularly sexual abuse (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613).

CSOs have also employed advocacy/lobbying tactics to fight for economic justice in Africa. For example, they have been advocating for an increased local ownership of the means of production, lobbying for more equitable distribution of national income and transparent budgeting, and criticising corruption between government and the private sectors. Among the CSOs that have been active in this regard are the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN), the Indigenous Business Women’s Organisation (IBWO), the Southern African Centre for Economic Justice (SACEJ) and Zimbabwe’s Affirmative Action Group (AAG), as well as Namibia’s Indigenous People’s Business Council. However, the major shortcoming is that the elites seem to benefit most from their struggles (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613). Economic injustice also manifests itself in agriculture especially in terms of land and genetic resources. Therefore, CSOs such as Biowatch, the Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers’ Forum (ESAFF), and Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) Association are lobbying

45 against the domination of the agricultural production chain by corporations. This is because it creates the dependence of farmers on the corporations through ‘terminator technology’ which makes it difficult for farmers to recycle seed. In Mozambique for instance, the Land Campaign Coalition has been involved with some degree of success in national land advocacy issues. Likewise, Oxfam successfully lobbied in Zambia for indigenous people in the Copperbelt to obtain rights over land that hitherto had been owned by absentee landlords and mining companies (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613-614).

Another strategy adopted by civil society in fulfilling its democratic functions is political activism which seems to have been the most widely used method following the third wave of democratisation. In Zambia for example, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) General Council on 30 December 1989 decided to lead a campaign to restore political pluralism to national politics and declared its preparedness to work with other institutions or individuals with similar interests. In an effort to effect the political transition, the then leader of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba called for a national referendum to decide the issue of multiparty competition (Bratton, 1994:71-72). The attempts by President Kenneth Kaunda to delay the referendum for a year proved futile as huge crowds staged peaceful demonstrations in urban centres while warbling the opposing slogan ‘the hour has come!’. These types of rallies were unprecedented in Africa and on a grand scale likened to those that were organised in Prague and Leipzig. They attracted a wide spectrum of Zambian urban society and government employees formed a significant element of the protesters. Kaunda in August 1990 finally succumbed to the pressure and agreed to organise multiparty elections23 (Bratton, 1994:74). Similarly, in Malawi, CSOs through political activism were instrumental in bringing about the demise of the anachronistic single-party system that had been in existence for close to 30 years and its subsequent replacement by a multiparty system. Like in Zambia, they utilised mass protests to demand the expansion of political freedoms. This ultimately resulted in the holding of the country’s first multiparty elections in May 1994 with the consequent ousting of the incumbent president, Hastings Banda and his replacement by Bakili Muluzi (see Mukute and Taylor,

23 As noted below, Kenneth Kaunda was eventually defeated in a fairly competitive and transparent electoral contest.

2013:613; McIntyre, 2011:2942; African Elections Database, 2011b; Meinhardt and Patel, 2003:26).

Even in the post-transition phase, CSOs in Africa as pointed out in chapter one, have continued to use activism tactics to further the democratisation process. In Ethiopia for instance, students at the University of Addis Ababa in 2001 organised protest marches demanding greater academic freedom. Among other things, they demanded the removal of security troops stationed inside the campus, the dismissal of two university administrators alleged to have been closely affiliated with the government, and permission to republish a banned student magazine. The government met their last two demands but rejected the first one. When students insisted that the rejected demand be met, they were threatened by the Minister of Education to return to classes or bear the full brunt of the police force. The execution of the threat by the police resulted in a series of events that culminated in a crisis (M’boge and Doe, 2004:28-29). Similarly, in Nigeria, trade unions have constantly accused the government of overlooking them in policy- formulation processes which have far-reaching economic and social implications for civil society. This has forced the NLC to embark on strike actions over the years usually triggered by the removal of petroleum subsidies (M’boge and Doe, 2004:35). Equally, CSOs in Malawi have successfully employed mass protests to thwart the attempts by autocratic regimes to amend the constitution with the intention of introducing unlimited tenure for the presidency (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:612). Similarly, in Zambia (see chapter one), when President Chiluba in 2001 wanted to revise the constitution in order to be eligible to run for a third term, CSOs jointly resisted his scheme (Kaliba, 2014:11). Likewise, in Madagascar, CSOs responded with demonstrations when the government attempted to lease to an Asian company about half of its arable land for biofuel production. This eventually contributed to the ousting of the government (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:614).

An additional approach utilised by civil society in performing its democratic role is monitoring (‘watchdog’) particularly in terms of government policies and activities, as well as actions. For instance, in the wake of the third wave of democratisation as indicated

47 above, CSOs scrupulously monitored the electoral process and ensured that the ‘political game’ was played along democratic principles (White, 2004:15). Examples of CSOs that adopted this method are the Namibian Non-Governmental Organisations’ Forum, the Council of Churches of Namibia, and the Namibian Society of Human Rights all in Namibia, and to a limited extent, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network in Zimbabwe (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613). This greatly contributed to produce a new set of democratic norms which regulated the conduct of founding elections and thus, helped in levelling the playing field (White, 2004:15). Therefore, it boosted public confidence in the electoral process since transparency was enhanced (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613). Similarly, in Ghana, CSOs like the GBA assumed custody of the process of restoring the country to constitutional rule and the establishment of a liberal political system. It believed that its autonomy would be maintained in such a system. Therefore, it succeeded to safeguard a robust representation in the Constituent Assembly of 1978-1979. It also managed to do the same on the watchdog institutions established by the 1979 constitution such as the Council of State and the Press Commission (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994:131).

This ‘watchdog’ strategy has continued in the post-transition phase as CSOs strive to protect those rights and freedoms they strongly fought for (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:612). Again, in Ghana for example, the GBA as mentioned in chapter one, has been unequivocal on its stance against bad governance and official abuses. It also has legal monitors who scrutinise government activities and decisions to check on their constitutionality. Furthermore, it studies all bills placed before parliament to determine any constitutional violations (M’boge and Doe, 2004:30-31). Likewise, in Zambia as earlier alluded to, the CSOs together with companies in the private sector have been meeting with government officials every three months to deliberate on among other things, strategies to enhance the country’s development. The CSOs also participate in several forums to monitor government activities such as the parliamentary portfolio committees which scrutinise government expenditure. These committees also request members of the CSOs and other stakeholders to provide suggestions on how the state can be better managed. Nevertheless, as asserted above, the extent to which the

48 government takes these suggestions into consideration when formulating policy is contentious (Kaliba, 2014:11).

Providing pro-democracy services (capacity building) is a further method utilised by civil society in fulfilling its democratic role. An important area where this method is employed is civic education. Examples of CSOs that have been adopting this method in the above area are the Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET) in Zimbabwe and the Namibian Institute for Democracy in Namibia, as well as faith-based organisations (FBOs) in Madagascar (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:12-13). Legal literacy is another area which has experienced this capacity building strategy by CSOs. For instance, the GBA in Ghana has been engaged in a ‘legal literacy programme’ aimed at sensitising the public on human and civil rights as stipulated in the 1992 constitution (M’boge and Doe, 2004:31). Furthermore, as indicated above, the capacity building tactics by CSOs have also been manifested in the extensive dissemination of credible information, thereby assisting citizens to collectively pursue and defend their values and interests. For example, in Kenya, the NCCK has been promoting an ecumenical brand of service and evangelism through publishing, education and broadcasting (Bratton, 1994:67).

Furthermore, capacity building techniques have been used by CSOs in the post-conflict period particularly in countries that have been characterised by a sustained history of human rights abuses. This has greatly contributed towards national reconciliation and healing. Some of the services that have been provided in this regard include trauma counselling, reparations, truth recovery, and victim support services, as well as the development of cultural models of reconciliation. One of the CSOs that does this type of work is the Institute for the Healing of Memories in South Africa. Others include the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) based in Kenya which operates in 20 post-conflict African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and the DRC. Similarly, FBOs in Madagascar and ZIMCET in Zimbabwe have established peace committees to promote peace and the acceptance of divergent opinions, thereby fostering conflict prevention and democratic culture (Mukute and Taylor, 2013:613).

In light of the above discussion, this study strives to ascertain whether civil society forces in Cameroon are fulfilling among others, the following democratic functions: clamouring for the rules of the ‘political game’ to be redefined along democratic principles; championing the struggles of traditionally excluded groups such as ethnic or racial minorities, as well as women; calling for the implementation of existing laws, as well as the adoption of new institutional reforms and legislations; encouraging citizens to voluntarily participate in political processes through civic and voter education; and enhancing the extensive dissemination of credible information through existing or new media outlets, thereby assisting citizens to collectively pursue and defend their values and interests. These elements therefore, serve as guidelines for analysing the role of civil society in advancing the country’s democratisation process.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned copious democratic functions of civil society and the various methods employed in fulfilling these functions, civil society organisations, however, encounter numerous challenges in performing them. In several African countries as pointed out above, civil society has disintegrated after the political transitions and has dwindled concerning political significance. The following section highlights some of the factors which have a bearing on the functioning of CSOs, particularly in Africa.

2.5 The challenges encountered by civil society in promoting democracy

Integral to African political life is ethnicity and, increasingly, religion. Concerning ethnicity for instance, most African states are ethnically quite diverse since they are recent creations and the assimilation processes that nurtured the degree of homogeneity that characterises the ‘supposedly’ termed nation-states are yet to occur (Ottaway, 2000:80). Therefore, as indicated in chapter one, the social pluralism of African states (because of their strong ethnic basis), can easily promote conflict rather than democracy if politicised. Whereas several African governments have declared their intentions to overcome religious and ethnic divisions, most are yet to do so. Instead, they are exploiting these divisions to drum up support for their egoistic political agendas. Therefore, the political role of ethnicity has become more overt following the third wave of democratisation. This

50 is because the return to multiparty politics has prompted the creation of ethnic political parties in several African countries. Consequently, although the multiplicity of ethnic parties demonstrates the underlying social pluralism, it does not, however, bode well for the efforts by civil society to promote democracy since ethnic cleavages and tensions tend to be intense and therefore, engender intolerance (Ottaway, 2000:80).

A further challenge encountered by CSOs in Africa is in terms of their relationship with the state which has a bearing on their autonomy and functioning. A major concern regarding the weakness of civil society is the contention that most African states have over the years, subverted the growth and activities of CSOs (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9). It is widely asserted that the fragile nature of state institutions has resulted in political instability largely triggered by the diverse character of African societies as remarked above. As a result, successive politicians have exploited the situation to control the political participation of the citizens (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9). Therefore, this desire to control has nurtured repressive regimes that target the governance structures of the state with the primary aim of curbing associational life (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9). According to Diamond (quoted by Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9), most of the political liberalisation movements that were initiated in the 1990s have been repressed by autocratic regimes which have steadily and securely instituted their political hegemony. This phenomenon which he labels as ‘the democratic rollback’, has engendered ineffective and corrupt state bureaucracies and institutions (Diamond, quoted by Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9). In Uganda for example, the parliament in 2005 voted for the elimination of term limits for the president which has perpetuated the rule of President Yoweri Museveni. Similarly, the country’s 2011 elections were ruined by clampdowns on democracy activists and freedom of expression (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:13).

Likewise, most African governments have resolutely decreed draconian legislation in an attempt to keep the activities of civil society groups in check and silence dissenting voices that may incite public demonstrations. Since the early 1990s, the governments in countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda and Botswana have enacted or proposed laws aimed at strengthening official authority over CSOs although the pretext is to develop

51 national regulatory frameworks for associations. Consequently, the space in which CSOs operate has lessened (see Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:13-14; Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:125). Concerning Kenya for example, the board that was established in 1990 to regulate the activities of NGOs in line with the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 was composed largely of government representatives. Also, its decisions were final as they could not be appealed in the courts. Furthermore, the Office of the President was entrusted with the ministerial responsibility to oversee CSOs and they were expected to reregister every five years (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:125). Concerning Uganda, in the aftermath of the 2011 elections and the ferocious criticism of government policies in the media that ensued, the regime of Museveni promulgated a series of decrees that demanded all newspapers to register with the Media Council which is largely controlled by the government. The council has sweeping powers such as revoking the licences of newspapers (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:13, 17). Similarly, Ugandan civic associations have been harassed and threatened by security forces with punitive laws, for example, the NGO Registration Amendment Act which requires CSOs to reregister every three years with the government. This subjects CSOs to bureaucratic hassles which are exploited by the government to its own advantage (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:14).

In addition, CSOs in Africa are vulnerable to co-option by the state into neo-patrimonial networks (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:9-10). This usually takes the form of bonds of patronage and vertical relations which compromise the ability of CSOs to effectively challenge the state (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:17). Their vulnerability is largely attributed to the erosion of their material bases of support resulting from the prolonged economic crisis that gripped the continent from the early 1980s. The situation was exacerbated by the stringent neoliberal SAPs imposed by Western donors aimed at resolving the crisis. As a result, the organisational capacity of African CSOs has been dented to the extent that they have become easy targets for neutralisation and co-option by the state (Orji, 2009:90).

Furthermore, the majority of CSOs are deficient in terms of knowledge concerning the policymaking process. Consequently, they find it challenging to procure sufficient funds,

52 as well as to hold their respective governments accountable for their actions. The resultant effect is that they tend to be financially and operationally dependent on international donors as elaborated on below, or on favours from the state which seriously undermines their autonomy and authority. Therefore, they have been perceived as lacking in purpose and ambition, as well as in capacity in terms of challenging the hegemonic power of the state as pointed out above. They are also seen by some of the citizens and the government in particular, as fostering the interests of the donors (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:10). However, some scholars claim that such foreign support is essential to the very survival of African CSOs without which their autonomy from the state will be quite difficult to attain (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:10).

Compounding the above situation is the fact that the private economic sector of most African countries is weak. Therefore, this makes it difficult for civil society, as well as democracy to thrive (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:127). Considering the dominance of the state in the formal sector, particularly in the spheres of employment and investment, numerous CSOs eventually depend on the government for financial assistance. Similarly, with the bulk of the working and middle classes tied to government by means of employment, and the dependence of the private sector on government for among other things, subsidised credit and contracts, the basis for associational and individual autonomy becomes exceptionally weak as indicated above (Orji, 2009:90). Consequently, civil society forces such as unions are usually susceptible to governmental arm-twisting since most of their members come from the public sector. For example, the Ghanaian associations of lawyers, doctors, and public servants were quite active until the early 1970s in the popular movements that demanded an end to authoritarianism and military maladministration. However, the government employees among them were threatened with dismissal by the ruling military council in mid-1977. They were also ordered to leave their government- provided houses. With these memories still fresh in the minds of the citizens, it is therefore, not surprising that many Ghanaian professional bodies were scared to openly take part in the country’s prodemocracy demonstrations that characterised the early 1990s (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:127).

The spinoff from the above situation is that the excessive dependence on the state and weakness of the private sector have prompted subservience towards political authority in the majority of civil servants, as well as civil society forces (Orji, 2009:90). For instance, most judges in several African countries find it difficult to assert a posture of strict independence. This is because they depend on the government for their operational budgets and appointments. Also, they hardly resign when their independence is threatened since the opportunities for profitable private practice are limited. By the same token, as a cautious measure for fear of displeasing high officials and losing revenue from government advertisements which they desperately need, private newspapers usually engage in self-censorship. Likewise, afraid of losing lucrative government contracts, private businessmen are wary of placing advertisements in private newspapers deemed by the government as agents of subversive ideas. Aggravating the situation is the fact that the intellectuals and middle-class professionals who manage strategic public institutions are often concerned with their individual economic survival. Therefore, this prevents their institutions from assisting CSOs to curb state hegemony (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:127-128).

However, it should be noted that the weakness of the private sector also extends to business groups. There is no gainsaying the fact that many African countries have employers’ associations and business chambers for example, commerce, industry and mining. Nevertheless, most of them, particularly in the francophone countries, are state- funded and state-created. Consequently, business associations in several countries are extremely weak. Worsening the situation is the declining national economies as pointed out above. As a result, the business associations are reluctant to get involved in politics since this can bring them into conflict with the state. Scared of jeopardising their friendly relationship with government, they usually secretly solicit the promotion of their narrowly defined interests (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:128). This does not augur well for the effective functioning of civil society, particularly in terms of unity of purpose.

Similarly, many deeply-rooted active CSOs as remarked in chapter one, have not contributed in advancing democracy since they shy away from politics. In other words,

54 most autonomous groups in Africa usually realise their goals without resorting to political activism. However, as underscored above, such activism is a vital ingredient of what constitutes civil society (Gill, 2000:6). The political openings that resulted from the third wave of democratisation that began in the early 1990s have broadened the political space in many African countries including those that fall short of the minimal requirements for democracy. However, there is little sign that voluntary associations are exploiting the new conducive climate to rally their followers behind political agendas. In the majority of African countries, it is mostly the democracy-advocating CSOs organised with financial assistance from the donors that have been active in the political processes (Ottaway, 2000:81). However, as discussed below, these CSOs are flawed in terms of promoting political pluralism. Equally, in several African countries, there are groups that in the course of pursuing their interests, adopt tactics that are anti-democratic. For example, extremist groups with egocentric and narrow agendas are notorious for being intolerant of the right of other groups to pursue their own interests. However, although such militant groups are undemocratic, and in some instances repulsive, they are nevertheless, not perceived as a real hazard in established democracies. This is because they are not usually noticed and heard in the discord of voices that seek to influence policy in a highly pluralistic political system. Therefore, they can be easily neutralised and absorbed without serious repercussions. On the contrary, in case inherently undemocratic forces dominate as is frequently the situation in Africa when ethnicity gets politicised (Ottaway, 2000:80), pluralism as observed above, can easily promote conflict.

The character of leadership particularly concerning its commitment to advance democracy, is another aspect of the challenge faced by African CSOs. Subservient and opportunistic leaders who mostly align themselves with the political elite for monetary gains have compromised the democratic role of civil society. In Lesotho for example, the egoistic nature of the leadership of the Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU) has negatively affected its role in the country’s democratisation process (Akokpari, 2002:219- 220). It has been noted that COLETU with a predominantly working-class background has sought to improve the economic, as well as political conditions of primarily the working class (Akokpari, 2002:252). For instance, it usually confronts the state only when the

55 interests of the working class have been threatened by unfavourable government policies. Notwithstanding its role in fostering a democratic culture by agitating for better working conditions and labour rights, COLETU, however, has the tendency to relax once the government has met its key demands (Akokpari, 2002:220). Similarly, COLETU is predisposed to affiliate with political parties which renders it susceptible to polarisation (Akokpari, 2002:252). This endangers a united front by CSOs against the threats to democracy.

Besides, as earlier indicated, in several African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, numerous prominent leaders of CSOs have defected and become state bureaucrats. Therefore, it is widely asserted that most CSOs, particularly those involved in democratic activism, are deficient in terms of institutional capacity. Many were established in the early 1990s following the third wave of democratisation. However, the majority of them have changed character or withered as their key leaders have plunged into party politics or grabbed positions in the new post-authoritarian governments. As a result, most of the recently formed democracy-advocating CSOs are more like ‘protoparties’ and ‘political-action committees’ (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:125). Thus, their leaders are no different to politicians who merely wait for opportunities to exploit at the expense of the masses whose causes they claim to champion (Obadare, 2011a:430- 431).

Closely related to the above is the undemocratic nature of the leadership of most CSOs. As maintained in chapter one, a democratic state can only be sustained by a democratic civil society. However, the widespread opinion is that African civil society is traditional and neotraditional in character. As a result, its leadership is prone to be among other things, illiberal, gerontocratic, extremely patriarchal and hierarchical, and therefore, inclined to adopt undemocratic values. For instance, it has been noticed that generally, the leaders of the traditional CSOs are politically and socially conservative and usually view democratisation with hostility or indifference. Perhaps, more worrisome, is the fact that the secular and modern civil associations, as well as some prodemocracy civil society forces are vulnerable to emulate the anti-liberal values of the major traditional CSOs.

Some of these anti-liberal values include the tendencies to endow their leaders with ‘life’ chairmanships, to ‘anoint’ rather than elect their executives, and to reject the establishment of ‘rational’ bureaucracies (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:129).

In contrast to the ‘conventional’ CSOs discussed above, Christian churches (both Catholic and Protestant) seem to suffer less from financial and organisational handicaps. Among other things, they are endowed with politically sophisticated leaders, international contacts, large memberships, and considerable financial independence, as well as security, which permit them to maintain their autonomy from the state. These strengths, coupled with a commitment to political liberalism and civic-mindedness render Christian bodies an important component of Africa’s nascent civil society in the post-1990 era. They therefore, have the potential to break the ‘culture of silence’ resulting from years of autocratic rule. However, notwithstanding their inherent strengths, religious bodies also suffer underlying shortcomings. For example, due to their colonial origins, they are viewed with suspicion by some nationalists. Furthermore, since they usually compete fiercely among themselves (or with rival religious groups like Islam) for state recognition and support, their moral authority and nonpartisan credibility are undermined. Similarly, their well-travelled and well-educated leaders are predisposed to be elitist, and therefore, ineffective in establishing alliances with civil society forces of the lower classes. This therefore, is a major contributory factor to the pervasive fragmentation that characterises civil society in Africa (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:123-124, 129).

Worth noting is also the proliferation in recent years of ‘independent’ charismatic Christian churches in Africa whose new-age religions are perceived as a menace to the hitherto political supremacy of the conformist Christian churches and their organisations. The usual political and social conservatism of these new groups typified by the political apathy among their members or the general tendency to be passive towards temporal authority contrast starkly with the political liberalism of their orthodox counterparts. It is contended that these contemporary churches in general and their leaders in particular (especially those with political ambitions), have the tendency to ally with governments for reasons of aggrandisement and nationalism. A case in point is the Kimbanguist movement in Zaire

(now the DRC) during most of the postcolonial era. Its conduct therefore, undermined the work that ‘orthodox’ Christian groups had done to counter the hegemony of the state in the DRC (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996:124).

Another challenge is in terms of the type of CSOs supported by donors which as earlier affirmed, are often artificial creations without strong roots in the community. This makes it difficult for these CSOs to promote political pluralism. This is especially true of CSOs that carry out civic education. They became prominent in Africa from the end of 1989 following the reintroduction of multiparty elections. An example is the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) which played a crucial role in monitoring the first multiparty elections in Zambia in 1991. Worth emphasising is the fact that unlike in several other African countries, it was a vibrant civil society that exerted pressure on President Kenneth Kaunda to conduct the elections and not pressure from the donor community. However, the elections were strongly supported by Western donors. In order to safeguard the credibility of the electoral process, donors promoted domestic monitoring initiatives and also provided international observers. Eventually, Kaunda was defeated in a fairly competitive and transparent electoral contest. Delighted by the credibility of the electoral process, the donor community introduced a set of programmes. These were intended to enhance the democratic process in Zambia by strengthening civil society on the one hand, and government institutions on the other. Concerning the former, the CSOs that were established with the primary purpose of monitoring the 1991 elections were encouraged to transform themselves into civic education CSOs. FODEP which was the largest of these groups therefore, transformed itself and assumed this new role (Ottaway, 2000:82).

However, FODEP was ill equipped to perform this new task. This was because among other things, it lacked broad-base support, its leaders were weak, it was a top-down organisation, it almost completely depended on the financial assistance from donors, and perhaps, even more serious, it relied so heavily on donors’ managerial support. For instance, in an effort to help build up and reorganise FODEP, an American consultant on a multiyear contract was brought in by the US Agency for International Development

(USAID). Despite this, the organisation remained notably dependent on foreign aid. Consequently, it was weak notwithstanding the fact that it had more monitors in the subsequent elections in 1996 in comparison to the previous elections in 1991. However, even if the organisation had developed a stronger sense of purpose and better leadership, it is likely that it would have still remained a free-floating organisation (Ottaway, 2000:82) without any broad-base support as indicated above. Its general lack of vigour and weak leadership, as well as weak social roots therefore, make it a classic example of a defective product of donor-supported CSO (Ottaway, 2000:82).

In light of the above weaknesses concerning the type of CSOs supported by donors, it can therefore be argued that the relationship between the majority of these CSOs and the constituencies which they represent can be described as trusteeship and not representation as should be the case. Unlike representative organisations such as business associations and labour unions, trustee organisations are not established by mobilised constituencies that perceive the organisations as instruments that articulate their interests and bring them to the attention of government. Therefore, these are organisations whose leaders have assumed the responsibility to define and promote the interests of the voiceless. As a result, compared to representative organisations, trustee organisations are more vulnerable to government attacks, especially during the early phase of the transition process when democracy is yet to be consolidated. Rooted in social groups, in contrast to trustee organisations, representative organisations are more difficult to suppress and control by governments with less commitment to democracy (Ottaway, 2000:83-84). As an illustration, concerning FODEP (see above), should the Zambian government clamp down on the organisation, the donors can complain. They may equally suspend assistance offered directly to the government if the repression is considered as part of a determined attack on CSOs. However, little would happen domestically since it is unlikely that the citizens would demonstrate in solidarity with the organisation. This is particularly because FODEP is a trustee organisation without strong roots in the constituency (Ottaway, 2000:84).

It is apparent that in their efforts to promote democracy, the ability of the leaders of CSOs to carry their constituencies along with them is critical to the outcome of their negotiations with regime actors. Their hands will be strengthened in the negotiations if they are able to maintain the disciplined approval of any agreements they reach on behalf of their constituencies. On the contrary, their capability to apply focused pressure on regime actors during negotiations will be compromised if they are unable to safeguard the acquiescence of their constituencies to commitments and agreements reached on their behalf, and if the links between the leaders of CSOs and their supporters are weak (Gill, 2000:127). As a result, their capacity to advance the democratisation process will also be limited.

The inability of African democracy-advocating CSOs to evolve with the changing times is another dimension of the challenge. It is contended that the ability of civil society to effect democratisation in a country to a large extent, depends on the relationship between the type of CSOs and the conditions that exist in the country at a given time. For example, in countries where the political system is still very closed, or where the transition process is still in its infancy with reversal highly probable, it is likely that CSOs would be able to sufficiently threaten the government to effect change since they can readily command mass followers (Ottaway, 2000:93). The real threat to democracy at this early stage of the transition process “provides a central organising principle for building civil society coalitions” (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:19). Nigeria serves as a typical example when in 1993, it became apparent that the transition military regime headed by Ibrahim Babangida had plans to perpetuate its stay in power. The rallying cause of getting rid of the military became very urgent, and therefore, sufficient enough to build a mammoth civil society coalition that was crucial in ousting the military from power (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014:19).

However, when the democratic process is at an advanced stage (which is not applicable to the majority of African states), the effectiveness of CSOs is compromised as they find it difficult to command mass support (Ottaway, 2000:93) since democracy is not seriously threatened at this stage. Therefore, as countries democratise, or become autocratic and reversals are experienced in the democratic process as evident in most African countries,

CSOs must transform accordingly. It should, however, be acknowledged that the process of transformation is not all that easy and its outcome uncertain. It may either enhance or mar the effectiveness of CSOs. Nevertheless, across the world, most CSOs that have been instrumental in advancing the democratic process of their countries have at some point faced a crisis of adjustment (Ottaway, 2000:93). Therefore, it can be argued that democracy-advocating CSOs in most African countries are facing a crisis of transformation to be relevant and effective in the post-transition phase of multiparty politics given their former active role in the transition process (see chapter one).

This last section of the chapter has examined issues such as government co-option of democracy-advocating CSOs into neo-patrimonial networks, the compromise of the autonomy of CSOs, the subservient leadership of CSOs towards political authority, and the defection of prominent leaders of CSOs to become state bureaucrats. These issues therefore, serve as guidelines to establish whether similar factors are indeed, prevalent in the Cameroonian political landscape (see chapter five) with the consequent bearing on the functioning of civil society, particularly in terms of its role in advancing the country’s democratisation process.

2.6 Conclusions

The essence of this chapter was to discuss the framework of analysis according to which the role of civil society in the promotion of democracy and its challenges in Cameroon are evaluated. From the discussion, the most important functions of civil society in terms of its role in promoting democracy can be broadly classified into two types of roles; namely, advocacy and capacity building.

The roles concerning advocacy include:  Clamouring for the rules of the ‘political game’ to be redefined along democratic principles by engaging in nonpartisan election-monitoring projects that are vital in boosting voter confidence, deterring fraud, and enhancing the legitimacy of election results.

 Combatting corruption by advocating that politicians and administrators scrupulously perform their duties by adhering to high standards of public performance and morality. This is also attained by assisting citizens to scrutinise the provision of development resources so as to guard against their misappropriation by local elites and bureaucrats.  Championing the struggles of traditionally excluded groups such as ethnic or racial minorities, as well as women through exerting pressure on governments to grant them access to power in formal politics, particularly concerning the upper institutional strata.  Similar to the above, striving for greater institutionalised respect for minority rights and individual liberties, improved prison conditions, and fairer legal and judicial systems.  In similar vein, calling for the implementation of existing laws, as well as the adoption of new institutional reforms and legislations that will promote social justice and the rule of law.

The capacity building roles (in the broadest sense) include:  Encouraging citizens to voluntarily participate in political processes through civic and voter education.  Nurturing democratic values and norms in citizens such as a respect for opposing viewpoints, moderation, tolerance, and a willingness to compromise by for instance, interactive programmes that illustrate how people of divergent opinions can collaborate in their communities to solve common problems.  Closely related to the above, uniting constituencies that cut across age-old ethnic, religious, partisan, or regional cleavages by triggering a variety of common interests that transcend these divisions, thus mitigating them.  Serving as a significant base for the training and recruitment of marginalised groups like women into positions of authority which is crucial in revitalising and renewing the legitimacy of democracy, particularly when the conscription of new political leaders dwindles or stagnates within the official political parties.

 Advancing the democratisation process by assisting in democratising political parties, fostering an opened and decentralised government, strengthening the legislature and reforming the electoral system.  Enhancing the extensive dissemination of credible information through existing or new media outlets, thereby assisting citizens to collectively pursue and defend their values and interests. This is also achieved by promoting debates about national security and military policies, as well as human rights issues since the majority of the citizens in most developing countries have a limited knowledge of the intricacies involved in the policies and issues.  Promoting the rule of law, and social rights and justice by providing paralegal services to helpless individuals who cannot have prompt and easy access to the courts.

This study as earlier indicated, strives to ascertain whether civil society forces in Cameroon are fulfilling the aforementioned democratic functions. Therefore, the above elements serve as benchmarks for analysing the role of civil society in advancing the country’s democratic process.

Concerning the challenges encountered by civil society, the following can be discerned from the discussion:  Existence of draconian legislation.  Co-option of CSOs into neo-patrimonial networks.  Dependence on the government and donors for financial assistance.  Lack of commitment of civil society leadership to advance democracy and subservience towards political authority.  Defection of several prominent leaders of CSOs to state bureaucracy.  Anti-democratic nature and tactics of some CSOs.  Elitist nature of religious bodies and political apathy among members of ‘independent’ charismatic Christian churches.  Artificial creation of CSOs by donors.

 The inability of democracy-advocating CSOs to evolve with the changing times.

The above challenges as earlier alluded to, serve as guidelines for establishing whether similar challenges are indeed, prevalent in the Cameroonian political landscape with the consequent bearing on the functioning of civil society, particularly in terms of its role in advancing the country’s democratisation process.

Before employing the analytical framework provided above to evaluate the role of civil society in the promotion of democracy and its challenges in Cameroon, the following chapter establishes the conditions under which CSOs operated in Cameroon before the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992. It also examines the transition process (to multipartism in 1992) and political liberalisation in the country and the role of civil society in the process, as well as the constraints encountered.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL RULE IN CAMEROON AND THE RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY, 1966-1992

3.1 Introduction

The state governs the spaces in which civil society operates – restricting and expanding it depending on the parties in power. In most countries, the main instrument for regulating the spaces is the law while in a few others, the regulatory mechanisms wholly depend on the utilisation of party or state authority (Sidel, 2011:298). Therefore, by means of public policy and law, the state establishes the space and institutional framework in which CSOs develop and fulfil their duties. The government not only provides the regulatory framework in which CSOs operate, but it also criminalises and outlaws certain associations whose activities are considered as anti-democratic. In other words, public law institutes the terms of cooperation, as well as the admissible terms of conflict between and within civil society groups. In short, government regulates, supports, constrains, cultivates and directs the whole range of CSOs that constitute social life (Rosenblum and Lesch, 2011:286). However, government often provides more than just the legal framework for establishing civil society, the infrastructure of public order, and the parameters of criminal and civil law within which CSOs operate. It is also often a funder, partner, and material patron in what it considers as the ‘valuable activities’ of CSOs (Rosenblum and Lesch, 2011:291).

In democratic states, excessive and overt restrictions on the democratic roles of civil society, particularly in terms of political advocacy, are less common. The restrictions are mostly applicable to groups and individuals throughout society and not focused on specific CSOs. Nonetheless, there are moments when the liberties, rights and spaces of civil society are overtly endangered in democratic states and this has far-reaching implications. One of these moments for example, was the period following the terrorist attacks on Washington, DC and New York on 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United Kingdom and the USA for example, initiated several measures aimed

65 at curbing terrorist financing such as criminalising certain types of support to groups that are deemed as ‘terrorist’ organisations (Sidel, 2011:298-299). Similarly, the freezing and proscription of the assets of some Muslim foundations in the USA on the pretext of their material assistance to terrorist organisations illustrate restrictions on the activities of civil society (Sidel, 2011:299-300).

However, in undemocratic (authoritarian) states, the ruling party or state can limit the liberties and space of CSOs (Sidel, 2011:299). These restrictions can take the form of broad government discretion to terminate, dissolve, or appropriate offending organisations and their assets – usually without leaving room for due process or appeal. It can also direct restrictions on the status and registration of CSOs and impose limited tax incentives on them. Other mechanisms include restrictions on the establishment of CSOs (without the right to appeal) and restrictions on foreign funding and fundraising, especially for public interest lobbying CSOs. However, the restrictions are less severe for some associations such as CSOs engaged in developmental projects or performing work that the government approves and which are not considered as threats (Sidel, 2011:305). These include associations dedicated to the provision of public goods and citizen watchdog groups (Warren, 2011:386). As pointed out in chapter one, in order to ensure that their projects are executed without hindrance, developmental CSOs cooperate with governments irrespective whether they are democratic or not. Therefore, these CSOs are liable to be tolerated in terms of their rights and liberties. As a result, they tend to receive the support and protection of the state (Warren, 2011:386).

However, policy-oriented, religious and advocacy organisations on the other hand, are prone to strict government control and management (Sidel, 2011:305-306). They are often perceived by governments as challenging traditional customs or opposing the party in power and/or the state (Sidel, 2011:305-306). Consequently, their rights and liberties are often endangered (Bob, 2011:215, 217). In several instances, such organisations have been closed and activists have been detained and imprisoned. A good example is the Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng) in China, which provided civil rights and public interest advocacy services to a range of organisations and citizens in Beijing and

66 also investigated major scandals. In 2009 when the Chinese government decided to shut down the Open Constitution Initiative, it started by employing nonprofit tax regulations such as the fine of 1.42 million Chinese yuan on the organisation for alleged tax evasion. Thereafter, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau which is the civil authority in charge of nonprofit associations, raided the organisation resulting in the official closure of the Open Constitution Initiative. Security forces detained the leaders of the organisation. In the wink of an eye, a carefully coordinated set of actions thus destroyed an important advocacy group (Sidel, 2011:305-306).

As shown above, most countries to a lesser or larger extent, regulate the activities of CSOs. Similarly, the space provided to civil society differs considerably from country to country. However, there are more restrictions in nondemocratic regimes and the space provided to civil society is more constrained compared to democratic states, which mostly regulate groups that are perceived as ‘terrorist’ organisations.

This chapter focuses on the conditions under which CSOs operated in Cameroon before the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992. It is important to note that these conditions have not been static over the years. It is therefore necessary to first provide a brief historical overview of political rule in Cameroon since 1966 (when the country became a single-party state) and the restrictions on civil society over the years, in order to establish the political environment in which they functioned during this period. This is necessary since it will set the scene for probing the challenges encountered by CSOs in the post- 1992 era in their efforts to promote democracy in Cameroon (see chapter five). Thus, the first section of the chapter focuses on civil society in Cameroon’s democratic transition process and the restrictions it faced. This is followed by examining the transition process (to multipartism in 1992) and political liberalisation in the country and the role of civil society in the process, as well as the constraints encountered.

3.2 Civil society in Cameroon’s democratic transition process

This section provides a brief outline of civil society in Cameroon’s democratic transition process and the restrictions it faced. CSOs as indicated below, operated in different forms during the country’s transition process. Similarly, they endured several forms of repression from successive regimes in the course of the country’s transition to multipartism.

3.2.1 Background: Ahidjo’s one-party rule and its control of CSOs (1966-1982)

Shortly after the union in 1961 between the former British and French Cameroon trust territories as indicated above, Cameroon became a single-party state in 1966. The political parties that had been in existence such as the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), the Cameroon United Congress (CUC) and the Cameroon People’s National Convention (CPNC) were co-opted into the Union Camerounaise (Cameroon Union) (UC) resulting in a change of name, that is, the Union Nationale Camerounaise (Cameroon National Union) (CNU) with Ahmadou Ahidjo as its president, and head of state (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:44-46).24 Ahidjo was able to maintain the political stability of Cameroon at a time when most African countries were plagued by civil wars and other kinds of political instability, by means of intimidation and coercion, as well as centralisation, and coalition building (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:51, 55). Patrimonial networks as mechanisms for sustaining power also characterised the one-party state (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:6).

The upshot of the above situation is that it ushered in a period of repression by Ahidjo and his ruling CNU party of close to two decades. For example, the anti-subversion decree of 12 March 1962 discouraged Cameroonians from uttering any statement (political or non-political) that could be interpreted as criticising the ruling party or regime.

24 It should be noted that Takougang and Krieger (1998) have written extensively and systematically on the political situation in Cameroon, especially during the era of Ahidjo. Therefore, rather than citing from other scholars who have quoted their work, this section relies heavily on their work.

For instance, Articles 2 and 3 of the decree stipulated that an individual can either be imprisoned for a period of one to five years or imposed a fine ranging from 200,000 to two million francs CFA, or both. Therefore, anyone who reproduced or published statements and reports that were considered as false or rumours, or likely to bring contempt, hatred or ridicule to any public official was liable to be imprisoned or fined. Consequently, the decree was most often utilised by senior officials to accuse citizens of making ‘tendentious’ statements or comments. A case in point was the seizure of two consecutive issues of the Catholic weekly newspaper, L’ Effort Camerounais (The Cameroon Effort) in September 1970. The first issue was seized on allegation that it printed the picture of Colonel Ojukwu,25 while the second was seized because it published an article that condemned the confiscation of the previous issue (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54). Furthermore, the articles of all local newspapers had to be endorsed for publication by the senior prefect of the city or town where they were printed. Failure to comply with this requirement could result in imprisonment of the publisher, payment of a fine or an outright embargo on the paper (Takougang, 2004:78). Foreign magazines and newspapers were also scrutinised to ensure that they were free of articles that criticise the regime (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54). In addition, Article 4 of Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 prohibited the creation of associations or groups perceived to have an exclusively clanic or tribal character or the tendency to promote causes that can endanger the state or national territory (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:53-54).

However, the actual task of creating and maintaining an atmosphere of constant intimidation and fear among Cameroonians was largely carried out by two tightly controlled and well-organised units – the Brigade Mixte Mobile (Mixed Mobile Brigade) (BMM) and the Service des Etudes et de la Documentation (The Department of Studies and Documentation) (SEDOC) renamed as the Centre National de documentation (The National Documentation Centre) (CND) in 1975 (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:459). The BMM operated sites of torture where suspects were subjected to physical punishment as

25 During the Nigerian civil war from 6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970, Colonel Ojukwu led the breakaway republic of Biafra to declare its abortive independence from the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54).

69 a means of extracting confessions from them while the SEDOC acted as the political police by spying on those perceived as adversaries of the regime both inside and outside the country. The agents of both units received handsome rewards in the form of financial remunerations and promotions for obtaining incriminating evidence from suspects or unearthing subversive elements. As a result, overzealous and unscrupulous agents exploited the system to acquire financial gains or attain higher offices by falsely accusing people. Therefore, the state of uncertainty and fear engendered by the system was so pervasive that most Cameroonians were scared to condemn the government even in front of their close family relatives (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54). Also, afraid of risking their positions, the president’s cabinet ministers could not make suggestions that might upset him (Takougang, 2004:77). Cameroon under Ahidjo was often equated to the Soviet Union under Stalin (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54).

As a result, individual and civil society restrictions characterised the one-party rule. For example, until February 1975, adult Cameroonians travelling between cities and towns in the country were required to carry a laissez-passer (pass), while college students had to carry a school identity card. Concerning the former document, it had to be renewed every six months or whenever the bearer had to travel to a destination which was not included in the official authorisation. Likewise, it was mandatory for all adult Cameroonians to carry a national identity card at all times. The card indicated among other things, occupation, place and date of birth. The above-mentioned documents enabled the government to keep track of the identity and movement, as well as activities of almost all Cameroonians (Takougang, 2004:78). The government also employed overt tactics to deal with political dissidents. As an illustration, approximately 2,000 people were arrested in Douala (the country’s economic capital) in 1976 following what the regime labelled as ‘anti- government’ protests. Similarly, in 1972, 1973 and 1978, troops invaded the campus of the University of Yaoundé to quell demonstrations by students who were protesting against the educational policies of the administration (Takougang, 2004:77).

Ahidjo also adopted repressive tactics to ensure that CSOs and other dissenting voices were effectively neutralised, thus, eliminating threats to his authority. For example, the

Jehovah’s Witnesses sect was banned in Cameroon in April 1970 on the grounds that its members had refused to participate in the 1970 presidential elections. Also, despite the fact that Article 3 of the Constitution permitted the creation of political parties, a meeting in June 1972 organised by some anglophone leaders such as Augustin Jua and John Ngu Foncha26 to discuss the creation of a new party was dispersed by the police force. Several people attending the meeting were momentarily detained. The administration justified both actions under Article 4 of Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 which as indicated above, prohibited the creation of associations or groups perceived to have an exclusively clanic or tribal character or the tendency to promote causes that can endanger the state or national territory.

Similarly, CSOs such as trade unions were also co-opted into the neo-patrimonial networks of the governing CNU party (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:6). Ahidjo’s ability to safeguard Cameroon’s political stability for over two decades was largely attributable to his skills in utilising his authority and power to create supportive coalitions and networks which reflected the country’s ethnic, linguistic and regional diversity. The creation of such coalitions and networks was facilitated by his use of the system of patronage that permitted him to distribute and control state resources. Through this system, those in positions in the administration or within the party exploited their position for personal gain. Also, they were able to establish clienteles for the president and themselves by fostering employment opportunities and providing other economic and social benefits to their clients. The upshot was that the president was capable of creating a vast patron-client network that comprised various regional, ethnic and social groups (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:52) which undermined the development of a spirited civil society.

Ahidjo also established a highly centralised government with the president wielding much power particularly in terms of taking decisions. Therefore, the entire administrative decision-making process was concentrated in the office of the presidency and centralised

26 John Ngu Foncha served as prime minister of West Cameroon in the Federal Republic of Cameroon from 1 October 1961 to 13 May 1965 and Augustin Jua from 13 May 1965 to 11 January 1968 (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:45).

71 in Yaoundé. The governors (heads of the regions) although under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Territorial Administration, were nonetheless, the direct representatives of the head of state in the regions. Therefore, they were directly answerable to him and could deal directly with the presidency instead of the Minister of Territorial Administration on most important issues. Similarly, cabinet ministers and other senior staff needed authorisation from the presidency before taking the most basic decisions. Indeed, Ahidjo’s dominance over all spheres of government was so pervasive that most parliamentarians were deprived of their right to initiate laws. Therefore, the president was not responsible to anyone (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:51). Furthermore, a distinct characteristic of Ahidjo’s regime was the personal attention he paid to military promotions and appointments. This enhanced the loyalty of the security forces to the civilian authority which was managed in a similar manner (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:53).

As a result, the country was politically stable and experienced marked socio-economic progress during Ahidjo’s tenure but, at the expense of gross human rights abuses. Areas that witnessed remarkable progress include education, transport, health and economy. Concerning education for example, the total number of registered students in technical and secondary schools increased from 42,774 pupils in 1966-1967 to 462,225 in 1980- 1981. In terms of transportation, development included the extension of the Mbanga- Douala railroad to Kumba, the expansion of the Douala seaport, the extension of the Yaoundé-Douala railroad to Ngaoundere, and the extension of the Tiko-Douala road linking the former East and West Cameroon. As a result, in comparison to 1965 when the total railroad system was 517 km, it expanded to 1,172 km in 1977. Concerning health, the number of hospital beds doubled in the period 1962-1980 (from 10,000 to 24,541). Furthermore, the University of Yaoundé’s medical school which was established to cater for the multifarious health problems faced by the country, graduated its first batch of students in 1974. The economy also grew substantially from the late 1970s. This was largely due to the extra revenue acquired from the sale of oil. Government figures indicated that oil revenue increased from US$ 425 million in 1981 to US$ 469 million in 1982, which represented an increment of 5% of the total export earnings of Cameroon during the same period (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:55-56).

Notwithstanding Ahidjo’s evident firm command of virtually all the mechanisms of power, the appearance of political stability and national unity in Cameroon, and the comparatively strong economy, it would be misleading to assume that the country was devoid of discontent and severe political problems. In the middle and late 1970s for instance, there were visible signs of resistance to the regime. In Douala (the economic capital) and Yaoundé, thousands of anti-government flyers were in circulation in January 1976 and 1977. This anti-government sentiment was largely due to economic frustrations resulting from the rising financial inequality between the small, but privileged class of politicians and bureaucrats on the one hand, and the majority of underprivileged Cameroonians on the other. As a result, in an act of defiance against the regime, workers in Douala embarked on an unprecedented strike in January 1977. The strike was to protest against the rising prices and high rate of inflation. An amicable settlement to the crisis was reached as the workers were granted a wage increment of between five and 18%. However, the strike served as a warning to the administration against impending strikes. In a related incident, the Presbyterian Church in the North West and South West regions in its 20th synod in January 1977 expressed concern over the maltreatment of prisoners. Similarly, the Catholic bishops of the Bamenda and Buea diocese in September 1977 denounced corruption by government administrators (particularly police officers) in a letter printed in the Cameroon Times. An attempted military coup was also alleged by some foreign newspapers in July 1979 (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:57-58).

The above discussion demonstrates the various types of repressive measures that were utilised by Ahidjo’s regime to curtail the freedoms of individuals and limit the activities of CSOs. These measures included oppressive legislations such as the anti-subversion decree of 12 March 1962 and Article 4 of Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 which endangered the creation of CSOs. The actual task of creating and maintaining an atmosphere of constant intimidation and fear among Cameroonians was largely carried out by two tightly controlled and well-organised units – the BMM and SEDOC. Consequently, individual freedoms and civil society activities were constrained, resulting in a limited role by CSOs in fostering democratic governance during this period. However,

73 the analysis indicates that there were visible signs of resistance to the regime in the middle and late 1970s.

3.2.2 President Biya’s political reforms in the 1980s

Despite Ahidjo’s success in effectively neutralising dissenting voices and thus, eliminating threats to his authority, he surprisingly resigned as President on 4 November 1982.27 Paul Biya his constitutional successor who, up till then had been the Prime Minister, succeeded him and has been ruling since (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:2). When taking over power, President Biya introduced measures aimed at transforming the political status quo from the authoritarian and archaic rule of his predecessor to a new ‘democratic’ and humane society. For instance, Article 7 of the Constitution was amended on 18 November 1983 to permit multiple contenders in presidential elections. Therefore, since the establishment of the single-party system in 1966, contestants meeting certain requirements could for the first time compete in presidential elections (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:76). Similarly, he initiated the principle of communal liberalism, aimed at tackling the prevalent socio-economic inequalities by enabling all Cameroonians to reap the fruits of the country’s economic development. Another novelty of Biya’s administration especially during the first five years, was that he and members of his cabinet made an effort to be accessible to the media. For example, ministers were encouraged to make themselves available to radio programmes and answer questions related to their different ministries. In contrast to his predecessor, who did not believe in a liberal system and was therefore considered by some observers as not being accessible to the public, Biya had faith in this type of accessible administration. He assumed that it could help in understanding the various problems faced by the different communities in terms of schools, recreational facilities, clinics and other services, and thus, assist the administration in finding solutions to these problems. In addition, the head of state expected that the new practice would foster a close bond between him and the people, and therefore, win their trust in and support for his administration (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:76-78).

27 Ahidjo’s sudden resignation as president was attributed to ill-health (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:63).

The above policies were welcomed by a population which, for more than two decades, had suffered under the authoritarian and oppressive regime of Ahidjo. Consequently, the president was described by Cameroonians (including politicians) in complimentary terms which, included ‘an approachable man’, ‘a man who mixes’, ‘handsome’, and someone who has the interest of the masses at heart. Home-based Cameroonian students and those abroad also praised the head of state for his candour and openness. The popularity of the president was also demonstrated by his initiation into several traditional societies all over the country. For instance, he was inducted into the Ngondo (the association of traditional rulers of the Duala tribe) in December 1984. Likewise, Biya was conferred the traditional title ‘Fon of Fons’ (‘Chief of Chiefs’) in January 1985 by the fons (chiefs) of Mankon, Bafut, Nso, Kom and Bali which made him the senior fon (chief) in the North West region (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:78).

The congress of the ruling CNU in Bamenda in March 1985 (dubbed the New Deal Congress) further indicated the greater openness and freedom in the country during Biya’s early years in office. It provided him with the golden opportunity to determine the path he wanted the country and party to follow under his administration, notwithstanding the controversies that surrounded the congress held from 21-24 March 1985. These three days were characterised by political wrangles between two opposing camps. On the one hand, were adherents of the ‘New Deal’ championed by young militants such as Mohamad Labarang and Georges Ngango. They favoured an increase in the pace of political liberalisation and a total departure from the past, as well as the establishment of a multiparty system in the country. On the other hand, were vestiges of the old regime like Mengueme, Doumba and Sengat Kuo. They were worried that sweeping reforms might engender political instability and therefore, advocated for continuity and caution (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:78).

Despite these divergent views as demonstrated above, most delegates were frank and carefully scrutinised government policies. This was in stark contrast to preceding party congresses that were simply well-designed proceedings to present party officials and validate policies that had already been endorsed by the party’s Central Committee and

Political Bureau, as well as the head of state. To illustrate the frankness of delegates at the congress, the elites of the North West region presented a memorandum which revealed how the constitution had been manipulated to the detriment and disadvantage of the anglophone culture. Among other issues that were raised in the memorandum were the prejudiced attempts to revise the anglophone educational system by francophone officials without effecting similar reforms in the francophone educational system. Another issue that was raised pertains to the government practice of hiring French speakers as superiors to English-speaking Cameroonians – even in situations where the latter were better qualified (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:78).

In light of the opposing opinions noted above during the CNU congress in Bamenda, Biya had to find a middle ground between the conservative and progressive factions. Therefore, he made a symbolic gesture by changing the name of the CNU to the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). This was an attempt to appease the progressive members of the party who had expected the congress to launch multipartism in the country. As a result, it was assumed that the party’s new name and motto, ‘Union, Progress and Democracy’, indicated Biya’s yearning for political liberalisation. It was further believed that the above changes suggested the desire of the president to transform the party to a party for all Cameroonians and not only for the elites as was the case with the CNU. Therefore, the expectation by some party members was that democracy would be introduced to the CPDM so that its work and control mechanisms could evolve from a bottom-up approach unlike the CNU which adopted a top-down approach. However, while assuring delegates that there would be greater openness within the party, the president cautioned them not to utilise such democratic openings to sow confusion and division within the nation and party (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:79). This caution seemed to be an effort to address the fears of the conservative party members who (as indicated above), were worried about the negative consequences of sweeping political reforms.

A further illustration of Biya’s desire to appease both the conservative and progressive wings of the party was that he increased the members of the Central Committee of the

76 newly established CPDM. Unlike the CNU whose Central Committee was composed of 41 members and 11 alternate members, the CPDM was made up of 65 members and 20 alternate members. As a result, some progressive members like Joseph Fofe, Denis Ekane and Georges Ngango, as well as businessmen such as Samuel Kondo, James Onobiono, Joseph Sack and Pierre Tchangue were admitted to the Central Committee.28 Similarly, some seasoned politicians like Doumba, Sengat Kuo and Mengueme were retained. Overall, on the Central Committee of the CPDM, 40 of the 65 and 15 of the 20 full members and alternate members respectively, were new and had not held such positions before under the CNU (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:79-80).

In spite of the significant number of new members admitted to the Central Committee of the CPDM as illustrated above, and the new name of the party, it was widely believed that those who carried the day at the Bamenda Congress were the seasoned conservative politicians. This is because they retained several key positions in the party. For example, Sengat Kuo and Doumba were elected as political secretary and organising secretary of the party respectively, while young liberal followers like Ebenezer Njoh Mouelle and Ngango who championed radical changes in the Central Committee were admitted to the committee just as alternate members. However, the features that characterised the Bamenda ‘New Deal Congress’ as highlighted above, were significant in Biya’s political career and presidency. For instance, by creating his own party (the CPDM), he destroyed the last relics of Ahidjo’s CNU epoch in Cameroon. Biya also gained control of the most important institutions of power in the country, that is, chairman of the party and head of state. Therefore, he was fully confident to implement some far-reaching political reforms. For example, he allowed the return of 55 political dissenters in February 1986 who were forced to go into exile in Ghana during Ahidjo’s regime. Similarly, in August in the same year, 14 followers of the UPC who had been incarcerated since December 1985 for allegedly disrupting public peace were granted clemency (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:80).

28 It was alleged that the inclusion of prominent businessmen in the Central Committee was aimed at creating a bond between the business class and the bureaucracy (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:79-80).

A further offshoot of the Bamenda Congress was the introduction of a new competitive electoral system. This system was utilised in the 1986 elections of representatives to the various organs of the newly created party (CPDM), the municipal elections in November 1987 and the legislative elections in April 1988. Concerning the latter, the former administrative divisions were changed to electoral districts and each district was allocated legislative seats proportional to its population. Under the former system, the whole country was regarded as a single electoral district and voters could only cast their votes for a single list of contestants. The new system also provided that more than one contender could run for the same legislative seat or party position from the same district. Therefore, the new system was a marked improvement on the previous single-list system whereby the party’s Political Bureau ignored the ordinary members in its selection of candidates for the legislative assembly (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:80-81).

Subsequent national legislative and party elections revealed the positive impact of the new electoral system. In the 1986 party elections for example, 25 of the 49 section party presidents were newcomers. Also, 28 of the 49 section presidents of the party’s Women Wing were newly elected. Similarly, in the 1988 legislative elections 85% of the elected candidates were new. Also, the number of women elected to the National Assembly increased from 15 to 22%. Among the candidates that were elected to key leadership positions were those who previously sympathised with the UPC party or opposed Ahidjo’s regime. They included Thomas Melone from Sanaga-Maritime who was elected to the National Assembly and Jean-Jacques Ekindi elected as the party president in Wouri Division (Douala). The election of both the conservative and progressive candidates to public and party offices contributed towards the alleviation of conflict that had developed between the two camps (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:81-82).

Due to the merits of the new electoral system as indicated above, it attracted positive reaction from some party members. For instance, according to a member of the Central Committee of the CPDM, the new process served as an appropriate means for party activists to choose their leaders and not simply accept the choices made on their behalf as was previously the case. The change was described by another member as a fulfilment

78 of the president’s promise of democratising the party. Similarly, the government-owned Cameroon Tribune in an editorial, perceived the change as a tangible demonstration of Biya’s commitment to genuine democracy, which is one of the vital components of national revival. Even some Western observers regarded both the 1986 party elections and 1988 legislative elections as the right steps towards enhancing democratic governance in Cameroon (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:82).

Biya also introduced the National Charter of Freedom which guaranteed among other things, freedom of expression and thought, and equal protection before the law. Consequently, in line with the President’s vision of promoting greater freedom, the Minister of Information and Culture, François Sengat Kuo assured Cameroonian journalists in August 1983 that they could write and report freely and without fear of being harassed, but within the law (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:76-77). Private local newspapers and magazines were quick at exploiting the new-found freedom. By 1985, over a dozen private magazines and newspapers were published in the country and most were very critical of the government. Foreign publications such as Jeune Afrique (Young Africa) and West Africa were also permitted to enter the country without the excessive inspection that characterised the previous regime, to ascertain that they were free of articles perceived to be subversive (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:77). The new-found freedom also boosted the confidence of the citizens, particularly in terms of their ability to express themselves without being scared of arrest or persecution. For example, political discussions at the University of Yaoundé were tolerated more than was the case during the former regime. Lecturers at the university could publish articles that were critical of the government without fear of being disciplined or dismissed from the university as would have been the case in the past (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:77).

Notwithstanding the introduction of the above political reforms in the early 1980s, they were, however, cosmetic and of short duration. By the late 1980s, it became clear to many Cameroonians that Biya was not interested in promoting individual and collective freedoms or fostering the emergence of a spirited civil society. Instead, he was merely interested in consolidating his power (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:76, 89-90). As a

79 result, similar to the situation under his predecessor, the rise of a robust civil society as key player in the country’s democratic process was inhibited. For example, despite the fact that the President and some of his cabinet ministers had encouraged journalists to freely write and report as indicated above, it was premised on the assumption that such freedom should not be perceived by government officials as constituting a threat to the regime. Consequently, Law No. 3292/L/MINAT/DAT/LP was issued on 8 November 1983 by the Minister of Territorial Administration. Reminiscent of the previous regime, the law retained prepublication censorship and the resultant confiscation of newspapers regarded as not conforming to the law. Therefore, the principal victim of this policy was the private press since newspapers could be banned and journalists arrested for publishing articles deemed to be inappropriate by the authorities. A case in point was when the editor of the Cameroon Times, Paul Nkemayong was arrested and briefly detained in 1985 for allegedly refusing to release documents considered to be confidential concerning a story he had written detailing fraud and corruption at the Société Nationale de Raffinage (The National Refining Company) (SONARA). In 1986 several journalists were also arrested for supposedly using ‘bad language’ and attacking institutions and individuals in a manner that was viewed by the government as incompatible with their status as journalists. Similarly, two journalists were handed down a four-month sentence in 1988 for publishing an article which was perceived as critical of Giscard d’Estaing, former French President who was in Cameroon on a private visit (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:90-91).

Government censorship and control were not restricted to the private media. Journalists of state-owned media such as the Cameroon Tribute and the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) were also censored. The fact that these journalists were civil servants meant that they had to represent the views of the government and therefore should be less critical of the regime. Defaulters were penalised in a number of ways, including detentions, arrests, and transfers to less desirable positions or regions of the country. For instance, some anglophone journalists were arrested in 1986 for expressing comments about government officials that were regarded as ‘derogatory’. The editor of the Cameroon Tribute and the director of the Cameroon Press and Publishing Company (SOPECAM) were arrested on 22 January 1987 for having published a presidential order

80 without formal authorisation. It was claimed that their action violated an established order which prohibited such publication since the decision was still unofficial and hence, regarded as classified information. In addition, popular radio programmes like Minute by Minute and Cameroon Report which presented an in-depth analysis of critical issues faced by the country were taken off the airwaves on the allegation that they were irresponsible in their commentaries on the government (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:91).

A further indication of the limitations and hypocrisy of Biya’s political reforms is the fact that he did not demolish many of the oppressive institutions or scrapped the laws inherited from his predecessor (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:3). These included the anti-subversion decree of 12 March 1962 and Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 which, as earlier alluded to, restricted freedom of association and expression (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:90- 91). Similarly, SEDOC with its omnipresent and sophisticated network of spies was maintained notwithstanding the change of name to the Centre National des Etudes et des Recherches (The National Centre for Studies and Research) (CENER).29 Also retained, was the BMM responsible for the scrutiny and brutalisation of anti-government suspects. Therefore, just like Ahidjo, Biya utilised the above institutions and laws to intimidate and suppress civil society, particularly critics of his administration and political dissidents (Takougang, 2004:79-80). For instance, Joseph Sende, a medical practitioner in Yaoundé was arrested in January 1985 for filing a lawsuit against the administration requesting a repeal of the ban on the Union des Populations du Cameroun (the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) (UPC) party in Cameroon.30 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the lawsuit, Sende was arrested again in February of the same year and detained for several months without trail (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:460).

29 Jean Forchivé who had served as head of SEDOC for more than 15 years under the former regime and who was noted for his effectiveness and ability in flushing out perceived ‘enemies of the state’ was reappointed by Biya to lead CENER. This indicated that Biya was determined to use the coercive tactics of intimidation and force to maintain the political system he inherited (Takougang, 2004:80). 30 The Union des Populations du Cameroun (the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) (UPC) party was banned in Cameroon in 1955 by the French colonial administration as a result of its fierce resistance to colonial rule (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:35).

Similar to Sende’s case, a prominent anglophone lawyer from the North West region, Fongum Gorji Dinka was arrested on 28 May 1985 for publishing and circulating a booklet (The new social order). In the booklet, he challenged Biya’s authority and constitutionality in unilaterally changing the country’s name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.31 He was also never brought to trail although he was ultimately released in January 1986 after being charged with contempt by the head of state and other dignitaries under Article 152 and 153 of the penal code. In addition, 14 followers of the UPC party were arrested in December 1985 and detained for six months for allegedly dispensing flyers on behalf of the party. On their release in August 1986, government authorities overlooked the irregularities in the legal process. On the contrary, they praised and publicised the release as symbolic of the President’s liberal policies (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:91-92). Aggravating the situation is the fact that night raids popularly referred to as kalé kalé were frequently carried out by the army and gendarmes32 in areas suspected to be sanctuaries for dissident elements (Takougang, 2004:80).

It is evident from the above incidents that a pattern of flagrant disregard for the law was emerging. Although the Cameroon Penal Code prohibited the arrest and detention of anybody for more than 48 hours without a court order for allegations of committing non- political crimes, authorities usually ignored the law or framed the alleged infringements to suit a political crime. As an illustration, the Cameroonian musician, Koko Ateba was arrested in May 1988 and accused of singing a song at an inaugural ball that was perceived as insulting to the presidential couple. The same applied to Albert Mukong, a prominent anglophone political activist who was arrested in June 1988 following an interview he had with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). During the interview,

31 Shortly after taking over power in November 1982, President Paul Biya amended the Constitution, which led to among other things, the change of the country’s name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon. He claimed that the change of name demonstrated the political maturity of Cameroonians and diminished divisions after several years of European colonisation and the independence that ensued. However, the perception by many anglophone Cameroonians is that this was a step towards their assimilation and eventual disappearance as a distinct political unit of the country (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:76, 83). As earlier indicated, the Republic of Cameroon is the product of a union in 1961 between the former British and French Cameroon trust territories. 32 Cameroon’s National Gendarmerie force is one of the country’s oldest military units. Its origin dates back to 4 January 1920 when Cameroon was still under French colonial rule (Cameroon Post Line, 2010).

82 he criticised the Cameroonian government for its frequent constitutional changes and attributed the country’s economic woes to misappropriation of public funds by government officials. Consequently, he was accused of using seditious language which was considered to be insulting to the head of state, and government. Mukong like others, was detained without trail, but ultimately released in May 1989 (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:92).

Besides restraining individual freedoms as indicated above, both the anti-subversion decree of 12 March 1962 and Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 were also utilised to contain groups and CSOs whose ideals were deemed to be different from those of the regime. For example, similar to what transpired during Ahidjo’s era, some members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses sect were arrested in December 1984 during their annual conference and detained without trail till May 1985. The government justified the arrests under the law of 1967 alluded to above, which prohibited any association whose values were at odds with national unity or that had an exclusive membership. Despite Biya’s professed stance against the apartheid regime in South Africa, an ‘anti-apartheid’ conference scheduled for 15-18 January 1985 in Yaoundé by the Association of African Jurists was banned by the government. It was alleged that the organisers did not adhere to the law in terms of securing proper authorisation to organise the conference (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:92).

Similar to the previous autocratic regime under Ahidjo, individuals and civil society in the 1980s under Biya also encountered several types of oppression. These include covert tactics like anti-subversion decrees and laws, spying, and intimidation, as well as overt tactics such as arrests, detention, torture and imprisonment. Notwithstanding these repressive tactics, the aspiration of civil society to achieve sweeping political reforms and political pluralism was not dampened; as demonstrated in the subsequent section.

3.2.3 The ‘third wave’ of democratisation and the resuscitation of civil society in the 1990s

The above-mentioned acts of aggression and intimidation against individuals and protest movements, as well as repressive institutions and laws necessitated demands for far- reaching political reforms in the early 1990s (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:462). The peculiarity about this period was that civil society activities in Cameroon were characterised by mass protests under the coordination of coalitions of civic groups and political movements. As indicated in chapter one, most of the subtle transformative activities in Africa such as spontaneous mass protests occur at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life and are easily ignored or dismissed as non-civic. Furthermore, the period coincided with the ‘third wave’ of democratisation that swept across the African continent from the end of 1989. Therefore, it ushered in a crucial phase in the development of civil society in Cameroon like in most other African countries (Ngoh, 2004:431, 433). As a result of support from external and internal sources, CSOs gained strength. For example, with support from the donors as mentioned in chapter two, they became vibrant both organisationally and vocally. Consequently, CSOs in Cameroon engaged the state in a ferocious political battle, championed the cause of political reforms, and stamped their influence on the course of the transition process notwithstanding the drawbacks (as discussed below). They, as pointed out in chapter one, made a strong contribution to the demise of the authoritarian and archaic system that had been in existence since 1961 and its subsequent replacement by a more liberalised system and transition from a one-party to a multiparty system in 1992 (Nkwi, 2006:96).

Initially, Biya like the majority of other African leaders, was reluctant to officially allow political pluralism in Cameroon although the country was a de jure multiparty state33 (Ngoh, 2004:433). However, CSOs in Cameroon were bent on dismantling the single- party system which as earlier mentioned, was introduced in 1966. This treacherous

33 As noted above, in contrast to most other African countries, the Constitution of Cameroon did not prohibit the establishment of other political parties. Article 3 of the 1972 Constitution permitted the creation of opposition parties (Ngoh, 2004:433).

84 endeavour started in February 1990 when Yondo Black, a renowned barrister and former president of the CBA gathered some Cameroonians in Douala (the commercial capital) to explore the possibility of forming a political party. As a result, agents of CENER, arrested Black and his collaborators (the “Douala ten” as they became known in the private media since the group consisted of ten members). However, the government tried to cover up the real motive for their arrest, that is, their attempt to form a party, which was permitted in the Constitution. Rather, they were charged with among other things, inciting revolt, producing and circulating leaflets that were hostile to the regime, holding secret meetings, fomenting ethnic tension, and abusing the president. These were considered to be gross violations of the anti-subversion decree of 12 March 1962 and Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967, which restricted freedom of association and expression as earlier pointed out (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:103-104).

The government was severely criticised by professional bodies like the CBA and several international human rights organisations, as well as the international community, for arresting the “Douala ten”. The CBA for instance, requested that the accused be released. It also denounced the search of Black’s office, which was regarded as an infringement of Law No. 87/018 of 15 July 1987. According to this law, the search of a lawyer’s office was subject to formal judicial investigation. In addition, the CBA threatened to boycott all court proceedings in the course of the trail. Eventually, the accused were tried by a special military court in Yaoundé (the administrative capital) on 30 March 1990 after spending about six weeks in detention. In spite of inadequate evidence by the prosecutors, three of them were given varied prison sentences after being found guilty, two others received suspended prison sentences, while the remaining five were acquitted. The trail was perceived by some scholars as an abuse and a mockery of the Cameroonian judicial system (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:104-105).

Rather than acting as a deterrent, the above incident served as motivation for forces of civil society to continue in their quest for political pluralism. Therefore, the next episode revealed the power of mass protests under the coordination of a political party that strove for its legalisation and political pluralism. It marked a momentous stage in the rise of civil

85 society in Cameroon’s democratic process. As pointed out above, a peculiarity of the 1990s was that civil society activities in Cameroon were characterised by mass protests under the coordination of coalitions of civic groups and political movements. In the immediate aftermath of the trail of Black and his associates, some anglophone elites led by John Fru Ndi, a bookshop proprietor in Bamenda (in the North West region of Cameroon) also decided to form a political party, the SDF. Other members of this political movement included Albert Mukong (who as indicated above, had been arrested and detained before by the Biya regime), Carlson Anyangwe, Siga Asanga, Vincent Feko, Justice Nyo ‘Wakai and Gemuh Akuchu. Acting as the chairman of the newly formed SDF, Ndi submitted to the local authorities the documents for the party’s registration on 16 March 1990 as required by law, and also applied for authorisation to launch the party (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:462-463).

The scheduled date for the launch was 26 May 1990 and the administrative authorities were informed and provided with details in terms of the activities planned for the day. However, the government was hesitant to grant permission for the inauguration of the party. Ndi was discouraged by the Minister of Territorial Administration and other state officials from executing his plans. This was followed by an administrative order on 24 May 1990 banning all public rallies and demonstration on 26 May 1990, which was the scheduled date for the launch of the party. Furthermore, several detachments of para- military and security forces, as well as close to 2,000 armed troops were deployed by the government at strategic positions in the city of Bamenda on the eve of 26 May 1990 where the launching was planned. All major entrances to the city were also blocked (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:463).

Nevertheless, having fulfilled all the administrative and legal requirements and procedures, Ndi, against all odds, launched the SDF on 26 May 1990 as programmed in Bamenda. Notwithstanding the fact that the launch took place at a different venue at Ntarinkon park near the residence of Ndi as troops had sealed off Commercial Avenue34

34 Commercial Avenue was about two kilometers from Ntarinkon park where the SDF was launched (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:105).

86 where the event was originally planned, it nonetheless, attracted a large crowd of about 80,000 sympathisers, supporters and curious spectators. However, immediately after the successful launching of the SDF, some jubilant supporters of the party attempted to enter the heavily militarised Commercial Avenue. Seemingly frustrated at being outfoxed, troops opened fire on the crowd. As a result, six people were killed and hundreds sustained fatal injuries. In a separate incident, a pro-SDF rally on the same day by some students at the University of Yaoundé led to several arrests. It was alleged that among those arrested, a female student was raped by the soldiers while three other students were tortured to death (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:105).

The killing of the six people in Bamenda and three university students received both foreign and internal condemnation. In terms of the latter, condemnation came from among others, elder statesmen, staff and students of the University of Yaoundé, religious bodies, non-governmental human rights associations, and the CBA. As elder statesman, John Ngu Foncha (a former Prime Minister – see above) who was the vice-president of the ruling CPDM resigned from his post on 9 June 1990. In his letter of resignation to the president, he contended that as a prominent anglophone CPDM personality, he had become an object of ridicule as a result of the tragic incident in Bamenda. Condemnation also came from a council composed of 19 Catholic bishops who signed a pastoral letter which was published on 3 June 1990. In the letter it was disclosed that the church could no longer remain insensitive to the suffering of innocent families and individuals resulting from the nation’s economic crisis. Despite that no reference was made to multipartism in the letter, the archbishop of Garoua and the Roman Catholic Primate of Cameroon, Christian Cardinal Tumi, in a press conference on 11 June 1990 condemned the killings in Bamenda and called for the establishment of a multiparty system (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:105-107). Western countries that criticised the killings and pressurised the regime to democratise were the USA, France, Britain and Germany (Ngoh, 2004:436).

The successful launching of the SDF marked a turning point in Cameroon’s democratisation process as it set a revolutionary precedent. Other leaders of political parties soon followed suit. For instance, the National Union for Democracy and Progress

(NUDP) was formed by Maïgari Bello Bouba. He was the first prime minister in Biya’s administration but later went into exile in Nigeria as a result of his alleged participation in a coup attempt against Biya. Similarly, Jean-Michel Tekam established the Cameroon Democratic Front (CDF) on 25 June 1990 in Paris, France. He was one of those involved in the ‘Yondo Black affair’ (see above), and was convicted in absentia (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:107). At this stage, the country’s ‘democratic train’ was moving forward at a fast pace and Biya could not stop it. Therefore, he was obliged to make some political concessions as discussed below.

3.2.4.1 Multipartism, political changes and the clamour for political reforms

Like most of his other African counterparts, Biya eventually succumbed to political pressure and established the Foumane Akame Commission, which was tasked with designing laws to expand the political space. Subsequently, the proposals of the Commission which were in line with the pro-democracy sentiment echoed by a large segment of the population, were approved and adopted by the National Assembly on 5 December 1990. This was followed by the promulgation of a series of laws coined ‘Liberty Laws’ by the President on 19 December 1990 to liberalise the country’s political landscape. These included Law No. 90/056, Law No. 90/054, Law No. 90/053, and Law No. 90/055 (Ngoh, 2004:436-437). Law No. 90/053 of 19 December 1990 for example, relates to freedom of association. Article 1(2) of the law stipulates that everybody has the right to establish an association and also be a member of any association. Similarly, Article 6 maintains that associations may be freely formed, while Article 12 asserts that they may be voluntarily dissolved by their members as stipulated in their constitutions. Similarly, Article 9 affirms that they may be freely managed in accordance with the law and their constitutions. Furthermore, CSOs in terms of Article 10(1) have the right to freely initiate a lawsuit (Republic of Cameroon, 1990). Law No. 90/055 of 19 December 1990 relates to the regulation of public meetings and processions. As declared in Section 3(1) of the law, everybody is free to organise public meetings irrespective of their purposes. However, in case such meetings are banned, Section 8(3) permits the organisers to resort to the President of the High Court who is expected to pass judgment on the matter within

88 eight days after receiving the complaint. Article 8(4) further states that the judgment may be reviewed in compliance with ordinary law procedures (Republic of Cameroon, 1990a). Another law that was promulgated is Law No. 90/054 of 19 December 1990. It deals with the maintenance of law and order. Section 3(1) of the law prohibits the use of arms in routine operations for the preservation of law and order, particularly during public meetings and processions. Furthermore, Section 3(2) provides that shooting in the air or with blank cartridges is forbidden (Republic of Cameroon, 1990b).

The most significant law that was promulgated in terms of fostering political pluralism was Law No. 90/056 of 19 December 1990. It formally reversed Biya’s opposition to multiparty politics and established procedures for the formation of political parties. Article 4 makes provision for funds to political parties that contest elections. However, similar to Law No. 67/LF/19 of June 1967 (see above), section 9 of Law No. 90/056 stipulates that a party could be disqualified if it was perceived to be regional, tribal or prone to violence (Ngoh, 2004:436-437). Nevertheless, there was a proliferation of political parties (about 68 were registered by the end of April 1991) as a result of the law. In addition to the ruling party (CPDM), the other major parties included the SDF, the NUDP, the Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) and the UPC (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:464-465).

The above brief review of the various ‘Liberty Laws’ illustrates their lofty intentions on paper, which raised the hopes of many Cameroonians at the dawn of a new democratic era. However, despite the introduction of these laws, the structures and methods of the one-party system were still entrenched. For example, the National Assembly continued to be monolithic and the Constitution continued to foster a single-party state (Ngoh, 2004:437). The electoral laws were also inadequate. Instead of an independent election management body, the Minister of Territorial Administration was still in charge of the electoral process. The judiciary, media and police were also susceptible to manipulation from the executive arm of government (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:147-148). Consequently, in the words of Ngoh (2004:437) it was assumed that “new wine could not be put in old wine skins”. Therefore, the next phase in the struggle of civil society for democracy in Cameroon was characterised by their efforts to overhaul the electoral rules.

They also strived to transform institutional electoral structures such as the judiciary, the electoral body, the police and the media to reflect the realities of the new political dispensation, particularly in terms of insulating these institutions from manipulation by the ruling party or regime. This proved to be a herculean task as it soon became apparent that Biya was determined to manoeuvre the outcome of the process by unilaterally dictating the rules (Gros, 1995:118). For instance, he took no heed to calls from elder statesmen such as John Ngu Foncha and opposition parties for the convening of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to discuss the country’s ills as had been done in several other francophone African countries including the Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Benin and Mali (Derrick, 1992:174).

In an effort to pressurise the president to convene the conference, a coalition named the National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA) was formed in April 1991. The coalition consisted of civic associations such as civil and human rights groups formed during the Yondo Black trial discussed above, and several of the newly formed opposition parties (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:123). It was expected that the conference would address the above-mentioned electoral issues, in addition to revising and adopting a constitution that would reflect the new political landscape. However, to Biya and adherents of the governing CPDM party, heeding to calls for the convening of the conference was almost like signing their death warrants (Ngoh, 2004:437). Therefore, it is not surprising that in a long-awaited speech to the National Assembly on 27 June 1991, Biya categorically affirmed that “Je l’ai dit et je le maintien, la conférence nationale est sans objet pour le Cameroun” (“I have said and I repeat, the national conference has no purpose for Cameroon”) (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:465).

The above defiant posture and show of strength by the president galvanised the NCOPA into action and triggered intense demand for genuine democratic reforms. Enjoying the backing of a large segment of the population, the coalition embarked on a nationwide

90 campaign35 of civil disobedience in the form of ‘villes mortes’ (‘dead towns/cities’)36 and the non-payment of taxes aimed at paralysing the country economically and thus, forcing the regime to summon the conference (Ngoh, 2004:437). The campaign of civil disobedience was strictly adhered to in the cities of Bafoussam, Bamenda, and Douala, as well as other large cities in the Western and Southern regions until September but continued until December 1991 in Bafoussam and Bamenda (Krieger, 1994:611).

The civil disobedience was characterised by among other things, market and other economic boycotts and spontaneous street demonstrations, while four-wheeled inter-city and intra-city private and public transport remained grounded. Similarly, stalls, curb-side markets, and shops closed, except pharmacies that operated on a rotating schedule. The public sector also closed down except for the health and postal services. As for the banks, they opened occasionally on Saturdays (subject to cash flow). Solidarity among the strikers was fostered by massive demonstrations and reprisals by militants who threatened strike breakers (Krieger, 1994:611). In the city of Bamenda, female elders of the traditional society known as Takembeng displayed traditional paraphernalia and maintained a fearless defiance against excessive government authority in containing the strikers. They also disrobed themselves which made the security forces very uncomfortable as a majority of them were not familiar with local customs but were, however, aware that this was an act of open defiance (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:128).

The campaign of civil disobedience had far-reaching effects particularly in the economic domain. For instance, Douala with its port handling more than 80% of the country’s foreign trade, as well as that of some neighbouring landlocked countries such as the Central African Republic and Chad was brought to a complete standstill. It is estimated that the

35 These campaigns assumed the intensity of general strikes although they lacked the organisational base of workers associated with classic general strikes witnessed in industrial societies (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:126).

36 These were “ghost” cities because of a shutdown of activities by CSOs that were protesting.

91 country lost about four billion francs CFA per day during this period due to the shutdown of the main economic centres.37 Despite the crippling effect of the strike on the already depressed economy, the government held firm. Therefore, it eventually failed since Biya’s regime was able to weather the heavy losses with the enormous financial assistance from the French government (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:465-466).

Compounding the situation were internal divisions within the NCOPA. This compromised its effort to adopt a consistent, coherent and united strategy to sustain the pressure on the regime (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:467). For example, the coalition was divided over ‘bread and butter’ issues. A case in point was the thorny debate in September 1991 on whether to include in its agenda a boycott of the 1991-1992 academic year. The issue was contentious as there were concerns from some Cameroonians, particularly the middle and lower classes, about the loss of revenue which schools generate in terms of food-vending and transport, as well as the popular belief in the benefits of education. Consequently, the NCOPA found it difficult to reach a consensus on the issue. Hence, regime initiatives resumed as the consensual base of the NCOPA weakened. This was accompanied by competitive political ambitions in its leadership to replace the incumbent president (Krieger, 1994:612-613).

In the aftermath of the collapse of the general strike, President Biya felt confident to determine the destiny of the country’s political process on his own terms. This was evident in his invitation to the relevant stakeholders for talks in Yaoundé scheduled from 30 October to 17 November 1991. The Yaoundé ‘Tripartite Conference’ as it was popularly referred to, brought together representatives from three sectors; namely, the opposition parties, government, and CSOs comprising among others, students’ and workers’ unions, religious bodies, the media and local entrepreneurs, as well as prominent personalities

37 Notwithstanding the fact that the call for the campaign of civil disobedience was respected throughout most of the country, life for the ordinary citizen became unbearable. Citizens were already in dire straits as a result of the economic recession. People could travel or buy groceries only during the weekends. Nonetheless, life went on normally in Yaoundé as well as in the center regions where President Biya’s ethnic group dominated (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:465-466).

(Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:467).38 The optimism that preceded these talks misled some of the stakeholders into believing that they were receiving the substitute for the SNC in a different form. However, this optimism was short-lived as it soon became apparent that the agenda that was formulated by the government fell short of their expectations. For instance, President Biya took no heed to calls for his personal participation in the talks but instead, sent his prime minister. Furthermore, whereas the scope of such talks had been much broader in other francophone African countries, Biya, however, succeeded in restricting the main agenda to constitutional questions. Most importantly, the government tricked the populace to erroneously believe that the upcoming legislative and presidential elections would be preceded by constitutional and electoral reforms. However, both the 1992 legislative and presidential elections in March and October respectively, were (as before) conducted under the auspices of the Minister of Territorial Administration39 and the electoral laws, as well as institutions remained unchanged (Gros, 1995:118-119). Therefore, it is not surprising that both elections were marred by severe irregularities that worked in favour of the ruling CPDM party (Ngoh, 2004:440-442).

Concerning the presidential elections in October 1992, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (1993:vii) in its election report noted for example, that the pre-election phase, the voting process and the tabulation of results were seriously flawed. Therefore, in its opinion, the grave anomalies that characterised the entire electoral process seriously compromised the validity of the results (NDI, 1993:vii). Among other irregularities observed during the pre-election phase were the partisan use and biased news coverage of the government-controlled radio and television in favour of the incumbent which compromised a level playing field for the competitors. As an illustration, while the incumbent was allocated 142 minutes of coverage by the television news broadcast on 7 October 1992, the opposition was provided only 12 minutes. Just before voting day, in some areas such as Ebolowa, Douala and Yaoundé, polling stations were

38 It was alleged that these prominent personalities were exclusively selected by the government and largely composed of sympathisers or supporters from the ruling CPDM party (Fombad and Fonyam, 2004:467). 39 Although the Minister of Territorial Administration was touted by the regime as being the paragon of fairness and neutrality, he was however, an unabashed adherent of the governing CPDM party and a close ethic associate of the president (Gros, 1995:123).

93 arbitrary relocated. Similarly, on polling day, it was noticed that there were inconsistencies in applying the rules pertaining to voter eligibility. Furthermore, the names of eligible voters were incorrectly cancelled from the register throughout the country. These shortcomings created confusion and contributed to the low voter turnout that was experienced in certain regions. Aggravating the situation was the fact that bogus polling stations existed and the vote counts from these stations generally provided similar and overwhelming results in favour of the incumbent (NDI, 1993:viii-ix).

Perhaps, the thorniest exercise in the 1992 presidential elections was the tabulation of results. The electoral law gave the Minister of Territorial Administration and civil administrative officials answerable to the head of state such as senior divisional officers and divisional officers, excessive discretionary powers in the tabulation process (NDI, 1993:vii). Furthermore, 11 of the 13 officials of the vote counting commission were from Biya’s support bases in the South and Centre regions (Fombad, 2004:368). Therefore, many of them abused their powers to advance the political goals of the incumbent (NDI, 1993:vii). Similarly, with no clear separation of powers between the judiciary and executive arms of government as earlier remarked, the Supreme Court was helpless in terms of investigating and resolving the irregularities noted above. Although the court acknowledged the probability of widespread fraud, it nonetheless declared that it was powerless to invalidate the elections. It also contended that it had no choice but to pronounce the incumbent president the winner. The impotence of the Supreme Court was further demonstrated four days after the elections when the Minister of Territorial Administration with just 20% of the vote counted unilaterally proclaimed Biya (incumbent president) the winner while the court was yet to declare the final results (Gros, 1995:124). However, the court later proclaimed the official results which affirmed that Biya was the winner with 39.5% closely followed by the main opposition candidate, Fru Ndi of the SDF with 35.5%. Against the backdrop of the severe irregularities that characterised the electoral process, Ndi rejected the electoral outcome and proceeded to announce that he was the president-elect (Awasom, 2005:218). He was subsequently placed under house arrest (Ngoh, 2004:442). This triggered riots and protest demonstrations in Bamenda city, the stronghold of the SDF party (Awasom, 2005:218). As a result, a state of emergency

94 was imposed on the city until the end of 1992 when it was lifted (Krieger, 1994:615). This resulted in the mass arrests of opposition followers (NDI, 1993:50).

Considering that the October 1992 presidential elections was not preceded by constitutional and electoral reforms as indicated above, the NDI (1993:vii) claimed that the electoral process seemed to have been designed to fail. While holding several parties responsible for the electoral irregularities noted above, the NDI, however, emphatically maintained that President Biya and the government of Cameroon were largely to blame for the failed electoral process (NDI, 1993:vii). Therefore, rather than resolving Cameroon’s crisis of governance, the elections instead blocked it (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:149). In the immediate aftermath of one of the most controversial elections in the history of Cameroon and the human rights abuses that ensued, the international community-imposed sanctions on the country. The spokesperson of the US State Department for example, noted that the Cameroon government after the elections resorted to intimidation as a means of consolidating its authority. As a result, in reaction to post-election abuses and election-related problems, the USA suspended US$14 million in foreign aid to the country on 14 November 1992 (NDI, 1993:50).

3.3 Conclusions

Authoritarian states are generally characterised by a restriction of civil society. This chapter provided an overview of the nature of the restrictions CSOs faced in Cameroon since 1966 (when the country became a single-party state) until 1992 when a multiparty system was introduced. The aim as indicated earlier, was to establish the political environment in which they functioned during this period. This was necessary to setting the scene for probing the challenges encountered by CSOs in the post-1992 era in their efforts to promote democracy in Cameroon. This chapter indicated that the restrictions before 1990 were exemplified by covert tactics like anti-subversion decrees and laws, spying, intimidation, banning of the activities of CSOs, as well as overt tactics such as arrests, detention, torture and imprisonment. These resulted in severe limitations on the freedoms of individuals and that of CSOs.

The early 1990s offered a greater opportunity for CSOs to be more vocal and determined to open and expand the political space. This was largely due to support from external and internal sources. It resulted in the dismantling of some of the restrictions as demonstrated by the promulgation of new laws (‘Liberty Laws’). These include Law No. 90/053 of 19 December 1990 relating to freedom of association, Law No. 90/055 of 19 December 1990 relating to the regulation of public meetings and processions, and Law No. 90/054 of 19 December 1990 which deals with the maintenance of law and order. Also significant is Law No. 90/056 of 19 December 1990 which formally reversed Biya’s opposition to multiparty politics and established procedures for the formation of political parties.

Worth noting during this period was the role of civil society in the NCOPA which was formed in April 1991. As indicated in the discussion, CSOs played a crucial role in the coalition (NCOPA) in the ‘fight for democracy’. It is in this context that the aim of this study as earlier indicated, is to establish the role that CSOs are playing in trying to promote the development of democracy in Cameroon (given their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as illustrated in this chapter) and the challenges they face in playing such a role.

It can be deduced from the discussion that notwithstanding the various restrictions faced by CSOs during the period in question, they made strenuous efforts to be assertive. This is particularly evident in the “Liberty Laws” that ensued and the resultant democratic transition from a single-party rule to a multiparty system. The promulgation of the ‘Liberty Laws’ as pointed out in the discussion above, raised the hopes of many Cameroonians at the dawn of a new democratic era. However, it seems that these were false hopes. Therefore, the next chapter focuses on the state of democracy in Cameroon, that is, the environment in which CSOs in the country are operating.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the conditions under which CSOs operated in Cameroon before the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992. This chapter provides a brief overview of the current state of democracy in Cameroon, that is, the environment in which CSOs in the country are operating. The reason is to set the scene for addressing the aim of the study which is to establish the role that CSOs are playing in trying to promote the development of democracy (given their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as earlier indicated) and the challenges they face in playing such a role (see chapter five).

There are various conceptions of the term democracy. However, a number of scholars have distinguished between a minimalist/thin conception of democracy and a maximalist/thick conception. The minimalist conception (mostly borrowed from Joseph Schumpeter’s 1943 contribution)40 focuses on electoral competition as a basic requirement for democracy, which should include universal adult suffrage; regular competitive free and fair elections; more than one political party; and diverse sources of information (see for example, Przeworski, et. al., 1996: 51; Dahl 1971:20; and Morlino, 2004:10). For Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:13) elections alone are not a sufficient condition for democracy but are regarded as “the principal and necessary condition of democracy”. Thus, they argue, without elections democracy cannot be born. However, for Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:13) and Diamond (2001:150) the procedural minimum requirements also include civil liberties since elections cannot be conducted without, for example, candidates being able to express their views openly, being able to obtain political information, and to form and join organisations. Furthermore, Schmitter and Karl

40 For Schumpeter (1943:269), democracy is “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.

(1991:104) argue that the “fallacy of electoralism” is committed when elections are regarded as a sufficient measure of democracy – when electoral contestation is privileged over other dimensions of democracy. Schedler (2002:36) on the other hand, cautions that elections have also been “instruments of authoritarian control” and a distinction should therefore be drawn between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism.

A maximal or thick conception of democracy (liberal) in contrast, is not limited to just the classical democratic element of popular rule or electoral democracy. It also embodies the republican element of utilising power to the interest of the governed through the rule of law and the liberal element of safeguarding individual rights. Therefore, among other things, it necessitates the absence of spheres of power reserved for the military or other political actors not answerable to the people either directly or indirectly. It also calls for horizontal accountability, particularly in terms of public officials to one another. This helps to check executive power and enhances legality, constitutionalism and the deliberative process. Furthermore, a maximal democracy demands ample provisions for civic and political pluralism in addition to group and individual freedoms. This fosters the expression and competition of contending values and interests through the processes of representation and articulation, apart from periodic elections. It further requires a rule of law whereby legal rules are predictably, consistently and fairly applied across identical cases, notwithstanding the class, power or status of those involved. Therefore, an authentic rule of law engenders legal and political equality for all citizens as well as the absence of corruption in the judicial, administrative, and political branches. The state as well as its agents are also equal before the law. Under these conditions, the freedoms of individuals and groups are protected such as the freedoms of movement, expression, demonstration and association. Citizens are also protected from the state and organised anti-state forces in terms of unwarranted exile, torture, detention, terror and excessive intrusion into their private lives. The basic institutional prerequisites for a maximal democracy include: provisions in the legislature and executive to enforce a professional, non-discriminatory and politically independent judiciary; a civilian ascendancy over the military; an independent electoral management body; a parliament with some autonomous powers and capacity to check the executive arm; as well as the absence of

98 broadcast or press monopolies or the restriction of press freedom. In addition, the constitution should be supreme since maximal democracies are supposed to be constitutional democracies and, as such, a constitutional state is one of justice which acts in accordance with the law and predictably. This permits the courts to enforce limitations on public officials when they infringe the constitutional rules and the laws. Nonetheless, this requires a judicial and legal system and, generally, a state with potent capacity (Diamond, 2001:186-187).

However, many countries particularly in Africa, do not meet all the above-mentioned requirements of a full (maximal) democracy. They fall somewhere in between the above two conceptions and are often called various names such as, hybrid democracies, illiberal democracies and semi-democracies. Due to domestic and international pressure, these hybrid regimes usually mask the existence of authoritarian hegemony and mimic a full democracy (Diamond, 2002:24-25).

Considering the above elements/characteristics of a democracy, this chapter focuses on the state of democracy in Cameroon. The first section is devoted to ‘free and fair elections’, that is, representative government, which encompasses elements such as the impartiality, transparency, accountability and efficiency of the electoral management body; the timeliness and transparency of the registration and voting procedures; media coverage of elections throughout the election phase and the degree of acceptance of elections results, particularly by the electorate.

The second section is dedicated to the rule of law and accountability which include the predictability, consistency and fairness in terms of how legal rules are applied; the independence of the courts and judiciary; the accessibility of courts to all persons; judicial accountability and efficiency; the independence of the legislature, particularly in terms of powers and capacity to check the executive arm; corruption investigations and the supremacy of the constitution.

The third section focuses on the media and popular participation. Some of the elements considered are media freedom; plurality in media ownership; representation of different opinions; the independence of the media from government (including self-regulation); the safety of journalists from intimidation, harassment, imprisonment, prosecution, and restrictive laws; media professionalism and opportunities for conventional participation at all levels of government.

The last section which deals with freedom and human rights, covers elements such as the freedom of movement, expression, demonstration, association and assembly; protection from the state and organised anti-state forces in terms of unwarranted exile, intimidation, torture, detention, terror; excessive intrusion into people’s private lives and discrimination.

4.2 Free and fair elections

Political rights are the essence of a democracy. The minimalist conception of democracy as pointed out above, focuses on electoral competition as a basic requirement for democracy. Therefore, political competition is also part of what is referred to as vertical accountability (Morlino, 2004:18). According to article 2(2) of the 1996 amendment to the 1972 Constitution of Cameroon, “the authorities responsible for the management of the State shall derive their powers from the people through election by direct or indirect universal suffrage …” Furthermore, “the vote shall be equal and secret” (article 2(3)) and political parties participating in the elections shall be bound to respect democratic principles and carry out their electoral activities in conformity with the law (article 3). Similarly, section 4(1) of the Electoral Code41 stipulates that Cameroon’s election management body referred to as Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) shall be an autonomous body in charge of the supervision, management and organisation of all elections and referendums. Furthermore, sections 288-293 stipulate the various electoral offences and the corresponding penalties (Republic of Cameroon, 2012:8,110-113). Notwithstanding

41 The Electoral Code in terms of section 297(1) repeals and replaces previous electoral laws that existed (Republic of Cameroon, 2012:114-115).

100 the lofty democratic principles, the implementation of these are problematic (discussed below).

Concerning the first multiparty presidential election in October 1992, the NDI (1993:vii) for example, in its election report noted that the pre-election phase, the voting process and the tabulation of results were seriously flawed. Therefore, in its opinion, the grave anomalies that characterised the entire electoral process seriously compromised the validity of the results (NDI, 1993:vii). Considering that the elections were not preceded by constitutional and electoral reforms such as the creation of an independent election management body, the NDI (1993:vii) claimed that the electoral process seemed to have been designed to fail. The conduct of subsequent elections has followed the same pattern under the auspices of the highly politicised Ministry of Territorial Administration whose officials were subservient and loyal to the head of state (Fombad, 2004:368).42 Concerning the second multiparty legislative election held in May 1997, the constituency system consisting of a complex combination of multiple and single number constituencies, as well as the proportional representation (PR) and first-past-the-post (FPTP) (‘winner takes all’) systems favoured the ruling CPDM. Therefore, similar to the previous elections, the election was characterised by irregularities such as unfair distribution of seats among the constituencies (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1997:8,12).

The management of Cameroon’s third presidential election in 2004 was no different to the previous election in 1997. Although the National Elections Observatory (NEO) was mandated to supervise and manage the election, it was deficient in terms of enforcement powers, staff and financial resources. Therefore, ‘free and fair’ elections were compromised by, for example, gross inconsistency in the application of the voter registration procedures, inaccurate voters’ registers, misinterpretation of the electoral code by electoral officials, biased coverage by the state media in favour of the governing

42 As indicated in chapter three, although the Minister of Territorial Administration during the 1992 presidential election was touted by the regime as being the paragon of fairness and neutrality, he was however, an unabashed adherent of the governing CPDM party and of the same ethic group as the president (Gros, 1995:123).

101

CPDM and the incumbent, shortages of election materials, impersonation of voters and number of votes cast exceeding the number on the register (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2004:17-18, 20-21, 23, 25, 30-31, 36-37, 42). Given the above shortcomings, international observer groups such as the Commonwealth Observer Group (2004:37) concluded that the outcome of the 2004 elections lacked credibility.

Unlike previous elections in Cameroon that were conducted under the auspices of the Minister of Territorial Administration and subsequently the NEO, one of the positive aspects of the fourth presidential election in 2011 (and subsequent elections) was that an ‘autonomous’ body, the ELECAM, was established to administer the elections. This followed as a result of pressure from several stakeholders such as CSOs and opposition political parties. However, most of the members that were appointed to the body were regarded with suspicion by both international and domestic actors because of their affiliation to the ruling party. There were concerns that this could compromise their independence. Despite the fact that members had to publicly renounce their affiliation to the governing party, public confidence in ELECAM was and is still low since it is widely believed that the body is not completely independent from the government as it claimed to be (Commonwealth Expert Team, 2011:3-4, 25). This is underlined by the fact that the same irregularities that marred previous elections have persisted, thereby compromising the credibility of elections. Some of these irregularities include: the possession of substantial campaign resources by the ruling CPDM compared to other parties; partiality of state-owned CRTV networks towards the governing party; discrepancy between the ELECAM guidelines and the electoral code on several aspects of the electoral process; vote buying and multiple voting; electoral gerrymandering and wide discretionary powers exercised by administrative authorities in terms of legalising the holding of rallies and meetings especially in areas where the opposition parties have large followings. There has been also the issue of extremely complex counting and reporting sheets which delayed the counting process (Commonwealth Expert Term, 2014:14, 17-18, 20, 23-26; Interviews: Chongsi, Landon, Moye and Nji). Therefore, elections have been serving an authoritarian function of facilitating recurrent incumbent victory (Morse, 2012:162).

102

One of the most serious factors undermining democracy in Cameroon was the amendment to the Constitution prior to the 2011 election, which abolished presidential term limits and therefore, permitted Biya to contest for a fourth term. This increasing phenomenon in sub-Saharan African countries by changing the constitution, referred to by Yarwood (2016:51) as a “constitutional coup d’état”, has become a favourite tactic by leaders (and their parties) to sustain power. The protracted stay of leaders in power often results in the entrenchment of informal patronage networks and the personalisation of power. Therefore, the absence of term limits compromises the development of state institutions by deeply politicising them (Namakula, 2016:14). As a result, Rusell (interview) maintains that “Cameroon is broadly operating on the basis of illegitimacy”. Holding a similar view, Ngong (interview) alleges that the majority of Cameroonians have lost faith in “government institutions because they have failed to represent them”, which raises the question of legitimate governance.

The electoral shortcomings in Cameroon are also underlined by the 2017 Independent Electoral Integrity Project (EIP).43 According to its Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) expert survey,44 which monitors elections worldwide and at all stages of the electoral cycle, Cameroon shows a low level of electoral integrity with a 46 (PEI) compared to an African mean electoral integrity of 58 (PEI) (for elections between 2012-2017) (Electoral Integrity Project 2017, 2018:6-7,35). Among the dimensions considered in the pre- election phase are: the fairness of electoral laws; whether elections are conducted in line with the law and are well managed; impartial boundary demarcations; the accuracy of the electoral register and the registration of parties and selection of candidates. In terms of the campaign period, the following are taken into account: the fairness of TV news and

43 To establish the electoral integrity in each country, the project identified approximately 40 election experts in each country who had a “demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process” to complete a PEI questionnaire. In addition, external validity tests were also undertaken (see Electoral Integrity Project 2017, 2018:40-42). 44 The PEI survey of electoral integrity includes independent nation-states all over the world which have conducted direct (popular) elections for the presidential or parliament elections. The PEI questionnaire covers 49 items on electoral integrity across the entire electoral cycle. These items are categorized into 11 sub-dimensions which include: electoral laws, electoral procedures, boundaries, voter registration, party registration, campaign media, campaign finance, voting process, vote count, results and electoral authorities. The PEI indices are coded from 0 to100, whereby low scores indicate greater levels of corruption/coercion (Electoral Integrity Project 2017, 2018:5-8, 40-41, 45).

103 newspaper coverage; the use of social media to expose electoral fraud; the improper use of state resources for campaigning; vote buying and the accessibility to public subsidies by parties and candidates. Concerning the polling day, the indicators considered are: casting of fraudulent votes; violence and intimidation of voters; simplicity of the voting process; availability of postal ballots and special voting facilities for the disabled and the possibility of national citizens living abroad to vote. Lastly, the following are taken into consideration in terms of the post-election phase: the security of ballot boxes; votes counted fairly; the presence of domestic and international election monitors; announcement of results without due delay; the challenge of results by parties and candidates; resolution of disputes through legal channels and the effectiveness and impartiality of election authorities (Electoral Integrity Project 2017, 2018:45). According to the EIP (2018:35), the thorny areas (with scores less than 50 PEI) of Cameroon’s electoral process over the years have been the electoral laws (47 PEI), boundary demarcation (36 PEI), voter registration (44 PEI), party registration (49 PEI), media coverage (39 PEI), campaign finance (23 PEI) and the voting process (38 PEI).

Interviewees were also asked about their views on the state of democracy in Cameroon. Concerning elections, most regarded the elections as not being free and fair. Among the issues raised were the extremely complex counting and reporting sheets. This, according to Fon (interview: 2017), leads to controversial and conflicting results. In other words, it enhances the manipulation of election results in favour of the governing party or incumbent president (Interviews: Rusell, Shuazieh, Rhett, Alejandro, Lakinyu, Nji, Tata, Gaby, Chongsi, Kofete and Jayceon). Therefore, it is widely perceived that “election results are known in Cameroon before the voting day” (Gwain, interview). Holding a similar view, Tata (interview), Moye (interview) and Tenyeh (interview) assert that if the same trend continues, the winners of the impending 2018 elections are obvious. Aggravating the situation is the challenge encountered by women to win electoral contests considering that females constitute the majority of the Cameroonian population (about 52%). Consequently, there is an urgent need for more women to hold elective

104 political positions in the country since gender inclusiveness is a cardinal democratic principle (interviews: Shuazieh, Fon, McKenzie, Moki, 2018).45

In view of the above grave electoral irregularities that have marred the various elections,46 Fon (interview: 2017) affirms that the management of the electoral process has “continued to grow worse from the 1990s till present day”. Similarly, Tufon (interview) contends that “elections in Cameroon are just a farce”. Likewise, Moye (interview) asserts that they are “appointments in disguise” and “not a choice”. Sama (interview) adds that the regime “is just playing to the gallery”. It conducts elections merely as “a formality” to satisfy the international community (interviews: Moye and Fon). Therefore, many Cameroonians are of the view that successive elections “have been badly managed and none of them so far has been such as can be considered to be above the average level of acceptance” (Rusell, interview). The contention is that “the present regime has never won any clean and fair elections” since “there have never been free and fair elections in Cameroon” (Ataubo, interview). Therefore, it is widely believed that President Biya has been able to maintain himself in power that long (for about 35 years) through the “rigging of elections” (McKenzie, interview). As a result, Rusell (interview) postulates that “Cameroon has yet to recover from the injustices that have accrued from poor elections”. The poorly managed elections cast doubt on the state of democracy in Cameroon (Interviews: Landon and Mbah) since the basic requirement for a democracy is electoral competition.

45 In the general elections in 2013 for example, just 6.7% and 31.1% of women were elected in the council and legislative elections respectively. 46 The recent presidential election on 7 October 2018 is not included in this study. However, similar to previous elections, preliminary reports indicated that the election was “marred by allegations of fraud” (Kiven, et. al., 2018). Among the irregularities observed were full control of the electoral apparatus and state machinery by the incumbent and ruling party. For example, the Constitutional Council in charge of resolving electoral disputes and proclaiming results is perceived by many as not being independent (International crisis Group, 2018). It is regarded as a tool utilised by the president to inflate his results beyond the required winning score “in order to demonstrate his dominance”. Consequently, as contended by (Kiven, et. al., 2018), the majority of Cameroonians were of the view that the 2018 presidential election “was meaningless as the result never changed”. Therefore, they were not “surprised that the Constitutional Council pronounced Paul Biya the winner” (International Crisis Group, 2018). These allegations concur with Schedler’s (2002:36) contention that in terms of electoral regimes such as Cameroon, “elections have been an instrument of authoritarian control”. Thus, as maintained earlier, the regime conducts elections simply as a formality to satisfy the international world.

105

From a different angle Morse (2018:713) argues, that elections in Cameroon have not assisted democratisation in the country due to the powerful influence of its president, Biya. The more secure Biya’s term became, opposition parties not only reduced their opposition, but some became part of the government/ “Presidential Majority” due to its clientelistic appeals. Morse also points out that elections have remained flawed.

4.3 The rule of law and accountability

The rule of law as indicated earlier, requires legal and political equality for all citizens, including the state as well as its agents. However, it does not only entail the application of legal norms, but also embodies the tenet of the supremacy of law as well as the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, it can be regarded as a further requirement of a full (maximal) democracy alluded to above. Accountability on the other hand, as pointed out, compels the elected political officials to provide answers to the electors or other constitutional bodies for their political actions whenever required. These requirements are also reflected in the Constitution of Cameroon. However, as shown below, they are not met in practice. In order to enhance the supremacy of the law, article 5(2) of the 1996 amendment to the 1972 Constitution stipulates that the head of state shall ensure that the Constitution is respected. Article 64 further prohibits the amendment of the Constitution which may endanger the democratic principles governing the country. Similarly, article 37(2) states that the judicial power shall be independent of the legislative and executive powers and that the head of state is obliged to ensure the independence of the judiciary (article 37{3}). Equally, in an attempt to combat corruption, high ranking public officials such as the president, prime minister, and members of government as well as all holders of elective political positions, are expected in terms of article 66 to declare their property and assets at the commencement and at the completion of their tenure of office (Republic of Cameroon, 1996:5, 9, 21, 31).

However, according to a variety of international indices, Cameroon rates low on meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law and accountability. The 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) has scored Cameroon a below average 40.3% for its rule of

106 law and accountability signifying ‘increasing deterioration’ since 2008 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018).47 Among the elements considered were: transfers of power; judicial process and independence; access to justice and information; diversion of public funds; corruption in public officials and government; accountability of public officials; public sector accountability and transparency and corruption investigation (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018).

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) 2017 Democracy Index also scored the country a low 2.86 (out of 10) in terms of the functioning of government. The elements that were considered included: the freedom of elected representatives to determine government policy; the supremacy of the legislative over other government branches; the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority; the freeness of government from undue influence by the security services or the military; the adequacy of institutions and mechanisms for guaranteeing government accountability to the electorate particularly between elections; the transparency and openness of the government especially in terms of sufficient public access to information; the pervasiveness of corruption; the capability and willingness of the civil service to implement government policy; as well as public confidence in government (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018:8, 33, 67-69).48 In addition, the World Justice Project’s 2017-2018 Rule of Law Index scores the country 0.37 (with less than 0.40 indicating a weak performance and more than 0.81 signifying a strong performance). Therefore, Cameroon records the weakest performance in the region in terms of the rule of law (it ranks 18 out of 18 states) and globally, it occupies the 109th position out of the 113 countries ranked (World Justice Project, 2018). Similar to the IIAG and the EIU, the elements considered include: constraints on government powers (sanctions for official misconduct, lawful

47 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is an index published annually providing a statistical assessment of governance performance in each African country. Its framework encompasses four categories namely; participation and human rights, safety and rule of law, human development, and sustainable economic opportunity. These categories further comprise 14 sub-categories, composing of 102 indicators (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). 48 The measurement is guided by sources such as experts’ assessments, public-opinion surveys especially the World Values Survey, Gallup polls, and national and Afrobarometer surveys (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018:65).

107 transition of power, independent auditing, judiciary and legislature limits on government powers); absence of corruption (in the legislature, judiciary, executive, and the police/military branches); civil and criminal justice (no corruption, discrimination, unreasonable delay, improper government influence; accessibility and affordability; impartial, effective and timely adjudication; due process of law; effective investigations) and open government (publicised government data and laws, complaint mechanisms, right to information) (World Justice Project, 2018).

Bribery and corruption of which the absence is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law (see above) is rampant in Cameroon. The 2013 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) indicated that 96% of the respondents acknowledged that corruption is a problem in Cameroon (Transparency International, 2013). According to the 2015 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Cameroon occupied the 130th position out of the 167 countries that were ranked (Transparency International, 2016a). A variety of forms of corruption are found in the country. For example, to gain admission or be promoted in the public sector in Cameroon, the candidate or worker must bribe or be ‘assisted’ or ‘sponsored’ by a political patron (Transparency International, 2016:3). Compounding the situation is the existence of ‘ghost workers’ who are not working, but are receiving a government salary. In 2008 for instance, between 7,000 and 45,000 ‘ghost workers’ were reported to exist in the public service (Transparency International, 2016:3). According to the 2013 Transparency International GCB, 72% of the respondents considered civil servants and public officials to be corrupt or extremely corrupt while 69% believed that corruption is a serious problem in the public sector (Transparency International, 2013). A sector in the public service that is notorious for bribery and corruption is the police. Illustrating the pervasive nature of these malpractices, the Transparency International 2013 GCB revealed that 69% of the respondents (or members of their household) have bribed the police. Similarly, 86% of the respondents regarded the Cameroonian police to be corrupt or extremely corrupt (Transparency International, 2013).

108

Closely related to the above, is the award of government contracts, which is also marred by bribery, corruption and embezzlement, particularly in terms of the process (Transparency International, 2016:4). According to Transparency International (2016:5), the process of procuring public contracts in Cameroon is deficient in terms of transparency since it is mostly shrouded in secrecy. Information on a particular political action or successive actions concerning accountability is crucial to ascribing responsibility (Morlino, 2004:17). Demonstrating this secrecy, decisions about the procurement of the majority of large-scale contracts come directly from the presidency. Furthermore, although contracts whose value is less than US$10,000 can be awarded by various agencies such as municipal councils, institutions and individual ministers, there is little or no control from the Ministry of Public Procurement or National Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP). In other words, the regulations and laws on the procurement process exist only on paper. As a result, several bureaucrats are exploiting these loopholes to put contracts on hold and solicit bribes which hamper the procurement process (Transparency International, 2016:5-6). Therefore, it is understandable why the US Department of State in 2013 regarded bribery with the aim of avoiding taxes, and embezzlement as the most visible signs of corruption in the country’s public financial management programme (Transparency International, 2016:6). In the 2013 Transparency International GCB, 46% of the respondents reported that they had paid a bribe to the Tax Revenue (Transparency International, 2013).

Another arm of the government that is noted for perceived bribery and corruption is the judiciary. According to Moye (interview: 2018), “there is rampant corruption in the judiciary”. He adds that there are some people who are above the law in the country as evident in “discriminatory justice” being practised with apparent impunity (Moye, interview: 2018). The 2013 Transparency International GCB indicates that 55% of the respondents who accessed the services of the judiciary offered a bribe. The GCB also revealed that 81% of the respondents felt that the judiciary is corrupt or extremely corrupt (Transparency International, 2013). These negative perceptions as contended by Rusell (interview: 2017), demonstrate bad governance. One of the vital conditions of maximal democracy as pointed out earlier, is judicial accountability, fairness and efficiency.

109

Bribery, corruption and embezzlement are also common in the private sector although to a lesser extent in comparison to the public sector. For instance, private firms often bribe officials to bypass regulations or avoid taxes, particularly in terms of the extraction of natural resources. Misconduct is also associated with public-private partnerships which have become popular in the last decade. A case in point is the scandal which occurred in 2011 involving a public-private partnership in a health programme to produce vaccines for children. Following suspicions of misappropriation of funds during the first 10 years of the scheme, an audit was instituted to investigate the matter. The findings revealed that more than 72% of the scheme’s annual budget had been stolen or misused (Transparency International, 2016:3-4). In light of these malpractices, it is not surprising that in the 2017-2018 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (using the same indicators which measure the ethical behaviour of private firms), Cameroon ranks 116 out of 137 countries (World Economic Forum, 2017).

In an effort to combat the above-mentioned malpractices, the government has formulated a series of legal and institutional frameworks to investigate corruption and oversee state activities (Transparency International, 2016:6, 8). However, the widely held view is that the fight against corruption is far from producing the desired results. This is so because most of the institutions that have been established to combat misconduct in both the public and private sectors lack administrative and financial independence. For example, the board members or directors of the majority of these institutions are appointed by the president. As an illustration, the National Anti-corruption Commission (CONAC) was founded in 2006 to substitute the Anti-corruption Observatory. The main duty of CONAC is to investigate corruption in the state structures in general and the public service in particular. It is also charged with the task of educating the populace about corruption. Nonetheless, the independence of CONAC from the executive is undermined since its members and directors are appointed and can be dismissed at will by the head of state. Consequently, it does not have the ability to confiscate or freeze revenue derived from corruption and lacks the capacity to bring corruption cases before the courts. Furthermore, there are concerns that it does not provide in-depth information about those found guilty of corruption or the investigation process (Transparency International,

110

2016:6, 8). This runs contrary to a fundamental provision of accountability, which requires public institutions to provide comprehensive information to the public or other constitutional bodies on political actions and processes whenever required.

Furthermore, Operation Sparrow Hawk launched in 2010 by the executive arm through CONAC has been raiding and imprisoning numerous high-profile ex-ministers and bureaucrats (some for above 25 years) for alleged embezzlement, bribery and corruption. However, critics maintain that the operation is employed as a political instrument to incarcerate political aspiring bureaucrats or opponents. Similarly, the National Financial Investigation Agency (NIFA) which monitors financial institutions and combats money laundering can only investigate but not indict offenders. Besides, just as CONAC, the independence of the Agency from the executive is compromised since its leader is appointed by the president (Transparency International, 2016:6-9). Therefore, 56% of the respondents in the 2016 Transparency International Survey were of the opinion that the government is not making a real effort to fight corruption (Transparency International – Cameroon, 2016:6).

4.4 The media and popular participation

Some of the elements considered in this section as indicated earlier, are media freedom; plurality in media ownership; representation of different opinions; the independence of the media from government (including self-regulation); the safety of journalists from intimidation, harassment, imprisonment, prosecution, and restrictive laws; media professionalism; and opportunities for conventional participation at all levels of government. The media as the ‘fourth estate’ plays a crucial role in fostering democracy by keeping the government and political elites in check as well as representing the interests of the masses. They inform the society and public about undemocratic practices such as corruption, bribery and human rights violations (Coetzee, 2016). Therefore, an independent and free media is vital to advancing the democratic process since they contribute to the right of freedom of conscience, thought, and expression as well as promoting the accountability and responsiveness of governments to the citizens, thereby

111 enhancing human development and good governance (Amodu, et. al., 2014:1-2). The preamble of the 1996 amendment to the 1972 Constitution guarantees the freedom of the press and communication, as well as freedom of expression; although under the conditions fixed by law (Republic of Cameroon, 1996:3). According to the 2014 African Media Barometer (AMB),49 fewer lawsuits were filed against journalists in 2014 in comparison with previous years. A major contributory factor to this decline was the increasing role of the National Communication Council (NCC) in addressing media regression. Furthermore, following the death of a Cameroonian journalist, Germain Cyrille Ngota in jail in April 2010, national and international media freedom organisations have been mounting pressure on the government to ensure the safety of journalists. Similarly, local media organisations particularly trade unions, have become more vigorous in blowing the whistle on abuses suffered by journalists. This has attracted the attention of international pressure groups such as Journalists Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Likewise, social media has been very instrumental in curbing abuses against journalists (African Media Barometer, 2014:133).

The outcome of the above situation is that there is limited restriction on citizens in terms of consuming information and news from national and international media sources of their choice. As a result, information and news have expanded over the years largely because of the growing number of broadcast outlets, the popularisation of mobile platforms and better internet access. Consequently, the private media has become more daring and vocal in the issues it comments on and reports. Frank live debates and bold headlines are common. Therefore, compared to the Ahidjo era (see chapter three), ordinary citizens are freer to discuss public issues because of greater access to the media and social media platforms (African Media Barometer, 2014:81-82, 94, 97). However, despite the expansion of private radio broadcasting, the state-owned CRTV still dominates the landscape. Similarly, despite claims of ‘frequent jamming’ on television or radio particularly concerning the discussion of sensitive issues, there is no evidence of a

49 A panel of 10-12 experts made up of at least five civil society representatives and five media practitioners meets every three to four years to appraise the media situation in their home country. The scoring and discussion are moderated by an independent consultant who also edits the report of the AMB (African Media Barometer, 2014:72).

112 premeditated effort to technically interrupt broadcasting. However, power outages and technical failures are usually misinterpreted as frequency jamming (African Media Barometer, 2014:95, 97).

Notwithstanding the above positive developments, the US Department of State (2016:16) notes that gendarmes, police and other government instruments are employed to intimidate, physically attack, arrest and detain journalists as a result of their reporting. In other words, despite the feeling of greater freedom, “journalists are still afraid to express themselves freely because the threat of a legal suit or physical assault is real” (African Media Barometer, 2014:82). Consequently, they usually refuse some tasks for fear of the consequences from either powerful interest groups or the state. Similarly, organisations or individuals that privately or publicly criticise the government or express opinions that are at variance with its policy are usually penalised. Consequently, in order to avoid reprisals, journalists often practise self-censorship, particularly in terms of security matters (US Department of State, 2016:15-16). However, they as well as civil society activists and human rights advocates continued to be threatened, harassed and intimidated (Amnesty International, 2017). Furthermore, due to the country’s autocratic system, citizens are conscious of the omnipresence of secret agents who pry into their discussions. Civil society organisations also allege that security agents usually sneak into their meetings to overhear their conversations and report back to the authorities. Therefore, although the Constitution guarantees the freedom of the press and communication, as well as freedom of expression (see above), the ingrained habit whereby the citizens are constantly spied on by the state has not disappeared (African Media Barometer, 2014:82).

Likewise, government authorities use several methods to control media content. For example, journalists of the state media often suffer reprisals for examining certain issues. Similarly, the editorial policy of the Cameroon Tribune (a state newspaper) is governed by the state which makes it susceptible to undue political influence. Furthermore, its journalists are generally forced to practise self-censorship or reflect the official narrative and are not permitted to report on certain stories deemed as sensitive (African Media

113

Barometer, 2014:82, 97-98). In light of these limitations, Tita, et. al., (2016:3) assert that the professional standards of media practice especially in the public sector in Cameroon is declining. In their view, reporting norms such as fairness, integrity and accuracy are non-existent since most media practitioners are corrupt and have low integrity. The low salaries of journalists which makes them vulnerable to corrupt practices and their poor working conditions across the years, as they maintained, are the major contributory factors to these vices (Tita, et. al., 2016:3).50

Against the backdrop of the above deficiencies, it is not surprising that according to the EIU’s 2017 Democracy Index, in terms of media freedom, Cameroon scored 4 out of 10 and occupied the 121st position of the 167 countries that were ranked. Therefore, the country’s media is regarded as ‘unfree’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018:41). Similarly, concerning the Reporters Without Borders’ 2018 World Press Freedom Index, the country scores 40.92% (representing a drop compared to 41.59% in 2017) and occupies the 129th position of the 180 countries ranked. This suggests that the country’s “authorities have imposed a climate of fear and self-censorship” on journalists and media freedom has deteriorated over the years (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). Similarly, concerning civil society participation, according to the 2018 IIAG, Cameroon had a below average score of 38.4% signifying ‘increasing deterioration’ since 2008. As a result, the country ranked 36 out of the 54 African countries in 2018 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018).

4.5 Freedom and human rights

Human rights are the universal entitlements of people purely by virtue of their humanity, while freedom is the right or power of a person to think, speak, or act without coercive restraints (Valentini, 2012:574; Gammon, 2012). However, the line separating the two is very blurred since there is an overlap between them (Hasa, 2016). This entails an integral

50 It should be noted that in the public sector where the majority of journalists are in effect civil servants, salaries are higher and they enjoy more benefits compared to their colleagues in the private sector (African Media Barometer, 2014:124).

114 and a holistic discussion on the subject. According to Valentini (2012:581), “human rights are necessary and sufficient conditions for a reasonable implementation of persons’ right to freedom”. Therefore, human rights connote those protections that every state should dispense to its citizens if its claim to uphold their right to freedom is to be taken seriously. It follows that human rights are violated when the state either vigorously curtails the rights of persons to freedom or fails to safeguard them such as neglecting to administer the law (Valentini, 2012:582, 587). Some of the human rights and freedoms under consideration are: the right to petition, the right to criticise, the right to oppose the government, the right to security, the right to education, the right to personal freedom, the right to freedom of thought and expression, the right to freedom of movement, the right to equality and justice, the freedom to form associations and assembly, the right to work and adequate wages, and the right to property (Freedom House, 2018a; Ghai, 2016).

Cameroon is a signatory to several international human rights instruments such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as regional and international conventions (Republic of Cameroon, 1996:1). In terms of these agreements, the country, according to the preamble of the 1996 amendment to the 1972 Constitution, affirms its commitment to ensure equal rights, freedom, and security to all persons; subject to the higher interests of the state and respect for the rights of others (Republic of Cameroon, 1996:1-3). Particularly relevant to this study is that the country pledges in terms of the preamble of the Constitution to guarantee the freedom of association, assembly, expression and the right to strike especially by trade unions albeit under the conditions fixed by law (Republic of Cameroon, 1996:3). According to Freedom House (2017), workers’ unions often conduct strikes notwithstanding the constraints. Recent examples include the public workers’ and taxi and truck drivers’ strikes in 2016. The teachers in the anglophone South West and North West regions also organised a strike in November and December 2016 (Freedom House, 2017). Furthermore, disciplinary and administrative measures have been applied by the government against members of the security forces who perpetrated abuses of human rights (United Nations Office at Geneva, 2017).

115

Despite the lofty constitutional provisions concerning freedom and human rights, and the encouraging signs as indicated above, the US Department of State (2016:8-9) contends that the arbitrary arrests and detentions of citizens, usually without trial, are common in Cameroon. In its view, government authorities, the gendarmerie and police are noted for arbitrarily arresting people and detaining them for protracted periods without charge or trail. It further maintains that some detainees are held incommunicado (in solitary confinement). For example, 54 opposition followers were arrested in October 2016 during a party meeting and taken into custody for more than eight hours. However, the reason for their captivity was not explained to them. Furthermore, although 18 months is the maximum period stipulated by law for detention before trail, many detainees wait for years to be taken to court. Corroborating this assertion is a statement released by the Ministry of Justice in January 2016, which disclosed that of the prison population of 27,977 convicts, 15,616 were in pretrial custody (US Department of State, 2016: 8-10). Therefore, according to the US Department of State (2016:10, 12), most of the pretrial inmates have been waiting for more than two years to be tried in court resulting in them being treated as though they had already been convicted.51 Another aspect of arbitrary arrests and detentions is the allegation that gendarmes or police arrest people without warrant based solely on circumstantial evidence. This is often in respect of orders from ‘important’ personalities with a desire for vengeance. In addition, a practice which has continued unabated is the so-called ‘Friday arrests’. People arrested on Friday for any crime are usually held in custody until at least Monday except when a bribe is paid for them to be freed earlier (US Department of State, 2016:9).

Another form of human rights violation is that detainees are usually subjected to torture and other inhuman, cruel, or undignified punishment or treatment including killing (US Department of State, 2016:2-3). This is contrary to the notion of a democracy which is typified by social rights like the right to physical and mental well-being, and the right to human dignity (mentioned above). The US Department of State (2016:3) affirms that

51 For instance, the US Department of State reported on 31 August 2016 that an activist, Oben Maxwell was in pretrial detention since 2014 in the Buea Central Prison, South West region for allegedly organising a meeting that had been banned (US Department of State, 2016:10).

116 members of the security force such as gendarmes, police and soldiers, as well as officials of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) often abuse offenders. This is perpetuated mostly through harassment, beating, and torture both outside and inside detention stations. Therefore, allegations of unlawful and arbitrary killings by members of the security force through the use of excessive force or due to personal grievances are common (US Department of State, 2016:2-3). For instance, a motorbike rider, Moupen Moussa died on 25 March 2016 at a detention station located at the Secretary of State for Defence (SED). The allegation was that he died as a result of the severe beating he received from the gendarmes for not presenting his national identity card. Similarly, Eyebe Levodo passed away on 4 February 2016 in custody at the legal branch of the Yaoundé court of first instance. It was reported that he suffered gruesome violence as the police coerced him into providing information (US Department of State, 2016:2-4). Again, in Nom-Kandi, Ngan-Ha sub-division in the Adamawa region, two adolescent boys named Moussa and Abdou were allegedly tortured to death on 28 May 2016 by four officials of the BIR. This was in reaction to an accusation made against the boys by a woman who claimed that they had stolen 5,000 CFA francs (about US$ 9) from her. Furthermore, those charged of supporting Boko Haram are unfairly tried in military tribunals resulting in most of them being sentenced to death. This is in line with the extremely defective anti- terrorism law promulgated in December 2014 (Amnesty International, 2017).52 Likewise, about 20 people were killed in the anglophone (North West and South West) regions of the country during demonstrations in October 2017 by security forces who responded with tear gas and live bullets. Approximately 500 people were also arrested in response to the demonstrations. The inhabitants of the two anglophone regions were further deprived of internet access for 93 days (January to April 2017) (Freedom House, 2018).53 These incidents are tantamount to violation of anglophone minority rights.

52 The anti-terrorism law and its bearing on the functioning of civil society in Cameroon, particularly with regard to the challenges faced, is elaborated on in chapter five. 53 The demonstrations commenced in late 2016 as a result of the allegations by anglophone Cameroonians that the French legal system is being imposed on the anglophone regions and French speakers with inadequate English skills are being sent by the government to teach in anglophone schools. Central to the current grievances is the perceived marginalisation, deprivation and oppression of anglophone Cameroonians by the government (see Mbamalu, 2017; Mustafa, 2017; Gaffey, 2017).

117

The appalling conditions at most detention centres and prisons also indicate the violation of human rights in Cameroon. As pointed out above, the right to human dignity and the right to health are fundamental social rights associated with democratic polity. The US Department of State (2016:5) maintains that these conditions are hazardous and life threatening since detention and prison centres are characterised by severe congestion, dreadful hygienic conditions, and inadequate medical care, potable water and food. Concerning overcrowding for instance, the Ministry of Justice in January 2016 disclosed that the country’s prisons with a planned capacity of 17,000 were holding 27,997 convicts. The congested prisons are attributed to administrative bottlenecks, judicial corruption and delays, as well as insufficient staff (US Department of State, 2016:5, 10).

An area which is ‘less contentious’ in terms of human rights violations is the issue of formal equality which, as mentioned above, is an important element of democracy, since it prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, language, race, and gender as well as personal and social conditions. Given that some CSOs are engaged with issues such as gender equality in Cameroon (see chapter five), this aspect deserves attention in order to provide the background of the involvement of CSOs in these issues.

Notwithstanding the fact that equal rights to women and men is guaranteed in the Constitution in terms of inheritance, property and labour (see the Preamble of the Cameroonian Constitution of 1996), women often encounter discrimination and challenges in exercising their full rights since customary law usually supersedes civil law. For example, women cannot own land, particularly through inheritance (US Department of State, 2016:29). Consequently, with the economy of Cameroon being largely agrarian, this barrier to land ownership compromises the economic independence of women. As a result, it perpetuates their dependence on men which engenders the impoverishment of orphans and widows (Amnesty International, 2016a). In addition, in several regions of Cameroon, a woman is regarded as the property of her husband (US Department of State, 2016:29). As mentioned above, these practices are incompatible with substantive equality which entails the elimination of impediments to economic and social equality, and therefore, the complete advancement of a human person. Besides, Cameroonian females

118 are disrespected in the form of societal abuses like female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) (US Department of State, 2016:27, 32). Similarly, even though rape against women is criminalised, if the victim voluntarily gives her consent to marriage or has reached puberty, the culprits are frequently vindicated (Amnesty International, 2016a).

Just like women, HIV/AIDS patients are also often discriminated against and isolated from society or their families because of inadequate knowledge about the disease or social stigma. A network in Cameroon of people with HIV (Cameroon Network of Associations of People Living with HIV) conducted a survey between October 2010 and February 2011 comprising 1,284 persons with HIV. According to the survey, in the 12 month period that preceded the study, as a result of their HIV positive status, 22.6% of the respondents who were employed lost their job or other source of income, 9.8% alleged being denied a career promotion or experienced unfair changes in their duties, 6.7% maintained they were refused employment, 25.9% were not able to obtain rental accommodation or were coerced into changing residence, and 68.7% reported having experienced at least a form of discrimination or stigma. In terms of access to health services, the survey further revealed that owing to their HIV positive status, 5% of the respondents were refused reproductive and sexual health services, 3.3% were denied family planning services, and 2% dental care services. Concerning education, 2.3% had been suspended, dismissed, or barred from attending a learning institution (US Department of State, 2016:36). These societal abuses as pointed out earlier, are at odds with the social and civil-economic rights fundamental to a democracy such as the right to social security and assistance, the right to study, health and human dignity, and employment-related rights.

Considering the violations of rights and freedoms as well as discrimination as demonstrated above, it comes as no surprise that in terms of the 2018 Freedom House ratings as mentioned in chapter one, Cameroon scores 6 (of a maximum score of 7 in terms of violations) for both civil liberties (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, personal autonomy and individual rights, the right to equality and justice) and political rights (the right to criticise, the right to petition, the right to oppose the government, the right to hold public office). The country is therefore considered ‘not

119 free’ (Freedom House, 2018; Freedom House, 2018a). Similarly, according to the EIU’s 2017 Democracy Index, the country scored 3 out of 10 in terms of civil liberties (freedom of protest and expression, freedom to form trade unions and professional organisations, opportunity to petition the government, torture by the state, the right to equality, basic security, private property rights, personal freedoms) and is perceived as an ‘authoritarian’ regime (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018:33). Likewise, concerning the 2018 IIAG, Cameroon in terms of rights had a below average score of 34.4% and similar to Freedom House ratings and the EIU’s Democracy Index, this indicates that it is not free. Consequently, the country is ranked 36th of the 54 African countries in 2018. The indicators that were considered included: freedom of association and assembly, human rights violations, freedom of expression, civil liberties and protection against discrimination (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018).

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter provided the environment in which CSOs in Cameroon are operating. The purpose was to establish the prevalence of democracy in Cameroon since the first multiparty legislative and presidential elections held in 1992 in setting the scene for addressing the aim of the study. In terms of free and fair elections, it reveals that despite the creation of ELECAM during the fourth presidential election in 2011, the same irregularities that characterised previous elections persisted. Aggravating the situation is the amendment to the Constitution prior to the 2011 election, which abolished presidential term limits. These irregularities and manipulations demonstrate electoral authoritarianism aimed at sustaining Biya and the ruling party in power.

Concerning the rule of law and accountability, bribery, corruption and embezzlement are pervasive in the public and private sectors although to a lesser degree in the latter. The government’s efforts to contend these malpractices have not been effective. Therefore, according to several international indices, Cameroon rates low on meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law and accountability. Regarding the media and popular participation, there are, on the other hand a few positive developments. These include limited restriction on citizens in terms of consuming information and news from national

120 and international media sources of their choice and the greater freedom they exercise in discussing public issues compared to the past. Notwithstanding these positive signs, the chapter illustrated that numerous international press freedom indices assign to Cameroon below average scores suggesting that journalists in the country suffer from self- censorship and a climate of fear imposed by the authorities. In other words, they still suffer intimidation, physical attack, arrest and detention from the gendarmes, police and other government instruments as a result of their reporting. In addition, the government uses several methods to control media content.

Concerning freedom and human rights, there were also some positive signs such as the ability of workers’ unions to conduct strikes regardless of the constraints. The government has also applied disciplinary and administrative measures against members of the security forces who committed violations of human rights. However, the freedoms and human rights of citizens are regularly violated. The forms of violation include: arbitrary arrests and detentions usually without trial; torture and other inhumane, cruel, or undignified punishment or treatment including killing of detainees and protesters; inhumane conditions in most detention centres and prisons; and discrimination suffered by women and HIV/AIDS patients.

Not having fared well in terms of the different democratic indicators examined above, it can be safe to argue that Cameroon is a pseudo-democracy. Although most of the formal requirements for democracy are contained in its Constitution and that elections are held regularly, in practice, it falls short of fulfilling the requirements of a democracy.

Therefore, it is not surprising that 93.1% of Cameroonians are not satisfied with the country’s democracy (established in the 2014/2015 (round six) Afrobarometer national public attitudes surveys on democracy and governance in Africa).

The following chapter establishes the role (and perceived role) that CSOs are playing in trying to promote the development of democracy (given their former active role in the

121 country’s transition to a multiparty system as earlier indicated) and the challenges they face in playing such a role.

122

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EFFORTS BY CIVIL SOCIETY IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON AND THE CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is based on the 42 interviews that were conducted with a variety of respondents in Cameroon in the period December 2017 to January 2018.54 The respondents included representatives of democracy-advocating CSOs that were active in the early 1990s in the change to a multiparty system, such as the CBA, students and workers’ unions such as the UBSU and the TAC as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church (see chapter one).55 Prominent independent analysts included academics and journalists from the independent news media as well as members of parliament of opposition parties such as the SDF.

A limitation of this study is that the selection of respondents was restricted to the North West region where the researcher is familiar with the political terrain and therefore, could safely navigate through the politically contentious environment.56 Notwithstanding this limitation as pointed out earlier, the respondents seemed to be objective and tried to be as informative as possible. As mentioned in chapter one, after about 25 interviews, a recurrent theme began to emerge with data saturation becoming evident. In addition, as stated, this is a qualitative study with the aim to get some indication of the role of

54 Since the interviews all took place during the same period, the dates of the interviews are not provided in this chapter. The bibliography contains a full list of the interviewees, their affiliations and the date of the interview. 55 Democracy-advocating civil society organisations as mentioned earlier, include trade unions, student bodies, and non-gov-ernmental organisations that seek in a nonpartisan manner to advance the democratisation process and improve a political system. This can be achieved through, for example, anti- corruption efforts, voter education and mobilisation, human rights monitoring, and poll-watching (see Diamond, 1994:6; Sachikonye, 1995:7). 56 It should be emphasised that the interviews were conducted against the backdrop of an attempt by the anglophone parts of Cameroon (North West and South West regions) to secede and form an independent entity. This engendered a spirit of fear, insecurity and mutual distrust in the populace (Ayang, 2017:3).

123

Cameroon’s democracy-advocating CSOs in promoting democracy since the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections held in 1992 (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as mentioned above).

The analytical framework discussed in chapter two, guided the interviews (see interview guide appendix II) and also served as the framework for analysing the interviews. As indicated in chapter one, civil society in this study, includes formal institutions such as organised groups and social movements which are voluntarily formed and are functioning within the legitimate system to foster democratic governance and enhance collective freedoms. They also include informal groupings such as spontaneous mass protests/demonstrations that pursue or strive to address any democracy-related issue such as human and political rights, civil liberties, rule of law, government accountability and transparency as well as promoting democratic governance. As highlighted in chapter one, most of the subtle transformative activities in Africa such as spontaneous mass protests occur at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life but are easily ignored or dismissed as non-civic. This conception of civil society also informed the choice of respondents.57 Therefore, interviewees also included the leaders of protests/demonstrations, particularly those that characterised the democratic process in the early 1990s led by the NCOPA (see chapter three), as well as those witnessed in the ongoing anglophone crisis led by the outlawed Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) (see International Crisis Group, 2017).58

Since the first multiparty elections in 1992, democracy in Cameroon has hardly developed. Instead, there are serious shortcomings as shown in the previous chapter. Given the numerous shortcomings in terms of democracy in the country, this chapter aims to establish whether CSOs indeed challenge the government concerning the democratic

57 The informal groups that this study has addressed as pointed out earlier, are spontaneous mass protests/demonstrations. Other forms of informal organisations such as neo-traditional (primordial) groups based on tribe, kinship, family, and religion did not surface during the interviews as being active in Cameroon’s democratic process. 58 The outlawed Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) composed of teachers’ trade unions and lawyers’ associations was formed in December 2016 to champion the anglophone cause (International Crisis Group, 2017).

124 shortcomings (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system as discussed in chapter three). The main question that this chapter therefore addresses is, whether after nearly 25 years since the first multiparty elections, CSOs are playing any role in challenging the current violations of democratic principles in Cameroon. As mentioned in chapter one, some scholarly contributions have remarked on the absence of the once vibrant CSOs, which have played a key role in the democratic transition process in many African countries but have since not played any active role in addressing current violations of democratic principles. The first section of this chapter focuses on the perceptions of the interviewees on several aspects which have a bearing on the functioning of CSOs in the country. These include: the relation among CSOs, the relationship between CSOs and the government, the status and leadership of CSOs, the commitment of CSOs to fostering democratic governance, and the internal organisation and structure of CSOs. In the second part of the chapter, interviewees were questioned on whether CSOs still play a democracy-advocacy role and what the issues are that they address. In other words, do they still champion the democratic cause and if not, what the reasons are.

5.2 The relation among civil society organisations

It can be argued that mutual cooperation among CSOs as mentioned in chapter one, nurtures a sense of mutual obligation and social ties by uniting distinct associations towards the achievement of shared goals, particularly in terms of promoting democratic principles, which transcend private interests (Eberly, 2000:5-7). The civil society landscape in Cameroon is characterised by a number of CSO networks. These are mainly those that, for example, focus on peace advocacy, development and gender-based violence. These include the Civil Peace Service (CPS) which constitutes about 26 organisations and the North West Association of Development Association (NWADO) comprising of approximately 60 organisations (interviews: McKenzie; Shuazieh; Njondad; Atumo). As contended by Chongsi (interview), the Executive Director (UN permanent representative) of the CHRAPA, networks is crucial to the effective functioning of CSOs. Therefore, the above-mentioned networks are mostly established to foster collaboration

125 and pool resources, both human and material, to execute certain projects. Others are formed to enhance unity and strength when negotiating on issues (interviews: Shuazieh; McKenzie). Nevertheless, the widely held view is that these networks are characterised by egocentrism, competition, acrimony, jealousy, pride, dishonesty, leadership tussles, and greed especially in terms of money, power and fame, among the different individual CSOs which form part of a particular network (interviews: Ngepah; Tatah; Chongsi; Ataubo; Njondad; Atumo; Gaby; McKenzie; Tufon; Moye). Consequently, for Tufon, Ataubo, and Chongsi (interviews) the relation among CSOs denotes a ‘zero sum game’ whereby each of them wants to grab all the benefits or opportunities, while depriving others of these. As a result, Gaby (interview), the Executive Director (Human Rights Advocate) of the FGI alleged that most of the networks are short-lived and fail to achieve their goals. As an example, he cited the Union of North West Human Rights Organisations (UNOWHURO), which collapsed as a result of serious infighting (interview: Gaby).

The outcome of the above situation is that the unity of purpose is compromised (interviews: Ngepah; Ataubo). Consequently, in the words of Njondad (interview), a consultant for NWADO, CSOs “have no weight in society”. In other words, “they are very weak” (interview: Chongsi). Therefore, as Njondad (interview) noted, it makes it “difficult for any change to be effected”. The majority view is that they easily lose focus and commitment in seeking solutions to the problems identified in society (interviews: Atumo; Chongsi; Ataubo). Therefore, according to Ataubo (interview), a lawyer and member of the CBA, “they are just there for their selfish purpose”. Chongsi (interview) added that “they don't look at the common good”. However, he claimed that some CSOs are committed at the individual level (interview: Chongsi). However, according to independent analysts such as Ngepah and Moye (interviews), the above-mentioned problems are also common within individual CSOs although to a lesser extent. It can be inferred that the unity of purpose among CSOs in achieving shared goals, particularly in terms of peace advocacy and gender-related issues is compromised. This threatens their ability to play an effective role in the democratic process.

126

5.3 The relationship between CSOs and the government

The existence of a good working relationship between CSOs and the government as noted in chapter one, is a key indicator that democracy and democratic governance are deepening. According to Morse (2018:709), “the extent of formal presidential power significantly shapes the ability of ... civil society participation” in the democratic process. The relationship between CSOs and the government in Cameroon hardly provides an enabling environment for them to function effectively (interviews: Shuazieh; Kemende; Njondad; Rhett; Chongsi; McKenzie; Atumo; Rusell; Fon; Gwain; Ataubo; Njei). The first issue raised by interviewees is the lack of financial support by the government to CSOs. This, however, raises doubts about the commitment of CSOs to play an effective role in challenging the violations of democratic principles in the country. It is questionable whether they will be able to criticise the socio-economic and political ills plaguing the country after receiving money from the government. Therefore, it is highly likely that their autonomy will be compromised. Furthermore, it can be deduced that CSOs mostly work at micro-level within the system and are concerned with their own parochial organisational goals which are less contentious, as affirmed below concerning their role in the democratic process. Therefore, they are not engaged with broader (national) contentious democratic issues that entail questioning the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country (see chapter four). In other words, they do not see themselves as playing a role in criticising the government concerning the undemocratic elements associated with it. Notwithstanding, this lack of financial assistance was specifically raised by representatives of CSOs; for example, those dealing with peace advocacy and gender-based violence. Therefore, the above category of CSOs mostly rely on the financial support from members, which they maintained, is hardly sufficient. This in their view, hinders them from effectively performing their role in the democratic process in terms of their narrow organisational goals at micro-level as suggested above (interviews: Zayden; Tombir; Kisob; Atumo; McKenzie; Fon; Rhett; Afu; Shuazieh; Njondad; Moye; Chongsi; Gaby; Songwe). As confirmed by Atumo (interview), human rights officer of WaCameroon, “civil society organisations in Cameroon don't … carry out a lot of activities that they would have loved to carry out if they had the financial capability”.

127

Therefore, Rhett (interview) contended that CSOs should have been subsidised just as is the case with for example, private radio stations and schools as well as political parties in Cameroon. This he argued is particularly, because CSOs are “pointing out the weaknesses” in governance and “working with the government to solve them” (interview: Rhett). Zayden (interview) added that since they “help to address certain societal problems, the government should be able to acknowledge this and know that CSOs are partners and not persons to be muzzled”. However, Gawum (interview), a member of the traditional society called Takembeng, claimed that “the government does not even recognise CSOs as playing a major role in enhancing democratic governance”. This attests to the claim above that CSOs mostly work at micro-level within the system and are concerned with their own parochial organisational goals which are inconsequential at national level. Therefore, their impact on the democratic process is insignificant.

On the other hand, the independence of CSOs from the state, particularly those involved in peace advocacy, development and gender-based violence was emphasised by a number of interviewees such as Tombir, Gwain and Afu. They argued that the unwillingness of the state to subsidise CSOs is a blessing in disguise since it enhances their autonomy from the state. In their view, “there are some civil society organisations when they start receiving subventions, they will derail from their mission and start singing the praises of the government”. They further asserted that “a civil society organisation that is financially stable and has diverse sources of funding, should not play that cheap”. Nonetheless, CSOs tend to be heavily dependent on the financial aid by donors which also compromises their independence in terms of freely implementing their own objectives rather than those imposed on them by the donors (see below). As indicated above, the majority of CSOs, particularly those involved in democracy-advocating, find it difficult to obtain subventions from the state. Therefore, as strongly affirmed in the interviews, most rely on foreign funding to carry out their activities which as asserted earlier, are predominantly at ‘micro-level’ (interviews: Yani; Ngwa; Formuh; Lakinyu; Fon; Afu; Njouny; Shuazieh; Songwe; Tata; Mckenzie; Zayden; Atumo; Tenyeh; Gwain; Alejandro; Gaby; Jayceon; Tombir; Nji; Rhett; Easton; Sama, Gawum).

128

However, the public in the majority of African countries, as pointed out earlier, view the assistance of Western donors such as the USA to emerging CSOs with suspicion. These funds, as maintained by Gwain and Gaby (interviews), often come with strings attached to them which compromises the autonomy of CSOs regarding freely executing their own narrow organisational goals as contended above. As noted by Gwain (interview) for example, Cameroonian CSOs find it difficult to pursue “their own objectives that can change society because they virtually follow the dictates of funders”. He added that if they “are not working on the dictates of funders, it will be very difficult to get finance” (Gwain). McKenzie (interview) further disclosed that “because of the desperate need for funding, some Cameroonian civil society organisations accept the conditions of the foreign donors even if they compromise their autonomy or independence”. Similarly, Gaby (interview) attested that the democracy-advocating CSOs will endeavour to meet the conditions notwithstanding whether they reflect the realities on the ground. Therefore, Afu (interview) pointed out that the dictum “he who pays the piper dictates the tune” holds true in the Cameroon context concerning the relationship between CSOs and foreign donors. This heavy reliance on foreign funders, as indicated below, causes the government to perceive democracy-advocating CSOs as adversaries and agents sponsored by donors to destabilise the regime. They are also seen by some of the citizens and the government in particular, as fostering the interests of the donors (see chapter two). Thus, it enhances a suspicious and tense relationship between them and the state.

The expectation of subventions from the government by Cameroonian CSOs as asserted above, raises doubts about their commitment to play an effective role in addressing the democratic shortcomings in the country. This contrasts starkly with the early 1990s when they were able to play an active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system regardless whether they received subsidies from the government or not. Their present expectation of funding from the government attests to the assertion below that the main aim nowadays of creating CSOs seems to be for personal gains and not to foster the interests of the masses, particularly concerning the democratic cause. This partly explains why CSOs do not see themselves as playing a role in criticising the government and are therefore, silent on the current violations of democratic principles.

129

A third important aspect that was raised by the respondents which has a bearing on the relationship between the CSOs and the government, is the establishment of so-called ‘bogus’ CSOs by the government (interviews: Rusell; Gwain; Afu; Rhett; Gaby; Njondad; Ataubo). These, according to Gwain (interview), the Executive Director of A Common Future, are fictitious or satellite CSOs that have been established by “the government to counter any real democratic change that the real or authentic civil society organisations would want to bring”. In the words of Rhett (interview), they are “agents of the government” with a mandate to weaken and destroy the authentic CSOs. These types of CSOs as alleged by Rusell (interview), a renowned journalist in the country, are usually composed of members of the ruling CPDM. He added that they are ‘fictitious’ in the sense that they are created by the government to “give the impression that all people are free to associate in Cameroon” but people are aware that “they are just window dressing” (interview: Rusell). According to Gaby (interview), these “artificial organisations ... don’t exist anywhere” and can be termed as ‘suitcase’ CSOs “with false registration numbers”. Ngepah (interview), an independent analyst, further contended that this category of CSOs “instead of standing for the people, they are standing for the government and ... they want to appease the government”. Therefore, in the opinion of Gwain (interview), the government has infiltrated civil society to the extent that it seems like CSOs are “almost dependent on the government”. Hence, as claimed by Gaby (interview), it is mostly these fake CSOs that benefit from the government’s financial assistance and the allocation of projects. This as alluded to earlier (see chapter two), seriously undermines their autonomy and authority. Meanwhile, other artificial CSOs are created by individuals “in order to look for funds which they want to sustain themselves with” (interview: Rusell). As pointed out by Njondad (interview), these types of CSOs cannot promote democracy since the passion for and commitment to the democratic cause is virtually non-existent. The creation of ‘fictitious’ CSOs by the government therefore, underscores Biya’s clientelist networks which entice CSOs to be “more concerned with access to the system than with systemic change” (Morse, 2018:713)

The fourth issue established from the interviews which has a negative bearing on CSOs, is the divide and rule tactic of the government, which has engendered division and mutual

130 suspicion among CSOs (interviews: Afu; Chongsi). As contended by Tatah (interview), the Director of Communications, Archdiocese of Bamenda, the government is exploiting the cultural and linguistic differences between the anglophones and francophones to sow discord among CSOs.59 Therefore, the Roman Catholic Church in Cameroon is also polarised (interviews: Gwain; Chongsi). For Gwain (interview), “there is a sharp dividing line between the francophone Bishops and the anglophone Bishops”. In his view, “the anglophone Bishops are more liberal and more receptive to ideas while the francophone Bishops still work like auxiliaries of the administration”. Consequently, “the Catholic National Episcopal Conference is unable to stand firm on an issue as a group” (interview: Tatah). Furthermore, Chongsi (interview) pointed out that “the anglophone priests continue to talk about the problems of the anglophones” while “the francophone priests continue to support the system in place”. According to Tatah and Gwain, this contrasts with the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Episcopal Conference was a strong force led by an anglophone (Christian Cardinal Tumi) and the pronouncements of the Conference were thorns in government’s flesh. Therefore, according to Gwain, the force of the National Episcopal Conference dwindles each time it is led by a francophone and the reverse is true when it is an anglophone. This division seems to be one explanation for the Catholic Church’s inability to play an effective role in mediating in the ongoing anglophone/francophone crisis (see below) or questioning the Biya regime.

Similar to the Catholic National Episcopal Conference, the CBA also suffers from the divide and rule tactic of the government (interview: Ataubo). As argued by Ataubo, a lawyer and member of the CBA, the CBA “is very divided now”. Also drawing from the anglophone/francophone crisis, he asserted that the CBA as a result of the crisis, is fractured to the point that the lawyers who are practising the common law system (mostly anglophones), are contemplating creating a separate bar association for the anglophones. This in his opinion, indicates “how broken the Cameroon Bar Association

59 As pointed out earlier (see chapter four), the anglophone/francophone crisis commenced in late 2016 as a result of the allegations by anglophone Cameroonians that the French legal system is being imposed on the anglophone regions and French speakers with inadequate English skills are being sent by the government to teach in anglophone schools. Central to the current grievances is the perceived marginalisation, deprivation and oppression of anglophone Cameroonians by the government.

131 is” (interview: Ataubo). Therefore, it lacks vigour in terms of fostering democratic governance. The same applies to the students’ unions especially at the tertiary level which, as disclosed by Alejandro (interview), a member of the University of Buea Students’ Union, “don't longer act now as one”. He maintained that the authorities have created a situation where there is no “interaction with other student unions in other universities”. Consequently, in his view, “a matter that effects the students of a university of a particular region … does not concern the others in other areas”. Even within the various unions, the omnipresent hands of the government are at work to ensure that they are docile (interviews: Alejandro and Jayceon (a member of the National Polytechnic Students’ Union)). For instance, they claimed that the process of electing strategic union members such as the president and secretary general, is usually influenced to prevent students with radical ideas from occupying these positions. Therefore, according to Jayceon, student unions in Cameroon are “not even worth the name” since they “don’t defend the rights of the students”. This divide and rule tactic of the government underlines the control of CSOs by the Biya regime. It also highlights the manner in which it exploits the anglophone/francophone division to constrain the space available to CSOs to challenge the government concerning the democratic shortcomings in the country.

Another point of contention in the relationship between CSOs and the government is the required government procedures to be met in order to establish new CSOs, which seems to be a further method by the government to restrict the establishment of CSOs that might challenge the government in one way or the other. As stated by Njondad (interview), “the process is very challenging”. Most of the interviewees representing CSOs were of the opinion that the process is characterised by among other things, bureaucratic bottlenecks, bribery, and long delays, as well as a plethora of required documents (interviews: for example, Njei; Rhett; Shuazieh; Njondad; Chongsi; Tata; Atumo; McKenzie). Furthermore, some interviewees stressed that organisations involved in governance and human rights issues are more susceptible to suffer from these hurdles than those engaged in developmental projects (interview: for example, Chongsi). According to Rusell (interview), the government usually regards democracy-advocating CSOs with suspicion

132

“as being a sort of people that have a hidden agenda which is anti-establishment”. Therefore, as noted above, democracy-advocating CSOs, unlike developmental CSOs, generally have strained relations with the state, compelling them to be confrontational when dealing with the government.

The government also adopted restrictive laws in terms of certain CSOs in order to limit their political role. This is particularly the case with the CBA, an association which played a pivotal role in the early 1990s in the country’s transition to a multiparty system (see chapter three). According to Kemende, the president of the CBA, North West region, the CBA is now “a civil society organisation with limited scope of operation”. He maintained that its activities are governed by a law which is different from that which regulates the functioning of other CSOs and according to which the CBA is not permitted to “get involved in political issues or issues of national life” or “take part in civil society activities”. Therefore, the law as he alleged, “defines the Bar on professional basis only”. As a result, in his words, “the Bar seems to be caged by the law that creates it”. Consequently, this limits the Bar’s role in fostering democratic governance. Nevertheless, the CBA at times dabbles in crucial political issues affecting the country. It for example, expressed its view during the commencement of the anglophone/francophone crisis. However, given the political circumstances of this issue and due to the legal restrictions, it “cannot play a pivotal role right to the end” (interview: Kemende). This contrasts with, for example, the GBA which, as pointed out earlier, has been unequivocal in its stance against bad governance and official abuses. Therefore, unlike the CBA, it has been playing a crucial role in the democratisation process by acting as an advocate for genuine political reforms.

Similar to the above-mentioned restrictive laws, is the law on terrorism, which is generally perceived by CSOs as an oppressive instrument designed by the government against

133 them60 (interviews: Fon; Rhett; Gwain; Njondad; Ataubo; Ngong; Chongsi; Tufon; Kemende; Atumo; Gaby; Tata; McKenzie; Kofete). Most African governments, as highlighted in chapter two, have resolutely decreed draconian legislation in an attempt to keep the activities of civil society groups in check and silence dissenting voices that may incite public demonstrations. For Gwain, this law on terrorism targets CSOs which are perceived by the regime as adversaries and “people who are sponsored from abroad to destabilise the government”. Njondad (interview) added that the law has negatively impacted on the activities of CSOs in Cameroon since they “cannot play their ‘watchdog’ role”. Holding a similar view, Atumo (interview) alleged that it “is causing civil society organisations to wag their tails and stay quiet even when they see a lot of things going wrong” since they are scared of what will befall them if they speak out. Furthermore, as Ataubo (interview) emphasised, the definition of terrorism in terms of the law is very broad, which makes it "subject to the interpretation of the person who is charging you with the offence”. As Kemende (interview) added, “it has been interpreted now to even include civilian demonstrations”. Rhett (interview) went as far as to state that in accordance with the law, the authorities can interpret this interview with him for the study as “a seditious meeting” and charge both of us with committing an act of terrorism.61 Likewise, the media is also “clearly gagged” as a result of the law (interview: Rusell). Therefore, in Rusell’s opinion, “doctoring facts to reflect realities” is now a common phenomenon with the press, which, as pointed out above, should serve as the watchdog over government actions and societal abuses.

To make matters worse, respondents also emphasised the fact that transgressors of the law are tried by a military court (interviews: for example, Ataubo; Kofete). As a result, Rhett (interview) contended that many civil society activists who had been vocal have

60As discussed in chapter four, Law No. 2014/028 on the suppression of acts of terrorism was promulgated in December 2014. Section 2(1) (a) to (c) of the law outlines draconian measures to contain perceived acts of terrorism. For instance, it stipulates that whoever provokes a situation of terror, creates widespread insurrection in the country, intimidates the public, and disrupts the normal functioning of public services shall be punished with a death penalty. Aggravating the situation, Section 1 of the law mandates military tribunals to solely deal with the offences stipulated in this law (Republic of Cameroon, 2014).

61 This comment underlines the difficult circumstances in which the interviews for this study were conducted.

134

“now gone into their shells” since many of their colleagues who have been indicted for committing acts of terrorism “are still languishing in jail”.

In summary, from the interviews one can describe the relationship between the government and CSOs in terms of co-optation on the one hand, and strict control on the other. In terms of the former, the clientelist networks of the regime lure CSOs to be co- opted into the political system. Co-option also manifests itself in the manner in which the government exploits the anglophone/francophone division to limit the space available to CSOs to criticise the government concerning the current violations of democratic principles. In terms of the latter, the government employs a variety of tactics to weaken and silence those that it regards with suspicion. Therefore, the various methods that the government uses to clamp down on anti-establishment CSOs and civil society protests, results in a restrictive environment for CSOs to operate in.

5.4 The status and leadership of CSOs

This section particularly focuses on the leadership of CSOs and their role as activists in criticising the political order. In order for CSOs in Cameroon to be able to mobilise the population to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance, they need leaders who can motivate the populace (interview: Rusell).62 However, according to some representatives of CSOs interviewed such as Mbah, Afu, Rhett, Fon, Rusell, Kisob, and Songwe, the Cameroonian CSOs lack effective leadership committed to fostering democratic governance. Kisob maintained that following the advent of multipartism, most of the active leaders of CSOs in Cameroon were hoping for a radical change. However, with this change being slow or not forthcoming, many of them have “resorted to carpet crossing” and became state bureaucrats (interview: Kisob). Holding a similar view, Fon asserted that some leaders of CSOs “have resigned to the position of if you cannot beat them, join them”. These leaders as mentioned in chapter two, are no different to politicians who merely wait for opportunities to exploit at the expense of the

62 In comparison to the 1990s as observed earlier (see chapter one), CSOs in Cameroon (both the old and new generations) find it difficult to sensitise and encourage the citizens to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance.

135 masses whose causes they claim to champion. Therefore, subservient and opportunistic leaders who mostly align themselves with the political elite for monetary gains have compromised the democratic role of civil society (see chapter two). In this regard, Rusell (interview) noted that several CSO leaders in Cameroon have “become opportunists rather than people who stand for what matters to the masses”. Therefore, the majority view is that the government easily targets the dynamic leaders and co-opts them either through bribery or coercion which pacifies them (interviews: Ngepah; Fon; Rhett; Njondad; Kemende). As succinctly expressed by Ngepah (interview), “the civil society organisations today in Cameroon are in a good rosary bed with the government”. He added that “they are easily bought over”. In his opinion therefore, the active leaders of CSOs “dine with the government on the same table and collect huge envelopes”. Consequently, “in Cameroon today, when you are hungry you make noise, when you are full you don't make noise” (interview: Njondad).

Ngepah (interview), further contended that in the wake of the transition to multipartism, many active leaders transformed their CSOs into political parties and joined the governing coalition of political parties referred to as ‘the presidential majority’. As a result, “their wings were clipped” and “the candle of their strength burnt off and ceased to burn” (Interview: Ngepah). This, Ngepah postulated, is because they found it difficult to criticise the ills of the system that they are now part of since they would be ‘shooting themselves in the foot’. Therefore, in his words, “honestly speaking, in Cameroon you cannot talk of any strong civil society that can take actions” (interview: Ngepah). Other spirited civil society leaders (as remarked by Tatah and Kemende), gradually withdrew due to the heavy handedness of the government in clamping down on dissident voices. This, according to them, is particularly evident during the current anglophone/francophone crisis characterised by the reign of terror. Meanwhile, others, as noted by Tatah and Rhett, have gone into hiding in the diaspora as they are being ‘hunted’ by the regime for their alleged involvement in seditious activities. Rhett mentioned that this was particularly the case with some leaders of the CATTU (of which he is a member) who triggered the strike in the two anglophone regions, which led to the current anglophone/francophone crisis. Tatah (interview) furthermore maintained that some of the charismatic and active civil

136 society leaders of the 1990s have passed away, thereby creating a void in terms of leadership. A classic example according to him, is Simon Nkwenti who was the leader of CATTU. The above situation has deprived most Cameroonian CSOs of effective leaders committed to fostering democratic governance. Attesting to this, Sama (interview) maintained that “civil society in the country is weak because there is no strong leadership”. Therefore, on the question about the nature of leadership in Cameroonian CSOs, particularly in terms of their commitment to advance the country’s democracy, the above discussion lends credence to the existence of neo-patrimonial or patronage networks/relationships between CSOs and the government with the resultant leadership vacuum. As mentioned earlier, CSOs in Africa are vulnerable to co-option by the state into neo-patrimonial networks. Therefore, as contended by Morse (mentioned above), presidential power has a considerable bearing on the ability of CSOs to effectively play their role in the democratic process.

In addition, some interviewees noted that most CSOs in Cameroon lack technical skills and expertise in terms of playing an effective role in the democratic process. This is particularly so concerning their narrow organisational goals at micro-level as pointed out above, and also demonstrated below in terms of their role in the democratic process (interviews with for example, Gaby; Chongsi; Njondad; Mckenzie). Several CSOs such as The Fomunyoh Foundation (TFF), organise seminars and workshops to train members, particularly those belonging to democracy-advocating CSOs, in terms of enhancing their expertise and skills related to fulfilling their democratic duties (interviews: Rhett; Gwain; Njondad; McKenzie; Atumo; Njouny). However, as argued by Gaby (interview), “many don't have the technical skills or expertise” required to effectively perform their democratic role, while others create organisations erroneously “thinking that money will just begin to come” (interview: Njondad). Consequently, some of them, according to Njondad, operate without a strategic plan which gives direction to the organisation. Therefore, a lot of CSOs easily change from one thematic area to another in the quest for funding, primarily to enrich themselves (interviews: Tufon; Gaby). As a result, many of them “have fallen on the way because … their aim was to make money” (interview: Njondad).

137

Furthermore, as argued by a number of interviewees, there is also a lack of support from the intelligentsia in terms of supplementing the role played by CSOs in the democratic process (interviews with for example, Ngwanyam; Lobuin; Atumo; Tenyeh; Njei; Rhett; Songwe; Njondad; Banlilon; Tombir; Shuazieh; Tatah; Fielding; Nji; Kemende; Mbah; Ataubo; Tata; Ngepah; Kofete; Yani). As highlighted before (see chapter two), most of the intellectuals and middle-class professionals who manage strategic public institutions are often concerned with their individual economic survival such that they fail to assist CSOs to curb state hegemony. According to Rusell (interview), Cameroon is endowed with “sound minds”, while Tatah (interview) avows that the country has “the most flamboyant academic robes”. However, it is widely believed that the government has given them privileges which they jealously guard. Similarly, the contention is that some of them have equally been co-opted into the government which makes it difficult for them to speak out against the socio-economic and political ills plaguing the country (Zayden; Kofete; Rusell; Tombir; Gwain; Tatah; Ngepah; Yani; Rhett; Njei; Shuazieh; Tenyeh; Kemende; Tata; Moye; Lobuin; Fielding; Chongsi; Banlilon). However, considering the repressive nature of the regime embodied in the law on terrorism, interviewees also emphasised that some of the ‘genuine’ intellectuals are scared to talk because of the repercussions which may follow (interviews with for example, Ataubo; McKenzie; Atumo).

5.5 The commitment of CSOs in promoting democratic governance and the support from the population

The generally held perception by both the representatives of CSOs and independent analysts is that most leaders of CSOs are fostering their personal interests and not those of the masses, particularly concerning the democratic cause (interviews: Easton; Sama; Nji; Tatah; Ataubo; Ngong; Tombir; McKenzie; Ngwanyam; Kisob; Njei; Chongsi; Tata; Moye; Tenyeh; Jayceon). In the words of Moye (interview,) several leaders of CSOs in Cameroon have turned their organisations into “sources of finance for themselves”. Therefore, the leaders put their interests first, although the public may coincidentally benefit from their activities (interview: Moye). Consequently, many people “no longer trust the activities of the civil society organisations” (interview: Njouny). As a result, most CSOs

138 suffer from lack of support from the population, especially the youth (interviews: Moye; Jayceon). This lack of support, as commonly alleged, is also due to the disillusionment with the achievements of CSOs, particularly in terms of their own internal/organisational mandate at micro-level (interviews: Ngwa; Rusell; Fon; Ataubo; Kofete; Ngepah; Lobuin; Ngwanyam).

Furthermore, there is also the psychological factor at play. The youth in particular, are sceptical of civil society leaders or activists who have suffered from frequent incarcerations as a result of their political activism. Therefore, many of the youth are reluctant to listen or adhere to the messages from these activists because they are afraid of going through the same ordeal as them (interviews: Jayceon; Alejandro). With the high unemployment in the country, others are scared of either not being employed or fired by the relevant authorities as a result of their participation in political activities that threaten the interests of the authorities (interviews: Atumo; Kemende; Alejandro). Therefore, the impoverishment of people “inhibits their participation in political activities” (interview: Rusell). As a result, for Kemende (interview), “civil society organisations are vulnerable because they cannot actually call civil strife easily”. Their vulnerability, as pointed out in chapter two, is largely attributed to the erosion of their material bases of support resulting from the prolonged economic crisis that gripped the continent from the early 1980s. Therefore, Moye (interview) noted that in a country such as Cameroon characterised by widespread poverty, “we cannot talk of democracy”.

5.6 The internal organisation and structure of CSOs

As pointed out in chapter one, a democratic state can only be sustained by a democratic civil society. However, it emerged from the interviews that some CSOs in Cameroon are characterised by anti-democratic practices. These include unelected presidents and executive members, unspecified tenures, as well as ‘life’ presidents/coordinators with indefinite mandates. Some of the CSOs in this category include the WaCameroon, the CHRAPA, A Common Future, and COMINSUD (interviews: Fon; Shuazieh; Gwain; McKenzie; Atumo; Chongsi; Kisob). Therefore, the leaders of the majority of

139

Cameroonian CSOs “don’t accept power alternation” (interview: Ngepah). Ngepah added that “they don't have the democratic will to accept democratic change”. As a result, the leadership of CSOs is prone to be among other things, nonliberal, gerontocratic, extremely patriarchal and hierarchical, and therefore, inclined to adopt undemocratic values (see chapter two). Consequently, as contended by Moye (interview), some leaders consider their organisations as exclusively belonging to them. In other words, the CSOs are managed as their private property (interview: Moye). These democratic shortcomings undermine the integrity and reliability, as well as the moral authority of CSOs in terms of championing the democratic cause. This, as indicated above, alienates the population and compromises the broad-base support for CSOs.

However, the democratic weaknesses of Cameroonian CSOs can be construed as a lack of democratic culture in the country epitomised in the Biya regime which has now permeated societal organisations and has become ingrained in society. Therefore, the internal organisation and structure of CSOs are no different from that of Biya’s regime which compromise their ability to sustain a democratic state.

5.7 The role of informal groups in Cameroon’s democratic process

The role of informal groups in Cameroon’s democratic process such as mass protests/demonstrations that this study has addressed (as indicated above), also emerged from the interviews. As alluded to earlier, most of the subtle transformative activities in Africa such as spontaneous mass protests occur at the periphery or outside of formal organisational life but are easily ignored or dismissed as non-civic. Rusell and Kemende (interviews) noted that mass protests/demonstrations in Cameroon are mostly sporadic. According to Rusell, “most civil society organisations seem to go back into their low profiles when there is nothing to militate about”. In other words, mass protests/demonstrations only occur “when an issue arises” and this creates the perception that CSOs “are issue-oriented” (interview: Rusell). They “just come up during crisis and disappear” (interview: Moye). Examples are the mass protests/demonstrations witnessed in the ongoing anglophone/francophone crisis led by the outlawed CACSC (interviews:

140

Lakinyu; Zayden; Tatah; Rusell; Moye; Afu; Kemende; Rhett; Easton; Njei).63 Kemende also observed that “when the pockets of civil society organisations run dry, they run out of steam”. This implies that sustained pressure in the form of spontaneous mass protests/demonstrations which as indicated above, is vital to effect democratic reform, is compromised. However, Rusell argued that the sporadic nature of the mass protests/demonstrations is strategic. In his view, it allows the leaders of the protests to “go underground until things cool down” especially with the clamping down on civil society activities by the regime. He added that “when the dust settles”, they “come back strongly” (interview: Rusell). A contrary view held by Shuazieh and Afu (interviews) is that the activities of most CSOs are consistent. For example, Afu, the president of the PEATTU, North West region, maintained that his organisation holds statutory meetings regularly during which its activities are planned and the strategies to execute and evaluate them are discussed. These activities he further claimed, are carried out “on a consistent basis” (interview: Afu).

Against the backdrop of the hostile environment noted above, several respondents (both the representatives of CSOs and independent analysts) maintained that CSOs have changed their tactics concerning the role played in the democratic process from militancy (including demonstrations and protest marches) in the early 1990s led by NCOPA (see chapter three) to more subtle methods such as the use of social media, as well as lobbying and advocacy (interviews: Ngepah; Shuazieh; McKenzie; Gwain; Rusell; Moye; Chongsi; Kemende; Atumo; Gaby). This change of strategy is largely influenced by the fact that CSOs realised that they cannot carry on with the same militant strategy, while harmless civilians are being killed by armed officers (as indicated above, particularly in terms of the law on terrorism) (interview: Moye). Rusell (interview) further argued that adopting the same tactics will not yield similar results like before, “because the rock has

63 The outlawed Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) as mentioned above, composed of teachers’ trade unions and lawyers’ associations formed in December 2016 to champion the anglophone cause (International Crisis Group, 2017).

141 become unshakable”. In other words, the regime has firmly entrenched itself (interview: Rusell).64 This change in tactics has been particularly evident in the current anglophone/francophone problem. According to Moye (interview), the government has been puzzled and embarrassed about the significant role of social media in the anglophone/francophone crisis. It has been the main medium of communication in terms of the ‘dead towns/cities’65 operations that characterise the crisis (interviews: Ngepah; Moye). Consequently, the government shut down the internet for 93 days (January to April 2017) in the two anglophone regions (North West and South West). However, as Ngepah (interview) noted, this strategy is deficient in the sense that it lacks a physical coordinator.

Concerning lobbying, CSOs communicate with the government by means of engagements and discussions (interviews: Gaby; Kemende). However, according to Kemende, this strategy is not very effective in the Cameroon context because the autocratic regime ignores communiques, unlike demonstrations/protest marches, which can expose the shortcomings of the government to the national and international media. Therefore, in his opinion, “there is nothing intimidating” in the correspondences of CSOs since the regime is aware that “they cannot carry their intimidation in those letters through” (interview: Kemende). Holding a similar view, Moye (interview) alleged that the strategy is ineffective largely because “most Cameroonian civil society organisations do not have what it takes to influence policy unlike in the advanced country where powerful civil society organisations hold the government ransom”. He argued that they are deficient in terms of capability and capacity such as the required networks, confidence, qualification, and money as mentioned above. Consequently, in his opinion, “the regime decides to do what it wants” (interview: Moye). Therefore, on the question about the strategies employed by CSOs in challenging the government, as maintained in chapter one, they are largely ineffective in alleviating the socio-economic and political problems facing the country. The above discussion thus, provides possible explanations for the ineffectiveness.

64 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the present regime has been in power for about 35 five years. 65 As pointed out in chapter three, these are “ghost” cities because of a shutdown of activities by CSOs that are protesting.

142

Due to the defects of the current strategies adopted by CSOs as indicated above, as well as the lack of an enabling environment alluded to earlier, it is not surprising that they are mostly engaged in ‘soft’ (less contentious) policy issues that demand less political wrangles with the authorities. Therefore, they shy away from the contentious democratic issues as demonstrated in the subsequent section, which is also based on the interviews that were conducted.

5.8 The role played by civil society organisations in the democratic process

Interviewees were also asked to highlight some issues that CSOs have addressed over the years. They disclosed that some of the roles played by CSOs in the democratic process in Cameroon since 1992 include: enhancing the electoral process; promoting women's rights and participation in politics; fostering land governance and championing the rights of detainees and the vulnerable. These functions are elaborated on below.

5.8.1 Enhancing the electoral process

One of the areas where Cameroonian CSOs have been making efforts to counter the deterioration of democracy is the electoral process. Some political democracy-advocating CSOs such as CHRAPA and A Common Future have been sensitising the citizens to their civic right to register for elections and vote (interviews: Chongsi; Gwain; Njondad).66 This is essential since many Cameroonians “don't believe that change can come to Cameroon through the ballot box because of the entrenched and dictatorial regime of the many years of President Paul Biya”. Therefore, it was expected that the sensitisation would engender a high voter turnout resulting in “power changing hands in 2018 through the ballot box” (interview: Gwain). As pointed out in chapter two, the sensitisation of citizens about their democratic rights and obligations is particularly relevant in Africa where the majority of

66Compared to the previous presidential election in 2011 which witnessed a voter turnout of 68.28%, the 2018 presidential election indicated a voter turnout of 53.85%, representing a drop of 14.43% (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2019).

143 the populace are not benefiting from the democratic system. Therefore, many people chose not to participate in elections (Dulani, 2004:13). Civil society thus, becomes vital in promoting the voluntary participation of citizens in political processes which is central to the functioning of a healthy democracy (especially when elections are not flawed) (Diamond, 1994:8). However, Ngepah (interview), alleged that some Pentecostal churches in Cameroon deter their members from registering and participating in the electoral process which compromises their civic rights. Notwithstanding, this can be interpreted as a way by the churches to convey their distrust in the elections which have always been flawed (see chapter four). However, as alluded to earlier, the usual political and social conservatism of these new groups of churches typified by the political apathy among their members or the general tendency to be passive towards temporal authority, contrasts starkly with the political liberalism of their orthodox counterparts.

In an attempt to guard against vote rigging, a number of CSOs such as A Common Future have been advising the electorate to stay behind after voting to participate in the counting process (interview: Gwain). Similarly, COMINSUD, NWADO, and CHRAPA, as well as the Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda have been organising seminars and workshops for the training of members regarding the electoral process and election observation. These organisations, as well as A Common Future, have also been involved in election monitoring with most of the members discharging their duties voluntarily (interviews: Shuazieh; Njondad; Fon; Gwain; Tatah; McKenzie; Chongsi; Kisob; Landon). As pointed out in chapter four, information on democratic processes is crucial to attributing responsibility which leads to the realisation of other basic elements of accountability such as justification and compensation/punishment. However, in the course of elaborating on the issues discerned in the previous elections in Cameroon, Njondad disclosed that his organisation (NWADO) shies away from this responsibility. Therefore, he affirmed that NWADO often fails to inform the population about the evaluation of the electoral process since it is a contentious issue (interview: Njondad).

Notwithstanding, most representatives of democracy-advocating CSOs among others interviewed, maintained that election reports are usually provided, and recommendations

144 are made at the end of every election monitoring exercise. These reports, they asserted, are handed to the appropriate authorities for consideration. However, they claimed that their suggestions are usually overlooked (interviews: Gwain; Tatah; Chongsi; Landon; Njondad; Shuazieh). According to Tatah (interview), this is as far as the CSOs “can reach and no more”. This raises doubts about their impact on the electoral process as illustrated in terms of the electoral deficiencies noted in the previous chapter.

5.8.2 Promoting women's rights and participation in politics

A second aspect that was spontaneously mentioned by the interviewees when asked about the efforts made by CSOs in promoting democracy in Cameroon was the promotion of women’s rights and their participation in politics. As contended by Tatah (interview), women in Cameroon “are still considered as second-class citizens and … their rights are not fully being taken care of”. Therefore, Gwain and Atumo (interviews) noted that several regional political CSOs have been involved in promoting women’s rights and participation in politics. In terms of the latter, they asserted that these CSOs have been empowering women to hold elective positions (interviews: Gwain; Atumo). In this regard, McKenzie (interview), a member of the WaCameroon, based in the North West region, maintained that her organisation has been facilitating workshops which focus on the role of women in the electoral process and sensitising women to “be councillors and not only be hand clappers during political campaign rallies” (interview: McKenzie). Likewise, COMINSUD, another regional organisation based in the North West region, has adopted the ‘yellow ribbon campaign’ for more women councillors and advocating for gender balance concerning the electoral list (interviews: Shuazieh; Fon). Gender inclusiveness, as pointed out earlier, is a cardinal democratic principle. These efforts yielded fruits as the number of women councillors in the region rose from 16% in the 2007 election to 27% in the 2013 election (interview: Fon).

Concerning the promotion of women’s rights, McKenzie (interview) declared that her organisation (see above) has been working with traditional rulers who are stewards of laws that are cruel to and discriminatory against girls and women. These laws she

145 claimed, foster horrific practices such as ‘breast ironing’67 and female genital mutilation. As a result, she alleged that her organisation draws the attention of the traditional rulers to international instruments that protect the rights of girls and women. The organisation also makes them aware of the negative effects of these practices. Therefore, it requests the traditional chiefs to revise the laws to be favourable to the girls and women. Just like the case with promoting women’s participation in politics, she claimed that the efforts of her organisation in this regard have also yielded dividends. Several traditional rulers such as those in Guzang village in the North West region, she proclaimed, have amended some of the horrendous laws and adopted a policy document to this effect (interview: McKenzie).

5.8.3 Promoting land governance

A further contribution to the democratic process which was mentioned by a number of interviewees such as Shuazieh and Fon of COMINSUD is in terms of land governance which deals with the rights to land particularly concerning the vulnerable in society. The common practice in Cameroon is that large firms, with the consent of the authorities, grab huge pieces of land belonging to the people (interviews: Fon; Shuazieh; Tatah). According to some interviewees, this phenomenon is quite noticeable in the Littoral region which is suitable for palm plantations (interviews: Shuazieh; Fon). Therefore, Fon asserted that his organisation (COMINSUD) has been active in the affected communities and sensitising the people to land grabbing, as well as their rights and responsibilities in this regard. For example, it empowers the leaders of the communities in terms of the necessary procedure for bargaining land transactions with investors (interview: Shuazieh). Due to this empowerment, Shuazieh noted that the leaders are able to negotiate from a position of strength. Consequently, “these companies have realised that actually they cannot fulfil the benefits of the people” and most of them are staying away

67 ‘Breast ironing’ is a custom in Cameroon whereby the chests of young girls are massaged with hot tools such as pestles and spatulas in an effort to squash their developing breast. The intention is to make their bodies less attractive to boys or men and therefore, postpone their maiden sexual relationships. The custom is engendered by parents’ fear that the girls may become pregnant and unable to complete their education (Paré, 2015).

146 from their land (interview: Shuazieh). Nonetheless, he added that this intervention by his organisation (COMINSUD), usually brings it into conflict with the authorities who have a stake in the land deals (interview: Shuazieh).

5.8.4 Championing the rights of detainees and the vulnerable

A fourth area which interviewees highlighted that Cameroonian democracy-advocating CSOs have been striving to promote democracy in the country is in terms of championing the rights of detainees and the vulnerable in society. For example, the FGI, CHRAPA, and the CBA, provide free paralegal services or legal aid to detainees (interviews: Gaby; Kisob; Ataubo). As pointed out in chapter two, these services are crucial, particularly to helpless individuals who cannot have prompt and easy access to the courts. According to Gaby (interview) of the FGI, the legal assistance has helped “to release people who were locked up for crimes they did not commit”. A case in point as indicated by Ataubo (member of the CBA), is the legal assistance that was rendered by anglophone lawyers to those who were detained in Buea and Yaoundé due to the anglophone/francophone crisis that erupted in 2016. Similarly, several CSOs such as the Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda as well as CHRAPA, pay impromptu visits to prison and detention centres to ascertain whether inmates are held in humane conditions (interviews: Landon; Kisob; Chongsi; Tufon). Human rights as emphasised in chapter three are fundamental to democracy. Therefore, the above-mentioned CSOs, among other things, seek to ensure that children and adults or males and females are not held together in the same cell (interview: Kisob).

Furthermore, CSOs such as the WaCameroon are engaged in juvenile justice by identifying juvenile offenders in detention and designing projects that serve as an alternative to detention. In terms of these projects, Atumo (interview), the Human Rights Officer of WaCameroon, pointed out that the juveniles are removed from the detention centres to borstal homes where they undergo counselling. She added that “the idea is getting the children out of the detention centres because when they are there, they get worse”. Therefore, in her opinion, the projects aim at permitting the adolescent

147 delinquents to undergo reformation through counselling, as well as getting them back to school or busy with some fruitful activities (interview: Atumo). Similarly, Kisob and Gaby (interviews) pointed out that also their organisations, CHRAPA and the FGI respectively, intervene to defend the children whose rights have been abused such as being victims of rape. In such situations, they provide free services such as guidance and psycho-social rehabilitation, as well as bringing the perpetrators to book. However, they alleged that most of the perpetrators are not punished when taken to court, which points to the inefficiency of the judiciary (interviews: Kisob; Gaby). Kisob (interview) furthermore maintained that his organisation is involved in radio programmes which educate children about their rights and what to do when their rights are violated.

Closely linked to the above is the right to internet access which some local CSOs such as A Common Future is promoting, particularly in terms of the common people who are the most vulnerable to suffer in this regard. According to Sandle (2016), denying anyone access to the internet constitutes a violation of human rights. However, as mentioned above, the inhabitants of the two anglophone regions were deprived of internet access for 93 days due to the anglophone/francophone crisis that is plaguing the country. As a result, the Executive Director of A Common Future, Gwain (interview), disclosed that his organisation is engaged in digital rights and educating the public about their right to access the internet which in his words “the government has no right to shut down”. His organisation he added, also informs the people about the importance of internet access to fostering democratic governance (interview: Gwain). In addition, as argued by Gwain (interview), Cameroonian CSOs “cannot function without the internet” since “they cannot liaise with their partners abroad”.

5.8.5 Promoting peace

Cameroon is characterised by a number of conflicts, which not only include ethnic conflict but, more seriously at national level the deepening of the anglophone/francophone conflict, which resulted during the period of the interviews in December 2017 to January 2018 (see above). Given this volatile situation, the role of civil society intervening in these

148 conflicts was also raised during the interviews. Several CSOs in Cameroon such as COMINSUD and CHRAPA have been engaged in promoting peace by intervening in national, ethnic and family conflicts (interviews: Fon; Shuazieh; Kisob). The respect for opposing viewpoints, moderation, tolerance, and a willingness to compromise are indispensable to the fostering of a democratic culture (see chapter two). At national level, some religious groups such as the Roman Catholic Church have been seeking ways to resolve the anglophone/francophone crisis (interviews: Ngepah; Fon; Tatah; Shuazieh). In addition, the Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Episcopal Conference composed of anglophone Bishops submitted a couple of documents to the presidency which highlighted the problem, condemned the resultant human rights abuses and proposed solutions. However, at the time of the interview, no reaction had been received from the presidency and this has prompted the Bishops to release the documents to the public (interview: Tatah). Furthermore, several respondents confirmed that some Bishops requested the incumbent President Biya not to contest the October 2018 presidential election for the sake of peace and, further, to take the appropriate steps to resolve the anglophone/francophone crisis (interviews: Rusell; Fon; Ngepah). Traditional societies such as the Takembeng also demonstrated during the recent political upheavals and invoked the ancestors to intervene in the crisis to bring peace to the country (interviews: Gawum; Ngwa). CSOs such as COMINSUD, have also intervened in ethnic conflicts in an attempt to mediate between warring factions (interview: Fon). A case in point is the conflict between the Oku and Mbesa villages. COMINSUD also arbitrated in disputes between the farmers and grazers (interview: Shuazieh). One way that the problem was addressed was by demarcating land for farming and grazing to enhance harmonious cohabitation (interviews: Shuazieh; Tatah).

5.8.6 Keeping the government in check

A sixth domain that interviewees spontaneously mentioned concerning the efforts being made by CSOs to further the democratic process in Cameroon is in terms of keeping the government in check. A particular issue raised by the FGI and CHRAPA is the fact that the government does not fully adhere to international agreements. In this regard, these

149 organisations have been striving for the respect of these agreements by the government (interviews: Gaby; Chongsi). According to Gaby, there is the “need to re-awaken that spirit in the government to take responsibility of the engagements it has taken at the international and regional levels”. Cameroon is a signatory to several international human rights instruments (see chapter four). However, the government is unaware “that one of the main sources of national law are human rights international instruments” (interview: Chongsi). Consequently, CHRAPA is fighting “hard to force through their throats human rights issues” (interview: Chongsi). Similarly, the FGI is taking the government to task concerning the international agreements it has ratified. Illustrative of this commitment, the FGI (a national CSO) dragged the government to the International Court at the Hague. This was due to the failure of one of its agents to respect international conventions that the government had signed (interview: Gaby). As alleged by Gaby, “a little girl was raped and the magistrate threw out the case”. Therefore, the FGI had to intervene to remind the government of the pledges it made at the regional and international levels to protect and respect the rights of all its citizens (interview: Gaby).

Other national CSOs such as CHRAPA, partner with several international organisations in terms of holding the government in check (interview: Chongsi). In the interview with Chongsi, he mentioned that CHRAPA is in a unique situation since it can speak out both at home and at the different UN structures such as the Human Rights Council against the violation of international human rights conventions by the government. He added that if the organisation (CHRAPA) cannot be vocal at home because of the clamping down on the activities of CSOs by the regime (see above), it provides the information to other partner international organisations within or outside the country to talk on its behalf. Therefore, in his view, networks are crucial to the effective functioning of CSOs (interview: Chongsi). However, as demonstrated above, the establishment of local networks seems to be problematic in the Cameroonian context.

It can be deduced from the above discussion that a few CSOs are making an effort to hold the government accountable. This is in line with horizontal accountability which, as alluded to earlier, demands the existence of auxiliary groups that are autonomous from

150 the government in order to enhance the practice of checks and balances. Notwithstanding, according to a variety of international indices, Cameroon rates low on meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law and accountability (see chapter four).

5.8.7 Promoting governance-related issues

Several interviewees, for example, Fon and Shuazieh when underlining the contributions of CSOs to the democratic process, pointed out that a number of CSOs such as COMINSUD have been involved in fostering governance-related issues at local level in Cameroon. In this regard, it empowers the population in terms of tracking the budget of their local councils. This is in line with vertical accountability which, as pointed out earlier, compels the elected political officials to provide answers to the electors for their political actions whenever required. Budget tracking empowers the populace “to question aspects of quality, efficiency and effectiveness of governance, thus promoting accountability” and enhancing participation in governance. Therefore, COMINSUD trains community members to monitor projects and public investment budgets allocated to their councils. It also works with several councils concerning what is referred to as the ‘perception index’. This national community development programme (PNDP) assesses the level of satisfaction of the population in terms of specific government or council services provided to them such as in the areas of education, water supply and health (interviews: Fon; Shuazieh). Fundamental to a democratic polity is the capacity of government to fulfil the desires of the citizens by implementing policies that are consistent with their demands. This typifies representation ‘in action’ (Morlino, 2004:20-21). Consequently, COMINSUD provides feedback to the councils concerning the assessment conducted which assists the councils in aligning their services with the needs of the people (interviews: Shuazieh: Fon).

Similarly, in the course of elaborating on the role played by CSOs in promoting democracy in Cameroon, Gaby maintained that the FGI is making efforts to combat corruption. As pointed out in the previous chapter, bribery and corruption are rampant in Cameroon. Consequently, the FGI in partnership with CONAC, is involved in the fight against

151 corruption. The FGI represents CONAC in the North West region and probes into corruption issues. It also trains stakeholders in the region such as chiefs of services, senators, parliamentarians and mayors, as well as members of the private sector such as heads of corporations on how to check corruption. The organisation also participates in evaluating the effectiveness of the battle against corruption in the region and offers recommendations (interview: Gaby).

The above discussion reveals that a number of CSOs are striving to promote good governance in Cameroon. This is particularly in terms of budget tracking, service delivery and combatting corruption. However, as alluded to earlier, the fight against corruption is far from producing the desired results.

5.9 Conclusions

This chapter is based on the 42 interviews that were conducted for this study. Given the former active role of CSOs in the country’s transition to a multiparty system, the aim of the study is to establish whether CSOs in Cameroon are challenging the government concerning the various democratic shortcomings in the country. This chapter focused on the perceptions of the interviewees on several issues which have a bearing on the functioning of CSOs in the country. The main questions addressed in this chapter were whether approximately 25 years after the first multiparty elections CSOs are playing a role in championing political reforms and, if not, what the reasons are for their lack of commitment to the democratic future of the country.

The chapter showed that the president and his government have considerable influence on the ability of CSOs to effectively play their role in the democratic process. The government employs a variety of tactics to weaken and silence those that it regards with suspicion. On the one hand it co-opts active civil society leaders into its neo-patrimonial or patronage/clientelist networks and on the other, it clamps down on perceived anti- establishment CSOs and civil society protests. The government for example, has co- opted a number of the leaders of CSOs who were active in the early 1990s and these

152 leaders have become part of the president’s clientelistic network. Restrictions are also placed on associations such as the CBA to limit its political role. The CBA played a pivotal role in the early 1990s in the country’s transition to a multiparty system. In addition, the government also introduced repressive measures such as the law on terrorism which deters many civil society activists who had been vocal, particularly in the early 1990s.

In order to weaken existing CSOs the government has also created ‘bogus’ CSOs to counter the influence of the authentic or legitimate CSOs concerning fostering democratic governance. These ‘fictitious’ CSOs have been mandated to weaken and destroy the authentic CSOs.

A further explanation for CSOs not playing an effective role is the anglophone/francophone crisis, which is used by the government as a divide and rule tactic, which has also polarised CSOs resulting in them no longer working together. This is particularly the case with those CSOs that were very active in the early 1990s in the change to a multiparty system, such as the CBA, the students’ unions at tertiary level as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church. The divide and rule tactic of the government underlines the control of CSOs by the Biya regime and the manner in which it exploits the anglophone/francophone division which constrains CSOs to challenge the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country.

Another method of control at a different level is the required government procedures to be met in order to establish new CSOs, which seems to be a further method by the government to restrict the establishment of CSOs that might challenge the government in one way or the other.

Given the above obstructive and hostile environment in which CSOs in Cameroon operate, CSOs hardly play a role in championing political reforms. CSOs mostly work at micro-level within the system. They are concerned with their own parochial organisational goals which can be termed as ‘soft’ (less contentious) issues that demand less political wrangles with the authorities and do not threaten the Biya regime. They do not engage in

153 broader (national) contentious democratic issues that entail questioning the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country. In other words, they do not see themselves as playing a role in criticising the government concerning the undemocratic elements associated with it. Furthermore, they have changed their tactics concerning the role played in the democratic process from militancy in the early 1990s (demonstrations and protest marches) to more subtle methods such as the use of social media, as well as lobbying and advocacy. This change of strategy is largely influenced by the fact that CSOs realised that they could not carry on with the same militant strategies and risk their lives in doing so. Besides the inherent shortcomings of these strategies, many leaders of CSOs are also perceived to lack leadership skills. Consequently, they then also shy away from addressing contentious democratic issues.

Although CSOs do not confront the Biya government with demands for political change, they are involved in less contentious political issues. For instance, in terms of the electoral process, they have been either sensitising the citizens to their civic right to register for elections and vote, while some have also been involved in election monitoring. However, their role in election monitoring has been limited to the writing of reports and making recommendations which raises doubts about their impact on the electoral process. They are also involved in promoting women’s rights and promoting the participation of women in politics as well as in land governance which deals with the rights to land, particularly concerning the vulnerable in society. Other areas where CSOs have been engaged include: championing the rights of detainees and the vulnerable in society; promoting juvenile justice and the right to internet access; promoting peace by intervening in national and ethnic conflicts; holding the government accountable, particularly in terms of the international agreements it has ratified and promoting good governance such as empowering the population concerning budget tracking and enhancing service delivery; as well as making efforts to fight corruption.

The above issues pursued by CSOs do not threaten the regime or the political status quo. As a result, the regime has provided the political space for them to engage in these 'soft' (less contentious) issues since, it can be argued, this serves to legitimise the

154 government’s authority and gives it the semblance of a ‘functional’ hybrid regime. However, the government at the same time initiates restrictive and repressive measures aimed at keeping the CSOs passive, thereby thwarting any endeavours which may engender far-reaching democratic reforms and destabilise the political status quo.

Furthermore, it seems like the ongoing anglophone/francophone crisis overshadows the lack of democracy in the country as the focus now is on resolving the problem. It also negatively impacts on the endeavours of CSOs to challenge the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country.

155

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

This study assessed the role of Cameroon’s democracy-advocating CSOs (both formal institutions and informal groupings) in promoting democracy since the first multiparty presidential and legislative elections held in 1992 (mindful of their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system). In other words, it sought to establish whether approximately 25 years after the first multiparty elections CSOs are playing a role in championing political reforms and if not, to ascertain the reasons for their lack of commitment to the democratic future of the country.

In order to establish the current role of CSOs in promoting democracy in Cameroon, the study focused on various aspects, which in general has a bearing on the functioning and advocacy of CSOs as highlighted in the literature. These aspects also served as the analytical framework for this study, namely: ‐ The status and leadership of CSOs ‐ The relationship among CSOs ‐ The internal organisation and structure of CSOs ‐ The amount of autonomy democracy-advocating CSOs have ‐ The nature of the relationship that exists between the state and democracy- advocating CSOs ‐ The sufficiency of resources (both financial and material) for the effective functioning of democracy-advocating CSOs ‐ The strategies/tactics adopted by CSOs in challenging the government (for example, the use of social media, protest marches and political advocacy/lobbying) ‐ The nature of the political environment in which CSOs have to operate ‐ The commitment of CSOs to the democratic cause

156

In order to establish the role of CSOs in addressing issues of democracy in the country the study first assessed the state of democracy in Cameroon.

Civil society in this study, refers to formal institutions such as organised groups and social movements, which are voluntarily formed and are functioning within the legitimate system to foster democratic governance and enhance collective freedoms. They also include informal groupings such as spontaneous mass protests/demonstrations that pursue or strive to address any democracy-related issue such as human and political rights, civil liberties, rule of law, government accountability and transparency as well as promoting democratic governance.

Civil society organisations, which played an important role in the political transition of Cameroon in the early 1990s include the CBA, students and workers’ unions such as the UBSU and the TAC as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church.

This was a qualitative study consisting of a literature analysis as well as 42 semi- structured personal interviews conducted from December 2017 to January 2018. Nine of these interviewees are prominent persons in the North West region, while 33 are representatives of CSOs. Due to the tense political atmosphere that characterised the interview period, it was difficult to initially gain access to some of the interviewees who were suspicious of the motive of the study and sincerity of the researcher (although a letter from the supervisor explained the academic nature of the study). However, this challenge was overcome by the use of reliable anglophone intermediaries who convinced the interviewees of the credentials of the researcher.

A limitation of this study was that the selection of respondents was restricted to the North West region where the researcher was most familiar with the political terrain and therefore, could safely navigate through the politically contentious environment. Notwithstanding this limitation, the respondents seemed to be objective and tried to be as informative as possible. After about 25 interviews, a recurrent theme began to emerge with data saturation becoming discernible, which provides a good indication of the role of

157

Cameroon’s democracy-advocating CSOs in promoting democracy since the early 1990s. The study does not claim to be representative, the aim was to gain some insight into the role and functioning of CSOs in Cameroon.

6.2 Key findings of the study

6.2.1 The state of democracy

In establishing the current state of democracy in the country elements of the maximalist definition of democracy guided the evaluation of the country’s democratic status. As stated above, it was important to evaluate the environment in which CSOs in the country are functioning. Despite the fact that most of the formal requirements for democracy are contained in Cameroon’s Constitution, in practice, it falls short of meeting any of the essential elements of a democracy, which are the prevalence of credible elections; adherence to the rule of law and accountability, media freedom and individual freedom and human rights.

Since the inception of multiparty elections in 1992 elections in Cameroon have been severely flawed despite the creation of an independent electoral commission (ELECAM) before the 2011 elections. Since the transition to multiparty elections in 1992 the president has not been defeated and has been in power for 36 years. The irregularities and manipulations that characterised the various elections over the years have been in the favour of the president and the ruling party and elections have therefore been used to sustain an authoritarian leader. A further tactic of Biya to sustain power was to abolish his presidential term limit in 2008 by changing the Constitution. Over this 36 year period in power, Biya managed to further sustain power through patronage and clientelist networks, which include the co-optation of prominent leaders of CSOs, virtually exclusive control of political appointments and state institutions and on the other hand, by punishing detractors and curtailing political dissent. Examples of such appointments are the board members and director of CONAC to investigate the pervasive corruption in the state structures in general and the public service in particular, and the head of NIFA, which is

158 supposed to monitor financial institutions and combat money laundering. CONAC is regarded by many as a political instrument to incarcerate politically aspiring bureaucrats or opponents.

Cameroon also fails in meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law and accountability and rates far below average, less than four (out of a score of 10), which is described as a “weak performance” (chapter four).

The consumption of information and news have expanded over the years largely because of the growing number of broadcast outlets, the popularisation of social media platforms and better internet access. Local media organisations, particularly trade unions, have become more vigorous in blowing the whistle on abuses suffered by journalists. This has attracted the attention of international pressure groups such as Journalists Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Likewise, social media has been very instrumental in curbing abuses against journalists. There is little restriction on citizens in terms of consuming information and news from national and international media sources of their choice. The private media has also become more daring and vocal in terms of the issues it comments and reports on. Frank live debates and bold headlines are common. However, the state-owned CRTV, radio and newspaper still dominate the local media landscape, though the government controls the media content in terms of, for example, the editorial policy and the issues that can be published. Journalists are therefore forced to practise self-censorship.

Various international press freedom indices assign below average scores to the existence of media freedom in the country. Journalists (mostly from the private media) are often subjected to intimidation, physical attack, arrest and detention from the police and army as a result of their reporting.

Since 2016, Cameroon’s anglophone regions in particular, have experienced violence and turmoil resulting in a human rights crisis. Human rights violations include unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and torture committed by the Cameroonian security forces during

159 military operations conducted in the anglophone regions. Freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, continues to be restricted throughout the country. Civil society activists, journalists, trade unionists and teachers have been arrested and some face trial before military courts.

While Biya has firmed his grip on Cameroon over the years by co-opting elites who could potentially challenge him, undermining a fragmented opposition and bending state institutions towards his own interests, it is not strange that violations of democratic principles continue unabated.

6.2.2 The role of civil society organisations in Cameroon

The Biya regime has considerable influence on the ability of CSOs to effectively play their role in the democratic process. The government employs a variety of tactics to weaken and silence those that it regards with suspicion, which results in a restrictive environment for CSOs to operate in. On the one hand, as suggested above, Biya co-opts active civil society leaders into neo-patrimonial or patronage/clientelist networks (including some of those that were active in the early 1990s), and on the other, the government clamps down on perceived anti-establishment CSOs and civil society protests. CSOs are further weakened by the creation of ‘bogus’ CSOs to counter the influence of the ‘authentic’ CSOs in fostering democratic governance.

Additionally, the anglophone/francophone crisis has created divisions within the CSOs, thus constraining CSOs to challenge the government about the democratic shortcomings in the country. This is particularly the case with the CBA, the students’ unions at tertiary level as well as religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church, which were active in the 1990s.

Required government procedures to be met in order to establish new CSOs, is another method used by the government to restrict the establishment of CSOs that might challenge the government in one way or another. The government also restricts certain

160

CSOs such as the former politically active CBA from engaging in political issues. Another way the government silences the critical voices from CSOs and suppresses dissent, is by utilising the ambiguous provisions of the anti-terrorism law, which was enacted in 2014 (see chapter three).

The above repressive environment has resulted in CSOs mostly working at micro-level within the system. They are concerned with their own parochial organisational goals which can be termed as ‘soft’ (less contentious) issues that demand less political wrangles with the authorities. In this regard, in terms of the electoral process, they have been sensitising the citizens to their civic right to register for elections and vote while some have also been involved in election monitoring. However, their role in election monitoring has been limited to the writing of reports and making recommendations, which raises doubts about their impact on the electoral process. They are also involved in, for example, promoting women’s rights and promoting their participation in politics; land rights for the vulnerable in society; championing the rights of detainees; promoting juvenile justice and the right to internet access; promoting peace by intervening in national and ethnic conflicts; holding the government accountable particularly in terms of the international agreements it has ratified; and promoting good governance such as empowering the population concerning budget tracking and enhancing service delivery as well as making efforts to curb corruption.Therefore, they are not engaged with broader (national) contentious democratic issues that threaten the regime or the political status quo. As a result, the regime has provided the political space for them to engage in these 'soft' (less contentious) issues since this serves to legitimise its authority and gives it the semblance of a ‘functional’ hybrid regime.

Furthermore, given the repressive political environment, civil society activists have changed their tactics. In fear of being detained, they no longer speak out publicly against the government or organise demonstrations and protest marches (as they did in the 1990s). At times they do engage with government officials either in person or by means of correspondence, but with little effect. Besides the inherent shortcomings of these

161 strategies, the leaders of CSOs are also handicapped in terms of their capabilities and abilities.

Lastly, it emerged from the interviews that some CSOs in Cameroon are characterised by anti-democratic practices. These include unelected presidents and executive members, unspecified tenures, as well as ‘life’ presidents with indefinite mandates. These democratic shortcomings undermine the integrity and reliability, as well as the moral authority of some CSOs in terms of championing the democratic cause and alienates the population and compromises the broad-base support for CSOs.

The democratic weaknesses of some Cameroonian CSOs can be interpreted as a lack of a democratic culture in the country epitomised in the Biya regime, which has now permeated societal organisations and has become ingrained in society. Therefore, the internal organisation and structure of some CSOs are no different from that of Biya’s regime which compromise their ability to sustain a democratic state.

6.3 Contribution to the field of study

This study’s contribution to the field of study lies at two levels. In the first instance, the study broadens academic reflection within the democratisation literature on the role of civil society in Cameroon in particular, in the post-transition period amid serious democratic shortcomings in the country over the past two decades. The second contribution lies at the broader African level where this study can provide the basis, for explaining the role of or the perceived absence of civil society in the post-transition period in other African countries with severe democratic deficiencies.

As highlighted in the literature overview (chapter one) a paucity of scholarly work exists on the role of CSOs in Cameroon in the post-transition phase, particularly since 2007. Particularly evident, is the dearth of systematic empirical studies in terms of providing an insight into why Cameroonian CSOs are ineffective in their efforts to deal with the country’s current multifarious democratic deficiencies. A further shortcoming in the

162 literature is the limited scholarly explanations for the difficulty encountered by Cameroonian CSOs in sensitising and encouraging the citizens to take collective responsibility for the fostering of democratic governance (given their former active role in the country’s transition to a multiparty system).

By means of conducting 42 personal interviews this study provided some explanation for the limited role that CSOs are playing in promoting democracy in Cameroon. It specifically highlighted the various facets of the repressive political environment on the one hand (including the variety of tactics the government employs to weaken and silence those that it regards with suspicion), and on the other, the nature of limitations related to CSOs themselves, which contribute to their failure in motivating citizens to mobilise against democratic abuses. The findings of the study are therefore based on extensive field research.

Besides the key findings of the study pertaining to CSOs and their role in Cameroon, the findings could also serve as the point of departure for future studies in other African countries with similar experiences − where once vibrant CSOs are not addressing the current violations of democracy. In addition, this study has drawn on key elements from the literature on CSOs which served as a framework for analysing the role of CSOs. These elements, which have a bearing on the functioning of CSOs, can also serve as a guideline in future studies on the same topic in other African countries. These elements include: the relation among CSOs; the relationship between CSOs and the government; the status and leadership of CSOs; the commitment of CSOs in fostering democratic governance, and the internal organisation and structure of CSOs.

163

Bibliography

The names and details of the interviewees are listed separately at the end.

Adejumobi, S., 2000. “Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of democracy”, in Nnoli, O., (ed.), Government and politics in Africa. Harare: AAPS Books. pp. 242-261.

Aeby, M. 2016. “Making an impact from the margins? Civil society groups in Zimbabwe’s interim power-sharing process”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 54(4). pp. 703- 728.

African Elections Database, 2011b. “Elections in Malawi.” Internet source, accessed 7 September 2011. Avialable at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/mw.html

African Elections Database, 2012. “Elections in Ethiopia”. Available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/et.html

African Media Barometer, 2014. “The first home grown analysis of the media landscape in Africa: Cameroon”. Available at: http://crm.misa.org/upload/web/AMB%20Cameroon%20Report%202014%20French%2 0and%20English.pdf

Afrobarometer, 2016. “An African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance in Africa”. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/online-data- analysis/analyse-online

Akokpari, J. K., 2002. “Civil Society and democracy in Lesotho: the role of leadership in the Lesotho Council of NGOs and the Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions”, in Bujra, A. and S. Buthelezi, (eds.), Leadership, civil society and democratisation in Africa: case studies from Southern Africa. Addis Ababa: DPMF. pp. 219-256.

164

Alidu, S and M. A. A. Gyekye-Jandoh, 2016. “Civil society and democratic governance in Ghana: emerging roles and challenges”, Contemporary Journal of African Studies, Vol. 4(1). pp. 1-27.

Al-Sayyid, M. K., 2000. “A clash of values: U.S. civil society aid and Islam in Egypt”, in Ottaway, M. and T. Carothers, (eds.), Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. pp. 49-73.

Amnesty International, 2016a. “Cameroon: freedom in the world 2016”. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/cameroon

Amnesty International, 2017. “Cameroon 2016/2017: report”. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/

Amodu, L. O., Usaini, S. and O. O. Ige, 2014. “The media as fourth estate of the realm”, Working Paper. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308120682_The_Media_as_Fourth_Estate_of _the_Realm

Awasom, S. Y., 2005, ‘The Vicissitudes of Cameroon civil society in the 1990s: what lessons for the Central African region?’, in E.S.D. Fomin and J. W. Forje, (eds.), Central Africa: crises, reform and reconstruction. Dakar: CODESRIA. pp. 210-222.

Ayang, M., 2017. “Anglophone crisis: is Biya waiting for midwife to deliver lasting solutions?”, The Guardian Post, No. 1317.

Bayart, J., 1986. “Civil society in Africa”, in Chabal, P., (ed.), Political domination in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 109-125.

165

Baylies, C. and M. Power, 2001. “Civil society, kleptocracy and donor agendas: what future for Africa?”, Review of African Political Economy, No. 87. pp. 5-8.

Beem, C., 1999. The necessity of politics: reclaiming American public life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bernhard, M., 1993. “Civil society and democratic transition in East Central Europe”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108(2), Summer. pp. 307-326.

Bob, C., 2011. “Civil and uncivil society”, in Edwards, M., (ed.), The oxford handbook of civil society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 209-219.

Bratton, M., 1994. Civil society and political transitions in Africa”, in Harbeson, J. W., Rothchild, D. and N. Chazan, (eds.), Civil society and the state in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. pp. 51-81.

Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle, 1994. “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa”, World Politics, Vol. 46(4). pp. 453-489.

Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle, 1997. Democratic experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brooks, H., 2004. “The Dominant-party system: Challenges for South Africa’s second decade of democracy”, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 3(2). pp. 121-153.

Bujra, A., 2002. “African civil society, democracy and development”, in Bujra, A. and S. Adejumobi, (eds.), Breaking barriers, creating new hopes: democracy, civil society and good governance in Africa. Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. pp. 23-51.

166

Bujra, A. and S. Buthelezi, 2002. “Introduction”, in Bujra, A. and S. Buthelezi, (eds.), Leadership, civil society and democratisation in Africa: case studies from Southern Africa. Addis Ababa: DPMF. pp. vii-xiv.

Cameroon Post Line, 2010. “Main corps of the armed forces”, Cameroon Post Online. Available at: http://www.cameroonpostline.com/main-corps-of-the-armed-forces/

Carothers, T. and M. Ottaway, 2000. “The burgeoning world of civil society aid”, in Ottaway, M. and T. Carothers, (eds.), Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. pp. 3-17.

Chatterjee, P., 2001. “On civil and political society in postcolonial democracies”, in Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, (eds.), Civil society: history and possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 165-178.

Cheeseman, N., 2015. Democracy in Africa: successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chipkin, I., 2002. “What civil society in South Africa?: political conceptions of the relationship between civil society and democracy”, in Bujra, A. and S. Buthelezi, (eds.), Leadership, civil society and democratisation in Africa: case studies from Southern Africa. Addis Ababa: DPMF. pp. 1-34.

Chouala, Y. A., 2007. “Cameroon: is its civil society ‘tainted’?”, in Polet, F., (ed.), The State of resistance: popular struggles in the Global South. London: Zed Books. pp. 135- 138.

Coetzee, D., 2016. “Newspapers and the fourth estate: why a free press is important for brands”, The Media Online. Available at: http://themediaonline.co.za/2016/10/newspapers-and-the-fourth-estate-the-importance- of-a-free-press-and-what-this-means-for-brands/

167

Commonwealth Observer Group, 1997. “The parliamentary elections in Cameroon, 17 May 1997: report”. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-

Management/oecd/commonwealth/governance/the-parliamentary-elections-in- cameroon-17-may-1997_9781848596092-en#.WbA4C_kjHIV

Commonwealth Observer Group, 2004. “Cameroon presidential elections, 11 October 2004: report”. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: http://www.postnewsline.com/files/Elections_cmwlth_report.pdf

Commonwealth Expert Term, 2011. “Cameroon presidential elections, 9 October 2011: report”. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news- items/documents/Cameroon%20Presidential%20Elections%202011%20Final%20Repor t.pdf

Commonwealth Expert Term, 2014. “Cameroon legislative and municipal elections, 30 September 2013: report”. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: http://www.thecommonwealth-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/governance/cameroon- legislative-and-municipal-elections-30-september-2013_9781848599079-en

Dahl, R. A., 1971. Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Derrick, J., 1992. “Cameroon: one party, many parties and the state”, Africa Insight, Vol. 22(3). pp. 165-177.

DeWiel, B., 1997. “A conceptual history of civil society: from Greek beginnings to the end of Marx”, Past Imperfect, Vol. 6. pp. 3-42.

168

Diamond, L., 1994. “Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5(3), July. pp. 4-17.

Diamond, L., 2000. “Developing democracy in Africa: African and international imperatives”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14(1). pp. 191-213.

Diamond, L., 2001. “Democracy, fat and thin”, in Clarke, P. B. and J. Foweraker, (eds.), Encyclopedia of democratic thought. London: Routledge. pp. 184-189.

Diamond, L., 2002. “Elections without democracy: thinking about hybrid regimes”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13(2), April. pp. 21-35.

Diamond, L., 2008. The spirit of democracy: the struggle to build free societies throughout the world. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC.

Dulani, B., 2004. “The elections under scrutiny: process – results – lessons”, in Ott, M., Immink, B., Mhango, B. and C. Peters-Berries, (eds.), The power of the vote: Malawi’s 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections. Zomba: Kachere Series. pp. 7-28.

Eberly, D. E., 2000. “The meaning, origins, and applications of civil society”, in Eberly, D. E., (ed.), The essential civil society reader: classic essays in the American civil society debate. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 3-29.

Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018. “Democracy Index 2017: free speech under attack”. Available at: https://lcabelheim.com/wp- content/uploads/2018/02/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf

Edwards, M., 2011. “Introduction: civil society and the geometry of human relations”, in Edwards, M., (ed.), The Oxford handbook of civil society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-14.

169

Edwards, M., 2014. Civil society. Cambridge: Polity Press.

EISA, 2015. “About EISA”. Available at: http://eisa.org.za/

Ekeh, P. P., 1992. “The constitution of civil society in African history and politics”, in Gboyega, C. A. and E. Osaghae, (eds.), Democratic transition in Africa. Ibadan: CREDU. pp. 187-212.

Electoral Integrity Project 2017, 2018. “Corruption and coercion: the year in elections 2017”. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafbe99c85dc9b/t/5aa60e298165f53 3f6462e58/1520832089983/The+Year+in+Elections+2017.pdf

Emify, K.M., 2014. “Transformative Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 18. pp. 102-122.

Eyoh, D., 1998. “Conflicting narratives of anglophone protest and the politics of identity in Cameroon”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 16(2). pp. 249-276.

Fatton, R., 1995. “Africa in the age of democratisation: the civic limitations of civil Society”, African Studies Review, Vol. 38(2), September. pp. 67-99.

Fokwang, J., 2007. “Democracy, governance and civic participation: youth involvement in civil society in Cameroon since 1990”, Africa Insight, Vol. 37(3), September. pp. 308- 326.

Fombad, C. M., 2004. “The dynamics of record-breaking endemic corruption and political opportunism in Cameroon” in Mbaku, M. and J. Takougang, (eds.), The leadership

170 challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. pp.357- 394.

Fombad, C. M. and J. B. Fonyam, 2004. “The Social Democratic Front, the opposition, and political transition in Cameroon”, in Mbaku, M. and J. Takougang, (eds.), The leadership challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. pp. 453-488.

Forje, J. W., 1999. “Building a vibrant state-civil society in Cameroon facing the changes of the new millenium”, Bulletin de l'APAD, No. 18. Available at: http://apad.revues.org/461

Forje, J. W., 2006. “The dynamics of political competition and the future of democratisation process in Cameroon: challenges and opportunities”, Educational Research and Reviews, Vol. 1(3), June. pp. 85-97.

Freedom House, 2016. “Freedom in the world 2016”. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016

Freedom House, 2017. “Freedom in the world 2017: Cameroon”. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/cameroon

Freedom House, 2018. “Freedom in the world 2018: Cameroon”. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/Cameroon

171

Freedom House, 2018a. “Freedom in the World 2018: methodology”. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018

Gaffey, C., 2017. “Understanding Cameroon’s anglophone protests”, Newsweek LTD Online. Available at: http://europe.newsweek.com/cameroon-anglophone-problem-paul- biya-556151?rm=eu

Gammon, K., 2012. “What is freedom?”. Available at: https://www.livescience.com/21212-what-is-freedom.html

Ghai, K. K., 2016. “Rights of citizens: civil rights, political rights and economic rights”. Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/330518844/Rights-of-Citizens-Civil- Rights-Political-Rights-and-Economic-Rights

Gill, G., 2000. The dynamics of democratisation: elites, civil society and the transition process. London: Macmillan Press.

Goody, J. R., 2001. “Civil society in an extra-European perspective”, in Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, (eds.), Civil society: history and possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 149-164.

Gros, J., 1995. "The hard lessons of Cameroon", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3(6). pp. 112-127.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., 1994. “Associational life, civil society, and democratisation in Ghana”, in Harbeson, J. W., Rothchild, D. and N. Chazan, (eds.), Civil society and the state in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. pp. 125-148.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., 1996. “Civil society in Africa”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7(2). pp. 118-132.

172

Harbeson, J.W., 1994. “Civil society and political renaissance in Africa”, in Harbeson, J. W., Rothchild, D. and N. Chazan, (eds.), Civil society and the state in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. pp. 1-23.

Hasa, 2016. “Difference between rights and freedom”. Available at: http://pediaa.com/difference-between-rights-and-freedom/

Hearn, J., 1997. “Foreign aid, democratisation and civil society in Africa: a study of South Africa, Ghana and Uganda”, Discussion Paper 368. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Dp368.pdf

Howell, J. and J. Pearce, 2001. Civil society and development: a critical exploration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Hussein, M. K., 2009. “Opposition politics in Malawi: hopeful signs amid the warnings”, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16(3), December, First quarter. pp. 347- 369.

International Crisis Group, 2017. “Cameroon’s anglophone crisis at the crossroads”. Report No 250. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central- africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads

International Crisis Group, 2018. “Uncertainties deepen in Cameroon after divisive election”. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central- africa/cameroon/uncertainties-deepen-cameroon-after-divisive-election

173

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2019. “Election guide: Republic of Cameroon”. Available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/38/

Jayaram, N., 2005. “Civil society: an introduction to the discourse”, in Jayaram, N., (ed.), On civil society: issues and perspectives. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. pp. 15-42.

Jenkins, R., 2001. “Mistaking ‘governance’ for ‘politics’: foreign aid, democracy, and the construction of civil society”, in Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, (eds.), Civil society: history and possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 250-268.

Jobert, B., 2008. “Contending civil-society frameworks: beyond the tutelary model”, in Jobert, B. and B. Kohler-Koch, (eds.), Changing images of civil society: from protest to governance. New York: Routledge. pp. 3-15.

Jobert, B. and B. Kohler-Koch, 2008. “Changing images of civil society”, in Jobert, B. and B. Kohler-Koch, (eds.), Changing images of civil society: from protest to governance. New York: Routledge. pp. i.

John, L. and J. Comaroff, 2005. “Civil society and the political imagination in Africa”, in Hall, J. A. and F. Trentmann, (eds.), Civil society: a reader in history, theory and global politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 279-284.

Kaldor, M., 2003. “Civil society and accountability”, Journal of Human Development, Vol. 4(1). pp. 5-27.

Kaliba, M., 2014. “Toward an autonomous civil society: rethinking state-civil society relations in Zambia”, International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 16(2). pp. 5-15.

174

Kasfir, N., 1998. “The conventional notion of civil society: A critique”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 36(2). pp. 1-20.

Kasfir, N., 2004. “Civil society, the state and democracy in Africa”, in Burnell, P. and P. Calvert, (eds.), Civil society in democratisation. London: Frank Cass and Company. pp. 117-142.

Kendemeh, E., 2018. “The number of women in political positions in Cameroon is staggeringly increasing and more promotion efforts are required to add a new impetus”, AllAfrica online. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201801230613.html

Kew, D. and and M. Oshikoya, 2014. “Escape from tyranny: civil society and democratic struggles in Africa”, in Obadare, E., (ed.), The Handbook of Civil Society in Africa. New York: Springer. pp. 7-23.

Khilnani, S., 2001. “The development of civil society”, in Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, (eds.), Civil society: history and possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 11- 32.

Kiven, B., Stone, S. and R. Maclean, 2018. “Biya wins again in Cameroon as crackdown disrupts anglophone vote”. The Guardian Online. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/paul-biya-cameroon-85-year-old- president-wins-re-election-landslide

Konings, P., 1996. “Le ‘probléme anglophone’ au Cameroun dans les années 1990” (“The ‘anglophone problem’ in Cameroon in the 1990s”), Politique Africaine, Vol. 62. pp. 25-34.

Konings, P. and F. B. Nyamnjoh, 1997. “The anglophone problem in Cameroon”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35(2). pp. 207-229.

175

Konings, P. and F. B. Nyamnjoh, 2004. “President Paul Biya and the ‘anglophone problem’ in Cameroon”, in Mbaku, M and J. Takougang, (eds.), The leadership challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. pp.191-234.

Krieger, M., 1994. “Cameroon’s democratic crossroads, 1990-4”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32(4). pp. 605-628.

Ligny, B., 2011. “The DRC 50 years after Dag Hammarskjöld’s death: a tribute and a current assessment”, New Routes, Vol. 2. pp. 44.

Maina, W., 1998. “Kenya: the state, donors and the politics of democratisation”, in Rooy, A. V., (ed.), Civil society and the aid industry. London: Earthscan publications Limited. pp. 134-167.

Makara, S., 2010. “Deepening democracy through multipartyism: the bumpy road to Uganda’s 2011 Elections”, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 2. pp. 81-94.

Mamdani, M., 1995. “A critique of the state and civil society paradigm in Africanist studies”, in Mamdani, M. and E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, (eds.), African studies in social movements and democracy. Dakar: CODESRIA. pp. 602-616.

Mamdani, M., 1996. Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Matti, S. A., 2010. “The Democratic Republic of the Congo? Corruption, Patronage, and Competitive Authoritarianism in the DRC”, Africa Today, Vol. 56(4). pp. 42-61.

Mbaku, J. M., 2002. “Cameroon’s stalled transition to democratic governance: lessons for Africa’s new democrats”, Africa and Asian Studies, Vol. 1(3). pp. 125–163.

176

Mbamalu, S., 2017. “Cameroon: anglophone activists charged with terrorism face death penalty”, This is Africa Online. Available at: https://thisisafrica.me/cameroon-anglophone- activists-charged-terrorism-face-death-penalty/

M’boge, F. and S. G. Doe, 2004. “African commitments to civil society engagement: a review of eight NEPAD countries”. African Human Security Initiative.

Mbuagbo, O. T. and C. N. Fru, 2003. “Civil society and democratisation: the Cameroonian experience”, Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol. 18(2), July. pp. 133-148.

Mbuagbo, O. T. and R. M. Akoko, 2004. “Roll-back: democratisation and social fragmentation in Cameroon”, Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 13(1). pp. 1–12.

McIntyre, P., (ed.), 2011. The Europa World Year Book 2011. London: Routledge.

Meinhardt, H. and N. Patel, 2003. “Malawi’s process of democratic transition: An analysis of political developments between 1990 and 2003”, Occasional papers. Lilongwe: Konrad- Adenauer- Stiftung.

Mkandawire, T., 2010. “Aid, accountability, and democracy in Africa”, Social Research, Vol. 77(4). pp. 1149-1182.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018. “The 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Cameroon”. Available at: http://iiag.online/

Moki, E. K., 2018. “Cameroon seeks greater female political participation”, VOA online. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-seeks-greater-female-political- participation/4264003.html

Monga, C., 1995. “Civil Society and Democratisation in Francophone Africa”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33(3). pp. 359-379.

177

Monga, C., 1996. The anthropology of anger: civil society and democracy in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Monga, C., 2009. “Uncivil societies: a theory of sociopolitical change”. The World Bank, Mukute, M. and J. Taylor, 2013. “Struggles for systems that nourish: Southern Africa civil society contributions and challenges to the creation of flourishing societies, Development in Practice, Vol. 23(5-6). pp. 609-616.

Morlino, L., 2004. “What is a ‘good’ democracy?”, Democratisation, Vol. 11(5). pp. 10-32.

Morse, Y. L., 2012. “Review article: the era of electoral authoritarianism”, World Politics, Vol. 64(1), January. pp. 161–198.

Morse, Y. L., 2018. “Presidential power and democratization by elections in Africa”, Democratization, Vol. 25 (4), pp. 709-727.

Moye, G. B., 2018. Head of department, lecturer, Department of Political Science, the University of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 22 January 2018.

Mustafa, R., 2017. “Cameroon anglophone activists plead not guilty to terrorism”, Africa Metro Online. Available at: http://www.africametro.com/central-africa/cameroon-anglophone-activists- plead-not-guilty-terrorism

Namakula, C. S., 2016. “The efficacy of presidential term limits in Africa”, Discussion Paper, Mandela Institute for Development Studies Youth Dialogue, 3-4 August 2016, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Available at: https://minds-africa.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/08/2a.-MINDS-2016-Youth-Dialogue-Discussion-Paper_Term- Limits_Catherine-Namakula.pdf

178

Ndeh, M. S., 2011. “Election cacophony in Cameroon: reading the frustrations of an oppressed electorate 1990-2007”, Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights, Vol. 5(1). pp. 71-93.

NDI, 1993. “An assessment of the October 11, 1992 election in Cameroon”. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/060_cm_assessment.pdf

Nduwimana, F., 2004. “African civil society: prospects for raising awareness on priority issues”. Partnership Canada Africa. Available at: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/pdf

Ngoh, V. J., 2004. “Biya and the transition to democracy”, in Mbaku, M. and J. Takougang, (eds.), The leadership challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. pp. 427-451.

Ngolle, E. N., 1996. “Democratisation and multipartism in Cameroon: challenges and prospects”. Available at: http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:22460/eth-22460- 01.pdf

Niblock, T., 2005. “Civil society in the Middle East”, in Choueiri, Y. M., (ed.), A companion to the history of the Middle East. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. 486-503.

Nkoum-Me-Ntseny, L. M., 1996. “Dynamique de positionnement anglophone et libéralisation politique au Cameroun: de l’identité à l’identification” (“The dynamic of anglophone positioning and political liberalisation in Cameroon: from identity to identification”), Polis, Vol. 1. pp. 68-100.

Nkwachukwu, O., 2003. “‘Conventional’ notion of civil society, international civil society organisations and the development of civil society in Africa”, Paper presented at the International Civil Society Forum at Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 8 – 9 September 2003.

179

Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267993221_%27Conventional%27_Notion_of _Civil_Society_International_Civil_Society_Organisations_and_the_Development_of_Ci vil_Society_in_Africa

Nkwi, W. G., 2006. “The dilemma of civil society in Cameroon since 1990: which way forward?”, African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9(1&2). pp. 91-96.

Norton, A. R., 2005. “Pockets and deficits of civility in the Middle East”, in Hall, J. A. and F. Trentmann, (eds.), Civil society: a reader in history, theory and global politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 275-279.

Nyambo, T. J., 2008. “The legal framework of civil society and social movement in Cameroon”. Available at: http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Chapter_2.pdf

Nyamnjoh, F. B., 2002. “Cameroon: over twelve years of cosmetic democracy”, News from Nordic African Institute, No. 3, October. pp. 5–8.

Obadare, E., 2011. “Revalorizing the political: towards a new intellectual agenda for African civil society discourse”, Journal of Civil Society, Vol. 7(4). pp. 427-442.

Olukoshi, A. O., 1998. “The democracy debate in Africa – an outline”, in Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., Olukoshi, A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, (eds.), Towards a new partnership with Africa: challenges and opportunities. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. pp. 15-41.

Oommen, T. K., 2005. “Civil society: religion, caste and language in India”, in Jayaram, N., (ed.), On civil society: issues and perspectives. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. pp. 187-202.

180

Orji, N., 2009. “Civil society, democracy and good governance in Africa”, CEU Political Science Journal, Vol. 4(1). pp. 76-101.

Ottaway, M., 2000. “Social movements, professionalisation of reform, and democracy in Africa”, in Ottaway, M. and T. Carothers, (eds.), Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. pp. 77-104.

Pankhurst, D., 1998. “Striving for ‘real’ democracy in Africa: the roles of international donors and civil society in Zimbabwe”, Global Society, Vol. 12(2). pp. 197-219. Paré, G., 2015. “The victims of Cameroon's horrific breast ironing tradition”. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4wbqdj/cameroon-tradition-flattening-chests-876

Policy Review Unit, Policy Research Working Paper 4942.

Post, R. C. and N. L. Rosenblum, 2002. “Introduction”, in Rosenblum, N. L. and R. C. Post, (eds.), Civil society and government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 1- 25.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. and F. Limongi, 1996. “What makes democracies endure?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7(1). pp. 39-55.

Rakner, L., 1992. Trade unions in processes of democratisation: a study of party labour relations in Zambia. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Department of Social Science and Development.

Reporters Without Borders, 2018. “2018 World Press Freedom Index: Cameroon”. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2018

Republic of Cameroon, 1990. “Law No. 90/053 of 19 December 1990 relating to freedom of association”.

181

Republic of Cameroon, 1990a. “Law No. 90/055 of 19 December 1990 regulating public meetings and processions”.

Republic of Cameroon, 1990b. “Law No. 90/054 of 19 December 1990 relating to the maintenance of law and order”.

Republic of Cameroon, 1996. “Cameroon: Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972”. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/ihl˗nat/0/7e3ee07f489d674dc1256ae9002e3915/$FILE/Constitution %20Cameroon%20-%20EN.pdf

Republic of Cameroon, 2012. “Cameroon: Law N° 2012/001 of 19 April 2012 relating to the Electoral Code, amended and supplemented by Law N° 2012/017 of 21 December 2012”. Available at: http://www.elecam.cm/sites/default/files/Electoral_Code.pdf

Republic of Cameroon, 2014. “Law No. 2014/028 of 23 December 2014 on the suppression of acts of terrorism”.

Rosenblum, N. L. and C. H. T. Lesch, 2011. “Civil society and government”, in Edwards, M., (ed.), The oxford handbook of civil society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 285- 297.

Saberwal. S., 2005. “Democracy and civil society in India: integral or accidental?”, in Jayaram, N., (ed.), On civil society: issues and perspectives. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. pp. 110-123.

Sachikonye, L. M., 1995. “Democracy, civil society and social movements: an analytical framework”, in Sachikonye, L. M., (ed.), Democracy, civil society and the state: social movements in Southern Africa. Harare: SAPES Books. pp. 1-19.

182

Sandle, T., 2016. “UN thinks internet access is a human right”. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/un-says-internet-access-is-a-human-right-2016- 7?IR=T

Schedler, A., 2002. “The menu of manipulation”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13(2), April. pp. 36-50.

Schedler, A., 2006. “The logic of electoral authoritarianism”, in Schedler, A., (ed.), Electoral authoritarianism. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. pp. 1-23.

Schmitter, P. C. and T. L. Karl, 1991. “What democracy is …… And is not”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2(3). pp. 103-109.

Schumpeter, J. A., 1943. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Sidel, M., 2011. “Civil society and civil liberties”, in Edwards, M., (ed.), The oxford handbook of civil society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 298-310.

Takougang, J., 2004. “The nature of politics in Cameroon”, in Mbaku, M. and J. Takougang, (eds.), The leadership challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. pp. 67-92.

Takougang, J. and M. Krieger, 1998. African state and society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s political crossroads. Boulder: Westview Press.

Temngah, J. N., 2000. “Civil Society and constructive pluralism: the case of Cameroon”, paper presented during the joint Francophonie-Commonwealth International Colloquium on the theme of democracy in pluralistic societies, 24-26 January, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

183

Teshome, W. B., 2009. “Civil society and democratisation in Africa: the role of the civil society in the 2005 election in Ethiopia”, International Journal of Human and Social Sciences, Vol. 4(2). pp. 80-95.

Teshome, W., 2013. “Democracy promotion and Western aid to Africa: Lessons from Ethiopia (1991-2012)”, International Journal of Human Sciences, Vol. 10(1). pp. 993- 1049.

The Cameroon Report, 2017. “SDF MP blames President Biya for worsening of anglophone crisis”. Edition 369.

Tita, J. C., Wantchami, N. L. and H. Muluh, 2016. “Understanding Cameroon press freedom according to African Media Barometer from 2008-2014”, Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism, Vol. 6(6). pp. 1-4.

Transparency International, 2013. “Global Corruption Barometer: Cameroon”. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=cameroon

Transparency International, 2016. “Cameroon: overview of corruption and anti- corruption”. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Cameroon_20 16.pdf

Transparency International, 2016a. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015”. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015

United Nations Office at Geneva, 2017. “Human rights committee examines the report of Cameroon”. Available at: https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/C0CAF6001 193FCB6C12581C400464346?OpenDocument

184

US Department of State, 2016, “Cameroon 2016 human rights report”. Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265446.pdf

Valentini, L., 2012. “Human rights, freedom, and political authority”, Political Theory, Vol. 40(5), October. pp. 573-601.

Villadsen, K., 2016: “Michel Foucault and the forces of civil society”, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 33(3). pp 3–26.

Walzer, M., 1991. “The idea of civil society: a path to social reconstruction”, Dissent, Vol. 38(2), Spring. pp. 293-304.

Warren, M. E., 2011. “Civil society and democracy”, in Edwards, M., (ed.), The oxford handbook of civil society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 377-390.

Weis, T., 2014. “Dominant parties and the private sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: a typology of approaches”, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 8(3-4), December. pp. 263-281.

White, G., 1996. “Civil society, democratisation and development”, in Luckham, R. and G. White, (eds.), Democratisation in the South. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 178-219.

White, G., 2004. “Civil society, democratisation and development: clearing the analytical ground”, in Burnell, P. and P. Calvert, (eds.), Civil society in democratisation. London: Frank Cass. pp. 6-21.

Wood, J., 2016. “Unintended consequences: DAC governments and shrinking civil society space in Kenya”, Development in Practice, Vol. 26(5). pp 532-543.

185

World Economic Forum, 2017. “Global Competitiveness Index 2017-2018”. Available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/countryeconomy- profiles/#economy=CMR

World Justice Project, 2018. “Rule of Law Index 2017-2018”. Available at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/

Yarwood, J., 2016. “The struggle over term limits in Africa: the power of protest”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 27(3), July. pp. 51-60.

Yenshu, E., 2001, “Social movements and political parties during the Structural Adjustment Programme in Cameroon: a critical survey of some literature”, paper presented at the Third World Forum, 14-16 April, Dakar, Senegal.

Zubaida, S., 2001. “Civil society, community, and democracy in the Middle East”, in Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, (eds.), Civil society: history and possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 232-249.

Afu, S. K., 2017. President of the Presbyterian Education Authority Teachers Trade Union (PEATTU), North West Region, Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 22 December 2017.

Alejandro (pseudonym), 2018. Member of the University of Buea Students’ Union, Cameroon. Interview on 4 January 2018.

Ataubo, B. U., 2018. Lawyer, Member of the Cameroon Bar Association, based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 12 January 2018.

186

Atumo, M. A., 2018. Human Rights Officer, the Women In Action Against Gender Based Violence (WaCameroon), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 16 January 2018.

Banlilon, T. V., 2018. Registrar, Lecturer, Department of Law and Political Science, the University of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 18 January 2018.

Chongsi, J. A., 2018. Executive Director (UN permanent representative), the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy (CHRAPA), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 4 January 2018.

Easton (pseudonym), 2017. Member of the Catholic Education Workers’ Trade Union (CEWOTU), Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 20 December 2017.

Fielding, F. F., 2017. Lecturer, Department of English Law, the University of Dschang, Cameroon. Interview on 29 December 2017.

Fon, N., 2017. Coordinator of the Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 20 December 2017.

Gawum, D. N., 2018. Takembeng Member, Mankon, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 18 January 2018.

Gaby, A., 2018. Human Rights Advocate; Executive Director, the Finders Group Initiative (FGI), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 8 January 2018.

Gwain, C., 2017. Executive Director, a Common Future, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 21 December 2017.

Jayceon (pseudonym), 2018. Member of the National Polytechnic Students’ Union, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 7 January 2018.

187

Kemende, H. G., 2018. President of the Cameroon Bar Association North West Region; Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 10 January 2018.

Kisob, G., 2018. Social Worker, the Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy (CHRAPA), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 4 January 2018.

Kofete, D. C., 2018. Barrister, counsel of the Finders Group Initiative (FGI), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 19 January 2018.

Lakinyu, G., 2018. President of the Catholic Education Workers’ Trade Union (CEWOTU), Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 6 January 2018.

Landon (pseudonym), 2018. Member of the Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 11 January 2018.

Lobuin, N. K., Counsels of the Finders Group Initiative (FGI), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 19 January 2018.

Mbah, N. J., 2018. Barrister at law; Social Democratic Front (SDF) member of parliament, Cameroon; deputy speaker, Cameroon National Assembly; member CEMAC Parliament; member Pan-African Parliament. Interview on 9 January 2018.

McKenzie (pseudonym), 2018. Member of the Women in Action Against Gender Based Violence (WaCameroon), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 16 January 2018.

Moye, G. B., 2018. Head of department, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, the University of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 22 January 2018.

Ngepah, J. B., 2017. Vice Chairman and Political Adviser to the Balikumbat Electoral District of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 30 December 2017.

188

Ngong, S. J. M., 2018. Journalist, the Rambler Newspaper, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 12 January 2018.

Ngwa, B. E., 2018. Takembeng member, Mankon, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 18 January 2018.

Ngwanyam, N., 2018. Surgeon and Urologist, Saint Louis Group, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 11 January 2018.

Njei, M. E., 2018. Treasurer of the Presbyterian Education Authority Teachers’ Trade Union (PEATTU), North West Region, Based in Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 19 January 2018.

Nji, I., 2018. Mobilisation Officer, A Common Future, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 6 January 2018.

Njondad, A., 2018. Consultant, the North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 12 January 2018.

Njouny, N. M., 2018. Manager, The Fomunyoh Foundation (TFF), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 5 January 2018.

Rhett (pseudonym), 2017. Member of the Cameroon Teachers’ Trade Union (CATTU), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 28 December 2017.

Rusell (pseudonym), 2017. Journalist, Foundation Radio, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 21 December 2017.

189

Sama, E., 2018. Accountant of the Society for Initiatives in Rural Development and Environmental Protection (SIRDEP), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 16 January 2018.

Shuazieh, B., 2017. Administrator of the Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interviewed on 27 December 2017.

Songwe, M. S., 2017. CEO/President of the United Youths Organisation, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 29 December 2017.

Tata, N. P., 2018. Coordinator of the Society for Initiatives in Rural Development and Environmental Protection (SIRDEP), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 5 January 2018.

Tatah, M., 2017. Director of Communications, Archdiocese of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 19 December 2017.

Tenyeh, D. T., 2018. Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, The Fomunyoh Foundation (TFF), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 18 January 2018.

Tombir, S., 2018. Coordinator of the North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO), Bamenda, Cameroon. (Interviewed on Friday 5 January 2018.

Tufon, L. A., 2018. Coordinator of the Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, Cameroon. Interviewed on 8 January 2018.

Yani, P. D., 2018. Finance Officer of the United Youths Organisation, Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 3 January 2018.

Zayden (pseudonym), 2017. Member of the Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC), Bamenda, Cameroon. Interview on 22 December 20

190

Appendix one

A semi-structured interview guide

1. Do you think Cameroonian civil society organisations (CSOs) have fully achieved what they were fighting for in the early 1990s? 2. What are some of the major limitations with regard to democratic governance in Cameroon presently? 3. What is your organisation doing in terms of the limitations of democratic governance you have just highlighted? 4. What is or would be the reaction from the authorities when your organisation pursue some of the activities you have just highlighted? 5. How can you describe the relation between your organisation and other Cameroonian civil society organisations? 6. How can you describe the nature of relationship among Cameroonian civil society organisations? 7. Describe the commitment of Cameroonian civil society organisations in terms of fostering the interest of the masses or the common man rather than their own personal interests? 8. In your opinion, are the activities of CSOs sporadic or do they represent a consistent course? 9. Compared to the early 1990s when Cameroonian civil society organisations were more into militancy such as protest marches and demonstrations, nowadays, they seem to be more into advocacy and lobbying. If that be the case, what could be the contributory factors to this change of strategy? 10. Some scholars are of the view that compared to the early 1990s, Cameroonian civil society organisations seem not to be too vocal on issues of Democratic governance that the country is presently facing. What is your opinion on this? 11. How can you describe the commitment of the present leadership of Cameroonian civil society organisations in terms of fostering democratic governance?

191

12. There is the allegation that compared to the early 1990s, the Roman Catholic Church seem not to be too vocal nowadays on issues of Democratic governance that the country is presently facing. What is your opinion on this? 13. Some scholars are of the view that the academics in Cameroon seem not to be too vocal on issues of democratic governance that the country is presently facing. What is your opinion on this? 14. There is the allegation that compared to the early 1990s, Cameroonian civil society organisations are presently finding it difficult to galvanize the population particularly the youth on democratic issues that the country is presently facing. What is your opinion on this? 15. Compared to the early 1990s, they seem to be apathy and disillusionment from the Cameroonian population and the youth in particular to participate in the electoral process and democratic governance. If that be the case, what could be the contributory factors? 16. What is the present major present preoccupation of the Cameroonian population particularly the youth? 17. What in your opinion are the main issues that Cameroonians are presently facing? 18. What were some of the major issues that your organisation identified with the previous elections in Cameroon and what efforts were made for these issues to be addressed? 19. How can you describe the relation between your organisation and the state? 20. Is your organisation subsidised by the state? If so, does the state allow you to do or say something that you want or not to do or say something that the state want you to do? 21. Is your organisation funded by foreign donors? If that be the case, do the donors allow you to do or say something that you want or not to do or say something that they want you to do? 22. How has the law on terrorism impacted on the activities of Cameroonian civil society organisations? 23. How can you describe the structure of your organisation? In other words, how is your organisation organised?

192

24. How can you describe the composition of the board of your organisation and how do members get to the board? 25. What can be the major challenges that civil society organisations in Cameroon are presently facing in terms of promoting democratic governance?

193

Appendix two

194