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China in Africa: Explore Its Positive Sides

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China in Africa: Explore Its Positive Sides China in Africa: Exploring the Positive Sides I. Changing Attitudes II. Physical Level III. Strategic Level IV. Theoretical Level V. Future I. Changing Attitudes China-Africa relations has become a hot topic since 2005/2006. Since 2000, there are 3 phases of attitudes changing toward China-Africa relations: 1. 2000-2005: almost nobody cared about this relationship; 2. 2005-2008: violent critiques, very hot [Darfur (2C strategy: China + Celebrity) & Beijing Summit (peak: Beijing Olympic Games)] 3. 2009-now: some more balanced views emerging I. Changing Attitudes The mainstream attitudes about China in Africa are still negative. Six questions most frequently asked: (1) Is China a newcomer to Africa? (2) Is China a threat to American interests in Africa? (3) Is China supporting the Pariah regimes in Africa? (4) Is China engaging Africa mainly for natural resources? (5) Does China’s no-strings attached assistance practice hurt America’s efforts in Africa? (6) Does the African continent now have a very high anti-China mood because of huge number of Chinese immigrants and Chinese workers? I. Changing Attitudes An interesting phenomenon While criticizing China, many experts still acknowledge some contributions China has made in Africa, and even call for cooperation with China in Africa. We haven’t gone very far to find the justifications for our cooperation. People have no concrete idea about how, when, where, and what to cooperate. Dr. Jendayi Frazer: We need to acknowledge each other’s Comparative Advantages and Legitimacy. Brainstorming: What are the positive sides or constructive roles of China-Africa relations? Three level of analysis: physical, strategic, and theoretical levels. II. Physical Level Most of critics focus on the physical level, for example: trade imbalance, investment for natural resources, aid without strings, corporation social responsibility, and so on. China has contributed to the stabilizing of crisis or emergency situations, the post-conflict reconstruction, and the sustainable development of Africa. Chinese Medical Teams to Africa Countries Historically, 23 provinces for 46 African countries; Currently 22 provinces for 41 African countries. Africa Peacekeeping Operations China Participating (September 2011) Mission Troops Police Military Experts on Mission Total MINURSO 10 10 MONUSCO 218 16 234 UNOCI 6 6 UNAMID 322 322 UNISFA 1 1 UNMIL 564 17 2 583 UNMISS 367 6 10 383 Total 1472 23 44 1539 Source: http://www.un.org/ September 2011. Trend of external support to the African infrastructure sector (2007- 2010) (USD billion) Source: Richard Schiere and Alex Rugamba, “Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration,” Working Paper, No. 127 (May 2011), African Development Bank Group China’s role in African sustainable development China is a valuable trading partner, a source of investment financing, and an important complement to traditional development partners. China is investing massively in infrastructure, which helps alleviate supply bottlenecks and improve competitiveness. ----Richard Schiere, “China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? – An Overview of Issues,” Working Paper, No. 125 (May 2011), African Development Bank Group. Leading U.S. Export Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa U.S. exports to Sub-Saharan Africa remained highly concentrated among a small number of countries. The top three markets – South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola – remained the same from 2007 and accounted for 68.3 percent of U.S. sales in 2008, with South Africa claiming 35.1 percent, Nigeria 22.2 percent, and Angola 10.9 percent. South Africa’s share declined slightly and Nigeria’s and Angola’s shares increased from 2007. South South Africa (20%), Sudan (1Africa’s1%) and share Rep declinedublic of not C obecausengo (8%) of a3 .dec Theline high in a particucountrylar concproductentratio area, nbut o fbecause of especially high growth in exports of vehicles, wheat, and non-crude oil to Nigeria and China’s imports in part reflectsoil-field the importa equipmnceent oandf crud parts,e oaircrafil (70t ,p anderc envethicles of im top oAngola.rts from Also Af ricaof note (figure is that 9), which accounts for almost Baleln ofin’ sChina’ share ms orime pthoarnts d foruobmle dA fnrogmol a2 0a0nd7 d theue t oSud extaren.m eChly ina’slarge iagncricureaselturals in t he export of vehicles and parts and non-crude oil. imports have a modest share, although they constitute the bulk of imports from several African countries. U.S. Exports to Major Sub-Saharan Africa Trading Partners, 2008 Similarities in trade structure between China and America with Figure 8: Breakdown bby country of Chinese exports and imports in Africa (2007) Africa Exports Imports Liberia Gabon 2% 3% Other Others Others South Algeria 21.5% Libya 13% 18% Africa 3% 2% 21% Libya Angola Kenya So3ut4h% Africa Kenya 2.4%4% 35.1% 3% Egypt Ghana Ghana 3.3% 12% Congo, 3% Equatorial Benin Rep. Angola Nigeria 4.G6%uinea South 8% 3% 10% 4% Angola Sudan Africa Togo 10.9% 11% 20% Algeria Nigeria 4% Sudan Morocco Benin 7% 22.2% 4% 6% 5% Source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD (2008) Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census Export 2009 Figure 9: African exports to China by product, 2007 China America 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% U.S.-African Trade Profile – 2009 www.agoa.gov - 10 - 0% 1 2345678 910 Products Source: COMTRADE 3 China Imports from Africa: Angola, 34.25%; South Africa, 19.55%; Sudan, 11.05%; Rep. Congo, 7.52%; Equatorial Guinea, 4.49%; Libya, 4.10%; Algeria, 3.08%; Gabon, 2.91%; Others, 13.05 15 Leading Sub-Saharan African Suppliers to the United States U.S. imports from Africa remained highly concentrated among a small number of suppliers. Four countries – Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, and Republic of Congo – accounted for 83.7 percent of U.S. purchases in 2008. The share of imports from Angola and the Republic of Congo increased, while Nigeria’s and South Africa’s shares decreased slightly. Oil imports from Angol a and Republic of Congo outpaced oil imports South Africa (20%), Sudan (11%) and Republic of Congo (8%)3. The high countryfrom Nconcigerentratioia. Imponr tos fo f platinum and diamonds declined from South Africa and increases in imports of vehicles and iron and steel products were not enough to bring China’s imports in part reflects the importance of crude oil (70 percent of importsSo ufromth A fAricfricaa’s i m(figureport sh are up. Equatorial Guinea’s and Chad’s shares increased with a rise in oil imports from both countries, while Gabon’s share declined as the small 9), which accounts for almost all of China’s imports from Angola and the Sudan.in cChreaina’sse in oagilricu implturalorts fr om the country did not keep pace with the other oil producing countries. imports have a modest share, although they constitute the bulk of imports from several African countries. U.S. Imports from Major Sub-Saharan Africa Trading Partners, 2008 Figure 8: Breakdown bby country of Chinese exportsSimilarities and imports in trade in Afr structureica (2007) between China and America with Africa Exports Imports Gabon Chad 2. 6% Liberia Gabon 3.9% Other 5.9% 2% 3% Equatorial Guinea Others 3.9% Others South Algeria Libya 13% 18% Africa 3% 2% Angola Congo 21% Libya 5.9% Nigeria 34% Kenya 4% 44.2% 3% South Africa Egypt 11.6% Ghana 12% Congo, 3% Equatorial Rep. Angola Nigeria Guinea South 3% 8% Sudan 10% 4% Africa Angola Togo 11% 20% 22.0% Algeria 4% Sudan Morocco Benin 7% 4% 6% 5% Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census Source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD (2008) Import 2009 China America Figure 9: African exports to China by product, 2007 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% U.S.-African Trade Profile – 2009 www.agoa.gov 30% - 12 - 20% 10% 0% 1 2345678 910 Products Source: COMTRADE 3 China Imports from Africa: Angola, 34.25%; South Africa, 19.55%; Sudan, 11.05%; Rep. Congo, 7.52%; Equatorial Guinea, 4.49%; Libya, 4.10%; Algeria, 3.08%; Gabon, 2.91%; Others, 13.05 15 Similarly to trade patterns, China’s outward FDI to Africa is dominated by a few resource-rich countries, plus South Africa (figures 14 and 15). From 2003-07, over half of Chinese FDI flows into Africa were absorbed by three countries: Nigeria (20.2%), South Africa (19.8%) and Sudan (12.3%). Algeria (oil) and Zambia (minerals) came 4th and 5th, respectively. FDI to Nigeria is set to rise: according to the Financial Times, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), a State-owned enterprise and one of the three major energy players in China, is negotiating the acquisition of rights to 1/6th of Nigeria’s oil reserves.6 Figure 14: China’s FDI flows into Africa by FigurSimilaritiese 15: China’s FDI stocksof Investment in Africa by Structure between destination (2003-2007) location (2007) China and USA Congo, Ethiopia Dem, Rep Nigeria South 1% 2% 20% Others Africa 16% Others 23% Mauritius 11% South 2% Africa Ethiopia Nigeria 20% 2% Guinea 14% 2% Tanzania Egypt 2% 2% Sudan Angola 12% Mauritius Sudan 2% 13% 3% Egypt Congo, Algeria Zambia Dem, rep Zambia Algeria 3% 9% 8% 10% 4% 12% Niger Niger 3% 4% Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2008 China 2007 America Most Chinese enterprises investing in strategic sectors, such as oil, minerals or infrastructure, are state- owned (by either the central government or local governments-- Chen and Jian, 2009) and receive government grants or loans from State-owned banks. These enterprises often manage large investment projects (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). For instance, the State-owned China National Petroleum Corp is the leading foreign investor in Sudan. Chinese medium- to large-sized enterprises are found mainly in the manufactured goods, telecommunications and wholesale trade sectors.
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