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Del Cambio De Gobierno En Chile LIBRO BLANCO DEL CAMBIO DE GOBIERNO EN CHILE 11 de Septiembre de 1973 2a Edición. Editado por Editorial Lord Cochrane S. A., Santiago, Chile. Texto impreso por COPESA.. Santiago, Chile. EL PRODUCTO DE LA VENTA DE ESTA OBRA SERA DESTINADO INTEGRAMENTE A LA RE- CONSTRUCCION NACIONAL DE CHILE. La verdad sobre los sucesos de Chile ha si- do deliberadamente deformada ante el mundo. Quienes, dentro del país, lo arrastraron a una ruina económica, social, institucional y mo- ral sin precedentes en su J-{istoria, y cjuienes, des- de juera de Chile, colaboraron activamente a la catástrofe, se han confabulado para ocultar y fal- sificar esa verdad. Cómplices han sido cjuienes en cualquier parte del mundo, por pasiones doc- trinarias, ligereza o afán sensacionalista prefie- ren no ver la realidad de los hechos chilenos. SI pueblo y el Qobierno de Chile no tienen miedo alguno a la verdad y, con este Libro Illan- co, la presentan con todos sus antecedentes y pruebas a la opinión universal. Que ella juzgue si los chilenos tuvimos o no derecho a sacudir, el 11 de septiembre de 1973, el yugo de un régimen indigno y oprobio- so, para iniciar el camino de la restauración y de la renovación nacional. SECRETARIA GENERAL DE GOBIERNO REPUBLICA DE CHILE LA JUNTA de Gobierno de Chile. De izquierda a de- recha, Almirante dan José Toribio Merino Castro, General Augusto pinochet Ugarte fPresidente), General Giistnvo Leigh Guzmán y General César Mendoza Duran. El 11 de septiembre de 1973 las Fuerzas Armadas y el Cuerpo de Carabineros de la República de Chile —cumpliendo una decisión previa y absolutamente unánime— depusieron al Presidente Salvador Allende. En su reemplazo, asumió el mando supremo de la nación una Junta de Go- bierno compuesta por los Comandantes en Jefe del Ejército, general Augusto Pino- chet (a quien se confirió además el cargo de Presidente de la Junta), de la Armada, almirante José Toribio Merino y de la Fuerza Aérea, general Gustavo Leigh, y por el Director General de Carabineros, general César Mendoza. Desde entonces, la Junta de Gobierno de Chile —en un clima interno de ab- soluta paz y normalidad— ha sido reconocida como legítima por muchos países y ha comenzado, con el beneplácito común de los chilenos, la urgente y difícil tarea de la reconstrucción nacional. Sin embargo, en el exterior se suele desconocer la exacta realidad de lo suce- dido en Chile. Este desconocimiento —unido o una deliberada y organizada campa- ña para falsear dicha realidad, campaña que es principalmente obra del comunismo internacional— ha conducido a que muchas personas y algunos medios de comuni- cación se hayan formado juicios y hayan difundido versiones de los hechos chilenos que no se compadecen con la verdad. Así, aun hoy día se sostiene: —que el gobierno del ex-Presidente Allende representaba a la mayoría de los chilenos y que sus intenciones y procedimientos eran genuinamente democráticos, en el fondo y en la forma; —que ese gobierno significaba un progreso económico y social por el camino del socialismo y sin el "costo" que experiencias semejantes habían tenido en otros países, reflejado en derramamientos de sangre y en penurias para la población; y —que la deposición del ex-Presidente Allende fue un típico "cuartelazo", desatado por militares ambiciosos a instigación de círculos reaccionarios del país y del extranjero. Ninguna de estas afirmaciones es verdadera, ni puede honradamente defen- derse a la luz del más sumario conocimiento de los hechos. Ni el ex presidente Allende ni su régimen eran democráticos El mandatario depuesto y su combinación de gobierno —la lla- mada Unidad popular— no fueron jamás democráticos, ni en el sentido de representar a la mayoría nacional, ni en sus convicciones doctrinarias, ni en el respeto de fondo o de forma a los principios de la democracia, ni a la Constitución ni a las leyes del país. 1) Salvador Allende y su régimen no gozaron de una mayoría electoral absoluta. He aquí los porcentajes que obtuvieron, durante los últimos tres años, sobre el total de votos válidos emitidos en elecciones generales: —Septiembre de 1970 (presidenciales) 36,50°/o —Abril de 1971 (municipales) 49,23°/o —Marzo de 1973 (parlamentarias) 43,98°/o Se puede apreciar que ni aun en la euforia inmediatamente pos- terior a la elección presidencial —es decir, en abril de 1971— el gobier- no de Allende alcanzó la mayoría absoluta. Y a partir de ese momento, siempre fue una minoría, situación que pudo apreciarse no sólo en los comicios de marzo de 1973, sino en diversas elecciones complementarias anteriores (provincia de Valparaíso, julio de 1971; provincia de O'Higgins, Cólchagua, departamento de Linares, enero de 1972; departamento de Co- quimbo, julio de 1972, donde venció el candidato de la Unidad Popular, pero con una acentuada baja en la votación, comparada con la de abril de 1971) (1). Debe además observarse que aun esta posición electoral minorita- ria la consiguió el régimen del señor Allende gracias a jjn fraude elec- toral gigantesco. Este fraude fue investigado y comprobado, después de la elección de marzo de 1973, por un organismo insospechable: la Universidad Católica de Chile, que constituyó al efecto una Comisión, compuesta por profesores del Instituto de Ciencias Políticas y de la Escue- la de Derecho de ese plantel de enseñanza y presidida por el Decano de la escuela referida, señor Jaime del Valle, ex subsecretario del Ministerio de Justicia. En discurso radiotelevisado del 17 de julio, el abogado Del Valle denunció los siguientes tipos de fraude descubiertos: —doble inscripción de la misma persona, a la vez como analfabeto y como alfabeto; —suplantación simple de electores; —suplantación de electores fallecidos y no borrados de los regis- tros; y —doble inscripción en distintas comunas. "Las más severas y cautas proyecciones (concluyó el decano Del Valle) determinan alrededor de 200.000 sufragios falsos (en la elección de marzo de 1973)". Estos 200.000 votos significarían más o menos un 6 por ciento del total emitido. Si se piensa que las dobles inscripciones exi- gieron necesariamente la complicidad de funcionarios públicos controla- UN CUBANO con su atuendo guerrillero típico adies- tra en el uso de una ametralladora de guerra .30 al Presidente depuesto, señor Allende. En el suelo se ven las vainillas de numerosos proyectiles ya disparados. El lugar son los cerros de "El Arrayán" donde se en- contraba la residencia presidencial y campo de entre- namiento de guerrilleros de "El Cañaveral'. dos por el Gobierno de la Unidad Popular, no resulta difícil discurrir quiénes se beneficiaron con ellas (1). Después de las denuncias de la Comisión de la Universidad Cató- lica, la Cámara de Diputados constituyó su propio organismo investigador que, al producirse los sucesos del 11 de septiembre, había acumulado pruebas adicionales irredargüibles de la falsificación electoral denun- ciada. Se impone, pues, la conclusión que adelantábamos: el gobierno del señor Allende fue siempre minoritario en la masa electoral chilena y ello pese a un fraude tan hondo como audaz. 2) En seguida, debe descartarse la idea ingenua de que los principios sustanciales de la democracia tenían algún significado o tras- cendencia para el régimen depuesto. Es necesario recordar al respecto que el ex Presidente Allende era y se declaraba marxista-leninista. Igual postura tenían los partidos mayoritarios de la Unidad Popular: el socialista (al cual el señor Allende pertenecía) y el comunista. Aún se autodefinía como marxista-leninista una tercera colectividad de esa combinación política: el Movimiento de Acción popular Unitaria (MAPU). Y la declaración de principios de un cuarto partido de la Unidad Popular, el Radical, estaba fuertemente teñida de esa doctrina que —-de tal modo— era fundamental para cuatro de las cinco colectividades que componían aquélla. Ahora bien, es indiscutible que el régimen democrático no tiene, para el marxismo-leninismo, ningún valor en sí; es un camino como cual- quier otro para llegar al poder: se lo seguirá si es viable; si no lo es, o si hay otro más fácil, rápido y conveniente, según las circunstancias, se adoptará este último. Son múltiples las declaraciones en tal sentido, tanto del señor Allende como de los partidos y máximos dirigentes de la Unidad Popular. Con ellas se acredita que el camino democrático fue, para todos, una alternativa de conveniencia y no de convicción. A esto debe agregarse que el MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria), cuya relación con el señor Allende y la Unidad Popular se analiza en el Capítulo I, fue siem- pre marxista-leninista y partidario de la "vía armada". Aun más, este camino democrático fue descartado completamente en el curso de 1973, como veremos, optando el ex Presidente Allende y sus partidarios por (a vía violenta del "autogolpe". 3) Algunos sostienen que —cualquiera que sea el motivo por el cual el ex Presidente Allende haya seguido el camino democrático— de hecho así lo hizo, por lo menos en un principio. Es ésta una nueva ilusión, producto de un conocimiento incompleto de lo sucedido en Chile. Lo que pasó, efectivamente, fue otra cosa: el señor Allende, acon- sejado por un equipo de juristas de izquierda, buscó adelantar en el implantamiento del marxismo con un respeto falso, formal, por la letra EL M¡R (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) poseía los elementos necesarios para .falsificar toda cla- se de timbres oficiales. La .foro da ultimas maestras de estas falsificaciones, ^ de la Constitución y de la ley, pero atropellando flagrantemente su espíritu. Es lo que se llamó utilizar los "resquicios" legales. Es decir, emplear —de entre las aproximadamente 17.000 leyes chilenas— algunas disposiciones oscuras o anticuadas o aisladas y distorsionadas de su contexto, para aplicarlas a esos fines de avance de la marxistización, aunque fuese contradiciendo indiscutiblemente las demás leyes y el sentido general de la legislación chilena.
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