Counterinsurgency (Coin)

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Counterinsurgency (Coin) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) ANA 3-24 June 2007 ANA 3-24 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 2 ANA 3-24 Foreword This manual takes a general approach to COIN. The Army recognizes that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You cannot fight the Taliban the way you would fight the former Soviet Union; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each vary considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people, employ variations of standard themes, and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign a solid foundation on which to build in seeking to understand and address specific insurgencies. A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation. It requires Soldiers to employ a mix of both familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies, with the balance between them varying depending on the local situation. This is not easy. Leaders at all levels must adjust their approach constantly, ensuring that their elements are ready each day to be greeted with a handshake or a hand grenade, to be nation builders as well as warriors, to help reestablish institutions and local security forces, to assist in the rebuilding of infrastructure and basic services, and to facilitate the establishment of local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is a long one and involves extensive coordination and cooperation with a myriad of intergovernmental, indigenous, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting – and the discussions in this manual endeavor to alert them to the challenges of such campaigns and to suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign thus requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the necessary guidelines to succeed in such a campaign, in operations that, inevitably, are exceedingly difficult and complex. Our Soldiers deserve nothing less. 3 ANA 3-24 Contents Page PREFACE 9 Chapter 1 INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 10 Overview 10 Aspects of Insurgency 11 Aspects of Counterinsurgency 29 Summary 40 Chapter 2 UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN 42 AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES Integration 42 Key Counterinsurgency Participant and their Likely 46 Roles Key Responsibilities in Counterinsurgency 50 Civilian and Military Integration Mechanisms 52 Tactical-level Interagency Considerations 53 Summary 54 Chapter 3 INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 55 Section 1 – Intelligence Characteristics of 55 Counterinsurgency Section II – Predeployment Planning and 56 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Define the Operational Environment 57 Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment 57 Evaluate the Threat 68 Determine Threat Courses of Action 71 Section III – Intelligence, Surveillance and 73 Reconnaissance The Intelligence – Operations Dynamic 75 Surveillance and Reconnaissance Considerations 77 Considerations for Other Intelligence Disciplines 78 Section IV – Counterintelligence and 79 Counterreconnaissance Section V – Analysis 79 Current Operations 81 Network Analysis 82 Intelligence Reach 82 Continuity 83 4 ANA 3-24 Section VI – Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion 83 Intelligence Cell and Working Groups 83 Protecting Sources 84 National Integration 84 Summary 85 Chapter 4 DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY 86 OPERATIONS The Importance of Campaign Design 86 The Relationship Between Design and Planning 86 The Nature of Design 87 Elements of Design 88 Campaign Design for Counterinsurgency 89 Summary 93 Chapter 5 EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY 94 OPERATIONS The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations 94 Logical Lines of Operations in Counterinsurgency 96 Common Logical Lines of Operations in 100 Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency Approaches 112 Assessment of Counterinsurgency Operations 121 Targeting 124 Learning and Adaptation 127 Summary 127 Chapter 6 DEVELOPING NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 128 Overview 128 Challenges, Resources and End State 129 Framework for Development 134 Police in Counterinsurgency 147 Chapter 7 LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR 151 COUNTERINSURGENCY Leadership in Counterinsurgency 151 Ethics 155 Warfighting Versus Policing 156 Detention and Interrogation 158 The Learning Imperative 160 Summary 160 Chapter 8 BUILDING AND SUSTAINING CAPABILITY AND 161 CAPACITY Logistic Considerations in Counterinsurgency 161 Operations 5 ANA 3-24 Logistic Support to Logical Lines of Operations 166 National Support Contractors 179 Summary 179 Appendix A A GUIDE FOR ACTION: PLAN, PREPARE, 181 EXECUTE AND ASSESS Plan 181 Prepare 182 Execute 185 Ending the Tour 191 Three “What Ifs” 191 Conclusion 192 Appendix B INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE 193 BATTLEFIELD Section I – Intelligence preparation of the Battlefield 193 Steps Section II – Define the Operational Environment 193 Section III – Describe the Effects of the Operational 194 Environment Civil Considerations 194 Terrain Analysis 205 Weather Analysis 205 Military Aspects of Terrain (OCOKA) and Civil 206 Considerations Section IV – Evaluate the Threat 206 Insurgency-related Threats 206 Opportunities 207 Objective and Motivation Identification 207 Popular Support or Tolerance 208 Support Activities – Capabilities and Vulnerabilities 210 Information and Media Activities – Capabilities and 211 Vulnerabilities Political Activities 212 Violent Activities 212 Insurgent Organizational Structure and Key 214 Personalities Section V – Determine Threat Courses of Action 215 Insurgent Strategies 215 Tactical Courses of Action 217 Appendix C LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 220 Authorization to Use Military Force 220 Rules of Engagement 220 The Law of War 221 Internal Armed Conflict 221 6 ANA 3-24 Detention and Interrogation 223 Enforcing Discipline of Forces 224 Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction 225 Domestic Claims 225 Establishing the Rule of Law 225 Appendix D SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 227 Networks and Insurgents 227 Performing Social Network Analysis 228 Social Network Data Collection 229 Social Network Graphs and Insurgent Organization 231 Social Network Measures 233 The Network Perspective 236 Appendix E AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 238 Overview 238 The Advantages of Airpower 239 Airpower in the Strike Role 239 Airpower in Intelligence Collection 239 The Role of High-Tech Assets 240 The Role of Low-Tech Assets 240 The Airpower Command Structure 241 Building the Nation’s Airpower Capability 241 Appendix F LEARNING COUNTERINSURGENCY 243 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 245 FIGURES Figure 1-1 Possible counterinsurgency phases 13 Figure 1-2 Support for an insurgency 29 Figure 1-3 Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational 40 practices Figure 4-1 Design planning continuum 87 Figure 4-2 Iterative campaign design 91 Figure 5-1 Common counterinsurgency operational-level logical lines of 98 operations Figure 5-2 The effect of proper application of LLOs in counterinsurgency 99 Figure 5-3 The strengthening effect of interrelated LLOs 100 Figure 5-4 Unit application of the essential services logical lines of operations 108 Figure 6-1 Matrix of security force development 137 Figure 8-1 Conventional and counterinsurgency operations contrasted 162 Figure 8-2 Comparison of essential services availability to insurgent 174 effectiveness Figure D-1 Simple network 229 Figure D-2 Large complex network 229 7 ANA 3-24 Figure D-3 Dyad examples 230 Figure D-4 Activities matrix 231 Figure D-5 Network organization with high connections 232 Figure D-6 Fragmented network 232 Figure D-7 Assessments 233 Figure D-8 Hypothetical regional insurgency 233 Figure D-9 Comparison of subgroup densities 234 Figure D-10 Density shift 235 8 ANA 3-24 Preface This manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and relevant combat operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine, and doctrine recently developed. Many people who articulate and apply ANA policy and those who conduct operations in counterinsurgency environments are neither conversant nor familiar with the principles of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is not surprising, considering that these subjects have been generally neglected in broader military doctrine and national security policies over the last 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to counterinsurgency with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances and globalization. To make this text useful to leaders involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to various areas of operation. This manual is not focused on any region or country. Insurgencies have many common characteristics and patterns, while their ideological basis may vary widely. Fundamental to all counterinsurgencies is the need to assist local authorities to secure the populace and thereby separate the people from the insurgents while enhancing the legitimacy
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