Integrating Realist Alliance Theories the Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957)
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Integrating Realist Alliance Theories The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957) Fahad Al-Ankari PhD ABSTRACT The three theories may seem to be at odds with each other, but each brings to the discussions very relevant and useful notions of alliance motivation rooted in the notions of power, threat, and interest/opportunity. It is not the aim of this chapter to arrive at a new theory that explains the entirety of Saudi-U.S. relations to the exclusion of other perspectives. The goal is to broaden the path, which enriches understanding of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment by applying not just one but all three major elements found in realist alliance theory: power, threat, and interest. This thesis examines and applies realist theories of alliance to Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment from 1941-1957, which are best understood within a structure of power, threat, and interest/opportunity for gain. Realist alliance theories applied to economic, military, and political circumstances and events in the Saudi-U.S. case result in a more complete understanding of the formation, dynamics, and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance. In addition to the grand scenario of Cold War power-seeking and self-interests, the Palestine- Israel problem, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis made Saudi-U.S. relations, and the formation of alignment, a complicated process marked by extraordinary challenges to the interests of both states. Gregory Gause (2007) emphasised that except for Walt’s study, literature on the formation and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance is virtually non-existent. The literature review pointed to a shortage in deploying major realist alliance theories into the Saudi-U.S. alliance, especially theories advanced by Stephen Walt (1985, 1987) and Randall Schweller (1994, 1997). The literature shows that the application of realist alliance theory tends to emphasise a single dimension more than an attempt to integrate arguments from the three major theories. The paper argues that the integration of multiple realist alliance theories in the study of the Saudi-U.S. case is more useful than studies that focus on single concepts only, such as balance of power. The application of core elements of neorealist and neoclassical realist alliance theories creates an explanatory structure that brings a sharper focus and a more sober understanding of the basic drivers of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. By viewing the Saudi-U.S. alliance through the lens of the three major realist alliance theories, the research paper adds to the body of knowledge about the dynamics of a long-standing and critical alliance in the international economic, political, and military arena. Table of Contents Chapter 1 General Introduction 1 Background 1 The influence of realism in the Saudi-U.S. case 2 The use of realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case 3 Gap between academic theory and the Saudi-U.S. case 3 Literature review on realism and alliance theory in Saudi-U.S. relations 4 Aim and purpose of the project 8 Research, methodology, and limitations 9 Project chapters 11 Chapter 2 Realist Alliance Theories 14 Introduction 14 Dueling realisms 15 Defining an alliance 18 Kenneth Waltz: Balance of power 21 Stephen Walt: Balance of threat 23 Randall Schweller: Balance of interest/opportunity 28 A framework for analysis and testing 33 Conclusion 34 Chapter 3 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1943) 35 Introduction 35 1933-1939: Prelude to relations 37 1941: Saudi Arabia was not a priority for the U.S. Government 40 1942: Saudi Arabia becomes a U.S. strategic military priority 50 1943: Positive shifts in U.S. attitudes towards Saudi Arabia 54 Conclusion 63 Chapter 4 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1944-1946) 65 Introduction 65 1944: Clearer motives for stronger relations and alignment 66 1945: Ambivalence in Saudi-U.S. relations 75 1946: Threats to the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia 89 Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1941-1946 91 Conclusion 94 Chapter 5 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1947-1948) 95 Introduction 95 1947: Saudi-U.S. relations become more complex 98 Palestine: diametrically opposite U.S. and Saudi positions 112 Realist alliance elements in the Palestine problem 130 1948: Proposals for formal alliances 133 Conclusion 140 Chapter 6 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1949-1952) 142 Introduction 142 1949: Ibn Saud’s quest for Saudi military power and security 143 1950: Intensity of Saudi threat perceptions and military security 153 1951: Hurdles to U.S.-Saudi negotiations 165 1952: U.S grant aid to strengthen the alignment 169 Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1947-1952 171 Conclusion 175 Chapter 7 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1953-1955) 176 Introduction 176 1953: U.S. seeks to revitalise relations 180 Crown Prince Saud becomes the new Saudi King 185 1954: Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment in jeopardy 187 1955: Further deterioration in Saudi-U.S. relations 191 The Buraimi dispute 198 Realist alliance elements in the Buraimi dispute 214 Conclusion 218 Chapter 8 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1956-1957) 219 Introduction 219 1956: Regaining Saud’s trust and confidence 221 The Suez Crisis 225 Realist alliance elements in the Suez Canal crisis 233 Eisenhower searches for a strong Arab leader 235 1957: The U.S. regains Saud’s trust and confidence 238 Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1953-1957 246 Conclusion 248 Chapter 9 Conclusion 249 General observations 249 Project results 250 Bibliography 254 1 Integrating Realist Alliance Theories The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957) Chapter 1 General Introduction to the Project Background This project traces the birth and early stages of what became an enduring alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. After 9/11, Saudi-U.S. relations and the alliance came under very critical scrutiny; however, those who carried out the critique of Saudi-U.S. relations did not examine the realist basis of its origins and evolution. This thesis examines and applies realist theories of alliance to Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment from 1941-1957, which are best understood within a structure of power, threat, and interest/opportunity for gain. After 9/11, U.S. and Western explanations resorted to convenient labels and characterisations that do not explain the realist roots and foundation of relations and the alignment between the two states. Lee Teslik (2008: par.1) described it as a “complicated alliance where oil dominates”. Matt Palmquist (2008: par. 1) characterised it as an “inconvenient alliance bound by oil polluted by profit and political quid pro quos”. David Ottaway and Robert Kaiser (2002: pars.6 &15) labelled it a “marriage of convenience”, in which America’s dependence on Saudi oil is “the best single assurance that American governments will try to preserve the alliance”. Josh Pollack (2002: 7 & 2003: 30) also labelled it as a “marriage of convenience, an ongoing transaction of economic and security relations”. Thomas Lippman (2004: 1, 5) described it as the “ultimate marriage of convenience, a bargain in which Americans gained access to Saudi oil, and the Saudis purchased American planes, weapons, construction projects and know-how that brought them modernization, education, and security”. Ellen Laipson and Emile Hokayem (2005: par. 3) 2 called it a “cozy security alliance”. Doug Bandow (2002: 9) viewed it as a “dubious alliance because it is not clear that America's presence increases Saudi stability”. The influence of realism in the Saudi-U.S. case For historical and academic reasons, the realist paradigm is highly applicable to the study of the Saudi-U.S. case. Realism dominated international politics in the years studied. Incessant competition for power and influence characterised much of the twentieth century, reflected primarily by the struggle and competition between the United States and Soviet Russia in their global ‘Cold War’. The realist core ideas of survival and insecurity, conflict, struggle and competition, fears of domination, power, and force were unmistakable features of the international conflicts that happened during the middle to almost the end of the twentieth century. Kurth (1998:29) described it as “among the most, if not the most, grand and dramatic centuries in the history of international relations”. He pointed out that in the military sphere, there were two World Wars and the Cold War; in the economic sphere, there was the Great Depression of the 1930s, the long boom of the 1950s-60s, and the oil shocks and world inflation of the 1970s (Ibid). In addition to the grand scenario of Cold War power-seeking and self-interests, the Palestine-Israel problem, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis made Saudi-U.S. relations, and the formation of alignment, a complicated process marked by extraordinary challenges to the interests of both states. Given these scenarios and state interactions within the anarchic international structure, realist considerations surely dominated the deliberations of Saudi and American leaders and their foreign relations advisers. Realism dominated liberalism and other international relations theories in academe during 1941-1957 when much of the development of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment occurred. Perhaps, realism dominated academe due to the persistent struggles and conflicts reflected in many of the events on the international political stage during those years. 3 Clearly, idealism/liberalism with its notions of peace and harmony of interests is difficult to fit as an explanatory tool for much of a conflicted world during that period. The use of realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S.