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William James As American Plato? Scott Sinclair
WILLIAM JAMES AS AMERICAN PLATO? ______________________________________________________________________________ SCOTT SINCLAIR ABSTRACT Alfred North Whitehead wrote a letter to Charles Hartshorne in 1936 in which he referred to William James as the American Plato. Especially given Whitehead’s admiration of Plato, this was a high compliment to James. What was the basis for this compliment and analogy? In responding to that question beyond the partial and scattered references provided by Whitehead, this article briefly explores the following aspects of the thought of James in relation to Whitehead: the one and the many, the denial of Cartesian dualism, James’s background in physiology, refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes, religious experience, and other kinships. In the end, the author agrees with Robert Neville that James had seminal ideas which could correctly result in a complimentary analogy with Plato. Therefore, a greater focus on the important thought of James is a needed challenge in contemporary philosophy. Michel Weber provided a very helpful article in two parts entitled, “Whitehead’s Reading of James and Its Context,” in the spring 2002 and fall 2003 editions of Streams of William James. Weber began his article with a reference to Bertrand Russell: “When Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) visited Harvard in 1936, ‘there were two heroes in his lectures – Plato and James.’”1 Although he goes on to affirm that Whitehead could have said the same, Weber either overlooks the fact, or is not aware, that Whitehead actually did compare James to Plato in his January 2, 1936 hand-written letter to Charles Hartshorne, as printed by Whitehead’s biographer, Victor Lowe: European philosophy has gone dry, and cannot make any worthwhile use of the results of nineteenth century scholarship. -
INTUITION .THE PHILOSOPHY of HENRI BERGSON By
THE RHYTHM OF PHILOSOPHY: INTUITION ·ANI? PHILOSO~IDC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON By CAROLE TABOR FlSHER Bachelor Of Arts Taylor University Upland, Indiana .. 1983 Submitted ~o the Faculty of the Graduate College of the · Oklahoma State University in partial fulfi11ment of the requirements for . the Degree of . Master of Arts May, 1990 Oklahoma State. Univ. Library THE RHY1HM OF PlllLOSOPHY: INTUITION ' AND PfnLoSOPlllC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON Thesis Approved: vt4;;. e ·~lu .. ·~ests AdVIsor /l4.t--OZ. ·~ ,£__ '', 13~6350' ii · ,. PREFACE The writing of this thesis has bee~ a tiring, enjoyable, :Qustrating and challenging experience. M.,Bergson has introduced me to ·a whole new way of doing . philosophy which has put vitality into the process. I have caught a Bergson bug. His vision of a collaboration of philosophers using his intuitional m~thod to correct, each others' work and patiently compile a body of philosophic know: ledge is inspiring. I hope I have done him justice in my description of that vision. If I have succeeded and that vision catches your imagination I hope you Will make the effort to apply it. Please let me know of your effort, your successes and your failures. With the current challenges to rationalist epistemology, I believe the time has come to give Bergson's method a try. My discovery of Bergson is. the culmination of a development of my thought, one that started long before I began my work at Oklahoma State. However, there are some people there who deserv~. special thanks for awakening me from my ' "''' analytic slumber. -
Mereology Then and Now
Logic and Logical Philosophy Volume 24 (2015), 409–427 DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2015.024 Rafał Gruszczyński Achille C. Varzi MEREOLOGY THEN AND NOW Abstract. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of the motivations that led to the development of mereology as we know it today, along with a brief description of some questions that define current research in the field. Keywords: mereology; parthood; formal ontology; foundations of mathe- matics 1. Introduction Understood as a general theory of parts and wholes, mereology has a long history that can be traced back to the early days of philosophy. As a formal theory of the part-whole relation or rather, as a theory of the relations of part to whole and of part to part within a whole it is relatively recent and came to us mainly through the writings of Edmund Husserl and Stanisław Leśniewski. The former were part of a larger project aimed at the development of a general framework for formal ontology; the latter were inspired by a desire to provide a nominalistically acceptable alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. (The name itself, ‘mereology’ after the Greek word ‘µρoς’, ‘part’ was coined by Leśniewski [31].) As it turns out, both sorts of motivation failed to quite live up to expectations. Yet mereology survived as a theory in its own right and continued to flourish, often in unexpected ways. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that today mereology is a central and powerful area of research in philosophy and philosophical logic. It may be helpful, therefore, to take stock and reconsider its origins. -
Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production: the Relations of Change
Running head: MARX AND PROCESS 1 Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production: The Relations of Change ---------------------- ------- ABSTRACT: In this essay I offer a reading of Karl Marx which deviates from traditionalapproaches. I should like to explicate the metaphysics of process in Marx‟s philosophy. This work will make explicit a Marxianconcept of change and transformation in the flow of history—as Marx‟s vision of history is adynamic unfolding. On my view, Marx‟s underlying structure which serves to support his metaphysics of process is production. In The German Ideology(1845-1846) Marx writes, “The way men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part” (Tucker, 1978, p. 150). It is from the departure of real human relations that we see Marx beginning his analyses. I contend that that these relations (human production) have ontological primacy. As I see Marx as a philosopher of change, I contend that the modern process philosopher is better suited to understand the metaphysics of Marx—and therefore the dynamics of production—in pursuit of the revolutionary struggle. MARX AND PROCESS 2 Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production In this essay I will offer a reading of Karl Marx which deviates from more traditional philosophical approaches. -
The Apocryphal Whitehead Michel Weberi
Contact Made Vision: The Apocryphal Whitehead Michel Weberi Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. It runs through three stages, if it evolves to its final satisfaction. It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion. (RM 16)1 Introduction The present Whiteheadian dialogue between natural process theology and Whiteheadian scholarship exploits a tangential approach that will provide new ways of contrasting Whitehead’s worldview by adding a third unexpected speaker: Thomas, the Gnostic Jew who wrote his Gospel perhaps as early as 60 years after Jesus’ death and could thus have constituted an earlier corpus than the canonical gospels—and their hypothetical Q.2 Some readers might consider that the price to pay is too high to venture oneself on such a cross-interpretative path: there is no need to impose an unfashionable syncretic burden either on Whitehead or on Thomas; the inflexion required on each of them to bring them together is simply too demanding and totally unscientific anyway. At least four answers immediately come to mind: first, there is no such thing as a totally objective interpretation in these matters (even the “hard-core” scientific enterprise does not completely escape from the social construction of its issues); second, this hermeneutical wager carries important consequences for each party; third, the rapprochement is operational only at the level of the fundamental intuition—of course not at the level of the technicalities (for the most part absent in Thomas anyway); fourth, what matters above all is to highlight new ways of understanding the human condition, not to stick sclerotically to dead abstractions. -
33536 SP WEB FM 00I-Xii.Indd
Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind Edited by MICHEL WEBER AND ANDERSON WEEKES Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind Edited by Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2009 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production by Cathleen Collins Marketing by Anne M. Valentine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Process approaches to consciousness in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind / edited by Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes. p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4384-2941-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Consciousness. 2. Process philosophy. 3. Psychology. 4. Neurosciences. 5. Philosophy of mind. I. Weber, Michel. II. Weekes, Anderson, 1960– B808.9.P77 2010 126—dc22 2009010131 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 In memoria ingentis ingenii, dedicamus librum hunc ad Alecem MDCDLXXVI – MMVII vi Contents For much of the twentieth century, all sciences, including biology, were obsessed with reductionism: viewing the world at all levels, from the smallest to the largest, as merely a machine made of parts. -
Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought
Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Edited by Jakub Dziadkowiec and Lukasz Lamza Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Series: European Studies in Process Thought Edited by Jakub Dziadkowiec and Lukasz Lamza This book first published 2019 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2019 by Jakub Dziadkowiec, Lukasz Lamza and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-3697-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-3697-5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword .................................................................................................. vii Part I: Towards a Science of Process Introduction to Part I .................................................................................. 2 Bogdan Ogrodnik Chapter 1 .................................................................................................... 6 Formal Representation of Space Michael Heather and Nick Rossiter Chapter 2 .................................................................................................. 19 An Inductively Formulated Process Metaphysics Lukasz Lamza Chapter 3 ................................................................................................. -
Cvsp 202 Fall 2013–2014
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT Civilization Sequence Program CVSP 202 FALL 2013–2014 LECTURE 1 (10th September 2013) ‘Philosophical Background’ [Dr. Nader El-Bizri] [email protected] The ancient Greek legacies in philosophy, in particular the thoughts and experiences of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, influenced the intellectual history of the Abrahamic monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, from late antiquity to the 13th century (This document offers simplified and adapted highlights about some of the main concepts of this ancient Greek philosophical background). * * * * * * * PLATO [ca. 427–347 BC] أﻓﻼطﻮن / Πλάτων ‘The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ [Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929)] The ‘Simile of the Cave’ (Plato’s Republic 514a-521b) Imagine a group of people who lived chained in a cave all their lives, and facing a blank wall on which shadows are projected from objects situated in front of a fire behind them. They ascribe forms to these shadows, and this is the closest they get to reality and truth. Unlike them, the philosophers are freed prisoners from the cave who understand that the shadows on the wall do not make up reality, and who also grasp the true form of the real and its source of illumination, rather than being fixated on mere shadows and appearances. They generally believe that their duty is to free the chained others by giving them knowledge in order to distinguish truth/reality from appearances. A Theory of Forms Prior to Socrates and Plato (in Pre-Socratic times), there were two main Ancient Greek conceptions of reality in the 6th and 5th centuries BC. -
Bergsoniana, 1
Bergsoniana 1 | 2021 Reassessing Bergson What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein Steven Savitt Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/333 DOI: 10.4000/bergsoniana.333 ISSN: 2800-874X Publisher Société des amis de Bergson Electronic reference Steven Savitt, “What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein”, Bergsoniana [Online], 1 | 2021, Online since 01 July 2021, connection on 14 September 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/ 333 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.333 Les contenus de la revue sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. WHAT BERGSON SHOULD HAVE SAID TO EINSTEIN1 Steven SAVITT Let me begin by repeating (changing only the name) a paragraph from a recent paper by David Chalmers: I should say that I am not a historian or a serious scholar of Bergson. These are merely some speculative remarks not well-grounded in scholarly attention to Bergson’s texts. But I think the speculative question is interesting. I’m going to sketch one speculative answer. I’m going to be interested to hear from people who know much more about Bergson than I do about whether this speculation has any remote plausibility. If the historical speculation has none, as may well be possible, I think there is still a very interesting philosophical project in the neighbourhood which is itself worthy of attention (Chalmers 2018). My speculative remarks concern the famous debate between Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein that took place in Paris on 6 April 1922. This encounter has recently received a book-length treatment (Canales 2015), but little of the substance of the debate was actually reported in it. -
The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead's Non-Reductive Monism
Anderson Weekes The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead’s Non-reductive Monism Abstract: There have been many attempts to retire dualism from active philosophic life, replacing it with something less removed from sci- ence, but we are no closer to that goal now than fifty years ago. I pro- pose breaking the stalemate by considering marginal perspectives that may help identify unrecognized assumptions that limit the main- stream debate. Comparison with Whitehead highlights ways that opponents of dualism continue to uphold the Cartesian ‘real distinc- tion’between mind and body. Whitehead, by contrast, insists on a con- ceptual distinction: there can no more be body without mind than mind without body (at least at the level of ultimate constituents). Key to this integration is Whitehead’s understanding that mind, at its most rudimentary, is simply the intrinsic temporality of a physical event. Thus, the resulting form of ‘panpsychism’ is more naturalistic than commonly supposed, and it solves both the composition problem (tra- ditionally fatal to panpsychism) and the ‘hard problem’. I. Introduction In this paper I look at the ideas of the mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) in light of the contemporary debate on the ‘hard problem’of physically explaining consciousness. Consciousness studies is a burgeoning business, but one still marked by partisan controversy. If we look closely, however, we can find consensus behind the controversy. There is, for example, well attested agreement on the structure of the problem space.Onealso Correspondence: Email: [email protected] Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, No. 9–10, 2012, pp. -
Whitehead's Pancreativism: the Basics
Michel Weber Weber's hermeneutical tools are designed to reveal Whitehead's unique Whitehead's Pancreativism: The Basics. ness. They avoid the 'retroactive illusion' in which we see in a past event Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2007. nothing but the preparation for the present, and the 'teleological prospective' Pp.255. illusion in which we see the present as merely a preparation for the future, US$106.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-3-938793-15-2). each of these preventing us seeing the present as a 'complete act in itself' (xiii); but at the same time, they reveal the achievement of an author or a In his introduction to After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre called upon his readers work as a 'complete act in itself by seeing it against the background of the to imagine a culture in which, to begin with, the natural sciences had been entire history of thought from which it emerged, and in relation its legacy destroyed by an anti-science movement, and then, reacting against this move for the future. Contextualization and exegesis are inseparable, requiring us ment, people had attempted to reconstruct science from surviving fragments. to have a holistic interpretation of this background, but without obliterating In this imaginary world adults argue over the respective merits of different the creative advance ofthe author. theories, and children learn by heart the surviving portions of the periodic Weber first situates Whitehead in relation to the extraordinary develop table and recite as incantations some of the theorems of Euclid, but 'nobody, ments within science, mathematics and logic from which his work emerged. -
Whitehead's Panpsychism As the Subjectivity of Prehension
Whitehead's Panpsychism as the Subjectivity of Prehension Leemon B. McHenry LEEMON B. McHENRY is Visiting Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024. 1. Introduction Whitehead's concept of prehension is undeniably the master principle of his process metaphysics. It is the central function of a creative universe whereby the many past occasions become a novel one. In my view, the concept of pre hension is Whitehead's most original and distinctive contribution to metaphy sics. It is also the very idea that prevents most contemporary philosophers from understanding or appreciating his thought. In this paper, I wish to explore the idealist context in which the concept of prehension becomes intelligible. While I do not deny that important influences from physics and biology helped Whitehead frame his idea, I contend that pre hension only makes sense as a concept of panpsychistic idealism. Here I use the term 'idealism' not in the sense of nature dependent on mind, but rather nature understood fun.damentally as sentient experience. 1 This appears to be White head's intention when, introducing the term 'prehension' for the first time in Science and the Modern World, he says: For Berkeley's mind, I substitute a process of prehensive unification. In order to make intelligible this concept of the progressive realization of natural occurrences, considerable' expansion is required, and confrontation with its actual implications in terms of concrete experience. (SMW 69) Whitehead also draws analogies with Leibniz's monads and Spinoza's modes in order to clarify how his novel idea of prehension squares with the notion of individual perspectives interlocked in a system of internal relations.