Democracy by Deterrence: Strategic Self-Entrenchment in U.S. Elections
Working Paper Series #5 Democracy by Deterrence: Strategic Self-Entrenchment in U.S. Elections Gretchen Helmke Mary Kroeger Jack Paine University of Washington Political Economy Forum Democracy by Deterrence: Strategic Self-Entrenchment in U.S. Elections Gretchen Helmke* Mary Kroeger† Jack Paine‡ July 21, 2020 Abstract If politicians and their political parties generally want to stay in power, why would they ever forgo using anti-democratic tactics to win elections? We analyze a game-theoretic model to explain democracy by deterrence, which specifies how fear of retaliation by the opposition party can check the incumbent party, as well as describes the conditions for deterrence to break down. In our dynamic model, party leaders can strategically tilt electoral rules to their advantage. Asymmetric legal opportunities emergent in the constitutional order that enable a party to legally target certain groups of voters, combined with high partisan sorting, activate a party’s incentives for self-entrenchment. This mechanism does not require that politicians have short time horizons, nor that parties differ in anti-democratic sentiments. We apply this framework to illuminate the dynamics of gerrymandering and voter suppression, two key areas of contemporary American electoral politics that threaten fundamental democratic principles. Word count: 9,954 Keywords: American institutions, democratic backsliding, game theory, gerrymandering, vot- ing rights *Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. ‡Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. 1 INTRODUCTION Self-enforcing democracy requires not only that losers accept unfavorable electoral results, but also that winners refrain from using their office to alter rules and norms to stay in power.
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