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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Kuytun Reclamation Area People’S Court Criminal Verdict (2018) XPCC 0701 Crim

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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Kuytun Reclamation Area People’S Court Criminal Verdict (2018) XPCC 0701 Crim Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Kuytun Reclamation Area People’s Court Criminal Verdict (2018) XPCC 0701 Crim. Init. No. 22 Public prosecuting body: Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Kuytun Reclamation Area People’s Procuratorate. Defendant: Ismayil Sidiq, male, born on October 1, 1964. Uyghur, illiterate, farmer. On June 24, 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Yengisar County People’s Court sentenced the defendant Ismayil Sidiq to ten years in prison with three years’ deprivation of political rights and a fine of 10000RMB for the crime of propagating extremism. He is currently held at the XPCC Seventh Division Kuytun Prison. On May 16, 2018, the XPCC Kuytun Reclamation Area People’s Procuratorate filed the XPCC Kuytun Rec. Area Proc. Crim. Pros. (2018) Indictment No. 22 with our court, accusing the defendant Ismayil Sidiq of the crimes of undermining prison supervision and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination. In accordance with the law, this court convened a panel of judges and held a public hearing of the case. The XPCC Kuytun Reclamation Area People’s Procuratorate appointed prosecutor Guo Xin to appear in court to support the charges, with the defendant Ismayil Sidiq also appearing in court to participate in the hearing. The case has now been concluded. The public prosecuting body alleged that: On July 13, 2017, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq was transferred to the XPCC Seventh Division Kuytun Prison (hereafter referred to simply as “Kuytun Prison”) to serve his sentence. On January 25, 2018, while the defendant Ismayil Sidiq was watching television in the prison, he realized that the time displayed on the television was that of the final daily namaz, and used a disguised and simplified method to perform the namaz prayer in the prison dormitory. On March 3, 2018, the defendant, saying that he needed to wipe his nose and urinate, performed wudu (the procedure done before performing the namaz) in the bathroom of Group No. 1, District No. 5 of Kuytun Prison, stopping after he was discovered by A**, an inmate from that group. After the defendant Ismayil Sidiq’s wudu procedure was stopped, he would shout at multiple Uyghur inmates in the dormitory, saying: “Are you Uyghurs? Do Uyghurs enjoy reporting other Uyghurs like this?” The public prosecuting body has submitted to this court the relevant evidence regarding the abovementioned accusations, believing that the defendant Ismayil Sidiq engaged in concealed religious activities multiple times while at the prison, receiving education but refusing to repent, with this behavior violating Article 315 of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”. Moreover, after the defendant Ismayil Sidiq was reported for engaging in religious activities within the prison by inmates from the same prison district, he openly and in Uyghur sowed discord among the ethnic groups and created ethnic antagonism, with this behavior violating Article 249 of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”. The facts of the crime being clear and the evidence solid and sufficient rendered it appropriate to investigate the relevant criminal responsibility as regards the crimes of undermining prison supervision and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination. At the same time, as stipulated by the provisions of Article 69 of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”, multiple crimes require a combined punishment, with this court requested to issue a sentence in accordance with the law. The defendant Ismayil Sidiq had no objections to the facts and charges regarding the accusations in the indictment, of his having committed the crimes of undermining prison supervision and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination. In his defense, he said that he was uneducated and had only now learned that his actions were wrong, adding that he hoped that the government may judge him leniently, while he does a good job of reforming at prison and strives for an early release. The facts as ascertained by this court are consistent with those of the indictment. It has also been ascertained that, on June 24, 2017, the XUAR Yengisar County People’s Court found the defendant Ismayil Sidiq guilty of the crime of propagating extremism, sentencing him to ten years in prison (from June 19, 2017 to June 18, 2027), three years’ deprivation of political rights, and a fine of 10000RMB. The defendant Ismayil Sidiq had no objections to the abovementioned facts. The following evidence was also offered and verified in the course of the trial: I. Written Evidence 1. The (2017) Xin. 3123 Crim. Init. No. 6000 criminal verdict from the XUAR Yengisar County People’s Court (hereafter referred to simply as the “Yengisar County People’s Court”), the notice of enforcement, and the criminal incarceration registration form; 2. The Kuytun Prison No. 5 District point evaluation chart, point reduction examination form, and records of the prison district meetings. II. Witness Testimony 1. The testimony and facts presented by Witness Yu** confirmed that, on the evening of January 25, 2018, after being taken into prison, and again on the evening of February 17 while watching television, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq performed namaz in the prison dormitory; 2. The testimony and facts presented by Witness Ao** confirmed that, on the evening of January 25, 2018, after being taken into prison, and again on the evening of February 17 while watching television, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq performed namaz in the prison dormitory; 3. The testimony presented by Witness Yu** confirmed that, on February 24, 2018, the prison district authorities required the inmates to write thought reports, and that the defendant Ismayil Sidiq, on the basis of his illiteracy, refused to write the thought report. Even after the group leader of their mutual-liability group, Yu**, wrote out a sample for him, he still refused to write the thought report, saying in Uyghur “like hell I’m writing this”, and used the thought-report paper to wipe his nose; 4. The testimony presented by Witness Ao** confirmed that Ismayil Sidiq’s refusal to write a thought report is consistent with what was described in Witness Yu**’s testimony. It also confirmed that, on March 3, 2018, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq performed namaz after eating lunch. This was also seen by Witness A**, who then reported Ismayil Sidiq’s behavior to a supervisor surnamed Qin. Ismayil Sidiq would later yell at the people in his group, loudly and in Uyghur: “Are you Uyghurs? Is this how Uyghurs do things? Uyghurs like to snitch on others?” 5. The testimony presented by Witness A** confirmed that, on March 3, 2018, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq reported that he needed to urinate, and that the mutual-liability group leader, Yu**, arranged for the testifier to monitor the defendant from behind, with the testifier noticing that, having urinated, the defendant used toilet paper to perform wudu. The testifier then reported it to Yu**. When Ismayil Sidiq saw that he had been reported, he glared at the testifier and said, in Uyghur, “Are you Uyghurs? Is this how Uyghurs do things? Uyghurs like to snitch on others?” The other “endangering-security criminals” in their group all heard this. 6. The content of the testimony by the witness surnamed Qin, as regards the defendant Ismayil Sidiq’s praying on March 3, 2018, was consistent with the testimonies of Witnesses A** and Ao**. III. Defendant’s Testimony and Defense The testimony of the defendant Ismayil Sidiq confirmed that, on February 17, 2018 at approximately 9:20 PM, the defendant, while watching television, saw that it was time to perform the last daily namaz, and that he thereupon secretly performed the namaz in the prison dormitory. The testimony also confirmed that, on February 24, 2018, while writing a thought report, the defendant used the thought-report paper to wipe his nose. The testimony also confirmed that, on March 3, 2018, the defendant claimed to need to urinate and used toilet paper to clean his genitals, performing wudu, and that he became angry after being reported by the vice leader of the mutual- liability group, A**, and that he felt that Uyghurs should unite and not inform on people of their own ethnic group, which then prompted him to say such things as “Are you Uyghurs? Is this how Uyghurs do things? Uyghurs like to snitch on others?” in the prison dormitory. IV. Records of Inquisition, Inspection, Identification, and Investigative Experiments, among others. Inquisition records and on-the-scene photos could confirm the location and circumstances of the crime scene. This court believes that the defendant Ismayil Sidiq repeatedly engaged in covert religious activities within the prison, received education but refused to repent, resisted the reform efforts by prison management, and disrupted standard prison supervision. The circumstances are serious. His behavior is in violation of the provisions of Article 315 of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China”, and his criminal responsibility ought to be established on the basis of the crime of undermining prison supervision. Furthermore, the defendant Ismayil Sidiq publicly made illegal remarks following being discovered and reported for engaging in covert religious activities, sowing discord among the ethnic groups and creating ethnic antagonism. These circumstances are especially serious. His behavior is in violation of the provisions of Article 249 of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China” (hereafter referred to simply as the “Criminal Law”), and his criminal responsibility ought to be established on the basis of the crime of inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination. The public prosecuting body has accused the defendant Ismayil Sidiq of undermining prison supervision and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination. The facts are clear, and the evidence is sufficient and solid. The charges of the accusation are valid, and this court supports them.
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