Iran Democracy Monitor: No. 143 | American Foreign Policy Council

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Iran Democracy Monitor: No. 143 | American Foreign Policy Council Iran Democracy Monitor: No. 143 January 19, 2014 Related Categories: Iran EXPORTING THE BASIJ MODEL The Islamic Republic’s preferred method of domestic control is going global. Even as it makes progress with the P5+1 powers on implementing the “Joint Plan of Action” agreed to in Geneva in November, Iran simultaneously is seeking to bolster its standing in the Muslim world by franchising its basij militia throughout the region. A voluntary auxiliary force that operates under the authority of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the basij is used by the Iranian regime to maintain internal security – a concept that the Iranian government now appears eager to provide to other countries in its neighborhood as a way of pressuring Israel. “Today Israel is surrounded by resistance – following the Basij in Palestine and Lebanon, the Syrian Basij was formed; and the Jordanian and Egyptian Basij will follow,” Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of Iran’s basij, has declared. (London Asharq Al Awsat, January 15, 2014) [Editors’ Note: The idea of exporting the basij concept is not new. In recent years, a number of Iran’s foreign allies have toyed with the idea of building basij-like domestic militias in their own countries for the purposes of social control. Perhaps the most notorious of these was Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, who publicly lauded the structure of Iran’s basij during his time in office – and who subsequently mobilized a similar network to intimidate the Venezuelan public ahead of his country’s 2012 elections.] IRAN’S TRADE PARTNERS SEEK TO REENGAGE... Amid a slackening sanctions environment, South Korean firms are gearing up to reengage in trade with Iran. Specifically, a relaxation of sanctions on automotive components, precious metals, and petrochemical products have provided South Korean firms with an opportunity to export car parts and refined petrochemical products to Iran, as well as to purchase oil from the Islamic Republic. Until 2012, South Korea was Iran’s fourth largest trading partner – a position that officials in Seoul now seem eager to reclaim, taking advantage of temporary sanctions relief provided under the Geneva agreement between Iran and the P5+1 powers. (Tehran PressTV, January 15, 2014) ...AS NEW ONES EMERGE Iranian officials, meanwhile, are fielding new interest from prospective trade and energy partners. Representatives of Iran’s Research Institute of the Petroleum Industry (RIPI) are reported to have met recently with visiting Indonesian officials to discuss the possibility of Iran providing its assistance in reviving more than 1,000 dead oil wells in Indonesia. The Indonesian Parliamentary delegation also requested RIPI assistance in training personnel and establishing an oil industry research center in Indonesia. (Baku Trend, January 5, 2014) NEW SIGNS OF IRAN’S HAND IN BAHRAIN In an indicator of Iran’s ongoing interest – and interference – in the Gulf State, officials in Bahrain have arrested five people accused of colluding with Iran to carry out attacks in the country’s Sunni government. The five suspects allegedly travelled to Iran and received training, explosives, and sums of money there from Iranian IRGC officials, with the aim of bomb institutions in Bahrain. The development has rekindled fears of unrest in the majority Shi’ite state, which saw uprisings in 2011 believed to have been orchestrated and aided by Tehran. (Beirut Daily Star, January 3, 2014) IRAN, UAE RESOLVE ISLAND DISPUTE In what represents a major regional development, the Islamic Republic is poised to settle its long-running territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates. The two countries have reportedly reached an agreement over the disposition of three islands, known as Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, situated near the Strait of Hormuz. “A deal has been reached and finalized on the Greater and Lesser Tunbs,” an Emerati source speaking on condition of anonymity has confirmed. “For now, two of the three islands are to return to the UAE while the final agreement for Abu Musa is being ironed out.” (Defense News, January 15, 2014) © 2021 - American Foreign Policy Council .
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