From Caraquet to Lord:

Language Politics in New Brunswick

Jonathan Peter Bishop

B. A. University of New Brunswick, 1998

Thesis

submitted in partial fulfillrnent of the requirenients for

the Degree of Master of .4rts (Political Science)

Acadia University.

Sprinç Convocation 2000

Jonathan Peter Bishop, 1999 National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nre WeUiion Onawa ON KIA ON4 OnawaON K1AW CaMda canada

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantiai extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autonsation. Table of Contents

Page

List of Tables and Figures...... v

. . Abstract...... vil

Chapter One: Introduction...... -1

Chapter Two: The Theoretical Frarnework...... 1 1

Consociationalism Applied to Canada...... 15

Consociationalism Applied to New Brunswick: The Initial Deal...... 29

Chapter Three: The Breakdown of the Initial Consociational Deal...... XI

The Need for Restructuring...... -57

The Second Consociational Deal...... 59

Challenges to the Second Consociational Deal...... 84

Chapter Four: 1997- 1998 Survey Research: A Profile of the People of New Brunswick...... 1 O4

Chapter Five: Conclusion...... -126

Bibliography...... -138 List of Tables and Figures

Page

Figure 1 - 1 : The Consociational Model...... 9

Table 3- 1 : Ethnic Composition of Cabinet in New Brunswick. 196 1 - 1997...... 39

Table 3- 1 : Overarching National Solidarity in New Brunswick. 1 993 ...... 82

Table 3-2: Political Identification in New Brunswick, 1995-1 999...... -53

Table 4- 1 : importance of B iIingualism to the way Survey Respondents Voted in Leadership Conventions in New Brunswick...... 1 O6

Table 4-2: Conservative Party Convention Survey Question: Who did you vote for on the first Ballot ...... 107

Table 4-3: It is important for Party leaders to be Bilingual...... 108

Tablc 4-3A: Who did those that "strongly ageed" with the statement. /I i~ it)rporturltfor Netr' Bnulst rick pcrrt~,leaders IO he biliirgzrtrl. Vote for with their first ballot in the 1997 Conservative Leadership Convention...... 109

Table 4-1:New Brunswick should remain bilingual irrespective of whether Quebec secedes from Canada...... -...... - . .. - -.. - -.-. -. - 109

Table 3-5:Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society...... 1 10

Table 4-6: As the only officially bilingual province. Ne~vBrunswick has a special role to play in matters of national unity ...... 1 12

'Table 3-7: Official Bilingualism has been a good thing for New Brunswick...... 1 13

Table 4-8: Response to the question "Has Bilingualism been a good thing for New Brunswick". among those who are biIinguaI...... 1 16

Table 4-9: 1 could never vote for a Confederation of Regions type party...... 1 17

Table 4- 10: Anglophone Respondents who "strongly disagrced" with the statement "Official BiIingualism has been a good thing for New Brunswick". compared with their response to the statement "1 could ncver vote for a COR type party.*'......

Table 4-1 1: Both the Acadian and New Brunswick flag should be flown in front of government buildings in New Brunswick...... 12 1 v i

Page

Table 3- 12: Ne\v Brunswick's Libemls are more attuned to the Francophone community. while the PC's are more attuned to the Anglophone community...... 1 22

Table 5- 1 : Size of Major Subcuitures in New Brunswick...... 134

Table 5-2: Provincial Electoral History of the CCF-NDP in New Brunswick...... 136 vii

Abstract

From Caraquef to Lord studies relations between francophones and anglophones within the province of New Brunswick since Confederation. In other places where two or more cultures intersect, a confrontation ofien develops, occasionally resulting in civil instability and even war.

However, New Brunswick deviates fiom this pattern. What have the people of this province done differently to avoid the tension that frequently occurs within a bi-ethnic society?

What they have done is practiced the politics of accommodation, mainly through the activities of their leaders. An examination of campaign strategies, cabinet formations. and the composition of the civil service shows a pattern of elite cooperation in New Brunswick that may be absent elsewhere. The path in finding an answer to this query has been lit by a number of political scientists. Arend Lijphart and Edmund Aunger both provide the theoretical framework required in order to view clearly what has transpired in the province. However, this analysis has significantly revised the consociational theory in order to account for activities that have occurred in New Brunswick dunng the past three decades.

This elite accommodation found in the province has taken the form of two consociational

'-deals." Each had separate terms and conditions, aithough both had a similar goal in mind: the placement of language issues off the potitical agenda. The first deal ended in 1960, while the second has been in operation for over thirty years. These consociational arrangements have provided the province of New Brunswick with the stability it requires to remain peaceful in an ever-changing world. viii

Ackno wledgemena

Throughout the course of this work, 1 have accumulated a large number of debts. as well as a number of people to thank. First of all, to my parents, family and friends for their support, without which, none of this would be possible. Ian Stewart of Acadia University has supervised this work from first thoughts until final copy, and 1 am grateful for his numerous suggestions and his in fin ite editing capacity. 1 would also like to thank the library staff at Acadia, who worked diligentiy to ensure that 1 had a multitude of available resources. Thanks also to the Centre for

Democracy at Queen's University for your quick response to my queries conceming New

Brunswick opinion polls. Moreover, my thanks go to al1 those who took the time to speak with me during rny research. Your comments were helpful and your anecdotes were unforgettable. A debt of gratitude aiso goes out to Gary Allen and Conde Grondin at the University of New

Brunswick in Fredericton. Gary for having faith in me, even though 1 was not always the most intelligent student in the class, and Conde, for teaching me some of the tricks to the New

Brunswick political trade.

Finally, 1 would Iike to thank Nicola, my inspiration, Paul, my mentor, and Gina Bernard for her superb translation skills and companionship. Gina now knows more about New

Brunswick politics than she ever wanted to, and her unfailing support throughout the period it took to write this work is something to be cherished. Chapter One: Intduction

Within Canada, there is a province that has a unique ethnic makeup - New Brunswick.

The most distinctive aspect of New Brunswick is the relative balance between its English and

French-speaking populations, who have been living together in the region for more than two centuries. New Brunswick's current language policy now reinforces the province's uniqueness.

In al1 essential aspects of public administration, both languages are legally equal.' The political stability of this province since 1875 has rested on the formulation and maintenance of hvo consociational deals. The first deal began with the Caraquet riots and ended with the election of

Louis Robichaud in 1960. The second began with the introduction of a bill that proved to be a precursor to the Oficial Languages Act, 1969 (NB). Since the beginning of the second deal, the two traditional parties have consistently supported the vision of the province king officially bilingual. Most conflicts and concems on language policy have been worked out or suppressed within their ca~cuses.~The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain whether the consociational mode1 still fÏts the province, and if so, whether the second deal described above is still functioning. The initial chapter will attempt to outline the cornplex structure of the current consociational agreement as well as explain how the previous arrangement between the anglophone and francophone leaders operateci.

The use of the term "deal" is interesting. It implies that two or more groups get together, negotiate, work out a solution to a problem, and then go about their separate ways, each adhering to the decision agreed to during negotiations. And, in fact, this is what happened in 1875 to initiate the first consociational deal. However, the use of the term "deal" to describe what has

. - L Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 2.

Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 2. occurred since 1967 is more of a metaphor. There was no recorded meeting between leaders of the two political parties at the time, and no known negotiations. But there was a problem and there has been a solution. The problem was that French-speaking New Brunswickers were not being provided with adequate govemment services in their own language. The solution has ken an implicit understanding between party leaders that language issues are volatile and need to be dealt with cautiously. This understanding has evolved over time into practices, when taken together, constitute a second consociational deal.

Thetefore, in this thesis, the consociational theory of elite accommodation will be employed. To this end, it will be said that political elites within the province worked cooperatively but implicitly, in order to take the issue of language off the provincial political agenda. Edmund Aunger made a similar argument in his comparative analysis of New

Brunswick and Northem Ireland. Aunger concluded that the presence of crosscutting cleavages along linguistic and religious lines, in combination with the masses having faith in their elite and the elite having the ability to negotiate compromises acceptable to al1 parties has resulted in the province being a stable political: entity.

However, Aunger's research is now almost two decades old, and given subsequent events within Canada, one is curious as to whether the assumptions made by Aunger are still applicable.

In Canada, it has been argued that one of the impacts of introducing the Charter of Rights and

Freedoms is that the electorate is no longer as willing to defer to their elite as in the past.' For example, in a report given before the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, Richard Simeon remarked that women, native peoples, multicultwal groups have:

mounted an attack on the political style of Mulroney's federalism.. .The process took place largely in secret, public mobilization was carefully avoided, decisions were made by 1 1 first ministers, al1 men, making a deal, under extraordinary pressure, behind closed

- - Uslander, Eric. Review of The DecZine of Defirence: Canadian Value Chgein o Cross- National Perspective, by Neil Nevitte. Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 37 1- 373. Moreover, the recent emergence of political parties such as the Bloc Québécois at the federal level and the Confederation of Regions Party within New Brunswick, point to the apprehensions of Sid Noel, arnong others, when he stated:

The emergence within any one subculnire of new dites who, for nationalistic, economic, ideological, or any other reasons, are unwilling to provide overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system will make the system inoperable, for there exists no mas consensus to which its defenders may appeaL5

Fortunately, for these proponents of elite accommodation, COR-NB had a short life as a political force. However, it will be interesting to determine whether the existence of such a Party has altered the position of either the Progressive Conservatives or the Liberals within the province on the issue of language. In addition, it is hoped that through the use of the survey data, one can discover if there is a decline of deference to the elite within New Brunswick or if the elite accommodation theory can still be applied to the province. Many have commented that the theory is no longer applicable to the nation as a whole.& However, this thesis will explore the notion that the theory rnay still be applicable to New Brunswick.

From 1867 to 1875, election campaigns in New Brunswick were fought on issues conceming Confederation itself, and then on secular schools. Throughout this period, the electorate was divided upon religious and ethnic lines, resulting in Protestant-mled govemments, since they constituted approximately two-thirds of the population. The provincial election in

1874 provides a perfect exarnple. During this campaign, the premier's battle cry was "Vote for the Queen against the Pope," and resulted in the ruling party attaining thirty-four of the thirty-

' Richard Simeon, 'Wational Reconciliation: The Mulroney Govemment and Federalism," p. 26.

5 S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: interpretations of Canadian Federalism," p. 8 1.

6 See Kenneth McRae, The Meech Lake Impasse in Theoretical Perspective, pp 140-1 53. nine contested seats. Prior to this election, the govemment had introduced legislation providing for the establishment of a common school education systern financed by public funds; sectarian schools were specifically excluded from the provisions of the Act and ail religious instruction was banned fiom the curriculum of public schools. The Catholic Church claimed that the Act compelled the Catholic population to subsidize a public school system that it would not use while having to support through private financing a sectarian school system which received no public hnds.' This could be seen as a major setback in the educational attainment of the Acadian population, since, in 1871, there were approximately 188 elementary schools in Acadian census districts employing a total of 142 teachers.' Moreover, since 1858, Catholic priests and nuns had been permitted to serve as teachers in schools throughout the province.

In the year that followed, many French-speaking New Bmnswickers chose not to pay their school taxes. Afier a sequence of actions including an anonymous threat to burn down the local Catholic Church, francophones and anglophones were at odds. This situation led to the

"Caraquet riots", which left two dead and horrified the province. As a result, the Protestant dominated provincial cabinet immediately began negotiations over the schools question with the

Catholic members of the opposition? The resulting compromise, known as the Modus Vivendi of

1875, contributed to the establishment of a new political style of cooperation rather than cornpetition and also marked the starting point for the first period of consociationalism between the two language groups.'O

7 Calvin Woodward, A History of New Bnmnuick Election Cumpaigns and Plat$oms, p. 12.

9 hiela Andrew, nie Development of Elites in Acadiun New Brunswick, pp. 76-77.

9 Edmund Aunger, ln Search of Political Stabifity, p. 1 10. See Buckner, "The 1870s: Political Integration," p. 77. la Edmund Aunger, In Semch of PoIitical Stability, p. 1 1 1. See Starr, Richard Harfield: The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 24. For the next three decades, the province was ruled by an omnibus govemment Party

which included the leaders of al1 sectional interests that were party to the previous conflicts." In works that describe provincial election campaigns during this period, this part' has been refened to as the "Governrnent party."12 Even after the establishment of one-party cabinets based upon the Westminster modef, the ethnic and religious composition of the executive in New Brunswick closely reflected that of the community as a whole.l3 Clearly, con~ciationaldemocracy has been in place within New Brunswick for at least a century. Moreover, as time passed, inter-dite cooperation becarne habitua1 and did not represent a deliberate departtue hm competitive responses to political challenges; thetefore consociational noms became more finnly

However, by the 1950s, cracks could be seen in the old system of compromise between the two linguistic elites. Della Stanley described the province during the 1950s as follows:

To the outside observer, New Brunswick was a staid, conservative, parochial, even backward province, but the truth was that undercurrents of change and reform were beginning to make themselves felt. New Brunswick was a chronically depressed region, emigration rates were high, incomes were low, unemployment was high, Iiteracy levels were low, industrial development was lirnited and expenditures in health and education were below the national average. But the climate for change which might well reverse these trends was being shaped. l5

To make matters worse the quality of life was clearly better in the areas settled by the anglophone majority, than in the primarily francophone North and East- As elsewhere in North

America, concems for ethnic equality and minority rights surfaced as political and social issues

" Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabiiity, p. 1 13. l2 Calvin Woodward, A Hisrory of Nav Brunswick EIection Campoigns and PIarfonns, pp. 12-60. See Garland and Machum, An Almanac of New Bnmswick Electiom: 18 70-1980, pp. 25-32. l3 Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Political Stability, p. 1 19.

14 Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Dernocracy," p. 80.

" Della Stanley, Louis Robichoud: A Decade in Power, p. 27. during this period. In New Brunswick, these concems took the form of Acadian nationa~isrn.'~

The dernands made by the Acadian leaders (including Robichaud) were motivated by concerns for cultural and linguistic sumival. Nevectheless, it will be show in the third chapter that, in the creation and implementation of policies such as the Program of Equal Opportunity, the goal of the

Liberal government of the day was to improve the lives of not only French-speaking New

Bmnswickers, but also of al1 citizens who were suffering the effects of poverty and an inadequate system of social services.

in the past, Francophones have ken linked to the Liberal Party of New Brunswick. This bond was forged dunng the 1920s when a prominent Acadian leader, Peter Veinot, was selected as head of the party and premier of the province." Aunger argues that the political parties .'are connected closely enough to the major blocs for voting to be frequently an expression of cultural loyalty rather than policy preference, therefore political allegiance becornes entwined with cultural identity."I8 This is important since the fim consociational bargain was struck not between party elites, but between ethnic/religious elites. in the 1870s, New Brunswick had not yet developed strong party identities. Moreover, because of the srnall size of the fiancophone rninority at this time (sixteen percent as of 1871) the English leaders were not threatened by the granting of certain concessions concerning the use of religion in their schools. In contrast, by the

1960s, the francophone population of New Brunswick had grown to over thirty-five percent of the total population.'g This meant that it is dificult for either traditional party to achieve a majority without some support fiom the fiancophone electorate. At the present time, both the

16 Della Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 448.

" Edrnund Aunger, In Search o/Political Stability, p. 24. There were other reasons for this association, including the result of a resettlement scheme for World War One veterans, as will be discussed in detail in chapter two below. '* Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 25. 19 Edrnund Aunger, In Semch of Political Stability, p. 17. Liberal and the Progressive Conservative parties can be viewed as containing a portion of both ethnic dites. Since the passage of the Oficial Languages Act in 1969, both parties have striven to reconcile the language views of more radical ethnic spokespersons with those of the greater interest of the Party. This stmggle can become very intense, especially when çome ethnic leaders have perceived the consociational deal that is in place to be favoring one side over the other.

For example, the francophone elite during the 1960s was beginning to splinter into two groups. The older, more established elite believed that an entente had been achieved with the

~n~1ish.z' A majority of this group supported the Liberal Party and held the view that compromise and negotiation between the two parties would result in steady cultural advancement for their people. A second group, however, had a growing sense of dissatisfaction with these efforts and, according to Aunger, preferred confrontation to c~o~eration.~'In the years shonly afier the passage of the Off~cialLanguages Act, this younger group continued to organize protests and campaigned aggressively for greater cultural recognition of francophones in the province.

They felt that the deal, which was in place, did not go far enough in improving the status of the

French language and in providing for francophone input in governrnent. Eventually, they formed what can be viewed as the first substantial challenge to the second consociational agreement stnick between the two political parties in New Brunswick - Le Parti Acadien.

Similar dynamics led to the formation of the Confederation of Regions Party in the late

1980s. When Frank McKenna became premier in 1987, he placed the complete implementation of the Oficial Languages Act hi& on his political agenda. Even as late as 1987, there had still been çome discrepancies apparent in the delivery of govenunent services in both officia1 languages. In addition, the results of the election (the Liberals were metaphorically "swept" into office, taking al1 fi@-eight seats) utterly demoralized the Conservatives and left them without a

Richard Wil bur, The Rise of French New Bnmswick, p. 239.

" Edmund Aunger, In Seorch of Political Stability, p. 1 89. leader. Moreover, the long pend of rule under Robichaud and Hatfield produced an environment where there was no partisan opponent to the policy of Oficial Bilingualism (save the Parti Acadien), and at the time, no effective opposition to any government policy. This, according to Maurice Pinard, usually proves to be fertile ground for the bllth of third parties, and this situation proved to be no exception.u

The Confederation of Regions Party of New Brunswick (COR-NB) was formed in large part from the non-political Association of English Speaking New Brunswick, better known as the

English Speaking Association (ESA). While some members of the lobby group wanted to remain loyal to the traditional parties, the ESA was viewed as a party-in-waiting with a membership and an agenda; therefore activists were easy to mobilize once the decision to form a new party was taken? It was created in 1989 with the initial purpose of repealing the Official Langages Act,

1969 (NB). As with the Parti Acadien, the leaders of this movement felt that the consociational bargain was tilting too far in favor of one of the participating groups. fiowever, on this occasion, it was the francophones who were seen as unjustly favored by the current arrangement.

The second chapter of this thesis will discuss the consociational mode1 as developed by such scholars as S.J.R. Noel, Hans Daalder, Arend Lijphart, Val Lonvin and Jurg Steiner.

According to Lijphart, consociational democracy means govemment by elite cartel designed to

Nm a democracy with a hgrnented political culture into a stable democracy." Professor Noel, in a subsequent review of the consociational theory and its applicability to Canada, noted that

Lijphart's theory could be portrayed diagrammatically, as in figure 1- 1 .

" Pinard, as quoted in Geofiey Martin, "We've Seen it All Before: The Rise and Fa11 of the COR Party of New Brunswick," p. 28.

Geoffky Martin, "We've Seen it All Before: The Rise and Fall of the COR Party of New Brunswick," pp. 26-27.

24 Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," p. 79. Figure f - f The Consoci~lrionalModel

Source: Nocl. S.J.R Polirical Parties and El&e Accomm&ion: Itrterpretiuio~sof CdianFederafism. in J. Perm Meckison. Editor. Canadian Fedcralism: Myrh or ReaIiry, Third Edition (Toronto, Methuen: 1977) page 73.

Within this arrangement, both the leaders and the followers have a role to play.

According to Noel, for the system to fiinction successfiilly, the elites, or leaders, must have a number of qualities. They must accommodate the divergent interests of their own subculture, be able to transcend cleavages and join in a common effort, and be committed to the maintenance of the system while understanding the perils of political fragmentation.'* For the masses, the requirements are only that they be committed to their own subcultures and that they trust and support their respective political elites. The çtrategies used by leaders in order to maintain the relationships diagamed above will be analyzed in detail during the second chapter.

The objectives of the third chapter are to explain how the initial consociational deal broke down and to explain how and why the second consociational deal, which began in 1967, was

"stnick" between the leaders of the two traditional parties in New Brunswick. Moreover, this chapter will show how this second consociational deal has ken challenged: once by a group representing francophones, and once by a group representing anglophones.

The fourth chapter of the thesis will analyze survey data that was taken during the months following the leadership conventions of the New Brunswick Progressive Conservative Party (held in the autumn of 1997) and the New Brunswick Liberal Party (in the spring of 1998). The data will identiw if there is a difference of opinion between the two parties on the issue of language.

S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: lnterpretations of Canadian Federalism," p. 76. Although the elites of both parties have come to a consensus on the issue in the pst, there may be difference in opinion between today's rank and file party members. The data may ahindicate whether the consociational theory is still applicable to the province. Or, stated a different way, has the death of the COR-NB Party marked a retum to the stable two-party formula of old, complete with the cross-cutting cleavages mention4 by Aunger? Or has an entirely new system emerged?

Once these questions have been answered, the final chapter will reaffirm, modifj or reject the use of the consociationd theory as an effective tool in analyzing the political system in

New Brunswick. Even though the elite accommodation theory has not received a great deal of support in recent years in the broader Canadian context, it still may be useful in analyzing a provincial system once described as disaffected, parofhial and stagnant.L6 In addition, the final chapter will speculate upon the implications these findings will have for New Brunswick in particular and for Canada more generally. 1 will argue that if the depoliticalization of language has occurred within the province, then this provides for an opportunity for electoral cornpetition from other sources. By taking the electoral 'Lspotlight'yaway from the issue of language, it may place it upon other stnictural factors deemed important by the province's parties or electorate.

New Brunswick is one of the few examples of where two cultures ainicably share the same space.

One of the purposes of this inquiry is to find out why.

26 David Bellamy, "The Atlantic Provinces," p. 16. See P. J. Fitzpatrick, ''New Brunswick: The Politics of Pragmatism," p. 120. Chapter Two: The Tbeoreticai Fmmework

This chapter discusses the theoretical fiamework employed throughout this thesis - the consociational theory. It will explore how the consociational theory has been applied both to

Canada and more specifically to New Brunswick. As well, this chapter will consider some of the criticisms of consociationalism and how these might best be rebutted.

Consociationalism is also known as elite accommodation, and during the inaoductory chapter, the term "elite" was often used in order to describe those actors responsible for a number of political decisions conceming language in New Brunswick. However, this does not imply that al1 elected politicians are part of the elite, nor does it mean that one has to be a politician in order to be included. Vilfiedo Pareto once noted that the elite in any group consists of those who are most successfid in achieving the common aim of that group, and tùrther explained that there are

"~WOstrata in a population: (1) A lower stratum, the non-elite ... then (2) a higher stratum, the elite, which is divided into two: (a) a goveming elite; (b) a non-governing elite. '"' What this implies, for the purposes of consociational theory, is that those governing elites responsible for making the accommodative decisions must have the consent of the masses. Perhaps this is why students of political science have an easier time viewing elected politicians as elite, since they obviously have to request this consent periodically through the electoral process.

The term consociation is one that reaches back to the sixteenth and seventeenth cenniry and the work of lohannes Alth~sius.~It means simply the asswiufing of groups in a way that

27 Vil fiedo Pareto, as quoted in T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 8.

28 J. Althusius (1 557- l638), a Dutch professor of law, believed that the state is the association of al1 other associations. He was a federalist whose themes were important to the idea of the state as a social contract. See David Apter, Introduction ro Political Analysis, p. 3 1 8, and Otto Gierke, Nat& Law and the Theory of Society, pp. 70-74. maintains the distinctive characteristics of each of the constituents without inhibiting the pursuit of collective aims? More recently, however, the theoty has been implemented and expanded by

Arend Lijphart, arnong others, to a number of contemporary nations throughout the world with the goal of explaining the absence of violence arnong strongiy developed cultural groups found in the same area. The crux of the consociational theory is that the decision-making behavior of political elites affects the level of violence among cultural groups.'O

According to Lijphart and Lehmbruch, there are two main types of political decision- making. in the words of Lehmbruch, these are:

(a) The competitive pattern of conflict management (the fundamental device of which is the majority principle);

(b) The noncornpetitive "cartelized" pluraiist pattern (which works by amicabilis compositio, "amicable

The consociational theory postulates that in countries that are subculturally segrnented, consociational decision-making is more likely to lead to peacefùl relations among the subcultures than is competitive decision-making. It was felt in the 1960s that Amencan political scientist. could not deal adequately with the reality of politics in a number of West European democracies.'* Lijphart once argued that "neither pluralist theory nor structural functionalism nor communication theory can deal with the politics of 'fragmented but stable dernocracies' (such as the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland) other than by treating them as 'deviant' cases."33 In addition, a number of nations, like Canada, lacked an overriding national identity or

29 David Apter, Introduction to Political AnaZysis, p. 3 1 8.

30 J. Obier, J. Steiner and G. Dierickx, Decision-Making in SmuZIer Democracies, p. 5.

3' Gerhard Lehmbruch, "A Noncornpetitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Asuna and Lebenon," p. 97.

32 S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," p. 75.

33 Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," pp. 14-1 7. mass consensus and were characterized by strong limited identities, yet they nevertheless managed to funaion as stable and effective political entities." The theory of consociational democracy, as presented by Lijphart, attempts to explain the successful operation of democracy in those societies where segmented subcultures existJ5

As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, Lijphart argues that there are four facilitating conditions necessary for consociational decision-making to be implemented:

1) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of their own subcultures. 2) This requises that they have the abiIity to nanscend cleavages and to join in a common effort with rival subcultures. 3) This, in tum, depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 4) Finally, al1 of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elite understand the perils of political

In a fiirther step, Lijphart indicates a number of preconditions under which the above four requirements are most likely to be fulfilled?' These preconditions can be classified within the three relationships displayed in figure 1- 1: Inter-group relations between the elites, inter-group relations between the masses, and elite-rnass relations within each subgroup.

Lijphart argues that the following preconditions are conducive to consociational decision making at the inter-dite levelw:(a) the existence of external threats to the country; (b) a multiple balance of power among the subcultures instead of either a dual balance or a clear hegemony by

34 S. J. R. Noel, "PoIitical Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," p. 75.

35 According to Aunger (1 98 1), New Brunswick conforms to Almond and Powell's description of fragmentation as a fi~ndamentaldivision in the values of different groups in the Society. in addition, eac h of the subcultures contains their own network of interconnected socia1 organizations. That is, there are schools, leisure groups, newspapers and politicaI vehicles particular to each subculture (p. 15).

36 Arend Luphart, "Consociational Democracy," p. 79.

" 1. Obler, J. Steiner and G. Dierich Decision-Moitng in Sn14IZer Democracies, p. 6. " Or, in other words, within the relationship tenned throughout the applications of the theory as IntersubcuZtural Relations A mong Elites. one subculture; (c) a relatively low total load on the decision-making apparanis?9 îhe second

relationship concems inter-sukultural relations at the mass level; here the crucial preconditions

for consociational decision-making are distinct lines of cleavage among the subcultures."

Finally, the third relationship involves the elite-mass relations within the individual subcuitures

for which Lijphart enumerates the following favorable preconditions for consociational decision-

making: (a) a high degree of intemal political cohesion of the subcultures; (b) an adequate

articulation of the interests of the subcultures; (c) a widespread approval of the principle of

government by elite cartel!' Besicles preconditions of consociational decision-making, Lipjhart's theory includes a side effect of this particular mode of decision-making, namely "a certain degree of immobilism.'"' David Apter points out that this side effect ultimately creates the paradox of consociational democracy: the more homogeneous the segments, and the more each bloc breaks down into a common political culture, the more the commitment to compromise and negotiation declines and the more apathetic or withdrawn from politics is the bulk of the ele~torate.'~This thesis will examine the preconditions noted above and apply them to both Canada and New

Brunswick. It will thus be apparent where Canada generally, and more specifically, the province

39 J. Obler, J. Steiner and G. Dierickx, Decision-Making in Stnaller Democracies, p. 6.

40 In a later application of the consociational theory by Lijphart (1996), he drops the classifications (in terms of the relationships) and lists what he terms "nine background factors that may favor or hinder" the probability that power sharing wiil be instituted and maintained in a divided society. Within this group of nine he notes that a major factor "is the absence or presence of large socioeconomic differences arnong the groups of a divided society" (pp. 262-3). in the applications that follow, this author notes evidence of such socioeconomic discrepancies between the North and the South of New Brunswick, and by extension, between anglophones and francophones in general. It is also argued that these discrepancies, in combination with other factors, led to the breakdown of the initial consociational arrangement between the two linguistic groups in the province.

4' J. Obler, J. Steiner and G. Dierickx, Decision-Muking in Srnalier Democracies, p. 7.

42 Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," p. 88.

43 David A pter, Inîroduction to Political Analysis, p. 32 1 . of New Brunswick, fit on this balance between a stable, effective consociational democracy and the alternative of having a political society that consists of immobile blocs.

Consociationalism Applied in Canada

Throughout its history, Canada has been deeply divided dong ethno-national lines. In spite of this, political elites have held a significant role in building national political unity through the application of consociational practices4 nie fm political scientist to employ the consociational theory to analyze Canada was SJ.R. Noel in 1971. He determined chat "it becomes the task of the political leaders of (the) separate subcultures to practice accommodation at the elite level in order to maintain the national political system and make it work."' One can argue that there are signs of conwciational practices found throughout Canadian politics, even though the latter is based primarily on the British parliarnentary system, which emphasizes the concentration of executive power. In fact, it has been noted that it was Canada's need for political accommodation that allowed for the flexibility that exists within the contemporary version of Canadian federalism. Venues for these consociational practices include the federal cabinet, the Senate, and the operation of executive federalism."

Inter-subcultural Relations among Elifes

Under this relationship the preconditions that are conducive to the successfid operation of consociational democracy include: the existence of an extemal threat, a multiple balance of power

" S. Van Veigen, Why does Consociation Fail: An fiamination of Canada and Northern Ireland, p. 30.

." S. J. R. Noel, c'ConsociationaI Democracy and Canadian Federalism," p. 264.

46 S. Van Veigen, Why does Consociation Fail= An Enmination of Canada and Northern Ireland, p. 30. Consociational principles can also be found guiding, in a less officia1 context, the Canadian federal party caucuses, federal brokerage party traditions of leadership selection, patronage and resource allocation, and in the patterns of work in federal boards, departrnents and agencies. See Kenneth McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian System," pp. 248-253. among the subcultures instead of a duaf balance or a clear hegemony by one subculture and, a

relatively low total Joad on the decision-making apparatus. For Canada, according to most

writers, the formidable extemal threat to its sovereignty has historically been the United States.

However, the second precondition, the multiple balance of power, is not so self-evident.

Although Noel did not go into geat detail on the matter, he noted that the term "subcultüre" could be interpreted a number a different ways; it could be taken, for example, to refer to English

Canada and French Canada, or to a number of distinct regions such as the Maritimes, Quebec,

Ontario and the West - but rnost usehilly perhaps as "province.''"

In Canada, though there has been no institutionalized balance of power among srnietal segments, the needs and interests of different groups have ken accommodated in practice through elite accommodation, and relations among the segments have remained stable.

Cooperative practices have existed because the permanency of minority groups has been accepted

- ai least in the case of ~rench- anad di ans.^' However, conswiational practices have been undermined due to successive attempts to change the Canadian constitution over the past two decades which have included proposais that would permanently alter the baiance of power and threaten the recognition of French Canada, causing greater inter-segmental instability."

This could bnng one back to Noel's comment above conceming the use of the term ccsubculture.'yHow one views consociational arrangements in Canada is dependent upon what is implied when using the term. For example, if one subscribed to the compact theory of

57 Noel, as quoted in Kenneth McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian System," pp. 239.

" S. Van Veigen, Khy does Consociation Fail: An Examination of Canada and Northern Ireland, p. 55.

49 S. Van Veigen, Why does Consociation Fail: An Examination of Canada und Northern Ireland, p. 55. An example king the cal1 for an "equal, elected and effective (Triple 'E') Senate during negotiations of the Charlottetown Accord, thereby diminishing the voice of the Quebecois (in number) in Canada's Upper chamber. See Ron Graham, The French Quarter. p. 284. However, the same proposal would have granted the province of Quebec a minimum of twenty-five percent of the number of MPs in the House of Commons, regardless of its population. Confederation, one would view Confederation as a deal between the French and the English,

whereby each would hold a veto over change to this agreement. Obviously what is meant by

subculture in this model is either "French-Canada'' or "English-Canada." Moreover, the pattern

of political behavior since 1867 has suggested that this has been an influential interpretation.

However, there has emerged within Canadian political history a different story of the

federation - that of a country built upon the joining of ten equal provinces." These two

competing visions of the Canadian wnstitutional anangement have been in constant battle for

many years, with the decisive blow king dealt by the paîriation of the constitution in 1982.

During this process, the compact iheory was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, which led a part of the Quebec elite to argue that the agreement they had entered into in 1867 had been violated and their veto had been lost. The second of these two visions is largely a creature of

Amencan political culture, which has been adopted by politicians primarily in the Western provinces in order to receive greater concessions From Ottawa, and is exemplified in the proposais of the Charlottetown Accord. This perspective holds that French Canada, territorially concentrated in Quebec, is equal to the other provinces and has no special rights or privileges.51

How these communities (the provinces) interacted at the elite levei, in large measure, was through interprovincial conferences and meeting between provincial and federal govenunent leaders. Noel noted that the mere existence of these gatherings were more important than the agreements whic h they produced.'2 Moreover, they dramatical ly illustrate a prime m inisterial role of considerable consequence in the operation of the federal system: the presenting of a

S. Van Veigen, Wlydoes Consociation FaiZ: An hamination of Canada and Northem IreZanid, p. 56. See K. McRoberts, Disagreeing on Fundamentals: English Canada and Quebec, The Charlottetown Accord. K. McRober&s and P. Monahan, Eds. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1994.

5 1 S. Van Veigen, Why does Consociation FaiZ: An Examination of Canada and Northern Ireland, p. 57.

52 S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," p. 17. national viewpoint to provincial political leaders whose positions within the system are even more crucial than those of federal cabinet ministem. A federal-provincial conference, thetefore, has a dual symbolic function: it symbolizes the vitality of the provincial fact in Canada and also the prime minister's unique position as the personifkation of inter-elite accornrn~dation.~~

The emergence of Aboriginal claims to self-government also has threatened the balance of power that was once achieved through the subscription to the compact theory. These claims, set out in the Assembly of First Nations Commissioners' Report in 1992 titled To the Source, include the acknowledgment of First Nations governments as king on qua1 tenns with the federal and provincial govemments and the requirement that Quebec and the other provinces recognize the temtorial integrity of Fim ~ations.~This latter claim is significant to Quebec, since, Native land claims in the province cover about 85 percent of the province's temtory5' In the view of Quebec, this circumstance would have the potential to promote Merdefection fiom accommodative practices because it would potentially neglect the necessity of bargaining with

~uebec."

A multiple balance of power that legitimizes the permanency of each group in Canadian society, and guards stable relations among groups at the consociational bargaining table, is necessary before successful renewal of consociational power-sharing can be achieved." Without this the threat of separation will remain, since Quebec's (or the First Nations) leaders will not be satisfied with their position in the federation and cannot be assured of their status. Thus, a

53 S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democtacy and Canadian Federalism," p. 17. " Ramsey Cook, Canado. Quebec and rhe Uses of Nationutism, pp.80-83. 55 Ramsey Cook, Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nutionalism, p.8 1 .

56 S. Van Veigen, Why does Consociaîion Failr An Examination of Canada and Norrhern Ireland, p. 59.

57 S. Van Veigen, W?y does Consociation Fail: An Examination of Canada and Northern Ireland, p. 59. balance of power between groups that entrenches their permanent status and ensures stable

relations among groups for accommodation is essential to achieve stability thmugh

cons~ciation.~~

What assists in the creation and maictenance of such a balance is the federal

constitution's division of policy areas among the two fevels of govemment. This division allows

the federal politicians to focus their energies on things such as foreign affairs, national defense

and the accommodation of the province's demands, as welt as those of interest groups such as the

Assembly of First Nations. Moreover, al1 of these activities can take place without the federal

politicians having to be directly concemed with more localized issues such as education, law

enforcement, and a majority of public works, which are often more sensitive in terms of

communal division^.'^

Intersubcultural Relations ut the Mass Levei

There are a number of cleavages that are said to exist in Canadian political culture. For

instance, Donald Smiley noted that there exist crucial and persisting cleavages of an economic nature, specifically differences between "have" and "have not" provinces and between, on the one

hand, the two central provinces of the industrial heartland and, on the other, the regions to the east and West of the heart~and.~in addition, it has been argued that historically the most obvious line of cleavage to be seen in Canada was between Protestants and Catholics. However, since about

1960 the pattern of institutionai segmentation has appeared to be shifting fiom religion to

'' S. Van Veigen, Why does ConsociufionFail.: An Examination of Canada and Norrhem Ireimd, p. 59.

59 Edmund Aunger, In Sead of PoIiticaI Sttzbiliry, p. 180.

60 Donald Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and ConsociationaI Democracy," p. 180. languagedl This is imporiant given that while al1 provinces except Quebec have quite substantial religious minorities, the official-language minorities are proportionately smal l and political l y weak in al1 provinces except Quebec and New ~runswick.~~

If one divides the nation subculturally by province, the evidence to support the notion that there is little interaction is considerable. It has been fkquently noted, for example, that communication networks tend to adapt themselves to political boundaries; consequently, the transmission of values, ideas, and information is much more prevalent within, rather than across, such b~undaries."~Each province has its own media outlets that serve their local population.

Moreover, a number of recognized social groups that have a national membership, are divided into provincial wings. Finally, some of the political parties that operate at the federal level have provincial wings that bear the same name.

However, this argument is dificult to sustain given the nurnber of overarching institutions that keep Canadians fiom coast to coast in contact with one another. Even local media outlets have portions devoted to national events In addition, a majority of Canadians in nine of the ten provinces speak the saine language, so usually there is no linguistic barrier present when transmitting information from one part of the country to the other. Furthemore, since access to information has greatly improved during the past decade, arguing that the nation is divided into ten separate subcultures is a difficult achievement.

61 Kenneth McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian System," pp. 243.

Kenneth McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian System," pp. 243. See Donald Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy," pp. 182-1 84.

Ian Stewart, Rousting Chesfnurs, p. 23. See, David E. Sopher, ''Place and Location: Notes on Spatial Patteming of Culture," Social Science Quarferiy,Vol. 53, 1972-73, p. 335. See also David R. Reynolds and Michael L. McNulty, "On the Analysis of Political Boundaries as Barriers: A Perceptual Approach," Politics and Geographic Relafionships: Toward a Nau Focus, Second Edition. W.A. Jackson and Marwyn S. Samuels, Eds. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. pp. 215-216. Greater success may be encountered if one makes the distinction along the linguistic

cfeavage found in Canada. For instance, even one of the media outlets designed to bring

Canadians together, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), is divided along linguistic

lines. Certainly the histoiy learned fiom studying the two subcultures contains a different

interpretation of certain events. And although the history of al1 francophones found in Canada

may not be sirnilar, it is distinct fiom the histoty of other groups found here. As a result, there are

different social groups found among the francophone community that celebrate different symbols

and holidays than their anglophone brethren.

Therefore, when looking at Canada sub-divided into the ten provinces, there is evidence

suggesting that there are lines of cleavage present between them. However, this argument was

not entirely persuasive due to the presence of overarching institutions and the increasing access to

information. On the other hand, if the nation is divided into hcophone and anglophone subcultures, one can state that a distinct line of cleavage exists. The dificulty here may be that there is little to unite the various francophone cornmunities found in Canada, other than the

language that they speak.

Elite-Mas Relations within Individual Subculrures

With this relationship, there are three factors which are conducive to consociational arrangements. These include a hi& degree of political cohesion within the subcultures, an adequate articulation of the interests of the subcultures, and widespread approval of the principle of govenunent by elite cartel. As we shall see, these three preconditions have not ken met within Canada during the recent past.

If one associates the term "subculture" with the provinces in Canada, then one could argue that there is a high degree of politicat cohesion within the subcultures. The problem then

becomes how to accommodate the divergent interests of these ten subcultures. The historical solution for this problem has been the practice of executive federalism describeci above.

However, if the term subculture is associated with the linguistic cleavage found in Canada, the political cohesion of the subcultures can be questioned.

For instance, even when the linguistic cleavage is observed, it is usually done so in terms of Quebec versus the rest of Canada. This indicates the dificulty in separating federal-provincial relations fiom analyzing the country along a linguistic cleavage. There are other francophone communities in Canada, and these pups found in other provinces do not always agree with what hncophone politicians in Quebec are saying.

Nevertheless, even within Quebec, it can be shown that political consistency has been absent. It is interesting that, during the 1970s and 1980s, a great number of voters in that province cast their ballots provinciatly for a party advocating the eventual separation of the country (the Parti Quebecois), while federally voting for parties that wanted to address the needs of al1 Canadians (the Liberals and Conservatives). Noel noted that if there were to emerge within any one of the provinces an elite who for nationalistic, economic, ideological or any other reasons are unwilling to provide "overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system," the system would becorne in~~erable.~

What is being argued here, simply, is that the presence of the Parti Quebecois is an example of a provincial elite unwilling to provide overarching cooperation.

The second factor conducive to consociational arrangements to be discussed here is the presence of an adequate articulation of the interests of the subcultures. To pan-Canadian liberals

Iike Trudeau, accommodating the legitimate needs and aspirations of Canada's tiancophones meant the achievement, Canada-wide, of equd status for both official langages and ensuring equal opportunities for al1 individuals throughout Canada to participate in the counrry's

64 S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," pp. 17- 1 8. deve~o~ment.~'Hence, his govemment, seeing themselves as the major vehicle of French-

English accommodation, enacted policies such as the Official Languages Act in 1969, in order to

ensure that the two groups were fonnally equal under Canadian law.

However, Noel also noted that national policies such as bilingualism may cause friction

between separate communities which previously had Iittle direct contact with each other; it may

be that a system of consociational federalism works best when the "two solitudes" are

preserved.66 This has subsequently been found to k accurate. Five years afier the introduction

of the federal Official Languages Act, the govemment of the province of Quebec gave their

symbolic response to this accommodative approach of bilingualism by enacting Bill 22.

Introduced by the provincial Liberals, this measure explicitly abandoned the long-standing

practice of bilingualism (in Quebec) by declaring French to be the (sole) official language of

~uebec?' During the centus. preceding the Quiet Revolution:

Ethnic pluralism in Quebec was regulated by consociational arrangements. The French- speaking Catholic majority and the economically dominant English-speaking minority maintained their separate institutions 6ee of interference corn the other. When conflicts arose that required settlement, they were negotiated behind the scenes by the elite of both communities, English-speaking business leaders on the one hand and the church hierarchy and senior provincial poiiticians one the other. Measures that might offend either community or that might alter the implicit mles of this pluralist society were avoided, establishing a century- long pattern of peaceful, though economically very unequal, coe~istence.~'

Bill 22 effectively eliminated this accommodation and resulted in the English minority in the province becoming politically weak and ineffectual. The cuItural and economic interests of the Québécois could be protected, Quebec nationalists argued, only by vigorous collective rneasures enforced by the one political authority that they control, the state of ~uebec." What

Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics, p. 173.

66 S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," p. 18.

" Milton Esman, Efhnic Politics, p. 158.

68 Milton Esman, Efhnic Politics, p. 17 1.

" Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics, p. 173. Trudeau and the English-speaking majority regarded as accommodative to the French-speaking minority, Quebec's nationalists regarded as at best irrelevant, and at worst subversive, to their survival and development as a distinct peopleo Events since 1974, such as the constitutional changes in 1982, the rejection of the "compact theory", and the failure of the Meech Lake

Accord, fûrther fùeled speculation that English-speakers are prepared to ignore and even violate what Quebec nationalists see as the fundamental collective interests of the Quebecois.

The final factor conducive to consociationalism found under this relationship is that there is widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel. In order for consociationalism to operate properly, the masses must defer to their elites. Noel noted that a decline in deference to elites may be detrimental to the maintenance of the federal system if it leads to a situation in which the masses do not accept those compromise decisions that are reached by their respective leaders.

In recent years, some Canadian writers have detected a cfear decline of deference within

Canadian political culture. Possibly the greatest compromise decision that was reached by a

Canadian government in recent memory occurred in the early 1990s. It has since ken dubbed the Charlottetown Accord, and has been described as:

A proposition unanimously endorsed by the mling classes, including the paladins of big business and leaders of every national political paq, most unions, aboriginal organizations, mainstream journalists, cultural groups and those observers who count themselves among the enlightened. Yet in the referendum that followed, the carehlly crafied iegal deal unraveled Iike a cheap sweater. Nearly eight million Canadians rose up and cried "No!" defiantly overturning the constitutional smorgasbord prepared by their ôest and brightest. 'The link between the Charlottetown Accord's defeat and our retreat fiom deference,' says Michael Adams of Toronto's Environics Research Group, 'was simply this: we ask ourselves, Why should we defer to our betters, when our betters aren't really better?"'

This was just one moment where this question was asked. Noel noted almost two decades before that if inter-elite accommodations must be populariy ratified they might be

'O Milton Esman, EhicPolilies, p. 173.

71 Peter Newman, The Canadia Revolution: From Deference to Defiance, p. 5. impossible to achieve? However, according to Newman, Canadians stopped to ask themselves

"Why should we defer to Our betters," more often in the past two decades than during the preceding ~enhiry.~~For instance, Newman recalls events surrounding Meech Lake, the federaf

Goods and Services Tax, and countless disgraces that befell organized religion, the monarchy, the military, the Red Cross and the diplomatic corps which virtually forced Canadians to take another look at their institutional executives." And what they collectively realized, according to some observers, is that they felt they were lacking the opportunities and the avenues for effective political and social participation in Canadian so~iety.'~

With al1 these instances, one might be led to believe that this was a distinctly Canadian trend, that the political culture in Canada was in a "separate sphere" in comparison to other nations. However, Neil Nevitte offers a different explmation. Nevitte claims that during the

1980s, many of the social and political conflicts that took place concerned fundamental values - about what values divide Canadians, what values Canadians share, and what values make

Canadians distinct. Moreover, he attributes the dectine of deference towards Canadian political leaders to a fundamental shift in values, a shiR that not only affected Canadians but the majority of citizens in many other liberal dern~cracies.'~

Nevitte discovers through his statistical analysis that between 1981 and 1990 citizen interest in politics had increased, more information conceming the political was available, and

S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," p. 8 1.

73 Peter Newman, Tne Canadian Revolution: From Defirence to Defiance, pp. 4-9.

74 Peter Newman, The Canadian Revolurion: From Deference ro Defance, p. 6-9. Or, what Newman refers to as the "Establishment." He describes it as a "surpnsingly compact, self- perpetuating junta numbering perhaps a thousand, Iinked more closely with each other than to their country, that had mn Canada for more than a century."

'' Nei l Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, p. 55. 76 Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, pp. 13, 55. tbat, on the whole, people were becoming more educated." However, there was ais0 a correlation between these trends and the fact that public confidence in al1 governmental institutions was eroding. Some have argued that this is due to a "sustained and possibly generationally driven public miction against ail hierarchical institutional arrangements that limit the opportunities for meaningfbl citizen participation."' For example, it has been argued that:

mass political participation emerges through two fundamentally different routes, one based on an older mode of participation, the other on a newer mode. The institutions that mobilized mass political participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century - labor union, church, and mass political party - were hierarchical organhtions in which a smaller number of leaders or bosses led masses of discipüned troops. These institutions were effective in bringing large numbers of newly enfianchiseci citizens to the polls in an era when universal compulsory education had just taken root and the average citizen had a low level of political skills. But while these elitedirected organizations could mobilize large numbers, they produced only a relatively low IeveI of participation, rarely going beyond mere ~otin~.~~

What makes this a11 the more curious is that within the data that reveaied these trends was evidence that Canadians were still just as proud in their country in 1990 as they were in 198 1.a

However, the level of pride in one's country was directly proportional to variables such as age and educational attainment. For exarnple, young people (those in the 18-24 age group) are two to three times more likely than the old (those over 65 years of age) to take on supranational

identification^.^' In addition, les than half of Canadian respondents between the ages of twenty- five and fi@-five expressed confidence in government institutions, compared to over sixty percent for those respondents 65 years and older. Therefore, one could surmise that those who

T7 Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, pp. 52-66.

Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, p. 62. l9 Ingelhart quoted in Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, p. 55.

'O Nevitte noted that the difference is about two percent, from 62.2 percent of those surveyed to 60.2 percent, a change so siight that it may be attributed to measurement error. To see the data for al1 nations conceming the trends arrived at in this discussion see Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, pp. 25-72.

''Neil Neviîîe, The Decline of Deference, p. 67. were young and educated had les confidence in their national institutions and took less pride in their nation than those who klong to the preceding generations.

Another, perhaps more findamental, shift in the views of the different generations, according to Nevitte, is what he calls "a shifi away fiom a preoccupation with material goals

(money and physical security) and a shift towards 'pst-materialist values' and such high-order priorities as the need for belonging, self-esteem and values reflecting to the quality of life? This shift is based on the premise that the younger generations of contemporary society did not have to endure such dramatic events as the Depression or a World War. It can be argued that this, in combination with greater access to information, education, and a heightened interest in the political affairs surrounding them, have created an increased sense of profound mistration among

Canadians. Sensing a desire to have their collective voices heard, but living with a poiitical system that was felt to be antiquated, an increasing number of Canadians decided to choose different avenues and styles for their poIitical participation.

Some of these "different avenues" of participation included unconventional foms of political behavior; including joining in boycotts, attending unlawfûl demonstrations, joining unofficial mikes and ocîupying buildings." Another involved becoming active in a ballooning number of social movements that were on the rise throughout Europe and North America during this period. However, there are some that would counter this with the notion that Canadians were different than the others because they were simply employing their newly minted constitutional rights, which were granted to them in 1982, But Nevitte found that even with the unique events unfolding in Canada during this pend that the protest potential increased even faster in other countries that had no intervening constitutional event equivalent to the introduction of the

Nei l Nevitte, The Decline of Dejeence, p. 28.

Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, pp. 82-84. charter." Moreover, it has been argued that most of the social movements mentioned had already become politically active in the period before the Charter was created." No doubt the

Charter played a role in accelerating these movements; however, the evidence gathered by

Nevitte and others suggests that these changes were coming regardless of the response fiom the goveming elite in Canada.

Al1 of this leaves Canadian scholars and politicians a fiiture debate. If the party system, as it currently stands, is felt to be structurally inadequate, then how will these parties accommodate a more infonned electorate? Has the 1992 referendum set a precedent for friture ratification of inter-elite compromises? While the answers to these questions remains unknown, it is obvious that the decline of deference among Canadians has cast a shadow over the fùture of inter-elite cooperation in Canada.

In addition to this decline of deference, it was found that the term "subculture" can be applied to either the provinces, or to language groups in Canada. If it is applied to the ten provinces, then there has historically been an accommodation of these interests though federal- provincial negotiation. However, because there are so many provinces, negotiations among them are dificult and cornplex. Moreover, because a provincial elite has emerged intent on undermining the system, it makes achieving a consensus amongst the provinces and the federa1 govemment on constitutional matters next to impossible.

If the term subculture is applied to the linguistic cleavage found in Canada, the consociational mode1 is met with a separate set of challenges. The most important is that the constraints irnposed by federalism make it dificult for French Canadians to be a politically cohesive group. Moreover, the decisions made by the federal govemment pertaining to this cleavage have been beneficial to those francophones outside of Quebec. However, to Quebec

Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, p. 105.

'* R. Epp, "Do Bills of Rights Really Matter?", p. 178. nationalists, these policies were felt to be irrelevant or subversive to the survival and development of Quebec's francophones as a distinct people. AI1 of this suggests that the consociational mode1 may not be the most appropriate to apply to Canada.

Consociationaüsm Applied in New Brunswick

Using the same framework, perhaps the consociational theory may be more suitable to view New Brunswick's political culture. ït will be found that in the New Brunswick case that their are fewer outside influences at work (such as aboriginal demands for self-government, in the

Canadian example) and therefore, the theory is in general better suited to analyze the province rather than the nation overall. New Bmnswick is a small province, and, on a linguistic basis at least, the line of cleavage within the province is far more distinct than it is for the nation as a whoie. Moreover, it can be said that both of the linguistic groups found in the province have been somewhat "cut-off' fiom their historical homelands. For instance, the group that English- speaking New Bmnswickers may have a sentimental attachment to - the Loyalists, were castoffs from the United States and it could be argued that they have since been isolated ffom the corridors of political power in Ottawa by their Upper Canadian cousins. As for the francophones, one cm argue that for most of their existence, the Acadians have been isolated fiom France and that those French Canadians that have settled in Madawaska, Victoria and Restigouche counties have not kept close relations with their ancestors fkom Quebec.

It has aiready ken noted that the first consociational "deal" that was struck conceming

Ianguage in the province of New Brunswick began in 1875, afier the Caraquet riots. The riots themselves were an indirect resuit of the Common Schools Act of 1871, which had the objective of establishing a non-sectarian schooi system supported by public tùnds." Those most intimately

86 George Stanley, "The Caraquet Riots of 1875," pp. 67-83. involved in achieving the compromise included the five Roman Catholic mernôers of the

legislative assembly fiom the northem counties who were elected in 1874, despite king opposed

to the Common schools Act of 1871." However, politicians in the legislanire were not the only

actors in this process. The Roman Catholic bishops also played a crucial mediating role in the

dispute. And although the final solution fell short of the equality they had sought, the bishops of

New Brunswick reluctantly advised Catholics to cease their opposition to the Act (Stanley, 1988,

p. 83).

The importance of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in French speaking regions of the province during this period was aptly described by George Stanley when he noted: 90 the

English-speaking Protestant, the law was a religion, to the French-speaking Roman Catholic, religion was the law.= Therefore, when the Abbé Joseph Pelletier read two statements from the pulpit of the parish Church in Caraquet on January 24& 1875, one of which ordered him to stop the "band of pirates" or have his presbytery bmed to the ground, this obviously alarmed the rnajority of the parishioners.

In any event, Sheila Andrew contends that one of the roles of the Acadian pnests at this time was to act as an intermediary with the anglophone world." This would have to be done even within the Church itself, since many Catholic bishops of the &y were of Irish origin. in fact, the

Acadian elite would have to wait until well into the niventieth century before one of their own would become head of a diocese within New Brunswick.

By that time the initial consociational deaI struck between the hvo linguistic groups would be well rwted, with the acceptance of an omnibus govemment Party, cornprised of leaders

87 PhilIip Buckner, "The 1870s: Political Integration," p. 77. Buckner noted that seventy-three percent of al1 votes cast in the 1874 election were for those candidates who supporteci the 1871 Common Schools Act. See also Peter M. Toner, "New Brunswick Schools and the Rise of Provincial Rights," pp. 97- 104. " George Stanley, "The Caraquet Riots of 1875," p. 69.

" She i la Andrew, neDevelopment of EIites in Acadim New Brunswick: 186 1- 1881, p. 97. of al1 sectional interests within the province," who were conciliatory towards the linguistic rninority. What this meant was that negotiations conducted between the two groups were to be discreet, and the results were not to be flaunted publicly. The goal of the initial consociational deal was not the noble aim of equality of education, but an effort to contain the confiontations between the two groups - hence the need for secrecy. It is highly likely that any announcement of concessions during the time of the schools question would have aroused vehement opposition fiom the Protestant supporters of the government. These fears were confirmed almost two decades iater when it became publicly known for the first time that the govemment had granted con cessions^' Although the violence that had oçcumd in 1875 was unnerving to al!, and there was a common desüe to not see it repeated, tension was still created by this admission by the governmenta

Intersubculrural Relations among Efires

Ironically, it is the event. that have taken place within the nation as a whole that have served as brilliant examples of the perils of political fragmentation. The rise of Quebec nationalisrn during the 1960s, the FLQ crisis, and the subsequent events since then have been influential in the plitical elite of New Brunswick coming to a new agreement regarding the issue of language. This was due to the combination of the increase in Acadian nationalism and the fear that the events that were taking place in neighboring Quebec during 1970 would be repeated in

90 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 114. Aunger noted that these "sectional interests" included the Société Nationale 1'Assomption, Société Mutuelle l'Assomption, Freemasons and the Orange Order.

'' Edrnund Aunger, In Search of Poli~icrrlStabifity, p. 138. '* This tension was only one of many issues on the political agenda in New Brunswick during the 1892 etection campaign. However, the Opposition Party did defeat the premier (Blau) and he had to run in another county in order to retain leadership of his party. For more see Garland and Machum, p. 27 and Woodward, pp. 25-26. New Brunswick. This second consociational "deal," although it has at its base a similar goal as its predecessor, the containment of violence and attempts to avoid the public fkom becoming involved in sensitive language issues, gives a much greater recognition to the permanence of the francophone minority. This recognition was syrnbolized by the passage of the provincial Official

Languages Act, 1969(NB),as well as the establishment of the Université de Moncton. The former rneant that the use of the two Ianguages is equal under the law, while the latter allowed for the opportunity of French-speaking New Brunswickers to be formally educated at the pst- secondary level in their own language.

When Aunger was reviewing the elite political culture within New Brunswick, he described relations between the two groups as bonne entente, and asserted that the relations between the political leaders of each bloc have involved, with few exceptions, fiiendly understanding and good faiag3 He then isolated four distinct sîrategies used by the political elite to reduce the possibility of conflict between French and English speaking New Brunswickers: depoliticalization, secrecy, consensus and proportionality. Depoliticalization involves the removal of communal issues fiom the arena of political debate. Aunger argues that this has occumed in New Brunswick when political leaders have cautiously avoided any issue that might have significant religious or ethnic implications. For example, in the 1999 New Brunswick election campaign, some Liberal Party candidates raised the issue of bilingualism by launching attacks at Conservative leader Bernard Lord for embracing former members of the COR-NB party back into his Party. Most obsemers believe that this was done in order to dissuade francophones fiom voting for the Progressive Conservative Party in the upcoming election. The thinking behind such a strategy was that the bcophone voters might be apprehensive supporting a party that was king infiltrated by former members of a party that wanted to eliminate official bilinguatism in the province. However, as Don Richardson mused, "Why

- 93 Edmund Aunger, In Sem& ofPolitical Stubiiity, pp.153. didn't it go anywhere is probably the more interesting question.'% Richardson claims that

everyone had an interest in bringing former COR Party members back into the traditional parties,

and most did not want to make an issue of it. To do otherwise would run the risk of king

perceived as wanting a COR-type party around. Adrnittedly, Dennis Cochrane, former leader of the Conservative Party in New Brunswick, claims that some Liberal MLA's wanted the COR

Party to continue, since many Liberal MLAs owed their election wins, both in 1991 and 1995, to

PC-COR Party vote splits."

Party leaders, to their credit, managed to stifle the issue by not legitimizing it. Bernard

Lord, the Conservative Party leader obviously realized that the COR-NB party was against officia1 bilingualism in the province; however, he responded to his critics by stating that he was

"a consensus builder." In addition, the Liberal leader at the time, Camille Thériault, also stayed above the hy, saying that New Brunswick is "a tolerant society" and the reai election issues are jobs and health care."

Another example of the exercise of this type of strategy occurred during the debates conceming the Program of Equal Opportunity. While in this instance, the policy had important communal implications, the political leaders of the day attempted to debate only the general principles involved - such as eficiency, centralization, economy and justice. While the media was not as cooperative and linguistic tensions were raised, the program was eventually implemented.

94 Don Richardson. Personal Interview. June 29, 1999.

95 Dennis Cochrane. Personal interview. August 4, 1999.

96 Chris Moms, "Liberal Press the Bilingualism Button," p. 9. A second example of this type of behavior occurred during the election campaign of 1925. During this campaign, P.J. Vienot, an Acadian, was leader of the Liberal Party, and a whispering campaign ensued in southem areas of the province stating that he was an agent of the Roman Pope and that he intended to implement a system of scparate schools should he be elected. The leader of the Conservative Party, J. Baxter, repeatedly insisted that the Liberal leader not be attacked "because of the faith to which he owes al legiance" (Roman Catholicisrn) "nor because he belongs to a great race." See Garland and Machum, pp. 33-35. Cooperation between the blocs can also be fostered if the political elite of each subculture can conduct their negotiations in sectecy, or as Lijphart euphemistically proposes: the process of accommodation must be "shielded fiom publicity.'" Critical public snutiny of the leaders' moves during such negotiations not only restricts the flexibility necessary to reach a compromise, it also inhibits the granting of concessions which, if publicly known, might arouse widespread communal opposition? Recaii the initial consofiationai amment conceming the New

Brunswick schools question. The negotiations were held in secret, concessions were granted, and even after two decades (when it was made public that concessions had been granted to the

Catholic leaders), there were still pockets of opp~sition.~Aunger further notes that in those few cases where linguistic demands have been deaft with publicly, tensions have ken heightened and no consensus has ken reached. In 1928, for exampte, the Acadian leaders successfully persuaded the govenunent to permit French-language instruction; however, when the decision became known, English opposition led by the Orange Order was so vehement that the govenunent subsequently rescinded its decision.'" One can conclude fiom these events thaq if political leaders can resist the temptation to publicize the results of secret negotiations between the two groups, the secrecy strategy proposed by Aunger can work in the province. Although what makes this more dificult now is that information is so much more tieely available than in the past. Therefore, the use of this strategy may be in decline in the province.

Political leaders can fiirther reduce the level of cornpetition between blocs by reaching a consensus, whether formal or informal, on contentious communal issues, When the party leaders

'' Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political SiabilityI p. 155. Edmund Aunger, In Semch ojPoliiico1 Stability, p. 155. * So much opposition that the premier at the time, A.G. Blair, lost his seat in the 1892 election and had to run in another county to retain the leadership of his Party. For more see Woodward, pp. 25-26. lmEdmund Aunger, In Semch of Political StabiiityI p. 1 56. take up similar stances on potentially divisive questions, the probabi lity of a severe polari~ation of the comrnunity because of partisan debate is greatly minimized.lO1 An example of this informal consensus surrounded the enactrnent of the Official Languages Act of New Brunswick in the late 1960s. Aunger describes the situation as follows:

Because of the ehic alignment of the two political partiesIo', the Liberals have been the natural vehicle of expression of Acadian demands of equal rights for the French language. Given the substantial opposition to such demands fkom the English bloc, the Conservative Party could realistically have been expected to oppose any such concession. However, the issue was substantially defused by the early decision of the Conservative leadership to give its support, in principle, tu official recognition for the French language. The cornmitment was made in 1967 when the Conservative leader, Charlie Van Home, introduced a motion in the Legisianire to estabtish English and French as the officia1 languages of the province.'G

Fitzpatrick noted that this "eased racial tensionsy' and "created a climate of acceptability for the govemment's Onicial Languages Act when it was ultimately introduced."'" Aunger concludes that because of this consensus, the political debate that took place on the issue during the passage of the Act was restricted to technical details.Io5 That may have ken me in the

Legislature; however, in this instance, the choice (by political elites) of using the consensus strategy may have resulted in the shifting of debate from the elite level to the mass level, and eventually resulted in at lest two public challenges to the consensus agreement reached conceming oficial bilingualism. This also represents the biggest challenge facing these two parties within New Brunswick since the introduction of bilingualism - to strike some type of

Io' Edmund Aunger, in Search of Political Stabitity, p. 158.

'O2 Robert Garland and G. Machum point out thaf on average, (between 1870-1980) the Liberal party receives support frum 78% of French-speaking New Bnrnswickers while the Conservative party receives support fkom 48% of English-speaking New Brunswickers. See Garland and Machum, An Alamanac of New Brunswick Elections: 1870-1980, pp. 1 7- 1 8.

1 O3 Edmund Aunger, in Seorch of Politicai Stabiiïty, p. 158. This was not the first instance where Conservative members called for o~ciairecognition of both languages used in the province. See Richard Wi l bur, 13re Rise of French NmBrunswick, p. 1 8 7.

104 P. J. Fitzpatrick, 'Wew Brunswick: The Politics of Pragmatism," p. 132.

'Os Edmund Aunger, In Seurch of Polirical Stability, p. 1 5 8. balance between maintaining the support of the core group they represent while reaching out in attempt to attract support fiom the other camp on the one hand, and, not making overtures so much that the extremists in their core support splinter off into competing political movements, on the other.

Tension between the subcultures may also be reduced by the policy of redistributing scarce resources and positions of influence proportionately between the two blocs. Where each subculture is assured that it will receive a just share of these resources, the anxiety that would result hma cornpetitive allocation may be av~ided.'~Aunger believes that the principle of proportional distribution is widely accepted by both groups, even though there is no institutionalized rule in place. Moreover, because their is no mle in place, this has, on occasion, led to less than proportional share for cadi ans.'^' However, one can argue that as time progresses, the proportionality strategy has been implemented within the provincial civil service, as well as in the Liberal Party's tradition of alternating its leaders between the francophone and anglophone communities. For instance, as of 1988, 32.1 percent of al1 employment positions within the provincial civil service were filied by fhcophones, almost mirroring their proportion of the province's population.'08 It is also difficult to separate the arguments for the use of the proportionality strategy as proposed by Aunger fiom the notion of the presence of a multiple balance of power within the subcultures, since many of the arguments overlap when only two groups are involved.

New Brunswick, king a province within Canada, has a simiiar political structure as its federal counterpart, except that its upper house was abolished in 1892. Therefore, one realizes

'O6 Edmund Aunger, In Senrch of Polirical Stubility, p. 1 56.

'O7 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stubility. p. 157.

'O8 Catherine Steele, Can Bilingunlism Work?, p. 90. See New Brunswick Linguistic Profle of Employees in the Public Service: 1988. that a multiple balance of power among the subcultuies has not ken insti~ionalizedwithin the province. The problem with applying this part of the theory to New Brunswick is that the consociationalism assumes that the groups involved, regardless of their number, should be roughly the same size. This is so that any one of them cannot have the ability to control the others. New Brunswick does not fit this portion of the theory because one of the groups involved, anglophones, represents a majority of the province's population. However, Aunger notes

"without denying that such a multiple balance of power may facilitate consociationalism, the New

Brunswick case demonstrates that such a condition is not essentia~."'~ In fact, because there existed a majority-minority relationship in New Brunswick, "concessions and compromises were made which, while satisfiing the minority, pose little threat to the majority. During the nineteenth century, the Acadians were so small in number and so isolated regionally that they were not perceived as an opponent to be feared or mistrusted."'10

In addition, Lijphart notes that this need for a multiple balance of power could also be interpreted as a need for a multiple party system. However, once again the political history of

New Brunswick does not comply. The province is home to a stable two-party system that has operated with only slight interruption since World War One."' Recall in the years before the

Great War, the province was govemed under a coalition party made up of anglophones and francophones, Cathoiics and Protestants (as a result of the Caraquet riots). nierefore, the balance of power that Lijphart seeks in his wnsociational mode1 must be viewed from another perspective.

'O9 Edmund Aunger, In Seurch of Political Stability, p. 178.

''O Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Political Stabiiity, p. 179.

III Such intemptions include the election of six United Fanners candidates in 1920, eight Con federation of regions candidates in 199 1, and the continued presence of the CCF-NDP on the political scene, although that Party has never elected more than one MLA at any given time in the province's histov. Earlier, it was noted that since 1875, there has been representation within the goveming party of most ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Within New Brunswick these groups "cross- cut" each other, meaning, for example, that while most associate francophone New Brunswickers as Roman Catholic, there is also a substantial minority of English-speakers who practice

Catholi~ism.~~This political reality was reflected in the electoral practices of the parties during the nineteenth, and most of the twentieth, centuy. Until 1974, most constituencies were linked to county boundaries and were represented by more than one member. This allowed parties to balance the ticket in constituencies of varied populations. For example, in the city of Moncton, which, until 1967, was a two member constituency, each political party nominated one French

Catholic and one English Protestant candidate. When a third seat was added to the constituency in 1967, both parties nominated an English Catholic as the third member of their slate - English

Catholics have long been favored as compromise candidates likely to appeal to the English by language and to the French by religion."' This ensured that the legislanire would be reasonably representative of the population in tems of ethnicity and religion, pmvided that voters chose the whole party ticket rather than crossing party lines to vote on the basis of demographic background."*

As a result, one can deduce that proportionality among the subcultures would be found within the party caucus in the New Brunswick example. If this is true then goveming parties would attempt to balance their cabinets so that al1 the ethnic and religious groups would be fairly represented. In New Brunswick, this has not always been the case. Dyck noted that between

112 Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada, p. 142. This minority accounted for over one quarter of English-speaking New Brunswickers as of 1980. See also Machum and Garland, p. 57. However, Aunger noted that this trend did not work in reverse. in 187 1 there were no French Protestants and by 1971 only three percent fell into that category. For more, see Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabiiiiy? p. 77.

Il3 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Pofitical Stabiiity?p. 145.

"" Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Cda,p. 144. 1900 and 1959, only fourteen percent of provincial cabinet ministers were cadi ans.' Is However, since 1960, he argues that French-speaking New Brunswickers have either been over-represented

in the cabinet (during Robichaud's tenure) or have held important portfolios such as Education or

Finance under ~atfield."~An overall picture of cabinet representation since 1960 confimis this and also reveals the progress made by Hatfleld and McKenna, in their attempts to make the cabinet reflect the ethnic diversity of the province. In addition, it has been the practice of the

Liberal party in recent years to altemate between English and French-speaking leaders.

Table 2-1 Erhnic Composition of Cabinet in New Brunswick, 1961-199 7

Y ears Analo~hone% W) Franco~hone% CN) Totaf Number

1961-1970 48.9 (69) 51.1 (72) 141 1971-1980 78.6 (140) 21.3 (38) 178 1981-1990 68.2 (131) 31.8 (61 1 192 1991-1997 61.6 (901 38.4 (56) -146 Totals 65.4 (430) 34.6 (227) 657 Sources: CdianParIiatnenlq Gukks, 1961-1991.

One consociationai advantage that New Brunswick does hold is its proportional lack of size and population, in cornparison to Canada. In addition, the province is also fortunate to be the autonomous province of a rnuch larger state - Canada. Therefore, the decision-making responsibility for a wide range of problems rests with the federal government. This means that the leaden of the province have the time and energy to work t~gether."~Moreover, the province has historically beeii the beneficiary of substantial transfers of funds from the federal govemment to relieve the strains caused by a lack of economic development and hi& ~nern~lo~rnent."~

" Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Cda,p. 144.

Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canado. pp. 144- 145.

Ili Edmund Aunger. Personal E-mail correspondence. July 9, 1999.

' " Edmund Aunger, In Seurch of Political Stability, p. 1 80. Thus, it could be argued that the province's policy of accommodation owes a great deal to the

positive financial influence of the federal government.

Intersubcultural Relations at the Mas Level

"A political system is one of segmented pluralism when its cleavages have produced

competing networks of schools, communications media, interest groups, leisure time associations.

and political parties along segmented lines of both religious and anti-religious nat~re.""~

Lijphart argues that a distinct line of cleavage between the two subcultures is conducive to the

successfül operation of consociational democracy. Does this separation exist in New Brunswick?

Emery Fanjoy describes the province as "approximately a square, if you draw a line fiom

the northwest to the southeast, francophones are mostly above the line and anglophones are

mostly below it. Generally, anglophone and hncophone New Brunswickers have not mingled

much with interaction king mainly at the elite 1eve1.l~~in addition, each subculture in New

Brunswick has different communal symbols and national identities. The French-speaking portion

of the population, for exampie, will usuaIly refer to themselvts as Acadians or French Canadians.

Moreover, since the late nineteenth century, the Acadian identity has ken given formal

expression by the adoption of a variety of exclusive national symbols, including an anthem and a

flag.I2'

New Brunswick has, in essence two separate school systems, one for each language.

Both have a similar administrative structure complete with a deputy minister responsible for each

subculture. A move to bilinguaf schools has ken contemplated in the past; however, this move

Il9 Edmund Aunger, In Searcia of Political Stabifity, p. 15. See V. R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," p. 142.

''O Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 2.

"' Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Politicul Stubility, p. 17. proved to be unpopular with the Acadian minorïty who feared that increased contact with English midents would lead to a~similation.'~This trend also continues at the pst-secondary level, with university institutions that separately serve the two linguistic groups, in addition to a number of pu blicly fiinded community colleges.

Another area where there is a distinction made within the two linguistic groups in New

Brunswick is in the form of print and television media. Television services are available in both languages; however, a majority of the programming takes place outside the province. For the

English, this means either the United States or Ontario, while French language television signals, by and large, are transmitted fiom Quebec. While most English-speakers read either the

Telegraph JoMnal, Times-Transcrri,~,or the Dai& Gleaner, more than two-thirds of French newspaper readers read a French language newspaper. These come fiom a variety of sources. In the southeast, many who used to read L'Evangéfine now read the L'Acadie Nouvelle. As for those in the northem part of the province, many have been reading newspapers from the neighboring province of ~uebec.'~

Findly, the two groups also are involved in a host of different interest groups for both

Ieisure and political activities. However, Aunger points out that fi@-two percent of the English belong to voluntary organizations compared to only thirty-six percent of French-speaking New

Brunswickers. He assumes that the difference in these number may be Iargely attributed to the various roles and fimctions of the Catholic Church. Here again, it is seen that in most groups there is very little crossover membership between subcultures. The most important of these to note politically are the English Speaking Association, which went on to form the basis of the

Confederation of Regions Party, and the Société des Acadiens du Nouveau Brunswick (SANB)

'" Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 25.

" Eâmund Aunger, In Semch of Polirical Stability, p. 29. which acts primarily as the chief spokesman and lobby for Acadian interests. "'A description of the social relations in Moncton provides an example of this separation:

At the level of social activities it seems as that there is not much 'social inter-play'; it seems rather that there exist two world living side-by-side which meet for their nonna1 needs but do not succeed in integrating themselves. If it is not a question here of two solitudes, it may be a question here of two worfds aimost separated, living a bit on the border with each other without any reat exchange, in surn, undergoing a sort of 'culturai isolati~nism."~

This suggests that one could easily live one's entire Iife in New Brunswick only having to communicate in a single language. hch subculture has its own distinctive history, national symbols and cultural identity. New Brunswick, therefore, has developed a culture of two solitudes, separate but equat, with little interaction between them at the mass level.

EZite-Mas Relations Wirhin Individual Subdures

Although it has been said that a high degree of intemal political cohesion of the subcultures is desirable in order for a consociational demoçracy to operate, it has also been recorded that there is a need for an overarching national solidarity among the two groups. For

New Brunswick, this simply means that the majority of the populace, regardless of their language or ethnicity, must take pride in king Canadian, and by extension, a New Brunswicker. Aunger believes that this has occurred over time, pointing to statistics provided by the 1974 National

Election Study as evidence. As was previously mentioned, both linguistic groups have been somewhat "cut-off' fiom the lands of their ancestors and have had plenty of time to develop a shared allegiance to Canada.

The formation of fonnal political parties in New Brunswick was a gradua1 process.

Many nineteenth century politicians were primarily interested in the dispensation of patronage in

12' 12' Edmund Aunger, In Search of Polirical Stability, pp. 32-33.

12' 12' Edmund Aunger, In Search of Poliiical Siability, p. 37. their areas. Intent on sitting on the govemment benches, these politicians would make no formal cornmitment to any party until an election was over, in order to ensure their position in the patronage dispensing system.

The move towards parties king primarily associated with particular linguistic groups did not begin until the First World War. Two events during 19 17 contributed much to the process of the Conservative Party losing the support of French-speaking New Brunswickers. The first was the passage of a provincial prohibition bill that would make the province "dry." At the time, a number of the "French" counties (Victoria, Madawaska, Restigouche and Kent) had no such restrictions on the use of alcohol and saw the bill as an unwarranted intrusion into their social activities.lZ However, it was the second of these events that generated "a greater undercurrent of concem and suspicion for the cadia ans.""' This was a resettlement scheme proposed by the

Conservative government, designed ''to give preference on every possible occasion, both with respect to land settlement and occupation, to the retumed soldief" (mostty mgIophone) for the

"peopling of the great spaces" in nomiesstem New ~ninswick.'~~The predictable response fiom

Acadian leaders and L 'Evangeline was that this was a thinly veiled plot to assimilate Acadians into anglophone society. As a result, many French-speaking voters sought the "shelter" of the

Liberal Party in order to state publicly their mistrust of the Conservatives. One also can not forget that this was at the time of the conscription crisis as well, which must have had some outside influence on the political views of those who spoke French in the province, regardless of whether their farnilies were originally from Quebec or Acadia.

126 The use of alcohoi in these areas was not reserved for purely social purposes. Many tmk the substance to the woods with them (apparently) in order to keep them warm during the winter months.

"'Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of New Brunswick Elections: 1870-1980, p. 20.

'" Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of New Brunswick Elections: 1870- 1980, p. 20 Finally, the Iink between French-speaking New Brunswickers and the Liberal party was also developed through the rising political consciousness of the Acadians themselves. in addition to these events described above, most Acadians probably began to notice that they might not be getting a "fair slice" of the political pie. By the end of the war, there had been at test a dozen premiers in the province, and not one of them had been of French origin or had lived north of

Chatham. In addition, there had only been a small number of Acadian cabinet ministers at the provincial level, and none at the federal level, until 1926.'" According to Garland and Machum, the Francophones were politicized under the leadership of P.J. Vienot, an influential newspaper publisher and successful MLA from Gloucester county into "an atmost-monolithic bloc of voters which was to adhere strictly to a voting pattern of support for those who accepted an increasing role for Acadians in the affain of the province."'M Vienot himself went on to become leader of the Liberal Party, thus further cementing the support of French-speaking New Brunswickers fimly behind that Party.

Previously, it was noted that an increasing interest in politics, combined with better access to information and more education, has made Canadians more mistrated politically, and less deferentiat to their political leaders than in the past. Moreover, this perceived fnistration was one of the reasons found for the inability to apply the consociational mode1 to Canada. Therefore, what, if anything, would keep one from making similar arguments against applying this particular mode1 to New Brunswick?

in the first instance, recall that while most Canadians voiced their displeasure at the federal government during the Charlottetown referendum, a majority of New Brunswickers

In Philippe Doucet, "Politics and the Acadians," pp. 246-256.

Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Afmanac of New Brunswick Efectiom: 1870-1980, p. 21 (61 3%)suppor

Some writers have suggested that it has been historically important for New

Brunswickers to maintain an interest in politics in order to receive the patronage benefits of living in a wnstituency that elects a govemment member. Aunger himself noted that some New

Brunswick politicians would not commit to a Party in the late nineteenth century for fear of missing out in the dispensation of patronage!" In this century, it has been custom in New

Brunswick (and other Atlantic provinces) for governing parties to invest oniy in constituencies they ho~d.'~~Moreover, the provincial govemment is a large employer in New Brunswick. In fact, it was found that New Brunswick has more bureaucrats per capita than any other province in canada."' However, it has also been argued that, as patronage practices decline, so to will the incentive for people in New Brunswick to actively participate in politics. Therefore, it is interesting that a practice as fkowned upon as patronage may be the reason that keeps New

Brunswickers fiom having as precipitous a decline in deference than other Canadians.

Furthemore, New Brunswickers have historically had less confidence in their political institutions; therefore, a general decline in deference has not affected them to the same extent as other Canadians. Aunger noted that most New Brunswickers have ''very little confidence in their ability to have an impact on the political process and on govemment. They therefore lave

13' Keith Archer, Roger Gibbons, Rainer Knopff and Leslie A Pal, Parorneters ofPower: Canada 's Political Institutions, p. 1 55.

13' New Brunswick, Report ofthe Chief Electoral WcecTh*-Third General Election September 11, 1995, p. 3 1.

13' Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabilily, p. 1 1 3.

13-' Agar Adarnson and Ian Stewart, "Party Politics in the not so Mystenous East," p. 526.

13' Rand Dyck, Provincial Pofitics in Canada, p. 576. decision-making to theu ~eaden.""~This low sense of political eficacy, combined with mistrust, led Simeon and Elkins to conclude that New Brunswick is a "disaffected" society: "Disaffection fiom govenunent and politics is very widespread, but this is not translated into political a~tion."'~' Steven Ullman reinforced this notion in his analysis of New Brunswick using the

1984 National Election Study data.'38 His findings suggested several hypothesis as to why their are usuaf levels of political disaffection found in the province. They included:

Persistent political corruption, failure by provincial and federal govenunents to deliver on economic development promises; domination of the province's political systern by wealthy dites.. .and the persistence of the political patronage system. "'

Even if deference has declined in New Brunswick, there are good grounds for believing that the rate of decline has been slower than in the rest of the country.

Conclusion

It was found here that consociation meant the association of groups in a way that maintains the distinctive characteristics of each without inhibiting collective goals. The theory assumes that a Iink exists bewn the decision-making behavior of leaders and the level of violence found among cultural groups in a given society. Even thought its population consists of more than one linguistic group, New Brunswick is generally considered a stable political entity.

Therefore, it was interesting to determine whether this was due to the actions of the decision- making elite, or to some other structural factor found in the province.

136 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Polirical Stability, pp. 1 65- 1 66.

13' Richard Simeon and David Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," pp. 435-436.

13' Steven Ullman, "Political Disaffection in the Province of New Brunswick: Manifestations and Sources," pp. 1 60- 174.

139 Steven Ullman, "Political Disaffection in the Province of New Brunswick: Manifestations and Sources," pp. 173-1 74. The strength of the consociational theory rests on its ability to explain the political history of the province. It was, for example, readily apparent that the political leaders of the province implemented the four consociational strategies noted by Aunger (depoliticalization, srecy, consensus, and proportionality), in order to keep communal issues fiom "spiraling" out of their cent-01. However, by the same token, it can also be argued that the two traditional parties' consensus on oficial bilingualism caused subsequent debate on the issue to shift from the elite to the mass level. It will be seen later that through this debate comes the most significant chailenge to consociationalism in New Brunswick to &te - the Confederation of Regions Party. That the theory is not applicable to Canada is of little consequence here, since the goal of the chapter was to assess the consociationaf model's applicability to New Brunswick. However, the Canadian example did provide useful criticisms explaining why the theory might not readily apply to the province.

It would be easy to dismiss applying the consociational theory to Canada due to its sheer size, although it was found that the nation did contain some characteristics of a consociational nature. This problem in applying the theory is compounded by the fact that there are so many potential divisions within the country to which the term "subculture" could apply. There are, for instance, geographical divisions, reinforced through the use of the federal system: economic divisions and; finally, there are potential divisions based on religion and language, the latter king perceived as receiving the bulk of the attention fiom federal govemments since the 1960s.

ironically, one of the trends that Noel identifies in his classic study of consociationalism in Canada has arguably improved the position of fiancophones in New Brunswick, compared to their anglophone neighbors. While national policies of bilingualisrn increased friction in New

Brunswick, they also resulted in fiancophones gaining legal equality with anglophones in dealings with the federal government, which undoubtedly influenced the provincial govemment's decision to do the same in 1969. Another trend revealed by Noel was that the consociational system would not be able to operate if a provincial elite emerged intent on not cooperating to ensure that common goals are achieved. In the Canada of the 1970s, this meant that if a Parti Québécois govemment came to power in Quebec City, the process of immobilism would begin. The former occumd in 1976 and attempts to curtail immobilism began shortly after- Since the time that the Parti Québécois came to power these attempts would be made to end the immobilism between Quebec and the rest of

Canada and al1 attempts failed. Not that al1 of the blarne for this can be placed at the feet of the

Parti Québécois. The second and third attempts came at a time when they were the OlEcial

Opposition in the National Assembly. In the case of the Meech Lake Accord, it was the govemments of two other provinces that kept Canadians in a constitutional odyssey to the presentday.

However, it was the death of Meech Lake that gave legitimacy to the third of Noel's predictions concerning the use of consociationdism in Canada, the decline of deference on the part of the masses to their political leaders. The evidence of this decline was confirmed by the research of Neil Nevitte, who also found that Canadians were not aione in this regard. Nevitte found that, in general, Canadians were becoming more educated, better infonned and more interested in politics than they had ken previously. Moreover, it was discovered that these trends were linked to Canadians' eroding confidence in government institutions. This lead to larger numbers of Canadians having politically to express theanselves in non-traditional forums. Some

Canadians felt that they could not find a place in those hierarchical institutions that mobilized rnass participation. As we shall see, a number of francophone New Brunswickers had similar feelings during the 1970s that resulted in a challenge to the traditional rnethods of accommodation in that province.

To conclude, one can argue that without a high degree of political cohesion within the subculnires it will be difficult for elites to articulate adequately the intetests of the subcultures for which they are responsible. Herein lies the main challenge for the elites within New Brunswick since the 1960s; this will largely be the focus of the third chapter. It will be shown that the consociational ded smunding the fanguage issue by the two political parties in the province has been subsequentty challenged by a group hmeach linguistic camp, each claiming that their interests have not been articulated adequately, thereby partially destabilizing the political cohesion found within each linguistic bloc. Chapter Tb-: The Initial Coasociatioaai Deal Breaks Down

This chapter has two principal purposes. First, it will explain why the initial

consociational bargain broke down. Second, it will provide a detailed analysis of the second

consociational deal. Included herein will be a description of how this deal has ken maintained

over the past three decades and how the deal has been challenged by two groups during this

period, one representing each of the two linguistic groups involved. The structure of the arguments will be similar to that employed in the second chapter, a subdivision of the evidence

under the three relationships provided by Noel.

W hy t be Initiai Coasociatioaal Deal Bro ke-Down

In order to explain the reasoning behind this second consociational deal, one would have to look back to the environment fiom which this compromise was bom. The New Brunswick of the 1950s and 1960s was an economically depressed region in cornparison to the rest of Canada.

The inequalities between the more developed South and West of the province and the lesser- developed North and East only served to perpetuate the economic and social challenges which

faced the province at that time. Anglophones were employed in professional or clerical occupations while their hcophone counterparts were more involved in primary industries.'"

Moreover, the population of French- speaking New Brunswick had been steadily growing to the point that by 195 1 it accounted for close to forty percent of the provincial population, as

140 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Polirical Slabiiity, pp. 87-89. This inequality was maintained for a period even after the second consociational deal. For example, while anglophones accounted for over eighty percent engineers and clerical supervisors found within New Brunswick in 1971, over sixty percent of miners and fish processors were francophone. compared to sixteen percent in 1871.14' Liberal MLA Joseph LeBlanc observed in 1954 Wat

Acadians were numerous everywhere except in the civil service in Fredericton", where French-

speaking oficials were a rare commodity."' This was something that would be addressed by a young lawyer fiom St. Antoine who would eventually become premier of the province - Louis

Robichaud.

Robichaud's sense of these discrepancies came about honestly. Lacking the funds to attend the University of New Brunswick Law School, he articled in a small law office in Bathurst and eventually passed both the provincial and UNB law exarninations, the latter with high honors.

Moreover, his studies at the Social Science School at Laval in the charged political atmosphere of the Duplessis regime no doubt reinforced his commitment to social change.ls3 In three scant years afier retuming fiom Quebec City, Robichaud found himself making the trip to Fredericton as a MLA for Kent County. He then spent a tem on the backbenches and two years as opposition finance cntic before becoming leader of the provincial Liberal Party in October 1958. By 1960, he rode the Liberal Party to power, carnpaigning for better economic conditions, social services and the abolition of the hospital premium tax.Iu

What the Robichaud govemment syrnbolized was an era of change. The initial consociational deal between the francophone and anglophone elite broke down in the late 1950s and early 1960s for a number of reasons. The economic disparities present and the growth of the francophone population within New Brunswick were major causes; however, these activities had been ongoing for years and the provincial government had not seerned al1 that concemed.

Changes did not take place until francophones finally had their hands on al1 the levers of power.

14' Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New Bnmswick, p. 1 85. See also Edmund Aunger, In Seurch of Political Stability, p. 77.

'42 Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New Brrmswick, p. 186.

14' 14' P. J. Fitzpatrick, 'New Brunswick: Politics of Pragmatisrn," p. 129.

'a Della Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 448. One could argue that the balance between the two groups was perceived as king ta> much in favor of anglophones, in comparison to the growing numbers of francophones. Therefore, alterations had to made to the consociational deal to take into açcount the growing political awareness of Acadians in particular, and francophones, in general, within the borders of New

Brunswick.

In order to respond properly to the social concerns, Robichaud set up a royal commission to examine the fuiances of the province at the municipal level. However, before the commission couId release its report, Robichaud called an election for Apnl 22, 1963. The bais for going to the polis was a deal between the province and South Nelson Forest Products, an Italian controlled firm."' The forest Company was going to build a pulp mil1 on the Miramachi in exchange for a woodcutting license. Accoding to Robichaud, the new mil1 would create 1 500 jobs in the area. 146 Moreover, he stated %e prime purpose of this Liberal govemment is to provide rapid industrial and economic expansion throughout New Brunswick so that al1 people of the province, wherever they may live, may have equal opportunities for employrnent, income and human bette~ment."'~~

The Liberals won the election, allowing Robichaud to move forward with the next part of his plan. The royal commission that had been set up during his first term published its findings on Febmary 4, 1964. Since then, the actual document has been widely labeled the Byrne Report, while most of its recommendations are now more generally known as the Program of Equal

Opponmity. The report recommended that the province should assume responsibility for four

145 Calvin Woodward, The History of Nav Bnnswick Efection Campaigns and Plaiforms: 1866- 1974, p. 78.

Calvin Woodward, The History of New Brunswick Election Cumpaigns and P futforms: 1866- 1974, p. 78.

147 Calvin Woodward, The Hisrory of New Brunswick Election Campaigns und Platforms: 1866- 1974, p. 79. general services to the people - education, welfare, health and social justice."' As a result, this wouId eliminate the government structure at the county level that had been operating in the province for over a century. The report reads:

Existing provincial and municipal govenunent agencies are singularly unsuited to the needs of the times. Education, health, welfare and the administration ofjustice have come to be regarded as general services, first, because their benefits extend beyond the municipalities that provide for them and affect the whole province, and second, because citizens in al1 parts of the province feel that they are entitled to receive the same quality of these services.. .Futhermore, the formulation of policy and the overttll direction of administration must of necessity be province-wide in scope. The efficient administration of such highly cornplex programs requues well-trained specialists, and these can only be mustered at the provincial level, where theu abilities can be adequatety utilized, where there is a sufficient range of opportunities to offer an attractive career, and where adequate salaries can be paid.'49

Recall that Lijphart noted that a precondition for a successful consociational democracy hinged on the ability of elite to solve the political problems of their states."' The elite in this case did have the ability to enact legislation that would solve political problems, if it were implemented properly. However, given the situation noted above, there was an obvious need for well-trained and educated bureaucrats to move into the province, since the existing provincial public civil service was not pmicularly strong."' In fact, the innovative program may have ken rescued by an influx of civil servants fiom Saskatchewan who had previously dealt with similar programs under the CCF in that province.

The Program of Equal Opportunity was particularly beneficial to the depressed areas of northern and southeasteni New Brunswick and was greeted with enthusiasm in predominantly

Acadian areas. And although equality of opportunity was not a popular principle with everybody, the pursuit of equal rights by Acadians for Acadians was becoming a permanent feature of New

-- "'Richard W ilbur, The Rise of French lVew Bnmswick, p. 207. 149 New Brunswick, Report on the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation in New Brzmswick, p. 1 13.

''O Arend Lijphaa "Consociational Democracy," pp. 8 1-84.

15' Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Cda,p. 153. Brunswick's political ~andxape.'~~Some media outlets argued that the legislation was an attempt

at a French takeover of the province; however, in reality, the bewildering number of new

provincial civil service jobs were also king filled by anglophones.'53 The program also eased the

tax burden of many English as well as francophone property owners. This was due to new federal

iùnding fiom cost sharing agreements, without which, it is doubtfiil that the Program for Equai

Opportunity would have ever become a reality.

However, to ensure that his plan for restnicturing the role of both the provincial and municipal govenunents within the province had the support of the electorate, Robichaud called for another mandate in 1967. Although the carnpaign served to heighten ethnic tension within the province, it also gave the premier the support he felt was necessary in order to continue his re forms.

As elsewhere in North America, concems for ethnic equality and minority rights surfaced as political and social issues during this period. Within Canada, the youth began to reject the traditional social and cultural values and sexual taboos weakened. Women questioned the inequalities of their condition, labor becarne more militant, a Native resurgence began in reaction to fears of assimilation, and French-speaking Canadians sought linguistic rights that would place them on equal footing with their English-speaking ~ounterparts.'~Most Canadians also saw improvements to their social infrastnichire during this period, and nowhere was this more evident than in New Brunswick.

Within New B~nswick,these concerns took the form of Acadian nationali~m.'~~nie demands made by the Acadian leaders (including Robichaud) were motivated by concerns for

'" Della Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 449.

Is3 Richard Wiibur, The Rise of French New Bnmnvick, p. 2 18.

'" R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones and Donald B. Smith, Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, p. 350. lS5 Della Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 448. cultural and linguistic survival. Improved transportation and the availability of better education

and television had contributed to increased contact with the anglophone majority.'" And while

the Francophone population was growing faster than the anglophone, so was the number of

French-bom New Bmnswickers becoming unilingually anglophone."7 In response to this

concern, Lucien Fortin, a Conservative member fiom Madawaska County, once remarked in the

provincial legislature that "What the French want were means and ways required to keep their cultural and religious heritage." French Canadians "object steadfastly to assimilation." Quoting the Quebec patriot Henri Bourassa, Fortin said that mutual agreement between the English and the French, '30 be complete and perfect, must include officia1 recognition of the mother tongue of both.. .and a proportional participation in public

During what was to be his final mandate as premier, Robichaud introduced another piece of legisiation aimed at increasing the availability of opportunity for people to teceive govemment services in the language of their choice - the Wcial Languages Act. This Act had been preceded by the tabling of a white paper entitled Declaration on the Equaliiy of Linguistic Opportunities in

New Brunswick. The Paper afirmed the principles justi@ing the bilingual drafiing of laws. of regulations and the records ofjournals of the legislative assembly, the use of French or English in any official communication with provincial institutions and, finally, instruction in the language of the minority where numbers ~arranted."~

Aunger argued that "because of the ethnic alignment (historical) of the two traditional parties, the Liberals have been the natural vehicle for the expression of Acadian demands of equal rights for the French language. Given the substantial opposition to such dernands among the

Della Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 448.

Is7 Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Poliricol Stability, p. 68.

''13 Richard Wilbur, nie Rise of Fenfh New Bmmwick, p. 187.

'59 Michel Bastarache, Language Rights in Canada,p. 40. English bloc, the Conservative Party could realistically have ken expected to oppose any such concession. However, the issue was substantially defused by the early decision of the

Conservative leadership to give its support, in principle, to officia1 recognition for the French lang~age."'~~This early admission in supporting the principle of official bilingualism initiated the second consociational bargain that was stnick between the two parties during this period.

This bargain was publicly symbolized in the form of the 1970 provincial election.

Supporters of Robichaud himself claim that the party was tired, letharw had set in at the executive level, and that "sornetimes it seemed as if the party had a death ~ish."'~'On the other hand, the Liberal party's polling during the summer of 1970 revealed that the political leadership image of Robichaud was still strong, although it also indicated that the only issue registering with voters at the time was "the ethnic mat te^."'^^ This issue is dificult to explain although Belliveau over-simplifies it by citing that it was an English back~ash.'~~Another account suggests that there were two sets of Acadian elites acting within the Moncton area during this period. Moncton constituencies played a key rote in the results of the 1970 election, since three of the seats that constituted the six-seat majority for the Conservatives came fiom that city. One has to keep in mind that at this critical juncture in New Brunswick's history, the FLQ Crisis was going on within the neighboring province of Quebec, and it served as constant reminder of the "perils of political fragmentation." Nevertheless, one can see that this process of fragmentation was beginning to occur within the francophone community with the establishment of a second, politically active group of French-speaking New Brunswickers coming into the political sphere.

.

''O Edmund Aunger, In Seurch of Political Stability, p. 158.

16' John Belliveau, Little Louis and the GimKC., p. 1 13.

'" John Belliveau, Little Louis and the Giant KC., p. 1 1 1.

'63 John Belliveau, Little Louis and the Gia~K C., pp. 1 10- 2 14. The Need for Restructuring

Ironically, it was the "ethnic matte?' which Belliveau refers to in the previous paragraph that was the motivating factor for formulating the second consociational deal. %y the late 1960s it was alrnost as if the people of the province of New Brunswick needed protection fiom themselves. AAer the tension-filled years surrounding the passage of the Program of Equal

Opportunity, the leaders of the two traditional parties, Robichaud and Van Horne, realized that any respect the two linguistic groups had lefi for each other could quickly dissipate into fear. The two leaders understood the perils of political fragmentation because they had an opportunity to watch the political fragmentation both in the nation as a whole and in the province of Quebec, during the 1960s. Events such as the Quiet Revolution, and the formation of the Parti Québécois, could only have fùeled the need for reconciliation behveen the two linguistic groups. Therefore, it will be argued here that the two traditionai political parties took it upon themselves to provide a fiamework that would accommodate future negotiations and consensus between the two groups.

Since then, the people of New Brunswick have had a "fiont row seat'' to events that have epitomized the dangers of political fragmentation. These events include: the FLQ Crisis, multiple rounds of constitutional negotiations, a referendum on sovereignty-association in both 1980 and

1995, as well as the election of a Parti Québécois govemment that has governed fiom 1976-1985 and since 1994. Even though Lijphart places great emphasis on the need for an external threat in order for consociationalism to work, this may not be necessary for its successfbl operation in New

Brunswick. Perhaps the perils of political fragmentation have been so constantly revealed by the national example that no outside motivating factor is required to maintain the accommodative process in the province.

In response to these increased tensions found both within the nation and the province, both the Progressive Conservative and the Liberal Party leadership fett that the only way to contain the situation was to act cautiously. Both sets of party leaders agreed that both English

and French needed to be recognized as official languages within the province. They also agreed

to the notion that the quality of service given by the provincial govemment in the French

language needed to be improved.'" Finally, the goal of this consensus was to contain ethnic

tensions in order to prevent violence and il1 will towards each other while promoting equality and

hmony, not the elimination of ethnic tensions. Part of this meant that issues dealing with

language between politicians, and between themselves and the public were to be handled discreetly, not publicly. This notion is one that had been in practice since the late 1870s and there are signs that this convention has been strictly adhered to, even if this practice of accommodation has sometimes cost the two traditional parties short-term political gain. It will also be noted that

in those instances where this convention was not adhered to, an increase in the political tension in the province has emerged, reinforcing the need for such an arrangement.

For instance, during the provincial election campaign of 1925, P. J. Vienot, an Acadian, was leader of the Liberal Party. During this campaign, there were nimors in southem areas of the province stating that he was an agent of the Roman Pope and that he intended to implement a system of separate schools, should he be elected.16' The leader of the Conservative Party, J.

Baxter, repeatedly insisted that the Liberal leader not be attacked "because of the faith to which he owes allegiance" (Roman Catholicism) 'hor because he belongs to a great race."'66 Therefore,

in this instance, Mr. Baxter was adhenng to the "gentlemen's agreement," even though he could

'"

165 Robert Garland and Gregov Machum, An AImcmac of New Brunswick Election: 1870-1980, pp. 33-35.

166 Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of New Bnmswick Elecfion: i87O-Z98Oy p. 35. have done differently in order to potentially obtain more votes fiom these areas where the

whispering carnpaign was occumng.

However, just because there was a consociational deal surrounding the language issue did

not mean that electoral competition had ceased. As has been mentioned before, the challenge for

the two traditional parties duhg this period was to retain their traditional base of support while attempting to garner as much support as possible fiom the opposite linguistic group. It will be

seen that the Conservative Party atternpted to take advantage of the Liberal Party's immobilism in this regard during the late 1970s. What is striking here is that afier the Conservative Party achieved a coalition within itself, the carefùlly crafied coalition began to fa11 apart. Ironically, a similar chain of events can also be detected within the federal Conservative Party years later, with sirnilar result~.'"~

Inrersubcultural Rela~ionsarnong EIifes

The second consociational deal was publicly symbolized by three events: the establishment of the Universite de Moncton, the passage of the provincial Official Languages Act

in 1969, and the provincial election of 1970. The establishment of the university, and subsequently its satellite campuses in Edmunston and Shippagan, allowed French-speaking New

Bmnswickers the opportunity to be formally educated at the pst-secondary level in their own language. The Officia1 Languages Act gave a much greater permanency to the French fact within

lts7 What is meant here is that the New Brunswick Conservative Party was successful by the early 1980s in fonning a coalition between traditional Tory supporters, mostly anglophone, and a relatively newer group of Acadian nationalists who were involved with the Parti Acadien during the 1970s. The tesult was a Conservative victory in 1982. However, two years into this mandate, Hatfield would make the political decisions that led to the increasing popularity of the English Speaking Association, fore-mnner to the COR Party. Eventually the provincial Conservatives would be wiped out in one sense because this coalition collapsed. Many observers contend that Mulroney would attempt a similar coalition in 1984-1990, between Western supporters of the party and Quebec nationalists. Mulroney's coalition collapsed in a similar manner by 1990 and three years later, the two Conservative parties (federal and provincial) had a combined total of seven elected representatives - Five N.B. MLA's and two national MP's. the province since it meant that the two linguistic groups were equal under the eyes of the law.

Finally, the 1970 election is important in this regard because it showed that a majority of the people of the province had faith knowing that the progress made in reconciling the differences between the two linguistic groups in the 1960s would be continued.

In chapter two, it was stated that the political elite used four distinct strategies to reduce the possibility of conflict between English and French-speaking New Brunswickers

(depoliticalization, secrecy, consensus and proportionality). Hadield's initial decisions conceming his caucus reveaied his desires for both proportionality and consensus within his own party and the cabinet.

The early 1970s were indeed a crossroads for the political development of New

Brunswick in terms of the language issue. Hatfield himself was a unilingual anglophone and there were only two French-speaking members in his first caucus. In fact, it was felt in some rural areas that Hatfield might not continue the progress made by Robichaud in the recognition of the hcophone fact in the province.'" However, this was not to be, for Hafield himself thought that the only way to alter his party's image as the voice of the anglophone South was to be perceived by the public as an effective alternative voice for hcophone concerns. Perhaps he atternpted to do this al1 at once, for it has ken noted that Conservative Acadians in the Bathurst area riding association told their leader to visit less often for "the good of the

Nevertheless, one of Hatfield's first moves afier king elected in 1970 was to make Jean-

Maurice Simard his Finance minister, a position Simard would hold until his appointment to the

Senate in 1986. In fact, during his first two mandates, Hatfïeld appointed al1 Conservative hcophones MLAs into his cabinet. One young Conservative MLA, JeamPierre Ouellet, initially refùsed his appointment, stating that he was not biiingual, to which HatfSeld replied,

168 Doug Tyler. Personal Interview. June 29, 1999.

169 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hat$e/d: Power and Disobedience, p. 126. "Neither am I."'" However, Sirnard was likely the linchpin in the party's attempts to try and create a coalition within itself. Simard and Hatfield felt this could be done if they could transfonn the Conservative Party hmone based on anglophone support fiom the South to a truly provincial Party, capable of garnering support in the North.

For the Conservatives, however, the first obstacle to overcome was structural in nature.

For decades, slate politics had been the rule in New Brunswick, with multi-member constituencies largely based on county lines. For the Conservatives, this meant that pockets of

Conservative support in the North would usually be drowned out or surrounded by a massive

Liberal vote. HatfÏeld made an election promise during the 1970 campaign to reorganize the electoral map into a number of single-member constituencies. This was done in time for the 1974 election that saw the number of Conservative francophone MLAs rise to five-*" The second problern facing Hatfield's party was one of public perception. If his governent was seen as making decisions that favored francophones, then how could the inevitable anglophone backlash be avoided?

Hatfield seemed content to proceed on the issue of language rights cautiously, leaving the formation of the means to attract the francophone vote largely up to Simard and his caucus-mates, while largely leaving the implementation of the of the Oflicial Languages Act in akyance.

Perhaps Hatfield thought that as time passed, more francophones would naturally move into the civil service in order to create the linguistic balance that most French-speaking New

Bninswickers felt was necessary. Perhaps he felt that the less it was discussed openly, the more depoliticized the issue would become. Neverthetess, Hatfield was interested in listening to the concems of f'rancophones, although he was always a politician that preferred style to substance.

For example, during the 1974 election campaign, Hatfield condemned the govemment of Quebec

-- - - 170 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HatfieId: Power and Disobedience, p. 133.

171 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabifity,p. 1 1 9. for its decision to make French the only official language of that province. Meanwhile, the

Official Languages Act that was on the New Brunswick books had still not ken fiilly implemented. It contained no preamble of rights, no mechanism for applying rights, nor any means of lodging a complaint if the act was viofated. Moreover, most of the provisions of the Act were not proclaimed until after the 1974 election, and the Act was not constitutionally entrenched until 1982."~ However, Hatfleld was in the process of making some changes that francophones felt were necessary for their cultural survival. The Officiai Languages Ofice was opened, with a mandate to provide a place for the public to register complaints regarding the level of government service (or fack thereof) they were receiving in the ianguage of their choice. It also oversaw the progress of various departments in providing this service, attempting to ensure that the complaints they received did not reach an alarming number. In 1974, the Department of Education was divided into English and French units. This was important because it allowed the necessary changes to the cwriculum that would enhance students' awareness of their culture. In addition, the controversial aspects of the education function could be supervised and delivered by people who were part of each culture; this alleviated tensions in a number of comrn~nities."~Fuither, the premier was involved in the final decision to provide Moncton with a francophone schooi board, finally putting to end a problem that had dogged both he and Robichaud during the

Acadian premier's final mandate. However, shortly afienvards, other communities expressed similar demands'" and the premier would wait until 1981 before finally ending the school board problem province-wide by setting up forty-one unilingual school boards.

Dunng the initial consociational deal, a key issue concemed the use of religion in the classroom. The negotiation of this arrangement was held in secret during the late 1870s and the

IR Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud? Richmd Hatfiefd: Power and Disobedience, p. 134. ln Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 5.

174 Dalhouise, Bathurst, and the Francophone minority in Saint John, in particular. results of these meetings were not made public for twenty years. While one can argue that the

role of religion in the consociational process had diminished since this time,l7' the desire by

francophones to have control over the education of their children had not. These negotiations

conceming school boards were held publicly and at the tirne had the result of hstrating

francophones and arousing ethnic tensions in those affected areas. The objective of keeping these

negotiations under the shroud of secrecy has been arguably more difficult since 1970, due to the

increased access of individuals to information regarding the activities of govemment. However, there still have been opportunitieç for the politicai leaders to implement policies without public consultation with the goal of accomrnodating the needs of francophones within New Brunswick.

Some examples are the enactment of the Act Recognizing the Equafity of the Two Wciaf

Linguistic Communities in New Brunswick, the subsequent negotiation of this act into the

Canadian constitution in 1993, and the entrenchment of New Brunswick's mcial Languages Act into the 1982 Canadian constitutional package, under the Charter ofRights and Freedoms.

That is not to say that tension disappeared complately. On the contmy, many have argued that these tensions are always present in New Brunswick, residing just beneath the surface, and that an inadvertent decision or action can accelerate these tensions in a dramatic façhi~n.'~~From looking at the examples above, it seems as if the provincial govemment is more able to negotiate with the federal govemment than it is with its own municipal counterparts. For example, in 1974, the Hatfield government decided it was time for the establishment of a French educational and cultural center in Fredericton. Until that time, students could only receive education in French from grades one to nine.'" However, when the provincial govemment

- 175 Bishop G. C. Lemon. Personal Interview. June 29, 1999. Bishop Lemon stated that role of organized religion in this process is reconciliatory in nature. It is '%O show leadership on the issue" of language tensions and try and "get the people fiom where they are to where they should be, because that is what the gospel is about."

176 Don Richardson and Doug Tyler. Personal interviews. June 29, 1999.

In Richard Starr, Richard HarfieId: ï%e Seventeen Year Saga, p. 62. attempted to negotiate a land settlement for the pmject with the city of Fredericton, the city

counci 1 refused. Hatfield subsequently attempted to get city counci l to embrace minority ri@s

by appealing to theu self-interest. He told them, in rflect, that their choice was between

acceptance of minority rights or a New Brunswick equivalent of Nonhem ~reland."~ At one

point, Hadield remarked:

lf you think we're going to make al1 our decisions on the basis of so many fors and so many againsts, that the ones with the most numbers are going to win, I'm telling you you're not going to have that kind of luxury. That kind of mathematical application of government decision- making leads to chaos, riots, wars and everything else. 1 can't accept that.'79

Eventually, the premier had to negotiate a land deal with the University of New

Brunswick in order to buiid what is commonly known now as "Ecole Ste-Anne." This would not have ken such a political problem except that during the two meetings of Fredericton's city council, there were protesters there who did not want the francophone community center in

Fredericton. in fact, during the meeting at which Hatfield made the above remarks, two busloads of protesters came from Sussex and Moncton in order to üy and influence the council not to assist in Hatfield's plan.1"

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the implementation of the Act Recogniring the

Equality of the Two mcial Linguistic Cornmuniries in New Bnmswick, or more commonly known as Bi11 88, was done without any public consultation. However, it can be argued that the final text of the act was not what was originally intended. For instance, in an unauthorized biography of Richard Hatfield, Michel Bastarache recalls Hafield's concems with Bill 88:

When I went into his office with the document, he asked me a lot of questions about the

"'Richard Starr, Richmd Harfeld: nie Seventeen Year Saga, p. 62. Michel Cormier and Achille M ic haud, Richard Hafleld: Power and Disobedience, p. 13 1.

ln Richard Haîfield, quoted in Richard Starr, Richard Hatj.?efd: meSeventeen Year Saga, p. 63.

''O Richard Starr, Richard Ha$eekd: nie Seventeen Yem Saga, pp. 6244. significance of what f had written. He then called Lowell ~urra~'"in Ottawa while 1 was still in the roorn. He read Murray a passage from the text and asked him what he thought. Murray obviously told him to ssnd a copy of the document to Ottawa and said he'd cal1 back Iater. Just before the bill was tabled, 1 met with Mumy and saw he'd cut out a lot. I'd winen a real piece of legislation. but al1 that remained was the preamble. This experience taught me that Hatfield was worried about the enforceability of legislation. He was always looking for people for reassurance. He wanted to be told 'yes, yes it's OK, it affirms principles. it has a political impact, but no signiflcant practical consequences.' That was what he wanted for the equality act.'"

This was also something that was realized by some francophones afier they had read the freshly minted legislation. According to Léon Thériault ".. .We are.. .faced with an Act of solely cultural effect, as were most earlier governrnent Bills. a cultural Bill that is. in addition. very limited in scope. The only innovation contained in Bill 8%is that it guarantees bilingualism in al1 the public institutions of the province, and that in the cultural, educational and social fields it guarantees the Acadians will have their own institutions, distinct from those of anglophones.

There has been no mention of a division of powers between the two language communities in the

And although such concerns have continued to arise. Hatfield's goal was achieved. The government was able to pay "lip-service*. to the ideal of equality between the language _croups by implementing a law that would be difficult to enfor~e.'~Don Richardson claims that "after the passage of Bill 88 (in 198 1) a consensus had sealed-over. and people thought that everything was

- 181 Murray was bom in Cape Breton and has had a number of interesting positions in the realm of Canadian politics. He served as an aid to Davie Fulton while the latter was the Justice Minister in John Diefenbaker's cabinet, and worked for Robert Stanfield when he was the Opposition leader. He assisted Hatfield in al1 his campaigns, and for a period was a deputy minister in the premier's office. He lefi in 1976. and has since been appointed to the Senate and as Minister of Federal- Provincial relations under Mulroney. His services were always available to Hatfield. as was the case here.

"'Bastarache, quoted in Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hurfield: Power und Disobedieuce, p. 154.

"' Thériault. quoted in Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jaibert, '*The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 17. Also Don Desserud, "The Exercise of Community Rights in the Liberal-Federal State: Language Rights and New Brunswick's Bill 88," p.2 17.

19-1 Don Desserud, "The Exercise of Community Rights in the Liberal-Federal State: Language Rights and New Brunswick's Bill 88," pp.230-23 1. fine and things were going to move ahead, without language king an issue anymore." However,

the provincial columnist also stated that this was only one in a series of times that the public had

considered the issue dead, only for it to arise again.'" Moreover, the passage of Bill 88 led to

confusion on the part of many, as to what the provincial government was trying to achieve in

terms of language equaiity.

Before 1981, the government was publicly committed only to the provision of government services in both official languages, bilingual govenunent documents, and education

in both officia1 languages.'" These were individual rights that were easy to identify and enforce.

Bill 88 afirmed the equality of status and the qua1 nghts and privileges of the two official

linguistic communities, and in particular asserted a responsibility on the part of government to protect that equality.lm This raised more dificult questions. For instance, can an individual claim a community ri&? Wow would these community rights be enforced? Do these community linguistic rights trump those rights previously granted to the individual?

This last question was put to the test in 1982, when two incorporated societies, La Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. (SANB) and L'Association des Conseillers Scolaires

Francophones du Nouveau-Brunswick (ACSF) representing the francophone community, wished to prevent the Minority Language School Board in Grand Falls fiom admitting francophone students into either its French immersion or regular English prograrns.'a The court in this case asked the school board to stop admitting francophone students into its French immersion program-

185 Don Richardson. Personal Interview. f une 29, 1999.

" Michael MacMillan, "Equality of Languages: The Case of New Brunswick," p. 7.

'" Michael MacMillan, "Equality of Languages: The Case of New Brunswick," p. 8.

'" Don Dessenid, "The Exercise of Community Rights in the Liberal-Federal State: Language Rights and New Brunswick's Bi11 88," pp. 216. iiowever, before hll-blown conhion could ensue over who had rights to what, the provincial government introduced Motion 1, a resolution to entrench language rights in the

Canadian Chatter of Rights and ~reedoms.'" This placed the focus of language rights back in the hands of individuals and enswed that such rights over-rode those of the linguistic community.

This presumably should have put an end to the debate between collective and individual language rights in New Brunswick, but it did not. In 1993, Bill 88 also became part of the Canadian constitution; therefore, the debate continues, since the language rights of both the individual and the community are now fond in the Canadian constitution-'*

Shortly &er the passage of Bill 88 and Hadieid's election win in 1982, language tensions started to rise again, due to some ill-considered government decisions. The first was the decision of the Hatfield government to fly the Acadian flag on al1 public buildings in the province in 1984.

This was apparently a snap decision made by the premier in response to a Liberal member's suggestion that the -4cadian flag should be flown in front of the legislature in recognition of the flag's centennial during the province's bicente~ial. Jean-Maurice Simard, in answering a question during correspondence, explains the reasoning behind the 1984 decision:

This (the decision to fly the Acadian flag in front of governent buildings) is simply the recognition of the Acadian population king a major partner in the fabric of the province and shows that the province is roud to identiS, the contribution of the Acadian people to the foundiag of this region. tg,

Don Desserud has noted that the Acadian flag's presence on the lawn of the provincial legislature "is a wonderfiil symbol of the Acadian heritage of New Brunswick, something that is not recognized by the New Brunswick flag."'" The provincial flag itself was not publicly

Ia9Michael MacMillan, "Equality of Languages: The Case of New Brunswick," p. 9.

Don Dessenid, "The Exercise of Community Rights in the Liberal-Federal State: Language Rights and New Brunswick's Bill 88," pp. 2 15-236, for a more detailed discussion concerning this debate.

19' Jean-Maurice Simard. Persona1 E-mail correspondence. July 13, 1999.

192 Don Desserud. Personal E-mail correspondence. June 22, 1999. proclaimed until Febniq 24, 1965, and there is no known Acadian reference to any of the symbols within it.Ig3 in fact, it has been argued that the current design of the provincial flag was chosen in early 1965 because there was a rumor that the Conservative Party would introduce a motion in the next legislative session calling for the Red Ensign bearing the arms of the Province to become the officiai flag.

However, the decision to fly the Acadian flag created a backlash hmanglophones calling for the Union Jack to be given equal status.'" Within a few weeks, Hatfield bachcked.

First, he said, the Acadian flag would fly permanently only in French-speaking areas, and he agreed to fly the Union Jack at the legislature duhg the Bicentennial year.'95 But the flag controversy had a lasting effect. It had done what the talk about more fiindamental changes wrought by the constitution, linguistic communities and education duality had failed to do: it had roused to a fever pitch a segment of the anglophone majority already agitated by issues like bilingualism at airPorts.'% in faît, the flag controversy helped publicize a fledgling group of anglophones alienated by the bilingualism policies of the HatfieId govemment. The New

Brunswick Association of English-Speaking Canadians led by Len Poore, spent part of the summer of 1984 on the lawn of the legislature spreading their message: "More bilingualism, fewer jobs for anglophones.y~197The group, led by the former Fredericton City councilor, had many grievances. The federal govemment had already created more linguistic tension within the

19' 19' Alistair Fraser, "The Flags of Canada."

194 At present, both the Acadian flag and the Union Jack fly prominently on top of the New Brunswick legislature.

Ig5 Richard Starr, Richard Hafield.- The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 169.

'% Richard Starr, Richard Ha@eId: The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 170.

19' 19' Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 17. Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hafield: Power and Disobedience, p. 15 8. Richard Starr, Richard Hatjield- The Seventeen Year Saga, pp. 170- 1 7 1. province through an oversight in its bilingualism planning. Airports, as federal institutions, were to provide services in both officia1 languages where numbers warranted.'" By 1982, both Saint

John and Fredericton had reached this point, according to Transport Canada and the Oficial

Languages Commission, where changes had to be made in their sflng policy. The plan devised by Transport Canada called for one bilingual employee per shifi among security guards and car rental agents at the two airPorts.'" Therefore, the current employees were faced with an ultimatum: become bilingual within a year or risk king laid off in favor of someone who was already fluent in both languages. When word reached the public, there was an outcry of sympathy for the commissionaires. Transport Canada eventually arranged matters so that no jobs were 10% but the strong reaction was a harbinger of trouble for ~atfield.~~~Said one letter to the editor provoked by the affair:

Between Richard Hatfield and the federal Liberals there is not much difference. Both have made sure that my family and any other English-speaking Canadians are not qualified for jobs anpore. So Richard, you who have deserted us here in the south are talking through your hat. Rebel against bi~in~ualisrn!~~'

This sentiment was also voiced during the hearings for and after the release of the

Poirier-Bastarache report, sponsored by the provincial govemment. The report was a response to pressure fiom Acadian lobby groups and the desire by Simard to see the Official Languages Act modernized. The process started in 1978 and by 1982, a comprehensive thousand-page study was completed. It suggested that Fredericton fürnish al1 services to New Bmnswickers in the language of theu choice, compel private companies, unions and professional associations to make greater use of French, and create a more equitable representation of francophones in the

Richard Starr, Richard HaijieId: The Seventeen Yeur Saga, p. 167.

'* Richard Starr, Richurd Haîjieid: The Seventeen Yem Saga, p. 1 67. '" Richard Starr, Richard HaMeid: l:e Seventeen Year Saga, p. 167. Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 5.

201 Richard Starr, Richard HafleZd: The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 167. provincial civil service.202 Moreover, it suggested that a second-language training program be implemented within the school system so that ail high school graduates would be at least passively biling~al?~~The suwey depicted English soçiety as somewhat racist, ethnocenûic and generally indifferent to Acadians and the French language, and suggested that anglophones oflen doubt the cornpetence of French speaking civil servants.2a

Several meeting were arranged afier the release of the report, which marked the low point in

English-French relations within New Brunswick in ment rnemory. Instead of discussing the report, many anglophones attacked îhe whole principle of bi~in~ualisrn.~~At the meetings:

in Newcastle, angry opponents of expanded bilingualism threw an egg at the advisory cornmittee conducting the workshop. In Moncton a few days later, the workshop degenerated into an exchange of insults, with anglophone participants living up to the harsh description in the original report. Acadians le fi the steamy sessions feeling humiliated, wondering whether those hostile Anglophones represented the majority of New ~runswickers?~

This question was never really answereà. Although Richard Hatfield attempted to console the Acadian eiite, the premier was no longer the influential political force he once was.

Moreover, by this time the report was such a political "hot-potato" that no one wished to

Steven Ullman, "Political Disaffection in the Province of New Brunswick: Manifestations and Sources," p. 17 1. Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hatfield: Power and Disobedience, p. 204.

'O1 Catherine Steele, Can Bilinguciism Work? p. 3 1.

Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hafleld: Power and Disobedience, p. 204.

'O5 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HatJieId: Power and Disobedience, pp. 205- 206.

206 Steven Ullman, "Political Disaffection in the Province of New Brunswick: Manifestations and Sources," p. 17 1

207 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HatfieId: Power and Disobedience, p. 205. comment on it, for fear of intensiQing the tensions already present berneen the two groups.

Hatfield himself later said "1 must say that 1 did not think it would get the kind of reaction it did get, and 1 have to take responsibility for that."208 Stephen Ullman believes that perbaps these low points contributed to the general air of political disillusionment found in the province by the 1984

National Election ~tud~.'~

*O8 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HatfieId: Power anà Disobedience, p. 206.

'EISteven Ullman, "Political Disaffection in the Province of New Brunswick: Manifestations and Sources," pp. 154- 1 62. intersubculrurai Relations ar the Mas Level

As was noted in the second chapte. a politicaf system is one of segmented pluralism when i ts cleavages have produced competing networks of sc hools, communications media, interest groups, leisure time associations, and political panies along segmented in es."^ Lijphart, while examining the example of India, has noted that if groups are geographically concentrated, then federalism can be used to promote group autonomy.'" In this regard, the case of New

Brunswick's francophone community is an interesting one since, one can argue that this group has benefited substantially fiom the federal govemment's policy on bilingualism since the late

1960s. In fact, after the resolution by the New Brunswick's Progressive Conservative Party was introduced in 1967 calling for the fidl recognition of the French language, Robichaud responded by saying that "laws and resolutions were unnecessaq to the preservation of the French language and cu~ture.'"'~Yet afier John Robarîs hosted the Ontario govemment-sponsored Confederation for Tomorrow conference, which Robichaud attended a year later, the provincial mciai

Loguages Act was parsed."3 The federal govemment also passed a similar law during the same year.

It is well known that the francophone minority in New Brunswick is found, to a great extent, in the Northern and Eastern portion of the province. As of 1996, the population of the province of New Brunswick was 729 625, with 32.8 percent of this total king francophone and

"O Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Political Siobiiity, p. 15. V. R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," p. 142.

Arend Lijphart, "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," p. 263.

"'Richard Starr, Richard HorJTeid: The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 58.

*13 Richard Starr, Richard Hatjieid: The Seventeen Yem Saga, pp. 58-60. 64.9 percent anglophone, if the detemination is made by mother tongue.""owever, if the determination is to be made by the language spoken in the home, the percentages are 68.3 percent anglophone and 30.1 percent francophone? Nevertheless, Catherine Steele, in the her study of the Poirier-Bastarache Report, points out that at the time of the 1986 census, over one in four

New Bmnswickers were bi~in~ual.~'~By 1996, this figure had increased to 32.6 percent?'7

Moreover, the 1996 census data reveals that a vast majority of those who are bilingual in the province daim French as their home language or mother t~ngue.~"What this data suggests is that language barrier, which used to separate the two groups, is slowly king eroded. As a result,

New Brunswick's francophone community may be slowly king assimilated into anglophone society.

The education system within New Brunswick is the one example where the distinct line has been drawn by the province's politicians. Up until school boards were eliminated by Frank

McKenna's Liberals in the early 1990s, there were 42 school boards in the province - twenty- seven anglophone and fifieen francophone. Within the Department of Education, there is a dual system in place fiom the level of deputy minister down to the schools themselves. As was noted previously, this has ken important to the hcophone community in order for their shidents to be more aware of their culture. Throughout the discussions surrounding the Poirier-Bastarache

*" Statistics Canada, "1996 Census Figures: Population Distribution by Home Language and Mother Tongue."

215 Statistics Canada, " 1996 Census Figures: Population Distribution by Home Language and Mother Tongue.''

'16 '16 Catherine Steele, Can Bilinguolsrn Work? p. 10.

'"Statistics Canada, "1996 Census Figures: Population Distribution by Home Language and Mother Tongue.''

218 The actual figures for the number of bilingual New Brunswickers who corne fkom the English or French subgroup is dependent upon how one detemines the size of the groups. If this determination is made on the basis of home language, the results are that 61.4% of those who are bilingual in New Brunswick are of French origin. If it is made by mother tongue, this figure rîses to 70%. Report, the notion of dualiîy within the system was questioned by some anglophones, monly on the basis of cod9 In fact, even at the presentday, there are those who question the use of duality in the school system. During the 1999 provincial election campaign, a Progressive

Conservative candidate, interviewai on Radio-Canada, stated the following:

1 haven't spoken to people up North about this [and] 1 don't know what they are thinking about this, but I am talking about what they are thinking down hem. And people want to leam to live together; they want unity. They don't want a dual department of education for exarnple and spend nvice as much money than they need on the bureaucracy of education. That money could be better spent in the actual classmm. We're duplicating things. 1 still maintain we're segregating. We're living in a world where people must leam to live together, and 1 don't believe, this is my personal point of view, 1 don? believe we can continue to segregate people and think we are going to have a healthy fi.trrre.EO

This view conceming duality in the Department of Education is not a new one. In fact it has been noted that 17% of anglophone briefs presented to the Poirier-Bastarache Report made similar arg~rnents.~'However, the response of francophones has always been that duality is valued because these structures allow control of theu own education system as well the opportunity to promote their own culture." Moreover, most francophones fear that bilingual schools could lead to a~similation.~

Mile publicly airing these views would create a news story at any time, it was al1 the more interesting since this particular candidate once held the post of CORParty President between

19%- 1997. In a subsequent interview, h4r. Huntjens, stated that if English-speakers and French- speakers "don't get together, then how can you create a society that is going to be tolerant of each

~ther."*~Mr. Huntjens pointed out that it was interesting that the front page of the Telepph-

Catherine Steele, Can Bilinguaiism Work? p. 35. z0 Tony Huntjens, as quoted in Andre Veniot, "Lord Disappointed by Candidates Remarks," p. 4.

Catherine Steele, Cm Bilinguaiism Work? p. 35.

"Catherine Steele, Can BiZingwaIism Work? pp. 35-40. " Andre Veniot, "Lord Disappointed by Candidates Remarks," p. 4. **' Tony Huntjens. Personal Interview. June 28, 1999. JournaI on the day these original comments were made by him claimed that the PC Party ''would

eliminate French school boards" (June 4). Huntjens denies saying this on the grounds that such a

staternent is inconceivable, since the Liberal Party had alteady eliminated al1 School boards in the

eariy 19905 and replaced them with "Parent ~ouncils".~In any case, on the next day Mr.

Huntjens received a telephone cal1 from Bernard Lord, the leader of the Conservative Party,

reiterating the following message:

"This is a p~ciplethat is virtually sacred in New Brunswick, to have duality in education. The French population in New Brunswick have fought hard to have their schooIs and it is protected by the Charter of Rights [and Freedoms] in the Constitution and will remain that way."

Mr. Lord acknowledged the comments "make it difficult" but added the paq's stand on official bilingualism is "an issue of leadership."

"My leadership is clear on this point. 1 don? expect al1 our candidates, on every issue, to agree with eveqthing 1 Say. It wouid be the most boring caucus that we could have. That's why we have different MLAs to b~gabout different ideas. But on this specific point the policy of the PC Party is clear and it is ~nchan~eable."~~

What may have been even more interesting than the exchange between Mr. Huntjens and the Conservative Party leader, were the actions of Premier Thériault during this period.

Apparently, this "was the moment (during the 1999 election campaign) the Tories had been dreading and many Liberals had been anticipating." according to Don ~ichardson."~Richardson continued:

On the &y the story broke, Mr. Theriault came up to the front of his campaign bus ta chat with reporters. Had they heard Mr. Huntjens comrnents? They nodded. Mr. Thériault rolled his eyes but said no more on the subject. For the rest of the day, reporters waited for the Liberal leader to cal1 them to the back of the bus for interviews or mise the issue in sorne other fashion. He never did. Mr. Thkriault did raise the subject the following &y, but by then.. .the Storm had passed.228

225 These "Parent Councils," were, in my estimation, a policy appendage or aftecthought. They have no real power (in comparison to the school boards they replaced) and serve as a forum for parent gievances to be sent up the bureaucratic "chain of command."

U6 Bernard Lord, as quoted in Andre Veniot, "Lord Disappointed by Candidates Remarks," p. 4.

Don Richardson, "How the Liberals Lost It," p. A-5.

Don Richardson, "How the Liberals Lon It," p. A-5. Clearly the consociational bargain is dl1 in effect and is still enforced by the party

leaders." Party candidates mua publicly adhere to the party line on language or face interna1

Party discipline. Moreover, those in a position to potentially gain fiom such events must act

cautiously to avoid causing long-tem hmto linguistic relations in the province.

In the three decades that this consociational bargain has been in place, other evidence

suggests that there is still a distinct line of cleavage. For example, Jean-Maurice Simard was always trying to help Richard Hatfield find ways in which the Conservative Party would seem more appealing to francophones. Early in 1982, Simard came up with a plan to appIy Bill 88 within his own party. He then went to Hatfield with the fidl intention of not re-offering if his request was denied. "I'm fed up," he told the premier. "we lost out on major victories in the

French-speaking regions in 1974 and 1978. 1 won't run for re-election just to have another two- seat majority and the same gang we have n~w.''~~Hatfield agreed with Sirnard's plan to nin a separate campaign in French-speaking areas of New Brunswick, and the gamble paid off for the

Party, in terms of seats fiom the North. Part of this separate campaign consisted of "Le Grand

Ralliement '82," a ally in Shippagan prior to the election for the purpose of feeling out what

issues were of concern to francophones so that Simard could design his campaign accordingly.

This set the stage for an aggressive carnpaign with the result being that the Conservative Party picked up seven seats fiom the Liberals in predominantly French-speaking areas."'

"' One would have to search for some time to find a better example of what is commonly referred to as "a gag order." Almost two months have passeû since that statement and Mr. Huntjens has yet to make another public statement (save for the night of the election) conceming any of his personal beliefs.

Jean-Maurice Simard, as quoted in Michel Cormier and Achiile Michaud, Richard Hafiekt Power and Disobedience, p. 143.

Richard Starr, Richard Hoffield. The Seventeen Yem Saga, p. 159. EZite-Mus Relations

In his work, In Search of Political Stabilitv, Edmund Aunger notes the main conditions that are conducive to CO-operativeelite behavior. They include the notions of elite dominance in a system, the presence of an overarching national solidarity, and moderate partisanship on the part of the ma~ses."~The success of the elites in stabilizing a hgmented community presumes that they are willing to pursue a strategy of cooperation, but also that they are able to retain the support of their followers. This implies either widespread popular support for their specific cooperative policies, or sufficient autonomy for the elites to let them act indep~dentl~.~~

The argument that elites have historically dominated the politics of New Brunswick is an easy one to make. Garland and Machum note that before the implementation of the Program of

Equal Opportunity, the strength of the elite found expression in the virtual monopoly of a county's political apparatus by one or selected families; the history of both major parties resernbled that of a Yfamily compact," in which selected ridings became personal fiefdoms of the prorninent.u4 Both openly (as candidates), and behind-the-scenes (as organizational activists), there was a small group of notables responsible for political fortune or rnisfort~ne.~'Three vivid examples highlight this proçess - the Michaud family of Kent and Madawaska counties (1890-

1956), the Maclean farnily in Charlotte county (1935-1970), and the Dubé farnily of the present day in Campbellton.

=* Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabilily, pp. 160- 162.

Edmund Aunger, In Serach of Political Stability, p. 162.

Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of New Bnmswick Electiom: 1870-1980. pp. 47-50.

Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of Nw Brultswick Elections: 1870-1980. p. 49. Pius Michaud sat as a Liberal MP fiom Madawaska for 17 yem (during which he

controlled the provincial Grit organization in the county); A.D. Leger (a brother-in-law), was a

federal MP fiom Kent frorn 1890 to 1892; David Landry (a brother-in-law), was a federal MP

fiom Kent fiom 1908 to 19 17; J.E. Michaud (a son), was Liberal MLA fiom Madawaska in 1920,

1 925, and 1930; and H.J. Michaud (a nephew), was federal MP fiom Kent from 1925 to 1956.U6

The MacLeans of Charlotte county possessed a similar infiuence, although their control

was exercised primarily in the back-rooms of the organization rather than as candidates. From

1935 to 1948, the MacLeans were the Liberal Party in Charlotte county, according to Garland,

Machum and Dalton camp."' Grit candidates were endorsed and financed by the family and one

of the MacLean clan, Donald, was president of the provincial party association before becoming a

senator, and a second MacLean was later a federal MP fiom Charlotte. A close associate of the

farnily, J.J. Hayes Doane, had been provincial secretary-treasurer in the McNair administration in

Fredericton, before he also became a senator. Ironically, the seat he left vacant was filled by

W.N. Campbell, a management official for Connors Bros., which the MacLeans owned."'

- 236 Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An AImanac of New Bnnswick Elecrions: 1870-i980, p. 49.

"'Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Ahacof New Bnmnvick Elecrions: 1870-1980, p. 49. Dalton Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Pofiticians,p. 38. John Belliveau, Lirrle Louis and the Giant KC., p. 113.

*''John Belliveau, Little Louis and the GianfK C., pp. 1 11-1 14. Belliveau noted that at one time during the 1970 campaign, in a MacLean fishing supply boat, he and some others were sailing the rough seas fiom Grand Manan Island to Black's Harbour with premier Robichaud while Senator McLean discussed the county's election prospects. "If we can't get it any other way, we'll buy if' he said in the haering of some news correspondents. Bill Curtis of the CBC (now of A&E) Iooked startled: "Buy it" he asked. "OnIy in a manner of speaking", sorneone explained. "It's just that Don finances al1 the Liberals in these parts." He had personally paid for the island banquet at which the premier spoke and which al1 adult residents of Grand Manan were invited. The story of the Dubé family is of rnuch more recent vintage. Jacues Poitras of the

Telepuph Journal describes the family as a "PC political dynasty" during his coverage of the

1999 New Brunswick provincial election ~am~aign.~~

As he carnpaigns door to door in Tide Head, Pierre Dubé hem similar comrnents over and over. "1 howwho you are," one woman says. "1 can tell by looking at you." She tums to someone else and says: "This is Femand's son." "Fernand" is Fernand Du&, the mayor of Campbellton and the former MLA and cabinet minister in the Haffield govemment. His other son, Jean, is the PC MP for Madawaska-Restigouche, a large riding that includes Campbellton. If Pierre wins (he did not, losing to former Finance minister Edmund Blanchard by over 1700 votes), Dubés would hold office at al1 three Ievels of government in ~am~bellton.~~

And while these examples display the closeness of the political elite at the local level, it is the ieader of the political party who has dominated the political culture in New Brunswick. In his watershed work on New Brunswick politics, Hugh Thorbum observed: %e leader is given every opportunity to control his party - and al1 his supporters who have the interests of the party at heart hope that he will use his authority. He alone makes al1 important policy pronouncements.

He is the petsonification of his party in the election campaign and is in complete executive

~ontrol."~~~Aunger notes that as the party continues to win elections, the dominance of the leader is assured and cites the fact that out of twenty-four (now thirty) premiers since 1867, only two have resigned from office as a result of pressure from their own

However, does the leader still dominate the government of New Brunswick as he did in the days of Blair and McNair? It would seem so. Most of those who have studied the political activities within New Brunswick since the 1960s cite the governrnent they are refemng to as the

"Robichaud Liberals or Govemment," or the "Hatfield Tories" or the "McKenna Liberals."

However, this does not mean that recent premiers of New Brunswick have gone entirely unchallenged. At the annual general meeting of the PC party in 1985, a group of Conservatives

"9 Jacques Poitras, 'Worth Warms to Opposition Ovemires."

Jacques Poitras, 'Worth Warms to Opposition Ovemires."

'4' Hugh Thorbum, as quoted in Edmund Aunger, ln Search of Polirical Stabilify, pp. 162- 163.

242 Edmund Aunger, In Semch ofPoliricu1 Stability, pp. 160- 163. called for Hatfield to resign. They obviously felt that the premier would not be able to regain the credibility necessary in order to win the coming election. However, Hafield did not want control of the party falling into the hands of these party dissidents, largely based in the Saint John region, since he thought they only cared about themselves and their city while ignori:ig the rest of the province.243 The party executive had agreed to hold a secret vote on the motion calling for regular leadership reviews. Before the vote, the dissidents knew they had lost, but they consoled themselves that the results would show how many delegates wanted to durnp their ~eader.'~The examples of Joe Clark and Joseph Daigle had taught them that a leader could not ignore opposition votes at a party meeting; however, Hatf?eld strategists also knew this and thetefore kept the results secret (only stating that he had won) in order to end the debate within a divided

Aunger also noted that the presence of elite domination within the province is slowly being eroded, even though there have been no dramatic changes in the behavior of the party leaders. He attributes this to two possible factors: the lack of adequate representation in the

Hatfield cabinet of francophones and the challenges to the traditional Acadian leadership in the fom of the Parti f cadi en.^'^ It will be fomd that the Consecvative Party ûied to solve the former by appealing to the latter.

The second condition mentioned by Aunger is the existence of an overarching national solidarity with the subcultures. He notes that the successfiI implementation of cooperative strategies in a fragmented community must presume a cornmitment to the maintenance of the

*j3Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HaHeid: Power and Disobedience, pp. 2 13- 214.

24-' Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richatd Haeeid: Power and Disobedience, p. 2 1 1.

'jSMichel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HaNeld.. Power and Disobedience, p. 2 1 1.

246 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabiiity, p. 188. existing political system, both on the part of the elite and of the masses?' This means that there

needs to be the presence of two notions. First thete should be some elements of national

identification that both subcultures accept and share. Second, nationalistic feeling should be

relatively moderate - and most especially that nationalistic feeling which is exclusive to each

communal group.248 Since in a deeply divided comrnunity attachment to the subculture is usually

very strong, nationalistic sentiment often has a divisive rather than a uniQing effect.

Aunger concluded hmexarnining the 1974 National Election Study data that the two

New Brunswick subcultures, while maintaining their individuality, are united by a common

identity as both Canadians and New Brunswickers. Frank McKema also expressed this pride in a

common national identity in his address to Toronto's Empire Club in Febrwy 1991:

1 want to make it clear at the outset that 1 speak to you today as a Canadian, as well as a New Brunswicker. In fact, we in New Brunswick have no hesitation in saying that we are Canadians first and New Bnuiswickers second. We are pmud of it We believe in

Moreover, the people of New Brunswick were asked how they felt about both their country and their home province, during the 1993 National Election Study. Respondents were asked to rate their feeling towards province and country on a scale of zero to one hundred. They were also

informed that an answer of under fi* would be considered a negative response and any answer given that was over fifty would be considered positive. The results were revealed in Table 3-1.

247 Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Political Stability, p. 169.

248 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Smbiliiy, p. 169.

249 Frank McKe~a,as quoted in Hugh Mellon, Wew Brunswick: The Politics of Reform," p. 105. Table 3-1

Overarching National Solidariîy in New Brunswick 1993

How do vou feel about: Scores Anglo~honeReswnse Francophone Reswnse Canada >50 4.4% - @J=53) 50-75 21.7 42.9 76-90 36.9 28.6 91+ 34.8 14.3

New Brunswick MO CN=53) 50-75 76-90 9 1 -+ Source: 1993 National Elcction Survcy

Clearly, New Brunswickers stiil have sîrong positive feelings towards both their province and their nation.

Aunger noted that the willingness of the elites to engage in consociational practices is tikely to be strongest where partisanship is weak, or at the very least, very moderate. This applies most particularly to the political attachment of the elite itself, atthough often, as in the case of

New Brunswick, both elites and masses share similar partisan feeling.lsO Recall in the second chapter that partisanship was not strong within New Brunswick until afier WWI. In fact, according to the historian McNutt, "Freedom to bargain, to support or to oppose, to form compacts according to the urgency of the hour, was the dcarly prized possession of provincial politicians. To many, a party ystem implied bandage."-' This was important, since between

1 878 and 19 17, there were very Iittle use for party labels because an omnibus party administered the government of the province.

Historically, as already noted, a link had existed between ethnicity and party in New

Brunswick, However, this link has been gradually eroding since the 1960s. Aunger noted that in

New Brunswick there is clear pattern of overlapping partisanship, in spite of the historic

250 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Polifical StabiIiiy, p. 172.

25 1 McNutt, as quoted in Edmund Aunger, In Se& of Polifical Stabiiiy, p. 173. association between the Liberals and the French, and between Conservatives and the ~nglish.~~

By the 1970s, both parties, especially the Liberals, were able to attract both French and English support. Although only 19 percent of Acadians indicated that they identified with the

Conservative Pariy, this did not inhibit a much larger proponion hmvoting for that As early as the 1974 election, the Conservatives were able to elect candidates in six of the twenty- three constituencies that had a French majority, and ecological analysis indicates that 39 percent of the Acadian voters supported the Conservative Party in that election."

Table 3-2 Political Identijication in New Bnmswick (1 995-1 999) Politicai Party % of Enniish ./. of French ./a of Total

Conservative 42.5 41.3 42 Liberal 40.9 50.1 44.4 New Democratic 10.0 7.9 9.2 Confederation of Regions 6.1 0.3 3 -9 Total 99.5 99.6 99.5 Sources: Ncw Brunswick Report of rhe Chief Elecroral Oflcer: 7hirry-Ttrird GenerafEIecrion Seprember 11. 1995 (Oflice ofthe Chicf Elcaoral Oficcr. Fredericton: 1995) pages 28-29, and Hm Yorr Vored (TimaGlobe. Saint John. Junc 8, 19B) page (2-16.

Table 3-2 reveals that the historical link between francophones and the Liberal Party has eroded substantially since the 1960s. Anglophone support was divided evenIy between both traditional parties. Aunger also observed in 1974 the relatively moderate partisan sentiment found in New Brunswick was reflected in the absence of either strong likes or dislikes about the two major parties. He reveated that when asked to cite what they like or dislike about either of the two parties, more than half of New Brunswicken reply "n~thin~."'~~Finally, Aunger claims

- - ~ Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 174. "' Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stabiiïty, p. 174.

254 Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 174. This estimate was made by correlating the proportion of French-origin voters in each constituency with the proportion of votes cast for the Conservative Party. Each constituency was weighted according to its number of voters. The calculation of the proportion of French-origin voters was based on the French-origin population of voting age as at the 197 1 census, adjusted to account for the higher turnout among French voters.

2~'Edmund Aunger, In Search of Political Stability, p. 176. that there is likely a direct Iuik between the behavior of the elites in the two communities, and the degree to which political loyalties overlap the ethnic or religious division. in New Brunswick, actions by a political leader which have exacerberated ethnic tensions would not only threaten the stability of the province, but might also undermine his party's electoral support. As already noted, the exarnple of such actions by Hatfield to fly the Acadian flag in front of the legislature and to have public hearings on the Poirier-Bastaache report eventually cost his party electoral support. However, in earlier years, when Hatfield was struggling to home leader of his party in the 1960s, he and his compatriots in the Conservative Party did rtot try to tum the controversy surrounding the Equal Opportunity Program into an ethnic issue even though this approach may have cost them anglophone votes at the polls. The Conservative Party under the leadership of

Hatfield would attempt to broaden their base of support in the francophone areas of the province throughout its tenure in office, achieving some success. However, it will be seen that this success came at the expense of a weakening in the Acadian elite.

Challenges to the Second Consociatioaal Deai

The francophone elite at the time of the 1970 election can be seen splitting into two camps. As Robichaud's tenure went on, he was seen by some to be representing only one of the two emerging fiamophone elites in the province. One group of Acadians at the time in Moncton consisted of the older, more established leaders who believed that an entente had ken achieved with the ~n~lish.~~They believed that they had made solid gains toward cultural recognition and pointed to the new Moncton City Hall cornplex as tangible proof. Moreover, they sensed that they had receivçd al1 the redress they could expect fiom the Acadian premier Robichaud, and an

"English" administration might be able to implement controversial sections of provincial Official

Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New Brunswick, p. 239. Languages Act with less opposition fiom the anglophone e~ectorate.~'This was their reasoning

for voting for the Conservative Party in the 1970 election.

The other group of Acadians active during this time was centered at the Université de

Moncton and Bathurst College. This was a younger group that had a growing sense of

dissatisfaction towards the efforts of their older brethren and, according to Aunger, preferred

confrontation to cooperation?' niese thoughts were undoubtedly influenced by events taking

place within Quebec, in addition to the relatively new and spirited professors fiom the freshly

rninted university. Most of these lecturers came fiom either la Belle Province or directly fiom

France, which, at the time, was Western Europe's hotbed for lefi-wing radica~ism?~Throughout the late 1960s, the younger group organized protests at city meetings, sit-ins on campus, and assisted in the production of the film L 'Acadie, L'Acadie. What they shared with the old guard was their desire for change; what separated the two groups was the Pace at which these changes should progress. These new leaders thought that nationalism for too long had been the privilege of a small elite, who waged its battles in secret and ignored the rest of the population. The young people who were inspired by "Robichaud's revolution" mocked the old guard. Perceiving that a conciliatory attitude towards politicat power was a fonn of betrayal or at least an act of surrender, the new nationalists rejected older forms of Acadian leadership.'"

But this younger Acadian leadership was not as united as were their older brethren. For aIthough nationalism was no longer the exclusive property of an elite considered too close to the ciergy and the Liberal Party, there were many different avenues present for the younger

257 Robert Garland and Gregory Machum, An Almanac of ,Mm Brunswick Elecrions: 1870- 1980, p. 45. P. J. Fitzpatrick, Wew Brunswick: The Politics of Pragmatism," p. 133. Richard Starr, Richard Harfield: me Seventeen Year Saga, p. 46.

Edmund Aunger, In Semch of Political Sîabilily, p. 1 89.

Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French Nou Brunnvick, p. 228.

Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Horfield: Power and Dkobedience, p. 127. generation to express their views. Those who believed in militant political action founded the

Parti Acadien in 1972. Those who favored action fiom within Acadian institutions founded the

Société Acadiens du Noveau ~runswick?" Menlooked elsewhere for answen; however, for

Our purposes, their is a need to explore the exact purpose of the Parti Acadien, since it was the fim challenge to the newly formed conwciational deal put forth by the main parties conceming language.

According to Roger Ouellette, the new party represented for many youth the only way to represent Acadians on the political scene since it faced an Acadian community controlled by traditional elites and a New Brunswick conbolled by anglophones?62 They thought that traditional nationalism should be combined with modem activism. Quebec's situation at the time gave anglophones in New Brunswick room for pause, especially fiom the traditional elite who worried about the stirrings in their om Acadian c~mmunity.~" One of the results of the

Programme of Equal Opportunity was that now the new graduates fiom the Université de

Moncton and the colleges in Bathurst, Edmunston and Shippigan had to compete with anglophones for civil service positions in Fredericton, at the time an almost totally English cornmunity. These new graduates were not seeing a role emerging for them in any of the traditional parties so they formed their own vehicle for political expression.

While those who founded the Parti Acadien opposed traditional nationalism, of an essentially legai and cultural nature, they sought to reconstruct a model of society that would reconcile nationalist and socialist concerns, opting for the socialist model. Some have felt that the reasoning behind the formation of the party was as much economic as it was nationalistic.

26' Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hafield: Power and Disobedience, pp. 128- 130. '" Roger Ouelletîe, Lu Parîi Acadien: De la Fondotion à la Disparition, p. 18. *" Roger Ouellette, Lu Pmti Acadien: De la Fondotion à b Disparition, pp. 2 1-24. While the Robichaud plan had done much to change the structure of society, a number of francophones still were unable to find employment close to home. For example, while millions of federal and provincial govemment investment dollars went into the Northeast during this period, in a number of communities the industrial parks sat empty while people were traveling to

Saint John and Moncton during the week to work.'" This problem is still evident in the present day, as al1 three main parties made promises to help improve the economic development of the region during the 1999 provincial election campaign.

The manifesto of the Parti Acadien, however, espoused an agrarian variety of socia~isrn.'~~The Party was essentially refonnist in nature, accepting the parliamentary system and liberal democracy as legitimate and supported neither violence nor subversion. It wanted to work for French-speaking New Brunswickers, but not against their English-speaking c~unter~arts.~~~Nevertheless, it felt that the capitalist system, including both the Engiish- speaking bourgeoisie and the Acadian elites, exploited Acadians. Union organizing and cooperative development were proposed as solutions that would allow Acadians to regain control of their resources and escape exploitation and p~erty?~'

The electoral histoy of the Parti Acadien began in the 1974 provincial election. The party nominated thirteen candidates and collected 1.2 percent of the popular vote. However, because of the small number of candidates, this translatai into seven percent of the vote where the Parti Acadien fielded candidates? By the 1978 election, the party had more experienced candidates and were expecting to be a significant force in the twenty-three ridings they contested.

264 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hafleld: Puwer and Disobedience, p. 134. ''' Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbe& "The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 14.

266 Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and FaIl of the Parti Acadien," p. 14.

267 Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 14.

Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 14. The eventual results were disappointing in the sense that the party failed to win a seat; but, it did poll 12 90 1, or approxirnately twelve percent of the francophone vote.269

At this point, the Conservatives were wondering how to expand their electoral base.

What they required was a method to break dom the link between hcophone voters and the

Liberal Party. Many in the North felt displaced by either failed resettlement schemes, lower incomes (if any at all) and an ineffective voice in their government, In 1978, the breakdown of the popular vote figures revealed that twelve percent of the electorate where the Parti Acadien ran candidates felt that they were not represented well enough by the two old line parties."0

Conservative analysts believed that a majority of these voters would, under normal conditions, have voted Liberal. For Jean-Maurice Simard, this was a signal that the red fortress in Northem

New Brunswick was not invincible. The Parti Acadien had show that a nationalist line was the way in.271

Simard came up with three tactics: to promote his image as the defender of francophone interests within the Conservative government, to take the nationalist demands seriously by intimating that his government might listen to them, and to show that voting Conservative was as nationalistic a gesture as voting for the Parti cadie en."^ The difference was that Sirnard's party had power, and with power the means for effective change that the supporters of the Parti

Acadien had craved. Moreover, the appeal of Simard was such that the Conservative Party was now being perceived as king sympathetic to the concem of al1 francophones.

-

269 John Reid, "The 1970s: Sharpening the Skeptical Edge," p. 482.

Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and Fall of the Parti Acadien," p. 15.

*" Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard ffa@e!d: Power and Disobedience, p. 13 5.

2R Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard HdeId: Power md Disobedience, p. 135. Simard also came to believe that there had to be a principle above politics that people

invoke when dernanding a share of the "political pie.'3" The opportunity to present such a

principle came in the fall of 1979, when the Société Acadiens du Nouveau Brunswick (SANB) organized a conference in Edmunston. The purpose of the conference for the new nationalists within the organization was to corne up with a clear game plan for the future and a feasible agenda. The rise of the Parti Acadien and the preamble to the Quebec referendurn made the agenda al1 the more urgent?74

The Parti Québécois government had contributed $75 000 for this weekend conference which produced some startling result~?~'It has been since welldocumented that over one-half of the delegates supported the notion of a separate Acadian province, while the second most-favored option was a form of "special status" within New Brunswick. It was at this point that Simard infonned the delegates that he would introduce a bill reçognizing the equality of New

Brunswick's linguistic communities, later to be known as Bill 88.276

For the Acadian nationalist movement, this marked the beginning of the end. Meanwhile, for the Conservatives, this signded the beginning of a process that would eventually make them an acceptable mouthpiece for the Acadians of New Brunswick. The leaders of the Société were uncertain of what to do, given the desire by some delegates to start working to form their own province. This indecision, combined with their tentatively supporting the "oui" side in the 1980 referendum, attributed to their losing whatever effective credibility that remained afler the 1979 con ference.

Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hatjield: Power und Disobedience, pp. 136- 137.

"' Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hatjield: Power mrd Disobedience. p. 13 7.

275 Richard Starr, Richard Hatjield: The Seventeen Year Saga, p. 129.

"6 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud Richard Hatjield: Power and Disobedience, p. 1 37. AS a result, the federal Secretary of State sent emissaries to convince the leaders of the

SANB not to endorse the conclusions of the convention, and to withdraw their support for certain

popu lar stniggles such as that of the expropriateci landowners of Kouchibougouac which becarne

a symbol of the Acadian resistance against temtorial and cultural disenhchi~ement."~Or, as

Guy Clavette noted at the the, "They told us to pull up our socks and stop stimng up New

Brunswick po~itics.'~" The results of this convention also posed a threat to the Liberal Party,

which until then had carefùlly avoided making any statement on the Acadian question, so as not

to scare off voters in the Engiish-speaking ridings. This irnmobilisrn was caused by their

adherence to the consociational deal, and would eventually benefit the Conservatives. However,

the attempts by the Consemative leadership to ease the situation were not always genuine. While

they did want to broaden their appeal in terrns of gaining francophone votes, at the sarne time

they did not want to concede to the francophone community too much in the way of enforceable

Iinguistic rights, as was seen during the discussion of the tabling of Bill 88, for fear of the

anglophone cornrnunity's response.

However, after years of little or no comment, a specific portion of the anglophone

population began to speak out during the 1980s. This group came to represent the second

challenge to the consociational arrangement orchestrated by the Liberal and the Conservative

parties in the late 1960s.

The consensus strategy had continued aller the departure of Richard Hatfield from the

political scene. His successor, Fraqk McKenna, placed the completion of the implementation of

the Official Languages Act high on his political agenda. Even as late as 1987, there were still

some discrepancies apparent in the delivery of govemment services in both official languages. In

addition, the Liberal sweep utterly demoralized the Conservatives and left them without a leader.

- pp - Monique Gauvin and Lizette Jalbert, "The Rise and Fail of the Parti Acadien," p. 16.

278 Guy Clavette, as quoted in Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, RichardHatfield: Power and Disobedience, p. 1 38. Even in the absence of an official opposition the McKenna government's refonn of the civil

service seem to have flowed fiom the consensus strategy. This argument tests on the fact that

New Brunswick govemment at the time felt they were simply carrying out the mission that both

Robichaud and Hatfïeld had left for them. Starting in 1988, the policy required al1 department.

and agencies to have the institutionai capability to meet their obligation in both parts - the

language of service to the public and the language of work. This was done by requirïng "teams" to be defined and have the team, rather than each employee, meet the obligation.279 Using this approach, positions were generally not identified by language requirement. This was in contrast to the federal government approach, which designated every position by language. AII tearns were to be fùnctioning with their planned capability by late 1993.'" According to some observers, the "target tearn" approach assured that highquality service provision in both official

languages remained the Public Service's top prïority, while providing the widest job flexibility for unilingual public servants?"

Although the goal of the policy was to provide a balance between the highest IeveI of pubIic service possible and the least amount of transition within the civil service, the political climate in which this policy was implemented was not one conducive to reason. In fact, a 1991 survey discovered that for every New Brunswick anglophone who thought their language group was better treated than the francophone community, there were ten who thought the opPosite.'"

The first of the two main probtems confionting the McKenna govemment, according to

Don Richardson, was the matter of size. "McKenna believed that because he received sixty

'" Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Poitics in New Brunswick," pp. 5-6. Scott Reid, Lamenf for o Notion: The Life and Death of Canada S Bifingual Dream, p. 196.

280 Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Poitics in New Brunswick," p. 6. "' Scott Reid, hentfor a Notion: Tne Lije and Death of Canada's Bilingd Dm,p. 196.

282 Agar Adamson and Ian Stewart, "Party Politics in the Not so Mysterious East," p. 5 19. percent of the popular vote that he had a consensus that breached the language line and that there was no language is~ue.'~The second problem was that there is no effective way of measuring the extent to which the civil service was fiilly bilingual. Moreover, the long period of mle under

Robichaud, Hatfield and McKenna, had produced an environment where there was no partisan opponent to the policy of Official Bilingualism, and at the time, no effective opposition to any govemment policy. This, according to Maurice Pinard, usually proves to be fertile ground for the birth of third parties, and this situation proved to be no excepti~n.~

The Confederation of Regions Party of New Brunswick (COR-NB) was formed in large part fiom the non-political New Brunswick Association of English Speaking Canadians, betîer known as the English Speaking Association (ESA). This was the same group who protested in front of the legislature during the Acadian flag controversy in the summer of 1984. While some rnembers of the lobby group wanted to remain loyal to the traditional parties, the ESA was viewed as a party-in-waiting with a memùership and an agenda; therefore activists were easy to mobilize once the decision to form a new party was taken.'85 It was created in 1989 with the initial purpose of repealing the Oficial Languages Act, 1969 (NB). In a political environment where at least some challenge to the legislative monopoly was felt necessary by some, it was a refieshing change. Part of this lay in the fact that the new party promised to listen to the people and consult with hem in the decision-making process. This seemed to appeal to the middle

283 Don Richardson. Petsonal interview. June 29, 1999.

2" Maurice Pinard, as quoted in Geoffky Martin, "We've Seen it All Before: The Rise and Fall of the COR Party of New Brunswick, 1988-1995," p. 28. Pinard argues that a "long period of one-party rule" is of vital importance in the rise of third parties. Martin contends that although this did not occur in New Brunswick, the language poticy of both McKenna and Hatfïeld has had the same effect.

2SS Geoffrey Martin, "We've Seen it All Before: The Rise and Fall of the COR Party of New Brunswick, I988- 1995," pp. 26-27. classes that were being hit hard at the time by tax increases in both Ottawa and ~redericton.~~

Brent Taylor noted that "COR feels that people have the tight to choose their govemment. COR also feels that this choice of ours has been eroded over the pst several decades by the fact that political parties vying for our votes have become so similar that we really do not have a choice anymore.'"'

This notion was confirmed by the election results in the fall of 199 1. Not since 1920 had a third party within the province gamered as signifiant a number of votes as the COR-NB had at this tirne. The Party won the support of 21 percent of the popular vote and elected eight MLAs, becoming the officiai opposition in the New Brunswick legislatue. From viewing the report of the Chief Retuming Off'icer, it was easy to see that contrary to popular belief COR-NB's support did not corne disproportionately from English-speaking civil servants fearing for their jobs. In fact, COR-NB received some of its strongest support fiom areas with very low levels of public sector employment, such as Albert county, Riverview and the Southwest ira mi chi.^"

Desserud and Richardson have surmised that the goal of the COR Party was to tetuni to a time where king English was al1 that was required to reap economic benefits." Moreover,

Desserud believes that they rarely had any positive message to present; unlike the Parti Acadien, they simply condemned others." Similarily, Don Richardson heard COR Party members recalling when "French people knew their place. You did not see them in Fredericton. You

286 Geoftjey Martin, "We've Seen it Al1 Before: The Rise and FaII of the COR Party of New Brunswick, 1988- 1995," p. 29.

287 Brent Taylor, as quoted in Chedly BelWiodja, "La Demension Populiste de ~'Émer~enceet du Succès Électoral du Parti Confederations of Regions du Nouveau Brunswick," pp. 308-309-

Geofiey Martin, "We've Seen it Al1 Before: The Rise and Fa11 of the COR Party of New Brunswick, 1988- 1995," p. 29. New Brunswick, Report of the Chief EIectoral O,@cer: Thirty- Second General Election Septernber 23, 1991,p p. 9- 1 6.

289 Don Desserud. Personai E-mail correspondence. June 22, 1999. Richardson, Don. Persona1 Interview. June 29, 1999.

290 Don Desserud. Persona1 E-mail correspondence. June 22, 1999. certainly did not expect to compete with them for jobs. They were nice people, and they spoke

Engiish to you when you spoke to thern.'*'

A sampling of comments made at COR Party meetings during the 1991 provincial

election campaign seem to confirm the impressions of Dessenid and Richardson:

He's [Frank McKenna] not the man everyone thought he was.. .He sold us out on Meech Lake. Now he's going back to Meech Lake wo. He's not going to be thinking about what you want, He'll be thinking of what the Acadians of New Brunswick ~ant.~ - Arch Pafford, COR Pmleader.

1 am French, but foremost 1 am a Canadian. 1 cannot understand for the Iife of me al1 the money we in New Brunswick are spending to protect the French ~an~ua~e.~ - Andre Lesage, COR Paq candidate for Moncton East.

(Premier) Frank McKe~apreaches about unity and then he builds French scho~lsand English schools. 1s that unity? It sounds more like division to me.29J - Tony Taylor, COR Party candidate for Moncton North.

1 feel there is a lot of money wasted on language that's not ne~!ded.~~ - Arthur Hayden, COR Party candidate for Moncton West.

I think my biggest conceni is that both French and English go to the sarne school- ïhey can study what the want.. .What is happening (now), we are king segregated. 1 would like that corrected.' - Glen Jones, COR Party candidate for King West.

Arch Pafford on the elimination of officia1 bilingualism: "We just want to improve everbody's life~tyle."~~~

However, Richardson states that not al1 of those people who supported the COR Party wanted "to burn French people at the stake. Some merely did not like the fact the French

29 1 Don Richardson. Personal Interview. June 29, 1999.

292 Arch Pafford, as quoted in Monique deWinter, "COR Picks Colby Fraser in Kings."

"' Andre Lesage, as quoted in Neil Hodge, "COR Select Four in Greater Moncton."

293 Tony Taylor, as quoted in Neil Hodge, "COR Select Four in Greater Moncton."

245 Arthur Hayden, as quoted in Liz MacQuade, "Moncton West 'up for grabs:' opponents."

'% Glen Jones, as quoted in Monique deWinter, "Education Tops Kings West Issues."

2n Arch Pafford, as quoted in Don Hoyt, "Things Politiciaw Say Worth Rernembering, Sometirnes." language was on their ceml boxes. Others, meanwhile, had none of these thoughts and were simply looking for a way (in the 1991 election) to really infuriate the Liberals." bugTyler and

Dave Jordan suggest that the people who supported the party initially saw it as an equalizer.

Many COR Party members thought the Liberal Party had ken tm aggressive in the promotion of language equality in the province.

Martin suggests that afier the 1991 election the delicate coalition of populists, anti- francophone activists and traditional consewatives was shattered. It was dificult to build a new party based on participatory and populist p~cipleswhen it must alsa fünction in a hierarchical political system that discourages active, meaningfûl, mass participation in the process of governing between e~ections.~*

in hindsight, this contradiction within the COR Party might have ken resolved given sufficient time to sort out this contradiction in the confines of party meetings. Unfortunately. the party had to deal with this problem publicly (and relatively quickly) when the leader during the

1991 election campaign, Arch Pafford, resigned der failing to win his seat? The subsequent convention therefore cleaved along both generational and theoretical lines, pitting the 67 year old pragmatist, Danny Carneron against the 32 year-old doctrinal purist Brent Taylor. Cameron won the leadership; however, Taylor, after about a year, orchestrateci an unsanctioned leadership convention, which he won easily. Taylor then went through the experience of king "officially" denied the leadership by the speaker of the legislature, the chief electoral officer, and the court system of New ~runswick.~~'He had the support of one of his caucus-mates, and this is when the

298 Don Richardson. Personal Interview. June 29, 1999.

Geofiey Martin, "We've Seen it Al1 Before: The Rise and Fall of the COR Party of New Brunswick, 1988-1995," p. 35.

3MAgar Adamson and lan Stewart, "Party Politics in the Not so Mysterious EasG" p. 5 19.

'O' Agar Adamson and lan Stewart, "Party Politics in the Not so Mysterious East," p. 520. pair arrived at the point where they were wilting to renounce their previous objections to officia1 bilingualism.

The COR Party has never recovered fiom these events, garnering seven percent of the vote in the 1995 election and about one percent in the 1999 campaign, Others have tried to fiIl the leadership role within the party in an attempt to broaden its policy scope with more than just issues pertaining to language (in an attempt to become a more viable alternative to the Liberals), but have only been met with failure and a substantial group of people within the party that "did not hoid a healthy view and could not let go [of their language view~].'~

The Progressive Conservative Party, although vitatly weakened by the results of 1987, can be said to have continued adhering to the consensus agreed to in the late 1960s. At one point, the Tories must have asked themselves how they were going to rebuild their party. They had at least two options: they could rebuild fiom their historical base in Southem New Brunswick, consisting mainly of anglophones, or they could attempt to rebuild the consensus version of the

Party. There are signs that the choice was made between 1991 and 1995. For instance, during the leadership squabbles within the COR Party during this period, COR Party leadership hopeful

Brent Taylor, along with a second COR MLA, Beveriy Brine, recanted on their opposition to some aspects of officia1 bilingualism. By doing so, they hoped to be admitted into the Tory caucus. However, because neither had ever formally asked, the leader of the Conservative Party never had to consider the question, even though it presented the party with the opportunity to becorne the Official Opposition within the Iegislat~re."~

'O2 Tony Huntjens. Persona1 interview. Iune 28, 1999. See also, Alan White "COR Presence Lingers in Western Charlotte Race," p. B-1.

303 Demis Cochrane. Persona1 Interview. August 4, 1999. Originally, this author was Ied to believe that the two COR MLAs were refused entry into the PC Party. This belief was based on Martin's research that carne hmthe writing of Don Richardson and C. Gillis in the Telegraph Journal between Apnl 14-1 9, 1994. Cochrane claims that Talyor had hinted at the possibility of "crossing the floor," but Cochrane maintains that Taylor never asked he or his party to rejoin it. One can only speculate as to why the Conservative Party did not take advantage of this potential opportunity. However, one theory is that at the time, the Consewative Party brain-trust thought that by accepting the two rogue MLA's, the party would be sending the wrong message to potential hcophone voters. The second piece of evidence supporting this view is that

Conservative Party chose a francophone, Bernard Valcourt, as its leader going into the 1995 election. This may have ken simply a case of narne recognition, since Mr. Valcourt was a member of Brian Mulroney's federal cabinet in the late 1980s and the only high profile candidate available to compte with the image of Frank McKenna. While the Conservatives lost that election and did not gain strengh in the legislature (in terms of MLA's), their percentage of the popular vote increased fiom twenty to thirty-one prcent? Moreover, four of the Conservative

Party's six victories in that election, were in ridings that contained a majonty of francophone voters. The surge in support in other parts of the province largely came at the expense of the COR

Party, whose support plurnmeted to seven percent of the popular vote and no representation in the iegislature.

Conclusions

It was found here that there was a need to reformulate the initial consociationd deal that was negotiated in the 1870s for a number of reasons. First, the province's economic development had progresseci unevenly throughout the eady twentieth century to a point where citizens in the

Southern portions of the province were receiving superior social services such as healthcare and education than those in the North. The findings of the Byte Report confmed these trends and

'04 New Brunswick, Report of the Chief Elec~oralWcer: Thirry-Second Generaf EZection September 23, 1991, p. 23. New Brunswick, Report of the Chief Elecroral wcec Thirty-mird General EZection September 11, 1995, p. 30. produced alternatives in order to give al1 New Brunswickers similar levels of social services.

Second, the proportion of francophones in New Brunswick had grown fiom under twenty percent

of the provincial population in the 1870s to over thirty-five percent in 196 1, and there was a cal1

for recognition of this fact through the establishment of separate institutions (especially a

university). in close association with this population growth was a rising political awareness among francophone leaders akin to what was happening elsewhere in North Arnerica during the

1960s. Finally, the government of the province was aware of these problems within the system but chose in large measure to ignore them and therefore it took the election of the province's second Acadian premier in order for these social concems to be adequately addressed.

The ethnic tensions raised by the implementation of the Program of Equal Opportunity did not replicate themselves within the New Brunswick legislature. While the elected opposition members of the legislature did criticize the program's impfementation, they did it mostly in tems of costs and not in tems that would enhance the ethnic divisions found in the province. They thus were adhering to the decades long convention in New Brunswick politics of attempting to depoliticize cuiturally sensitive issues by not publicly debating them.

The ongins of this convention were rooted deep in the province's history and the politicians of the province were constantly reminded of the penls of political fragmentation through the experience of their neighbors in Quebec. It was probably no coincidence that the

1970 election carnpaign in New Brunswick was considered by most observers to be "quiet and fair" even though the FLQ Crisis was occumng in Quebec during the same period."' it was found here that the contents of the second consociationai deal, in addition to the attempts to contain ethnic tensions by not discussing them in the legislatum or in public (especially during election campaigns), included the recognition of equality of the Engiish and French languages

305 The interesting dynamic here is that francophones in New Brunswick probably, in a sense, syrnpathize with the anglophones in Quebec, while political leaders within New Brunswick (regardless of their linguistic origins) take a keen interest in what the francophone dominated Quebec government does, in tems of the treatment of the minorities found within that province. before the law, and the cornmitment to provide to the francophone community a level of govemment service in their own language equal to that given to anglophones.

Over the years, the New Brunswick government has, with vqing degrees of success, used the four strategic tools available to political elites to facilitate this consociational arrangement. The efforts to depoliticize issues concerning language have led, in large measure, to the enactment of Bill 88, which was subsequently placed in the Canadian Constitution in 1993, ensuring the existence of institutions for both linguistic communities and their equality within the province. Moreover, examples were given hmthe most recent provincial election campaign, where some members of the Liberal cabinet publicly questioned the PC Party's acceptance of former COR Party members; their queries were answered by the leaders of the two traditional parties that they were "consensus builders." These attempts to politicize the issue were also rebuffed by the media, since after the initial statements, no more mention was made of the issue during the course of the month-long campaign. A second example fiom the 1999 campaign was that of the former COR Party member publicly questioning the notion of duality within the school system, and the sharp, quick response of his new part.leader.

The establishment of a dual department of education was done largely away fiom public scrutiny and was considered a great cultural victory by the francophone community within New

Brunswick. However, when this strategy has not ken implemented and contentious policies have ken opened up for the public's input, the results have not always been favorable and have inadvertently produced linguistic tension in areas where there were none previously. The release of the Poirier-Bastarache report (two years afier it was written) serves as a perfect example of such a process where the objective was to solve issues by modemizing the provincial Oficial

Languages Act, while the result was only to perpetuate existing feelings of uneasiness between

English and French-speaking New Brunswickers. An example of the consensus strategy was the fact that the Conservative Party, although they had the opportunity to repeal al1 of the reforms of the Robichaud Liberals when they attained power in 1970, did not. In addition, during their seventeen-year tenure in pwer the Conservatives attempted to become more appealing to hcophone voters by listening and responding to their concems.

One of the concerns of francophones, and a tenet of the second consociational deal, was that there be proportionatity in the civil service. Yet the progress of the New Brunswick government on this issue is very much open to interpretation. There is no way to measure properly when a civil service is giving an adequate level of service in a particular language apart fiom Iistening to the cornplaints of those who use the services provided by the government - the public. Catherine Steele, who took a detailed look at the recommendations of the Poirier-

Bastatache report in 1988, contended that, "although at present francophones are adequately represented in the pub!ic service on a province-wide basis, accounting for 32.1 percent of the 9

808 employees... there still exists a problem of representation at the Fredericton Central Oflfice, where francophone employees number 695, or 18.4 percent of the total.'06 Since that time, the government has responded to such daims by restructuring the civil service using the 'Yarget team" approach in the hope that this will solve the problems and provide the highest quality of service possible in both of the official languages.

The separation between the two groups in terms of language, geography and culture was, to a great degree, dealt with in the second chapter. The changes that have occurred in this regard could be largely viewed as the continuation of the efforts that were began in the 1960s - examples such as duality in the department of education, and the establishment of separate teacher's college and law schools. However, as the products of programs such as French/English immersion begin to enter adult society, they may be effectively breaking down the language banier between the subcultures. If this trend continues, it will be interesting to see what effects it has on the

306 Catherine Steeie, Can BiZinguaIisnt Work? p. 90. New Brunswick, Lingur'sric Profile of Employees in rhe Public Service: 1988. separation of the two cultures within the province, and how both the leaders of the government and the public will react.

The history of the province is littered with examples of a "family compact" style of elite dominance within many areas of the provin~e.~The three exarnples given have indicated that in order to become involved politically, one either had to know or have the support of the local ding families in that area. While this system is slowly breaking down, there are still places where it holds true today. The Duôés in Restigouche county and the Graham in Kent county are only two such examples. This notion of political dominance by elites was also historically true of the leaders of the parties, especially the ones in office. Whether this trend will continue is largely unknown, since Mr. Lord and Mr. Thériault have been the leaders of their respective parties for less than two years, althougb the leader of the New Democratic Party in the province, Elizabeth

Weir, could be said to dominate her Party. And Mr. Lord did "flex" his political "muscle" in dealing with the comments by Mr. Huntjens concerning the education system during the

Finally, the apparent challenges to the consociationa1 deal were examined. Aunger noted that rnoderate partisanship was important in order for the agreement to function property and the electoral presence of the Parti Acadien and the Confederation of Regions Party does cause concem on this issue. The Parti Acadien was a product of a new political elite emerging from within the francophone subculture in the early 1970s. The Parti Acadien itself only consisted of a portion of this new group, part of which established the Société Acadien du Nouveau Brunswick

(SANB) which still operates as the main lobby group for francophone concems to this day. This challenge arose because these newly-educated, Young, politically aware francophones could not

307 Robert Garland and Gregory Machwn, An Afmanac ofNew Brunswick Elections: 1870-1 980, pp. 48-52. Besides the exarnples that displayed hem, Garland and Machum cite a number of prominent political families fiom either the two traditional parties in eleven of the fifieen counties in New Brunswick. These exarnples only cover the powerful political families in the province since 1900. find a role within the established relationship that had developed between the older Acadian elite and the Liberal Party of New Brunswick. They therefore formed their own vehicle of political expression and initially followed a socialist doctrine. At their height, they attracted twelve percent of voters in the ridings where they ran. The Conservative Party responded by listening to their concerns and adopting comparable policies as their own, while the Liberal Party was, by and large, immobilized since they could not risk losing the support of anglophones by adopting a more aggressive strategy. The same argument does not apply to the Progressive Conservative

Party since, at this time, it was still perceived as a party representing the views of anglophones.

Therefore, the leaders of that party could work towards building a linguistic coalition without compromising losing anglophone support. Once this process took place, in combination with the

Parti becoming more nationalist in scope, a majority of the Parti Acadien's support moved to the

Conservative Party.

In the years that followed, a second wave of opposition to the current consociational deal appeared in the form of the Confederation of Regions Party. This was a populist movement that originated on the prairies and established itself in New Brunswick in 1989. A number of its adherents were former Conservative Party members who felt they were being treated like second- class citizens under the language policies of Robichaud, Hatfield and McKenna. This was the more significant challenge of the two presented, since it obtained eight seats in the Legislature in the 1991 provincial election, which represented the low point in the total popular support for the two traditional parties." However, the constant leadership struggles within that party documented above prevented it from becoming anything more than a massive protest vote.

308 New Bnmswick, Repor! of the Chief Electoral mcer: nirty-Second General Election September 23. 1991, p. 23. Total popular support for the Liberals and Conservatives combined was only 67.3 percent in the 1991 election. If one adds the support for the NDP, then the figure climbs to 78 percent. To put these challenges to the current consociational deal into perspective, one cm use the analogy of a city." One could cal1 it "Consociationville." Within Consociationville, there are the Liberals and the Conservatives building their city and watching it grow through the implementation of 'Wget teams," "Bill 88's," and the duality of education. Running through the middle of the city is a river, the river of public input. Public input is important because it helps the city grow in the way the public wants and cm, on occasion, prevent the city fiom making mistakes in city planning. The presence of the Parti Acadien and COR are similar to large amounts of water in this scenario. The large amount of water goes into the river and threatens to flood the city, causing major damage, perhaps even destroying it. However, the city workers in

Consociationville were intelligent enough when they built the city to put in "water deviation channels," which diverts the excess water fiom entering the city, therefore keeping it defiom flooding.

From this anaiogy the question remains, couid the city ever flood? The answer is of course the affirmative; however, the occurrence of a flood in a city that is built wel1 to prevent this flooding is a rare occurrence. In the same sense, it will take an unusual combination of circumstances for the New Brunswick consociational deal to breakdom.

309 The original thought for this analogy was a cornparison to the city of Winnipeg. Chapter Four: A Profile of the People of New Brunswick

One of the dificulties in applying the consociational mode1 to Canada has been the

apparent decline in the deference to elites in Canada. On at least two occasion^.^'^ the masses

rcjected the compromise constitutional solutions that their leaders had reached. This chapter wilI

consider whether the masses' deference to eIites in New Brunswick has also declined. and if so.

might this result in breaking down the proposed consociational deal between the hvo traditional

poiitical parties conceming the issue of langurige in New Brunswick- Or can there still be a

consociational agreement even if the elites and the masses hold different opinions on specific

questions or subjects? Moreover. do French and English speaking New Bmnswickers hold

similar views on political issues of the day. or do the cultural differences between the two qoups

estsnd themselves into the poIitical realm'? Finally. is each linguistic cornmunity united in their

opinions towards these issues. or are there divisions within the subcultures'?

What is known is that Liberal and Consenrative Party leaders have attempted to keep the

language issue out of the political debate through various means. What is also known are the

views of party leaders on a number of issues that affect Neiv Bmnswickers. What is largely

unknown are the vietvs of the masses concerning these attempts to depoliticize linguistic issues,

or how the average New Brunswicker feels about issues that concern them. Once this is revealed.

one can speculate ivhether a stronger dite-mass relationship has emerged in the last tive years as a consequence of there bein~gles linguistic tension in New Brunswick.

In an attempt to answer these questions and examine both the eIite-mass relationship within the two traditional parties, and the mass-mass relationship between anglophones and

francophones. an analysis of recent survey data will be implemented. The Liberal Psrty survey was completed during the summer of 1998, while the Progressive Conservative Party survey was

310 Mecch Lake and Charlottetown Accords. conducted during the winter months of 1997."' Those who responded to the surveys. represent a cross-section of New Brunswick society. The sheer size of the sample (there were between five and seven hundred respondents f?om each party). may suçgest to some that this is a pool consisting of ordinary New Brunswickers. In addition to these sunreys. one will observe the

Poirier-Bastarache Task Force Assessment. as welI as a nurnber of public opinion poils taken over the past two decades. This earlier analysis should serve to buttress the findings fiom these most recent party convention surveys. Most of the charts that follow have been broken down by both Party and Language. By prescnting the data in this format. one can consistently observe not only Noel's "mass-mass" relationship. but also the "elite-mass" relationship within each Party.

For example. in Table 4-1. it can be seen that less than one in tïve anglophones sumeyed considered whether rt leadership candidate was bilingual as an important vote determinanr. For

French-speakins Liberal supporters. this number rises to about one in four. while for the majority of francophone Consenfative Party supporters. the bilingualism of leadership candidates was of much concern.

311 The first thing to note here is that the two surveys that were used here were not conducted at the same time. The Consenative Party research was conducted in the faIl of 1997, while the Liberal Party research was compiled dunng the spring and summer of 1998. Another di fference is that the Conservative Party was in opposition at the time of their leadership convention while the Liberal Party members were not only responsible for electing a new party Ieader. but also a new premier of the province. Moreover. the type of convention held by each of the parties was distinct from the other. The Liberal Party held a more traditional dekgated convention. while the Conservative Party convention had al1 members of the party eligible. but they must have attended the convention (or one of its satellite sites) in order to vote. One may suspect that this type of convention may skew the data presented here. since it is argued that under this format, a greatcr number of those paq members who took part in the survey would have been members of the party for a short pet-iod of time. However. the data reveals that onIy 2.4 percent of Conservative Party respondents had been members of the party (at the time of the sunrey) for less than four months. Another concern when comparing the two data sets is the notion that there might be a difference in the percentage of women who wcre surveyed. However. the data revealed that 3 8.6% of Consemative Party survey respondents were women. compared to 39 percent of Li berai Party survey respondents. Table 4- 1

Of the folIowing reasons listed below. indicate which were the three most imponant to the way you voted. Put ( 1 ) by the most important. (2) by the second and (3)by the third rnost important.

One possible rtnswer: She is bilingual

Liberal Respondents PC Respondents Englisli French En nlish French hlost important 0.79'0 -.7 9% 2.8% 2 1.4%

Third important 4.47'0 Totals: 6.9% S= 775 (L-ib)441 (PC) The ianguqc determimiion mdewrthin rhs follouing wblcs 1s basrd upon the rnothcr-tongut. ot'tlic rcspondcnls -lndiç3tes ihat ihc siatistical signiticancc usmg the Pearson Chi Squarc \bas lcss than OSO.

Why wouldn't French-speaking rnembers of the Liberal Party be as concerned with this issue as are their Consemative Party counterparts? One possibility is the convention of the

Liberal Party to alternate regularly between anglophone and francophone leaders has kept this potentiaily divisive factor from becoming an issue among nnk-and-file Liberal Patq mernbers.

This practice has been more or less been in effect since the Robichaud days and was maintained uith the leadership \.ictory of Camille Thériault in May of 1998."'

Table 4- 1 also reveals that it [vas so important for francophone Consemative Party respondents that their Ieader be bilingual. that they chose this reason over other alternatives such as "I-idShe would be a good premier" or "a strong leader". They may have done so becriuse unlike the Liberal Party. therc is no convention among Consenratives that the Ieadership of the party alternate between anglophones and francophones. Perhaps this is a reason why the Tones have historically been considered as the party representing the interests of the predorninantly

"' When the question **Itwas tirne for an Acadian leader" was asked of the Liberal Party participants in the survey. only ten percent of respondents considered it a major factor in how they voted. The Liberal leadership pattern since the departure of Robichaud in 197 1 has been the follo~.ing:Higgins, Daigle. Young. McKsnna, Frenette (interim), Thériault. English-speaking Southwest of the province. However. by the time of this leadership convention.

that historical perception had been radically altered. Under the leadership of Bernard Valcourt.

the pro\incial election of 1995 had resulted in the Consenatives winning three of its six seats in

Mada\vaska County and another in Tracadie-Shiela: al1 are Iocated in primarily fmncophone areas

of the province.

Even so. by the tirne of the 1997 convention. francophones may still not have been

confident enough in the party's comrnitment to addressing their needs. One has to keep in rnind

that many tomsr COR Party members \vcre returning to the party rit this poinr: therefore

francophone Consenative supporters may have felt somewhat uneasy concerning their choice of

rheir ne\\. leader. If this is true. it may go far in explaining the results found in Table 4-2.""

Tuble 4-2 Cortsen-urive Pur-Q-Coriw~iriorr Sztr-vq. Qicesrion: Who did you vote for on the Fint Ballot'?

Candidates Mother Toneue of Res~ondents Enclish S= 356 French Y= 125

Cleveland Aliaby 25.6% 10.4 Sorman Betts 36.7 19.2 hlargaret-Ann Blaney 12.9 5 2 Bernard Lord 25.3 * 67.2 * ' Indrcarcs !ha[ the stritisrical signiticmce using rhc Prarson Chi Square ualcss than 050

.As one can see. anglophone support for the fbur leadership candidates was split quite evenly. ~viththree of the four candidates receiving over twenty-five percent of the votes on the first ballot of those surveyed. However. arnong francophone respondents over two-thirds cast their ballots in favor of Mr. Lord. the only bilingual candidate. This. in combination with the

313 Although. in the same token. this potential fear among Consewative francophones concerning the party's admittance of former COR Party members may have been largely overestirnated. It \vas found that only three percent of those Conservative Party members surveyed said they had voted for the COR Party during the 1995 provincial election. apparent importance of having Party leader fluent in both oficiaI languages as show in Table 4-

3. makes it obvious why Mr. Lord won the Conservative Party leadership on the second ballot.

It is important for Sew Bmnsuick Party leaders to be bilingual

Liberal Respondents PC Respondents Rrs~onst: Enriish French Enclish French

Saon& Disagree 7.4% 1.8 6.2 2.6

Strongly Agret: 25.1 72.4* 25.2 75 -8*

?;= 730 ([.ibl 562 t Pc) * Indic;?tcs ihar thc siarisiical signiiicancc using the Pearwn Chi Squsn: %ris lcss than .050.

The most stnking trend that this table reveals is that francophones hold airnost identical views on this issue, regardless of their party affiliation. A similar argument can also be made for anglophones. While a majority of those sun-eyed agree that being bilingual is important for a

Nr~vBrunswick party leader. it is seen that francophones are more adamant in their support on this question. As a rninority. francophones want leaders who are able to Iisten directly to their conccrns.-il4 While it has aiready been noted that a strong link esists between the importance of this issue to francophone Consen~ativesand iheir willin~qessto vote for Mr. Lord. what about anglophone Conservative respondents'! Can it be assurned that those 25 percent (in Table 4-3) who strongly agree that having a bilingual pare Ieader is important. voted for Mr. Lord?

514 Or. perhaps it is just a natural progression of events, since political leaders have spent the previous thrce decades attempting to make the provincial civil service more accountable for providing services in both languages. Therefore fi-ancophone New Brunswickers may see having their political leaders as biIingua1 as a natural extension of this phenornenon. Table 4-3A

If'lio dit/ rhosc~rhr "srrong!rvagreed " itirll tilt. srarement. it is important for Sew Brunswick pam leaders to be bilingual. rote for 1c.irlz tizeirfirsr ballor in rire 1997 Consrn.arir.e Leudcrship Coti~~rtiriorz?

Candidate Anelophone Respondents Francophone Respondents

Allaby 20.9% Brtts 22.1 Blaney 8.1 Lord 48-8 V= 472 Suristical Signiticancs: 053

Hencs. even arnong those anglophone respondents who think having a bilingual party

leader is important, it is not aIways the deciding factor in how they voted. Nevertheless, any

prospective leadership candidate cannot give up this kind of support and still expect to be

nominated. Almost one-half of the 25.2 percent of those anglophone respondents who thought

having a bilingual party leader ws important. cast their ballots in favor of iMr. Lord. Among the

francophone respondents. this nrimber rises to over seventy percent. However. this trend of

francophones being more adarnant in their support for the consociational arrangements already

made is a recumng theme. For example. when asked if New Brunswick should remain bilingual

irrespective of whether Quebec secedes from Canada. a majority of those sunreyed agreed.

Seu Brunswick should rernain bilingual irrespect ive of whether Quebec secedes from Canada

L iberal Respondents PC Rsspondents Response En.41isli Frmc/~ Enelis/r Frencll

Strongly Disagrre 7.976 1.1 13.7

Strongly Agrce 37.6 9 1 .O* 31.3

y=7?0 (Lib.)555 (PC) -lndicsks ihat ths statistic;il signilicanct. usir,g the Pearson Chi Square uas lcss than .050. Once again. this is an issue where francophones are more supportive than their EngIish- spsaking counterparts. Perhaps this stems from the speculation that a Canada without Quebec might withdraw from its cornmitment to provide government services in the French language.

Moreover. with an independent Quebec there may be fear arnong French-speaking New

Brunswickers that if the federaI governrnent reneges on its bilinçual policies. the provincial

Llrovernrnent might do the sarne. Although the provinciaI Official Languages Act and Bi11 88 are currently constitutionalIy sntrenched. the type of amendment needed to repeal Bill 88 only requircs the approval of the fèderai Parliament and the New Brunswick Legislature. .As for the provincial Official Languages act. one can only specuiate what kind of constitutional arrangement would be anived at in the event of Quebec Ieaving the fedention. Since the provincial Official

Languaçes Act is one of the primary tenets of the second consociationaI deal. if it were altered in any way. the deal could be placed in immediate jeopardy.

On a closely related topic. there is again a clear distinction to be made in terms of language spoken by respondents rather than their party affiliation. When asked if the province of.

Quobec should be recognized as a distinct society. a rnajority of angIophone respondents from both traditional parties disageed. while a majority of francophones responded othsnvise:

Tlh/e 4-5

Quebec should be recogcized as a distinct society

Liberal Resriondents PC Respondents Res~onse Enrlish French Enelish French

Strongly Disagree 37.3% 19.4 35.0 19.3

Strongly Agree 11.6 35.1* 12.5 24.3*

S= 730 (Lib) 54 I (PC) a Indicatcs that the siatistical signiticrince using the Pearson Chi Square \vas Icss than .OSO. tVhile the gap behveen the hvo language groups is smaller than in previous questions, it is still significant -given the number of respondents involved. Moreover. there is considerable opposition to the notion of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society even among francophone

New Rninswickers. Some would argue that this is a result of what would occur if such a

designation were given to the province of Quebec. In recognizing the province as a distinct

society. it would inevitably create the perception that there are two classes of French-speaking

people in Canada: those who reside in the province of Quebec would be seen as more important

than those livmg elsewhere. Evidence suggesting that this is a correct assessment is found in a

1978 study of public opinion in Atlantic Canada. Eighty-five percent of New Brunswick respondents agreed with the staternent that "the French should have no more privileges than any other ethnic group.""'

New Brunswick francophones might also beIieve that. "a community is made up of indi\.iduals tiom dift'erent ongins and al1 must promote their own culture. protcct same. and respect the differences of othrr~.""~Granting of distinct society status would likely infringe upon the rights of others found in Quebec. Hence. some francophones in New Brunswick would be opposed such a move. even though the gorfemrnent of Quebec sees itself as attempting to protect its onrn culture

This notion may be buttressed by the fact that francophones in New Brunswick are more adamant in stating that the province has a special role to play in matters of national unity. A number of observers have noted that thsre are '-no significant tensions between the French

Acadians and the EngIish people" at the present tirne.?'' Some have even gone so far to say that the issue is politically "dead" within the province of New Brunswick, that the two main linguistic

'15 MacMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick," p. 15 1.

31b Simard. JeamMaurice. Personal E-mail correspondence. JuIy 13, 1999.

'" Simard. Jean-Maurice. Personal E-mail correspondence. Jul y 13. 1999. eroups in the province have corne to "middle of the road" ageementeN6However, others are more &

cautious in their approach to the topic. stating that the issue "comes and goes" and at the current

time. tensions are at a "low-ebb."N'

Don Richardson once stated that if Canada were different. New Brunswick would remain

the same.':'' Some obsenvers see the province as a role mode1 for the rest of the country.'" Doug

Tyler compares relations in New Brunswick to a successful mamage. and that the rest of the

nation can ieam ti-om the province's expenence. Table 4-6 reveals that the peopIe of New

Bruns~vick concur wi th suc h notions.

Table 4-6

.As the only ot'ficially bilingual province. Xew Brunswick has a speciaI role to play in matters of national unity

Liberal Respondents PC Res~ondents Rrsponse Ennlish French Enrzlish French

Strongly Disagree 3.9% 2.5 7.3 1.3

Stronzly Agrer 22.7 56.6* 15.5 y= '30 (Lib)562 (PC) Indis3tr.s that thc swtisticrii signiticancr using the Pearson Chi Squarc -3s lcss than ,050

Once again a majority of respondents agree. with francophone New Brunswickers leading the ~vay. Since the French-speaking minority of the province has had to struggle to achie\.e cquality under the law and in the provision of government senices. they may be more inclined to see the province as a potential leader in any attempts made to unify the nation as a whote. These

318 Jordan, David C.. Bishop G.C. Lemrnon and Laverne Stewart. Personal Interviews. June 2 1 - 29. 1999. Dessenid. Don. Personal E-mail correspondence. June 22, 1999.

3 1'1 Richardson. Don and Doue Tyler. Personal Interviews. June 29. 1999.

'3 Richardson, Don. Personal Interview. June 29. 1999.

'" Jordan. David C.. Laveme Stewart and Doug Tyler. Persona1 Interviews. June 2 1-29. 1999. struggles have. for example. led to the implementation of the provincial Official Languages Act and the flying of the Acadian flag in front of a number of government buildings in the province.

At the time of' their irnplementation. both of these policies provoked opposition among anglophones within the province of New Brunswick. However. given the results found so far. and the fact that these policies are now thirty and fifteen years old. respectively. it wouId be interesting to note whether initial anglophone opposition has subsided or whether there are still some signs of reluctance on the part of some anglophones to accept and recoqize the francophone presence in New Brunswick. Most political observers agreed that officia1 bilingualism has been beneficial to the province. although many have pointed to merely the economic benefits of the policy."'

Official Bilingurtlisrn has been a zood thing for Xew Brunswick

Liberal Respondents PC Respondents Response -Enelish French Enri :lish- Frenc

y=-3 . /JO ([~b)552 (PC) * Indicsres thnt rhc stattstical signiticance usinp thc Pearson Chi Square uris Icss than -050.

The figures in the table above suggest that even three decades after the initia1 implementation of the Official Languages Act. there is stilI a substantial proportion of the anglophone population who do not agee that the policy has been beneficial to New Brunswick.

Some of these anglophone respondents. when asked (as they were in the Poirïer-Bastarache

"' Huntjens, A., Bishop G.C. Lemon. Don Richardson. Stewart. Laverne. and Doug Tyler. Persona1 Interviews. June 2 1-29. 1999. Desserud. Don and Senator Jean-Maurice Sirnard. Persona1 E-mail correspondence. June 22 and July 13. 1999, respectively. Report hearings) would point to the cost of rnaintaining bilingual services as a major factor in

forming their opinion. Others would rei terate the long-standing myth that, since the

irnplementation of the Official Languages Act. one has had to be bilingual in order to become a

provinc ial civil semant. therefore denying a majority of anglophones from being empIoyed by

their government. Although it is undoubtedly beneficial when seeking a governrnent position for

an individual to be fluent in both official languages, it is not a requirement for al1 available

positions. Furthemore. in implementing the "target tearn" approach. the New Brunswick

govtsmment has made attempts tu address this concem whik stilI enabting the people of the

province to receive government services in the language of their choicc.

One can argue that the notion of official bilingualism has been accepted by a majority of

New Brunswickers for a considerable period of tirne. In 1978. between 71 and 76 percent of

respondents supported the propositions that (a) French speakers outside Quebec should be abIe to

use their own language when dealing with govemment: (b) they should be able to have their

children educated in French: (c) language rights shouId be guaranteed in New Brunswick in

cducation and (d) in the co~rts."~In addition. a 1985 survey of national opinion on language

issues reported that 70 percent of Atlantic Canadians ageed that business services should be

available in both English and French. ranging from a low of 63 percent for sen-ice in department

stores to a high of 78 per cent for hospital ~en.ices."~ An analysis of these findings led its

authors to conclude that "the notion of access in both languages to the institutions of the pnvate

sector has seeped into the public sector by osmosis."J25

"' MacMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 15 1. See Buchanan. .-l nglophone Al ri1 [ides Torvards [lie French and Bilingtruli.s~rrin New Bninsic.ick p. 3 8.

j2" MacMillan, "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 152.

"' MacMillan, "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 152. See Stacy Churchill. and Anthony Smith. The Tinze Lias Corne, p. 8. MacMillan contends that this suggests broad support for services in both official

languages frorn go\.ernrnent. from public sector institutions providing essential services. and fkom

priL.aic srctor insiituti~ns."~Therefore MacMillan anticipated that there would be public support

t'or some expansion of provincial language policy. However. subsequent surveys have suggested

othenvise.

For example. George Perlin reported a sharp decline in suppon for official bilingualism among Ysw Brunswick's anglophone community in 1986. In 1978. 58 percent of those surveyed supported official bilingualism compared to just 46 percent in 1986.'" Those who felt that provincial bilingualism policy had "gone too far" had risen from 24 percent in 1978 to 49 percent in 1986."' The view that francophones received better treatment from the provincial govemment than anglophones zleaned almost identical increased support - from 23 percent in 1978 to 48 percent in 1986. On the basis of these results. Perlin concluded that "the whole regime of bilingualism in the province is threatened." and that this portends future developments nati~nall~.""

While the results from Table 4-7 do not suggest chat official bilingualism is threatened, it may be indicative of a conclusion made by Michaei MaclMillan in his study of language rights in

New Brunswick in 1999. Speciîïcally, angIophones and francophones may disagrse sharply over the meanings and implications of language equality.330 Moreover. perhaps the anglophone

'"' MacMillan. "Legislating Language Equali~:New Brunswick." p. 152. ;,- - iMaciMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 153.

'" MacMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 153. See Perlin, "Anglophone Attitudes Towards Bilingualism: A Summary of Some Findings From Survey Research." pp. 109- 1 10.

'" MacMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 153. See Perlin. .b.~lnglophoncAttitudes Towards Bilingualism: A Summary of Some Findings From Sunrey Rescarch." pp. 109- 1 10. .. ""iMacMillan. "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick." p. 157. cornmitment to language eq~alityis at best tenuous. becorning progessively less firm as one

moves îi-om the abstract statement of principle to iü concrete implernentation.3" Finally.

MacMilaan States that New Brunswick policy remains significantly in advance of anglophone

Nevertheless. Ernery Fanjoy once noted that because of bilinguaIism policies. the

province has been producinç more bilingual students out of its education system. He surmises that as the number of biiingual New Bmnswickers steadily increases. they will have "a Ieavening rffect on languagc tensions.""' Out of those respondents to the surveys. thirty percent of

Consematives and foq-six percent of Liberais ciaimed they were bilingual. If Fanjoy's hypothesis is correct. then these bilingual respondents should be more supportive of bilingualism than \vas the entire sample.

Rcsponse to the question "Has Bilingualisrn been a good thing for Xew Brunswick". among chose who are bilingual.

Liberal Respondents PC Rtisponden ts Response Enrlish French English French

Strongly Disagree 6.8% 1.3 6.1 1.6

Strongly Agree 37.3 74.6* 36.4 S= 302 iLib, 162 (PC', -Indicaies thai thc statrsticzil signiticancr using rhc Pearson C'hi Square wrü: lzss than MO.

"' MacMillan. "Legislating Lanpuage Equality: New Brunswick." p. 157.

'" MacMillan, "Legislating Language Equality: New Brunswick," p. 158. --. "' Fanjoy. "Language and Politics in New Brunswick", p. 5. .4s Fanjoy would expect. overall anglophone opposition to the benefits of biIingualism is halved \vhen compared to the overall resuIts presented in Table 4-7.'" However. there are still over one-quarter of bilingual anglophone Consemative respondents (and 17% of bilingual anglophone Liberals) that disagree with the notion that bilingualism has been a good thing for

Netv Bruns\vick. Of course. while it is one thing to disagree ivith a policy decision by politicai

Icadrrs. it is quite another to cease deferring to your political leaders over the issue.

This is important since one of the factors conducive to thc successful application of consociationalism is that the masses must defèr to their eiite. In chapter three it was noted that one of the challenges to the current consociational deai came in the tom of the COR Party.

Therefore. it wouid be interesting to note how many respondents would consider voting for a COR typc Party. This would indicate what percentage of anglophone respondents are not willing to defr to their political leaders and instead would be willing to challenge the current consociational deril. since the COR Party's main goal has been commonly identified as the repeal of official bilinpalism in the province of New Brunsw.ick.

I could never 1-01sfor a Confrderation of Rqions type pany

Libenl Respondents PC Rrspondents Enrrlish French Enclish French

Strongly Disagrer 7.4%

Disagrre 11.8

="\grcc 17.2

Strongly Agrrt: 61.3

S= 730 iLib) 547 (PC) œlndicares rhar ihe srritistical signiticance usinp iht: Pcarson Chi Square NUIess thrin .O50

33-1 The francophone results remain fairly constant since the overall numbers in figure 4-7 state that over ninety percent of francophones support the notion that bilingualism has benefited the province. This is one matter on which consensus was achieved: thrce out of four respondents. rcgardless of' the party they support or the language they speak. agreed that they couId never support a COR type party. One could argue that these results are evidence that the consociational amnsernents that have been made to date meet with general satisfaction on the part of the party members. Of interest though are the numbers of francophone respondents who strongly disagee ivith the notion that they could never support a COR type Party. One possible interpretation of this result is that these francophone respondents who could foresee supporting a party committed to thc intcrests of one particular subculture even if it rneant adverdy affecting others within a particular society. If this is the case. then it is ironic that the COR Party should serve as the example in the particular question posed within these su~e~s.'~'

But what about those respondents who strongly disageed with the notion that bilingualism has been a good th@ for the prokPince? 1s their opposition to the policy strong cnough that they would support a COR type party? Table 4-10 will show how many English- speaking respondents who strongly disagree that oftkial bilingualisrn has been good for the province. could vote for a COR type Party.

"' Another possible enplanation is that these respondents misread the question as ''1 could vote tor a COR type party" and answered accordingly. In hindsight. perhaps this discussion could act as a suggestion to change the wording of this query on a subsequent round of surveys performed by political scientists. Although this panicular result runs contrary to the author's expectations it does serve as evidence for the notion that the wording of the question is just as important as its answer. Table 4- 1 O

.-irrgloplrone Respondents who "suongly disagreed" with the statement "Officia1 Bilingualism has been a good thing for New Brunswick". compared with their response to the statemcnt "1 could never vote for a COR type pam.."''b

Ne\.er COR Liberal Rrspondrnts PC Responden ts Total of Anrrlophone Sample Liknf Calculntion; 14.6-77.1= JI .7?6

Disagret. 27.1 29.4 PC' Calculation: 16.5-19.4= 55.Yo

Stronelv Xzrtic J1.7 -25.0

Total: 100t%of11.1% 10096 of 18.99'0

As the results of this table above indicate, over half of anglophone Conservative supporters who strongly disagreed that bilingualisrn has benetited the province would be potentially willing to change the current consociationaI deaI by voting for a Party that wouId repeal the OffIcial Languages Act. This number for Liberal anglophones was 31.7 percent.'3-

One crin speculate that these respondents were the "core" of the COR Party. However. when compared to the entire anglophone sample. these tïgures combined equal 7.6 percent of those surieyed."' This suggests that there is little opposition to the consociational arrangements at this tirne. and even those opposed to the deal ~villlikely remain loyal to thcir respective parties. In

"" The reason that this table does not analyzr the views of francophone respondents from the two parties is due to the fact that only I .4 percent of francophone Liberal and 2.6 percent of francophone Conservative respondents strongly disagreed to the notion that "Official bilingualism has bcen a good thing for New Brunswick."

33- The provincial govemment has taken preventative measures against this potential action by enrrenching the provincial Official Languages Act in the federal Constitution.

33s This tlgure \vas arrivcd at using the ibllowing method: For the Liberals: 4.63% (found in table 4- 10)* 43 1 (number of anglophone Liberal Party respondents) = 20; for the Conservatives. 10.6% (found in table 4- lO)*4 1 1 (number of anglophone Consemative Party respondents) = 41. 64/843= 7.6% of ail anglophone respondents. fact. less than one percent of New Brunswick's electonte supported the COR Party during the

1999 ~am~aign.~'"

Although the numbers are small. they could be used to argue that Bernard Lord will have a more difficult task in holding to his end of the consociational bargain than did Camille

Thériault- h4r. Lord has already had a conversation with a former COR member who is now a

Consen.ative MLA during the 1999 election campaign concerning the view of the party on language issues. Moreover. sorne Libenl cabinet ministers launched blistering attacks against the

C'onservativrs for embncing former COR Party memben during the same campaign."" And

~vhilethis is obviously an example of a non-consociational act. the fact that the argument did not attain a great deal of media attention. or make a great numbers of francophones shy away from

\-oting for the Conservatives speaks for itself. These tindings may also indicate why francophone

Consenative supporters felt having a leader who was bilingual was important (see Table 4-1 ). as

\{.el1 as ~rhya majority of them chose Mr. Lord on their initial ballot (see Table 4-2).

Eventually. Premier Lord may have to make a decision that will cause one of the two principal linguistic groups to have some concerns and tensions over language will rise. as kvas the case in the Acadian tlag affair. Fifteen years after the fact. a number of those interviewed claim that they have no problem unith the flag's presence on their govemment buildings."' Although the rrovernment of the province may be proud to recopize Acadian tàct in New Brunswick L the publicly. there are still groups found within the province who disagree with this type of govemment activity. The Anglo Society of New Brunswick (ASNB). formed in 1 993. descri bes iiselt' as "a non-protit organization dedicatcd to the promotion and protection of the English

;"' Tim Porter. "Mighty Majority." p. 1.

3-80 Chris Morris. "Liberais Press Bilingualism Button." p. 17. Of the three cabinet ministers namcd in the article (Greg OIDonnell. Danny Gay. and Bernard ThCriauIt). only Thériault was re- elccted in 1999.

"' Huntjens. A.. Bishop G.C. Lemmon. Don Richardson and Doug Tyler. Persona1 Interviews. June 28-29. 1999. language and culture in the province of New ~ninswick."'~' They have staged a number of small

rallies. usually in the Fredericton area. to promote English culture. Whether the group has tapped

into an existing opposition to this policy or is simply engaged in a fniitiess struggle will be

revealed in Table 3- 1 1.

Both the Acadian and Xew Brunswick fias should be flown in front ofgovemmcint buildings in Xew Brunstvick Libcral Respondents PC Respondents Responsr Enelish French -Enrlish French

Disagret. 36.4 14.3 27.6 13.2

AS one rnighr suspect. the table reveals a consensus among fiancophones. regardless of their prirty affiliation: 3 majority of francophones support the raisinç of both Acadian and New

Brunswick flags in front of government buildings in New Brunswick. A majority of anglophones. hoivever. still do not agree u'ith the New Brunswick government's fifieen-year-old decision to fly the Acadian flag.3J3 Prrhaps they first consider themselves Canadian. then New

Brunsuickers. If so. they rnight feel that any atternpt to diversitL this identification would only complicate matters and cause language tensions to rise. Others rnight fear that eventually other groups tvithin Nctv Brunswick society \vil1 want their heritage recognized in a similar manner to

jJ' Anglo Society of New Brunswick. Qriestioris and Auswers. p. 1.

'"'This is assuming that those anglophones are happy with flying the provincial flag. that of the Acadians. and the governrnent rnay feel obligated to ~orn~l~.'~In any case. this may

be an area where abeyance is the most appropriate policy for al1 concerned.

The Liberal Party has historically been linked ta Acadian voters. while the Conservative

Party has been associatrd with English-speaking people. prirnarily in the St. John River valley.

l'et. as Table 4- 13 reveals. a substantial number of respondents do not açree that the Liberals are

mort: attuned to francophones in New Bruns\vick while the TO~Sare more attuned to the

English-spcaking community.

St.w Bnins\vick's Libcrals art: more attuned to the Francophone comrnunity, u-hiIe the PC's are more atmnrd to the An_elophone cornniunity

Li beral Rrs~ondents PC Respondents Responsc -Enrlish French En~Iish -French

Strongly Disagree 9.7"/" 10.8 21.3 45.1

In fàct. O\-er seventy percent of al1 Consemative Party respondents reject this notion. One cm argue that these respondents believe their party made a number of ovenures over the years to appezl to francophone voters. ~Voreover.they may argue that the Conser~ativegovernment between 1970 and 1987 made a number of decisions that benefited the francophone population of the province, even if it cost the party potential anglophone votes at election time.

The problem in analyzing these resuIts is way in which the question is asked. There are rcally nvo questions being posed here. therefore one could possibly agee with one notion in the question while disagresing with the other. If this is the case. one can argue that the francophone

344 Stewart, Laveme. Personal Interview. Juiy 2 1. 1999. Liberal respondents simply ageed with the statement pertaining to thern. while a majority of

Consemative respondents disagreed with the second statement within the question.

The other interestinp resuIt from Table 4-12 is that a majority of anglophone Liberal

supporrers also disagree with this notion. Perhaps these respondents feel that the Libenl Party is

attuned to both communi ties equally. or that they. Iike those Consenative Party respondents who disagreed. may think that both parties are equally attuned to both major linguistic communities.

On the othrr hand. these anglophone Libenl respondents may be from predominantly English- speakins sections of the province. and therefore the need t'or the Liberal Party to be attuned to the francophone community is diminished in these particular areas.

Cmcl~rsioris

Consociational theory requires a high degree of political cohesion within the subcultures.

If the theory has relevance to modem day New Brunswick, the survey responses of francophones should have been similar. regardless of their Party affiliation. The same shouid also have been truc for anglophones. In hct. the results of the tables cIearly reveal this tsndency. On the whole.

French-speaking 3it.w Brunswickers seemed to be more supportive of the provincial got-ernment'ç initiatives concerning linguistic rights than English-speakers. but this was to be expected. since francophones are the rninority in this case. Moreover. one can make the argument that. when compared. the francophone community was more poIitically cohesive than their anglophone counterpans.

On questions conceming the need for bilingual leadership. a majority of those surveyed fklt it riras important. although further investigation revealed that it was more important to

French-speaking Consenative Party members than al1 others. This rnay be attributed to the iack of a convention within the Conservative Party to alternate the party leadership between an anglophone and a francophone. as has been done within the Liberal Party. On issues concerning national politics (Tables 4-4 - 4-6). a similar trend developed where

francophone responses were similar. regardless of Party. and the same could be said for

anglophones. This trend was Ieast noticeable on whether "Quebec should be recognized as a

distinct society.'- Francophone opposition in New Brunswick to such recognition may be due to

ttvo factors. First. the granting of a distinct society status for the province of Quebec rnay result

in the t'urther int'ingement of rishts of those minorities found within that province. Second (and perhrips more importmtly). the designation of Quebec as a distinct society may cause Canadians to believe that there are two classes of French-speaking people within Canada. This goes against not only the progams that have been designed over the years to recognize the bilingual nature of the country. but also the notion that al1 Engiish and French speaking Canadians are equal under thc cyes of the lakv.

Consociationalisrn also requires that there should be an adequrtte articulation of the interests of the subcultures. In this case. there may not always have been an adequate articulation of the interests of English and French-speaking New Brunswickers. That there is still considembIe angIophone opposition to the activities of the New Brunswick government in rccognizing the .4cadian heritage of the pro~rince(Table 3- IO) might suggest to some obsenrers that the political leaders of Ns\v Brunsu.ick have not articulated the interests of the anglophone cornrnunity adequately.

Havever, there are cornpeIlin~arguments to the contrary. LiberaI-democracy allows for thosc w:ho rnay not support the current consociational arrangement (and al1 the views that it entails) to go outside that arrangement and establish their own interest groups and political parties in order to stress the opinions they believe need to be publicizcd. The fact that the third chapter dcscri bes two attempts by goups to challenge the current consociational arrangement because they feIt that their interests were not being articulated properly speaks for itself. Therefore, although thcre was evidence presented that some anglophones in the province do not like the current arrangement. one can argue that the interests of a majority of anglophones are being articulated. If they were not. one would suspect activities to be present within the province

suggesting that these people wish to challenge the present consociational agreement reached

bet\vecn the two parties.

Has there been a decline in the public's deference to their political leaders in New

Brunswick? The Vact that there was a challenge to the consociational deal in New Brunswick occurrins at the sarne time as the challenge issued by Canadians against the federal government u-ould certainly seern to indicate there has been a decline of dekrence in New Brunswick.

Hoivever. unlike the 1992 national refcrendurn. which may have permanently altered the manner in \{.hich the kderal government can amend the constitution. the rise and fall of the COR Party occurred within the political structure of New Brunswick and caused no alterations to be made within that structure. In terms of the consociational theory. events that surrounded the

Charlottetovm Accord reveal what can happen when the negotiation process between political leaders is opened up to include public input. The emergence of the COR Party in New

Brunswick. however. was done within the normal political parameters. Since the party never achieved rnough support to form the govemrncnt and disrnantle the current consociational arraneement. consociational negotiations over language between the hvo traditional parties have rcmained closed. The evidence presented here suggests that. although there has been a decline in dekrence during the past two decades. this decline has not yct reached a point where the consociationai deal in New Brunswick has been cornprornised.

Hokvever. this does not mean that this decline has had no impact on the consciousness of

Ne\\. Brunswickers. While Liberal and Conservative activists have virtually identical opinions. there are still many diffèrences between francophones and anglophones. Moreover. there seemed to be a consensus among the francophone community in support of the consociational deal that

\vas not revealed among anglophones. Therefore, the decline of deference among Canadians in general may have contributed to the division found in New Brunswick's anglophone community regarding their degree of- support for the consociational bargain. Chapter Five: Conclusion

The primary objective of this thesis was to find out if the consociational theory could still be successfully applied to the province of New Brunswick. Edmund Aunger had employed consociationalism in 1981; however. his application of the theory impfies that only one consociational deal has been in place. and that the Robichaud era was just an extension of the arrangement worked out in the 1870s. By contrast. this thesis assens that there have been, in fact. two separate consociational deais within the province of New Brunswick. The first, negotiated between leaders of the two linguistic groups with the assistance of religious leaders. was established in 1875 and was in effect until the election of Louis Robichaud in 1960. The second. between the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties of New Brunswick, began in 1967 and is stilt in operation at the present time.

What is at the heart of these consociational agreements is the notion that issues conceming language within the province can damage social relations, incite fear and violence among the public, and destabilize the province as a political entity. Therefore. those actors involved in the maintenance of the two consociational deals worked cooperatively but implicitly. in order to take Ianguage issues off the provincial political agenda. While the overriding goal of the consociational arrangements was the same. the terms of these deals differed considerably.

The initial deal concemed the role of religion in the classroom and the use of educational facilities. Moreover, at the time of the initial deal's negotiation, the party system of the province had not been entrenched and therefore a coalition party developed in the years immediately following the 1875 Caraquet riots.

However, by the time this arrangement was viewed as inadequate by some Acadian political leaders, this coalition party had broken down and been replaced by a stable two-party system. There were three reasons given for the demise of the original consociational deal. First, there was a rise in the proportion of francophones within the province. In 1875, francophones

made up about fifteen percent of the New Brunswick population; therefore. the majority of

anglophones may not have viewed their French-speaking neighbors as much of a political threat,

which made the accommodation oftheir dernands arguably easier. However, by the 1960s over

one-third of New Brunswick's population came from a francophone background, making their

concerns at this time much more dificult to ignore.

The second factor. which accompanied the first, was the rise of Acadian nationalism that

\vas occurring throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In this regard. the Acadians of New Brunswick

were not unique. In fact. as Ramsey Cook has documented. this process was occurring around

the globe. Black power in the United States. Welsh and Scottish nationalism in Great Britain. the

Bangladeshi separatist movement in Pakistan. and moves by Jamaica and Rhodesia to break up

federations in the West Indies and Central Africa were just a few ofthe examples ofthis type of

nationalistic fer~or.~~*Cook surmises that:

Though the languages in which these demands were expressed were ofien foreign. the meaning was familiar enough to Canadians: Canadian nationalists demanded increased econornic and cultural independence from the United States; Quebec nationalists advocated political sovereignty: and virtually every provincial premier learned that the language of regional identities was an excellent weapon in the banle for the largest share of the canadian pie.3J6

The third factor in the collapse ofthe initial consociational deal was the notion that there was a sense of deprivation - the denial of a fair share of political and economic power for New

Brunswick francophones. Louis Robichaud as the first elected Acadian premier in New

Brunswick wanted to change this sense ofdeprivation. His initial challenge was to change the way in which the provincial government delivered social services. He betieved that if services such as health, education and justice were administratively centralized. then these services could

"' Ramsey Cook, Cunuda, Quebec adthe Uses of Ndonulisni, pp. 10- 1 2. jJ6 Ramsey Cook, Canudri. Quebec und the Uses o/Nutionulism, p. 1 1. be provided at a sirnilar standard to al1 New Brunswickers. and that this would assist in correcting

the province's socio-economic inequalities.

The second goal of the Robichaud govemment was to give greater recognition to the

francophone community of the province. One of the results of this effort was the passage of the

provincial Offkial Languages Act, which States that use of both the English and French

Ianguages within the province are equal under the auspices of the law. Moreover, one of the

provisions of the Act requires the government to provide an equal level of service in each of the

official languages.

The second consociational agreement was reached when it was seen that no changes

would be made to the attempts by the Robichaud government to give greater recognition to the

French fact in New Brunswick. The second deal centered around three issues: both English and

French needed to be recognized as official languages within the province; the quality of service given by the provincial government in the French laquage needed to be improved: and linguistic issues had to be removed from the political agenda. This meant that linguistic issues between the politicians of the two traditional parties and between these parties and the public were to be handled with discret ion, not publicly.

The main actors involved in these consociational arrangements changed frorn ethnic and religious leaders in the 1870s to the leaders of the two traditional parties since the 1960s because of the changes to the party system that took place in the interim, not just due to the decline of religion. Moreover, in both cases the politicai parties involved, the omnibus party that ruled New

Brunswick from 1878 to the early twentieth century, as well as the Liberal and Progressive

Conservative parties since 1970. have had a cross-section of New Brunswick's population contained within them. This has allowed for the French-speaking political leaders to express their views within these parties without the degeneration of the provincial political party system to one that is based along linguistic lines. This has also given the provincial govemment the flexibility to make changes to policies that would effect language tensions within the framework of the

parliamentary system.

The consociational model used here rested on four basic elements: ( I ) that the elites have

the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. (2) This

requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the

elites of rival subcultures. (3) This. in turn. depends on their cornmitment to the maintenance of

the system and the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally. al1 of the above

requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political

fragmentation.

In order to analyze the province using the consociational model, the three relationships

described by S.J.R. Noel were used. These included the relationship between the two sets of

elites in each consociational arrangement described here. the relationship behveen the elites and

the masses within each subculture. and the relations between the masses of the subcultures.

While the second and third chapters were devoted to the activities of the political leaders during

these two consociational deals, the fourth chapter gauged public reaction to the activities by

leaders during the second consociational deal. Moreover. the views brought out through the use

of the surveys allowed one to see if the public supported these activities, or if there was a

substantial portion of the population who feel they cannot express their views adequately because of the consociational deal that is in place.

Wliat this analysis revealed is that there is currently a great deal of similarity between the parties. A number of questions revealed that the francophone respondents hold the same views, regardless of their party affiliation. A similar argument was made for the anglophone community of New Brunswick. However. the views of anglophones and francophones. when compared,

indicated that there is still a distinct line of clcavage between the two groups. The presence of these two factors and their ability to coexist successfuIly within the same party system speaks volumes for the effectiveness of the current consociational deal in New Brunswick. However. the survey data also revealed that while francophones presented a mited voice on a number of issues indicating their support for the consociational arrangement, anglophones were not as cohesive in their response. The presence of a division in the anglophone community indicated that not al1 English-speaking New Brunswickers are completely satisfied with the status-quo. Whether this division will result in future challenges to the consociational deal remains to be seen.

Admittedly the consociational theory has had to be modified in order to be applicable to the province ofNew Brunswick. Consociationalism assumes that a society that contains divisions on an ethnic. linguistic or religious basis will ultirnately develop a system where these divisions are expressed through separate party vehicles. In the case of New Brunswick, therefore. this means that there should be a political party prirnarily expressing the interests offrancophones in the province, and one supporting the interests of English-speaking New Brunswickers. Yet this simply has not happened in New Brunswick. especially since the 1960s. Although there was a -grand coalition party immediately afier the Caraquet riots. this party system was not maintained and was eventually replaced by a traditional hvo-party system typical of those found under a parliamentary system of government. There were also signs indicating that each of the parties had an association with a linguistic group during the first half ofthe hventieth century. However, it was shown here that throughout the iast three decades the two traditional parties have each developed a coalition offrancophones and anglophones.

Traditionally, consociationalisrn has emphasized the need for a "multiple balance of power," among the two groups. Because New Brunswick contains an English majority and a

French minority, it has been difficult to suggest that this has occurred within the province. In addition, New Brunswick's use of the "first past the post" electoral system as well as the parliamentary style ofgovemment has only compounded the problem. However, this application proves that these obstacles in trying to prornote proportionality and a balance of power between the subcultures can be overcome through the creation and adherence to political conventions with in the parties. For examplc, afier the initial consociational deal was reached, the province was ruled by a coalition party containing the leaders of both linguistic groups for more than hvo decades; however. this was before the establishment of the hvo main parties found within the province today.

By the time the second consociational deal came into effect, the political leaders of New

Brunswick had brought about an alternative solution to the notion of a grand coalition. This thesis daims that the present New Brunswick mode1 gets around this dilemma by having the two traditional parties create the coalition between English and French-speakers within themselves.

Therefore, when the parties exchange sides of the provincial legislature as the result of an election. one coalition party containing a sirnilar balance between the interests of francophones and anglophones is simply replaced by the other. Moreover. in an instance where a government party does not elect a large number of representatives form either linguistic group. the consociational agreement as described here serves as protection to both cornrnunities.

What effect. if any. did the COR Party challenge have on this current consociational deal?

It might be argued that the COR Party challenge acted as a brake. that it stopped the balance created by the arrangement from progressing too far in favor of French-speaking New

Brunswickers. The basis for this is that there has been a decline in the amount of legisfation passed in the New Brunswick legislature on language rights since the 1991 e~ection.~'The counter argument to such a claim. however, is that the groundwork had already been laid ensuring the equality of the hvo language groups within the province. If this is true. then there was little rieed to go fonvard with new policies that might only serve to enhance linguistic tensions. This may also esplain why most observers claim the tension surrounding linguistic issues is currently at a "low-ebb."

"' The one notable exception to this is the entrenchment of Bill 88 into the Canadian Constitution in 1993. That does not imply, however, that the issue of language equality is at a stable resting-

place for the foreseeable future. The remaining proponents of the COR Party certainly do not

think this is the case. believing that "there is still a need for the COR Party and there will be that

need again in the fut~re."~~''This suggests a trend that was also pointed out by Catherine Steele

when she noted that linguistic tensions in New Brunswick tend to corne in ~aves.''~ ~owever.it

is difficult at this point to speculate where the next --wave" of opposition to the current

consociational deal wilI originate. One could see the potential for future challenges to New

Brunswick's consociational mode1 ernerging from both francophones and anglophones. Surely. the irnplementation of the "target team" approach has put to rest the concems of those who wondered how the provincial govemrnent was going to interpret the meaning of linguistic equality. it was proposed here that the second consociational deal had at its base an understanding that the focus ofthis equality was on the provision of an equal level of service to the individual by the public service. regardless oflanguage.

The ongoing stability ofthe current consociational deal is very dependent on the future activities of the Party in power. Some observers. notably Don Desserud, state that "these

(language tensions) have been pretty well dropped from the political agenda. Few people in New

Brunswick pay rnuch attention to such things t~da~.""~However. this declaration announcing the "death" of the language issue has "been made so often and then been proven wrong that it suggests tensions exist in places outside ofwhere consensus has deve~o~ed."'~'

In fact, that language tensions have been and are always present within the province.

Usualiy, this tension resides just below the surface. similar to smoldering lava inside a volcano. A

358 Don Richarson. "COR'S Remaining Warriors Just Happy to be Alive."

"'Catherine Steele, Cm BiIinguuIis~trIVork? pp. 100- I 10.

3 50 Desserud, Don. Persona1 E-mail correspondence. June 22, 1999.

35 1 Richardson, Don. Persona1 Interview. June 29, 1999. future decision or series of decisions by government that give the perception of favoring francophone New Brunswickers might cause the volcano of English-speakers reaction to erupt.

The goal of the current consociational deal at that point would be to prevent the English backlash from becoming a rejection of the principles of bilingualism. Therefore, if this chain of events were to occur. a future challenge to the deal may corne from the Ençlish-speaking majority.

One set of government policies where linguistic tensions have always been high surrounds the civil service's hiring practices. The provincial govemment is the largest and most stable employer in the province. Emery Fanjoy first noted the potential for future conflict between anglophones and francophones when he feared that as more New Brunswick anglophones became bilinguat. Acadians will wonder whether people oftheir culture will get key public posts.352 This could create a potentially explosive debate conceming the placement of individuals in the civil service. One would expect the government of the day to state that they wilI hire on the basis of merit. although one has trouble believinç that there would not be some attention paid to maintaining a balance between the two linguistic groups. But what if the proportion benveen anglophones and francophones began to shifi? Would the consociational deal be put into jeopardy if, for esample, the francophone population in New Brunswick began to decline?

"' Emery Fanjoy, "Language and Politics in New Brunswick," p. 7. Table 5-1

Ske ofbhjor Sirbcidtwes in New Bnrnswick

Census Year 0/8 French Total 1931 34 408 219 1941 36 457 401 1951 38 515 697 196 1 39 597 936 197 1 37 634 555 1981 33.6 689 370 1986 30.8 709 440 1996 32.8 729 625

Sources: Aunger tn Scrvch olShbilitv. pagc 17. Stcsir Can Rilinrualisrn LVork?. pags 10. hckProvincial Politics in Canada. prigc. I JO. and Statistics Canada.

Two points are associated with this potential future conflict. First. with the growing number of bilingual New Brunswickers, the line of fragmentation. which. thus far. has been distinct behveen English and French-speakers. may begin to blur somewhat. As the lines of communication behveen the two groups broaden, some francophone groups may become increasingly alarmed. This development may have the inadvertent effect of assimilating francophones into an anglophone-dom inated culture. Second, it rnay also cause the deferential rclationship between individuais and their political leaders in New Brunswick to erode. therefore jeopardizing the current consociational arrangement.

However. at this point there is no reason to doubt Desserud's claim tliat the lançuage issue is not presently high on New Brunswick's political agenda. Moreover. it may not even be a decision by the provincial government that will trigger a subsequent challenge to the consociational arrangement. Recall that there were a number of extemal forces at work within

New Bmnswick that brouçht about the need to renegotiate the initial consociational deal during the 1960s. One of the extemal forces that would have a dramatic effect upon the provincial political climate would be in the event of Quebec's separation from Canada.

However, pcrhaps the next challenge to the politics of accommodation will not corne from the anglophone-francophone linguistic axis at ail. Over the past few years, the continuing struggle on the part of Aboriginal people in the province has been well documented. The

Aboriginals feel they have a right to practice their traditional hunting and fishing methods without

interruption from authorities on Crown lands. As of late, this debate has come to include the

question of logging rights. In 1998. this struggle went public. with Aboriginals taking to the

woods in order to take part in the viable forest industry in the province. This resulted in various

road blockades and the arrest of a number of individuals assisting the Aboriginal people by

hauling their product to market. However. the policies of accommodation have shown signs of

appearing in this area as well. The premier at the time. Camille Thériault, even publicly

advanced the notion that a small number ofseats in the legislature be specially assigned in order

to represent the Aboriginal population in the province.

Moreover, with the foundation of language equality firrn ly entrenched within the

province. the focus of politics within the province may shifi from a language or ethnic cleavage to

a socio-economic one. With this shift in focus may come a greater opportunity for electoral

cornpetition in the province from other sources. It is odd that throughout this thesis. no mention

has been made of the New Dernocratic Party, who have been active in the New Brunswick

political scene since the 1970s. Many writers have previously speculated in their analysis of New

Brunswick that ciass consciousness would figure more prominently in the future. thus improving

the party's chances. However. this has not occurred. In fact. the party did not elect an individual

to the legislature until 1982. and have never had a caucus larger than two MLAS.'" Table 5-1

reveals the bleak electoral Iiistory of the CCF-NDP in New Brunswick,

'" New Brunswick, Report of the Chicf Electoral Oflcer: Thirty- Third General Election Sepren~ber11, 199.5, p. 37. Eiectoral History of the CCF-IVDPin NB

Election Year Number ofVotes Percentage of Nurnbcr of Popuiar Vote Candidates Elccicd CCF

NDP

Sourccs: Cixland and Xlachum. ..ln ..llmunac of .Vew Bnrns11-ickElecrions. 18-O- l9Sn. Ncw Brunswick. Rqorr of the Chcf Elrcrorul Ofirr. ïirirv 7hird General Elecrron. &prrmbcr 11. 1995. Tim Poncr. .Ctighp .Itajonp (Dûilv Glruiçr. F~dcricton.func 8. 1999). and Rrsr~lrso/Tiresduy i &lecrion (Daiiv Glcancr. Fredericton. Ociober 13. 1982) pqc 5.

The New Democratic Party has never intruded upon the exchange of power between the

Liberal and Conservative parties in the province. However. unlike the other third parties analyzed within this work. the NDP's presence in the province has been constant. as shown by table 5-2. This constant presence. combined with the notion that the basic issues surrounding language tensions may have been effectively contained, indicate that the expansion of New

Brunswick's party system to accommodate three competitive parties rnay not be far off.

This prediction concerning the NDP is dependent upon the political activity of anglophone New Brunswickers. In the future. if anglophones become more militant in asserting their majority status on linguistic matters, it is less Iikely that the NDP will be successful at the polls. On the other hand, a majority ofvoters in the province may still be reluctant to cast their ballots for a party other than those that have brought them the consociational arrangement. These two parties have shown that they can work together in accommodating the interests of both anglophcnes and francophones. In a number of other places, where history and geography has

"boxed-in" two people who are different from one another in their ethnicity or religion, a formula for confrontation and violence has developed. However, in New Brunswick. this has clearly not

been the case. and the spirit of cooperation has been paramount. The habit of such cooperation,

now deeply engrained, is unlikely to be broken ovemight. It has been over two centuries since

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