THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S NOVEL MECHANISMS AND

THEIR CAPACITY TO ADVANCE AMBITIOUS AND EQUITABLE CLIMATE ACTION

An analysis of the Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue

1 Jacopo Pasquero THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S NOVEL MECHANISMS AND THEIR CAPACITY TO ADVANCE AMBITIOUS AND EQUITABLE CLIMATE ACTION An analysis of the Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue

Written by: Jacopo Pasquero Registration No: 950516642010 Contact: [email protected]

Written for: Wageningen University & Research MSc. Environmental Sciences Chair Group: Environmental Policy (ENP) Course code: ENP-80436

Supervisor: Dr. Aarti Gupta Second reader: Dr. Mattijs Smits

June 2019

2

Abstract The 2015 Paris Agreement is an important milestone in the United Nations climate regime: its bottom-up approach solves old conflicts between countries over equity and ambition, by introducing novel mechanisms that are intended to collectively guide the international community towards long-term climate action. However, as these mechanisms are novel and not fully scrutinized by academia, it is unclear how they will advance equitable and ambitious climate action, if at all. This study investigates how the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework, Global Stocktake and Talanoa Dialogue seek to advance equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime and the transformative potential of novel procedural mechanisms in global governance. To that end, a discourse analysis of written submissions, reason-giving sessions, and official policy documents is conducted. Several discourses are thus identified to understand if countries reach a shared understanding on how equity and ambition can be advanced over time. The results show that (1) Transparency checks and does not advance climate action (2) the Global Stocktake moves equity and ambition from substantive to self-determined, procedural, and information-centered and (3) the Talanoa Dialogue facilitates the exchange of best practices, but does not consistently move climate action forward. Eventually, the findings suggest that the transformative potential in global governance of novel mechanisms is limited: in fact, focus is put on procedures rather than substantive outcomes, the reference to substantive questions remains vague, and old conflicts persist even at procedural level. Key Words: climate governance, discourse theory, discursive Institutionalism, equity, Global Stocktake, Paris Agreement, public reason, Talanoa Dialogue, transparency, UNFCCC.

3

Abbreviations:

CMA: Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement COP: Conference of the Parties CBDR-RC: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities FSV: Facilitative Sharing of Views GST: Global Stocktake IAR: International Assessment and Review ICA: International Consultation and Analysis IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change MRV: Measurement Reporting and Verification UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

4

Table of contents 1. Introduction ...... 8 1.1 Setting the scene ...... 9 1.2 Research objective and research questions ...... 11 1.2.1 Research objective ...... 11 1.2.2 Research questions ...... 11 1.3 Roadmap ...... 12 2. Conceptual Framework ...... 13 2.1 Discourse theory ...... 13 2.1.1 Discursive Institutionalism ...... 13 2.2 Public Reason Theory ...... 14 2.3 Operationalizing the conceptual framework Equity ...... 15 2.3.1 Evolving conceptualization of the equity framework ...... 15 2.3.2 A shared understanding of equity and ambition to meet the Paris goals ...... 16 2.3.3 Analysing the evolving understanding of equity and ambition through Discourse and Public Reason theory ...... 17 3. Methodology ...... 21 3.1 Research Design...... 21 3.2 Research scope ...... 21 3.3 Data Collection ...... 22 3.3.1 The Transparency Framework ...... 22 3.3.2 The Global Stocktake ...... 23 3.3.3 The Talanoa Dialogue ...... 23 3.3.4 Discourse hegemonization ...... 23 3.4 Data Analysis ...... 24 4. Background: Evolving mechanisms of climate governance ...... 28 4.1 The UNFCCC ...... 28 4.2 Developments in climate negotiations ...... 29 4.2.1 From Kyoto to Paris ...... 29 4.2.2 Implementation of the Paris Agreement and its novel mechanisms ...... 30 5. Transparency ...... 36 5.1 Operationalization of the enhanced transparency framework ...... 38 5.1.1 Equity ...... 38 5.1.2 Ambition ...... 41 5.2 The existing transparency arrangements ...... 43 5.2.1 Equity ...... 44 5

5.2.2 Ambition ...... 45 5.3 Discourse hegemonization ...... 47 5.4 Transparency’s transformative potential in global governance ...... 48 6. Global Stocktake ...... 50 6.1 Equity ...... 50 6.1.1 General reference to the equity principle, framing, and silence ...... 51 6.1.2 Operationalization of the equity principle: the self-assessment discourse ...... 55 6.1.3 The scope of the Global Stocktake: the beyond-mitigation discourse ...... 58 6.2 Ambition ...... 61 6.2.1 A prescriptive approach...... 63 6.2.2 The political momentum discourse ...... 64 6.2.3 The positive outcome discourse ...... 65 6.3 Discourse hegemonization ...... 66 6.4 The Global Stocktake’s transformative potential in global governance ...... 67 7. The Talanoa Dialogue ...... 69 7.1 Equity ...... 70 7.1.1 The equitable climate action discourse ...... 70 7.1.2 The support discourse ...... 72 7.2 Ambition ...... 74 7.2.1 The 1.5 degrees discourse ...... 76 7.2.2 The pre-2020 discourse ...... 77 7.2.3 The political momentum discourse ...... 78 7.3 Discourse hegemonization ...... 79 7.4 The Talanoa Dialogue’s transformative potential in Global Governance ...... 80 8. Comparing Novel Mechanisms: Discussion and Conclusion ...... 82 8.1 Discourses and countries involved ...... 82 8.2 Discourses and effects ...... 83 8.3 Answering the Research Questions ...... 84 8.3.1 How do novel mechanisms of the United Nations climate regime advance ambitious and equitable climate action, if at all? ...... 84 8.3.2 What is the transformative potential of such novel mechanisms in global governance? ...... 86 8.4 Discussion on the Conceptual Framework ...... 87 8.5 Recommendations ...... 87 8.6 Reflection ...... 88 10. Literature ...... 89 ANNEX I ...... 94

6

ANNEX II ...... 95

7

1. Introduction With climate change emerging as an alarming threat for both society and ecosystems, decision- makers have been consequently developing several policy responses to collectively steer the way human activities affect and are impacted by changes in the atmospheric system. The international community began to mobilize on climate change governance as of 1979, when the first World Climate Conference took place (UNFCCC 2019). Following that, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established with the aim to produce objective scientific inputs on climate science for policy-making (UNFCCC 2019). Yet, it was only in the early 90s that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signatures and subsequently entered into force. The Convention was intended to be the major reference for the mobilization of international efforts in preventing the adverse effects of climate change and adapting to its unavoidable negative impacts (UNFCCC 2019). Following that, climate negotiations started in 1995, when the first United Nations Climate Change Conference, also referred to as Conference of the Parties (COP), took place in Berlin (UNFCCC 2019). From then on, key climate agreements have been adopted: the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Amendment, and the Paris Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol, entered into force in 2005, entailed legally binding and equitable climate targets that Parties had to comply with by 2012; its Doha Amendment, adopted in 2012, furthered the Kyoto’s provisions by putting forth additional targets until 2020 (Lal Pandey 2014). However, difficulties in climate negotiations and an emerging resistance to accept binding targets by Parties have led to low ratification, with the Doha Amendment not yet entered into force (UNFCCC 2019). As a result, discussions verted over a different agreement with a bottom-up approach: the Paris Agreement, formally adopted at COP 21 in Paris in 2015 (Lal Pandey 2014). An important aspect of the new Agreement is that it does not embed binding targets in its text. Rather, it asks Parties to submit voluntary and self-determined contributions, leaving it an open question how much each individual country should contribute to the overarching Paris goals. Furthermore, with the aim to ensure ambition and equity in absence of binding targets, the Agreement presented several novel mechanisms, which are intended to guide the international community towards long-term climate action. Precisely, the Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue were developed to address equity and ambition over time: by allowing countries to be transparent, reviewing their climate efforts, and sharing their experiences, these mechanisms may lead to the shared understanding on equity and ambition that is currently lacking in the United Nations climate regime. It is worth noting that the aforementioned mechanisms have not been fully scrutinized yet by academia, and it is thus not clear how they are to realize what they aim for, if at all. Transparency has been receiving extensive attention by policy makers in the last decade in many political realms (Mol, 2010), but the consequences of its uptake with regards to participation and effectiveness are still not fully studied by scholars. The Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue instead are more recent, with literature on those only starting after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. In this study, I thus aim to contribute to the research gap in understanding the effectiveness of novel mechanisms, by specifically analyzing the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency

8

Framework, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue, and by discussing the broader transformative potential of novel, procedural mechanisms in global governance. To do so, I use Discourse and Public Reason theory. The former allows the identification of discourses emerging from written inputs and reason-giving processes concerning Transparency, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. By understanding how countries that are signatories to the Paris Agreement envision the implementation of such mechanisms in their submissions, it will be possible to forecast what outcomes these mechanisms will produce in the future with regards to equity and ambition. Moreover, through the analysis of reason-giving processes, it is possible to investigate how countries advance climate action, by sharing and justifying their views. To that end, I use Public Reason theory, according to which a shared understanding can be reached through reason-giving. With the identification of discourses emerging from countries’ exchange of views on equity and ambition in reason-giving processes, I aim to understand if a shared understanding can be actually advanced. Specific information on Discourse and Public Reason theories can be found in Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework. In order to investigate how novel mechanisms advance equitable and ambitious climate action, I use coding to analyze countries’ submissions and statements. Coding in fact allows the categorization of pieces of text relevant to equity or ambition under several topics. Discourses are thus identified by analyzing how views on these topics advance climate action. I elaborate extensively on methodology in Chapter 3. This research thus aims to analyze how these novel policy mechanisms are envisioned to advance ambitious and equitable climate action by countries in the United Nations climate regime and how they have been performing to date. Furthermore, as these novel and procedural mechanisms can be considered to be the successors of substantive provisions, it becomes crucial to understand their transformative potential in global governance, in order to investigate their possible implications in other regimes. Below, I proceed by outlining the problem statement, presenting the research objective and research questions, and introducing the structure of the thesis. 1.1 Setting the scene At the 17th United Nations Climate Conference in Durban, negotiations took a different direction: as the substantive targets of Kyoto demonstrated to pose hurdles, countries started focusing on a legal instrument for long-term climate cooperation (Sweet 2016). Adopted at the Paris COP in 2015, the structure of the new agreement focused on the comparability of actions, requiring both developed and developing Parties to submit their voluntary Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Wirth 2017). As the text of the Paris Agreement does not specify binding targets, the bottom-up approach that it promotes enhances the willingness to cooperate of all countries, but poses serious questions on its capacity to ensure equity and ambition in the climate regime (Lamp 2017; Boran 2017). The Agreement aims to ensure equitable and ambitious climate action, by introducing novel mechanisms. More in particular, the text presents an Enhanced Transparency Framework in its art. 13, requiring countries to report on and review their national emissions and their NDCs (UNFCCC 2016). Such a mechanism is expected to hold Parties accountable for their actions, mediating those conflicts arising from differentiation and burden sharing questions. Yet, with these effects being questioned (Gupta and van Asselt 2017), it becomes essential to understand how the

9

Transparency Framework is envisioned to advance equitable and ambitious climate action by Parties, and if it does so in practice. The same questions apply to the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue, other two Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms. The Global Stocktake’s primary objectives are to take collective stock of the climate effort and to raise ambition over time (UNFCCC 2016), while the Talanoa Dialogue aims at anticipating the stocktaking of collective efforts in 2018 and further enhancing ambition through constructive discussions guided by common understanding of Parties (UNFCCC 2017). Winkler and Depledge (2018) further highlight how these two mechanisms are seen as crucial for their contribution to enhance ambition and equity in a bottom-up climate regime. Indeed, they track, take stock and share climate action, but how they seek to advance equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime still remains unclear. As these mechanisms are novel and they have not been fully studied by academia so far, there is an urgent need to do research on what they are envisioned to deliver and how they have been performing to date. The Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake have not been implemented yet. In order to investigate how countries envision these mechanisms to advance equity and ambition, a discourse analysis of official written submissions in which Parties express their views on how the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake should be operationalized is thus carried out. On the other hand, the Talanoa Dialogue was implemented in 2018, following the decision by the Fiji Presidency of COP 23 in Bonn. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the transparency in advancing equity and ambition to date can be assessed, by analyzing the existing transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. For these two mechanisms, a discourse analytical lens is also applied, by further considering the role of Public Reason theory in assessing the effectiveness of the reason-giving processes that transparency and the Talanoa Dialogue entail. This way, it will thus be possible to investigate how the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms are envisioned to advance equitable and ambitious climate action (for the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake) and how they have been performing so far (for the current transparency arrangements and the Talanoa Dialogue). The recent rising importance to investigate equity in climate policy research (Klinsky et al. 2017) further justifies the object of this research. The need to do research in this direction is not only highlighted by the recent change in the conceptualization of the equity framework under the United Nations climate regime but, as I outline in Chapter 2.3, the relevance of equitable climate action to deliver the Paris Agreement’s collective ambition goals also makes it crucial to reach a collective shared understanding on this matter. This study thus aims to contribute to filling the research gap on the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms, so as to better understand their role in advancing equity and ambition, now and in the future. Furthermore, building on the necessity to investigate the developments of the equity framework and ambition under the United Nations climate regime, it aims to shed light on how the equity and ambition discourses are currently evolving. Eventually, given the unclear outcomes of such mechanisms, this research contributes to the understanding of what procedural measures, such as transparency, stocktaking, and facilitative dialogues, can deliver in terms of substantive outputs.

10

1.2 Research objective and research questions Following the problem statement, this section presents the research objective and the research questions. 1.2.1 Research objective The 2015 Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms are intended to guide the international community towards long-term equitable and ambitious climate action. Precisely, the Transparency Framework, the Global Stock Take and the Talanoa Dialogue were developed to address equity and ambition over time. This research thus aims to analyze how these novel governance mechanisms are envisioned to do so by countries and how they have been performing to date. To that end, written inputs and reason-giving processes are analyzed, as it is through such public submissions and debates that it is possible investigating how ambitious and equitable climate action is advanced. Furthermore, as these novel mechanisms can be considered to be the successors of substantive targets, it becomes crucial to understand their transformative role in global governance, with the aim to investigate their potential in advancing social and environmental outcomes. In other words, the purpose is to assess their performance in the United Nations climate regime and, on such basis, to reflect on what they could potentially achieve and how, if they were to be adopted in other domains. Therefore, the research objective is formulated as follows: To investigate the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms, by analyzing how the Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue seek to advance ambitious and equitable climate action and the transformative potential of such mechanisms in global governance. 1.2.2 Research questions Building on the research objective, the research questions are formulated as follows:

RQ 1. How do novel mechanisms of the United Nations climate regime advance ambitious and equitable climate action, if at all?

SQ 1.1 How are these novel mechanisms envisioned to further equity and ambition?

SQ 1.2 How are they doing so in practice, if at all?

RQ 2. What is the transformative potential of such novel mechanisms in global governance?

Each of these questions is studied for the three mechanisms in turn: the Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue. A discourse analysis of countries’ understanding of how equitable and ambitious climate action is advanced by each mechanism is carried out. To that end, written submissions, reason-giving sessions, and official policy documents are analyzed. These data are then coded under several themes that eventually allow the identification of discourses relevant to equity and ambition. The conceptual framework justifies the need to

11 identify discourses in order to answer the research questions: results and conclusions are thus presented accordingly. 1.3 Roadmap This thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework. Specifically, discursive institutionalism and public reason theory are introduced, and the main concepts derived from these theories are defined. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used, including specification of the analysed data and elaboration on which research question is answered through the analysis of what data. Following that, the empirical chapters are presented. Chapter 4 provides background on the UNFCCC process and the Paris Agreement novel governance mechanisms. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 then present the analysis of the three mechanisms: Transparency, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. I introduce each chapter by providing a brief introduction, presenting my main arguments, and listing the identified discourses. All three empirical chapters follow the same structure: introduction, presentation of the discourses related to equity, presentation of those relating to ambition, drawing conclusions on discourse hegemonization. At the end of each chapter, a specific section is dedicated to the transformative potential of the mechanism in global governance, with the aim to debate the role of such procedural mechanisms in international regimes. Chapter 8 presents a comparison of the findings relating to the three novel mechanisms. Following that, recommendations for both academia and policy-makers are given in a concluding chapter 9.

12

2. Conceptual Framework In this chapter, I present the main theories that support and justify the analytical focus and methods. I first outline discourse theory, followed by public reason theory, and link them to the analytical focus and methods, explaining their functionality to this thesis. I proceed by outlining how these conceptual lenses can be used to study the evolving understanding of novel mechanisms. I first introduce how equity and its link to ambition have transformed over time in international climate policy. I then argue the need to have a common understanding on equity and ambition in order to effectively move climate action forward. I finally conclude by elaborating on the existing literature about the three novel mechanisms under scrutiny, and explaining how Discourse and Public Reason theory are applied for each mechanism. 2.1 Discourse theory Discourse theory justifies the focus of this research: as it specifies the relevance of concepts, ideas, and meanings produced through words in shaping practices and institutions, it legitimates the research objects, consisting of written inputs and verbal negotiations. From this starting point, I thus argue that the documents and negotiations analyzed in this research are not just words, but generate discourses that compete for hegemonization and, if dominant, eventually institutionalize in social practices. 2.1.1 Discursive Institutionalism Building on the Foucauldian approach, discourses are intended here as a manifestation of power, for they have the capacity to construct reality in various dimensions (Arts and Buizer 2009). More in particular, such an interpretation of the construction of reality envisions an anti-essentialist ontology, that “assumes the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of a single reality” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Taking into account these assumptions, focusing on meanings becomes particularly relevant: “for interpretative environmental policy research, it is not an environmental phenomenon in itself that is important, but the way in which society makes sense of this phenomenon” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Within this context, concepts “are continuously contested in a struggle about their meaning, interpretation, and implementation” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). As a result, discourses are constructed by human agencies and compete with each other to give meaning to reality (Arts and Buizer 2009). Holzscheiter (2014) further underlines how discourses can be considered as a social concept: “rather than simply investigating the use of language in international politics, an exploration of discourse asks for the social and political effects that result from using a particular vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of particular constructions of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups on the other” (Holzscheiter 2014). Hence, discourses are recognized as a powerful means through which social reality is shaped: through the language used in international negotiations, new meanings are established and new norms institutionalize on the basis of such meanings. But what exactly can be defined as discourse? I here define discourses as “specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices” (Hajer 1995). Further, Holzscheiter (2014) helps pointing out what a discourse is in this research. In international relations, she argues, two types of discourses can be identified: micro-discourses and macro-discourses. While the latter is intended as “an all-embracing structure” focusing on general meanings, micro-discourses can be defined as “pragmatic, actor- 13 based, and action-oriented approaches” (Holzscheiter 2014). The discourses identified in this research can be considered micro-discourses. In fact, they are specific in focus and action-oriented as they put forward views on how equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime can be advanced. Further, they are supported by specific countries, and are thus actor-based. Eventually, all discourses have a specific institutional context, the UNFCCC. Language is extremely important in discourse theory, as it “profoundly shapes one’s view of the world and reality, instead of being only a neutral medium mirroring it” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Furthermore, actors are seen as the agency promoting a specific discourse that, “through discursive abilities and the logic of communication, can alter or maintain institutions of which they are a part” (Den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen 2014). Hence, it becomes crucial to understand which actors promote what discourse through the use of language. This is particularly relevant when it comes to understanding how Parties of the Paris Agreement shape the United Nations climate regime: since public discussions can lead to a political, legal, or institutional change by affirming certain meanings (Hajer and Versteeg 2005), it is assumed that climate action is largely influenced by the output of negotiations. The basic assumption that supports such a reasoning is thus that language generates discourses that eventually lead to political change (Hajer, 1995). Discursive institutionalism presents the need to focus on communicative processes as drivers of institutional change. By taking into account the institutional context within which views are confronted, discursive institutionalism argues that discourses eventually institutionalize in social practices (Den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen 2014). However, institutionalization is subject to a confrontation: in fact, not all discourses institutionalize or at least they do not do so to the same extent. In this regard, Howarth et al. (2016) point out how different discourses compete with one another: “the constitution of every identity, practice or regime involves a moment of political exclusion, and thus the exercise of power” (Howarth, Glynos, and Griggs 2016). Throughout such a process, some discourses become dominant, hegemonize a certain institutional context, and eventually institutionalize. In this research, discourse hegemonization is assessed in the final Katowice decision: as the document summarizing the implementation of the Paris Agreement, it is assumed to show what discourse has become more dominant and thus is sought to institutionalize in the future. 2.2 Public Reason Theory Discourse theory links to Public Reason for the institutional arrangement within which discussions take place for the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Talanoa Dialogue. Precisely, these two mechanisms entail that Parties interact in a reason-giving process through which they are asked to justify their views or actions. In Discourse theory, “institutional arrangements are seen as the pre-conditions of the process of discourse formation” (Hajer, 1995). On the other hand, such institutional arrangements are further justified and supported by Public Reason theory, that sees them as an effective tool to address equity and ambition over time (Boran 2017). Public Reason Theory builds on the concept of political liberalism and legitimates it in a plural and diverse political context. More in particular, political liberalism and its companion public reason find their roots in the justification principle, according to which “‘we should exercise political power only in ways it is reasonable to expect everyone to accept” (Lister 2013, as cited in

14

Billingham 2016). Political liberalism and Public Reason theory have been largely discussed and criticized by Billingham (2016) and Arneson (2014). However, arguing in favor or against the implications of these theories is not within the scope of this section. Rather, I aim to explain why Public Reason theory is applicable to the architecture of the Paris Agreement, how it relates to equity and ambition, and what needs to be researched in order to understand its implications for the United Nations climate regime. Boran (2017) explains how Public Reason can be of advantage in rethinking the equity framework within the Paris Agreement, taking the inquiry about equity and ambition from a substantive to a procedural level. Principles of public reason, it is argued, raise the possibility to guide the debate on equity and ambition over time, taking into account the plural and diverse political context within which discussions take place (Boran 2017). More in particular, public reason theory “presents a set of procedural principles that constrain the reason-giving process in a way that acknowledges diversity of reasonable views on substantive questions” (Boran 2017). It does not seek to produce a definitive, substantive formula; rather, principles of public reasons aim to establish core political values to guide debates in Paris negotiation processes (Boran 2017). Johnstone et al. (2003) reiterate this conception by highlighting the centrality of “a process of justificatory discourse” in negotiations within international organizations. By thus recognizing, “as a prior condition, that pluralism overrides comprehensive moral views”, Public Reasons is of high importance when it comes to developing and furthering mechanisms “to be designed in such a way to bring all Parties involved for discussion on a footing of moral respect, accountability, transparency, and collaboration” (Boran 2017). Within the debates on the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Talanoa Dialogue, Public Reason thus advances the idea that a shared understanding on equity and ambition can be established through a reason-giving process. Yet, it remains unclear how these mechanisms can deliver such substantive outcomes, if at all. 2.3 Operationalizing the conceptual framework Equity In the sections above, I have provided insights of Discourse and Public Reason theory, which constitute the conceptual foundation of this thesis. Here, I proceed by outlining how the conceptualization of equity in the United Nations climate regime has evolved, presenting the views of different authors. Following that, I argue that a shared understanding on equity and ambition needs to be reached in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals. I conclude by specifying how Discourse and Public Reason theory can be used as innovative tools to analyze how equity and ambition are advanced, building on previous research on the three novel mechanisms under scrutiny. 2.3.1 Evolving conceptualization of the equity framework As explained in the section above, Boran (2017) argues that the equity framework can be moved from substantive to procedural, as the United Nations climate regime has evolved in a way that allows countries to achieve a common understanding that can be constructed over time. Throughout climate negotiations, significant difficulties have in fact hampered the possibility to reach a substantive framework, shaping how equity has been conceptualized. In particular, Winkler et al. (2018) demonstrate how Parties’ conceptions of equity in the United Nations climate regime differ from one another. These differences make it harder for countries to 15 achieve consensus, which is essential to reach as it constitutes the decision-making procedure under the UNFCCC. Furthermore, Tørstad and Sælen (2018), underline how the division between Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries creates the biggest barrier in terms of Parties’ willingness to negotiate fairness, with Annex-I parties mainly looking at equity as a burden. Hence, this divergence of views does represent a problem in reaching a shared understanding of equity. Another view of how equity may develop in the future to overcome the past conflicts is the one put forth by Klinsky et al. ( 2017). They believe in fact that equity may evolve in the United Nations climate regime to become self-determined. As Parties can decide to apply to their Nationally Determined Contributions their own conception of equity, negotiations can move forward while still somehow ensuring the provision of equity. However, it is yet to be seen whether a “post-equity framework” is actually applicable to the United Nations climate regime and, if so, to what effects. 2.3.2 A shared understanding of equity and ambition to meet the Paris goals Due to the bottom-up structure of the Paris Agreement, there is not a clear conceptualization and operationalization of the equity principle, whose general reference is however embedded in the text of the Agreement. Similarly, this affects the ambition of countries’ voluntary Nationally- Determined Contributions: as it is not clear who should do what due to different interpretations of equity, so it is difficult to understand whose contribution is ambitious and whose it is not. Below, I provide evidence of how countries adopt various conceptions of equity. I then proceed by presenting how this divergence of views on equity, and consequently on ambition, ultimately hamper the effectiveness of the Agreement. I conclude by arguing that a substantive shared understanding on equity and ambition, even if evolving, needs to be reached in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s collective goals. An overarching review of how ambition and equity are included in the Paris Agreement is carried out by Rajamani (2016), who points out how the Agreement leaves it open to countries to establish their own interpretation of differentiation and progression. Accordingly, several authors (Pan et al. 2017; Zimm, Nakicenovic, and Zimm 2019) as well as the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) specifies how there are different conceptions of equity in countries’ submitted Nationally Determined Contributions. Similarly, Tørstad and Sælen (2018), identify three main understandings of fairness adopted by countries, and while they reiterate the problematic aspect of having such divergence on fairness, they recommend a more pragmatic solution. Indeed, instead of a collective overarching understanding of equity, they promote a tailored shared understanding of fairness for each agenda point of the Rulebook, the document operationalizing the Paris Agreement (Tørstad and Sælen 2018). Furthermore, Winkler et al. (2018) assess several Nationally Determined Contributions with regards to their fairness. They also find that several indicators on equity are applied, and conclude that ensuring more rigor in the information provided by countries would allow collective assessments to result in greater collective action (Winkler et al. 2018), importantly underlining the link between equity and ambition. All the views presented above convey one main point: fairness (equity) and progression (ambition) are self-determined, thus leading to a variety of conceptions and consequent applications in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions. This context reveals that without a shared

16 understanding, substantive or procedurally constructed, on which contribution can be considered ambitious or equitable, meeting the Paris goals remains an unsolved challenge. The 2018 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2018) assesses the collective climate efforts against the Paris Agreement goals and concludes that countries are not on track to limit global warming below 2 or 1.5 degrees. Yet, although the Report provides several indications on how countries’ contributions can be further enhanced, it remains unclear what country should be more ambitious over others, as a single conception of equity is not suggested. Pan et al. (2017) assess several Nationally Determined Contributions in terms of equity and ambition, by applying a number of equity conceptions. The results emerged from their analysis, however, show that countries’ ambition and fairness vary depending on the principle applied. As a result, there is a strong need to understand how, and if, a shared understanding on equity and ambition can be reached. Moreover, in absence of specific targets, it becomes crucial to investigate if equitable and ambitious climate action can be advanced procedurally through the novel mechanisms under scrutiny here. 2.3.3 Analysing the evolving understanding of equity and ambition through Discourse and Public Reason theory In the sections above, I have presented (1) the evolving conceptualization of equity and (2) how a shared understanding on equity and ambition is needed in order to deliver on the Paris Agreement’s goals. I here start by providing an overview of the academic debate on Transparency, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue. Focus is mainly put on Transparency, as it is a mechanism that has received wide attention in global environmental governance, while its effectiveness still remains a controversial issue. I also elaborate on the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue, but since these mechanisms are completely new, the relevant literature is limited. Furthermore, I explain how Discourse and Public Reason theory can be used as tools to further investigate the evolving conceptualization of equity and ambition and to analyse how, and if, a shared understanding can be reached, building on the existing literature about the three mechanisms. 2.3.3.1 Transparency Transparency has been used as a policy instrument in several international agreements and domestic policies. Also, it has been adopted within the private sector to report on companies’ sustainability performance. However, while its effects are still largely debated among scholars, its uptake is expected to further increase in the future. Mol (2014) affirms that transparency is here to stay, because of two main reasons. First, transparency is not just a simple new policy instrument, but a major societal innovation: its spread can in fact be associated with wider social developments, such as globalization and the ever-growing use of information, among others (Mol 2008; Mol 2014). Second, it is widely assumed that transparency leads to positive outcomes and that “the more transparency, the better”, for environment, democracy, and empowerment (Mol 2010). Further, Mason (2014) highlights how it is largely assumed that transparency leads to improved environmental performance. Also, Gupta (2010) reiterates how transparency is expected to deliver improvements on reduced emissions and desired outcomes by “getting the process right” (Gupta 2008). Within this context, it becomes crucial to advance research on the subject, given the assumptions on this mechanism and its forecasted future diffusion. Two major criteria have been identified to assess the positive effects of transparency (Gupta and Mason 2014; Mol 2014): normative and substantive criteria. The former mainly relate to 17 participation and democracy, on the basis of the “right to know”. The latter instead refer to the actual improvements derived from the uptake of transparency as a policy instrument. In this study, I focus on the substantive effects of transparency, as I aim to investigate the advancements of the equity and ambition discourses in the United Nations climate regime. So far, the capacity of transparency to deliver substantive outcomes has been mainly assessed on the disclosed information. Mason (2014) reveals how substantive environmental rights under the Aarhus convention are vaguely or not reported by countries, while attention is primarily paid on procedural rights. Gupta (2014) explains how transparency arrangements for REDD+ can lead to environmental improvements in certain cases, although the scope of such improvements may be limited to carbon sequestration rather than other forest ecosystem services. Knox-Hayes and Levy (2014) instead focus on corporate information disclosure and show how sustainability reporting has not led to improved environmental performance. Zhang, Mol, and He (2016), investigating the role of information disclosure in China, find that this has changed environmental governance in the country, but conclude that reporting has not yet led to consistent substantive effects, such as improved air quality in cities. Finally, Meng et al. (2014) analysing the link between corporate environmental disclosure and environmental performance, find that there is not a linear relationship between the two. Within this context, it is crucial to further research the role of transparency in producing substantive outcomes, with the aim to understand how, and if, this mechanism can deliver actual results. Further, through an enhanced understanding of transparency, it will be possible to better comprehend if it has the potential to transform global governance, or if, instead, it represents more a distraction. To fully grasp the focus of this thesis, another distinction needs to be made: transparency can in fact be split into transparency as disclosure and transparency as reason-giving. The former refers to the effects of revealing information, as it was the case of the studies mentioned above. I here focus on the latter, which instead relate to the process of account-giving that follows information disclosure. In the existing transparency arrangements under the United Nations climate regime, this process entails countries posing questions to each other and represents the review stage of the information disclosure system. Gupta and van Asselt (2017) explore the capacity of this review process to hold countries accountable to each other on their climate actions. They find that the link between transparency and accountability is not straightforward. More importantly, they argue that the existing transparency arrangements under the United Nations climate regime do not solve, but mirror conflicts over differentiation and burden-sharing. In this thesis, the effectiveness of transparency to produce substantive outcomes is assessed in such reason-giving processes. To this end, Pubic Reason is of advantage, as it allows moving the inquiry on equity and ambition from a substantive to a procedural level. As countries can pose each other questions on how their reported actions are equitable and ambitious, Public Reason opens the possibility to investigate if a shared understanding on equity and ambition can be constructed through these reason-giving processes. Hence, it allows to investigate if substantive outcomes can be produced. Importantly, it has to be specified that the identified shared understanding on equity and ambition cannot be seen as the ultimate substantive effects themselves. Rather, they can be considered as preludes of the actions that would follow these understandings: only when discourses will eventually instutionalize, it will possible to finally assess the effectiveness of transparency in terms of improved equitable and ambitious climate action. 18

For this reason, Discourse theory is particularly relevant: it allows in fact to argue that the discourses emerging on equity and ambition from reason-giving processes of the existing transparency arrangements will eventually institutionalize and thus change and shape countries’ climate actions. Furthermore, as the Enhanced Transparency Framework is not implemented yet, discourse theory also makes possible to investigate how countries envision it to advance equity and ambition. By analysing the written submissions where countries discuss the operationalization of the Enhanced Transparency Framework, discourses on equity and ambition can be identified before its actual implementation. Public Reason and Discourse theory thus play a major role in evaluating the capacity of transparency to advance ambitious and equitable climate action. Indeed, both theories allow to analyse the substantive effects of the existing transparency arrangements in the United Nations climate regime through the reason-giving processes they entail. More, Discourse theory also permits to investigate how the not yet implemented Enhanced Transparency Framework is envisioned to advance equity and ambition by countries. Eventually, through these conceptual lenses, the transformative potential of transparency can be discussed building on the literature. 2.3.3.1 The Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue The Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue can be considered real innovations in global governance; the academic debate on these mechanisms, however, is extremely limited and focus is particularly put on how they should work once implemented. I here outline the main assumptions on what the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue are expected to deliver. I then explain how Discourse and Public Reason theory are functional to understand how, and if, these two mechanisms are envisioned to advance equitable and ambitious climate action. With regards to the Global Stocktake, a widespread assumption is that it will deliver enhanced ambition and drive countries towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement’s goals (Craft and Fisher 2018; Hermwille and Siemons 2018; Northrop et al. 2018). Milkoreit and Haapala (2018) specify how the purpose of review mechanisms is to ensure overall regime effectiveness. They then show how similar mechanisms, although not identical to the Global Stocktake, have delivered strengthened goals. Yet, they conclude that given the uniqueness of the Global Stocktake, it is not yet possible to state whether it will deliver the promised enhanced ambition or not. Concerns are expressed also on the capacity of the Global Stocktake to advance equity in the United Nations climate regime. More precisely, Northrop et al. (2018) and Prasad, Ganesan, and Gupta (2017) underline the difficulty of implementing the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle, especially considering that countries already face challenges in including equity considerations in their Nationally Determined Contributions. Northrop et al. (2018) also advance the idea that the scope of the Global Stocktake may go beyond mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, and include as well the provision of loss and damage. Within this context, Discourse theory is of advantage. In fact, through the identification of discourses emerging from submissions in which countries explain how they envision the mechanism to work, it will be possible to broadly understand how, and if, the Global Stocktake is sought to enhance equitable and ambitious climate action. As a result, the assumptions, and concerns, that the Global Stocktake will advance equity and ambition in the United Nations

19 climate regime can be discussed, by also considering the transformative potential of the mechanism in global governance. The Talanoa Dialogue, as in the case of the Global Stocktake, was minimally scrutinized due to its very recent introduction. The mechanism is widely assumed to showcase climate action, build trust, facilitate a positive exchange of views, review collective progress, and constitute a platform for enhanced ambition (Lesniewska and Siegele 2018; Winkler and Depledge 2018). Such assumptions follow the main concepts contained in the UNFCCC Decision outlining the objectives of the Talanoa Dialogue. The document in fact states that the mechanism will review climate action, support pre-2020 ambition, and inform policy makers to move climate action forward. With the aim to understand if the Dialogue will deliver what it is assumed to, Public Reason theory is here used to analyse how climate action can be advanced through this governance innovation. In fact, throughout the Dialogue, countries are invited to address the three guiding questions: “Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”. Hence, Public Reason allows to scrutinize how countries can advance a collective understanding on how ambition and equity are to be advanced in the United Nations climate regime by giving reasons for their statements in response to these questions. Furthermore, through Discourse theory, it is possible to understand if countries have different understandings on how climate action should be advanced with regards to equity and ambition or if, instead, a common vision can be actually constructed. In fact, reason-giving should lead to the achievement of a collective understanding on equity and ambition, as countries share their views by justifying their statements. However, answering the three guiding questions of the Dialogue may also lead to divergent points of view and consequent conflicts, as some countries may accept the justification given, but disagree with the statement. It thus becomes crucial to understand what discourses the Dialogue produces, and if such a process can advance ambitious and equitable climate action by allowing countries to share and justify their views. Public Reason and Discourse theory thus make it possible to investigate how the Talanoa Dialogue can advance climate action through the analysis of the reason-giving processes that the mechanism entail. In this chapter, I presented the conceptual lens through which the analysis is conducted. I first elaborated on Discourse and Public Reason theory, explaining how these are if advantage to investigate the capacity of the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms to advance climate action. Discourse theory in fact allows arguing that what countries say in submissions and statements will eventually shape climate action. Public Reason theory, instead, provides an innovative way to look at the capacity of reason-giving based mechanisms to advance a common understanding on equity and ambition. I then proceeded by presenting how equity and ambition have evolved in the United Nations climate regime and showed how a shared understanding on equity and ambition is to be reached in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals. I eventually elaborated on what the scholarly debate has said about the transparency, the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue so far and explained how the conceptual lens presented at the beginning of this chapter constitutes an innovative tool to further research these mechanisms.

20

3. Methodology

In this chapter, I outline the methods used to collect and analyze the data. I start by presenting the research design, explaining why a qualitative approach was chosen, also taking into consideration the conceptual framework. I thus proceed with the research scope, highlighting the limits of the research in terms of research objects. Following that, I continue with the data collection, pointing out the number of data analyzed per mechanism. Eventually, I present the data analysis process that led me to the results presented in the empirical chapters. I do so by dividing the process into three main steps: coding, identification of micro-discourses, and discourse hegemonization assessment.

3.1 Research Design This research investigates the capacity of the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms to advance equity and ambition by carrying out a discourse analysis of written inputs and public discussions. To that aim, a qualitative research design is considered to be of advantage, as it seeks to understand and clarify how values, perceptions and attitudes manifest in a group (Kumar, 2014). As such, a qualitative method is justified by the need to understand how Parties talk about equity and ambition when negotiating the implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake, and engaging in reason-giving processes within the Talanoa Dialogue and the existing transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. The research design is further justified by the Conceptual Framework as outlined below. In fact, according to discursive institutionalism theory, words and texts are considered to be important factors in political processes: they create meanings that eventually institutionalize, leading to a political change (Den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen 2014). It thus becomes relevant to qualitatively analyse and carry out a discourse analysis of the selected data, as it is assumed that Parties’ words determine how the three novel mechanisms advance climate action with regards to equity and ambition. Furthermore, public reason theory suggests the importance of looking at reason-giving processes to identify the formation and development of values that can lead to a shared understanding of a determined matter. (Boran 2017). A qualitative research design thus fits within the purpose of this thesis and coherently applies to the type of the selected data. To analyse and summarize the key findings, a quantitative approach is also used. Secondary in terms of importance to the qualitative analysis, the quantitative method is here used to give an overview of what countries are supporting the identified discourses. Through such an approach, it is in fact possible understanding how developing and developed countries position themselves on equity and ambition matters, and what discourses receive more attention. 3.2 Research scope The scope of this research is limited to three of the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement: the Enhanced Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. The choice of the former two is justified by their importance in the legal architecture of the Agreement, while for the latter, a choice was made considering its relevance in enhancing more ambitious and equitable climate action in the short-term after COP 23 in Bonn in 2017. Of these mechanisms, written inputs submitted by countries and reason-giving processes are analyzed, as well as public

21 discussions. This becomes relevant as it is within such public submissions and debates that the equity and ambition discourses can be advanced, as specified in the Conceptual Framework.

3.3 Data Collection Data are collected accordingly with the development of each mechanism so far: while both written submissions and oral discussions are available for the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Talanoa Dialogue, only written inputs have been submitted for the Global Stocktake to date. Below, the sources of data are indicated separately for all three mechanisms. A time framework that spans from 2014 to the Katowice COP in 2018 is chosen and applies to the selection of data. This choice is justified by the fact that relevant data start from 2014 and continue to date. Below, the analyzed written submissions and reason-giving processes are listed. For all three mechanisms, the final Katowice decision is also considered: by identifying what discourses are reflected in the document, it will be possible to understand which ones are more dominant and thus sought to be instutionalized in the future.

Figure 1: Number and type of data analyzed per mechanism 3.3.1 The Transparency Framework The data collected concerning the Transparency Framework consist of (1) the written inputs on the Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines, (2) the workshops on the Facilitative Sharing of Views (FSV), and (3) the Multilateral Assessment (MA). In total, 18 submissions were analyzed. Documents were submitted by individual countries or coalitions of countries, e.g. the Environmental Integrity Group, composed of Switzerland, South 22

Korea, Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Georgia. In total, 11 countries and 7 coalitions submitted their views on the implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework. Furthermore, with the aim to investigate how the existing transparency arrangements have been performing to date with regards to equity and ambition, 4 workshops for the developing countries’ facilitative process, and 8 rounds of submitted written questions for the developed countries’ Multilateral Assessment were analyzed. The FSVs were held under the ICA process for non-Annex-I countries, while the MAs were part of the IAR process for Annex-I countries. As such, FSVs and MAs represent differentiated account- giving processes as they target developing and developed countries respectively, although all Parties can ask questions to the targeted countries in both processes. All written inputs, FSVs, and MAs analyzed fall within the time framework indicated above. For this research, the recordings are transcribed to facilitate the analysis (the exact data selected are included in Annex I). 3.3.2 The Global Stocktake Concerning the Global Stocktake, data were collected on the basis of the inputs submitted on the following:

“Matters relating to the global stocktake (GST) referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement: (a) Identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake (b) Development of the modalities of the global stocktake”1

For the scope of the research, the views submitted from 2016 to date are considered (the exact data selected are included in Annex I). 37 submissions of three different sessions were analyzed. Documents were submitted by 12 countries, and 10 coalitions of countries, with some countries and coalitions submitting their views in each of the three sessions analyzed. 3.3.3 The Talanoa Dialogue The data on the Talanoa Dialogue are divided into two categories, those concerning the preparatory phase, and those concerning the political phase. For the preparatory phase, written inputs relating to the three key questions of the Dialogue: “Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”2 were analysed. The political phase consisted of oral negotiations taking place at COP24 in Katowice, and data were collected through participant observation (the exact data selected are included in Annex I). Specifically, 22 written inputs submitted by 6 coalitions and 17 countries were analyzed. Moreover, oral discussions at COP24 were also taken into account for the analysis. These oral sessions specifically consisted of the official opening and closing of the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue, and one of the high-level ministerial dialogues. 3.3.4 Discourse hegemonization With the aim to investigate which ones of the discourses identified per mechanism are more dominant, the final Katowice decision of COP24 is also analysed, as it contains the consideration of

1 APA item 6, UNFCCC, retrieved on 22/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/subsidiary-bodies/ad-hoc- working-group-on-the-paris-agreement-apa/information-on-apa-agenda-item-6 2 Talanoa Dialogue Background, UNFCCC, retrieved on 15/10/2018 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background 23 the items negotiated. Particularly, I look at how each discourse is included in the text of the decision, in order to investigate if some discourses can be considered more dominant over others and thus are sought to be institutionalized in the future.

3.4 Data Analysis Data are coded and qualitatively analysed. As the Conceptual Framework suggests, it becomes relevant to understand how Parties to the Paris Agreement talk about equity and ambition, as it is assumed that their words will lead to a political change. This logic is applied to all data collected. Within this context, the written inputs submitted by Parties are analysed with the aim to identify how Parties envision the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake to advance equitable and ambitious climate action. On the other hand, the verbal reason-giving processes only concern the Transparency Framework and the Talanoa Dialogue. On the basis of the Conceptual Framework, it is presumed that these fora of discussion serve Parties to establish a shared understanding on equity and ambition. Below, I present which research questions I answer through the analysis of what data and I then proceed by outlining the steps of the analysis.

RQ 1. How do the Transparency Framework, Transparency the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue • Written submissions seek to advance ambitious and equitable • Facilitative Sharing of Views climate action? • Multilateral Assessment Global Stocktake • Written Submissions Talanoa Dialogue • Preparatory and political phase SQ 1.1 How are these novel mechanisms Transparency envisioned to further equity and ambition? • Written submissions Global Stocktake • Written Submissions SQ 1.2 How are they doing so in practice, if at Transparency all? • Facilitative Sharing of Views • Multilateral Assessment Talanoa Dialogue • Preparatory and political phase RQ 2. What are the implications of such novel Transparency mechanisms for global governance? • Written submissions • Facilitative Sharing of Views • Multilateral Assessment Global Stocktake • Written Submissions Talanoa Dialogue • Preparatory and political phase Figure 2: Overview of the data used to answer the Research Questions While Transparency provides an answer to both SQ 1.1. and 1.2, the Global Stocktake only answers to SQ 1.1 as written submissions are the only data available to date. In contrast, the 24

Talanoa Dialogue only responds to SQ 1.2 as the written inputs are considered operating parts of the mechanism and thus do not imply Parties’ expectations on how the Dialogue should advance equity and ambition in its operationalization. Step 1: Coding Coding was chosen as method of analysis. The use of codes allow the classification of statements in macro-categories that were considered relevant for equity or ambition. The formulation of codes was carried out through thematic coding, that enabled to cluster series of statements referring to the same subject. Codes were created whenever a new theme emerged, until saturation was reached. For this purpose, the coding software ATLAS.ti 8 was used. In particular, the codes created were derived from thematic subjects, in relation to which ambition or equity was sought to be advanced. For example, for transparency, one of the codes is “flexibility”: the term refers to the fact that some countries talk about flexibility as a continuation of differentiation; yet, how they talk about it, and the ways they frame it, differ from submission to submission. However, all countries address flexibility relating such a theme with equity and ambition. The same applies to the other codes found for transparency and the other mechanisms. Another example can be the code “adaptation” for the Global Stocktake: some countries in fact put a lot of emphasis on adaptation, as they see it as a key element to be given as much relevance as mitigation within the scope of the Global Stocktake. However, how they do so differs: some submissions refer to the fact that adaptation needs to be taken into account in order to also mobilize financial support towards those countries most impacted by climate change. Others instead refer to it more generally, while still others link it to loss and damage, as a key element to be included if climate action is to be equitable. Hence, although views on this theme differ, they were grouped in one code as they were all referring to the same subject. As the themes varied from mechanism to mechanism, different projects were created in ATLAS.ti 8, resulting in the identification of different codes. Furthermore, for transparency, three different coding projects were created: one for the submissions, one for the Facilitative Sharing of Views, and one for the Multilateral Assessment. This was because the themes discussed in the submissions were different from those discussed in the oral discussions: the submissions in fact are centered on the operationalization of the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework, while the Facilitative Sharing of Views and the Multilateral Assessment, being the implementation of the existing transparency arrangements, focus on countries’ current climate actions. The process was different for the Talanoa Dialogue, as the same codes were identified throughout both written inputs and oral discussions. This was because the themes discussed were the same, as countries were negotiating the same issues, first by submitting their written views, and then talking about them in first person at COP24 in Katowice. All codes generated per each mechanism are included in Annex II. Step 2: Identification of micro-discourses Once the documents were coded, quotation reports were exported from ATLAS.ti 8 and converted into PDF reports. The quotation reports were created for each code: they contain all the quotations from various documents within the same project referring to one specific code, e.g. all the quotations coded for “adaptation” from the submissions for the Global Stocktake. To facilitate

25 the analysis, each report contains the quotations coded, comments, and additional information, e.g. country, question or answer, other codes relating to the quotation. A discourse analysis was thus carried out, by going through each quotation report and looking at the micro-discourses emerged. Some of the discourses coincide with the identified codes, e.g. the political momentum discourse for the Talanoa Dialogue. This is because several countries shared the same view on the theme discussed, and such uniformity of opinions generated a discourse. Furthermore, such views on that specific topic were not appearing in other quotation reports: as a result, in some cases, a discourse corresponds to a quotation report. In other cases, the discourses differ from the codes identified. This is because of two possible reasons. First, sometimes a code contained irrelevant information, as the theme discussed relates to equity or ambition, but does not determine climate action in a significant way. An example can be the code “policies” emerged from the analysis of the Talanoa Dialogue: it is in fact true that Parties were seeing the exchange of views on effective policies implemented at national level as a way to enhance climate ambition, but this does not constitute a discourse. In fact, while views on what policies countries should focus on were differing, the issue per se does not affect the United Nations climate regime, as it cannot result into institutionalization; rather, it represents a general exchange of opinions between countries on the implementation of their national policies. Second, in some cases a discourse was cross-cutting, i.e. emerging from quotations belonging to different codes. An example may be the beyond-mitigation discourse in the analysis of the Global Stocktake. In fact, the quotations were relating to the codes (1) “adaptation”, (2) “CBDR-RC principle”, (3) “GST timing and scope”, and (4) “linkages with other articles”. These are all codes that encompass the beyond-mitigation discourse, as countries (1) were talking extensively about adaptation, or (2) were referring to the CBDR-RC principle to underline that adaptation, means of implementation, and loss and damage should also be included in the Global Stocktake, or (3) were defining the scope of the Global Stocktake including loss and damage, or (4) were linking the need to include loss and damage in the Global Stocktake to the articles of the Paris Agreement that state the importance of this issue for equitable climate action. At the end, discourses were identified through the process explained above, inserted in the empirical analysis and eventually conclusions were drawn. Step 3: Discourse hegemonization assessment For those processes that were to be considered in the final decision of COP24 in Katowice, a further analysis was conducted, in order to check what discourse was more dominant and thus sought to institutionalize in the future. Namely, the potential hegemonization of the discourses or considerations emerging from the submissions on the Enhanced Transparency Framework, the submissions on the Global Stocktake, and the preparatory and political phases of the Talanoa Dialogue was analyzed. To that aim, the decision was coded on ATLAS.ti 8, using the previously identified discourses as codes. The codes were then clustered per mechanism, and quotation reports were exported in PDFs. As a result, it was possible to understand what discourse was dominant and to what extent, per each mechanism. In this chapter, I outlined the methodology used for this study. I started by explaining how a qualitative research design is of advantage, given that both Discourse and Public Reason theory

26 require an in-depth analysis of words and meanings. I thus proceeded with the research scope, pointing out that three mechanisms in particular are analysed: Transparency, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. Following that, I focused on the data collected and specified the number of written submissions, reason-giving processes, and official documents analysed per mechanism. Eventually, I detailed the data analysis, going through the process followed for the identification of the various discourses emerged from the analysed data. In the next chapter, I will proceed by providing an overview of how mechanisms have evolved in the United Nations climate regime, starting from the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), until the most important recent output of international climate talks: the Paris Agreement.

27

4. Background: Evolving mechanisms of climate governance In this first empirical chapter, I elaborate on the context and the progress made in international negotiations in the United Nations climate regime. I start by introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and I then proceed in chronological order, outlining the key steps that led to the Paris Agreement. I eventually provide detailed information on the three novel mechanisms that I focus on. 4.1 The UNFCCC Climate change has been significantly discussed in international arenas as of the early 90s, following the decision of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to establish a negotiating process “for the preparation by an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee of an effective framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any related instruments as might be agreed upon” (UNGA, 45/212 1990). The relevance of climate change in international politics has made it crucial to understand the implications of the measures agreed at international level.

As an output of the negotiating process established by the UNGA, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signatures at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Cinnamon et al. 2016). The Convention, entered into force in 1994, has as its ultimate objective the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992). Also, art. 3 of the Convention states that the contracting Parties “shall be guided” by several principles of international law “in their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions” (UNFCCC, 1992). More precisely, beside the precautionary principle, the text also mentions the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) as follows:

“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” (UNFCCC art. 3(1), 1992).

The text of the UNFCCC therefore shows two main factors: first, that climate change was and is to be addressed by the international community in order to reduce dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system; and second, that the contracting Parties shall do so by respecting the principles indicated in art. 3 of the Convention. Among those principles, the concepts of equity and differentiation are regarded as guiding ones.

Furthermore, the Convention indicates several commitments that Parties shall comply to, always by taking into consideration the CBDR-RC principle, as indicated in art. 4 (UNFCCC 1992). Such commitments, always falling under the overarching ultimate objective mentioned above, are to be implemented through several institutions that the Convention establishes. Precisely, a Conference of the Parties (COP) is responsible to yearly meet with the aim of making decisions to effectively implement the Convention, supported by the Permanent Secretariat and two Subsidiary Bodies (Carlarne et al. 2016).

28

4.2 Developments in climate negotiations In this section, I provide an overview of how different legal instruments and negotiation dynamics have been shaping the climate regime so far. I do so by highlighting the key points marking the discussions on and developments of different measures embedded in legal instruments agreed under the UNFCCC; further, I explain how such measures have operationalized the CBDR-RC principle, and ensured or aimed to ensure the implementation of the Convention. 4.2.1 From Kyoto to Paris Despite an initial general skepticism towards finding an agreement to implement the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP 3 in 1997 (Gupta 2010; Sweet 2016). The UNFCCC presents in its Annex I a list of industrialized countries that are to be held accountable for more ambitious climate commitments, given their economic development and their historical overuse (United Nations 1998; Wirth 2018). Following this provision, The Kyoto Protocol entails binding targets for Annex-I countries to reduce their aggregate emissions by 5.2 percent below 1990 levels (Gupta 2010). Further differentiation for the Annex-I countries that have different levels of emissions is ensured in Annex B of the Protocol (United Nations 1998). On the contrary, non-Annex-I countries had no binding quantitative targets (Gupta 2010). As a result, the CBDR-RC principle was successfully operationalized through the provisions that set differentiated targets in the text of the Protocol (Honkonen 2009). Yet, the Kyoto Protocol already presented some difficulties during its ratification and throughout the implementation of the first phase. In fact, although the USA signed the Protocol thanks to the Former Vice President of the United States Al Gore under the Clinton presidency, they never ratified it because of the changed presidency (Sweet 2016; Wirth 2018). This fact questioned the effectiveness of the Protocol, with the missed ratification of the largest emitter at the time. An additional factor that compromised Kyoto’s expected effectiveness was the withdrawal of Canada from the Protocol before 2012, the conclusion of the first phase. The country in fact was already pushing during the negotiations back in 1997 for weaker targets (Depledge 2000), and when it realized that meeting the set target was not feasible, Canada initiated the procedure to withdraw from the Protocol during the Durban COP in 2011 (Wirth 2018). As a result, with two large emitters stepping out of the Protocol, the provision of setting binding quantitative targets to reduce emissions and operationalize the CBDR-RC principle was largely questioned by some developed countries, e.g. New Zealand, Japan and the Russian Federation (Wirth 2018). These trends marked the negotiations to find an agreement for the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, namely from 2012 to 2020. From the Bali COP in 2007, climate talks brought Parties to envision a different option to Kyoto, as they expressed their reluctance for quantitative binding targets (Sweet, 2016). As an additional factor that furthered such difficulties, the EU pushed for an ambitious legal instrument that would have entailed quantitative targets for both developing and developed countries at COP 15 in Copenhagen (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). However, negotiations continued and an agreement for the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol was finally reached at COP 18 in Doha. The output consisted of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which implied setting quantitative targets for only some of the countries originally held accountable for reducing emissions during the first phase of Kyoto, as New Zealand, Japan, and the Russian Federation did not have their targets renewed (United Nations 2012). Also, the 29

Amendment has not been ratified by the minimum number of Parties, 144 countries, to enter into force (Wirth 2018). Hence, for all the factors outlined, the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and its Amendment with regards to both ambition and equity can be seriously questioned. With differentiation being not universally accepted anymore, it was necessary to open a new negotiation track, able to reach consensus on a long-term commitment for all Parties of the UNFCCC. This process led to the preference of the comparability of actions over differentiation, in order to overcome the problem of set targets at a substantive level (Dimitrov 2010). This newly emerging governance principle was central to the US position, but strongly opposed to developing countries. On the one side, it represented an opportunity to enable all Parties to take climate action, especially considering the recent increase in emissions by developing countries like China or India (Sweet 2016). Yet, it dangerously undermines the possibility to operationalize the CBDR- RC principle: the comparability of actions does not exclude differentiation per se, but it also does not ensure it. This idea of negotiating a different kind of agreement concretized in 2011 at the Durban COP, where it was agreed to negotiate a long-term legal instrument on climate, with its legal nature left open (Wirth 2017). Such a “legal instrument” aims at finding a common ground between developing and developed countries, with having all Parties under the UNFCCC to be committed to take climate action as its main goal (Sweet 2016). As a result, it was clear that targets had to be excluded, with the outcomes of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment being questioned. Indeed, the differentiation principle did not prevail in the negotiations, with comparability being the main focus (Dimitrov 2010). However, as differentiation was receiving less acceptance by some key actors, countries agreed on pledging to submit their voluntary contributions: in fact, the core mitigation undertakings were anticipated no longer to be binding, but instead are unilaterally-determined, voluntary, non- binding “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) (Wirth 2017). That is how the negotiations laboriously led to the COP 21 in Paris, where countries finally agreed on a new Agreement, whose main objective was to state the commitment of all countries to act on climate change (Sweet 2016). As targets were excluded throughout the negotiating process, the new Agreement included novel mechanisms to ensure that action was to be taken. Precisely, its binding parts entail the Transparency Framework (art. 13) and the Global Stock Take (art. 14). The Transparency Framework requires countries to report on their national emissions and the progress made in implementing and advancing their NDCs (United Nations 2015). The Global Stock Take as detailed in art. 14 requires Parties to take stock of the implementation of the Agreement and its long-term goal (United Nations 2015). These two binding parts of the Paris Agreement do not exclude the differentiation principle per se, but, at the same time, do not ensure it. Adding to these, another novel, informal mechanism was introduced during COP 23 in Bonn by the Fiji Presidency with the final aim to discuss the implementation of the Agreement and to enhance ambition, by anticipating the Stocktake to 2020. 4.2.2 Implementation of the Paris Agreement and its novel mechanisms The consensus achieved for the Paris Agreement signaled an important step in the United Nations climate regime: the international community is collectively committed to tackle climate change.

30

Yet, the operationalization of the major governance changes that the Agreement entails is yet to be negotiated. Below, the three mechanisms that are the focus of this analysis are presented. 4.2.2.1 The Enhanced Transparency Framework As indicated in art. 13 of the Paris Agreement, an enhanced transparency framework is to be implemented. According to the provisions of the article, the new transparency arrangements will have built-in flexibility, in order to maintain equitable reporting: “The transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility”3. However, what Parties still have to decide is how such built-in flexibility has to be developed and how it applies to the transparency arrangements. So far, the overall purpose of the enhanced transparency framework is broadly indicated in the Agreement: “The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' individual nationally determined contributions under Article 4, and Parties' adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.”4 A major discussion is how the enhanced transparency framework will relate to the existing transparency arrangements under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Transparency indeed is nothing new in the United Nations climate regime: a system of Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification on climate actions is already in place. As a key feature, the system is bifurcated between developing and developed countries with different levels of details on reporting. For developing countries, the International Consultation Analysis process applies and a Facilitative Sharing of Views constitutes the last stage of verification, during which they are asked questions on their technical reports and the information reported.

3 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 13.2, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 4 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 13.4, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 31

Figure 3: International Consultation Analysis for Non-Annex-I countries5 Contrarily, for developed countries, the International Assessment and Review process applies, with more detailed information to be reported and consequently checked. At Verification level, the process involves a Multilateral Assessment, during which developed country Parties are asked in-depth questions on the content and methodologies of the information reported. According to art. 13 of the Paris Agreement, the Enhanced Transparency Framework should further develop these existing arrangements through the development of new modalities, procedures and guidelines: “The transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article”6. In this research, I thus look at how Parties envision the Enhanced Transparency Framework to advance equity and ambition when negotiating its exact format. I also focus on the already existing bifurcated transparency arrangement, to see how they have been doing so in practice.

5 UNFCCC, International Consultation Analysis for non-Annex I countries, retrieved on 28/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/biennial-update- reports-and-international-consultation-and-analysis-non-annex-i-Parties/international-consultation-and-analysis-for- non-annex-i-Parties 6 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 13.5, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 32

4.2.2.2 The Global Stocktake Art. 14 outlines the general format of the Global Stocktake, the core mechanism of the Paris Agreement to enhance ambition over time. With Parties now developing voluntary self- determined contributions, the Global Stocktake becomes the key provision whose purpose is to take stock of collective climate efforts and update them: “The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the "global stocktake"). It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.”7 Milkoreit and Haapala (2018) reiterate this functionality of the Global Stocktake in the United Nations climate regime, stating that “the purpose of the GST is to ensure the effectiveness of the PA in the absence of legally binding mitigation (and other) obligations” (Milkoreit and Haapala 2018). However, if the Global Stocktake can achieve this objective is still unclear, as the detailed modalities and functioning of the mechanism are currently negotiated. The same applies to the outcome, which is also generally described in the Agreement: “The outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.”8. Broadly intended as the crucial element to ensure ambition in Paris, it is still uncertain whether the mechanism in its modalities and procedure will have the actual capacity to advance ambitious and equitable climate action. Especially with regards to equity, some scholars advance the idea that the Paris Agreement paves the way to a post-equity world (Klinsky et al. 2017): in absence of a prescriptive equity framework, it is reckoned to be equitable what can be self-determined as such. The legal architecture of Paris in fact enables such a possibility: Winkler et al. (2018) underline how the Global Stocktake allows this “own-analysis” not only on ambition, but also on equity. In this research, I thus investigate the negotiations that led to the final decision with the aim to understand how Parties envision the mechanism to put forward equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime. Furthermore, I aim to reflect on the concept of post-equity, by linking my results to the emerging literature on the subject. 4.2.2.3 The Talanoa Dialogue The Talanoa Dialogue was launched by the Fiji presidency of COP 23 in Bonn with the aim to engage Parties in a facilitative dialogue leading to COP 24 in Katowice. The process, lasting one year long from January to November 2018, had an innovative format: countries as well as non- Parties actors were encouraged to share their experiences, efforts and stories relating to climate change in order to build trust. Furthermore, the other objective of the Dialogue was to take stock

7 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 14.1, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 8 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 14.1, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 33 of the collective climate actions so as to pave the way for the enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions before-2020: “In accordance with decision 1/CP.23, paragraph 16, the efforts of Parties in relation to action and support in the pre-2020 period will also be considered as an element of the Talanoa Dialogue.”9 Moreover, the Dialogue was guided by three overarching questions: “Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”10. These questions were addressed by Parties during the two phases of the Dialogue: during the preparatory phase, they directly answered through the submission of written inputs. This initial and more technical phase had the purpose to “build a strong evidence-based foundation for the political phase”11. On the contrary, during the political phase, taking place in Katowice during COP 24, Parties were guided by those questions in oral discussions throughout the negotiations. The purpose here was to build on the information submitted throughout the preparatory phase and to achieve consensus on the future developments of globally coordinated climate action.

Figure 4: Background of the Talanoa Dialogue12 The Talanoa Dialogue thus provided a platform where Parties could elaborate on their views by giving reasons for their statements: by sustaining their opinions with their own experience, they would eventually put forward a common understanding of how climate action is to develop in the future. In this research, focus is put on whether such common understanding through a reason- giving process is established or not.

9 UNFCCC, Talanoa Dialogue Platform, Background, retrieved on 26/01/2019 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background 10 UNFCCC, Talanoa Dialogue Platform, Background, retrieved on 26/01/2019 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background 11 UNFCCC, Talanoa Dialogue Platform, Preparatory Phase, retrieved on 26/01/2019 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background 12 UNFCCC, Talanoa Dialogue, Background, retrieved on 27/11/2019 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background

34

In this chapter, I have outlined how governance mechanisms in the United Nations climate regime have been evolving since the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Further, I have described the dynamics that have led to a shift from the top- down Kyoto Protocol to the bottom-up Paris Agreement, and the unclear effectiveness of the mechanisms embedded on the latter. I have concluded by presenting more in depth the Enhanced Transparency Framework, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. Below, I proceed with the discussion on the analysis of these three novel mechanisms and I draw conclusions on their capacity to advance ambitious and equitable climate action.

35

5. Transparency The Paris Agreement represents a crucial step towards the developments of the transparency arrangements within the UNFCCC. Article 13 of the Agreement in fact establishes a new enhanced transparency framework with built-in flexibility in order to allow those developing countries that need it in light of their national circumstances and different capacities to have less stringent requirements on reporting (UNFCCC, 2016). Yet, the major change that the new transparency mechanism suggests relates to a different approach from the existing Monitoring, Review, and Verification (MRV) System, the transparency arrangement used by Parties so far under the UNFCCC. In fact, the current MRV System is bifurcated into two separate processes: one for developed countries, with more stringent requirements for reporting, and one for developing countries, with less strict rules in light of their national circumstances, so as to lighten the hurdles that such technical process poses. The provision of built-in flexibility contained in article 13 of the Paris Agreement thus implies a different, unified process, with the possibility to have flexible requirements on the implementation of the modalities, procedures, and guidelines, that the article itself in paragraph 13 defines as common: “The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall, at its first session, building on experience from the arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support. “13 In this chapter, I draw conclusions from the analysis of written inputs in which Parties or coalitions of Parties put forward their ideas on how the enhanced transparency framework and its modalities, procedures, and guidelines should work in practice. I particularly look at how they envision the new transparency mechanism to advance ambition and equity in the United Nations climate regime. I then proceed by looking at how the existing bifurcated MRV system performs in practice and I draw conclusions on how such system advances ambitious and equitable climate action through reason-giving processes. I do so by analysing both the review process for developed countries, the Multilateral Assessment, and the one for developing countries, the Facilitative Sharing of Views. The analysis of the written inputs on the enhanced transparency framework does not show much divergence of opinions and understanding between Parties. In fact, it is not possible to identify different discourses on equity and ambition with regards to the operationalization of transparency, as Parties’ submissions differ only on the focus and how they frame their statements, but do not present conflicting views. Indeed, the results reveal that there is no provision of transparency that is relevant to advance climate action on equity and ambition. In this chapter, I thus outline the different focus put by Parties in their submissions, arguing that (1) these different focuses are not translatable into different discourses (2) submissions address equity with regards to the implementation of transparency, but do not talk about how transparency can put forward a substantive equity framework on climate action, and (3) on ambition, transparency plays a role in checking against voluntary and nationally determined targets rather than advancing climate action.

13 Paris Agreement, Paris, art. 13.13, 4 November 2016, No. 54113, United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 36

On the contrary, in the analysis of the existing transparency arrangement, I focus on how the two differentiated processes for developed and developing country Parties advance the equity and ambition discourses through a reason-giving process. According to Public Reason Theory, similar processes allow Parties to advance the equity and ambition discourses by putting forward concepts, ideas, and views on how their actions can be considered equitable and ambitious. For example, Boran (2017) suggests that Parties may explain how their contributions are equitable. As a result, a common understanding may be reached by putting forward views on how equity and ambition should apply in the United Nations climate regime. I thus particularly looked at what questions were asked and on what topic in order to understand if Parties actually use such fora to advance climate action in this direction. Also, I focused on whether the answers were relevant to advance equity and ambition or not. Results confirm the findings emerged from the written submissions: in this chapter, I draw conclusions on the analysis of the existing transparency arrangements within the UNFCCC arguing that: (1) the review processes of the existing transparency arrangements largely fail in putting forward a common understanding on equity and ambition, (2) transparency plays a role in checking rather than advancing climate action, and (3) conflicting discourses emerge, but these are not question-driven. Indeed, three discourses emerge on equity: the sustainable development discourse, the equitable transparency framework discourse, and the support discourse. Three additional discourses relating to ambition can be identified: the self-determined ambition discourse, the long-term goal discourse, and the interdependence discourse. All six discourses emerged from views that were embedded in the answers yet they were not stimulated by questions aimed at furthering ambition or equity, as Boran instead suggests. Overall, the mechanism has extremely limited potential in advancing ambitious and equitable climate action. In fact, it is true that the transparency mechanism embeds in its operationalization the equity principle in order to allow developing countries more flexible requirements on reporting. Also, the new enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement provides developing country Parties the possibility to enhance the ambition of their reporting over time through capacity-building. However, countries’ submissions for developing the new enhanced transparency framework do not mention equity considerations on climate targets and only partly address ambition. Furthermore, the existing arrangements under the UNFCCC show that transparency primarily focuses on the technical aspects of disclosing national climate action, and only very few Parties share their understanding of how climate action should advance. The final overarching result is thus that transparency checks against voluntary and self-determined targets while it does not produce a shared common understanding of how climate action can be equitable and ambitious. Hereinbelow, I proceed by first outlining the results emerged by the analysis of written submissions on the enhanced transparency framework to see how Parties envision the operationalization of said mechanism to advance ambition and equity in the United Nations climate regime. I then proceed to draw conclusions from the analysis of the existing transparency arrangements in order to outline the capacity of transparency to advance climate action in practice. Eventually, I outline considerations on the role of transparency arrangements in global governance.

37

5.1 Operationalization of the enhanced transparency framework In this section, I outline how Parties envision the enhanced transparency framework to advance equity and ambition. I start by presenting the main findings on equity by explaining how flexibility is the key component to equitably operationalize the mechanism. I thus proceed with ambition, highlighting its role in checking progress towards countries’ nationally determined contributions. Through this analysis, I argue that the main role of transparency is to check climate action, rather than advancing it. 5.1.1 Equity I here outline how transparency relates to equity at two different levels: (1) in the operationalization of the mechanism itself, giving due consideration to countries’ different capacities on reporting and (2) in advancing Parties’ equitable climate actions. On the former, flexibility plays a key role for it can be seen as the element continuing a partly differentiated transparency mechanism. On the latter instead, there is a total lack of reference in Parties’ submissions. I thus focus on flexibility: on this regard, Parties have similar views, but a different focus. However, this divergence in focus is not strong enough to generate different discourses. I hereby present three clusters of views that differ in terms of where the focus is put: (1) flexibility to keep differentiation in transparency arrangements; (2) flexibility to address different national circumstances, and (3) flexibility to enhance capacity over time.

Figure 5: Equity considerations in the Enhanced Transparency Framework

38

Some Parties see flexibility as a tool to keep differentiation even under common modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework. China14, the Like-Minded Developing Countries15, and India put a strong focus on this issue. For example, in its submission, India states the following: “It is necessary that we build on the experiences drawn from the existing transparency arrangements under the Convention and ensure continuity of differentiation while developing modalities, procedures and guidelines for enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement”16. This is reflected in submissions by China and the Like-Minded Developing Countries, which further highlight the importance to keep differentiation through flexibility, in order to ensure acceptance of the common arrangement for developing countries. Expressly, the submission from Like-Minded Developing Countries highlights the following: “such differentiation forms the fundamental modalities of the transparency framework of action and support under the Paris Agreement, which is crucial to ensure the flexibility to developing country Parties to increase their acceptance of and willingness to be subject to such measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) system”17. Other submissions put less focus on differentiation, but still see flexibility as a manner to address Parties’ national circumstances. Among the submissions pertaining to this cluster, there are those by the African Group of Negotiators18, the Alliance of Small Island States19, the Caribbean Community20, the Environmental Integrity Group21, Japan22, and New Zealand23. Remarkably, the majority of submissions come from developing country Parties. On this regard, the one from the African Group of Negotiators is indicative, as it stresses that “the development of MPGs does not lead to increased reporting burden for developing countries”24 and remarks that “the flexibility provision as indicated under the Transparency Framework contained in Article 13.2 of the Paris Agreement is applicable only to the developing country Parties”25. Such statements underline the relevance of flexibility as a built-in element in operationalizing equity considerations in the enhanced transparency framework by taking into account different capacities.

14 Submission from China on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 15 Submission from LMDC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 16 Submission from India on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 17 Submission from LMDC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 18 Submission from AGN on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 19 Submission from AOSIS on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 20 Submission from CARICOM on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 21 Submission from EIG on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 22 Submission from Japan on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 23 Submission from New Zealand on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 24 Submission from AGN on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 25 Ibidem. 39

Eventually, the third cluster of submissions focus on flexibility as a tool to enhance capacity over time. In fact, submissions belonging to this cluster highlight that, through the provision of flexibility, developing countries are given the possibility to improve their reporting over time. Among the Parties sharing this focus in their submissions are Australia26, Canada27, the Caribbean Community28, the European Union29, the Independent Alliance of Latina America and the Caribbean30, Indonesia31, Norway32 and the United States33. All these submissions put a strong focus on capacity building and see it as a tool to improve the quality, scope, and frequency of reporting. A key example is the submission from the European Union, which states: “Flexibilities built in the common MPGs must recognize different capacities of the Parties, but should also take into account that capacity and in consequence the ability to rigorously monitor, track and report on action will improve over time with enhanced capacity building support and greater experience”34. As it is possible noting, most of these submissions come from developed countries: while they all address flexibility as an important instrument of the enhanced transparency framework, they also strongly advocate for more ambitious reporting from developing countries, and therefore a decreased differentiation of the process over time, through the provision of capacity building. As such, one may argue that the transparency mechanism developed with built-in flexibility leads to a procedural disappearance of the equity principle. However, some Parties endorse an option that would enable the transition in a fair manner: most of them in fact - namely Australia35, the Alliance of Small Island States36, Canada37, the European Union38, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean39, and the United States40 - also underline the importance of and

26 Submission from Australia on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 27 Submission from Canada on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 28 Submission from CARICOM on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 29 Submission from the EU on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 30 Submission from AILAC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 31 Submission from Indonesia on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 32 Submission from Norway on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 33 Submission from US on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 34 Submission from EU on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 35 Submission from Australia on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 36 Submission from AOSIS on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 37 Submission from Canada on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 38 Submission from EU on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 39 Submission from AILAC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 40 Submission from US on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 40 support the Capacity-Building Initiative on Transparency, as a mechanism to operationalize in practice what they advocate for in their submissions. An example can be the statement made by Australia: “Multilateral funds and bilateral efforts have an important and complementary role in assisting Parties to build this capacity. Australia welcomes the recently established Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT), and the important contribution it will make in assisting Parties to prepare for the post 2020 system”41. The three clusters of views I outlined above show different focuses put by Parties on the provision of flexibility; however, the difference between one cluster and another is not wide enough to produce different discourses on how equity is to be operationalized in the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework. This result can be explained by the provisions of art. 13 of the Paris Agreement that leave little space for interpretation on that matter. Besides that, and more importantly, Parties do not address at all how transparency can be used to advance equity on climate actions and targets. 5.1.2 Ambition In this section, as per equity, I outline how transparency relates to ambition at two different levels: (1) in the operationalization of the mechanism itself, furthering countries’ capacities on reporting and (2) in advancing Parties’ ambitious climate actions. On the former, ambition relates to capacity-building as already outlined in the equity section. Submissions by the Caribbean Community42 and the European Union43 are particularly relevant on the matter as they stress how the existing bifurcated MRV system represents an obstacle in tracking progress and lacks incentives for improvement over time. Besides that, there is not a strong divergence of views between Parties. On the capacity for transparency to advance ambitious climate actions, Parties do not mention anything relevant. Indeed, two views were identified: (1) transparency can track progress towards Parties’ nationally determined contributions; (2) transparency can track progress towards the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement. These opinions cannot be considered discourses, as the common message they transmit is that transparency checks and does not enhance ambition. I thus proceed below by presenting these views and outlining the limitations of transparency in advancing climate action.

41 Submission from Australia on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 42 Submission from CARICOM on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 43 Submission from EU on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 41

Figure 6: Ambition considerations in the Enhanced Transparency Framework Some of the submissions advocate for the modalities, procedures and guidelines to deliver common information in order to track progress toward Parties’ nationally determined contributions. Having common information about which national contributions can be assessed would enhance comparability and reduce uncertainty on the progress made towards each country’s self-determined ambition. Among Parties sharing this view, there are submissions from Australia44, the European Union45, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean46, and Norway47. The statement made by Norway in its submission is representative of these views: “The establishment of an enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement is needed in order to track progress towards the implementation and achievement of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Parties adaptation actions under Article 7 to provide clarity on support provided and received by Parties”48. Other Parties are of the opinion that a unified method to assess nationally determined contributions will also allow countries to track progress towards the long-term goal contained in

44 Submission from Australia on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 45 Submission from EU on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 46 Submission from AILAC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 47 Submission from Norway on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 48 Submission from Norway on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 42 art. 2 of the Paris Agreement. Submissions from the Alliance of Small Island States49, the Caribbean Community50, and the Environmental Integrity Group51 belong to this group. In particular, the Caribbean Community highlights how it is important for the common guidelines to track collective progress towards the 1.5-degree target52. Yet, the Environmental Integrity Group underlines how tracking progress towards the long-term goal is only effective if the purpose of transparency to inform the Global Stocktake on the collective progress is taken into consideration: “It is the basis for assessing the collective progress: in order to collectively assess the global progress towards the long-term goals, reliable and comparable information is essential. This is reflected in the purpose of the transparency framework to inform the Global Stocktake”53. A stand-alone submission is the one from the Like-Minded Developing Countries, which stresses how the enhanced transparency framework should not be a burden for developing country Parties, as they state: “The framework should not result in establishing a top-down regime for the subsequent NDCs or creating de facto limitations on the extent to which Parties, particularly developing countries, may exercise national determination in contributing to address climate change”54. From all these views, it emerges that transparency plays a role in tracking rather than advancing ambition of Parties’ climate action. Even from those submissions arguing for transparency to track progress towards a long-term substantive goal as the 1.5-degree target, it is evident that ambition can be advanced through another mechanism, the Global Stocktake, which transparency only informs. Thus, transparency can be seen as functional to the ambition mechanism of the Paris Agreement, yet per se does not constitute an incentive for Parties to enhance their climate efforts. 5.2 The existing transparency arrangements In this section, I outline conclusions from the analysis of the verification system under the existing transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. The system is bifurcated into the Multilateral Assessment for developed countries and the Facilitative Sharing of Views for developing countries. The two processes only differ on the level of details for reporting. However, the structure remains the same: countries have the possibility to ask each other questions about their national greenhouse gases inventories, mitigation actions and institutional arrangements as well as the methodology used for reporting. According to Boran (2017), such reason-giving processes have the potential to advance both ambition and equity: in fact, countries may be asked how their national policies can be considered equitable or if they are planning to further advance their climate targets. In the answer, she argues, countries may justify their actions by putting forward their understanding of how global climate action should advance (Boran 2017).

49 Submission from AOSIS on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 50 Submission from CARICOM on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 51 Submission from EIG on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 52 Submission from CARICOM on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 53 Submission from EIG on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 54 Submission from LMDC on item 5, APA 1-2 retrieved on 20/12/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 43

Taking this premises as a point of departure, I thus looked at what kind of questions were asked and whether they were relevant to advance the equity and ambition discourses. On that, the vast majority of questions in both processes did not have any role in advancing climate action. Questions in fact were highly technical and focused on checking the information contained in the submitted reports. I then looked at the answers given in both processes and identified different discourses they produced on equity and ambition. In the sections below, I elaborate on these discourses, arguing that (1) the review processes of the existing transparency arrangements largely fail in putting forward a common understanding on equity and ambition, and (2) transparency plays a role in checking rather than advancing climate action. 5.2.1 Equity I here present the questions that were relevant to advance a shared understanding on equity and the main discourses that emerged from the answers given. Among the questions asked, those relating directly to equity focused on mitigation actions and the support provided. An example can be the question asked by Brazil to the European Union: “The EU reiterated in BR2 that ‘under the UNFCCC, the EU and its Member States have taken a joint emission reduction target to reduce its GHG emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 by 2020, with a conditional offer to move to a 30% reduction, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities’ […] Considering the adoption of Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, is the EU moving to the commitment of 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990? “55. There also was one question related to institutional arrangements. In the developing country process, the questions focused on asking about the challenges in implementing the self- determined climate targets: “You have just mentioned your 2020 and 2030 targets in your presentation. Can you share more information on the challenges Thailand is facing in achieving these goals, and your consideration to address these hindrances?”56. Given the few questions posed, it can be argued that countries do not use these fora of discussion to specifically stimulate an advancement of the equity discourse. Rather, the main purpose, considering the topics touched upon by countries, is to scrutinize the information provided, with questions largely focusing on technical matters - ranging from the methodology used to develop greenhouse gas inventories to specifics on national policies. Drawing conclusions from the answers given, three main discourses emerge: (1) the sustainable development discourse, (2) the equitable transparency framework discourse, and (3) the support discourse. As in the case of the questions, answers advancing the equity discourse were extremely sporadic in both processes, and cannot be considered as a driver to formulate a strong shared understanding on equity.

55 UNFCCC, Multilateral Assessment under the IAR process, SBI 45, European Union, available at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-convention/national- communications 56 UNFCCC, Facilitative Sharing of Views under the ICA process, Third Workshop, available at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/biennial-update- reportsand-international-consultation-and-analysis/facilitative-sharing-of-views 44

Figure 7: Equity discourses in the transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC The sustainable development discourse particularly arises from the developing countries process. It mainly relates to the concept of intra-generational justice embedded in the definition of sustainable development. Four answers from developing countries in fact focused on stressing the priority of development needs over climate actions. One answer from the developed countries process confirmed the discourse highlighting how advanced economies should do more. The equitable transparency framework discourse draws attention on the need for developing countries to receive support so to enhance their reporting capacities. Only six answers under the developing countries process focused on that. As in the submissions for the enhanced transparency framework, equity operates at two levels: at mechanism level and at climate action level. The support discourse is instead centered at climate action level and outlines the need for financial support to implement mitigation actions for developing countries. Again, those advocating for this view were just a few, accounting for only three answers under the developing countries process. These three discourses remain extremely vague in their understanding of equity and only rephrase old concepts without advancing a substantive framework. Furthermore, as the vast majority of questions and answers in both processes focused on more technical aspects, it can be concluded that the role of transparency in advancing equitable climate action is extremely limited. 5.2.2 Ambition I here present the results from the questions asked on ambition and the main discourses emerged by the answers given. As per equity, the vast majority of both questions and answers touched

45 upon very technical aspects. Those questions aimed at advancing the ambition discourse related to mitigation actions in both the developing and developed countries processes. One question relating to institutional arrangements functional to the enhancement of mitigation actions was asked in the developing countries process. However, all questions were particularly aimed at checking the ambition of policies towards countries’ self-determined voluntary target. Only one question in the developed countries process was posed to the Russian Federation, asking if it aimed at enhancing the already set targets, which had a negative answer. The conclusions on the questions asked on ambition reflect those on equity: questions to advance ambition were extremely sporadic and both developed and developing country Parties do not primarily use these fora of discussion to advance the ambition discourse. Amongst the few answers that were relevant to ambition, three main discourses are put forward: (1) the self-determined ambition discourse, (2) the long-term goal discourse, and (3) the interdependence discourse.

Figure 8: Ambition discourses in the transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC As per equity, answers advancing the ambition discourse were very sporadic and vague and cannot be considered as a strong driver to advance the ambition discourse. Such finding can be confirmed by outlining these discourses. Answers belonging to the self-assessment discourse aimed at highlighting how Parties’ mitigation policies are on track in delivering the self-determined national target. This discourse appeared only in the developed countries process, which registered twelve answers putting forward this view. On the contrary, the only two answers belonging to the long-term goal discourse highlighted how Parties’ mitigation actions are on track in delivering the collective climate targets. However, there was not a clear reference to the substantive targets to do so, but it was just remarked that the most advanced countries should do more. The interdependence discourse was shared by three

46 answers in the developed countries process and underlined how one country’s ambition is dependent to other Parties’ targets. Amongst all discourses, the interdependence discourse can be seen as the most relevant, as it puts forward the idea that ambition cannot be raised by one country alone. Within this context, it can serve as driver for advancing the need of a clear common understanding of climate ambition amongst Parties. As per equity, the results on ambition show that vague concepts were put forward by very few answers and without reaching a clear common understanding of how climate action can be ambitious. Moreover, the role of transparency in checking rather than advancing climate action is further confirmed. 5.3 Discourse hegemonization Since there were no specific discourses emerging from the submission on transparency, I here look at how the most debated issues, namely flexibility and capacity building, are framed in the final decision of COP24. The discourses identified from the analysis of the existing transparency arrangements are not considered, as they were not meant to produce an output at the United Nations climate change conference in Katowice. Rather, their analysis aimed at investigating how the transparency mechanism within the United Nations climate regime was performing to date in advancing ambition and equity in climate action. With regards to flexibility, the Decision stressed the provision of the Agreement: “Also recognizing that flexibility for those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities is reflected in the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency of action and support”57. Interestingly, in the submissions there was high concern from all Parties on what flexibility should be used for or apply to. The decision, underlines that “The application of flexibility provided for in the provisions of these MPGs for those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities is to be self-determined.”58. Interestingly, flexibility here relates to the concept of post-equity, already introduced in the background chapter and also mentioned in Chapter 6: The Global Stocktake. The idea of post- equity relates to the fact that differentiation is to be self-defined and self-imposed, with no strict pre-determined rules. It is true that a distinction is still made between developed and developing countries. However, the freedom to determine on what, for how long, and to whom among the developing countries flexibility can apply leaves space to interpret self-determined flexibility as a form of post-equity. Yet, there is an important and interesting difference between transparency and stocktaking: while on transparency self-determined equity applies to procedures, for the Global Stocktake equity refers to information. Concerning capacity-building, some Parties addressed the Capacity Building Initiative on Transparency (CBIT) in the submissions. The Initiative was mentioned in the final decision of COP24: “Recognizing that the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency, established pursuant to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 84, will continue to support developing country Parties, upon

57 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 58 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 47 request, to build their institutional and technical capacity, both pre- and post- 2020”59. Although general, the statement reiterates the willingness on behalf of developed countries to enhance the ambition of reporting over time. More interestingly, there was a reference on the role of transparency to track progress. There seemed to be a divergence of opinions in the submissions: some were supporting transparency in tracking progress towards the long-term goal, whilst others endorsed the relevance of transparency to track progress towards the Nationally Determined Contributions. This last view was taken into account in the Decision, which states: “Each Party shall provide the information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving its NDC under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, in accordance with the MPGs contained in chapter III below;”60. As a confirmation of this, transparency does not advance equity nor ambition in the United Nations climate regime. It operationalizes equity in its development through the provision of flexibility, but countries in their submissions do not refer to the operationalization of the mechanism as a way to enhance equitable and ambitious climate action. Rather, as already argued, transparency tracks progress against voluntary, self-determined targets. 5.4 Transparency’s transformative potential in global governance The key result that emerges from the analysis of both the submissions and the reason-giving review process is that transparency checks and does not advance climate action. Gupta and Mason (2014) discuss the substantive effects of transparency, revealing that transparency largely distracts from substantive outcomes and that there is little proof of information disclosure-led environmental improvements (Gupta, Aarti and Mason 2014). The results suggest that under the United Nations climate regime, transparency does not advance climate action on equity and ambition and thus confirm Gupta and Mason’s argument. It was shown through the analysis that transparency’s main purpose is to check against voluntary, self-determined national targets. However, in the submissions and review processes analyzed, few Parties put forward the idea that transparency can check against a substantive collective target. Within this context, one may argue that transparency can advance climate action by checking national contributions against one overarching collective target and advancing national actions towards that target. Yet, this view presents a major limitation, as the transparency mechanism under the United Nations climate regime assesses climate action per country and not collectively. Hence, it would be too hard to define whether one country is on track to deliver what all countries should deliver collectively. While these considerations further confirm the limited capacity of transparency in advancing climate action, an interesting point arises: the disclosure of actions needs to be collectively assessed once gone through the transparency process. Indeed, in the analysis of the written submissions, several countries refer to the fact that transparency shall inform the stocktaking mechanism, so to collectively assess what is singularly disclosed. Thus, transparency arrangements in global governance may enhance a country’s efforts in a certain domain, under the condition that another mechanism allows a collective assessment of the disclosure against an agreed target.

59 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 60 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 48

In this chapter, I have outlined the discourses, or considerations, emerged from written submissions on the implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the reason- giving processes of the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. I also discussed the transformative potential of transparency in global governance, grounding my arguments on the findings and the academic debate on the topic. The results emerged from the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC show that transparency presents major limitations in advancing ambitious and equitable climate action. Below, I summarize the key findings of the analysis. In the next chapter, I proceed with the analysis of the Global Stocktake.

Figure 9: Summary of the findings for Transparency

49

6. Global Stocktake Article 14 of the Paris Agreement outlines the general provisions of the Global Stocktake, identifying it as the mechanism through which Parties are informed about the updating and enhancing of their Nationally Determined Contributions (United Nations 2015). However, how the Global Stocktake works in practice, operationalizes the principles of equity, and furthers ambition is yet to be agreed on. So far, Parties have been expressing their views on the subject through written submissions, pointing out specifically how they see said mechanism operating. In this chapter, I draw the conclusions from the analysis of three separated sessions, accounting for 37 documents from developed and developing country Parties, or party coalitions. I here analyze how Parties address equity and ambition in their written submissions and how they envision the Global Stocktake to advance climate action on these matters. I start by outlining conclusions for equity, arguing that although an operationalization of the equity principle has been suggested, many submissions do not mention it, while others express concern on what equity should apply to. I then proceed by analyzing ambition, arguing that ambitious climate action is determined by format and content of the outcome of the Global Stocktake, and I identify a political momentum discourse and a positive outcome discourse. Eventually, I conclude by discussing the implications of the Global Stocktake as a novel mechanism for global governance, by arguing that similar mechanisms diverge the attention from substantive questions and that power over information can escalate to power over substantive matters. 6.1 Equity In this section, I proceed by first identifying three categories of submissions: (1) those that do not mention equity at all, (2) those that merely re-state the content of art. 14.1 of the Agreement but do not go beyond it, and (3) those that elaborate on equity by sharing their views on the subject. From the first two categories I derive the one that I call the silence discourse. From the third category, after having identified some recurrent elements, I marked out two additional discourse: the self-assessment discourse and the beyond-mitigation discourse.

Figure 10: Equity and CBDR in the Global Stocktake

50

Figure 11: Equity discourses in the Global Stocktake 6.1.1 General reference to the equity principle, framing, and silence Article 14.1 of the Paris Agreement states that the Conference of the Parties shall periodically take stock of the collective efforts on mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support in light of equity and the best available science. In this section, I focus on the notion “in light of equity” and analyze how Parties and coalitions address such principle. At first glance, it is noticeable that not all submissions explicitly mention equity and the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle. I here identify three categories of submissions in this regard: (1) those that do not mention equity at all, (2) those that merely re-state the content of art. 14.1 of the Agreement but do not go beyond it, and (3) those that elaborate on equity sharing their views on the subject. The first category consists of those submissions that do not mention equity at all, as they do not contain any explicit reference either to the broader concept of equity, or to the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle. Submissions from Canada61, the coalition of Australia, Canada, Japan and USA62, and the Russian Federation63 belong to this category. Zooming in on the submission from the coalition of Australia, Canada, Japan, and USA, it is possible to observe that the group of negotiators avoid every reference to equity since the beginning: “The Global Stocktake is a centrally important component of the Paris Agreement that signals to the

61 Submission from Canada on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 62 Submission from Australia, Canada, Japan and USA on item 6, APA1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 63 Submission from Russian Federation on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 51 international community a collective, long-term commitment to achieving the purpose and goals of the Agreement. It is the primary mechanism through which Parties come together to track collective progress on a regular basis”64. The text proceeds by outlining technical considerations on the modalities and inputs of the Global Stocktake. The submission belongs to the first session of the three analyzed; in the following sessions, the coalition splits with Australia, Canada, and Japan individually submitting their views. Interestingly, Canada65 continues to lack references about equity, whilst Australia and Japan mention the principle in the introduction. The second category consists of those submissions that merely re-state the content of art. 14.1 of the Agreement but do not go beyond it, as they refer to the principle by only mentioning “in light of equity”. Examples of this case can be Australia66, the Environmental Integrity Group67, Indonesia68, and Japan69. The Environmental Integrity Group refers to it as follows: “it is crucial to consider the full scope of inputs covering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support in a comprehensive and balanced way, in light of equity and best available science as noted in Article 14.1 of the Paris Agreement”70. Almost the same applies to Australia and Indonesia, as their submissions mention the principle in the introduction by rephrasing the content of art 14.1. Japan goes slightly beyond a simple re-statement, by identifying equity as a guiding principle for the Global Stocktake. Yet, it is not detailed how the principle is envisioned to guide the mechanism, as the only reference is the following: “Principles: comprehensive and facilitative process in the light of equity and the best available science”71. In a more recent submission, Japan shortly elaborates on it, as the text states that “consideration would be given to equity and the best available science when assessing individual area”72. However, how Japan envisions such considerations on equity to work in practice remains an open question. It is thus possible to cluster under the silence discourse those submissions that avoid references or only mention equity, as opposed to those that instead advance suggestions to include equity-related considerations. The third category identifies those submissions that elaborate on equity by sharing their views on the subject. Almost all developing countries - with few exceptions, e.g. Indonesia73 - expand their

64 Submission from Australia, Canada, Japan and USA on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 65 Submission from Canada on item 6, APA 1-3, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 66 Submission from Australia on item 6, APA 1-3, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 67 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 68 Submission from Indonesia on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 69 Submission from Japan on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 70 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 71 Submission from Japan on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 72 Submission from Japan on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 73 Submission from Indonesia on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-3, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 52 general concerns on equity, by going beyond the mere re-statement of art. 14.1. These submissions often further general considerations, by providing an actual operationalization of the equity principle. I here outline the general elements and concepts that these submissions link to the equity principle. Firstly, there is often a more specific reference to equity, as countries explicitly mention the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle. Examples of that can be the submissions from India74, the Like-Minded Developing Countries75, and South Africa76. Interestingly, when they refer to the exact principle, a more precise elaboration is provided, as India introduces it as follows: “The modality of GST should operationalize the principle of equity and CBDR and should not be confined to assessment of collective progress on mitigation, but also consider adaptation and means of implementation and support in pursuance of Article 14.1 of the Agreement”77. Although this is still a general statement, it gives more weight to the relevance of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle by specifying that differentiation shall apply to the entire scope of the Global Stocktake and not be limited to mitigation. Similarly, the Like-Minded Developing Countries78 state in their submission: “Ambition and progression ought to be reflected in all the aforementioned elements, guided by the principles of equity and CBDR, and reflecting a differentiated arrangement for developing and developed countries that takes into account, for example, the context of special national circumstances and development imperatives of developing countries; and the level of financial, technological, and capacity building support to be provided by developed countries to developing countries”79. These submissions thus take a step further from the previous category: although the quotations provided still remain general, there is an evident attempt to advance an operationalization of equity, by taking distance from a simple rephrasing of art. 14.1. Another general trend in this category of submissions is the reference to sustainable development and poverty eradication when addressing equity. Examples of this can be found in the viewpoints submitted by the Arab Group80, China81, and the Like-Minded Developing Countries82. The link between equity and sustainable development is outlined in different manners. In fact, some are general statements, as in China’s case: “Sustainability and equity should be reflected in all

74 Submission from India on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 75 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 76 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 77 Submission from India on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 78 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 79 Ibidem 80 Submission from Arab Group on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 81 Submission from China on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 82 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 53 elements, such as synergies and tradeoff between mitigation and sustainable development, and the support received by developing countries, etc.”83 On the contrary, other references to sustainable development and poverty eradication are more specific, as the one from the Like-Minded Developing Countries: “Equity and science should be considered holistically in the GST. Information on equity, sustainable development and poverty eradication will be significant to set the right context for the GST”84. The lowest common denominator between the two quotations is the emphasis on climate change as a sustainable development issue, implying that an equitable sharing of efforts is required in order to ensure intra- and inter-generational justice. The Global Stocktake is thus seen as an essential mechanism that takes into consideration sustainable development and poverty eradication, in order to assess the collective climate action in equitable terms. There are submissions that elaborate on equity by opening a discussion on how an equity framework should be developed when discussing the implementation of the Paris Agreement with regards to the Global Stocktake. Relevant to this position are submissions by the African Group of Negotiators85, the Alliance Of Small Island States86, the European Union87, and New Zealand88. Interestingly, this cluster of submissions that refer to equity by opening a discussion is more heterogenous in comparison with the previous ones, as it involves both developing and developed countries. The common point is that they all express concern on how the equity framework should be put forward, although they differ to some degree on how that should be done. The Alliance Of Small Island States advocates for a non-prescriptive approach, as they state: “We do not believe it is possible to negotiate a prescriptive approach to equity - in particular given that Article 14 is clear that the outcome of the GST shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support in a nationally determined manner”89. New Zealand brings this view further, by expressing its intention to address equity in the Global Stocktake, while at the same time avoiding the debates that led to disagreement in the past: “New Zealand seeks to continue engaging in discussions on how to ensure the Global Stocktake is carried out in the light of equity in ways consistent to the Paris Agreement. This important discussion should not be diverted by reopening debate on modalities on which we were unable to achieve consensus in Paris”.90 The European Union remarks the same point, making it clear that the Global Stocktake should not aim at highlighting equity questions. However, its submission still recognizes the need to embed equity

83 Submission from China on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 84 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 85 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 86 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 87 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 88 Submission from New Zealand on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 89 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 90 Submission from New Zealand on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 54 aspects within the Global Stocktake’s discussion: “While it is not the objective of the GST to settle scientific nor equity questions, different aspects of both science (for example through the IPCC) and equity can be relevant to the GST's deliberations”91. Finally, the African Group of Negotiators does promote a commonly agreed equity framework, that shall function as a tool for Parties to assess their Nationally Determined Contributions, as the Group remarks: “With regard to equity, the African Group believes there must be an agreed equity framework with defined indicators against which each Party should assess their own contribution. These indicators could include contribution to emissions, capability and development needs. An invitation for Parties to submit their views and proposals on such a framework and indicators would help advance the work”92. This proposal is aligned with what other Parties envision in their submissions and opens the possibility to an actual operationalization of equity. More in particular, there are numerous views submitted by Parties that show how equity should work in practice through the implementation of the Global Stocktake. They in fact underline how inputs on equity can be relevant for Parties to self-assess their Nationally Determined Contributions when informed by the Global Stocktake. The next section further specifies how such an operationalization of equity is envisioned to function. 6.1.2 Operationalization of the equity principle: the self-assessment discourse In this section, I outline how Parties and coalitions envision the equity principle operationalized in practice. I identify submissions that elaborate on this matter as belonging to what I call the self- assessment discourse. In fact, although views on the operationalization of equity are fragmented and cover different aspects of the Global Stocktake, they all have one element in common: they recognize that the purpose of the Global Stocktake is to inform Parties. As climate efforts on adaptation, mitigation, and means of implementation are voluntary and nationally determined, it is not within the Global Stocktake mandate to directly update Parties’ contributions. Within such context, submissions that advocate for an operationalization of the equity principle seek to include equity-related information as inputs for the Global Stocktake. Accordingly, the outcome would provide indicators that Parties can use when self-assessing individual voluntary contributions. The self-assessment discourse entails several elements in which equity is envisioned to play a role: inputs, indicators, and outcome. Only few submissions address all these elements, as in the case of the Like-Minded Developing Countries93 and the joint submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay94, while the majority specifically focuses on inputs. With regards to the latter, relevant submissions come from the Alliance Of Small Island States95, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay96, the

91 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 92 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 93 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 94 Submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 95 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 96 Submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 55

Like-Minded Developing Countries97, and South Africa98. The aim of the proposal is to have inputs to the Global Stocktake that would then serve as sources for the collective assessment of mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation. Particularly explicatory is the submission from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, which says: “However, there is still lack clarity on what would be the possible specific inputs for equity, which Parties also agreed will guide the GST. Specific inputs on equity should be elaborated based on the synthesis and aggregation of information provided by Parties in their NDCs, specifically information related to Article 4.3 and the element of "fairness and ambition" stated in paragraph 27 of Decision 1/CP.21”99. The Like-Minded Developing Countries also advocates to feed the Global Stocktake with equity considerations as the joint submission from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay states. However, the coalition also points out another type of inputs that would be relevant for equity considerations: those on finance. Specifically, they envision information on finance to be crucial for an equitable global climate action, as they state: “Furthermore, another category of crucial inputs on finance is information on developed countries’ climate finance that take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, and how mobilization of climate finance represents a progression beyond their previous efforts and historical responsibilities”100. From these two statements, it thus becomes clear that while a substantive equity framework presents difficulties, information on equity can be made available in order to allow an assessment with not only scientific but also social considerations. Further, for the very structure of the Global Stocktake, whose aim is to inform Parties for the enhancement of their contributions, the inclusion of inputs on equity remains the only feasible option to put forward equitable, yet voluntary, climate action. Additionally, some submissions state the need to have clear indicators against which Parties can self-assess the fairness of their Nationally Determined Contributions. The African Group of Negotiators101, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay102, and the Like-Minded Developing Countries103 advocate for this option, but they are not aligned on how these indicators are to be developed. In fact, the African Group of Negotiators asks for a substantive equity framework to set the indicators: “With regard to equity, the African Group believes there must be an agreed equity framework with defined indicators against which each Party should assess their own contribution”104.

97 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 98 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 99 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 100 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 101 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 102 Submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 103 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 104 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 56

On the contrary, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay remark that the indicators should be derived from the inputs on equity: “Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are of the view that specific inputs for equity should be provided to enable Parties to have references on equity to set out their fairness and ambition when domestically self-defining their successive NDCs according to Article 4.3 of Paris Agreement”105. A third option is the one put forward by the Like-Minded Developing Countries, that instead suggest to use already-existing indicators, as they state: “Indicators such as human development index (HDI); which is a clear measure of development, the potential to mitigate, and technical and financial capabilities to respond to climate change, should be considered as factors to attribute responsibility”106. This divergence of views on where the indicators should be derived from weakens the self- assessment discourse. Indeed, while the discourse has potential as a valuable and feasible option to integrate equity considerations through inputs and the development of indicators, it does not provide a unified and coherently shared proposal that could put pressure on other Parties. On the contrary, since the suggestions on this matter are only coming from few submissions and even differ from one another, they may be simply avoided and not considered by other Parties and coalitions. Ultimately, the self-assessment discourse is reflected on what effects Parties envision for the Global Stocktake’s outcome to deliver. In fact, the idea that inputs on equity would develop or contribute to the development of indicators through which Parties can self-assess their Nationally Determined Contributions poses expectations on a differentiated response to the update of efforts. Such expectations are reflected in several submissions, including those from the Alliance of Small Island States107, the European Union108, the Like-Minded Developing Countries109 and South Africa110. Particularly strong is the statement from the Like-Minded Developing Countries, which are quite specific not only on how Parties should enhance their contributions, but also on how: “When informed by the outcome of GST, developed country Parties should further increase their ambition both on emission reductions and provision of finance, technology and capacity- building support to developing country Parties, in line with their historical responsibility and leadership in addressing climate change, and developing countries could further enhance their mitigation and adaptation actions, taking into account their circumstances, capacities and increased finance, technology and capacity-building support received.”111

105 Submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 106 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 107 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 108 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 109 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 110 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 111 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 57

Similarly, South Africa expresses its concerns on how the outcome would differently impact the contributions of each party on the basis of its national circumstances, as the country’s submission highlights: “It is for each Party to accept its fair share of responsibility. In Paris, we agreed that there is a strong expectation to show progression on a voluntary basis. Parties should use the stocktake outcomes to help with the preparation of their next NDCs on the basis of science, equity and CBDR&RC in light of national circumstances”112. Certainly, in a context that entails bottom-up, voluntary, and self-determined actions, putting forward expectations is a soft instrument to push for equity considerations to be taken into account. The proposals on inputs and indicators on equity legitimates and justifies such expectations, while the overall discourse is strengthened when enriched by a desired effect of the Global Stocktake. Eventually, it has to be noted that the self-assessment discourse is in line with what some scholars refer to as post-equity. The idea is that “issues can be addressed by national contributions that will be self-determined” (Klinsky et al. 2017). Within such a context, as it would be difficult to implement a substantive equity framework, it becomes relevant to feed mechanisms that should inform Parties to update their contributions with equity-related information. Yet, the limitations of this approach are considerable, as it leaves freedom of interpretation and no room for any binding provision. 6.1.3 The scope of the Global Stocktake: the beyond-mitigation discourse Several submissions address equity in a more indirect manner, as they refer to the scope of Global Stocktake to highlight what needs to be enhanced. More specifically, attention is put on adaptation, support, financial flows, and loss and damage, as key pillars to be addressed for an equitable climate action. It is important to highlight that this discourse bridges equity and ambition. In fact, on the one side these elements have considerable implications for equity; on the other, they put the light on what Parties need to be ambitious about. With regard to adaptation, several Parties and coalitions extensively elaborate on the subject, and highlight that the collective assessment has to be conducted specifically on ambition support, needs, and priorities. Submissions from the African Group of Negotiators113, the Arab Group114, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay115, the Caribbean Community116, the European Union117, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean118, India119, the Least Developed

112 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 113 Submission from the African Group of Negotiators on item 6 APA 1-2, available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 114 Submission from Arab Group on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 115 Submission from Argentina Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 116 Submission from CARICOM on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 117 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 118 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 119 Submission from India on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 58

Countries120, the Like-Minded Developing Countries121, and South Africa122 address the scope of the Global Stocktake. An example can be the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean that advocates for progress in terms of enhanced adaptive capacity, strengthened resilience, and reduced vulnerability to climate change123. The coalition furthers its statement, by identifying the need to have specific inputs on adaptation to be delivered from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as their submission underlines: “On adaptation, the IPCC can provide information on the impacts and vulnerability in light of the global emission pathways”124. Inputs on adaptation for the Global Stocktake are asked by a number of submissions, remarking the importance that such element has for both equity and ambition. However, the majority of Parties refer to the Adaptation Communications, which include “priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties”125. It becomes thus clear the importance of having such communications as key inputs for the Global Stocktake, in order to advance equitable climate action that goes beyond the mitigation domain. Among those stressing the importance to have inputs on adaptation, there are the Alliance of Small Island States126, Canada127, the Environmental Integrity Group128, Indonesia129, New Zealand130, Norway131, and South Africa132. The extraordinary focus put on adaptation is clear in the statement made by South Africa, as the submission states: “as the Global Stocktake will be assessing progress in implementing the Agreement in its entirety, in the light of equity and the best available science, it will be important to assess progress on achieving the Global Goal on Adaptation”133. Although the Global Stocktake entails adaptation as one of the three elements on

120 Submission from LDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 121 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 122 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 123 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 124 Ibidem 125 Registry for Adaptation Communications, UNFCCC, retrieved on 24/11/2018 at https://unfccc.int/registry-for- adaptation-communications 126 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 127 Submission from Canada on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 128 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 129 Submission from Indonesia on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 130 Submission from New Zealand on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 131 Submission from Norway on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 132 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 133 Ibidem 59 which ambition had to be enhanced together with mitigation and means of implementation, the particular space that Parties reserve to it in their submissions declares the relevance that adaptation has in equity considerations. This is further justified by the fact that, when Parties address it, they often frame adaptation in terms of capacity, needs, and support. Other two elements that Parties tend to focus on are support and financial flows. They also fall within the scope of the Global Stocktake under means of implementation; however, the particular attention given to these two components of the means of implementation establishes their relevance for equity. Furthermore, this becomes even clearer if it is considered that they are often framed in terms of development and historical responsibilities. Submissions from the African Group of Negotiators134, the Alliance of Small Island States135, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean136, the Like-Minded Developing Countries137, and Norway138 particularly insist on finance and support. Among those, the statement from the Like-Minded Developing Countries is particularly indicative, as it calls for having equity-relevant inputs on finance: “another category of crucial inputs on finance is information on developed countries’ climate finance that takes into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, and how mobilization of climate finance represents a progression beyond their previous efforts and historical responsibilities”139. However, the entire paragraph that Norway dedicates to the issue, provides a direct link between financial flows, support, and equity, as it states as follows: “With regard to equity the following is important to take into account under the work stream on finance flows and means of implementation, including support. Taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries (cf. art 9.3) Aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation and prioritize those that are particularly vulnerable and have capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries DC and small island developing states, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation (cf. art 9.4) The institutions serving the Agreement shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval processes and enhanced readiness support for developing countries, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing states”140 Although adaptation, support, and financial flows are given high priority in most submissions, and also taking into account that they fall within the scope of the Global Stocktake as indicated in the Paris Agreement, nonetheless, their crucial implications for equity are not always recognized. For

134 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 135 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 136 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 137 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 138 Submission from Norway on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 139 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 140 Submission from Norway on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 60 example, the European Union141 refers to these elements several time, but never mentions equity in the same paragraph. The same applies for New Zealand142, while Canada143 dedicates to it only a few lines of its submission. Eventually, an important and highly debated issue that can be clustered under the beyond- mitigation discourse is loss and damage. The African Group of Negotiators144, the Caribbean Community145, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean146, the Least Developed Countries147, India148, and South Africa149 advocate to include loss and damage within the scope of the Global Stocktake, although with some difficulties since the only elements to be collectively assessed under art. 14 of the Paris Agreement are mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. The submission from South Africa makes it clear, as it remarks: “To achieve comprehensiveness, the Global Stocktake must also include elements set out in the Agreement that are not explicitly mentioned in the Agreement’s purpose but form an integral part of it, such as loss and damage”150. Although the number of countries pushing for loss and damage to be taken into account under the Global Stocktake is significant, the hegemonizing silence from the other submissions on the matter leaves little room for consideration. Overall, the beyond-mitigation discourse emphasizes several elements that are crucial for both equity and ambition, especially with regard to adaptation and support. However, while it is possible for Parties to leverage on those components of the Global Stocktake prescribed by the Paris Agreement, including new issues such as loss and damage proves to be more laborious. On this regard, the main hurdle consists in the lack of consideration of other Parties and coalitions for the subject. 6.2 Ambition The Global Stocktake is at the core of the Paris Agreement’s ambition mechanism. It represents a tool through which Parties can collectively assess their Nationally Determined Contributions, and provides an outcome with the information necessary to enhance climate efforts with regards to mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation. However, ambition is not easy to reach

141 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 142 Submission from New Zealand on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 143 Submission from Canada on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 144 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 145 Submission from CARICOM on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 146 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 147 Submission from LDC on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 148 Submission from India on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 149 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 150 Ibidem 61 within the Global Stocktake: because its goal is to inform Parties, it does not trigger a directly consequential update of contributions nor it binds or sanctions countries against its outcome. Indeed, there is wide acknowledgement in all submissions that the Global Stocktake’s outcome does not oblige Parties to enhance their ambition in any way; rather, it provides information that can then be used for that aim. The Like-Minded Developing Countries are very clear on this matter, as they state: “Therefore, in the provisions of Paris Agreement, it is clear that there is no specific and direct linkage between the outcome of the GST and any adjustments or upgrading that individual Parties may make with respect to their existing NDCs and/or their subsequent NDCs”151. Less direct, but of the same opinion are all countries and coalitions, as they take space in their submissions to stress that the outcome shall be only informative. These statements highlight the limitations that the mechanism has with regards to ambition. At the same time, some contradictions occur within Parties’ statements: in fact, the same Parties that put forth their expectations on how developed countries are to update contributions in light of their historical responsibilities seem now to recognize and even underline the unrestrictive nature of the mechanism. Within this context, I analyze how Parties envision the Global Stocktake to advance ambition despite the hurdles posed by its purely informative purpose. I begin by outlining the prescriptive approach that some Parties propose, although it lacks grounding as not coherent with the nature of the mechanism. I then proceed with presenting the political momentum discourse as the main shared understanding of ambition that countries agree on. I then conclude by highlighting the positive outcome discourse that has received support only by a limited number of Parties.

151 Submission from LMDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 62

Picture 12: Ambition discourses in the Global Stocktake 6.2.1 A prescriptive approach Some Parties advocate for a prescriptive approach. This view identifies three components of ambition: (1) how ambitious Parties have to be, (2) what elements they have to be ambitious about, and (3) who has to be ambitious and to what extent. Concerning the first component, there is a shared understanding that the overall long-term goal to be achieved is the one indicated in art. 2 of the Paris Agreement: to remain below 1.5 or 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. However, only the Alliance of Small Island States152 and the Marshall Islands153 advocate explicitly for the 1.5 degrees target. Precisely, the Marshall Islands remark the following: “it is clear that the overall purpose of the ambition mechanism is to operationalize the progression principle by raising raise ambition over time so as to achieve the long-term temperature goal of 1.5˚C”154. The Alliance of Small Island States similarly addresses the matter by stating that “The adequacy of progress is to be assessed not only against achieving the temperature goal under Article 2 but also the mitigation goal under Article 4 to peak global emissions as soon as possible”155. Beside the Marshall Island, the statement is shared also by the

152 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 153 Submission from Marshall Islands on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 154 Ibidem 155 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 63

Independent Association of Latin American and the Caribbean156 and the Least Developed Countries157. However, the rest of submissions remain vague, and simply refer to art. 2 as a general reference to where the Paris Agreement should lead to in the long-term. The beyond-mitigation discourse, as already outlined in the equity section, elaborates on the second component of the prescriptive approach, as to say on what elements Parties have to be ambitious. Similarly, I have explained how Parties envision a differentiated commitment to enhance their Nationally Determined Contribution in the self-assessment discourse, also under the equity section. These two last components of the ambition’s prescriptive approach highlight how the equity and ambition discourses are very much interlinked and present similar obstacles. Indeed, the self-assessment discourse for equity provides on the one side a good tool to integrate equity considerations in the Global Stocktake, but on the other it lacks strong effectiveness due to the informative character of the mechanism. The same logic applies for ambition: identifying a specific and ambitious goal can help global climate action to move forward, but at the same time the objective is weakened by the lack of any guarantee that Parties will take action upon the information received. 6.2.2 The political momentum discourse The vast majority of Parties seem to agree that the most effective way to advance ambition through the Global Stocktake is to create a political momentum at the end of the process. The mechanism has two phases: a technical phase during which inputs are submitted and the collective assessment is carried out, and a political phase that consists of discussions on the output of the technical phase. At the end of the political phase, Parties envision a high-level dialogue that would pave the way to a political momentum on the basis of the information created through the technical phase. Submissions from the African Group of Negotiators158, Canada159, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay160, the Caribbean Community161, the Environmental Integrity Group162, the European Union163, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean164, Japan165, the Least Developed

156 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 157 Submission from LDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 158 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 159 Submission from Canada on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 160 Submission from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 161 Submission from CARICOM on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 162 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 163 Submission from EU on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 164 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 165 Submission from Japan on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 64

Countries166, the Marshall Islands167, New Zealand168, Norway169, and South Africa170 entail this option. However, there are slightly different framings about what this last high-level dialogue shall entail. The Environmental Integrity Group envisions the achievement of a shared political understanding: “the political phase would be held in a form of a high-level dialogue or a high-level roundtable, where Ministers discuss the implications of the findings from the technical consideration. The goal of this phase is to arrive at sharing a political understanding with the aim to produce a final output carrying a shared political message”171. Differently, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean reckons it to be an occasion for a political momentum as its submission states: “On that year, the CMA shall hold the High-Level Event (HLE) with a focus on the GST to consider the conclusions from the inputs formulated during the technical phase. In that consideration, the HLE may complement these and endorse them, as appropriate, but most importantly capturing the political commitment to take the findings of the technical phase of the GST and using it to enhance the ambition of the subsequent round of contributions, actions and support”172. Despite the small differences among Parties, the concluding stage of the political phase is considered to be crucial to advance ambition. Within this context, a prescriptive approach would be easier to envision and to implement, as there is both the consensus and the political enthusiasm at the end of the process to update contributions on the basis of an agreed understanding on the output of the Global Stocktake. 6.2.3 The positive outcome discourse Some submissions advocate for an output of the Global Stocktake that would not only assess the status of the collective climate efforts on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, but also provide Parties with information on best practices, lessons learned and opportunities to enhance cooperation. Such output of the Global Stocktake is envisioned to foster ambition as it provides positive information that Parties can actively use to update their contributions. Submissions that entail this approach are those from the African Group of Negotiators173, the Alliance of Small Island States174, the Arab Group175, China176, the Environmental Integrity Group177

166 Submission from LDC on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 167 Submission from Marshall Islands on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 168 Submission from New Zealand on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 169 Submission from Norway on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 170 Submission from South Africa on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 171 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 172 Submission from AILAC on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 173 Submission from AGN on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 174 Submission from AOSIS on item 6, APA 1-2, 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 175 Submission from Arab Group on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 65 and Japan178. China expresses the idea: “The outcome of the GST could be information reference for Parties, with a view to sending a positive signal to recognize the overall progress made and strengthen the confidence on achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals; Summarizing best practices and experiences as well as lessons learned from the implementations and identifying both the potential and barriers, benefits and costs on climate actions; Illustrating further opportunities and possible solutions on international cooperation”179. Similarly, the Environmental Integrity Group puts the focus on the importance of having a positive output from the Global Stocktake in order to enable an easier response from Parties, as its submissions suggests: “it should reflect the information on not only the ambition gap but also the opportunities to send out a positive signal and facilitate consequent actions”180. Through such proposal, it is possible to conclude that Parties envision two main elements to determine and advance ambition within the Global Stocktake: the concluding stage of the political phase, that needs to promote discussion among Parties to achieve a shared political understanding and to capture collective commitment; and the content of the output that should not only entail an assessment, but also provide positive and relevant information for future opportunities. 6.3 Discourse hegemonization Several of the discourses emerged from the Global Stocktake are inserted in the final Katowice decision. However, they are differently included in the text. The beyond mitigation discourse is embedded in the text with a language that does not ensure the actual consideration by Parties of a wider scope for the mechanism, including most importantly the issue of loss and damage; as such, it cannot be considered a dominant discourse. The final decision in fact reports: “Organize its work in line with taking stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving its purpose and long-term goals, including under Article 2, paragraph 1(a–c), in the thematic areas of mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, noting, in this context, that the global stocktake may take into account, as appropriate, efforts related to its work that: (i) Address the social and economic consequences and impacts of response measures; (ii) Avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;”181. However, among the sources of inputs to inform the Global Stocktake, it is stated that Parties are encouraged to take into account “Efforts to enhance understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and facilitative basis, related to averting,

176 Submission from China on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 177 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-3, 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 178 Submission from Japan on item 6, APA 1-3 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 179 Submission from China on item 6, APA 1-2 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 180 Submission from EIG on item 6, APA 1-4 retrieved on 22/11/2018 at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx 181 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved onn 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 66 minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”182. Relating to that, the self-assessment discourse was successful in the way equity-related considerations were included in the decision. Specifically, among the sources of inputs, the following was listed: “Fairness considerations, including equity, as communicated by Parties in their nationally determined contributions;”183. Such a provision represents an important step in the development of an equity framework under the Paris Agreement: being equity taken into account as information to assess countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions, it may have the potential to provide Parties with a common equity reference. The discourse can thus be considered dominant because not only it was inserted in the final Katowice decision, but also it paves the way to a radical change from ow equity has always been debated in the United Nations climate regime. With regards to the outcome, both discourses are included in the decision. The political momentum discourse was mentioned in the decision as follows: [the Conference of the Parties] “Decides that the consideration of outputs will consist of high-level events where the findings of the technical assessment will be presented and their implications discussed and considered by Parties, and that the events will be chaired by a high-level committee consisting of the Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and the Chairs of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation;”184. The positive outcome discourse was framed instead so as to include in the output of the Global Stocktake lessons learned and good practices, as the Decision states: [the Conference of the Parties] “Decides that the outputs of the components of the Global Stocktake referred to in paragraph 3 above should summarize opportunities and challenges for enhancing action and support in the light of equity and the best available science, as well as lessons learned and good practices, with a view to achieving the outcome identified in Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement;”185. Within this context, it is possible to state that the two discourses can be considered complementary, as they could be both implemented without compromising one another. However, only during the actual functioning of the Global Stocktake will be possible to understand if one of them in particular is more dominant. 6.4 The Global Stocktake’s transformative potential in global governance The Paris Agreement moved the equity discussion from substantive to procedural: there is not a pre-determined collectively agreed framework that bind countries in their contributions anymore, nor there is a specific discussion exclusively dedicated to equity-related matters. Rather, equity becomes a matter of marginal considerations in the debates over the developments of policy mechanisms as the Global Stocktake. This allows Parties to stay silent, as equity moves from being the main topic of discussion to being one of the side considerations. As a result, there is the risk of

182 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved onn 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 183 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 184 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved onn 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 185 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved onn 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 67 a hegemonizing silence discourse, as Parties remain silent on a matter that is not crucial for the agenda. The bottom-up configuration of the Global Stocktake does not allow any restrictive provision on how Parties should update their contributions, besides providing them with relevant information on how the collective climate efforts on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation have been doing so far. As a result, equity and ambition that in the past took a substantive shape have now become information: the suggested option of having inputs on equity can be an example. Hence, those who have the power to build and maintain a specific conception of equity have the power to decide over the information to be included. In other words, who has control over the information to be used, has also the power to decide upon the outcome. Furthermore, as a bottom-up mechanism, how countries have to react to the information they receive becomes a matter of self-governance. Indeed, great focus is put on the political phase of the mechanisms that needs to be positive in order to stimulate consequent ambitious action. As a result, the stocktaking mechanism provides some basis to advance efforts, but it does not secure an actual binding outcome. The results emerged from the analysis of the submissions on the operationalization of the Global Stocktake show that the mechanism has the potential to advance both equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime, although it presents some limitations. Below, I summarize the key findings from the analysis. In the next chapter, I proceed by drawing conclusions from the analysis of the Talanoa Dialogue.

Figure 13: Summary of the findings for the Global Stocktake

68

7. The Talanoa Dialogue The Talanoa Dialogue was launched by the Presidency of Fiji at COP 23 in Bonn in 2017186. The purpose of the Dialogue is to build trust among countries by sharing stories and taking stock of the efforts in relation to action and support before 2020; to fulfil its mandate, Parties were encouraged to respond to the questions “Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”187. As the mechanism was launched by the Fiji presidency at COP 23, and is not embedded in the Paris Agreement, there are no available submissions in which countries envision how the Dialogue should work. Although written inputs were analysed, they are part of the current mechanism. Hence, in this chapter I respond to the sub-research question “How do they work in practice?”. For the analysis of this mechanism, I thus refer to Public Reason Theory. According to this theory, a common understanding of a determined topic can be built by responding to questions. I here present my findings derived from how Parties answered the three guiding questions of the Dialogue mentioned above. In this chapter I draw conclusions from the analysis of the preparatory phase, consisting of written inputs submitted by Parties throughout 2018, and the political phase, that took place at COP 24 in Katowice in form of oral discussions. I begin by presenting the discourses emerged on equity, arguing that the format of the Talanoa Dialogue gives Parties more legitimacy for their views, as they can further justify them by sharing their experiences. However, key issues of the United Nations climate regime remain unresolved, e.g. operationalization of CBDR. Indeed, two main discourses emerge: the equitable climate actions discourse and the support discourse. And further, the Talanoa Dialogue can be considered a cross-cutting mechanism, for it provides a platform for discussion for the implementation of other mechanisms, giving countries the possibility to discuss equity in relation to other mechanisms like transparency. On this regard, statements from the African Group of Negotiators188, the Association of South-East Asian Nations189 and Egypt190 reiterate the main concepts already identified in the Transparency chapter. I then proceed by presenting conclusions on ambition, arguing that as per equity in the Global Stocktake, substantive questions take the shape of information, as I identify the 1.5 degrees discourse. Following that, I present the other two discourses that emerged from the analysis: the pre-2020 discourse and the political momentum discourse. Eventually, I outline the implications of such mechanisms for global governance, highlighting how sharing stories and experiences can help consolidating views by supporting them with sound justification, but does not resolve pre-existing conflicts.

186 UNFCCC, 2018 Talanoa Dialogue Platform, retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform 187 UNFCCC, Talanoa Dialogue Platform, Background, retrieved on 26/01/2019 at https://talanoadialogue.com/background 188 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AGN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 189 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from ASEAN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 190 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 69

7.1 Equity Two discourses on equity emerged from inputs and interventions by developing country Parties. As in the case of the Global Stocktake, many Parties do not explicitly address the Common But Differentiated Responsibility principle nor they say how they envision the broader concept of equity to be operationalized in the United Nations climate regime. In this section, I draw conclusions from the analysis of the Talanoa Dialogue. I identify two discourses that advance equity: (1) the equitable climate action discourse and (2) the support discourse. In both discourses, results show that key issues such as the need to identify substantive targets or the support provided through climate finance remain unresolved. Furthermore, as the Dialogue provide only a platform for discussion and as such does not have a precise agenda, the views on these issues remain vague.

Figure 14: Equity discourse in the Talanoa Dialogue 7.1.1 The equitable climate action discourse Probably representing the core discussion on equity since the formation of the United Nations climate regime, Parties still discuss the importance of having a substantive formula for climate targets. As addressed by several developing countries throughout the Talanoa Dialogue, such formula remains vague especially due to the structure of the Paris Agreement. As Parties have the freedom to voluntarily determine their climate actions, collectively identifying specific targets per country cannot be considered as a viable option, forasmuch as conflicts remain even in the provision of the general principles supporting the formula. Yet, the Dialogue provided a platform to at least reaffirm how climate efforts should be distributed, as envisioned by some Parties. 70

The equitable climate action discourse is shared by several developing country Parties that put forward the idea that climate actions should reflect different national capacities, with developed countries taking the lead in mitigation efforts. The discourse is shared by the African Group of Negotiators191, the Arab Group192, China193, Egypt194, Mexico195, India196, and Venezuela197. During the Ministerial Dialogue at COP 24 in Katowice, India addressed the issue by asking to reach a shared understanding of the differentiation of actions between developed and developing countries198. Many of the countries sharing the same view stressed the issue during the preparatory phase: for example, the African Group of Negotiator stated: “We also need fair contributions (taking into account national capacity, historical responsibility, level of development and adaptation needs) in addressing climate change”199. Furthermore, many Parties highlighted how differentiation is crucial not only in light of equity, but also in building trust: it is in fact considered to be an important element of cooperation among countries. Inputs from China, Egypt, Mexico, and Palestine underline this factor: indicative is the submission by Egypt that remarks the following: “It is important to build trust and promote cooperation between developed and developing countries, and this can be achieved by implementing the equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities principles in the Convention and its Paris Agreement”200. As already mentioned in the introduction of the section, most of the statements concerning equitable climate actions between developed and developing countries remain vague. However, two exceptions appear, as a more exact vision on how differentiations should apply is put forward. The first one consists of China’s inputs, which calls for equity to apply in the evaluation of countries’ actions, as it states: “An equity mechanism should be based on the principle of CBDRRC. Countries’ national circumstances should be taken into account in evaluation of their ambitions”201. Interestingly, this statement is in line with the self-assessment discourse identified for the Global Stocktake. According to this viewpoint, NDCs can be informed by equity inputs against which they can then be assessed. The second exception is the input from Japan, which endorses a common target for developed countries: “at the G8 L'Aquila Summit Leaders' Declaration of 2009, Japan supported the

191 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AGN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 192 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from the Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 193 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 194 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 195 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Mexico retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 196 COP24, Ministerial Dialogue “Wroclaw”, intervention by India, 11/12/2018. 197 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Venezuela retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 198 COP24, Ministerial Dialogue “Wroclaw”, intervention by India, 11/12/2018. 199 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AGN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 200 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 201 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 71 developed countries’ goal of an 80% or more reduction in GHG by 2050 compared to 1990 levels or that of recent years”202. Yet, the input from Japan was not included in the equitable climate actions discourse for two reasons. First, throughout the text, Japan did not address equity nor it mentioned the Common but Differentiated Capabilities principle. Second, the suggestion put forward cannot be considered equitable as it was agreed in a Summit only attended by eight developed countries. The very basic principle for climate action to be considered equitable is a collectively shared common understanding of responsibilities; hence, the suggestion from Japan cannot be considered equitable. Rather, it can be regarded as an alignment of national actions between seven countries. Attempts to operationalize the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities principle thus remain vague and the general idea is only shared among developing countries. Furthermore, due to the provisions of the Paris Agreement, the identification of substantive targets remains difficult. The most promising options remain to use information as a matter of politics in a post-equity world. As suggested by China during the Talanoa Dialogue and by many others in the submissions for the Global Stocktake, principles of equity may be submitted so as to provide Parties with relevant information against which contributions can be equitably assessed. 7.1.2 The support discourse Another issue extensively discussed by Parties in both the inputs and the oral discussions at COP 24 is support. As per the differentiation in climate targets, the support discourse remains vague. Furthermore, only developing country Parties talk of support referring to the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle. All Parties sharing the discourse, talked of support as essential to achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions. It is possible to identify two categories of countries sharing the support discourse: (1) those referring to it by mentioning its importance in light of equity and (2) those using the format of the Talanoa Dialogue to further justify their view. Yet, both categories belong to the same discourse as they advocate for the same issue with different strategies. Among those referring to equity, there are the African Group of Negotiators203, the Arab Group204, Egypt205, and Palestine206. This category of statements strongly links the provision of support as a core element of the equity mechanism. On this regard, it is indicative the statement from the Arab Group embedded in the text of their input: “It is important that there exists a functioning and implementation-oriented regime that follows clear principles and acknowledges the different

202 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Japan retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 203 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AGN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 204 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 205 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 206 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 72 circumstances between developed and developing countries, acknowledging that level of action by developing countries directly relates to level of support provided by developed countries”207. The second category of submissions puts the focus on the hurdles posed by their national circumstances to justify the need of enhanced support and climate finance. Interestingly, the format of the Talanoa Dialogue to share stories and experiences was strategically used. Indeed, some developing country Parties first presented the efforts they have been making nationally and then called for support so to overcome the barriers and fulfill their climate actions. Belonging to this category, are the statements from China208, Egypt209, Indonesia210, Malaysia211, Palestine212, Thailand213 and Venezuela214. An example can be the statement from Egypt, that underlines the following: “as the Egyptian national efforts alone will not be able to fulfill the state aspirations addressing the challenge of adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change and contribution to the mitigation efforts, therefore, it is important to highlight the fact that developed countries should fulfill their commitment to provide finance, technology & capacity building to address the needs of developing countries”215. As in the case of the equitable climate actions discourse, the ideas put forward on support remain vague and general. Further and more importantly, they remain unresolved. Opposing to the discourse, there was an overarching silence from developed countries, with few exceptions. The EU pointed out in its input that it remains committed to the collective mobilization of 100 billion USD a year216. Also, New Zealand recognized and reiterated the importance of mobilizing support to developing countries217. Eventually, Norway used the official opening of the Talanoa Dialogue’s political phase at COP 24 in Katowice to announce that both Norway and Germany will double their financial commitment to the Green Climate Fund218.

207 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 208 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 209 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 210 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Indonesia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 211 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Malaysia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 212 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 213 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Thailand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 214 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Venezuela retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 215 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 216 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 217 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from New Zealand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 218 COP24, Talanoa Dialogue Opening, intervention by Norway, 11/12/2018. 73

7.2 Ambition Among Parties, there was an overarching understanding that the Talanoa Dialogue’s main potential to enhance ambition was to share the best policies to upscale climate action. This view is aligned with one of the mandates of the Dialogue: sharing stories and experiences in a facilitative manner. On this regard, it is indicative the submission from the European Union, which remarks: “Collective and fair action by all as the best way of achieving ambition. With the Paris Agreement, all countries committed to undertaking ambitious efforts with a view to achieve its long-term goals. The Talanoa Dialogue could, as part of its outcome, highlight policies and sectoral potential that can significantly contribute to reaching global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and call on all Parties to undertake efforts in this regard”219. The idea that by showcasing policies ambition can be enhanced is shared by all Parties that submitted an input to the Dialogue. Parties shared several policies that they reckoned to be effective in advancing climate action. Australia220, the Association of South-East Asian Nations221, Fiji222, Nepal223, and Norway224 highlighted the potential of carbon markets and the importance of REDD+ in offsetting credits. By contrast, the Arab Group225, China226, Egypt227, Indonesia228, Palestine229, and Thailand230 underlined the priority of development policy over climate policy for developing countries. The European Union231, Japan232, and New Zealand233 remarked that private sector investments are crucial in upscaling climate finance. Also, the European Union234, Japan235, the Least Developed

219 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 220 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Australia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 221 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AESAN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 222 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Fiji retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 223 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Nepal retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 224 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Norway retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 225 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 226 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 227 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 228 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Indonesia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 229 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 230 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Thailand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 231 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 232 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Japan retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 233 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from New Zealand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 234 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 74

Countries236, and Norway237 put the focus on regulating the transport sector, as an important contributor to global emissions. Japan238 and the Least Developed Countries239 also stressed the need to facilitate energy efficiency. Moreover, the Association of South-East Asian Nations240, Mexico241, and Nepal242 stated that emissions from the LULUCF sector requires more attention and a stronger response. Lastly, New Zealand243 reiterated the importance to reduce fossil fuel subsidies in order to promote renewable energy. While all these statements facilitated the sharing of best practices in policy-making, they cannot be considered an effective approach to enhance ambition. Sharing policies that are reckoned to be effective does not necessarily need to upscale ambition: in fact, one may adopt additional policies to mitigate emissions, without updating its national target. Yet, there were some Parties that endorsed ways to advance a more ambitious climate action. On this regard, three discourses were identified: (1) the 1.5 degrees discourses, (2) the pre-2020 actions discourse, and (3) the political momentum discourse. In the following sections, I proceed by going into details about these discourses, arguing that key substantive questions have shifted towards information.

235 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Japan retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 236 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from LDCs retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 237 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Norway retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 238 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Japan retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 239 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from LDCs retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 240 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from ASEAN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 241 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Mexico retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 242 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Nepal retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 243 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from New Zealand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 75

Figure 15: Ambition discourses in the Talanoa Dialogue 7.2.1 The 1.5 degrees discourse The most significant but also most controversial issue discussed throughout the Talanoa Dialogue is the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees. The Report plays a key role in the upcoming developments of the United Nations climate regime, for it has the potential to provide an instrument through which Parties can refer to when updating their Nationally Determined Contributions. It is from this issue that an equally important discourse emerges: the one I call the 1.5 degrees discourse. The vast majority of countries taking part in the Dialogue not only endorsed the Report but also explicitly asked for a 1.5 degree target as the objective to be reached by 2030. Among countries referring to the Report in their submissions or throughout the political phase at COP 24, there are Australia244, Austria245, Grenada246, the joint input from the Caribbean Community, the Environmental Integrity Group, and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean247, the European Union248, Fiji249, India250, Lithuania251, Maldives252, Marshall Islands253,

244 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Australia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 245 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Austria retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 246 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Grenada retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 247 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AILAC-CARICOM-EIG retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 76

Mexico254, Nepal255, New Zealand256, Norway257, and Switzerland258. An example can be the statement by Norway, that in its input remarks: “Norway would like to highlight that the Talanoa- dialogue must be based on best available science. This places the IPCC at the core of the Talanoa- dialogue as the authoritative source of input on where we are and where we should be to achieve the long-term temperature goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement”259. Stronger is the statement put forward by the joint submission of AILAC-CARICOM-EIG, that stresses how the report is crucial especially for developing country Parties: “For vulnerable countries, the full consideration of the IPCC 1.5 Special Report will be critically important and inform the preparations or update of NDCs. The TD outputs should fully consider and reflect the main conclusions of the IPCC report, and inform the preparations or update of NDCs based on the best available science”260. 7.2.2 The pre-2020 discourse One of the aims of the Talanoa Dialogue was to take stock of mitigation efforts and enhance ambition before 2020. Countries thus engaged in discussions, stressing the importance of such a goal to be achieved. Interestingly, some countries took also the opportunity to call for another pre-2020 commitment: the ratification of the Doha Amendment. I thus cluster those country Parties endorsing this discourse into two separate groups: (1) those calling for the Doha Amendment to be ratified, and (2) those calling for a pre-2020 enhanced ambition under the Paris Agreement. Among those countries calling for Doha to be ratified, there are the African Group of Negotiators261, the Arab Group262, China263, Indonesia264, Palestine265, and Venezuela266. An

248 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 249 COP24, Official Closing of the Talanoa Dialogue, intervention by Fiji, 11/12/2018. 250 COP24, Ministerial Dialogue “Wroclaw”, intervention by India, 11/12/2018. 251 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Grenada retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 252 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Maldives retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 253 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Marshall Islands retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 254 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Mexico retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 255 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Nepal retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 256 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from New Zealand retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018- talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 257 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Norway retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 258 COP24, Official Opening of the Talanoa Dialogue, intervention by Fiji, 10/12/2018. 259 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Norway retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 260 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AILAC-CARICOM-EIG retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 261 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AGN retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 262 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 263 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 77 example can be the written input from Palestine, which highlights: “In the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (Doha Amendment), Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 levels. However, up until now, the amendment has not entered into force as not enough Parties have accepted the amendment. The no entry into force of Doha Amendment is an alarming signal of low level of commitment on pre-2020 targets”267. It is interesting to notice that Parties have thus used the Dialogue not only to call for more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions, but also to reiterate the importance of the Amendment containing substantive targets. On the contrary, among those calling for more ambition under Paris, there are the Arab Group268, Egypt269, the European Union270, the joint input from the Caribbean Community, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Environmental Integrity Group271, Norway272, and Palestine273. Particularly representative of this cluster is the submission form the European Union, which states: “It should express our collective determination to look into ways for enhancing ambitious climate action and recall that the outcome will inform domestic planning processes and preparations of NDCs by 2020”274. Probably the most important element of the Talanoa Dialogue beside endorsing the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees was the call for enhancing actions before 2020. It was widespread also at COP 24, where it received support not only throughout the official meetings of the Dialogue, but also during the High-Level Political Statements. The support received was aimed at including in the final Katowice decision a statement calling for Parties to enhance pre-2020 actions. This would, in theory, prove the collective political will to do so; however, whether this will happen or not only depends on countries’ individual determination before 2020. 7.2.3 The political momentum discourse Eventually, the Talanoa Dialogue registered a trend similar to those in the Global Stocktake. As the structure of the Paris Agreement is bottom-up, it becomes essential to create opportunities that can prepare the political will to enhance ambition. It is for this reason that also in the Talanoa

264 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Indonesia retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 265 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 266 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Venezuela retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 267 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 268 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Arab Group retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 269 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 270 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from the EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 271 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AILAC, CARICOM, EIG retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 272 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Norway retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 273 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Palestine retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 274 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 78

Dialogue, a political momentum discourse emerges. China275 and Egypt276 generally call for a political momentum to catch the “spirit of Talanoa” and create the political enthusiasm necessary to enhance ambition. More specific are the statements from the European Union277, the joint submission from the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community, and the Environmental Integrity Group278, and the Least Developed Countries279: in fact, they all advocate for the political momentum, while linking it to the expected outcomes it should generate. Precisely, they all ask for the enhancement of Nationally Determined Contributions pre-2020 and for the IPCC Special Report to be welcomed by Parties. An example may be the submission from the Least Developed Countries, which affirms: “The Talanoa Dialogue needs to deliver the scientific evidence and political momentum that sends a strong signal to Parties of the need to communicate more ambitious NDCs by 2020 that are aligned with the 1.5 o C goal in the Paris Agreement”280. More precise is the statement from The European Union, which highlights the need for a political declaration at the end of the Dialogue in order to capture the momentum. 7.3 Discourse hegemonization Among the discourses identified, only the pre-2020 discourse can be considered dominant, with the decision stating: [the Conference of the Parties] “Invites Parties to consider the outcome, inputs and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue in preparing their nationally determined contributions and in their efforts to enhance pre-2020 implementation and ambition281”. However, the language used is not strong enough to properly incentivize Parties to seriously take into consideration an enhanced ambition pre-2020. The 1.5 degrees discourse had a weaker reference, since the decision addresses it as follows: “Invites Parties to make use of the information contained in the report referred to in paragraph 25 above in their discussions under all relevant agenda items of the subsidiary and governing bodies”282. The statement was the strongest reference to the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees contained in the final decision, and the discourse thus cannot be considered dominant. An important remark is that the Report was also endorsed outside the Talanoa Dialogue by all countries’ Parties during COP 24’s High-Level National Statement, except for four countries: Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. In this case, the decision-making procedure of

275 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from China retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 276 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from Egypt retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 277 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from EU retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 278 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from AILAC-CARICOM-EIG retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 279 Input to the Talanoa Dialogue from LDCs retrieved on 20/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa- dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do-we-get-there#eq-1 280 Ibidem. 281 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 282 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved on 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 79 the UNFCCC that works by consensus prevented the inclusion of the discourse in the decision, even though the amount of countries against it was limited. Eventually, the decision provides a general annotation of the Talanoa Dialogue: “Takes note of the outcome, inputs and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue and their potential to generate greater confidence, courage and enhanced ambition”283. One may argue that all identified discourses are somehow included through such provision, as it compromises all the phases of the Dialogue. However, the lack of explicit reference to the issues that were most recurrent throughout the preparatory phase and the political phase prevents to take that argument into consideration. 7.4 The Talanoa Dialogue’s transformative potential in Global Governance The Talanoa Dialogue had an innovative format: split into a preparatory and a political phase, it aimed at engaging Parties in a facilitative dialogue, where they could share stories and experiences, while taking stock of their climate efforts and address key issues, such as the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees. The Dialogue however, largely failed to do so. In particular, it provided Parties with the opportunity to support their arguments by first sharing their national experience and then highlighting a specific issue on the basis of what they said. More, all Parties were guided by the same three questions, “Where are we? Where do we want go? How do we get there?”. These overarching questions further strengthened the Dialogue by enabling Parties to follow a common storyline. However, the poor consideration of the discourses in the final Katowice decision points out the limitations of such approach. It was in fact visible how Parties could advocate more effectively for similar issues during the negotiations for the implementation of other mechanisms. This allowed Parties to be precise, but also to put forward more acceptable proposals, as they were grounded on concrete articles of the Paris Agreement. The Dialogue, however, was of great success with regards to the involvement of non-party actors in climate talks. Also, it helped country Parties to exchange knowledge on their national climate policies. As a result, policy mechanisms aiming at a similar empathic and knowledge sharing approach have the potential to facilitate views and enable the exchange of best practices; on actual outcomes, however, they may lack effectiveness due to their general format. In this chapter, I have outlined the results emerged from the analysis of the Talanoa Dialogue and discussed the transformative potential of the mechanism in global governance. I have argued that the Dialogue has helped countries sharing their experiences and to further justify their views. However, the mechanism presents limitations in advancing equity and ambition, as discourses are vague and crucial issues remain unresolved. In the figure below, I present the key findings emerged from the analysis. In the next chapter, I proceed by comparing transparency, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue and respond to the research questions. Also, I discuss the transformative potential of these three mechanisms in global governance, and I conclude by providing recommendations for further research.

283 UNFCCC, Informal Compilation – proposal by the President, 15/12/2018 retrieved onn 25/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593 80

Figure 16: Summary of key findings for the Talanoa Dialogue

81

8. Comparing Novel Mechanisms: Discussion and Conclusion This study aimed to provide an increased understanding of the Paris Agreement’s novel mechanisms and their capacity to advance climate action in the United Nations climate regime. Moreover, it sought to reflect on the transformative potential of such novel mechanisms in global governance, building on the empirical analysis and relevant literature. In this chapter, I compare Transparency, the Global Stocktake, and the Talanoa Dialogue. I start by outlining the discourses emerged per mechanism, focusing on how the number of discourses and the countries or coalitions involved differ from one mechanism to the other. I thus proceed by comparing the three mechanisms’ discourses with regards to content and effects. I particularly pay attention to what mechanisms put forth discourses that are most relevant or dominant in advancing equitable and ambitious climate action. On the basis of this comparison, I then proceed by addressing the research questions. Following that, I reflect on the conceptual lens and methodology used to conduct the analysis. Eventually, I provide suggestions for future research and reflect on the overall aim of this study. 8.1 Discourses and countries involved A first comparison between the three mechanisms can be done in terms of number of discourses relevant to equity and ambition and the amount of countries or coalitions involved: this would give an overview of how Parties consider each mechanism to be important to advance ambitious and equitable climate action. With regards to Transparency, relevant discourses emerged neither for equity nor for ambition. Rather, countries put forward their general perspectives on how the mechanism is somehow related to equity through the implementation of flexibility and for ambition through the possibility to check self-determined climate targets. Yet, these perspectives do not represent discourses as they cannot transform into practices that can shape climate action; on the contrary, they can be better considered opinions with no tangible implications. The absence of discourses is already an indicator of the poor relevance of transparency in advancing climate action, but this argument can be further justified by the number of countries expressing their perspectives. In fact, only 7 countries and coalitions engage in discussing their opinions on ambition, while only 17 do so on equity. By comparison, the discourses emerged from the discussions on the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue see many more countries involved. These findings are also confirmed by the performance of the existing transparency arrangements: the discourses emerged from the Facilitative Sharing of Views for developing countries and from the Multilateral Assessment for developed countries are extremely vague and show a very poor engagement in putting forward views through which climate action can be advanced. The Global Stocktake instead can be considered a more relevant mechanism to advance ambition and equity in the United Nations climate regime: this is not only because several discourses actually emerge, but also due to the high number of countries engaged. Indeed, discourses on equity and ambition are put forth, respectively, by 28 and 19 countries and coalitions. These numbers are indicative of the relevance of such mechanism to advance climate action: as the

82

Global Stocktake has the capacity to move forward countries’ contributions through its provisions, more countries engage in the discussion to express their views on how it should do so. The discourses emerged from the Talanoa Dialogue follow a similar trend. In fact, also in this case, parties’ views can be clustered into discourses, and not perspectives, as they have the potential to produce an actual change with regards to equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime. Furthermore, the number of countries and coalitions that put forward discourses is higher in comparison to transparency. Indeed, 19 countries and coalitions engage in discussing equity and 30 ambition. Hence, considering the discourses produced and the countries involved, it is possible stating that the Global Stocktake and the Talanoa Dialogue can be considered more relevant than Transparency in advancing climate action. In the next section, I compare more in depth the three novel mechanisms, focusing on the substance of the discourses and their effects. 8.2 Discourses and effects In this section, I compare the three mechanisms on content and effects of the discourses emerged, taking also into account how they are included in the final Katowice decision. Through that, I aim to argue which mechanism is more relevant to advance equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime and is thus going to further in the future. With regards to Transparency, the perspectives put forward on equity relate to flexibility, and thus to the functioning of the mechanism itself. Besides that, no other equity-related considerations were mentioned, and it can thus be argued that transparency is not relevant in advancing equitable climate action. On ambition, countries focus on the role of transparency in checking climate action; however, some state that transparency can check against self-determined targets, while others argue that it can check against the collective targets specified in the Paris Agreement. The former was the view most reflected in the final Katowice decision. However, what becomes clear is that transparency checks and does not advance climate action. This finding is also confirmed by the analysis of the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. Yet, the role of transparency can be considered functional to enhance equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime. In fact, it ensures that countries are transparent about their contributions, even though the information disclosed will need to be assessed in order to advance climate action. The Global Stocktake may have the capacity to complement transparency in assessing parties’ contributions. The mechanism revealed to have several discourses that were relevant for both equity and ambition: on equity, among the discourses produced, the self-assessment discourse can be considered the dominant one, as it received more recognition in the final Katowice decision. According to such discourse, there would be the possibility for countries to submit equity-related considerations as inputs of the mechanism. It would be then possible to update parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions in light of this information. On ambition, the discourses emerged focus on the outcome of the mechanism: some countries advocate for a political momentum during which the political will is built to enhance climate actions, while others put forth the possibility to have a positive outcome, with recommendations on how to increase ambition considering best practices and opportunities. Both two discourses are inserted in the final Katowice decision, and it is thus possible that they will be implemented and

83 institutionalized in the future. However, it is clear that the Global Stocktake does not advance ambition per se: due to its bottom-up approach some sort of incentive is needed in order to enhance parties’ contributions. Hence, among the three novel mechanisms, it can be considered the most promising with regards to equity and ambition, especially taking into consideration the discourses produced and their endorsement in the final Katowice decision. Yet, this is not to say that the Global Stocktake does not have limitations: as made it evident from the discourses emerged on ambition, whether the mechanism is effective or not will depend on what information is submitted, and on how Parties react to the outcome. The Talanoa Dialogue generated several discourses relevant to advance climate action. On equity, the discourses remain general, mainly advocating for more equitable self-determined targets. On ambition instead, discourses encompass different issues: from enhanced ambition before 2020 to consideration of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees. However, the poor consideration given to the discourses, and in general to the Dialogue, in the final Katowice decision suggests that such mechanism may lack capacity to advance climate action on equity and ambition. According to the results of the analysis, it is possible arguing that (1) Transparency checks and does not advance climate action, but may be functional to enhance ambition (2) the Global Stocktake moves the equity framework from substantive to self-determined, procedural, and information-centred, and (3) the Talanoa Dialogue facilitated the exchange of best practices, but revealed a poor outcome with regards to equity and ambition. 8.3 Answering the Research Questions In this section, I provide an answer to the research questions, building on the comparison outlined above. I address the first research question, pointing out the key insights emerged from the analysis. I then proceed with the second research question, elaborating on how such novel mechanisms can transform global governance. 8.3.1 How do novel mechanisms of the United Nations climate regime advance ambitious and equitable climate action, if at all? The Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake have not been operationalized yet. Hence, conclusions are here drawn on how countries envision them to advance ambitious and equitable climate action. Both mechanisms are envisioned to advance equity through a self-governance approach. This is particularly evident in the Enhanced Transparency Framework as the final Katowice decision concludes that flexibility is to be self-determined. With regards to the Global Stocktake, the dominant discourse suggests that Parties self-assess the equitability of their actions on the basis of the equity-related information received. Several authors (Pan et al. 2017; Winkler et al. 2018; Nakicenovic, and Zimm 2019) and the IPCC Fifth Assessment (2014) show how Parties have different conceptions of equity, as expressed in their Nationally Determined Contributions. The results emerged from the analysis thus largely align with what the authors mentioned above have already found to date. Further, it seems that the Paris Agreement, through the implementation of its mechanisms as envisioned by Parties, is going towards the direction of post-equity, as already outlined by Klinsky et al. (2017). It is true that the Global Stocktake, with equity-related inputs through which Parties can assess their

84 voluntary Contributions, may encourage some sort of coordination. Its bottom-up format, however, hampers the possibility to deliver an overarching common equity framework that all parties are obliged to consider. As a result, without coordinated climate action, the Paris Agreement collective goals result more difficult to achieve, as it remains unclear what country should further enhance its Contribution, and to what extent. The main message emerging from the discussions about the implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework is that transparency tracks and does not advance the ambition of Parties’ contributions. The Global Stocktake, instead, advances ambition through the format of its outcome. As it was clear from the discourses emerged from countries’ submissions and from the final Katowice decision, the mechanism is generally intended to culminate in a political momentum in which Parties commit to enhanced ambition, but that will largely depend on the actual functioning of the Stocktake. Hence, no precise, reliable provision to advance ambitious climate action through the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake was put forward. This finding largely questions the assumptions that instead are mentioned by many scholars. Indeed, Gupta (2010), Mol (2010) and Mason (2014) underline how transparency is generally assumed to deliver improved environmental performance. Also, Craft and Fisher (2018) Hermwille and Siemons (2018) and Northrop et al. (2018) affirm how the Global Stocktake is widely expected to deliver enhanced ambition through its innovative format. The results from the analysis, however, show that transparency does not lead to enhanced climate efforts, while the Global Stocktake may encounter difficulties to advance progress, as the outcome will depend on the willingness of Parties to embrace greater climate action. With the aim to understand how novel mechanisms work in practice, the existing transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Talanoa Dialogue were scrutinized. As the mechanisms are already implemented, it was possible to understand how they have been performing to date. On equity, both mechanisms advance extremely vague discourses. Further, mainly developing countries put forward their views during the reason-giving processes examined. Both transparency and the Talanoa Dialogue were predicted to guide countries towards ambitious and equitable climate action. Importantly, Gupta and van Asselt (2017) argue that the review process of transparency, here scrutinized, mirrors the conflicts on differentiation that the mechanism aimed to solve. The results from the analysis of both transparency and the Talanoa Dialogue indeed show how discourses on equity were mainly, if not only, shared by developing countries, with developed countries largely remaining silent over the equitability of actions. In the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC, mainly developed countries focus on ambition. This aspect of climate action also reflects the polarization of discussions in climate negotiations: while developing countries tend to put the focus on the equity, developed countries demonstrate to be more concerned about ambition. Tørstad and Sælen (2018) highlight how the division between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has been one of the major barriers to the success of climate talks. This element persists to date, as transparency has shown how it does not solve that divergence of views that brought to the lack of a collectively agreed substantive understanding on equity and ambition in the past. The Talanoa Dialogue instead shares similarities with the Global Stocktake. Focus is in fact also here put on when rather than how 85 ambition is to be enhanced. While the Dialogue was assumed to constitute a platform to advance progress on climate efforts (Lesniewska and Siegele 2018; Winkler and Depledge 2018), it revealed to have limited capacity to do so. 8.3.2 What is the transformative potential of such novel mechanisms in global governance? Novel, procedural, transparency-based mechanisms have been welcomed as a major innovation in global governance (Gupta 2008; Mol 2010). They were expected, among others, to deliver substantive results and to overcome political conflicts. As such, they were expected to transform global governance, by enabling improved environmental performance through facilitative, procedural, and transparent discussions. Results from the analysis, however, have shown that the transformative potential of these mechanisms is rather limited. First, rather than advancing substantive outcomes, focus is mainly put on procedures. This is done under the assumptions that “getting the process right” will lead to the expected results, as Gupta (2008) critically states. Examples can be the discourses emerged from the Global Stocktake, the Talanoa Dialogue, and the Enhanced Transparency Framework. However, if one looks at how these mechanisms perform, the achievements in terms of substantive outcomes are extremely limited. This argument was already advanced by previous studies in the public (Gupta 2014) and private realm (Knox-Hayes and Levy 2014; Zhang, Mol, and He 2016). Hence, such a strong focus on procedures remains largely unjustified to date. Second, the reference to substantive elements, when appears, remains extremely vague. Examples of that can be the current transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Talanoa Dialogue. When in fact substantive issues are addressed, the room they are given is of secondary importance, as many do not engage in such discussions. This result was already shared by Mason (2014), who explains how substantive rights under the Aarhus Convention are poorly and vaguely mentioned. This thus adds an important point: novel, procedural mechanisms put focus on procedures, which have achieved limited results to date, while substantive matters are only limitedly addressed. Third, those conflicts over substantive matters that novel mechanisms aim to solve through transparency and procedural discussions, still manifest. This was the case of all mechanisms analyzed in this study. Also in this case, the transformative potential of novel mechanisms is largely questioned: building on what already Gupta and van Asselt (2017) argue, this study further confirms that even by moving discussions to a procedural level, old conflicts over substantive matters persist. Eventually, one of the conceptual lenses applied to this study, Public Reason theory, allows a different understanding of such account-giving mechanisms. Further, it positively justifies them, arguing that by posing questions, exchanging views, and giving reasons, substantive matters can be advanced. With this liberal approach, Public Reason discards regulatory approaches, and puts forth the idea that in a plural, diverse context, an effective response to problems like climate change can be found in the possibility to foster dialogue over substantive issues (Boran 2017). However, results from the analysis of Transparency and the Talanoa Dialogue, the two mechanisms on which Public Reason was applied, show that this liberal conception of governance leaves enough freedom to disregard the substantive questions that should instead be advanced through dialogue. 86

8.4 Discussion on the Conceptual Framework As outlined in Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework, Discourse and Public Reason theory constitute an innovative lens through which novel mechanisms can be scrutinized. Below, I outline some observations on these. Discourse theory was advantageous in allowing an ex-ante general evaluation of how those novel mechanisms that have not been implemented yet will advance ambitious and equitable climate action. However, it has to be noted that Discourse theory only enables a generic idea of how these mechanisms will function; it will be possible to fully assess how they advance climate action only when they will be operationalized. Public Reason, and its combination with Discourse theory, helped understanding how those mechanisms based on reason-giving have been performing to date. More precisely, these two theories together made it possible to investigate how such fora of discussion can advance an understanding of equity and ambition that will eventually shape future climate action. Moreover, they have contributed to deliver insights about under-studied governance mechanisms. Yet, Public Reason is just one angle to see the process and it cannot be considered a theory through which these mechanisms can be completely assessed. For example, with regards to Transparency, Public Reason only applied to the review phase, which only constitutes one part of the mechanism. Furthermore, for both Transparency and the Talanoa Dialogue, Public Reason and Discourse theory, exclusively served to scan matters relating to equity and ambition. In doing so, they revealed to be suitable for the purpose of this study; however, there might be other angles through which the mechanisms can be investigated and assessed. 8.5 Recommendations As it becomes clear in the conclusion, an evident research gap persists on the Paris Agreement’s mechanisms, and on the possible future uptake of procedural, facilitative, transparency-based governance measures. It is thus suggested that, first, future research on the Paris Agreement and its novel mechanisms focuses on the Global Stocktake and the Enhanced Transparency Framework, once operationalized. Furthermore, it would be interesting to focus on the politics of information that these mechanisms imply. It is in fact not clear how information will shape the United Nations climate regime, and who will have power over it. Further, it remains an open question if such mechanism effectively incentivises the advancement of climate action, or if instead it allows a status quo. Second, it may be useful to conduct a comparative analysis between the United Nations climate regime, which entails both a transparency and a stocktaking mechanism to other regimes that only have transparency arrangements. Through that, it will be possible understanding if the effectiveness of transparency in enhancing environmental and equity outcomes is determined by a complementary stocktaking mechanism. Third, it is recommended to further investigate novel, procedural mechanisms, their expected outcomes and current performance. Through this study, some light was shed on what they can and cannot achieve, but this remains issue-specific and constrained in a narrow timeframe.

87

Further, relevant literature on similar mechanisms remains extremely limited to date, and it is thus needed to advance knowledge on how such mechanisms can be transformative, and if. Fourth, Public Reason was an innovative conceptual tool that allowed the investigation of novel mechanisms from a different perspective. It is thus suggested to explore the potential of Public Reason in other regimes and policy domains. It would also be interesting to explore if reason- giving can be more effective under specific governance conditions, where, for example, account- giving processes are open to a wider range of actors. 8.6 Reflection This study aimed to provide a better understanding of novel mechanisms and their transformative potential in global governance. Precisely, focus was put on the Paris Agreement’s Transparency Framework, Global Stocktake and Talanoa Dialogue, with the aim to assess their capacity to advance equity and ambition in the United Nations climate regime. Yet, this research goes beyond the climate realm: it reflects on the results of the specific analysis and elaborates on the role of these mechanisms in shaping future practices and transforming governance. Results showed that the three mechanisms can indeed advance to some extent climate action, but their capacity to do so is limited. Further, the assumptions that such novel, procedural, facilitative, transparency-based mechanisms can transform global governance have been widely questioned: by linking the results from the analysis to the existing literature on the topic, new insights have been put forth, while the findings of other authors further confirmed. Eventually, this study contributed to identify new research gaps on the mechanisms and on their implications, such as an ever-greater shift towards procedural governance and information-based policy and politics.

88

10. Literature

Arneson, Richard. 2014. “Rejecting the Order of Public Reason.” Philosophical Studies 170(3): 537– 44.

Arts, Bas, and Marleen Buizer. 2009. “Forests, Discourses, Institutions. A Discursive-Institutional Analysis of Global Forest Governance.” Forest Policy and Economics 11(5–6): 340–47.

Bäckstrand, Karin, and Ole Elgström. 2013. “The EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations: From Leader to ‘Leadiator.’” Journal of European Public Policy 20(10): 1369–86.

Billingham, Paul. 2016. “Does Political Community Require Public Reason? On Lister’s Defence of Political Liberalism.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15(1): 20–41.

Boran, Idil. 2017. “Principles of Public Reason in the UNFCCC: Rethinking the Equity Framework.” Science and Engineering Ethics 23(5): 1253–71.

Carlarne, Cinnamon P. and Kevin R. Gray, and Richard Tarasofsky. 2016. "The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law", UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 98-160.

Craft, Brianna, and Susannah Fisher. 2018. “Measuring the Adaptation Goal in the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement.” Climate Policy 18(9): 1203–9.

Den Besten, Jan Willem, Bas Arts, and Patrick Verkooijen. 2014. “The Evolution of REDD+: An Analysis of Discursive-Institutional Dynamics.” Environmental Science and Policy 35: 40–48.

Depledge, Joanna. 2000. “Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article by Article Textual History.” United Nations FCCC/TP/2000/2.

Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2010. “Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference.” Review of Policy Research 27(6): 795–821.

Gupta, Aarti. 2008. “Transparency Under Scrutiny : Information Disclosure in Forum Transparency Under Scrutiny : Information Disclosure in Global.” Global Environmental Politics 8(2): 1–7

Gupta, Aarti. 2010. “Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: A Coming of Age?” Global Environmental Politics 10: 1–9.

Gupta Aarti. “Making REDD+ Transparent: The Politics of Measuring, Reporting, and Verification Systems” In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 181-201. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

Gupta, Aarti, and Harro van Asselt. 2017. “Transparency in Multilateral Climate Politics: Furthering (or Distracting from) Accountability?” Regulation & Governance 13: 18-34.

Gupta, Aarti, and Michael Mason. “A Transparency Turn in Global Environmental Governance”. In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 3-37. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

89

Gupta, Aarti, and Michael Mason. “Transparency Revisited”. In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 321-339. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

Hajer, Maarten., 1995. "The politics of environmental discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process". Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hajer, Maarten, and Wytske Versteeg. 2005. “A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives.” Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 7(3): 175–84.

Hermwille, Lukas, and Anne Siemons. 2018. “What Makes an Ideal Global Stocktake? A Functional Analysis.” Umweltbundesamt.

Holzscheiter, Anna. 2014. “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 15(2): 142–62.

Honkonen, Tuula. 2009. “The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations.” Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 18(3): 257–67.

Howarth, David, Jason Glynos, and Steven Griggs. 2016. “Discourse, Explanation and Critique.” Critical Policy Studies 10(1): 99–104.

IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Climate Change 2014. Synthesis Report. Versión Inglés.

Johnstone, Ian. 2003. “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument.” EJIL 14(3): 437–80.

Klinsky, Sonja et al. 2017. “Why Equity Is Fundamental in Climate Change Policy Research.” Global Environmental Change 44: 170–73.

Knox-Hayes, Janelle and David Levy. “The Political Economy of Governance by Disclosure: Carbon Disclosure and Nonfinancial Reporting as Contested Fields of Governance”. In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 205-223. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

Kumar, Ranjit. 2014. "Research Methodology: a step-by-step Guide for Beginners". 4th ed. Sage: London.

Lal Pandey, Chandra. 2014. “The Limits of Climate Change Agreements: From Past to Present.” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 6(4): 376–90.

Lamp, Nicolas. 2017. “Legislative Innovation in the Trade and Climate Regimes: Towards a Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Multilateral Lawmaking.” Ssrn (December).

Lesniewska, Feja, and Linda Siegele. 2018. “The Talanoa Dialogue: A Crucible To Spur Ambitious

90

Global Climate Action To Stay Within The 1.5OC Limit.” Carbon & Climate Law Review 12(1): 41–49.

Mason, Michael. “So Far but No Further? Transparency and Disclosure in the Aarhus Convention”. In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 83-105. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

Meng, X. H. et al. 2014. “The Relationship between Corporate Environmental Performance Andenvironmental Disclosure: An Empirical Study in China.” Journal of Environmental Management 145: 357–67.

Milkoreit, Manjana, and Kate Haapala. 2018. “The Global Stocktake: Design Lessons for a New Review and Ambition Mechanism in the International Climate Regime.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 19(1): 89–106.

Mol, Arthur. 2008. “Environmental Reform in the Information Age: The Contours of Informational Governance”. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mol, Arthur. 2010. “The Future of Transparency : Power, Pitfalls and Promises.” Global Environmental Politics 10(3):132-143.

Mol, Arthur. “The Lost of Innocence of Transparency in Environmental Politics”. In Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives, edited by Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason, 39-59. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014.

Northrop, Eliza et al. 2018. “Achieving the Ambition of Paris: Designing the Global Stocktake. Working Paper.” World Resources Institute.

Pan, Xunzhang et al. 2017. “Exploring Fair and Ambitious Mitigation Contributions under the Paris Agreement Goals.” Environmental Science and Policy 74(April): 49–56.

Prasad, Sumit, Karthik Ganesan, and Vaibhav Gupta. 2017. “Shaping the Global Stocktake Process Under the Paris Agreement.” Centre for Science and Environment.

Rajamani, L Avanya R. 2019. “Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics International and Comparative Law Quarterly.” International and Comparative Law 65(2): 493–514.

Sweet, William 2016. "Climate Diplomacy from Rio to Paris, The Effort to Contain Global Warming", USA: Yale University Press, pp. 126-143

Tørstad, Vegard, and Håkon Sælen. 2018. “Fairness in the Climate Negotiations : What Explains Variation in Parties ’ Expressed Conceptions ?” Climate Policy 18(5): 642–54.

UNFCCC. 2017. Conference of the Parties, "Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement", FCCC/CP/2017/L.13 available at https://unfccc.int/documents/65126

UNFCCC. 2016. Conference of the Parties, "Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-

91

first session", FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, available at http://undocs.org/FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1

UNGA. 1990. "Resolution A/RES/45/212 on the Protection of the global climate for present and future generations of mankind", available at https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm

United Nations. 1992. "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change", United Nations Treaty Series available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf

United Nations. 1998. "Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change", United Nations Treaty Series available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/kpeng.pdf

United Nations. 2012. "Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.” United Nations Treaty Series available at https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf

United Nations. 2016. "Paris Agreement", United Nations Treaty Series, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2018. "Emissions Gap Report 2018", available at http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pd f

Winkler, Harald et al. 2018. “Countries Start to Explain How Their Climate Contributions Are Fair: More Rigour Needed.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 18(1): 99–115.

Winkler, Harald, and Joanna Depledge. 2018. “Fiji-in-Bonn: Will the ‘Talanoa Spirit’ Prevail?” Climate Policy 18(2): 141–45.

Wirth, David A. 2017. “The Paris Agreement as a New Component of the UN Climate Regime.” International Organisations Research Journal 12(4).

Zhang, Lei, Arthur P.J. Mol, and Guizhen He. 2016. “Transparency and Information Disclosure in China’s Environmental Governance.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 18: 17– 24.

Zimm, Caroline, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, and Caroline Zimm. 2019. “What Are the Implications of the Paris Agreement for Inequality ? What Are the Implications of the Paris Agreement for Inequality ?” Climate Policy 0(0): 1–10.

92

Websites:

UNFCCC, 5th workshop of the facilitative sharing of views, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/event/fifth-workshop-of-the-facilitative-sharing-of-views

UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/subsidiary-bodies/apa

UNFCCC, APA item 6, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/subsidiary- bodies/ad-hoc-working-group-on-the-paris-agreement-apa/information-on-apa-agenda-item- 6

UNFCCC, FOCUS: Mitigation –Reporting on national implementation and MRV retrieved on 28/01/2019 at https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/measurement--reporting- and-verification

UNFCCC, History of the Convention, retrieved on 02/02/2019 at https://unfccc.int/process/the- convention/history-of-the-convention#eq-2

UNFCCC, 2018 Talanoa Dialogue Platform, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform

UNFCCC, The facilitative Sharing of Views under the ICA process, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the- convention/biennial-update-reportsand-international-consultation-and-analysis/facilitative- sharing-of-views

UNFCCC, Workshop for facilitative sharing of views at the forty-seventh session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, retrieved on 05/10/2018 at https://unfccc.int/event/workshop- facilitative-sharing-views-forty-seventh-session-subsidiary-body-implementation

93

ANNEX I Data Selection Sources: 1) Transparency Framework

• Written inputs: Submissions on item 5, APA 1-2, available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx • Facilitative Sharing of Views under the ICA process, I, II, III, and IV workshops, available at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the- convention/biennial-update-reportsand-international-consultation-and- analysis/facilitative-sharing-of-views • Multilateral Assessment under the IAR process, SBI 45, available at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under- convention/national-communications

2) Global Stocktake

• Submissions on item 6, APA 1-2, available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx • Submissions on item 6, APA 1-3, available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx • Submissions on item 6, APA 1-4, available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx

3) Talanoa Dialogue

• Preparatory phase: written inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-how-do- we-get-there#eq-1 • Political phase: - Official opening of the Talanoa Dialogue’s political phase, COP24, Katowice Poland. - Ministerial Dialogue “Wroclaw” of the Talanoa Dialogue’s political phase, COP24, Katowice Poland. - Official closing of the Talanoa Dialogue’s political phase, COP24, Katowice Poland.

4) All three mechanisms

• Final Katowice decision, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/187593

94

ANNEX II Codes generated per mechanism: 1) Transparency

Written submissions (1) Capacity Building (2) Flexibility (3) GHG inventory (4) inputs to the GST (5) MPGs (6) MRV Regime (7) NDCs and progress (8) support (9) technical review Multilateral Assessment (1) Best practices (2) Finance and support (3) GHG inventory and future projections (4) Institutional arrangements (5) Mitigation policies (6) National policies (7) QEWERT Facilitative Sharing of Views (1) support and finance (2) REDD+ (3) national policies (4) MRV System (5) monitoring (6) modelling (7) mitigation actions (8) IPCC Guidelines (9) institutional arrangements (10) ICA process (11) GHG inventory (12) capacity development (13) BUR developments (14) best practices and lessons learned (15) appreciation

2) Global Stocktake

Written Submissions (1) adaptation (2) CBDR-RC principle (3) GST definition and scope (4) GST timing (5) inputs (6) linkages with other articles (7) modalities (8) national sovereignty

95

(9) outcome (10) science and IPCC (11) support

3) Talanoa Dialogue

Preparatory Phase and Political Phase (1) Actors and fora involved (2) CBDR principle (under the same project because both responding (3) IPCC report to SQ 1.2, both guided by the same negotiation (4) Medium- and long-term goals items, and not presenting differentiation between (5) Policies developed and developing countries) (6) Political momentum (7) Pre-2020 actions (8) Support and finance (9) Transparency

96