The Moral and Religious Implications of Taylor's and Rorty's Epistemological Critiques
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After rationalism: the moral and religious implications of Taylor's and Rorty's epistemological critiques By Jonathan Sozek Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal June 2006 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Religious Studies. © Jonathan Sozek, 2006 Library and Bibliothèque et 1+1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l'édition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada Your file Votre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-28579-4 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-28579-4 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans loan, distribute and sell th es es le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non sur support microforme, papier, électronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. ln compliance with the Canadian Conformément à la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privée, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont été enlevés de cette thèse. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. ••• Canada Abstract This paper examines and compares the different ways in which Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty critique the representationalism and foundationalism characteristic of modem epistemology (Chapter One), then considers how their critiques affect their respective understandings ofmorality (Chapter Two) and of the role ofreligious beliefin modem secular societies (Chapter Three). Rorty's and Taylor's epistemological debate is presented as an example of the differences between, on the one hand, 'anti-ontological' or pragmatic post-foundational philosophies (such as Rorty's) and, on the other, 'weak ontological', contact realist alternatives (such as Taylor's). The paper concludes with a defense of Taylor's position over Rorty's, and, in doing so, makes a case for the rejection of strictly naturalist accounts of the moral and religious life in favor of a (weak ontological) picture of the human person as necessarily oriented in relation to transcendent goods of other trans-hum an realities. Dans ce travail je vise à élaborer et comparer les approches respectives de Charles Taylor et Richard Rorty à la critique du réprésentationalisme et du fondationalisme typiques de l'épistémologie moderne (premier chapitre). Par la suite je demande comment ces critiques influencent l'éthique de chacun des deux auteurs (deuxième chapitre) ainsi que leur vision du rôle de la croyance religieuse à l'intérieur des sociétés laiques de nos jours (troisième chapitre). Le débat épistémologique entre Rorty et Taylor est présenté tel un exemple des différences entre des philosophies pragmatiques ou antiontologiques (eg la vision de Rorty) et des philosophies d'une "ontologie faible" ou "contact realist", comme celle de Taylor. Ma conclusion est un plaidoyer pour le point de vue de Taylor contre celui de Rorty; ainsi je propose le rejet des versions strictement naturalistes de la vie morale et religieuse et l'acceptation d'une vision "faiblement ontologique" de la personne humaine - la personne humaine qui est orientée nécessairement vers des biens transcendentaux d'autres réalités transhumaines. 2 Acknowledgements Preparation of this thesis has been a long and arduous process, and would not have been possible but for the tireless personal and intellectual support of countless friends and mentors. First, l thank all of my professors at Sarah Lawrence College who set me on the path toward an interest in these questions, especially Fred Smoler for gui ding me through my undergraduate years, Cameron Afzal for teaching me the difference between cataphatic and apophatic theology, and Josh Muldavin for demonstrating the personal energy which needs always to accompany meaningful scholarship. Also, Bernard Roy for introducing me to both Descartes and Sartre, Danny Kaiser for showing me how to 'critique modernity', Griff Foulk for instilling in me early on an Eastern skepticism concerning Western epistemology. Thanks also to Sarah Nelson, Sarah Solomon, Juliya Salkovskaya, Lauren Frank, and Morgan Delgaudio for being such supportive friends, even at a distance, while this paper was being produced. Of my professors at McGill l would like first to thank my supervisor, Lisa Sideris, but for whose encouragement l should never have undertaken nor completed this project. Thanks also to Jim Kanaris for making me read Kant and Hegel, Rex Brynan for providing me room in his political science seminar to investigate Islamic critiques of epistemology, and Victor Hori and Michael Storch for being supportive of my work as a teaching assistant in their classes. Montreal can be a very cold city, and the long conversations and warm relationships l enjoyed with many friends made it possible for me to brave the seasons. l would like to thank all of my friends and colleagues at FRS, especially Bonnie de Bruijn, Rebecca Coughlin, Kirsten Dane, Sajida Jalalzai, Meera Kachroo, Bridget McGregor, Sara Mogilski, Nicola Morry, Robin Nobel, Erin Rehel and Hailey Sarno. Special thanks to Preeti Parasharami for providing comments on an early draft of this paper, and to Jeremy Wiebe for pointing me early on toward sorne important essays of Taylor's. Thanks also to Rebecca Butler for her unfailing friendship and long, wonderful breakfast chats, and to Mona Sarnhuri and CJ Smith for (with difficulty) pulling me away from my 3 books. Kimberly Davis was a constant support and friend during my first year in Montreal, and l remain in her debt. This thesis has been produced in two different places, in two different countries, and l would like to thank many people in each, but space allows for only a sampling. l cannot thank enough everyone at the McGill Newman Centre, especially Richard Bernier, Dan Cere, Sara Cornett, Nathan Gibbard, Vince and Melissa Guzik, Julianne Oh, Alisha Ruiss, and Nadia Solistiono. They, and everyone at Newman, are my family in Montreal. Thanks to Brandon Vaidyanathan for our illuminating conversations about Taylor, and Caolan Moore for keeping me sane during my last semester in Montreal. Special thanks is due to Alexis Nolan, who never tired of my philosophical ramblings. This work would never have been completed but for the hospitality and support of the community of St. Francis de Sales Parish in Loudonville, NY. l would like especially to thank Fr. David Noone for welcoming me so warmly into that community, Fran Reilly and Fran Ralph for being a daily source of guidance and encouragement, and Rich Cook for his light-hearted relief from the stresses of work. Thanks also to Rosemary Doyle, and to Colleen Williams both for her friendship and her comments on a draft of this paper. l also thank Fr. John Provo st for our severallong chats as l tried to balance work with writing, Linda N eidl for convincing me of the importance of this topic, and Sr. Monica Murphy, who has been a friend to me for more than a decade. l lovingly dedicate this thesis to my parents. 4 Table of contents 1. Introduction 1. Aim of this paper 7 2. Context 7 3. Chapter outline and review of sources 16 II. Epistemology 1. Introduction and background 19 1.1 The epistemological eicture 20 1.2 Heidegger and Wittgenstein 22 2. Rorty 25 2.1 The escape from time and chance 25 2.2 Language, texts and lumps 27 3. Taylor 31 3.1 Mediational epistemology 31 3.2 Recasting the picture 34 3.3 Objectivity, realism, and the human sciences 37 4. Analysis and conclusion 41 III. Morality 1. Introduction 47 2. Rorty 49 2.1 Synthesizing reality and justice 50 2.2 The public-private distinction 52 2.3 Achieving a liberal utopia 54 2.4 From vertical to horizontal ethics 56 2.5 Objections 58 3. Taylor 59 3.1 Human agency 61 3.2 Moral frameworks and articulation 64 5 3.3 Practical reason 69 4. Conclusion 72 IV. Religious Belief and Public Life 1. Introduction 76 2. Rorty 76 2.1 The rise of literary culture 77 2.2 Atheism and anti-clericalism 80 2.3 Romantic polytheism 82 3. Taylor 85 3.1 The Intellectual terrain, and CWSs 86 3.2 The modem moral order and Christian theism 90 3.3 Secularity, and a Catholic modemity 93 3.4 Malaises ofmodemity, theism, and deep ecology 96 4. Conclusion and analysis 99 V. Conclusion 1. Introduction 104 2. Summary 104 3. Conclusions 106 4. Avenues for further study 111 VI. Bibliography 113 6 INTRODUCTION 1. Aim ofthis Paper This paper examines the different ways in which Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and American intellectuai Richard Rorty have critiqued and professed to 'move beyond' the modem project of epistemology as founded by the Enlightenment.