GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2014 Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design, Agency Performance, the CFPB and PPACA William E. Kovacic George Washington University Law School,
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[email protected]. 2 Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design, Agency Performance, the CFPB and PPACA David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic1 Abstract How should the federal government be organized – and who (i.e., which departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what? The issue is not new: President James Madison addressed governmental organization in his 1812 State of the Union Address, and in the last century, it is the rare President that does not propose to reorganize some part of the federal government. Indeed, on numerous occasions during the past century, virtually every part of the federal government has been repeatedly reorganized and reconfigured. In previous work, we examined the dynamics that influence the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes affect agency decision-making. In this article, we focus on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).