Correspondence Austin Long Dinshaw Mistry Going Nowhere Fast: Bruce M

Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast Correspondence Austin Long Dinshaw Mistry Going Nowhere Fast: Bruce M. Sugden Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles

To the Editors (Austin Long writes):

In his article, Bruce Sugden provides a cogent, technically sophisticated assessment of the use of conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) for the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) mission.1 To a large degree, however, the article elides one of the central issues in targeting, the “actionable intelligence” problem. Without actionable intelligence, CBMs will be of little use, so understanding the problems and prospects for acquiring such intelligence is central to evaluating their utility. In this letter, I critique the depiction of intelligence in Sugden’s article and provide additional information on the collection of actionable intelligence against the near-term target set, which Sugden describes as “emerging, time-sensitive, soft targets, such as exposed WMD [weapons of mass destruction] launchers, terrorist leaders, and sites of state transfers of WMD to terrorists or other states” (p. 117). I conclude by arguing that developing actionable intelligence on these targets is time consuming and requires the presence of U.S. assets, making both the prompt and global aspect of CBMs irrelevant.

deªning actionable intelligence Actionable intelligence against a near-term target set must have four qualities: precision, reliability, timeliness, and comprehensiveness. Precise intelligence for a conventional weapon requires a speciªc geolocation to ensure the destruction of the target and to limit collateral damage. Precision is critical because even a large conventional explosive payload will have a relatively limited lethal radius. For example, the U.S. Army’s tactical ballistic missile, known as the ATACM, has a 560-kilogram warhead that dispenses submunitions designed to destroy soft targets over an area roughly 180 meters by 180 meters.2 To have high conªdence that a similar warhead would be effec-

Austin Long is Assistant Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a member of Columbia’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He thanks Brendan Green, Robert Jervis, Joshua Rovner, Jack Snyder, and Caitlin Talmadge for helpful comments.

Dinshaw Mistry is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Bruce M. Sugden is a defense analyst based in Washington, D.C. This letter reºects the views of the author and does not represent the positions of his employer or clients.

For their valuable insights, the author thanks Robert Angevine, Jason Aquino, Jeffrey Engstrom, Andrew Herr, Zachary Mears, Timothy Miller, Megan Sullivan, and Frank Wolf.

1. Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 113–146. Subsequent references to this article appear parenthetically in the text. 2. See Henry Rogers, “Army Tactical Missile System and Fixed-Wing Aircraft Capabilities in the Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting Process,” M.S. thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, p. 11.

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tive in destroying the target of a CBM, the target would have to be located within an area of similar, if perhaps slightly larger, dimensions. A large warhead assumes, however, that collateral damage is not an issue. If the target were located in an area of high population density, such a warhead would kill doz- ens. If a smaller warhead were used to limit collateral damage, the target must be located more precisely. The intelligence must be reliable, in the sense of being both accurate and trustworthy, for similar reasons. If the intelligence is unreliable, one runs the risk of inºicting collateral damage and potentially provoking a major diplomatic in- cident. Unreliable intelligence is also wasteful (with each CBM costing tens of millions of dollars) and potentially alerts the target, which, if mobile, can then alter its behavior to make future targeting more difªcult. Intelligence that is timely must be received, processed, and transmitted quickly enough that the weapon can arrive before the target location changes. It does not have to be instantaneous and can even be predictive, rather than describing the target’s current location. One could imagine reliable intelligence that a target will be arriving at a certain location at a certain time. The intelligence would have to be very reliable, however, for planners to launch a weapon without conªrmation of that target’s actual presence, particularly if there were risk of collateral damage. The collateral damage issue also indicates the need for comprehensive intelligence, in the sense of placing a target in context. Without comprehensive intelligence, policymakers may be unable to determine whether destroying a target is worthwhile. Is terrorist leader X important enough to merit striking with a CBM? What would be the second-order consequences of striking terrorist Y, who is driving a truck loaded with anthrax? Even with comprehensive intelligence, calculating the costs and beneªts of striking a target will take time, the length of which is essentially irreducible, as it requires debate and thought at the highest levels of government. The decisionmak- ing process could potentially be so long that even near-instantaneous, highly reliable, and extraordinarily precise intelligence coupled to a CBM might not be suf- ªciently fast.

limitations of intelligence collection and targeting Sugden argues “that a myriad of intelligence collection sensors and sources will periodically provide the timely and detailed information required for successful execution of a PGS mission” (p. 123). He then brieºy describes these modes of collection, including imagery satellites, radar satellites, aircraft, human intelligence, and signals intelligence. He concludes with a discussion of U.S. success in tracking terrorist targets. Closer examination reveals a host of problems with intelligence collection against the near-term target set for CBMs. Sugden himself notes that imagery and radar satellites are not persistent and are of limited utility against individuals or targets such as single trucks, which “can avoid open areas and employ cover and concealment to reduce the probability of detection” (ibid.). Human intelligence is more useful, but as he notes, it is often unreliable or unavailable. Further, even when human intelligence is available, it may not be timely or precise. Sugden cites two unsuccessful attempts to kill Saddam Hussein based on human intelligence. He rightly notes that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer a key way to gain intelligence, as they can carry full-motion video, signals intelligence, and other sensors (pp. 123–124). Combined with other intelligence, UAVs can provide an excellent means of locating and targeting the near-term target set.

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If the United States can dispatch a UAV to the area, however, the need for PGS is nonexistent because the UAV can destroy the target. Indeed, the United States began its Predator UAV program to target Osama bin Laden before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.3 In the 2002 Yemen example that Sugden cites, a Predator following a car carrying six al-Qaida associates launched a Hellªre missile, destroying the vehicle and killing the occupants (p. 124). Strikes by U.S. UAVs against militant leaders have been ongoing in Pakistan for several years, most notably in the August 2009 killing of Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan. According to news reports, the use of UAVs is supported by additional intelligence collection on the ground in Pakistan in cooperation with the government of Pakistan.4 UAVs will not always be able to operate in a particular area, for a variety of reasons. Sugden therefore argues that U.S. signals intelligence “could compensate for shortfalls in other areas of intelligence collection” (ibid.). He then describes the killing of a target in Somalia using Tomahawk cruise missiles, attributing it to “signals intelligence and other collection tools” (ibid.). There is little detail on what this means, but the New York Times article that Sugden cites makes clear that gaining the actionable intelligence required tracking the target for weeks, hardly a ºeeting target of opportunity identiªed from a single communications intercept.5 Another example provides even greater detail on how such manhunts work. It de- picts the capture of Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaida ªgure, in Pakistan. The hunt began when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in Islamabad learned in February 2002 that he was in Lahore or Faisalabad. The intelligence community then used direction-ªnding techniques against his cellphone number: “Armed with Abu Zubaydah’s cellphone number, eavesdropping specialists deployed what some called the ‘magic box,’ an electronic scanner that could track any switched-on mobile phone and give its approximate location.” Abu Zubaydah was careful to limit his cellphone usage, however, so he could not be precisely located.6 Analysts then spent weeks developing a pattern around Abu Zubaydah’s cellphone number. Over time analysts “added more and more linked phone numbers from the eavesdropping ªles of the National Security Agency and Pakistani intelligence. They excluded known institutions like mosques and shops and gradually built a map of the network of contacts around Abu Zubaydah.” This effort ultimately produced a list of fourteen locations that could not be reduced further. These locations were then put under surveillance, and on March 28, all fourteen were raided simultaneously, resulting in Abu Zubaydah’s capture.7 Although there are no equivalent examples of locating sites of state transfers of WMD, intelligence collection and analysis of WMD programs is a long-term endeavor.8

3. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet In- vasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 525, 543–545. 4. Salman Masood, “Taliban in Pakistan Conªrm That Their Leader Is Dead,” New York Times, Au- gust 25, 2009; and Tim Reid, “Former CIA Agent’s Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistani Badlands,” Times (London), September 9, 2009. 5. Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia,” New York Times, May 2, 2008. 6. Scott Shane, “Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation,” New York Times, June 22, 2008. 7. Ibid. 8. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

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The U.S. intelligence community’s efforts to uncover the proliferation network of Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan took years. Ultimately, however, a ship carrying centri- fuge parts from Malaysia to Libya was intercepted, resulting in the network’s expo- sure.9 Determining the likelihood of a WMD transfer would require similar long-term monitoring of a suspected country’s programs. Three key points emerge from the discussion above. First, locating a particular target will take, at a minimum, weeks, as it did in the cases of the Somali target and Abu Zubaydah. The ªnal, most focused part of the hunt for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al- Qaida in Iraq, another example cited by Sugden, required about three weeks, according to a Multinational Force–Iraq spokesman.10 This vitiates much of the need for CBMs, because there would be ample time to move other assets such as aircraft into position, either on land or at sea. Sugden’s own analysis notes that if forward-deployed aircraft are available, they will be more capable than CBMs for at least the foreseeable future against mobile targets, assuming there is sufªcient strategic warning (p. 141). Indeed, the example of the Somali warlord shows that existing systems such as Tomahawk can be used successfully in such operations. Second, the Abu Zubaydah example shows that even diligence may not produce actionable intelligence for targeting a weapon. In the end, analysts could not reduce the number of likely locations to fewer than fourteen, and each had to be put under surveillance. If the Pakistanis had not cooperated in watching and then raiding these locations, each would have had to be targeted by a CBM, increasing the likelihood of substantial collateral damage even with small warheads. The chances of any U.S. president authorizing the destruction of fourteen targets in an urban area because analysts believe that a terrorist may be in one of them seems vanishingly small. For targeting in these scenarios, seeing really is believing. Third, the Abu Zubaydah example demonstrates that most signals intelligence used to produce actionable intelligence cannot be conducted without the presence of ground or airborne platforms. The “magic box” described in Sugden’s article was not a satellite or a distant listening post; it was present in Faisalabad. Other accounts of similar operations illustrate this truth, such as Mark Bowden’s description of the U.S. and Colombian governments’ hunt for the drug lord Pablo Escobar.11 This undermines Sugden’s characterization of U.S. signals intelligence as “nearly global and persistent.” Certainly some aspects of it are, but not the parts that would be required to provide actionable intelligence for targeting a CBM in almost all cases. The limitations of geolocation with signals intelligence stems from physics. Locating a radio emitter, including a cellphone, requires multiple observations of a signal. One common technique, time difference of arrival (TDOA), requires three or more receivers, each with a known position and separated from one another by some distance. Each will receive the same signal from an emitter at a slightly different time. By calculating

9. See William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “The Bomb Merchant: Chasing Dr. Khan’s Network,” New York Times, December 26, 2004. 10. See William B. Caldwell IV, “Pentagon Press Brieªng,” June 9, 2006, http://www.mnf- iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1236&Itemid=128. 11. Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). See also Michael Smith, Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006); and Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations: Selected Perspectives and Experience (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2007).

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the difference in signal arrival time between a pair of receivers, analysts can locate the emitter on a hyperbola. The intersection of two or more hyperbolas provides a localiza- tion of the emitter. The accuracy of this location is affected by errors in the position of the receivers, errors in the clocks used to time the signal arrivals, errors in the frequency synchronization of the receivers, and the geometry of the receivers, with wide separation among receivers producing the most precise location.12 Using this technique from space, where U.S. signals intelligence is unconstrained by access issues, is possible but difªcult. The geometry of the satellites is constrained by orbital parameters to suboptimal separation of receivers. Combined with the other errors in timing, receiver location, and synchronization, this limits the ability of satellite receivers to precisely locate the emitter. Although this may be sufªcient for some activities, it is unlikely to provide the information needed to target CBMs. For example, the United States reportedly operates sets of three satellites in low earth orbit that use TDOA to locate emitters. The U.S. Navy used this program, referred to variously as Classic Wizard, White Cloud, or Parcae, to track Soviet naval ships through their radio frequency emissions. According to a Russian military journal, the accuracy of the location of the emitter obtained by these satellite groups was likely between 2 and 10 kilometers, which was sufªcient to allow the calculation of the bearing and speed of Soviet ships using multiple “passes” of satellite groups overhead. Loca- tion, bearing, and speed could then be used to target Tomahawk cruise missiles, which would ºy to the area and start a search pattern using onboard guidance systems.13 The same or even somewhat better precision, however, will be insufªcient for most near-term target sets. A location error of even 1 kilometer would be unacceptable, un- less the CBM had an effective means of terminal guidance. Although this type of terminal guidance is feasible (though not yet developed) for certain readily identiªed targets, such as military ships, its usage seems highly implausible for terrorist leaders or sites of state transfers of WMD. These targets will be virtually impossible to detect and classify, particularly in the short time frame of the terminal phase of a CBM. This also assumes that the target is emitting a signal strong enough for satellites to detect. Although common sense indicates that this is the case with satellite phones, it might not be true with the very low power of cellphones. The only near-term assets that might be successfully targeted are exposed WMD launchers, presumably Iranian or North Korean long-range missiles such as the Shahab or Taepodong. These missiles are large, difªcult to hide, and essentially immobile; also, they require fueling before launch. Therefore, U.S. intelligence would almost surely be aware if they were brought to ªring readiness, through satellite imagery and other sources. Yet the likelihood of these weapons being used against the United States or its allies except in a dire crisis are slim. Such a crisis would provide more than sufªcient strategic warning to move other assets into place for use in preemption against the mis-

12. See Richard A. Poisel, Introduction to Communication Electronic Warfare Systems, 2d ed. (Boston: Artech House, 2008); and K.C. Ho and Y.T. Chan, “Solution and Performance Analysis of Geoloca- tion by TDOA,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, Vol. 29, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 1311–1322. 13. A. Andronov, “Kosmicheskaya Sistema Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA ‘Uayt Klaud” [The U.S. Navy’s “White Cloud” Spaceborne ELINT System], Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 7 (1993), trans. Allen Thomson. See also Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

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siles. Sugden’s assessment notes that both aircraft and CBMs are effective against “soft, ªxed” targets of this type (ibid.). The only exception might be a “bolt from the blue” attack, wherein the leadership of the country launches a strike without being involved in an ongoing crisis. Yet there is no example of this having occurred when the target to be attacked has had nuclear weapons, as it is tantamount to committing national suicide. Moreover, if a country’s leadership awoke one morning ready to commit (or, at a minimum, risk) national suicide by using WMD against the United States or its allies, there would be no useful warning, because the fueling of the missiles would likely not be interpreted in a timely manner. What analyst could quickly and convincingly determine that the readying of missiles, which could be for a test or an exercise, was a warning that a nation was about to chance nuclear catastrophe for no apparent reason? What policymaker would believe this analysis?

conclusion Bruce Sugden is not alone in at least tentatively embracing CBMs for certain missions. He draws extensively on a report by the National Research Council’s Naval Studies Board.14 Former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and James Schlesinger have also called for the United States to ªeld CBMs.15 None of these other advocates advance more convincing evidence than Sugden on the question of actionable intelligence. The Naval Studies Board report notes, “If U.S. forces are deployed in the area and maintain control of the airspace, a high-altitude system such as Global Hawk could detect and locate a target with synthetic aperture radar or light imaging—assuming suitable ªduciary points. However, where satellites are needed to detect the target, the detection will be episodic at best. And sometimes it will be necessary to rely on human intelligence and to translate information like ‘The ship is moored at Pier 9’ into coordinates.”16 Yet, if U.S. forces are present, CBMs will not be needed. If U.S. forces are not present, there is little prospect of obtaining actionable intelligence on these targets from satellites. Even collection on the ground from human and signals intelligence may not produce actionable intelligence and would likely require cooperation with the host nation, which could simply arrest the target, as in the case of Abu Zubaydah. Brown and Schlesinger assume away the problem. They begin by hoping that in the future “our real-time intelligence will have reached a high degree of accuracy, precision, and timeliness” to enable CBM strikes on terrorists transporting nuclear weapons.17 Although this is a comforting thought, it has little prospect without a forward- deployed U.S. presence that could obviate the need for a CBM. CBMs are an impressive weapon that no doubt appeals to American technophilia. The ability to drop a warhead almost anywhere in the world in less than an hour seems to many a reason to have one “just in case.” Yet it is not a cost-free weapon, in terms of

14. National Research Council, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: National Acad- emies Press, 2008). 15. Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, “A Missile Strike Option We Need,” Washington Post, May 22, 2006. 16. National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, pp. 53–54. 17. Brown and Schelsinger, “A Missile Strike Option We Need.”

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dollars and potential nuclear ambiguity. For the former, the per-unit production cost of a Trident D-5 is more than $30 million.18 This excludes developing both the conventional warhead and the command and control system to target it, which will cost at least several hundred million dollars, if not more.19 Sugden rightly notes that the issue of nuclear ambiguity can be ameliorated but will always carry some risk (pp. 142–144). Analysts should therefore look past the technical speciªcations of the weapon and closely examine the prospect that a target for which a CBM would be appropriate and necessary can actually be located. The conclusion must be that CBMs are an excellent solution to a problem that does not exist. —Austin Long New York, New York

To the Editors (Dinshaw Mistry writes):

Bruce Sugden argues that the United States should deploy long-range conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) in support of the prompt global strike (PGS) mission.1 He builds on arguments for conventional long-range missiles made by analysts and policymakers since the mid-2000s. Broadly speaking, CBM proponents maintain that the United States needs long-range missiles that can hit distant targets precisely (i.e., with an accuracy of a few meters) and promptly (within one hour of the order to launch the missile). These niche targets include terrorist leaders meeting in a particular location for a short period of time, as well as terrorists or states of concern transporting or preparing to launch weapons of mass destruction.2 Still, Congress has been cautious about funding CBMs. For example, it rejected the Department of Defense’s 2007 budget request to arm nuclear-tipped Trident missiles with conventional warheads because of concerns about the conventional Trident missile and its belief that other weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and drones can also deal with the niche targets noted above. In assessing concerns about the conventional Trident, Sugden focuses entirely on the issue of “nuclear ambiguity,” which is “the risk of the target state, or a third-party state that detects a missile traveling toward its territory, misinterpreting the ballistic missile ºight as an indicator of nuclear attack and responding with nuclear weapons” (p. 141). This concern is deemed to be “the strongest case against CBMs” (ibid.).3 Yet,

18. U.S. Navy, “Trident Fleet Ballistic Missile,” Fact File, updated January 17, 2009, http://www .navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1400&ct=2. 19. U.S. Navy requests for initial development in ªscal years 2007 and 2008 were $127 million and $175.4 million, respectively. See Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Mis- siles: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 2007), Order Code RL33067. 1. Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 113–146. Further references to this article appear in parentheses in the text. 2. These situations were outlined in an inºuential op-ed about CBMs. See Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, “A Missile Strike Option We Need,” Washington Post, May 22, 2006. 3. The U.S.-Russia nuclear ambiguity issue was frequently mentioned and framed as being the most important concern in policy discourse about the conventional Trident. For example, a study

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even if this were true, there are other concerns about the conventional Trident that need to be addressed. These concerns, related to missile proliferation, regional nuclear ambiguity, and nuclear arms control, considerably alter the cost-beneªt analysis made by CBM proponents and make a strong case against proceeding with the conventional Trident and other CBMs.

the missile proliferation concern U.S. deployments of long-range conventional ballistic missiles would considerably undermine the global regime to restrain the spread of ballistic missiles. Prevailing discourse about the conventional Trident has downplayed this missile proliferation issue. Some studies, including Sugden’s, do not address it at all.4 Others discuss the issue only brieºy. For example, a National Academy of Sciences report dismissed the proliferation implications of long-range conventional missiles in just a few sentences: “In general, countries will do what is in their own national interest and within their technological capability and ªnancial capacity, regardless of what the United States does— or does not do—about CPGS [conventional PGS]. . . . Nor is CPGS likely to have a substantial effect on efforts to impede the spread of ballistic missile or nuclear technology.”5 Such assertions do not fully consider the negative missile proliferation implications of conventional Trident deployments. For more than two decades, the United States has led international efforts against ballistic missile proliferation. Washington was instrumental in establishing and ex- panding the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibits the transfer of missiles and missile technologies. Since the 1980s, a large number of missile technology suppliers have accepted the MTCR’s norms and practices. A combination of MTCR embargoes, U.S. diplomacy, regional political and security considerations, and domes- tic factors restricted the missile programs of nine states (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, and Taiwan).6 Some of these states gave up their missile programs entirely, and others were limited to building short-range missiles. The MTCR has been augmented by the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, signed by more than 100 states.

by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) referred to nuclear ambiguity as the “most promi- nent” concern. See National Research Council, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008), p. 72. Similarly, congressional discussions on the Trident, sum- marized in a letter, stated that nuclear ambiguity was “critical” to congressional opposition to the conventional Trident. See “Letter from Senators Daniel Inouye and Ted Stevens to Dr. Ralph Cicerone, President, National Academy of Sciences,” February 16, 2007, quoted in ibid., p. 173. 4. This issue was neglected in reports by the Congressional Research Service. See, for example, Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Con- gress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 2007), Order Code RL33067. Nor was the issue mentioned in statements by military and administration ofªcials in congressional testimony, such as at a major congressional hearing on March 28, 2007. See United States Senate, hearing before the Committee on Armed Ser- vices, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., March 28, 2007, http://armed- services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=2652. 5. National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, p. 81. 6. Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and Inter- national Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003).

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Thus, under an evolving missile nonproliferation regime, ballistic missiles have been internationally stigmatized, largely because they are a key nuclear delivery system and their proliferation undermines the nuclear nonproliferation regime.7 An international norm proscribes missiles with ranges of more than 300 kilometers (these thresholds are noted in the MTCR).8 Only six states currently build and deploy medium-range or intermediate-range missiles (these terms are often used interchangeably for missiles with ranges of 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers). Of these states, four (China, India, Israel, and Pakistan) maintain their medium-range missiles primarily for delivering nuclear rather than conventional weapons. A ªfth, North Korea, was prepared to give up its medium- range missiles under an agreement with President Bill Clinton’s administration that ultimately was not completed.9 Finally, the ªve states that do possess long-range missiles have reinforced norms against conventionalizing them. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States maintain their long-range missiles solely for nuclear deterrence purposes; they have not conventionally armed these missiles and have never used them in combat. In addition, Russia and the United States destroyed their medium-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and France and the United Kingdom do not have such missiles. In this context, if the United States legitimizes the use of ballistic missiles (especially those with ranges beyond MTCR thresholds) for conventional missions, after they have been stigmatized for more than two decades as a weapon of concern, other states would be more likely to develop their own “conventional” ballistic missiles.10 Many of the states that restricted themselves to short-range missiles, but have the technological capability to build missiles with greater ranges, could assert that they are following the U.S. example and develop such missiles. Moreover, once the ballistic missile becomes more widely used as a conventional weapon, the seriousness of the missile proliferation issue would diminish; the norm against the spread of ballistic missiles would erode; and regimes that control the spread of missiles would weaken. This situation is hardly desirable; a world with a strong missile nonproliferation regime and few states possessing missiles is, simply put, far better for U.S., regional, and international security than one with a weak missile nonproliferation regime and the extensive proliferation of ballistic missiles. For this reason, policymakers and analysts have called for further strengthening the missile nonproliferation regime through global treaties against entire classes of missiles.11

7. Mark Smith, “Pragmatic Micawberism? Norm Construction on Ballistic Missiles,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3 (December 2006), pp. 526–542. 8. Among the states without medium-range or long-range ballistic missiles, only two currently deploy ballistic missiles with ranges beyond MTCR thresholds: Egypt and Syria have Scud-C missiles with ranges of 500 to 700 kilometers. China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have ballistic missiles with similar ranges and also have medium-range missiles. Meanwhile Russia has built the 480-kilometer range Iskander missile, which is within the 500-kilometer- range limits of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. 9. In 2009 the North Koreans again indicated that they could consider a missile deal, stating, “If we can have nuclear negotiations, why not missile negotiations?” Selig S. Harrison, “Living with a Nuclear North Korea,” Washington Post, February 17, 2009. 10. Steve Andreasen, “Off Target? The Bush Administration’s Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 36, No. 6 (July/August 2006), pp. 6–11. 11. Calling for the universalization of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, Kenneth

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An early argument that addressed missile proliferation concerns was that the United States would restrict itself to just twenty-four conventional Tridents, and this limited number of missiles supposedly would not undermine existing practices against the widespread use of medium-range and long-range conventional ballistic missiles.12 Yet these early arguments have been overtaken by technological and military impulses to develop a series of conventional missiles superior to the conventional Trident. Analysts and defense planners are conceptualizing at least ªve types of long-range conventional ballistic missiles for missions far beyond the limited niche missions initially proposed for the conventional Trident.13 In short, once the United States deploys the conventional Trident and breaks the norm against conventionalizing long-range missiles, it is likely to develop several other such missiles. These U.S. CBM deployments would undermine norms against missiles and the global missile nonproliferation regime.

regional nuclear ambiguity and the nuclear taboo Another major concern with conventionalizing long-range missiles, which has not been examined in studies of the issue, involves the problem of regional nuclear ambiguity. If the United States conventionalizes its long-range missiles, existing nuclear-armed powers would be more likely to arm their medium-range and long-range missiles with conventional warheads, raising serious concerns about crisis stability. Despite having far different nuclear capabilities and doctrines compared with those of the United States, other nuclear powers have at times closely copied its nuclear policies when it is technically feasible, and it is certainly feasible for them to conventionalize their nuclear missiles.14 In this context, the nuclear ambiguity issue in regional nuclear dyads (such as the China-India; Pakistan-India; Pakistan-Israel; and, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Iran-Israel dyads) would be serious. Moreover, ambiguity mitigation and transparency measures being proposed for the U.S.-Russia dyad would be harder to implement in more volatile regional situations. In a political-military crisis, a regional power could misinterpret a conventional ballistic missile ªred from its regional nuclear rival as an indicator of a nuclear attack and could respond with nuclear weapons. Breaking the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons would be detrimental not only to the parties involved but also to U.S. and international security.15

Adelman writes, “We now need a new taboo against testing, developing and deploying medium- range missiles....Aglobal treaty signed by more than 100 states would stigmatize the testing and developing of such missiles. And that would be a good start.” Adelman, “A Long-Term Fix for Medium-Range Arms,” New York Times, September 24, 2009. 12. Bruce MacDonald, “Conventional Trident Provides a Vital Option,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 36, No. 7 (September 2006), p. 52. 13. These are the Conventional Trident Missile (CTM); the CTM-2; the Submarine-Launched Global Strike Missile; the boost-glide missile initial version, CSM-1, which could become operational around 2017; and the boost-glide missile second version, CSM-2, which could become operational around 2022. See National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, p. 5. 14. For example, India altered its nuclear doctrine to include language that closely copied U.S. policies and doctrines. Scott D. Sagan notes, “The signalling and legitimising effects of U.S. nuclear doctrine are by no means the only factors leading to such trends in India, but they [i.e., the effects of U.S. nuclear doctrine on India’s policies] should not be minimised.” See Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3 (June–July 2009), p. 176. 15. Highlighting the importance of the nuclear taboo for U.S. nonproliferation policy, a Council on

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nuclear arms control The widespread deployment of long-range conventional ballistic missiles by the United States would undermine future prospects for deep cuts in the number of nuclear weapons. CBMs are of concern because they can be rearmed with nuclear weapons. In addition, Moscow is concerned that conventional long-range missiles could strike its nuclear assets and degrade its deterrent.16 A small number of CBMs would not undermine U.S.-Russian deterrence stability, given the relatively high nuclear warhead limits of the Strategic Offensive Reductions treaty. A large number of CBMs, however, would undermine deterrence stability when the United States and Russia move to nuclear levels below those of the START follow- on treaty. (Under the START follow-on treaty, Washington and Moscow are negotiating to limit the number of their strategic warheads to 1,600, and the number of their strategic delivery vehicles to 800). This point is echoed in the National Academy of Sciences report, which noted that CBM deployments would raise concerns in situations where U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear force levels are less than four times the number of long-range conventional-missile warheads.17 Thus, once the United States goes beyond a limited deployment of twenty-four Tridents and builds the additional CBMs it is conceptualizing, such large-scale deployments of, say, more than 100 CBMs in the next dec- ade would undermine prospects for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces beyond levels of the START follow-on treaty.

conclusion Bruce Sugden has provided a reasonable technological-military argument for long- range conventional ballistic missiles, outlining the military requirements for these missiles and their superiority over other conventional weapons for a very small number of military missions.18 These beneªts, however, are outweighed by the costs and concerns presented above. In this situation, it is hard to support Sugden’s conclusion that “for the long term, the United States should continue investing resources into research and development of improved ballistic missile technologies and payloads” (p. 146). Instead, the United States should make every effort to strengthen the missile nonproliferation regime by

Foreign Relations report states, “The objective of ensuring that a nuclear weapon is never used is central to creating the political conditions” for a stronger nuclear nonproliferation regime. See Wil- liam J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and Charles D. Ferguson, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, April 2009), p. xiv. 16. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Reducing Russia’s Reliance on Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, ed., Engaging Russia and China on Nuclear Disarmament, Oc- casional Papers, No. 15 (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2009), p. 100. 17. National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, p. 84. 18. Such missions against niche targets are still very hard, and may rarely be attempted, because of the difªculty of acquiring actionable intelligence and having in place extensive supporting mechanisms. On this issue, and on the feasibility of using other conventional weapons for less ex- acting and more likely missions against ºeeting targets, see Woolf, Conventional Warheads for Long- Range Ballistic Missiles, p. 21; Dennis Gormley, The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority, Proliferation Papers, No. 29 (Paris: Institut Français des Rela- tions Internationales, Fall 2009), p. 18; and Joshua Pollack, “Evaluating Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January/February 2009), pp. 13–20.

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not developing and using new long-range ballistic missiles. It should reinforce current practices against conventionalizing and using long-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. And rather than pursuing the conventional Trident, the United States should invest in other parts of the PGS portfolio (such as stealthy, unmanned aircraft), and should continue to rely on cruise missiles, Special Forces, and drones for quick strikes against terrorists and other niche targets. Such an approach would enable the U.S. military to maintain PGS capabilities without raising concerns about U.S.-Russia, U.S.- China, and regional nuclear ambiguity; without undermining the global missile nonproliferation regime; and without jeopardizing prospects for deep cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals over the next couple of decades. —Dinshaw Mistry Washington, D.C.

Bruce M. Sugden Replies:

In “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” I made three principal arguments.1 First, the United States should deploy near-term conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs), such as the U.S. Navy’s proposed Conventional Trident Modiªcation (CTM), to hold at risk time-sensitive, high-value, soft targets. I explicitly identiªed the conditions that would make a CBM the favored weapons system to employ against such targets: the availability of actionable intelligence and the absence of alternative U.S. forward-deployed forces within sufªcient range of the target(s) that could complete the mission before the window of vulnerability closes. Thus, I argued that near-term CBMs would help to fulªll a niche mission. Second, near-term U.S. CBMs would be able to defeat either soft targets protected by sophisticated air defense systems or the soft elements of the air defense system itself, such as radar installations and surface-to-air missile batteries. Using CBMs against these types of targets could de- crease the risk posed to U.S. aircraft and aircrews as they ºy through hostile airspace as part of a major combat operation (e.g., the U.S. military campaign against Iraq in 1991). Third, if the difªculty and risk of reaching this second class of targets using present-day U.S. weapons systems—manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cruise missiles—were to increase over time, then the importance of U.S. CBM deployment, beyond the scope of the CTM proposal, would also increase. Because of the long lead times associated with ªelding complex, technologically sophisticated U.S. weapons systems, and potential U.S. adversaries’ deployment of increasingly capable anti-access and air defense systems, now is the time to analyze the appropriate tools for carrying out the near-term U.S. prompt global strike (PGS) mission, in particular, and developing long-term, nonnuclear global strike capabilities in general. Austin Long and Dinshaw Mistry raise several concerns with, and objections to, the proposed deployment of U.S. CBMs, and I appreciate their responses to my article.

1. Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 113–146. Additional references to this article appear in parentheses in the text.

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With their letters, they have contributed to a more complete understanding of the political and military issues surrounding U.S. CBMs. Nevertheless, the criticisms of Long and Mistry fail to undermine the argument for near-term U.S. CBM deployment. More- over, they ignore the argument for the long-term U.S. CBM mission altogether. Due to space constraints, I brieºy reply to only four of their concerns and criticisms.

long’s focus on post-2001 u.s. counterterrorism activities The thrust of Long’s critique against near-term deployment of U.S. CBMs is that “developing actionable intelligence on [the near-term PGS target set] is time consuming and requires the presence of U.S. assets, making both the prompt and global aspect of CBMs irrelevant.” Because of the delay involved with precisely locating a target, he argues, “there would be ample time to move other assets such as aircraft into position, either on land or at sea.” Long’s argument does not withstand close examination, however, because it ultimately rests on hasty generalizations from a handful of post- 2001 U.S. counterterrorist cases and an excessive degree of certitude in how future U.S. military contingencies will evolve. actionable intelligence and effective cbm strikes. In discussing four qualities of actionable intelligence—precision, reliability, timeliness, and comprehensiveness— Long does not explicate how much of each quality would be sufªcient for U.S. decisionmakers, especially the president, to order the launching of a PGS mission, whether by using a CBM or another weapons system. I contend that the overall quality of actionable intelligence sufªcient for ordering a PGS mission would depend on a myriad of factors, including the overall strategic objective of the United States; whether other military assets can reach the target within the required period of time; the importance of the target to the enemy’s strategy; and the political pressures acting on the president. In addition, Long goes on to suggest that with actionable intelligence in the hands of senior decisionmakers, the time required for weighing the costs and beneªts of striking a target “is essentially irreducible.” On the contrary, the time required for senior decisionmakers to select a course of action is, of course, reducible. Using the aforemen- tioned factors as a guide, for example, they may decide well in advance how much collateral damage is acceptable given the importance of the target. They might decide that because it was so difªcult to obtain precise location information on an elusive, high-value target in the ªrst place, they must promptly order a strike. They could also pre-delegate authority to strike the target to a theater commander to compress the kill chain (p. 117). These types of decisions, contrary to what Long suggests, would facilitate any PGS mission, including those employing cruise missiles, Special Operations Forces, aircraft, and CBMs. Anecdotal evidence from U.S. military operations conducted over the past two decades supports my view that a variety of collection sources occasionally produce actionable intelligence sufªcient for CBM strikes (pp. 123–124), and that senior decisionmakers have the time to order such strikes. Ghost Wars, a book that Long cites in his letter, supports the case that the quality of actionable intelligence that would enable a decisionmaker to order a strike against a target is not ªxed across time and space, and that it is ultimately up to the president, not bureaucratic procedures, whether the time required to select a course of action is reducible and how to weigh the costs and ben- eªts of prompt U.S. military action. In 1998, for example, President Bill Clinton made it clear to his senior aides that he would order a U.S. strike against al-Qaida’s Osama

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bin Laden if the intelligence community were conªdent of his location, and that he was more concerned with obtaining accurate location information on bin Laden than in minimizing collateral damage, though Clinton wanted to achieve both objectives, if possible.2 Furthermore, commenting on the quality of actionable intelligence that was desired before the president ordered a strike against bin Laden, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said he did not demand absolute certainty from U.S. intelligence agencies; he wanted “signiªcant” or “substantial” probability of success.3 When President Clinton obtained sufªcient actionable intelligence for ordering a cruise missile strike, bin Laden apparently departed the targeted location a few hours before the subsonic missiles arrived.4 In the prelude to, and the initial phase of, the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, moreover, evidence suggests that President George W. Bush, in part given the need to maintain public support for his administration’s management of the war effort, was impatient to begin military strikes against Taliban and al-Qaida targets, and the U.S. Department of Defense deployed forces and prepared overseas bases to support operations in Afghanistan as quickly as possible.5 Given the absence of signiªcant U.S. strike forces near Afghanistan in the days immediately following the al-Qaida attack on September 11, if accurate location information on bin Laden had become available to President Bush, what observer would think he would not have ordered a CBM strike on the al-Qaida leader if the option were the best available? location and deployment of u.s. forces. Long wrongly asserts that because U.S. forces on the ground or in the air provide the best means of collecting actionable intelligence, they can also defeat the target. He adds that there will be plenty of time to deploy U.S. aircraft or ships within range of time-sensitive targets to successfully prosecute PGS missions; therefore, CBMs will not be needed. CBMs might be needed, however, because U.S. forces already deployed near the target might not be able to defeat it, and the deployment of appropriate U.S. forces to the region could be delayed, or thwarted altogether, by factors beyond the control of the United States. First, intelligence agents on the ground who discover and track a high-value target, whether a human or military platform, might not be appropriately armed to kill or destroy it. Depending on the circumstances, they also may risk disclos- ing themselves as U.S. agents, and delaying future U.S. intelligence collection efforts against other targets in the area, if they moved against the ªrst target. Second, a UAV that collects intelligence could merely be an unarmed reconnaissance platform; or, if it were armed, it could have expended its weapons load on previous targets during the ºight. With the U.S. defense industry conducting research and development on micro UAVs, it is unlikely that all future UAVs will be armed with air-to-surface missiles suitable for destroying targets larger than a human.6 Third, in the period between transmit- ting actionable intelligence and receiving an order to destroy the target, agents on the

2. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet In- vasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 421–422, 530. 3. Ibid., p. 422. 4. Ibid., p. 411; and Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 5. 5. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 150, 156–158, 178–182, 241. 6. P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conºict in the Twenty-ªrst Century (New York: Penguin, 2009), pp. 117–119.

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ground could be captured or killed, and aircraft could be shot down (p. 124).7 There might not be ample time for sending in additional forces. Fourth, even if the agents or platforms that collected the actionable intelligence were armed, the target may be too well protected relative to the level of force they could employ against it within the required time line (p. 118). Fifth, high-demand assets, such as submarines armed with subsonic cruise missiles, might not be in position to strike a target quickly enough once actionable intelligence becomes available (p. 118).8 In his analysis, Long also ignores a central feature of U.S. defense planning: access for U.S. forces to overseas bases is not guaranteed. In describing how a joint military force may integrate future capabilities to generate desired tactical, operational, and strategic military outcomes, the Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept states that U.S. forces will face challenges in gaining and maintaining access to territory and airspace that would facilitate strikes against an adversary.9 In addition, the cornerstone of the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept is the assumption of “vastly reduced access to secure, U.S. controlled, overseas land bases.”10 Among the reasons for this assumption are that U.S. bases are sometimes targeted for attack, protests, and espionage; also, some foreign governments might not tolerate the costs associated with permit- ting U.S. forces access to their territory. In the 1990s, for example, the government of Uzbekistan seemed to be walking a ªne line between allowing U.S. UAV operations from its territory and maintaining secrecy about its cooperation; it could have stopped U.S. operations from its territory at any time.11 In 2003, Turkey denied the United States permission to conduct air strikes against Iraq from its territory.12 Moreover, even when U.S. forces have access to waters or friendly territory near a target, foreign governments might deny the United States permission to ºy aircraft and cruise missiles over their territories.13 In the 1986 U.S. air raid on Libya, France and Spain denied U.S. aircraft overºight rights. The denials added nearly 3,000 miles, and thus time, to the round-trip ºights originating in Britain.14 And in 2003, Turkey was not quick to grant permission for U.S. cruise missiles, launched from B-52s ºying from Britain, to travel over its territory.15 ºawed generalization and unjustiªed certainty. Strategists and military operations planners can always learn lessons from history, but the focus of their efforts is to anticipate and prepare for plausible military contingencies. Long shows that actionable

7. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was concerned about Afghanistan’s air defense system shooting down a UAV in the 1990s. See Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 526–527. 8. For an example of how competing missions may demand the same military assets, see ibid., p. 543. 9. Department of Defense, “Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept,” ver. 1.0, January 10, 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm. 10. Department of Defense, “Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept,” ver. 1.0, sec. 3, August 1, 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm. 11. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 457, 525. 12. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupa- tion of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006), p. 337. 13. Some targets might be so critical that U.S. decisionmakers will order a strike even without overºight rights. 14. Daniel L. Haulman, “Footholds for the Fighting Force,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Feb- ruary 2006), p. 76. 15. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, p. 337.

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intelligence for PGS missions against high-value, time-sensitive targets will continue to be rare in the near- and midterms, just as I did in “Speed Kills” (p. 116), but from four U.S. counterterrorist cases he cannot rule out a future scenario where U.S. intelligence agencies acquire location information on such a target, and there are no U.S. forces close enough to strike it before U.S. intelligence assets lose track of it. Moreover, in light of his limited set of cases, Long’s linear, deterministic extension of history and categorical statements regarding how future U.S. military contingencies will develop should raise red ºags in the minds of U.S. defense planners and strategists. Because of the risk and uncertainty intrinsic to defense planning, policymakers should think about whether appropriate U.S. forces will always be optimally positioned once a time- sensitive target has been located. They will conclude that there is a PGS capability gap that can be closed in the near term by CBMs.

mistry’s overstatement of the potential consequences of u.s. cbm deployment Mistry raises important issues when he argues that concerns related to missile proliferation, regional nuclear ambiguity, and nuclear arms control shape the outcome of a cost-beneªt analysis against deployment of the CTM and other U.S. CBMs. The picture Mistry paints of the international security environment and U.S. causal inºuence, however, is incomplete: nuclear weapons states have been developing and ªelding CBMs with increasing range and accuracy. As a result, nuclear ambiguity is already a concern in several regional dyads. Moreover, because the United States and Russia deploy dual- capable, long-range delivery systems and have managed to agree in the past on intrusive veriªcation measures to facilitate nuclear weapons reductions, U.S. CBMs would not necessarily undermine the prospects for additional reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. asia at the forefront of mixed missile forces. The gist of Mistry’s concern regarding U.S. CBM deployment is that if the United States “legitimizes” the use of CBMs, then other states “would be more likely to develop their own” CBMs, which, in turn, would increase the risk of crisis instability in regional nuclear dyads. The source of his slippery-slope scenario is that CBMs have been “stigmatized for more than two decades as a weapon of concern.”16 If there is an international stigma against CBMs, however, someone should inform China, India, and Pakistan. China is considered to have a top-notch ballistic missile production capability, and it has ªelded hundreds of conventionally aimed short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan.17 China has also been deploying the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which can hold U.S. military bases in the western Paciªc at risk with both conventional and nuclear warheads (p. 128 n. 56), and the “D” variant of the DF-21 is reportedly being developed as an antiship CBM capable of targeting U.S. aircraft carriers.18 In addition, although Mistry might not think that cruise missiles are as

16. To support his case, Mistry cites the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to which the United States is an adherent. The MTCR seeks to deny the international transfer of technologies related to UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, but it does not proscribe the indigenous production and ªelding of such weapons. 17. “Strategic Weapon Systems, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia (London: Jane’s Information Group, May 13, 2009), http://www.janes.com. 18. On the DF-21D, see ibid.

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militarily signiªcant as ballistic missiles, China has deployed cruise missiles capable of carrying conventional and nuclear weapons to ranges of 600 to 2,200 kilometers.19 Moreover, the Chinese defense industry is signaling its interest in long-range precision strike capabilities, including hypersonic cruise missiles that can travel up to 8,000 kilometers.20 India and Pakistan have also deployed mixed missile forces for use against regional targets.21 India’s Agni II MRBM, for example, is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, and longer-range versions of the missile are being developed so that Indian weapons can reach northeast China. Pakistan’s Shaheen II MRBM is also dual capable. As Mistry acknowledges, other states have deployed conventional SRBMs and MRBMs, but the nuclear weapons states have refrained from deploying intercontinental- range CBMs. Why has this been the case? Strangely enough, Mistry posits that a norm has developed against “conventionalizing” ballistic missiles. But it has actually been a practice of nuclear weapons states to abstain from building intercontinental-range CBMs, because most of the technologies for making them militarily effective weapons, especially high delivery accuracies, were not available prior to the 1990s. As I discussed in “Speed Kills,” to obtain the accuracy of U.S. aircraft-delivered payloads, which are critical for the efªcient use of conventional weapons in generating military effects, ballistic missile reentry vehicles require terminal guidance using organic radar or satellite navigation systems and a three-axis ºight control system (pp. 131–132). In contrast, some nuclear weapons states have had a valid military basis for deploying conventional SRBMs and MRBMs: they have contiguous borders with their adversaries (e.g., India-Pakistan and China-India), or they perceive regional security threats; and they have lacked highly trained and well-equipped air and naval forces capable of projecting effective, nonnuclear combat power deep into hostile environments.22 With the availability of enabling technologies, nuclear weapons states have been deploying CBMs of increasing range and accuracy. Thus, contrary to Mistry’s suggestion that other states would more likely deploy CBMs following U.S. CBM deployment, most countries that perceive national security threats will deploy weapons systems commen- surate with what they judge to be in their interest and resource capacity regardless of what the United States does.23 Furthermore, with the proliferation of mixed missile

19. “Offensive Weapons, China,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (London: Jane’s Information Group, June 24, 2009). On the military effectiveness of cruise missiles, see Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Contagion,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 4 (August–September 2008), pp. 137–148. 20. Mark Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: The Anti-Ship Ballistic Mis- sile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Paciªc and Beyond (Arlington, Va.: Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009), pp. 33–34. 21. “Comparing India and Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (London: Jane’s Information Group, November 11, 2009). 22. Mark Smith, “Pragmatic Micawberism? Norm Construction on Ballistic Missiles,” Contempo- rary Security Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3 (December 2006), p. 529; and Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 6–13. For similar reasons applied to China’s pursuit of an antiship CBM, see Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53–86. 23. The National Research Council is largely correct in its assessment of the proliferation implica-

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forces in Asia, the problem of regional nuclear ambiguity already exists across several dyads—without U.S. CBM deployment. From this reality, it is not clear which states Mistry thinks will be prompted to acquire CBMs because of U.S. deployment of such systems. prospects for nuclear arms reductions. Because CBMs can be rearmed with nuclear weapons, Mistry concludes that widespread U.S. deployment of long-range CBMs “would undermine future prospects for deep cuts in the number of nuclear weapons.” His concern over U.S. CBMs complicating nuclear arms reductions, however, is over- stated.24 The United States and Russia have deployed dual-capable delivery systems for decades (e.g., U.S. B-2A and B-52H bombers, U.S. AGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles, and Russian AS-15 and Kh-101/-102 air-launched cruise missiles), yet they have agreed to nuclear weapons reductions. The key enabler was an intrusive veriªcation regime, as was seen under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and Mistry fails to explain why such a regime would not also work for CBMs (p. 143). Mistry also mentions that Russia is concerned about a counterforce strike against its nuclear forces using CBMs, but its concern is unwarranted. To prevent Russian nuclear retaliation against a few U.S. targets following a CBM counterforce strike, at least four factors would have to line up perfectly in favor of the United States: (1) all Russian nuclear forces, including road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (p. 121), are off alert at known locations; (2) Russia’s early warning system fails to detect the incom- ing CBMs; (3) all targets are destroyed by the ªrst wave of CBMs; or, if any targets sur- vive, then (4) U.S. air and missile defenses shoot down the Russian nuclear delivery systems that manage to launch as part of a retaliatory strike. At best, the chances are slim that the United States would be successful in preventing retaliation. Although possible, it is implausible that U.S. leaders would risk this type of attack without at least a political crisis as a pretext, and the crisis should cause Russia to put its nuclear forces on alert.25

conclusion Austin Long’s and Dinshaw Mistry’s attempts to dispose of the case for U.S. CBM deployment, including the CTM, miss their mark. The plausibility of future military contingencies that would require the employment of U.S. CBMs are well grounded in history; what is known about worldwide military-technological developments; and un- certainties regarding the objectives and plans of potential adversaries. Moreover, a wide range of measures are available for mitigating concerns regarding CBMs and nuclear ambiguity (pp. 143–144), and U.S. CBM deployment will not likely create proliferation and arms control problems in addition to those that already exist. CBMs are

tions of U.S. CBM deployment. See National Research Council, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008), p. 81. 24. On why the desirability and likelihood of further U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons reductions are not foregone conclusions, see Bruce M. Sugden, “Assessing the Strategic Horizon: Nonproliferation, Security, and the Future U.S. Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (November 2008), pp. 499–514. 25. See the comments of James J. Wirtz, in Jeffrey S. Lantis, Tom Sauer, James J. Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber, and Daryl G. Press, “Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?” International Se- curity, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 174–193.

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needed because a myriad of intelligence collection sensors and sources will periodically provide actionable intelligence on time-sensitive targets for successful execution of PGS missions; and U.S. forces already deployed near the targets might not be able to defeat them, or the time required for appropriate U.S. forces to deploy to the region could ex- ceed the time it takes the targets to disappear from U.S. sights. Continuing to rely on ex- tant weapons systems for strikes against all time-sensitive or well-protected targets might result in mission failure, which is a high cost in itself. It follows that the United States should move beyond the status quo and deploy CBMs. —Bruce M. Sugden Washington, D.C.

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