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Behavioral and Brain Sciences VOLUME 16 An International Journal of Current Research NUMBER 1 MARCH 1993 and Theory with Open Peer Commentary Appearing in this issue, with Commentary . How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge Of intentionality Alison Gopnik The psychology of folk psychology Alvin I. Goldman A perspective for viewing the history of psychophysics David J. Murray Also, Continuing Commentary on "Sex differences in mathematical reasoning ability in intellectually talented preadolescents: Their nature, effects and possible causes" (Benbow) "Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science" (Searle) "The neuropsychology of schizophrenia" (Gray et al.) CAMBRIDGE Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.33.42, on 26 Sep 2021 at 10:41:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00028612 ISSN 0140-525X Behavioral and Brain Sciences Editor Language and Language Disorders Max Coltheart/Macquarie U. Stevan Harnad Linguistics E-mail: [email protected] or Robert Freidin/Princeton [email protected] 20 Nassau St., Suite 240 Neurobiology Princeton, NJ 08542 Irving Kupfermann/Columbia Neurobehavioral Genetics Managing Editor Wim E. Crusio/Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Nancy Simon Neuropsychology Chief Copy Editor Jeffrey A. Gray/lnst. Psychiatry, London John C. Marshall/Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford Avis Kniffin Neurophysiology Associate Editors Sten Grillner/Karolinska Institutet Behavioral Biology Paleoneurology Jack P. Hailman/U. Wisconsin Stephen Jay Gould/Harvard Hubert Markl/U. Konstanz Perception Biosocial Behavior Bruce Bridgeman/U. California Glendon Schubert/U. Hawaii, Manoa Richard Gregory/U. Bristol Cognition and Artificial Intelligence Philosophy Zenon Pylyshyn/U. Western Ontario Daniel C. Dennett/Tufts Cognitive Development Gilbert Harman/Princeton Annette Karmiloff-Smith/MRC, London and MPI, Nijmegen Philosophy of Science Evolutionary Biology Adolf Grunbaum/U. Pittsburgh Michael T. Ghiselin/California Academy of Sciences Primatology Experimental Analysis of Behavior Horst D. Steklis/Rutgers A. Charles Catania/U. Maryland, Baltimore County Psychobiology History and Systems Victor H. Denenberg/U. Connecticut Julian Jaynes/Princeton David S. Olton/Johns Hopkins Language and Cognition Vision and Artificial Intelligence Philip Johnson-Laird/Princeton Stuart Sutherland/U. Sussex Editorial Policy Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an Copying This journal is registered with the Copyright Clear- international journal providing a special service called Open ance Center (27 Congress St., Salem, MA 01970). 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The subscription provide substantive criticism, interpretation, elaboration, and price for institutions of Volume 16 (1993) is US $196.00 net pertinent complementary and supplementary material from a in the U.S.A. and Canada; £133.00 in the rest of the world; full cross-disciplinary perspective. The article, accepted for individuals US $80.00 net (£54.00); for BBS Associates commentaries, and the author's response then appear si- and for students (in the U.S.A. and Canada only) with proof of multaneously in BBS. eligibility with order US $46.00 net (£34.00); for APA, APS, Commentary on BBS articles may be provided by any and ASA members US $64.00 net (£34.00) with proof of qualified professional in the behavioral and brain sciences, eligibility with order. 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Postmaster: This publication was supported in part by NIH Grant LM Send address changes in the U.S.A. and Canada to Behavioral 03539 from the National Library of Medicine. and Brain Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20 Street, New York, NY 10011 -4211. Advertising Inquiries about advertising should be sent to 'Modelled on the 'CA Comment' service of the journal the Journals Promotion Department of the Cambridge or Current Anthropology. New York Office of Cambridge University Press. © 1993 Cambridge University Press Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.33.42, on 26 Sep 2021 at 10:41:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00028612 Contents Volume 16:1 March 1993 Gopnik, A. How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality 1 Goldman, A. I. The psychology of folk psychology 15 Open Peer Commentary Mele, A. Reporting on past psychological states: Armstrong, D. M. Causes are perceived Beliefs, desires and intentions 61 and introspected 29 Moore, C. & Barresi, J. Knowledge of the psychological Baron-Cohen, S. The concept of intentionality: states of self and others is not only theory-laden Invented or innate? 29 but also data-driven 61 Bartsch, K. & Estes, D. Are false beliefs Morris, W. E. & Richardson, R. C. Mismatching representative mental states? 30 categories? 62 Butterworth, G. Towards an ecology of mind 31 Morton, A. Heuristics and counterfactual Campbell, R. L. & Bickhard, M. H. Knowing levels self-knowledge 63 and the child's understanding of mind 33 Nichols, S. Developmental evidence and introspection 64 Cassidy, K. W. There's more to mental states Olson, D. R. & Astington, J. W. The role of concepts than meets the inner "I" 34 in perception and inference 65 Chalmers, D. J. Self-ascription without qualia: Perner, J. A plea for the second functionalist model A case study 35 and the insufficiency of simulation 66 Chandler, M. & Carpendale, J. The naked truth Pietroski, P. M. First-person authority and beliefs about first-person knowledge 36 as representations 67 Chater, N. Categorization, theories and folk Pillow, B. H. Limitations on first-person experience: psychology 37 Implications of the "extent" 69 Czyzewska, M. & Lewicki, P. How directly do we Plaut, D. C. & KarmilofT-Smith, A. Representational know our minds? 37 development and theory-of-mind computations 70 Daniel, S. The anthropology of folk psychology 38 Pratt, I. Matching and mental-state ascription 71 Dittrich, W. H. & Lea, S. E. G. Intentionality, mind Rachlin, H. Theory-theory theory 72 and folk psychology 39 Rakover, S. S. Theories of mind: Some Ericsson, K. A. Recall or regeneration of past mental methodological/conceptual problems, and an states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive alternative approach 73 processes 41 Rev, G. Why presume analyses are on-line? 74 Fetzer, J. H. Goldman has not defeated folk Rips, L. J. Qualities and relations in folk theories functionalism 42 of mind 75 Goldman, A. I. Competing accounts of belief-task Russell, J. On leaving your children wrapped performance 43 in thought 76 Gopnik, A. Theories and qualities 44 Saunders, B. A. C. Disenshrining the Cartesian self 77 Gordon, R. M. Self-ascription of belief and desire 45 Shoemaker, S. Special access lies down Gunderson, K. On behalf of phenomenological parity with theory-theory 78 for the attitudes 4g Siegal, M. Knowing children's minds 79 Gurd, J. M. & Marshall, J. C. Know my own mind? Stanovich, K. E. The developmental history 1 should be so lucky! 47 of an illusion 80 48 Sterelny, K. Categories, categorisation and Harris, P. L. First-person current 49 development: Introspective knowledge is no threat Heil, J. Unraveling introspection to functionalism 81 Hill, C. S. Qualitative characteristics, type materialism 50 Thompson, N. S. Why Alison Gopnik should be and the circularity of analytic functionalism a behaviorist 83 Horgan, T. Analytic functionalism without 51 Tomascllo, M. Where's the person? 84 representational functionalism 52 Velmans, M. Common sense, functional theories Jackson, F. Qualia for prepositional attitudes? 52 and knowledge of the mind 85 Johnson, C.
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