Pinsamheten Att Känna För Dig: Den Prosociala Rolen(Erna) Av Empatisk Förlägenhet Och Dess Neurala Grund

Home , Vicarious embarrassment

Pinsamheten att känna för dig: Den prosociala rolen(erna) av empatisk förlägenhet och dess neurala grund

The awkwardness of feeling for you: The pro-social role(s) of empathic embarrassment and its neural basis

Examensarbete för kandidatexamen med huvudområdet kognitiv neurovetenskap

Grundnivå 180 högskolepoäng

VT2021

Student: Jessica Svensson

Handledare: Joel Parthemore

Examinator: Antti Revonsuo

Examensarbete

Abstract

Empathic embarrassment is an emotional state that belongs to the self-conscious category of emotions. It is an uncomfortable condition where someone feels embarrassed over another person’s mishap or violation of social norms. It is prosocial in that one is motivated to help a person who expresses embarrassment. To experience it, one needs to be able to imagine how the other person is feeling and how one would feel if the situation happened to oneself. One is likelier to feel empathic embarrassment if one likes the person who is experiencing the mishap or if one has experienced the mishap oneself. This thesis investigates whether empathic embarrassment is a prosocial emotion and what neural basis empathic embarrassment has. The results show that empathic embarrassment is perceived as a prosocial emotion, while the areas that are the most involved are the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and medial prefrontal cortex.

Keywords: empathic embarrassment, embarrassment, prosocial, empathy

The awkwardness of feeling for you.

Imagine events where you have done (or said) something embarrassing, like farting in front of people, having your fly down, or finding a piece of toilet paper stuck on the bottom of your shoe. The same feeling of embarrassment can happen to a person observing the event: either a close friend or stranger. This phenomenon is called second- hand embarrassment, vicarious embarrassment, or empathic embarrassment, the latter being the term I will use in this thesis.

Empathic embarrassment is the emotion that arises when you feel embarrassment for someone who does something embarrassing. That person can either show that they are embarrassed, or they can be unaware of it. The term empathic embarrassment was first used by Rowland S. Miller (1987).

An observer witnessing an embarrassing event often responds with empathy towards the embarrassed person. The empathic response one feels is like what one would have felt if one had suffered the initial embarrassment oneself (Hawk et al., 2011). Empathic embarrassment is a complex emotion with components such as fear of negative appraisal, perspective-taking, and heightened levels of empathy or ability to be embarrassed (Uysal et al., 2014).

Embarrassment

Embarrassment is one component of empathic embarrassment. It occurs when a person feels like they have violated social norms, made a mishap, or otherwise had their social image threatened. Most people go to great lengths to avoid feeling or expressing embarrassment. Embarrassment is in the category of self-conscious, social emotions, together with shame, guilt, and envy. A self-conscious emotion concerns how one perceives oneself: one is consciously aware of others’ perceptions and judgement (Feinberg et al., 2012; Robbins & Parlavecchio, 2006).

Embarrassment is a generally unpleasant emotion that makes the person feel judged or otherwise scrutinized. Though it is unpleasant, it serves a valuable social function as, for example, a nonverbal apology or indication that the person expressing embarrassment will not let this happen again. Embarrassment is a highly coordinated response involving various brain regions and physiological reactions. It shows itself through blushing, looking downwards to the left, touching the face, flashing a Duchenne smile, or stuttering. An embarrassed expression is developed early in life, starting at 18 months (Keltner & Anderson, 2000).

When someone is expressing embarrassment, this leads to increased trust, forgiveness, and motivation to help the person who is expressing it (Keltner & Anderson, 2000). Physiological reactions only appear on the parts of the body that are visible to others (Miller, 2007).

There are different categories of embarrassing events: e.g., the faux pas, “centre of attention”, and sticky situation (Miller, 1987; Sabini et al., 2000). A faux pas is when one does something socially wrong. “Centre of attention” is receiving the unwanted attention of others. A sticky situation is one that makes one feel one is being judged or could be judged, even if one is not (Sabini et al., 2000).

Embarrassment is not to be confused with shame though the two are in the same category of self-conscious social emotions. Shame is a feeling of remorse in the event of a mishap. It is felt more intensely than embarrassment and can lead to feelings of anger and disgust towards oneself, whereas embarrassment is a feeling of silliness or humor in response to one’s mishaps; one is if often caught by surprise that they happened (Robbins & Parlavecchio, 2006).

Specific brain regions are involved when one experiences embarrassment or other self-conscious emotions. The most frequently mentioned are the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and superior temporal sulcus. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is linked to social cognition including feeling for and with someone; it is also involved in mentalizing. Paulus et al. (2015) report that patients with lesions in this area experience less embarrassment after being involved in inappropriate behaviour. The exact role of the mPFC is not quite established. It is involved in many different processes such as memory retrieval, (where it has a key role) decision-making, and error detection. It has also been shown that the mPFC has a role in guiding adaptive behaviour as modulated by “positive” and “negative” events (Euston et al., 2012).

The anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are involved in experiencing social pain and violation of social norms, along with trait empathy: a stable feature of one’s personality concerning one’s capacity for empathic response (Mayer et al., 2020; Wallmark et al., 2018). These two areas were activated in an fMRI study where participants observed something that could be interpreted as a threat to their reputation or perspective (Mayer et al., 2020). In an fMRI study of the ACC done on monkeys, it was shown that the ACC is activated during prosocial cues and plays a role in vicarious reinforcements. Damage to the ACC led to the monkeys having difficulties attaching value to reward outcomes and learning vicarious reinforcement in social decision-

making (Basile et al., 2020). The AI has many roles in the brain, including a role in decision-making. A meta-analysis by Bellucci et al. (2018) showed that the AI is involved in social-norm compliance and is activated during decision-making to trust or reject offers that might be unfair.

The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is important when it comes to sharing other people’s emotions nonverbally. In an fMRI study, Paulus et al. (2015) show activation in the pSTS when a person is herself embarrassed or when looking at hand- drawn sketches of embarrassing scenarios, compared to neutral scenarios. An fMRI study by Isik et al. (2017) found that the pSTS is sensitive to social interactions and emotional facial expression.

Empathy

Empathy is an affective reaction to others’ expression of emotions whereby one share (to a certain limited extent) the emotional state of another. “Affective” can be understood as an umbrella term for emotion and mood. Empathy demands the ability both to understand someone else’s emotions (and thought) and to resonate with them. Empathy is experienced for example when a person sees another in pain: either physical or social (Rameson et al., 2011). It can arise just by imagining it, as when reading a novel and empathizing with one of the characters (Stietz et al., 2019).

The brain regions primarily involved in empathy and empathic processes are the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and AI: both in observing pain in others and helping a friend (Krach et al., 2011; Rameson et al., 2011).

The mPFC is implicated in embarrassment and empathic judgement (also in interpersonal judgement). In their fMRI study, Rameson et al. (2011) demonstrate the activation of and the important role the mPFC has in empathic processes, along with the role of AI and dACC when helping a friend daily.

Empathic embarrassment

Perspective-taking – also known as theory of mind or mentalizing – is needed to experience empathic embarrassment. Perspective-taking means imagining how someone else is feeling or thinking without needing to ask. One must be able to imagine what the embarrassed person is feeling if one is to empathize with her (see e.g., Hawk et al., 2011; Miller, 1987). The mPFC is active both during general perspective-taking and when experiencing embarrassing events. The superior temporal sulcus is active when

someone is mirroring someone else’s behaviour or emotion. Mirroring is when someone is imitating or otherwise changing behaviour to match someone else’s, often unconsciously (Paulus et al., 2015).

Closely related to perspective-taking is the capacity for nonverbal mimicry, which is when someone witnesses facial expression, body language or posture, and is subsequently more inclined to engage in the same behaviour they are witnessing (Hawk et al., 2011). Mimicry shows itself facially, emotionally (through body language), behaviourally, or verbally (Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009). In the brain, non-verbal mimicry involves an overlap between the motor cortex and affective systems. It activates the same regions as when mentalizing another person’s state of mind (Hawk et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2012): notably the ACC (Paulus et al., 2018). Other brain regions involved in empathic embarrassment include the AI, mPFC, and ACC. The AI assists in representing negative affect and in mentalizing (Paulus et al., 2015).

The research question posed by this thesis is, is empathic embarrassment a prosocial emotion, and what are the neural bases of empathic embarrassment?

The hypothesis is that a systematic review of the literature will show empathic embarrassment to be a prosocial emotion and that the AI, mPFC, and ACC play a key role in the experience of empathic embarrassment. Empathic embarrassment is not much talked about, but it is common, even if people do not have a word for what they are experiencing. This thesis aims to bring awareness to an emotion that has a positive function but that many are afraid of experiencing because of its negatively perceived aspects. A better understanding of embarrassment in general and empathic embarrassment, in particular, can help people feel more comfortable with their existence and, perhaps, not be so afraid when they arise in everyday life.

Methods

Search Strategy

I started by searching on “empathic embarrassment” and got an appropriate number of articles. I then included “vicarious embarrassment” because it relates to empathic embarrassment. I experimented with different search terms to come up with the most relevant articles given my research question.

The final search string was ((“empathic embarrassment” OR “vicarious embarrassment”) AND “prosocial”) for the databases Scopus, Google Scholar, Wiley

Library, and Web of Science. In each case, the search was made on title, abstract, and keywords. I found that there was no need to add in search terms explicitly related to neuroscience, given the content of the articles that the search turned up. The search was made on 12 March. I limited my search to the years 2000-2021 but included one highly relevant article from the year 1987.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

The inclusion criteria follow the four parts of the PICO model. Participants should be persons over the age of 18 who can feel and express embarrassment and empathy. The intervention of interest is embarrassment induction in the form of reading scenarios; looking at hand-drawn sketches, watching vignettes, or videos; watching a live performance; or writing down one’s personal experiences. Comparison should be made between an experimental group and a control group. The intended outcome is observation of heightened embarrassment as a component of empathic embarrassment.

The included articles report original research on empathic embarrassment, embarrassment, or empathy. In some articles, the term “vicarious embarrassment” is used to mean empathic embarrassment. The articles address empathic concern where that concern is connected to embarrassment. The articles researched or otherwise mentioned prosocial aspects of embarrassment and empathy.

The excluded articles were either reviews or irrelevant because they addressed shame, guilt, rejection, or other emotions similar to but distinct from embarrassment. The focus is on embarrassment and not all the other related social emotions. Similarly, articles were excluded if they addressed issues related to empathy but not empathy itself, such as altruism or compassion.

Thirteen full-text articles were excluded (see PRISMA chart) either because they were not original studies (five articles), did not test people over the age of 18 (one article), focused on deficits and disorders related to but distinct from embarrassment (three articles), or focused too much on other emotions than embarrassment (four articles).

Data Extraction

Data extraction followed the criteria from the PICO model, focusing on information about study participants such as age, gender, and ability to feel

embarrassed; the intervention employed and how it was carried out; comparisons that were made to other interventions, an experimental group, or a control group; and the studies’ intended (typically a measure of participants’ empathic embarrassment) and actual outcomes. For the articles that use EEG or fMRI, the extracted results focus on the brain areas activated during the experiment in relation to empathic embarrassment.

Figure 1

Moher et al. (2009) PRISMA flow chart used to document the search done in this literature review. The 13 excluded articles did not fit the PICO model or focused too much on other emotions than embarrassment or empathy.

Records identified through Additional records identified database searching through other sources (n = 413) (n =0)

Identification

Records after duplicates removed

(n = 201)

Records screened Records excluded Screening (n = 201) (n = 173)

Full-text articles Full-text articles assessed for eligibility excluded, with reasons (n =28) (n =13)

Eligibility Studies included in qualitative synthesis

(n = 15)

Included

Results

The patterns that was most noticeable throughout the review was activation in the mPFC, AI and ACC. The participants also needed to engage in some form of perspective-taking to experience empathic embarrassment. The participant samples in most cases comprised undergraduates who studied psychology, sociology, or science. The mean age of participants was relatively young: not over 30. The setting was mostly in a laboratory, except for Feinberg et al.’s (2012) two studies, which were online. If the studies did not use an fMRI or an EEG measurement, they used self-reports to gather data on empathic embarrassment.

Psychological studies

Directly Observing Embarrassment

One way to elicit empathic embarrassment is to observe someone do something embarrassing. This has been done by having participants watch embarrassing videos, listen to audio, observe a performance or, in one study, interact with the targets.

Miller (1987) presents the first-ever study on empathic embarrassment; though it is early, it is included because of its importance in the field. In his first study, participants were divided into three conditions and played with another participant: cooperative (match their choices with their fellow participants), competitive (choose the opposite choices to their fellow participants), and independent (choose what participants deemed most likely that the others were choosing). Then they were further divided into two groups: one to observe and the other to play the role of actors. The results show that participants felt more empathic embarrassment for actors who showed embarrassment, while the independent condition elicited the most empathic embarrassment.

In their second study, Uysal et al. (2014) had participants watch embarrassment- inducing video clips and complete various scales that measured susceptibility to embarrassment, empathy, perspective-taking, fear of negative evaluation, and empathic embarrassment. The researchers wanted to see if their own scale could predict embarrassment. Participants answered a pre-test questionnaire, then watched an embarrassing clip in the laboratory, then reported their emotions using the scale. According to the researchers, the results show that empathic embarrassment is related to but different from susceptibility to embarrassment, and that the reseacher’s own scale could predict embarrassment.

Table 1

A Summary of the Articles for the Analysis

Articles Population Intervention Measurement Comparison Expected outcome Results

Cao et al., 2020 40 student volunteers described scenarios EEG VE vs. neutral & self- time course of VE and MFN and N400 were perspective vs. other- perspective-taking larger in VE. large theta perspective oscillation

Feinberg et al., 2012 57 undergraduates for recall embarrassing self-reports social values vs. prosocial intentions embarrassment (study 1a) course credit memories and play standard in social generate nonverbal associated with dictator game values vs. decision display of emb. prosociality making

Feinberg et al., 2012 38 participants imagine self-reports feeling emb. vs. the tendency to dispay hypothesis correct (study 1b) recruited from embarrassment prosociality emb. & prosocial are advertisement related

Feinberg et al., 2012 57 undergraduates watch videos of self-reports prosocial vs. antisocial emb. targets to be seen embarrassment (study 2) from study 1a & 94 embarrassed targets & & high vs. low emb. as prosocial than associated with undergraduates for observe participants antisocial targets prosociality extra credit

Feinberg et al., 2012 196 undergraduates for observe images of self-reports embarrassment vs. emb. targets to be hypothesis correct (study 3) extra credit in course emotions pride vs. neutral prosocial & desirable to group members

Feinberg et al., 2012 688 undergraduates for play trust game’s self-reports embarrassment vs. more trust to hypothesis correct (study 4) course credit pride vs. neutral embarrassed targets

Feinberg et al., 2012 48 undergraduates for interview setting and self-reports embarrassment vs. more trust to emb. hypothesis correct (study 5) course credit play a trust game pride vs. neutral targets with one’s resources

Hawk et al., 2011 (study 80 female video of emb. or not self-reports objective vs. EE when targets EE when perspective- 1) undergraduates for emb. targets perspective-taking showed emb. than no taking extra credit or money emotions

Hawk et al., 2011 (study 94 undergraduates for perform a song they self-reports prior experience vs. no prior experience with a EE affected if prior 2) extra credit or money had or had not heard prior experience situation will increases experience for camera recording EE

Krach et al., 2011 (study 534; 86% vignette and self-reports AA vs. AU vs. IA vs. IU different reaction if first AA gave the most 1) questionnaires vs. neutral & first- person or objective reaction undergraduates person vs. objective

Krach et al., 2011 (study 32 right-handed hand-drawn comic fMRI AA vs. AU vs. IA vs. IU greater responses in AI activation in ACC and 2) undergraduates strips vs. neutral & ACC left AI

Maire & Agnoletti, 27 undergraduates, no images of emotions self-reports embarrassed vs. happy socially valued if embarrassment signal 2020 (study 1) payment vs. sad vs. neutral embarrassment is of appeasement shown

Maire & Agnoletti, 100 professional depicted scenes of job self-reports showing emotions vs., if regretful in assertive tactics 2020 (study 2) recruiters interviews no emotions embarrassing situation favorable is favorable

Mayer et al., 2020 48 healthy participants hand-drawn comic fMRI shared vs. non-shared greater response in AI activation AI & ACC, strips vs. neutral & allocentric & ACC when observing but also mPFC, TPJ & vs. egocentric mishaps MTG

Melchers et al., 2015 60 healthy participants, video and still images fMRI VE amusement vs. VE VE from watching activation in ToM and mostly undergraduates from video compassion vs. control reality TV & activation VE group in ToM

Miller, 1987 (study 1) 168 students as course one group of actors self-reports cooperative vs. competitive or EE for actors that requirement doing embarrassing competitive vs. control cooperative, both showed embarrassment things and one of group would react to actor’s observers embarrassment

Miller, 1987 (study 2) 157 students as course prisoner’s dilemma self-reports cooperative vs. less EE for the actors EE was not affected requirement competitive & high vs. they do not like low embarrassability

Müller-Pinzler et al., 54 females only, to hand-drawn comic Physiological AA vs. AU vs. IA vs. IU VE elicit blush and physiological reactions 2012 minimize confounding strips measurements vs. neutral decreased heart rate in AA and AI situations effects

Müller-Pinzler et al., 64 participants, fluent hand-drawn comic fMRI VE vs. neutral greater response in AI activation in AI & ACC 2016 in German; mostly strips, assigned as & ACC undergraduates friend or stranger

Paulus et al., 2015 32 right-handed, native- hand-drawn comic fMRI embarrassed for vs. different neural greater embarrassment German-speaking strips embarrassed with vs. foundation for emb. for intensity in emb. with undergraduates neutral and with than emb. for

Rameson et al., 2011 32 healthy, right- depicted scenes fMRI instructed empathy vs. greatest empathy when more activation when handed undergraduates naturally observe vs. instructed & activation instructed and some cognitive load in mPFC activation in mPFC

Sabini et al., 2000 78 in first sample questionnaires of faux self-reports faux pas vs. centre of neuroticism positive faux pas and sticky mostly students; 84 in pas, centre of attention, attention vs. sticky with all embarrassment situations evoked second sample, sticky situations, and situations vs. subtypes embarrassment the undergraduates for eysenck’s personality personality traits most extra credit or money scale

Stocks et al., 2011 30 undergraduates for a made-up story self-reports liked vs. disliked targets EE will elicit when hypothesis correct (study 1) extra credit participants like the target

Stocks et al., 2011 48 undergraduates for listen to an audio self-reports objective vs. imagine- objective would elicit imagine-self elicit EE & (study 2) extra credit interview other vs. imagine-self least EE than imagining imagine-other elicit empathic concern

Uysal et al., 2014 (study 182 undergraduates for scales of VE, self-reports VE vs. empathy vs. VE associated positively VE related to 1) extra credit susceptibility, self- perspective-taking vs. with empathy, susceptibility esteem, and negative self-esteem vs. perspective-taking, and evaluation susceptibility susceptibility

Uysal et al., 2014 (study 104 undergraduates for embarrassment- self-reports VE vs. empathy vs. VE scale can predict hypothesis correct 2) extra credit inducing video clip perspective-taking vs. embarrassment self-esteem vs. susceptibility

Note. Emb. = embarrassment, EE = empathic embarrassment, AA = accidental/aware, AU = accidental/unaware, IA = intentional/aware, IU = intentional/unaware, AI = anterior insula, ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex, TPJ = temporo-parietal junction, MTG = middle temporal gyrus, VE = vicarious embarrassment, ToM = theory of mind.

Feinberg et al.’s (2011) second study, investigated which targets were perceived to be more prosocial: the ones who expressed embarrassment or the ones who showed less embarrassment. Participants watched a video of the targets then filled out a survey on how well different descriptions fit the target: if the target appeared cooperative, morally upright, trustworthy, and so forth. The results show that participants perceived the embarrassed target as more prosocial than targets who showed less embarrassment.

Hawk et al.’s (2011) first study, tested how different social cues trigger empathic embarrassment. Participants watched videos of an embarrassed and unembarrassed target, then filled out an inventory of their own emotions and those of the targets. Participants who engaged in perspective-taking during the videos expressed more empathic embarrassment than those who attempted to be objective. They also felt more empathic embarrassment if the target expressed embarrassment compared to if she did not.

Their second study investigated whether prior experience to the embarrassing situation would elicit more empathic embarrassment compared to no prior experience. Participants were divided into two group of prior experience or no prior experience. Participants listened to the same song that was played in the first study while watching the lyrics on a computer screen. They were then instructed either to dance to the song (prior experience) or sing along to the music (no prior experience). The results show that participants mimicked the target if the target displayed embarrassment. Participants who had prior experience of the embarrassing situation, felt the expressed emotion more intensely.

Stocks et al. (2011) wanted to investigate whether liking one’s target or taking a particular perspective on the target affected how much empathic embarrassment one felt towards the target. In the first study participants were to read two stories, one group read the story where the target was more likable (likable condition), and one group read the story where the target was more unlikable (unlikable condition), then listen to a transcribed interview about a person in the made-up story. The transcribed interview was about the person in the made-up story had details about the person in the made-up story that made the person more likable or unlikable, depending on the condition the participants were assigned. The researchers found that participants felt more empathic embarrassment towards the target in the liked condition, while the disliked condition made participants more distressed.

In their second study participants were to listen to another transcribed interview, with the same fictional character from the first study. They were then divided into three conditions; objective, where they were to try to be objective about the interview; imagine self, where they should imagine themselves as the target; and imagine others, where they were to imagine how the target felt without actually becoming the target. The researchers found that the imagine-self condition elicited the most empathic embarrassment, while the imagine-others condition elicited mostly empathic concern.

Reading about Embarrassing Situations or Looking at Embarrassing Pictures

Feinberg et al.’s (2011) third study investigated whether static emotional images could evoke the experience of empathic embarrassment and if participants would recognize what they were experiencing as embarrassment. The researchers used images of people portraying embarrassment, pride, or no emotion. Participants looked at all the images and after the viewing each image, completed a questionnaire on how much they believed that the person in the image had prosocial characteristics or tendencies. The results show that participants attributed more prosocial characteristics to the embarrassed targets, compared to the ones showing pride or no emotion.

Maire and Agnoletti (2020) did a similar study with static images of various emotions, comparing embarrassment with happiness, sadness, and a neutral expression. In the first study the participants were to view the images, responding after each image using a seven-point Likert scale to indicate how they perceived the targets. The researchers found that participants associated the embarrassed target with the desire for appeasement, meaning that the embarrassed target will find an explanation for their behaviour, most strongly compared to the other conditions.

Their second study investigated how expressing embarrassment can affect one’s impressions in high-stakes situations. Participants filled out a questionnaire which described various scenarios of job interviews. What the researchers found was that the people in the scenarios who used assertive tactics to address their embarrassment were viewed more favourably. Specifically, they were perceived as more reliable and more stable, and participants judged that this increased the probability of them being hired.

Krach et al. (2011) and Müller-Pinzler et al. (2012) used the same four conditions: (1) accidental/aware (AA: the target is aware of the accidental mishap and the inappropriateness of her behaviour, such as stuttering during a speech). (2)

accidental/unaware (AU: the target is unaware of the accidental mishap and the inappropriateness of her behaviour, such as walking with her fly down). (3) intentional/aware (IA: the target’s mishap is intentional, and she is aware of her inappropriate behaviour, such as throwing litter on the street). (4) intentional/unaware (IA: the target’s mishap is intentional, but she is not fully aware of her inappropriate behaviour, such as praising herself inappropriately in a public speech).

Krach et al.’s (2011) first study had participants watch vignettes of embarrassing situations and imagine themselves in each situation then rate their empathic embarrassment for the person in the situation. The results show that of the four conditions, the accidental/aware condition elicited the most empathic embarrassment.

In Müller-Pinzler et al. (2012) showed participants hand-drawn sketches and measured the physiological responses using an electrocardiogram (ECG), electrodes on the left leg and left forearm, and on the fingers to measure skin conductance. Participants rated the emotions, behaviour, and awareness of the target in each picture. The researchers found that participants had the most reaction under the accidental/aware and intentional/aware conditions. In each case where participants felt empathic embarrassment, there were measurable autonomic responses: responses that can be supposed to make one likelier to want to repair the embarrassing situation.

Playing Trust Games

Feinberg et al. (2011) investigate if, in various trust games, participants trust an embarrassed target over a target expressing another emotion. Studies 1a, 4, and 5 had participants play both trust games and a dictator game, which were participants chooses to either send money or not to another participants. Participants were divided into two groups, decision maker 1 (DM1) and decision maker 2 (DM2), and they both received a unit of tickets. DM1 has the opportunity to share some of their tickets with DM2. Studies 1a and 4 found that targets who expressed embarrassment were more generous sharing resources and reported greater prosociality than those who did not express embarrassment. Study 5 investigated whether there was a difference if the target showed pride, or no emotion compared to embarrassment. The researchers found that targets who showed embarrassment were more trusted and deemed more cooperative, compared to those who showed pride or no emotion.

In similar fashion, Miller’s (1987) second study investigated if participants trust embarrassed targets more than targets who express another emotion or no emotion,

and if capacity to be embarrassed affects how embarrassment is perceived. Participants were to play a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma, for which Miller used the cooperative and competitive conditions from his first study. In the game, participants were presented with ten various scenarios where they could choose to either be cooperative or competitive towards the other participants. He found that participants higher in embarrassability perceived targets to be more embarrassed and reported more empathic embarrassment. Participants felt more empathic embarrassment for actors they had experienced cooperation with in the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma than for those they had had a competitive relationship with.

Completing Questionnaires

Sabini et al. (2000) wanted to investigate whether the subtypes of empathic embarrassment which they termed the faux pas, “centre of attention”, and “sticky situation” (see Page 4) are associated with different personality traits: in particular the “Big Five” traits neuroticism and extraversion. Participants completed various scales that measured the subtypes in conjunction with these personality traits. The results show that the subtypes faux pas and “sticky situation” evoked more embarrassment than “centre of attention”.

In Uysal et al.’s (2014) first study, participants filled out scales measuring empathy, perspective-taking, self-esteem, fear of negative evaluation and empathic embarrassment, to determine which factors correlate with empathic embarrassment. The empathic embarrassment scale was one that the researchers made themselves. They found that empathic embarrassment correlates significantly with perspective taking, empathy, and fear of negative evaluation but not with self-esteem.

Feinberg et al.’s (2011) study 1b had participants imagine themselves as embarrassed, to investigate the tendency toward and relationship between embarrassment and prosociality. Participants reported how they felt in a questionnaire; those who reported a higher tendency towards embarrassment also showed higher levels of prosociality.

Neuroscientific Studies

EEG

Cao et al’s (2020) study using EEG the participants were shown a short sentence in which a protagonist either violated social norms or did not. The sentence

was presented to the participants on a screen. Participants were divided into two conditions, “imagine-other” where participants were to imagine how the target felt; and “imagine-self”, where participants were to imagine how they themselves would feel in that scenario. Each trial started with a fixation cross appearing on a computer screen for 800ms and then a sentence for a maximum of 4,000ms. After the sentence presentation, participants (who were undergoing EEG throughout) were to press a key if they were embarrassed by the scenario presented in the sentences or not. Participant were only presented one sentence at a time. At the end, a blank screen was shown for 600-800ms. Participants completed a self-report questionnaire after-wards in which they rated how much embarrassment the scenario caused them.

For the analysis of results, the researchers used event-related potential to measure the medial frontal negativity (MFN), associated with social deviations, mistakes, social cognition and emotion; and N400, a negative-trending deflection that peaks at 400 milliseconds when the brain detects and evaluates the target’s mishap as these were the components of interest based on visual inspection.

The ERP results show that the MFN and N400 components were larger in the experimental condition than for the neutral condition; the effect was most noticeable in the frontal region. The EEG rhythm in theta and alpha bands showed that empathic embarrassment evoked larger theta-wave oscillations compared to the neutral condition, and most noticeably in the frontal region, whereas the alpha-wave oscillations were more noticeable in the parietal regions. The researchers found the MFN component in the 250-310ms time window over the frontal regions. MFN was more active in the empathic-embarrassment condition than in the neutral condition. The MFN has been more associated with the ACC, the N400 with the left hemisphere language processing regions. The “imagine-self” condition evoked larger theta and alpha oscillations than the “imagine-other” condition.

The results suggest that empathic embarrassment involves two distinct neural processes. In the early stage, one sees activation of MFN and N400, when the brain detects and evaluates the target’s mishap. In the later stage, theta oscillations are evoked when the target’s emotion is grasped, and empathic embarrassment initiated. The difference in alpha oscillation between the “imagine-self” and “imagine-others” conditions reflects the role of perspective-taking on empathy and attention.

fMRI

Krach et al.’s (2011) second study used the same conditions as in the first study: AA, AU, IA, and IU along with a neutral condition. They investigated if social-norm violation would activate the brain regions involved with empathy for pain, which are the AI and the ACC. They used 50 hand-drawn sketches of embarrassing situations presented for 12 seconds each. The results show greater blood-oxygen-level-dependent responses in the areas involved with empathic processes for empathic embarrassment situations compared to neutral situations. Activation was found in both the left AI and ACC; it showed an overlap with the affective-motivational part of the pain matrix, which regulates empathy for others in pain.

Müller-Pinzler et al. (2016) and Mayer et al. (2020) likewise investigated whether the AI and ACC would be the brain areas that react the most to empathic embarrassment. Both studies used hand-drawn sketches to elicit the emotion.

Müller-Pinzler et al. (2016) investigated whether one experiences more empathic embarrassment if one knows the target (“friend” condition) compared to if it is a stranger (“stranger” condition). They also had a neutral condition. The data show that the ACC, AI and mentalizing regions in the mPFC were activated in empathic- embarrassment situations for both groups. Activation in the ACC was positively correlated with empathic embarrassment in the “stranger” condition but not in the “friend” condition. Activity in the shared circuits of the AI and ACC increased when a friend’s social integrity was threatened but not when a stranger’s was threatened.

Mayer et al. (2020) used hand-drawn sketches to investigate how perspective- taking affects empathic embarrassment and which perspective evokes the experience the most. The brain regions of interest were the AI, ACC, and mPFC. They looked at shared versus non-shared perspectives: i.e.., a perspective where participants and target both recognized the mishap versus one where only the participant noticed the mishap; comparing both of these to a neutral condition. They also examined an allocentric versus egocentric perspectives: i.e.., a perspective independent of the observer versus the perspective of the observer. The results show activation in the AI and ACC but also in the mPFC, temporoparietal junction, and middle temporal gyrus, either when the perspective was allocentric or when it was shared. The TPJ and MTG were shown to play a role in empathic embarrassment when participants took an egocentric perspective.

Melchers et al. (2015) used fMRI to research how reality TV evokes empathic embarrassment. They compared empathic embarrassment to a control group, with amusement vs. compassion as sub-categories for empathic embarrassment. Amusement meaning if the participants felt amusement watching the videos and compassion meaning if the participants felt compassion for the protagonist. Participants watched a video, then look at still images from the video. The areas activated (in comparison to the control group) when watching the still images, were the MTG, supramarginal gyrus, and right inferior frontal gyrus: all areas involved in theory of mind. These areas were more active in the empathic embarrassed condition than in the control condition. The researchers conclude that one needs to be able to put oneself in the other person’s shoes to feel empathic embarrassment.

Paulus et al. (2015) did an fMRI study with hand-drawn sketches on how different perspectives on embarrassment have different neural foundations. The brain regions of interest were the mPFC, temporal pole, left posterior superior temporal sulcus, AI, and ACC, as they are associated with the pain matrix, which regulates empathy for others in pain and theory of mind processes. The researchers used as conditions embarrassed with, where participants were meant to feel in company with the target; embarrassed for, where they were meant to feel embarrassed on behalf of the target; and a neutral condition. While participants looked at the drawings, they were instructed to rate the intensity of any embarrassment they experienced. The researchers found greater activation in the left AI, mPFC, and ACC when participants felt embarrassment with someone rather than embarrassment for someone. The left pSTS was most active for embarrassment for someone compared to the other conditions. The AI and ACC were active in response to the perceived social pain of the target, while the mPFC and TP responded consistently to threats to the target’s social integrity.

Rameson et al. (2011) reports the only fMRI study in this review that focuses on empathy and its relationship to empathic embarrassment. They investigated how empathy is affected under different conditions. The brain regions of interests were the mPFC, AI and dACC, where the mPFC is the brain region most associated with empathy. Participants were either instructed to feel for the target, or observe the target naturally, or else they were given a memory task with a high cognitive load. The researchers conclude that the mPFC was most active during experienced empathy and that high cognitive load diminished the empathic experience. The AI and dACC were less active during the empathic processes.

Discussion

My interest in this subject started with the simple question “what is that feeling called when I’m embarrassed for someone’s embarrassing actions?” Empathic embarrassment is an emotion I have been experienced many times in my life, without knowing what it was or if it even had a name. I have learned that embarrassment and empathic embarrassment played an important social role: more important than one might imagine, even though one can be mortified when one or the others occurs.

Thinking that empathic embarrassment serves no role other than making someone uncomfortable, is incorrect. Arguably, no emotion is without a purpose toward survival. Embarrassment can defuse an aggressive response. Embarrassment serves as an effective nonverbal apology that makes one look more trustworthy and cooperative. Empathic embarrassment helps one feel for the embarrassed person. To be able to imagine and partially share how the other person is feeling can help with forgiving the mishap. That said it can also be a way to manipulate someone or an audience to feel for someone (say, a TV character) crafted to evoke a reaction, like “I’ve done the exact same thing myself” or “how awful if that happened to me” (Keltner & Anderson, 2000; Maire & Agnoletti, 2020; Melchers et al., 2015; Miller, 2007).

What the Systematic Review Found

This thesis investigates whether empathic embarrassment is a prosocial emotion and which brain areas are associated with it, with an initial interest in the AI, ACC, and mPFC. The studies surveyed used self-reports and fMRI or EEG scanning. Their consensus is that empathic embarrassment is, indeed, a prosocial emotion: if one has experienced the same mishaps that, one sees someone else making, one is more likely to feel for that person and even to help her.

Empathic embarrassment is felt even though the actions may not reflect the observer’s self-image or have anything obvious to do with her. One is likelier to feel empathic embarrassment for someone one likes rather than dislikes; one needs to be susceptible to feeling embarrassed to be able to experience empathic embarrassment (Miller, 1987; Stocks et al., 2011). Embarrassment is perceived as an aversive for the one experiencing it; but for the observer, it is a prosocial emotion that shows the person is trustworthy and can evoke compassion (Feinberg et al., 2012). Indeed, one trusts a person who expresses embarrassment more readily than one who expresses other self- conscious emotions.

Participants in these studies favoured targets who expressed embarrassment because the targets seemed to be more cooperative, giving the observers a positive impression of the embarrassed target (Feinberg et al., 2012; Maire & Agnoletti, 2020). Observers experienced empathic embarrassment regardless of whether the target appeared aware of her mishap; but there was a more automatic response if the target was aware (Mayer et al., 2020; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2012).

To experience empathic embarrassment, one must not only be able to imagine what the other person is feeling but also have perspective on oneself: i.e., both an allocentric and egocentric perspective are needed to experience empathic embarrassment (Mayer et al., 2020; Melchers et al., 2015). Empathic embarrassment is stronger when someone feels embarrassment with a person rather than for a person, the latter eliciting empathic concern instead (Paulus et al., 2015).

The fMRI studies confirmed the hypothesis that the AI, ACC, and mPFC are indeed activated in empathic-embarrassment situations: areas previously known to be involved in theory of mind, embarrassment, and empathy, all of which would seem to be needed to be able to experience empathic embarrassment. Probably significantly, the AI and ACC are also involved in responding to painful stimuli. Their activation shows that one feels the social pain of others when one experiences empathic embarrassment. The AI and ACC respond more strongly when one observes a friend rather than a stranger making a mishap (Krach et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2020; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2016).

The studies found activation in the AI, ACC, and mPFC during observation of scenarios that could threaten the social image of the target. In addition, the pSTS was activated when the observer experienced embarrassment with the targeted person; the pSTS is understood to be involved in extracting information about posture and facial expression (Mayer et al., 2020; Paulus et al., 2015). The mPFC was found to be activated for a range of empathic experiences (Rameson et al., 2011).

Empathic embarrassment was found to activate areas involved in self- perspective, semantic memory, and representation of other’s emotional states: namely the supramarginal gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (Melchers et al., 2015).

The one EEG study shows that, neurologically speaking, there may be two stages responsible for empathic embarrassment. The earlier stage finds and evaluates the social mishap of the “target”; at the later stage, the brain detects the target’s emotional state. The latter stage shows activations in the frontal and parietal regions,

which are associated with empathic embarrassment. The N400 is associated with language but also violation of social norms. The MFN is associated with conflict detection and social cognition, which are needed for the experience of empathic embarrassment. The theta- and alpha-wave patterns observed are associated with perceiving and understanding others’ actions and mental or emotional states. As the mPFC, ACC and AI are most associated with empathic embarrassment, it makes sense to see activation in the frontal and parietal regions (Cao et al., 2020).

Limitations

Research on empathic embarrassment is relatively new and not many studies have been done. Researchers have not agreed on one term to use (“empathic embarrassment” or otherwise); neither have they agreed on whether there is one, unitary phenomenon, making it difficult to choose articles and know if they refer to the same thing or not. I chose to exclude the presence of disorders such as autism spectrum- or anxiety disorder and focus on “healthy” participants. That inevitably means excluding another side to empathic embarrassment and how it is experienced by those who have a heightened fear of it or otherwise do not experience it the same way as neurotypical persons.

The studies almost exclusively used undergraduates, typically ones studying psychology or sociology; the mean age was quite young. This sample is hardly representative of the general population. Studies on more diverse populations (by age, by ethnicity) are needed.

Societal and Ethical Aspects

Understanding embarrassment – including empathic embarrassment - and why one experiences it could help people over their fear of making a mishap in social situations. Understanding why one feels for someone who is embarrassed can help one not to be so afraid when it is one’s own turn to goof up. Social anxiety, fear of ridicule, fear of embarrassing oneself in front of others are perennial issues. Explaining embarrassment and the mechanisms behind it could help in cognitive behavioural therapy for those who suffer severe social anxiety due to embarrassment.

The present study raised no ethical issues of its own as no original studies were conducted. For the studies used in this thesis, it might seem potentially unethical to expose participants to such an uncomfortable emotion as embarrassment, especially as

some participants were effectively forced to be a part of the experiment for course credit.

Future Research

It would be useful to look at how empathic embarrassment is experienced in other parts of the world. Most studies have been done in Europe or the USA. It is far from clear if people in other countries find the same situations embarrassing or react empathically as consistently when they do. Inclusion of younger participants – children – would allow investigating when one is first capable of experiencing empathic embarrassment and how the capacity develops. Further fMRI and EEG studies might make it possible to close the gap between what is happening in the brain when one feels empathic embarrassment and the experience itself. Although EEG, in particular, can be difficult to read – what exactly generated the patterns observed? – it can still have a role to play. I would like to see if different personality types experience empathic embarrassment differently and if one personality type is more susceptible to it than others. It would be interesting to see if different personality types experience empathic embarrassment differently and if one personality type is more susceptible to it than others. A final question I would like answered is if one can train one’s empathic embarrassment in some useful directions.

Conclusion

Empathic embarrassment is an emotional state that, for a long time, did not have a name, even though it plays an important role among the self-conscious emotions as a variation on the more familiar embarrassment. It is an advanced emotional state that requires perspective taking, theory of mind, and, in particular, understanding another’s emotions. The research question – is empathic embarrassment a prosocial emotion? – can be answered in the affirmative, and the hypothesis – that empathic embarrassment can be perceived as a prosocial emotion – can be maintained. The primary brain areas involved in empathic embarrassment are shown to be, as anticipated, the AI, ACC, and mPFC, but other areas were also shown to be crucial to evoking the experience. The results show that empathic embarrassment is a prosocial emotion that makes one appear more trustworthy when one subsequently expresses embarrassment oneself. Bringing greater awareness to this emotion could help towards a better understanding of why it exists in the first place.

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