CREEKS AND OPEN SPACES: NED FRITZ’S ENVIRONMENTAL CRUSADES

Jared Ingram, B.A., M.A.

Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

May 2020

APPROVED:

Michael Wise, Committee Chair Randolph B. Campbell, Committee Member Sandra Mendiola-Garcia, Committee Member Irene Klaver, Committee Member Jennifer J. Wallach, Committee Member and Chair of the Department of History Tamara L. Brown, Executive Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences Victor Prybutok, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School

Ingram, Jared. Creeks and Open Spaces: Ned Fritz’s Environmental Crusades.

Doctor of Philosophy (History), May 2020, 258 pp., 3 figures, bibliography, 77 primary resources, 105 secondary resources.

Edward C. Fritz was one of the most influential environmentalists in Texas history. Although he took a circuitous route to environmental activism, Fritz evolved into a powerful force fighting on behalf of Texan nature. Participating in substantial actions throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Fritz’s contributions to environmental activism resulted in the successful preservation of thousands of acres and multiple wildlife species. Fritz parlayed his legal background into effective activism, beginning his career with a successful lobbying campaign for protection of Harris

Hawks. He led the campaign to stop a decades old plan for canalization of the Trinity

River. The creation of COST combined Fritz’s environmental focus with the concerns of economic conservatives to prevent a billion dollar government funded project that would have significantly altered the river. Fritz then led a cadre who took over efforts to establish a preserve in the Big Thicket national forest. He oversaw the foundation of a protected area far larger than original expectations, capitalizing on the growing awareness of environmental issues in the 1970s. Fritz’s interest in the Big Thicket led to a fight against the Forest Service’s practice of clearcutting and its effect on Red

Cockaded Woodpeckers. Through litigation and legislation, Fritz fostered a grassroots movement aimed at reforming management of the national forests, saw the establishment of the state’s first wilderness, and saved the declining population of the woodpeckers. For his tireless approach and lifelong achievements, Fritz was given the title of “Father of Texas Conservation.”

Copyright 2020

By

Jared Ingram

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 2. JOINING THE FIGHT: NED FRITZ’S FIRST STEPS AS A CONSERVATIONIST ...... 26

CHAPTER 3. WELCOME TO THE WIDER WORLD OF ENVIRONMENTALISM ...... 47

CHAPTER 4. FLOOD CONTROL: NED FRITZ AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TRINITY RIVER CANAL ...... 85 History of the Trinity Barge Canal ...... 90 Ned Leads a Response to Save the Trinity ...... 101

CHAPTER 5. THE BATTLE OVER CLEAR-CUTTING: NED FRITZ’S FIGHT IN THE FOREST ...... 121 Ned Fritz Finds His Nemesis: Clear-Cutting in the National Forests ...... 124 Ned Fritz Sues the Forest Service ...... 140 The Four Notch Lawsuit ...... 148

CHAPTER 6. NED FRITZ IN THE 80s: NEW FRONTS IN THE FIGHT FOR THE FORESTS ...... 168 Establishing the First Texas Wilderness ...... 180 Ned Fritz’s Radical Interlude: Population and Immigration Control ...... 185 Pine Beetles and Woodpeckers: Escalation in the Fight over East Texas Forests ...... 192

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: NED FRITZ’S LATE STAGE ENVIRONMENTALISM, 1988-2008 ...... 229

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 248

iii CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Edward C. Fritz was an influential Texas environmentalist who participated in many of the state’s important environmental battles in the second half of the twentieth century. Gaining his fame through public battles for preservation of the Big Thicket

Forest, the Trinity River, and a lawsuit over timber cuts in the National Forests, Fritz became a central figure in Texas’ environmental movement. Although granted the honorary sobriquet “The Father of Texas Conservation” near the end of his career, Ned

Fritz’s decades of work as an environmental advocate represented far more to the history of environmentalism in Texas, and beyond, than the narrow categories of

“father” and “conservation” indicate. The notoriety he earned was so influential that he became known simply as Ned by his fellow environmentalists. Ned did not so much serve as an autonomous parent, or even patriarch, of environmental advocacy. Rather, as a lawyer trained originally in helping the poor and underrepresented, and as a long- time admirer of the nonhuman world, he was swept into the legal challenges to industrial pollution and suburban development that defined the rise of environmentalism and environmental advocacy in the United States following the Second World War. Ned

Fritz and environmentalism grew up together. The organizations that Fritz helped to establish and lead functioned as platforms for representing trees, water, birds, weeds, and other nonhuman beings according to the principles of an emerging environmental ethic committed to addressing political issues as issues embedded within a holistic ecology. His environmental advocacy broke squarely away from the older visions of conservation that had defined natural resource law in the United States in previous

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generations. Ned held much more in common with Rachel Carson than with Gifford

Pinchot or Theodore Roosevelt, pushing for more proactive solutions to environmental threats to the nation’s forests, rivers, and wildlife that were premised on an understanding of ecological interconnection. Ultimately, Fritz’s work on the Trinity River cemented his reputation as a powerful challenger to the forces of government and industry that pushed for endless development no matter the environmental cost.

However, Fritz’s sensibilities as an environmentalist emerged and also evolved over the course of his long career as a consumer credit attorney, as an advocate and lawyer for environmental causes, and as a leader on the front lines of Texas’ environmental movement.

Fritz embarked upon full-time environmental advocacy in the early 1970s. But he had developed his interests in environmental issues over a period of decades, with his attention to advocacy fostered through his experiences and outrage at what he perceived to be human attacks on a defenseless nonhuman world. Although his most important contributions to the movement all took place after his career shift to working as a full-time environmentalist, the features of his future success were evident much earlier. Understanding the life he led prior to transitioning into the environmental movement helps explain the factors motivating his involvement. Although most of Ned’s actions during the early years were devoted to establishing his legal career, the influences from his childhood interest in wildlife, the skills he gained as a lawyer and organizer, and his earnest belief in the righteousness of his cause were already on display throughout his youth and early career. Tracing the effect of events in his

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childhood, education, and the early years of his career will explain the ingredients of his

later effectiveness.

Fritz’s name itself evolved as his career transitioned. His professional name of

Edward C. Fritz was replaced by his childhood nickname of Ned as he advanced

through his career in the environmental movement. The evolution of his name will be

reflected in this biography, with the name switching from Fritz to Ned at the same time

as they changed in his life. Many of the terms related to his environmental career also

require clarification. One example is in the proper term to classify his time in the

environmental movement. There are many aspects of the title, “the Father of Texas

Conservation,” that make it an inaccurate sobriquet for describing Fritz’s advocacy

work. Conservation came into usage around the start of the twentieth century, premised, in the United States at least, around the concept of wise use—“the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest time” as Gifford Pinchot’s famous maxim

put it. During the Progressive Era, the professionalization of Pinchot’s U.S. Forest

Service, as well as the creation of other land and natural resource management

agencies at both federal and state levels, marked a major transformation in American

environmental policy as government took an active role in practicing these new

conservation principles in resource development. By the 1920s, these early

conservationists found themselves in opposition to preservationists, such as the

wilderness advocate Bob Marshall, who pushed for more expansive protections of

America’s public lands that would preclude even “wise use” development.1

1 A great deal of historical work has been penned on the history of conservation, preservation, and environmentalism in the twentieth-century United States. For some foundational starting points, see Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The

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Even though, in broad strokes, Ned was committed to preservation in a similar anti-development vein as earlier preservationists, Fritz’s own environmental ideas evolved alongside the emergence of a newer, ecological thinking that began to pervade

American environmental discussions following the Second World War. During the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, a series of scientific studies revealed how harmful pollutants spread throughout the environment in ways that were often invisible. Rachel Carson’s work, for instance, on the unanticipated toll that the chemical insecticide DDT had taken on American birds, exemplified this ecological turn. So too did the work of atomic scientists whose studies of the ecological uptake of deadly radioactive isotopes—such as cesium 137 and radio-iodine 131— led directly to the 1963 international ban on atmospheric nuclear testing. The phrase “environmentalist” came into wide use around the same time, at the same moment that Fritz began his participation in environmental efforts around Texas. Like other individuals across the country, Fritz understood that solutions to environmental problems needed to respond to a variety of interconnected political and ecological systems.

Even so, depicting Fritz’s unique style environmentalist requires some more elaboration. Ned was not an activist in the manner most would understand. Protests and public spectacles were a limited facet of his arsenal. Instead, Ned was primarily a legal organizer, creating spaces for new associations, leading litigation, and recruiting new acolytes for his causes who would work within the evolving frameworks of federal and state environmental policies. He pursued changes to the status quo, in some cases

Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993); and Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

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radical changes, but he did not believe it was in the best interest to push people or organizations past their breaking points. Joining the environmental movement as it grew into an effective force to combat industrial pollution and suburban development, Fritz deployed his legal background to the defense of what he considered to be modern

America’s voiceless victims—the trees, wildlife, and bodies of water under threat across

Texas and beyond. He blended a cooperative approach towards his allies with an aggressive and pugnacious attitude directed at his opponents. Focusing his ideological zeal on legal maneuvering, Fritz developed a combative and effective form of environmental advocacy. And, as an environmental advocate, he contributed to the broader movement as an innovator of new legal approaches to settling regulatory disputes, as well as serving as an organizer of new citizen groups. Placing Ned Fritz into this proper context as an environmental advocate—rather than as the “father of

Texas conservation”—helps demonstrate the significance of his career for environmentalism in Texas.

Ned was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on February 8, 1916, to Edward and Ethel Fritz. His father was an employee of the Atlantic Refining Company, formerly a subsidiary of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. Ned’s first home at 52nd and Walnut St. was in the middle of Philadelphia’s concrete jungle. There were few trees, and the tiny backyard had little to no vegetation. Ned’s only exposure to rural locations came on trips to the golf course or in summers spent on his grandfather’s farm.2 When he was seven, the company headquarters of Atlantic relocated to Tulsa, Oklahoma, a move that—in

2 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 7 February 1983,” interview by J.B. Smallwood, Texas Legacy Project, (Feb. 7, 1983).

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Ned’s recollection—completely altered the course of his life. Ned’s experiences in the

outskirts of the Ozark Mountains in Oklahoma instilled an interest in the outdoors, and

his eyes suddenly opened to a new world as he found solace in the sprawling

wilderness outside his new home. He enjoyed walking down to a nearby creek, inviting

friends on occasion, but increasingly going on his own. Ned explained that despite the

minimal time outdoors before moving to Oklahoma; once it became available, he

naturally gravitated towards nature.3 In multiple interviews covering the history of his

connections to the environmental movement, the question of how he developed into an

activist repeatedly came up. Ned admitted that even he was not sure how he came to

love natural spaces, but he often pointed to his childhood in Oklahoma as the onset of

his interest in conservation.4 These explorations led Ned toward his lifelong love of

“creeks and open spaces,” a phrase he often used to denote the small, wild places he

sought to defend through his advocacy work; places he found worthy of preservation

despite their seeming ubiquity and ordinariness.

Time spent outdoors during Fritz’s childhood was an important factor in his

development as an environmentalist. Interest in the local wilderness from trips to the

ravines, creeks, and “hollers” near his home saw additional gains when Ned was fishing

for catfish with his father. Eventually, Ned learned to fly fish, enabling him to spend

more time engaged with outdoors activities. His desire to spend time in the wilds around

his home led to his enrollment in High Y youth camps put on by the local YMCA. The

camps were a kind of pre-Boy Scout initiation centered on a number of active pursuits

3 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 May 1997,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (May 17, 1997). 4 Ibid.

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and the scientific aspects of the outdoors. Ned’s growing affection for the outdoors made joining the Boy Scouts a natural fit. Time in the scouts would offer Ned his first exposure to conservationist ideals that were a central component of the group’s creed.

Rising through the organization involved Ned in a compelling race to accrue merit badges. Part of his enjoyment of natural habitats was an encyclopedic knowledge of plants, trees, and animals. He looked at identifying the flora and fauna as a game of

“Trivial Pursuit.” While his experiences in Oklahoma were pushing Ned to a greater appreciation of the natural world, another facet of his future career also saw its antecedents blooming at a young age. One of the more important components of Ned’s time as an environmentalist was his ability as a writer. He got an early start at honing his skill as an author focused on wildlife and nature with a poem written as an eight-year old. His poem, titled “I Wish I Were a Robin”, was published in the local Tulsa Daily

World.5 Although the majority of Ned’s later writings were designed to advance a specific policy agenda, he regularly wrote or recited his poems about nature to inspire his followers.6 Ned’s attempts to earn scout merit badges, his relationship with the Boy

Scouts, and his early initiation into writing were important precursors to his later participation in environmental causes.

Fritz also excelled in school, earning acceptance into the University of Chicago following his graduation from high school. He left for college in 1934 after earning his certification as an Eagle Scout.7. At the University of Chicago, Ned studied pre-law and

5 Joe Simnacher, “Lawyer, Had Finger in Every Conservation Pie,” Dallas Morning News, Dec. 20, 2008. 6 Edward C. Fritz, Sterile Forest: The Case Against Clearcutting (Woodway, Texas: Eakin Press, 1983), 51. 7 Simnacher, “Lawyer, Had Finger in Every Conservation Pie,” Dallas Morning News.

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was an active member of several student organizations, including the Junior Bar

Association and the fraternity Phi Kappa Psi. Another organization he joined was the

Texas Political Union.8 As President of the group, Ned was responsible for organizing

public speakers. He invited representatives of several controversial ideologies, including

fascists and communists, to speak on campus. While Ned disagreed with their politics,

his belief in the value and strength of freedom of speech compelled him to allow their speeches. He graduated from the University of Chicago in 1938 with an AB degree.9

After graduation, Ned applied and gained admission to the University’s law school. He

did not stay long, however, for in 1939, Ned’s family again relocated, this time moving

from Oklahoma City to Dallas, Texas. Ned followed. He finished his legal studies at

Dedman law school at Southern Methodist University, graduating in 1940.10

Ned joined the U.S. Navy in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor in 1941. Already a trained lawyer, Ned was able to qualify for pilot training. Even though he successfully completed training and qualified as a pilot, he never saw any action.11 Instead, Ned spent most of the war years training other Navy pilots in Corpus

Christi, Texas. One of the pilots he trained was future President George H.W. Bush, a

fact he would remind Bush of when seeking his support for legislation while Bush was a

Texas Congressman.12 Ned transferred from Corpus Christi to San Diego in 1944. The

next year he moved to Seattle in order to train to fly the new PBY spy reconnaissance

8 Eugenia Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz (Dallas: Evergreen Stories), 2010, 14. 9 Law School Editors, “Law School Record,” University of Chicago Law School Record 8, no. 1 (1958): 40. 10 “Edward C. Fritz,” Dallas Morning News, Jan. 1, 2009. 11 Fritz, Life with Ned Fritz, 7. 12 M.W. Cagle, “George Bush Naval Aviator,” Air Power History 37, no. 1 (Fall Spring 1990): 10.

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planes.13 Before he could ever see combat, the war was over. The military based dismissal from service on experience, with combat veterans first in line. Ned secured his release in September of 1945 due to his long tenure and returned to Dallas to begin his career as an attorney.

The war was rather uneventful for Ned with one major exception—he met his wife Eugenia, or “Genie,” a woman who shared many of Ned’s passions and who would work tirelessly as Ned’s partner in advocacy work. On leave from his duties in Corpus

Christi, in 1944 Ned attended a social for his Phi Psi fraternity put on by the Chi Omega sorority. There he met a young sorority girl named Eugenia Dunn. She thought the tall, thin man with the shock of wild red hair was worthy of her attention. They dated for a short while before she was to return to live with her parents who worked in the Foreign

Service in Bogota, Colombia. Eugenia was not very excited about the prospect of returning to South America, and Ned suggested that they get married instead. Soon, after his transfer from Corpus Christi to San Diego, the two married on June 26, 1944, in

Pasadena, California.14 They were not alone for long as the first of their four daughters,

Linda, was born in Dallas in November of 1945.

Ned’s priority after returning from the war was to establish himself as an attorney in Dallas. In 1945, his first year outside of the armed forces, he took a job as an attorney working for the U.S. Office of Price Administration (OPA).15 During the post-war housing crisis, vacant apartments throughout Dallas were difficult to find, and one of the OPA’s tasks was to control rent inflation. Ned worked as a rent-enforcement lawyer for the

13 Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz, 7. 14 Ibid, 3. 15 Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz, 10.

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OPA, managing cases on behalf of exploited tenants with proprietors who ignored the

price controls and raised rents too high or too quickly.16 Although the job might not have

been the specialty he dreamed of coming out of law school, it was an excellent fit for

Ned. He liked the work because of the steady pay, and the job also left him time to

participate in his hobbies. The cases were usually easy to prove, payment for fault was

predetermined, and as he began to win, many of the defendants chose to settle.

Working during the height of the struggle for Civil Rights in Texas, Fritz’s work

representing Mexican American and African American clients living in poorer areas of

Dallas was not appealing to many other white lawyers. However, defending these

renters fit Ned’s personality because it entailed standing up for disadvantaged groups

against more powerful interests. At this early stage of his career, Ned already displayed

a pattern that would be present throughout his time in the environmental movement,

defending those unequipped to defend themselves. Although his time in the OPA would

be short-lived, the legal expertise he gained eventually led to Ned becoming one of the foremost legal authorities on consumer issues in the United States.

Ned’s legal career expanded after leaving the OPA. After only a year in the agency, he opened his own firm with $2,000 he had saved from his naval service.17 He

rented a space from another controversial Dallas legal mind, George Clifton Edwards,

who had previously run for the Governor of Texas on as a socialist candidate. Edwards

helped stabilize Ned’s income by referring clients with consumer issues. Joining Ned

were two other young Dallas lawyers, Windle Turley and Edward R. Vinson. Fritz,

16 Ibid, 11. 17 Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz, 10.

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Vinson, and Turley was his firm until Turley left for his own practice in 1968. Ned received a boost from his extensive network of friends. One of the better paying clients was the Texas State Credit Union League.18 Eventually, representing clients such as

the Credit Union provided enough of financial boost for him to retire from full-time

practice in his fifties. Although he expanded into corporate practice, Ned’s primary legal

work continued to be consumer issues. With usury—defined as any interest rate above

10 percent—still illegal in Texas until 1960, Ned was always able to find work with

victims of exploitative lenders.19 Ned continued to blaze a trail on consumer issues in

the firm. Ned’s work on Duty v. General Finance Company established the precedent of

liability for medical damages caused by aggressive debt collectors.20 Another one of his

cases made harassment of debtors illegal in the state. Ned’s reputation grew, and he

eventually advised groups such as the NAACP and the Mexican American Defense

League on strategies for dealing with debt collections. On occasion, the work had extra

complications. Since many of the lenders charging illegal interest rates had connections

to the mafia, Ned’s notoriety caused him some trouble as his reputation grew. In one

instance, Genie received messages from the mafia that Ned was at risk of physical

retaliation and should lay low, but he ignored them and refused to involve law

enforcement.21 Instead, Fritz simply remained focused on attaining what he perceived to

be justice. He carried this dogged determination his entire life, and it was undoubtedly

18 Ibid, 12. 19 Senate Committee on Business and Commerce Texas Usury Laws and Credit Counseling Services, Dec. 2004. 2. 20 Duty v. General Finance Company 273 S.W. 2d 64 (1954). 21 Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz, 12.

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one of the keys to his success. However, later events would also reveal that Fritz’s

stubborn sense of justice was not without consequences.

Ned’s successful legal career benefited from a continued commitment to civic participation. Ned understood the value of organizations from a young age. He transitioned from his childhood association with the Boy Scouts and various student organizations to local and legal groups in Dallas. Ned was a leader of the American

Veteran’s Committee, a veteran’s group known as a haven for college educated

veterans distinguished by their policy of allowing African American service members to

join. Ned left the group after a steady progression of conflicts within the organization

over Communist sympathies of leaders and members of the AVC.22 He also joined the

Young Democrats, a political group led by Ned and future Congressman Jim Wright.

Although Wright would eventually stand as one of Ned’s foils in fights over water issues

in the 1970s, the pair worked together to prevent Communist infiltration of the Young

Democrats, and Fritz continued to speak out about Communism for years.23 Ned was

also Vice President of the Junior Bar Association and member of the Dallas Junior

Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Estate Council. Through his obligation to civic

participation, Ned was able to gain prominence in legal circles while simultaneously

developing a strategy that also worked as a response to environmental issues.

In addition to the strides made in his career, family life, and community, the early

years after World War II also saw Ned enhancing his skills as a writer. Legal briefs

dominated his writing during the period as his practice demanded. On the side, Ned

22 Robert L. Tyler, “The American Veterans Committee: Out of a Hot War and Into the Cold,” American Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 3 (Autumn, 1966), 419. 23 Edward C. Fritz, “Why Fulbright was Wrong,” Dallas Morning News, April 9, 1964.

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tried to find work as a popular author—submitting manuscripts to magazines, trying his hand at writing a book, and engaging in an extensive correspondence with fellow lawyers, friends, and influential Texans. The early fifties found Ned seeking to hone his skills as a writer.24 His correspondence was widespread and included individuals in a variety of fields. From Anti-Communists to professors and politicians, Ned was an avid letter writer and managed to get a response from several his targets. He frequently contributed essays to magazines and letters to the editor in newspapers.25 In the process, he developed an ability to argue a point succinctly and in non-technical language that would prove beneficial as his opportunities for effective change multiplied.

It is clear from range of topics Ned wrote about that he spent a good bit of early adulthood searching for a higher calling. While he waited for the knock of opportunity, his practice writing helped to improve what would prove to be an essential part of his later arsenal protecting creeks and open spaces.

Another aspect of Ned’s early adulthood that would prove important to his later work was his attention to political issues. The post-war America that Ned returned to following his time in the Navy was politically charged. Even though Ned would spend a substantial portion of his life on the front lines of political issues, he had not yet developed the political acumen that would guide his later involvement. Still, there were hints of his future connection to environmental politics at this early stage. Ned’s original political stance in the wake of World War II was a strong resistance to Communism.

Ned participated in veteran’s groups in the post-war era due to his distaste for

24 Edward C. Fritz, “A Price Upon My Head,” (manuscript, 1959). 25 Edward C. Fritz to Arizona Highways Magazine, Dec. 4, 1957.

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Communists. As a member, Ned gave public speeches, engaged in extensive letter

writing, and even authored essays delineating the differences between Western

societies and the growing sphere of Communist influence. Ned was associated with the

Young Democrats in this period. Primarily motivated by a strong anti-establishment

streak, Ned’s past colored his perception of many political issues. Ned’s strong anti-

communist beliefs led to an increasing engagement with political issues, through the

auspices of citizen’s organizations that called for him to participate in the issues raising

his concern. The process of political action through specialized groups of citizens would

remain a hallmark of Ned’s strategy for the remainder of his life.

In short, the factors that led Fritz to commit to environmental issues were a

culmination of influences in his life from youth to adulthood. A childhood move to rural

Oklahoma set the table for a future spent devoted to natural spaces. The hobbies that

Ned engaged in throughout his youth, primarily geared towards the outdoors, helped

him to develop an extensive well of knowledge and a keen interest in natural areas. Ned

as a child also joined the Boy Scouts, a group with a stated desire to rear conservation-

minded members. During his years at the University of Chicago, he spent time with

several civic groups, developing a taste for public organizations that remained important

to his future. Ned continued his education in Southern Methodist’s law school following

a family move to Dallas. His legal training granted him a substantial arsenal to fight on

behalf of environmental causes. When World War II called, he joined the Navy, serving

as a pilot instructor and taking a respite from his hobbies.26 After the war ended, Ned

26 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” interview by Sandra Skrei and Craig Damuth, Texas Legacy Project, (June 17, 1999).

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began a career as a lawyer where he worked to protect individuals from corruption, a

harbinger of his future instincts as an environmentalist. He established a pattern of

challenging those who violated his personal sense of justice, blazing a trail by relying on

legal maneuvers that set new precedents in his field. Along the way, Ned developed

skills as a writer and attorney that would make him a force as an environmentalist. From

youth to adulthood, Ned’s life seemed to follow a path to a career protecting the

environment. Coming of age as the movement was beginning to gain steam; Ned would enter the growing field with advantages over many of his peers that greatly improved his ability to effect change. Ned’s personal story left him positioned to have a profound effect on Texas environmentalism.

Ned’s background as an attorney was vital to the changes he brought to Texas

environmentalism in multiple ways. Before transitioning into a full-time advocate, Ned

spent years working as a consumer credit attorney. His primary work was done in

defense of mostly minority communities exploited by landlords and creditors. The

passage of major legislation such as the Wilderness Act of 1964, Endangered Species

Act of 1973, and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 paved the way for

attacks on the fringes of the new regulatory environment the laws created. Ned’s

experience as a lawyer increased his ability to wield new weapons, showing the benefits

of a more proactive approach on behalf of environmental issues. The legal training left

him well equipped to maneuver through the labyrinth of legislation, court decisions, and

regulatory red tape that evolved into a new environmental policy structure. He

transferred his courtroom skills and knowledge of the law into the environmental arena,

becoming an effective and formidable adversary of proposed changes to the state’s

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public lands. In addition to increasing his effectiveness, his legal career also deepened his commitment to environmentalism by strengthening his sense of justice, a sense that was consistently influenced by the forces he encountered as he engaged in conservation efforts. The equivalents between his focus as a lawyer and as an environmental advocate are evident. In both cases, he was working with defendants who had few or no other options for legal representation. As a consumer credit attorney, he had defended the poor and indebted who had nowhere else to turn. As an environmental advocate his clients were drawn from the nonhuman world. Ned was propelled by a belief that injustice demanded response. The parallels between his work defending marginalized members of society and his decision to shield the defenseless wildlife and natural areas he worked to preserve are apparent throughout his life.

Ned’s advocacy work benefited not only from his legal skill, but from his tenacity as an individual, as well as his capacity for leadership. Ned’s personality was essential to his career in environmental politics. Effective environmentalism demands a level of persistence uncommon to most individuals. The sheer number of roadblocks, from bureaucratic resistance and political apathy to corruption and entrenched industrial power networks, would be enough to dissuade most potential activists. Even Ned had occasion to shrink from the stress he knew would accompany challenging planned developments. While engaged in a preservation effort, he left no stone unturned. He was unsympathetic in his criticisms of regulators and industries that he thought threatened the environment. His example served as a model for other Texans who benefited from his leadership and who were influenced to a greater level of participation in environmental movement. Many of his successful initiatives were realized only

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through sheer effort and through Ned’s tenacity to inspire the support necessary to

seem them through. Occasionally his aggressive approach backfired. An agent of

change, Ned threatened the status quo of existing environmental organizations. He was

not beholden to standing arrangements and pushed for protection farther and faster,

sometimes, than others wanted. In some cases, Ned’s no-holds-barred approach

worked against him, threatening the progress he had worked so hard to achieve.

Although cooperation and coordination were essential ingredients for Ned’s plans for

enhancing the efficacy of environmentalism, his own behavior at times endangered his recipe for victory. Despite the occasional lapses, Ned’s overall contribution to environmentalism in Texas was amplified by his persona.

The primary component in melding Ned into such an influential environmentalist

was the success he led in creating throughout his time in the movement. Ned’s passion

and energy inspired a generation of environmentalists and flummoxed their opponents.

Throughout his career, he pushed a broad spectrum of prescriptive solutions that

increased the ability of Texans to respond to environmental threats. His primary

influence came through the creation of several citizen’s organizations that he used,

unified around specific issues affecting Texas’s ecology, as a platform for his advocacy

and lawsuits. Through his guidance, the groups he created ascended to a level of

influence and reach Ned could scarcely have imagined at their founding. Ned made his

name in battles to protect Texas’s lands and waters that attracted the public’s attention.

In the late 1960s, he worked with fellow conservationists to establish a protected

preserve in the Big Thicket. In the early 1970s, he led a campaign to stop the

reconstruction of the Trinity River as a shipping canal and preserve the river. Through

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the 1970s and 80s he filed a series of noteworthy lawsuits aimed at testing logging

regulations of national forests in East Texas. His suits led to the establishment of the

first wilderness areas in the state and the growth of a national grassroots movement

aimed at reforming regulation of the national forests. For five decades, Ned would prove

to be a thorn in the side of developers, politicians, and bureaucrats. During his career,

he led Texas environmentalism to new heights and saw fulfillment of many of his goals

for the movement.

Timing was essential to determining the existence and outcomes of Fritz’s career as an environmentalist. Ned’s development as an environmental advocate paralleled nearly the entire history of the movement in Texas. Due to his presence precisely when

the movement increased in intensity, Ned represents the impetus behind much of the

evolution and growth of Texas environmental politics. New legislation and political

movements in the 1960s and 1970s granted environmentalists novel tools to reform

environmental practices. Ned’s influence on the manners and approach taken in Texas

reflected the implementation of these new strategies. Taking advantage of new

legislation and legal opportunities Ned brought an aggressive, goal-oriented process to

the organizations he created. Moving his courtroom skills into the field of environmental

advocacy represented a boon to the movement, bringing tangible gains in long-running

battles for protection.

One important variable to understanding Ned’s career is his personal view of the environment. After forty years of active participation in conservation efforts, Ned developed his own philosophy regarding the targets of his preservation efforts. Ned appreciated both the aesthetic and scientific aspects of nature. He viewed humanity as

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a piece of a wider ecosystem and felt that the defenseless wildlife and natural areas were worthy of protection for future generations. He believed they were a blessing to mankind and that unforeseen benefits could disappear if nature was destroyed.

Outlining the tenets of his personal views of the environment works to explain the motivations and views of activists throughout his tenure. The development of Ned’s unique perspective will be visible in multiple components of his career and deepen the understanding of his effect on environmentalism.

There are noticeable parallels between the focus of other historians of the growth of the environmental movement and Ned’s time as an activist. Nash’s work, Wilderness and the American Mind, relates the story of the evolution of Americans’ attitudes towards wilderness. Nash traces the roots of preservation from its earliest iterations, delineating the shifting of views on the need for uninhabited, undeveloped space in the

U.S. from a small, elite segment of the population to wider acceptance. Much of this history traverses similar ground to the development of Ned’s own views regarding preservation. Kevin Marsh’s Drawing Lines in the Forest depicts the growth of conservation movements in the Pacific Northwest. Marsh’s portrayal of the importance of boundaries in the relationship between conservationists and the industry and governmental representatives they negotiated with echoes much of Ned’s own experiences in the Big Thicket. Marc Reisner’s book Cadillac Desert reveals the importance of water development to the history of conservation efforts. Ned’s campaign to protect the Trinity River from Corps of Engineers designs that would have canalized the river for nebulous concerns over water. Robert Gottlieb’s Forcing the Spring provides a backdrop into the modern environmental movement. Focusing on the period

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following the formation of a legislative and organizational environmental policy structure

in the 1970s, Gottlieb’s work exposes the complications that followed the “success” of

the environmental decade, a tale that intersects with much of Ned’s interactions with

mainstream environmental organizations over legislation and regulations of forest

management. There are other historians whose work Ned’s story relates to in a less

flattering light. Miles Powell’s work Vanishing America connects the language and goals

of modern environmentalists to the white nationalist movement, drawing parallels

between concern for the loss of pristine nature to fears of racial decline.27 Ned’s own

experiences with immigration reform pushed him to conclusions that draw into question

his own history of empathy for the downtrodden. Presenting Ned’s story within the wider

context of the national environmental history will help to illuminate the connection

between his work and those of other environmental historians.

Ned is an ideal biographical subject for the history of Texas environmentalism.

Although the national story of the environmental movement has been well established,

the historiography of environmental advocacy in twentieth-century Texas is relatively

undeveloped. Texas occupies an interesting position in the historiography of United

States environmental history. The state’s traditionally conservative politics and its

laissez faire economic policies have garnered Texas a reputation as an environmental

27 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness & the American Mind (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1982). Kevin Marsh, Drawing Lines in the Forest: Creating Wilderness Areas in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010). Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin Books, 1986). Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement. Miles Powell, Vanishing America: Species Extinction, Racial Peril, and the Origins of Conservation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).

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backwater. Relatively few environmentalists on the national stage—and even fewer

environmental historians—have cared to pay much attention to the environmental

controversies that wracked Texas from the Second World War onward. One exception

to the minimal offerings of works related to Texas environmentalism is the Big Thicket.

Several works were published by participants in the decades’ long struggle to preserve

the massive forest. The works of James Cozine, Pete Gunter, and Geraldine Watson

provide an outline that is supplemented by the details of Ned’s involvement. Ned himself

lamented the notion that Southern forests would be the primary provider of lumber for

the nation.28

Ned’s story works to establish the historical context of the Texas experience in

environmental politics through the lens of an active participant. Many of the changes

that occurred in the evolution of Texas environmentalism were a result of his activities.

Ned’s preservation of the Trinity River and the Big Thicket, and his campaign for reform

of the Forest Service and subsequent protection of the red-cockaded woodpecker, add to the history of the American environmental movement. Ned’s biography reveals the foundations of successful environmentalism in Texas and helps to establish the state’s long history of citizen-led environmental initiatives. Timing was essential to determining the existence and outcomes of Fritz’s career as an environmentalist. Ned’s

development as an environmental advocate paralleled nearly the entire history of the

movement in Texas. Due to his presence precisely when the movement increased in

intensity, Ned represents the impetus behind much of the evolution and growth of Texas

28 Edward C. Fritz, “Will East Texas Become the Sawmill of the Nation,” Conservation Progress 93 (Nov. 6, 1980): 6.

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environmental politics. New legislation and political movements in the 1960s and 1970s granted environmentalists novel tools to reform environmental practices. Ned’s influence on the manners and approach taken in Texas reflected the implementation of these new strategies. Taking advantage of new legislation and legal opportunities Ned brought an aggressive, goal-oriented process to the organizations he created. Moving his courtroom skills into the field of environmental advocacy represented a substantial modernization to Texas’s environmental movement, bringing tangible gains in long- running battles for protection.

Another interesting intersection of his environmental philosophy was the connection between his legal innovations as a defender of the non-human world and his own intellectual commitments as an ecological environmentalist. The timeline of his career as an activist ran congruent to many of the large-scale changes in environmental policy. Ned’s career as an environmentalist was propelled by his willingness to adapt to changing circumstances and bend new legislation into effective legal challenges. In some ways, Ned’s goals for conservation efforts, increasing cooperation and local coordination, reflected the development of social justice as a tool for environmental activism. Animating locally effected populations to activism in response to issues in their own neighborhoods was essentially the same message. Tracing the connections between Ned’s career and the growth of social justice expands the significance of his biography to wider historical currents.

As influential as Ned was to the Texas environmental movement, his own views were molded through his experiences as an ecological environmentalist. His political outlook went through dramatic shifts as a result of his exposure to the corruption and

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politics of environmental policy. Frustration with the status quo and the glacial pace of change were hallmarks of his time as an environmentalist. Much of his work in Texas was influenced by his relationships with fellow environmentalists in the state and throughout the nation. Although most of the interactions were positive, finding a common voice was often as difficult as it was essential to success. Some of his ideas created friction with allies within the movement. His adoption of radical positions on population control; supporting immigration reform to prevent population growth in the

United States and opposition to famine relief in Africa, raised controversy with many of his colleagues, threatening to divide environmentalists across new ideological lines. For most of his life, Ned was reticent to focus on his more extreme solutions. The evolution of his philosophy followed the same pattern as his involvement and the growth of environmentalism in Texas. Politically, Ned’s views evolved from his roots as relatively conservative anti-Communist to a political radical advocating extreme solutions to ecological issues. While these shifts did not occur on a strictly partisan line, subduing an easy examination of his political lineage, tracing the changes of his own political views reveals the effects of his time as a Texas environmentalist.

A history of Ned Fritz would be incomplete without an understanding of the substantial role Genie Fritz played in his career. Genie would prove to a valuable resource for Ned throughout their nearly seven decades together. She served as a sounding board to temper Ned’s more wide-eyed notions, helped to keep him organized, and typed most of the mountains of writings and correspondence that Ned produced. She was also an organizer in her own right, serving for years as a President and leading voice in the Dallas League of Women Voters. The pair collaborated on

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many issues, creating a partnership that multiplied their effectiveness. Even though Ned confessed that his wife did not share his depth of feeling in relation to natural surroundings, she admitted to not having the level of obsession as her husband, the two ultimately formed a formidable duo for Texas environmentalism.

Ned was a methodical record keeper, collecting thousands of documents related to his environmental activism. He was aware of his potential importance to Texas environmentalism and chose to document his activities in detail. He began donating his papers to Southern Methodist University’s DeGolyer Library in 1986. The collection now comprises over 425,000 documents. Personal letters, interviews, newspaper articles, images, exhibits from lawsuits and relevant studies are all present in his records. Ned also established a record through his own published works, writing three books that detailed his experiences in the movement. Ned published his first book, Sterile Forest:

The Case Against Clearcutting, in 1983. In the book, Ned described his first lawsuit against the Forest Service, a 1976 case seeking to halt deforestation on public lands in

East Texas. Ned’s second book, Realms of Beauty: A Guide to the Wilderness Areas of

East Texas, released in 1986 was devoted to a nonprofessional’s depiction of the different areas that he had helped preserve in East Texas. His wrote his final book,

Clearcutting: A Crime Against Nature in 1989 as an advocacy work intended to raise awareness of the systematic deforestation occurring on the nation’s public lands. Ned’s written works depict his actions on behalf of environmental causes and help to define the issues and stakeholders involved in the history of environmentalism in Texas.

Government documents and judicial testimony from allies and opponents offer useful historical sources on the primary issues Fritz confronted throughout his career,

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depicting the stakeholders and stakes contended during the early years of Texas environmentalism. Many of his activities intersected with government and public affairs.

The great interest engendered by plans affecting local business, ecology, and recreation led to a substantial number of contemporary media reports relevant to his actions. Legislation, case records from his lawsuits, and reports related to governmental projects help reveal additional insights into Fritz’s activism.

Ned’s innovative methods in opposing development opened new avenues for environmental advocacy. His moderate public pitch spread environmental awareness to unlikely supporters. Even the controversy surrounding some of Ned’s activities had some positive ramifications. Increased media attention to environmental protests helped to normalize the inclusion of environmentalists in discussions over the impact of economic development plans. Ned was different than most advocates for ecological preservation. His work on behalf of the nonhuman world did not follow any prescribed path. The groups, lawsuits and resistance efforts he organized were instrumental in establishing an effective ecological protection infrastructure in the state. His efforts facilitated the growth of an environmental ethos in the nation’s second largest state.

Ned’s struggles on behalf of environmental causes led to the preservation of hundreds of thousands of acres of Texas forests, the preservation of the Trinity River, and the end of clear-cutting in national forests. His successes in the state and his long-term influence within the environmental movement made him an instrumental factor in the development of effective environmentalism in Texas.

25 CHAPTER 2

JOINING THE FIGHT: NED FRITZ’S FIRST STEPS AS A CONSERVATIONIST

The 1950s were a decisive period for environmental causes, for both Ned Fritz and the nation. In the years following the end of World War II, events began to expose the attitudes and experiences that would shape the American approach to environmental issues. The decade after the war witnessed landmarks in national environmental history that led to greater attention to concerns over land use from the wider public. Citizens created public spectacles following threats to national parks in the continued pursuit of water development projects in the American West. The outcry that followed paved the way for the creation of new organizations devoted to environmental causes, organizations that brought new levels of pressure on the federal government.

Although the movement would not take off until the following decade, the events of the

1950s laid the groundwork for its future success.

Ned Fritz’s personal path witnessed similar transformations during the 1950s, with his involvement in environmental causes growing out of his concern for the loss of natural areas, his frustration with the process of development, and a passionate belief that environmental protection was an obligation to future generations. Ned’s personal experiences paralleled the changes in the wider movement, evolving from an observer to an active participant in a manner similar to many Americans. For Ned, a penchant for civic participation and blossoming legal practice in the preceding years set the table for a future as a successful advocate. The combination of wider acceptance of the potential disasters from continued development and his own growing awareness to threats to wildlife impelled him to act. His experiences throughout the era enlightened him to the

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strengths and weaknesses of conservation in the state, providing a roadmap as he

sought a plan for improvements. Although he was still new to environmental issues, his

legal experience, speaking ability, and passion brought substantial new energy to

Texas’s nascent environmental movement. The decade would see the influence of his

innovative ideas for environmental advocacy and the success that accompanied his

strategies.

Environmental issues bubbled to the surface throughout the 1950s, deluging the

public with knowledge of the dangers that accompanied the unchecked growth of water

development that had been missing at the height of the New Deal. A number of factors

propelled the emergence of environmental awareness in the post-war era. The end of

the war left Americans with a renewed sense of their own ability to effect change.

Continued growth of mass media allowed more people to understand the effect of

environmental destruction. Perhaps, however, the most influential changes came from

Washington, D.C. Conflict between the White House and the bureaucracies in charge of

internal improvements had been brewing since the end of the New Deal. Flush with

government funding during FDR’s tenure, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau

of Reclamation developed a multitude of projects. Dams and reservoirs, especially

popular during the New Deal, became a primary target for budget hawks and

environmentalists in the years following the end of WWII. Environmentalists were

concerned over the substantial damages to natural areas and wildlife that followed in

the wake of large water development projects.29 Although many of these projects were

29 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness & the American Mind (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1982), 210.

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designed in the free-spending years of the New Deal, the onset of World War II forced

implementation to wait. As the war ended, opportunities to tap into the bucket of federal

development funds began to dry up. The end of the blank check era was gone,

propelling competition between projects. Expectations for their fulfillment and gaps in

the horse-trading nature of water development politics fostered discontent that created

openings for increased influence by environmentalists. With growing numbers behind

them, environmentalists would quickly look to take advantage.

The end of the government largesse of the New Deal and World War II prompted

a shift in the relationship between politicians and some of the more powerful

bureaucracies. Although they were both government employees, some regulators had

established substantial control over their fiefdoms. Environmentalists, anxious to take

aim at the mammoth water development projects that had been a hallmark of

government interaction with the natural world, found common cause with economic

conservatives concerned with these projects’ financial impacts. Although the Roosevelt

administration during the war years had usually been able to avoid confrontation by

pointing to the necessity of wartime expenses, the Truman administration had diverging

goals for water development. Truman wanted public power through the building of dams

to be a patriotic symbol of the Fair Deal.30 In battles over prioritization of water projects,

Truman found the Corps to be a formidable foe due to substantial congressional

backing. While the Corps viewed water development as an important component of their

job, they also depended on the budget increases the projects brought to their coffers.

30 Karl Boyd Brooks, Public Power, Private Dams: The Hells Canyon High Dam Controversy (Seattle: Univ of Washington Press, 2006), 159.

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Congressmen liked the dams due to the jobs and federal dollars they brought to their

districts. Combined, the quid pro quo of federal water development created a potent

mix. Anyone challenging their continued formation would face considerable backlash.

Despite the wishes of the White House, the Corps was still able to rely on

Congressional allies to approve funding for their chosen projects.31 The entrenched

conglomeration of bureaucrats, willing politicians, and local boosters represented a

formidable obstacle to ceasing the runaway formation of hydroelectric dams. The cozy

relationship between the institutions responsible for planning, funding, and

implementing the water projects would prove to be a weakness exploited by

conservationists who focused on the corruption inherent in the situation.

Many environmental historians point to the 1956 dispute over plans to form a

dam at Echo Park along Colorado’s Green River as a critical moment in the battle for

the future of the nation’s natural bounty. The Eisenhower administration shared

Truman’s distaste for the unimpeded power of the Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of

Engineers. The administration’s decision to rein in the continual growth of the

bureaucracies emerged as a turning point with the fight over the proposed dam. The

location of the dam was the primary driver of controversy. Scheduled for a canyon

located on the border between Utah and Colorado, the area within the existing Dinosaur

National Monument was popular with recreationists.32 Existing protection for the canyon

31 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 178. 32 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 210.

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resulted from FDR’s 1938 extension of the national monument established by Woodrow

Wilson’s administration two decades before.33

The Echo Park dam was intended to provide water to growing populations in

Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Environmentalists were not a significant

consideration in the implementation of Corps’ plans for water projects before the release

of plans for the Echo Park dam. After the Director of the Park Service in charge of the

area addressed concerns about the potential loss of such a beautiful area,

conservationists surged into action.34 The historian Bernard DeVoto of Yale University

began the campaign to preserve Dinosaur Monument with a write-up in The Saturday

Evening Post.35 He recruited a number of other authors who wrote against

Congressional approval of the dam’s construction. There was a concern that a dam in

Dinosaur Monument could establish a precedent that might spell the end of the national

park system itself.36 Threats to cherished natural spaces combined with budgetary

concerns over the high costs of water improvements into a powerful mix that turned

popular sentiment against the project.37 Activists recognized the marketing opportunity

presented by a threat to a well-known landmark. With public consciousness raised,

issues ranging from nuclear weapons and energy, legislation such as the Air Pollution

Control Act, and a new controversy over Glen Canyon Dam near the Grand Canyon

became battlegrounds for conservationists. Although Texas was far from the center of

33 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation, “Proclamation 2290,” (14 July 1938). 34 Bernard DeVoto, “Shall We Let Them Ruin Our National Parks?,” The Saturday Evening Post, July 22, 1950, 17. 35 Ibid, 18. 36 Tom H. Watkins, The Redrock Chronicles: Saving Wild Utah (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2000), 92. 37 Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 285.

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the most significant environmental battles, the existence of these turning points stirred the first hints of activism in the state. The emergence of popular resistance to environmentally devastating actions laid the groundwork for successful activism. During this heady mix of growing conflict and increasing attention to environmental causes,

Fritz began his career as an agitator for protection of wildlife and natural spaces.

The 1950s saw Ned become directly involved with debates over wildlife issues for the first time. In some cases, he sought to interject himself into the debate. In others, outside forces thrust his participation upon him. Although still firmly ensconced in his burgeoning legal career, the 50s saw him take his first tentative steps into committed agitator. The decade would see his first appearance before a legislative body, his first creation of a citizen’s organization, and a growing understanding of the conditions faced by the state’s environmentally conscious citizens. Changes in his own perception of environmental issues, propelled by flashpoints that were simultaneously sinking into

America’s public consciousness, led to a greater commitment to activism on behalf of natural areas. As the effort to relieve increasing pressure on natural areas gained traction, he began to envision an approach tailored to the specific issues Texas’s culture and geography demanded of environmentalists.

As the growing attention to environmental causes spread to Ned, he took his first steps into environmentalism through his affiliation with two groups devoted to birds. An infatuation with ornithology had led him to join the National Audubon Society while still a student in college. He then joined the Texas Ornithological Society soon after its founding in 1953. The group of committed birdwatchers was an outgrowth of Houston’s

Outdoor Nature Club devoted to the “observation, study, and conservation of the birds

31

of Texas.”38 Ned served the organization for two decades, first as a member and

eventually as the group’s strongest voice for conservation. Involvement with bird-

watching associations opened doors to the wider world of Texas conservation. In Texas,

environmental awareness started with the writings of influential naturalists and the

growth of national wildlife organizations. The foundation of these associations coincided

with his increasing interest in conservation issues. Much of Ned’s effect on Texas

environmentalism came as a result of his skills as an organizer and the Audubon and

Ornithological Societies were where he got his start. Ned’s position on the ground floor

of the groups that began the slow push for state activism granted him a unique

perspective that would affect his future endeavors. By observing the trials and

tribulations of early state conservation attempts, Ned gained a greater understanding of

the specific conditions confronting environmentalists in Texas, allowing him to tailor his

approach in a more effective manner.

Ned's emergence within the Texas Ornithological Society coincided with shifts in

the group’s approach to the state’s birds. While the organization was always committed

to conservation, their early efforts were a patchwork approach with little planning. His

vision for the group encapsulated a more comprehensive approach to potential threats

to Texas birds. His influence was visible in the growing focus on conservation issues

and an increase in attention to a more technical view of ornithological issues. As the

decade progressed, TOS developed a greater focus on the conservation aspects of

birding. By 1958, Ned joined a conservation committee within TOS that worked to

38 Stanley D. Casto, “A History of the Origin and First Decade of the Texas Ornithological Society, 1953- 1963,” Directory of the Texas Ornithological Society (1991-1993): 15.

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create a more detailed action plan for the group’s conservation platform.39 The group

also changed their monthly newsletter, with Ned serving as the conservation editor,

from detailing member stories and bird sightings to a bulletin with a more specific

advocacy agenda. Ned’s relationship with the TOS revealed the beginnings of his plans

for organizing environmentalism in the state. Through his ability to influence others with

his ideas, effort, and personality he was able to shift the direction of an existing wildlife

group. Although he was new to the organization, little time passed before he began

innovations aimed at increasing the group’s ability to affect positive change. In short

order, Ned bent the organization to his will, creating a more aggressive, activist group.

Thereafter, he would begin to practice his craft within groups in which he held even

greater levels of control.

Ned was also one of the founders of the Dallas County chapter of the Audubon

Society. Founded in 1953, Fritz served as the organization’s first president.40 He had

already loaned his legal expertise to several volunteer groups in the city. His public-

minded consciousness and interest in ornithology made the Audubon a natural fit for his

interests. Ned claimed that he created the Dallas chapter in response to the feeling that

existing environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club were too broad in focus.41

He felt that the dearth of conservationist groups in Dallas represented a lost opportunity,

and he hoped to meld the specialized knowledge of local organizations to the larger

movement for environmental causes. For Ned, membership in the Audubon and Texas

39 Casto, “A History of the Texas Ornithological Society,” 21. 40 Edward C. Fritz, “Thumbnail Sketch of Edward C. Fritz,” Ned Fritz’ Red Cockaded Blog, Jan. 2, 2007, http://redcockaded.blogspot.com/2007/01/thumbnail-sketch-of-edward-c-fritz.html. 41 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 7 February 1983,” Texas Legacy Project, 1983.

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Ornithological societies served as a springboard for greater involvement in environmental issues.

Opportunities for pursuing intervention grew progressively as he spent more time in the movement. A significant advancement came after an invitation in 1954 to attend a kind of educational, experiential environmental camp sponsored by the state’s birding organizations. Some local teachers gave him a scholarship to the Audubon camp.42 His attendance at the Central Texas camp exposed him to influential conservationists in the state. The camps took place around Austin and brought in members from across Texas.

For Ned, the experience at the camp was akin to a religious revival. He was inspired by visitors to the camp such as Roger Tory Peterson, a preeminent American ornithologist famous for creating Texas’ first modern field guide.43 Peterson presented the background of the climate for environmental activism. Ned also made an ally of expert ornithologist Edgar Kincaid, who wrote to him afterwards praising his speaking, leadership ability, and talent as a birder.44 He would continue to impress state conservationists as his experiences in the camp propelled him to partake in activism to protect threatened birds.

Time at the camp represented his first prolonged exposure to the condition of conservation in the rest of the state. What he learned was quite discouraging. The key insight he gleaned from his experience was that the birds he loved might disappear if development in the state maintained its current trajectory. He understood that the current version of conservation would struggle to respond effectively to these threats. If

42 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 7 February 1983,” Texas Legacy Project, 1983. 43 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999. 44 Edgar Kincaid to Edward C. Fritz, March 5, 1955.

34

birds were dependent on access to natural areas, the continued loss of these spaces could result in a dearth of birds.45 With his love of birds a longtime part of his life, Ned could envision a scenario where there were no longer accessible locations to witness their beauty. His realization influenced him to take on a greater role as a central stakeholder in environmental causes. Combined with Ned’s passion for wilderness and wildlife, his newfound understanding of the potential loss of Texas’s natural areas spurred him to increase his involvement and seek significant changes in the state.

Ned’s encounters at the conservation camps thus convinced him of the need for action to protect natural areas. His brief collaboration with other conservationists confirmed that existing infrastructure was poorly designed and ineffective as a response to environmental threats. He came to envision a more active resistance with a greater focus on direct action. He sought to enlist the support of local, on the ground, organizations that would grant their expertise on specific issues to larger statewide and national groups. This process would allow the various committees to respond to environmental concerns related to a wider selection of conflicts. With a more widespread footprint, state conservationists could act on a larger number of issues threatening Texan wildernesses. They would be able to form some level of resistance to all potential incursions. The goal was to use flashpoints over beloved natural spaces to swell the ranks of environmentally concerned citizens. In the years following his time at the camp, Ned would take steps to implement his vision for the state.

Other attendees of the camps recognized the value of someone with Ned’s legal credentials and penchant for civic mindedness. In the first actions he participated in on

45 Eugenia Fritz, interview by author, Dallas, TX, June 10, 2016.

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behalf of the environment, he was able to work on a project to index all of Texas’s natural areas. Based upon a concept common to many states across the country, the book was an effort to catalogue the flora, fauna, and wildlife present in specific local areas. The idea was that by having a record of all the areas that needed protection, legislators and concerned citizens would be better equipped to respond to potential threats to their existence. With a state as large as Texas, such an undertaking was no small task. According to Genie Fritz, Ned took to the task with his usual vigor, with the two traveling across the state to record as many areas as they possibly could.46 Their contribution to the creation of the Texas Natural Areas Survey was his first active involvement in environmental activism. He cooperated with other concerned naturalists on the project and worked tirelessly to document the local areas in need of protection in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. He also tried to motivate the other scientists, conservationists, and citizens working on the project. The group effort to create the list of natural areas was an unqualified success. Published in 1971, the Natural Areas

Survey became a useful tool for identification of places that could merit protection. For

Ned, work on the classification of the state’s natural spaces would prove to be an opening for an ever-increasing role within Texas conservation circles.

Ned’s next opportunity to participate in Texan activism came with a 1954 effort to protect the state’s population of golden eagles. In a fitting beginning to the battles he would experience in subsequent years, Ned took on a leadership role in a long-lasting fight centered on a threatened bird. Eagles had long held a curious position within the

American consciousness. For many, they represented a powerful symbol of the nation’s

46 Eugenia Fritz, interview by author, Dallas, TX, June 10, 2016.

36

rugged past. For most West Texans they were a predatory animal, with protections that

allowed them to raid and pillage from helpless farmers.47 The formation of Big Bend

National Park in 1944 set the stage for conflict over the status of predators such as

mountain lions, coyotes, and golden eagles.

With large sheep and goat ranches nearby, ranchers considered Big Bend a

“predatory incubator,” a haven for predators who could raid their flocks and return to the

park for protection.48 Hunters were encouraged to seek out and eliminate the birds. The

eagles were so popular a target with hunters that businesses sponsored plane trips to

chase the birds through the air and shoot from a mounted shotgun. Eventually, the West

Texas trips became popular enough to support three private charter organizations.49

One prodigious hunter even boasted of killing 2,500 eagles between 1930 and 1942. In

a letter responding to Ned, Acting Superintendent of Big Bend National Park George H.

Sholly claimed that there were only ten to twelve eagles living in the park.50 In addition

to the dangers from hunting, eagles faced threats from attempts to control other

predators. Thallium sulfate, a chemical designed to destroy coyotes, was responsible

for the deaths of many of the nation’s eagles. By the 1950s, the chemical had

eliminated most of the birds in Big Bend National Park. Sholly voiced his concerns with

the feasibility of gaining any support for eagle protection from the region to Ned,

pointing out that no ranchers were likely to assist. Sholly also argued that no members

47 Louise O’Connor and Cecilia Thompson, Marfa and Presidio County, Texas (Xlibris Corporation, 2014), 253. 48 John Jameson, The Story of Big Bend National Park (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 86. 49 “Golden Eagle, Handsome Bird in Wild West Texas, Preys on Ranch Lambs and Kills Young Antelope,” El Paso Herald Post, March 4, 1955. 50 George H. Sholly to Edward C. Fritz, 13 Jan 1955.

37

of the State Game Commission were sympathetic to the eagles. Successfully defending the eagles would receive little in the way of assistance from West Texas.

Ned’s involvement with the state bird associations brought the plight of the eagle to his attention. He earned a seat on a special Golden Eagles committee consisting of members of TOS and various local Audubon chapters, created to respond to threats to the birds.51 The group, known as the Committee for the Preservation of the Golden

Eagle in Texas, worked to construct a response that would protect the birds. Ned joined the effort with a full-court press on the state legislature and other environmental groups.

He began by seeking Congressional support, corresponding with a number of legislators while simultaneously working to gain adherents among the general population. He wrote to multiple members of the Texas Legislature, but working to untangle the confusing web of alliances and favors known as the Texas Legislature would prove a considerable undertaking. He also wrote to groups that might have a shared interest in protecting the eagles, such as the Texas Fine Arts Association and the East Texas Nature Club. He also worked on media members, corresponding with wildlife writers in the state’s largest newspapers to raise awareness.52 Many of the targets of his letters offered suggestions and support for his goals, even if they disagreed with the likelihood of success.

Ned and his allies in Texas were unable to establish state-level legal protections for golden eagles. With action in Texas facing increasingly long odds, activists turned to the federal government for support. The main goal was the addition of golden eagles to

51 Casto, “A History of the Texas Ornithological Society,” 5. 52 Upshur Vincent to Edward C. Fritz, Nov. 25, 1954.

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the 1940 Bald Eagle Protection Act prohibiting the selling, killing, or possessing of the species. Their argument, that golden eagles were often mistaken for bald eagles in their youth, successfully persuaded Congress of the necessity to extend protection to the eagles. By connecting the golden eagles to a bird with such standing among the U.S. population, activists were able to accomplish not just a strategic victory for environmentalists but also to present a patriotic front to their drive for increased protections. The labors of the birding community paid off with the successful addition of the golden eagle to national protections for bald eagles. Passage of the Golden Eagle

Protection Act in October of 1962 added the golden eagles to the established protocols for bald eagles.53

The golden eagle campaign mirrored many of the entanglements Ned would find himself in throughout his career in the state. He was responding to an emerging threat to wildlife. He attempted to engage the legislative powers that could relieve the oncoming pressure. He helped to lead legal maneuvering to delay or prevent enactment of the policy change. He combined with other concerned citizens in public organizations to work on potential solutions. The only significant difference between this campaign and later endeavors was his inability to succeed at the state level. Even at this early date, he was already displaying the traits that would earn him a position of leadership among Texas conservationists. Beginning with the TOS push in 1954, Ned worked to add protection for the golden eagles for nearly a decade. He primarily operated behind the scenes, encouraging supporters and organizing committees. The effort benefited from the assistance of fellow member of TOS such as Clay Miller, who spoke out on

53 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Statutes at Large 76, sec. 1246 (1962).

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behalf of the eagles, and Edgar Kincaid, who penned articles and published drawings in the group’s newsletter and state newspapers portraying the eagle’s plight.

Proposed changes in the Texas legislature created threats for a new bird on the heels of Ned’s work on golden eagles. In 1957, the Texas Congress debated H.B. 723, a proposal to remove the Harris Hawk from the state’s list of protected birds. Farmers and ranchers were again concerned with the threat the hawks presented to their livestock. The primary drivers of the bill were sponsor Eligio De La Garza, a West Texas

Congressman who would eventually prove a friend to the environment through his effort to protect state wetlands, and J.W. Jackson, who raised quail in South Texas.54 Ned worked through the TOS to initiate a movement to prevent passage of the bill and protect the species. TOS moved towards more active participation by initiating a lobbying and public relations campaign to protect the birds.55 The TOS newsletter and state papers published paintings of the bird and the aftermath of the hunting trips that threatened their extinction.56 Ned again worked to enlist support among friendly conservation groups and state legislators. He wrote to multiple members of the Texas legislature to enlist their support against H.B. 723. In a letter to Representative Robert

Sutton, Ned organized the tenets of the conservationist argument in favor of the Harris

Hawk. First, he pointed to the unfairness of a decision on wildlife protection formed without any “scientific study of the Harris hawk”. He explained that the species was actually “helpful to man, because its diet is primarily rodents”.57 Ned took issue with the

54 Casto, “A History of the Texas Ornithological Society,” 20. 55 Casto, “A History of the Texas Ornithological Society,” 20. 56 Ibid, 20. 57 Edward C. Fritz to Robert Sutton, March 29, 1957.

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needless nature of removing protection, pointing out that farmers could apply for exceptions allowing them to protect their flocks. He also delineated the similarities between the hawk and several birds that been granted protected status.58

To gauge the prospects of success, Ned reached out to various Texas

Congressmen to determine their stance on H.B. 723. The correspondence between with

Congressman Sutton is a sound example of Ned’s strategy towards political maneuver at this early stage in his environmental career. Regarding the potential for opposition to

H.B. 723, he compiled a list of reliable legislators. He then provided a compendium of avenues that could influence legislators less amenable to maintaining protected status.

His explanation of the motivations and stances of individual members displayed the keen political insight that would continue to serve him well throughout his career. Next, he reached out to Representatives Joe Pool, Robert Hughes, and Barefoot Sanders, asking them to lead the legislative resistance to passage of the bill.59 Each of the legislators responded to his letters with assurances of support. They agreed to speak to the bill’s sponsor, attempt to keep the bill off the local calendar, and push Ned’s resolution in favor of the hawk. With the primary threat to the hawks materializing from the capital, Ned focused his attention there. As he sought responses to contend with the legislation, he relied on networks he had been forming for just such an instance.

In addition to his work to sway Texas politicians, Ned also attempted to enlist the support of fellow travelers within Texas conservation circles. Leading the effort was

Margaret Louise Hill, conservation chair of the Travis County Audubon Society. She

58 Ibid. 59 Edward C. Fritz to Joe Pool, April 10, 1957.

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proved invaluable to continuing protection of the Harris Hawk. Ned wrote to Hill, encouraging her to work with friendly members of Congress and to avoid offending any committed allies.60 Hill was instrumental in recruiting famous Texas naturalist Roy

Bedichek, who buffered the efforts of TOS by penning an influential essay on behalf of the bird’s protection. Ned’s participation culminated with his personal testimony on the floor of the Texas Legislature in 1957. His speech in Austin was the first of many he would make on behalf of environmental causes throughout his long career. In the speech, he argued for the protection of the Harris hawk, claiming the rationale behind removal was illogical and short sighted. Classification as a predator did not prevent the need for protection in Ned’s eyes. Removing any threats from the state’s list of protected species could prove a slippery slope. Who was to say what species might be next in the crosshairs of Texans? He explained that the removal held the potential to establish a dangerous precedent for Texas wildlife. The work of the birding societies paid off with the tabling of the proposed legislation in 1957.61

The substantial public response to the threat to Harris hawks by local Texans, sympathetic politicians, and citizens’ organizations led to the withdrawal of H.B. 723 by the author, Eligio De La Garza. Representative Joe Pool personally informed Ned, with whom he had worked throughout the Harris hawk campaign.62 Successfully preventing the removal of the Harris hawk was informative of Ned’s future labors in the state in two ways that were significant for the future of Texas environmentalism. The success of the venture relied upon the coordination of numerous organizations. Combining the

60 Edward C. Fritz to Miss Margaret Hill, April 11, 1957. 61 Casto, “A History of the Texas Ornithological Society,” 15. 62 Joe Pool to Edward Fritz, May 28, 1957.

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scientific, political, and technical knowledge of individuals throughout the state proved a more effective tactic than sole reliance on smaller, local groups. The campaign for the hawk also convinced him of the dangers of dependence on the whims of politics. His correspondence with various legislators taught him a great deal about the horse-trading required for legislative achievement. Learning the specific motivations of individual congressional representatives, Ned discovered that their loyalty and support could be short-lived. His experiences attempting to navigate the rough waters of the Texas

Legislature were essential to the formation of an opinion that would inform the remainder of his career in the movement; a belief that political lobbying was unlikely to be the avenue for successful prosecution of environmental ideals. These were lessons

Ned learned well. In future cases, he would attempt to bypass the state legislature by taking his argument to the public and eventually, to the courts.

The success that followed Ned’s entrance into the environmental movement in

Texas bought him credibility that advanced his role. Protection of the Harris Hawk and

Golden Eagles was more than just the preservation of a couple of bird species. Ned’s work provided a framework for further efforts, showing the ability of concerned citizens to pressure Texan politicians to enact meaningful change. His role in the Ornithological

Society granted him intimate knowledge into the inner workings of organizations committed to wildlife. His experience also convinced him of the weaknesses inherent in

Texans approach to environmental protection. In future years, Ned would build on the knowledge he gained in these early endeavors in the creation of his own organizations through which he sought to bring positive changes to Texan environmentalism.

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The 1950s saw Ned’s first formal forays into environmental issues. As conservation gained new adherents and occupied an increasing place in the American public’s psyche, opportunities to alter traditional environmental practices grew.

Motivated by his fascination for birds, Ned joined birding organizations just as they began confronting issues affecting natural areas in Texas. Although these groups were not always effective, the first-hand wisdom Ned gained convinced him of the value of a more robust approach to Texas activism. The experience led him to a transition from an observer into an active purveyor of the issues threatening Texas’ environment. Taking part in the effort to protect multiple birds and establishing his first organizations devoted to environmental causes brought him into regular contact with other Texas activists. As he discovered the substantial difficulties confronting environmentalists in the state, he began to envision a new approach. Throughout the decade, Ned made substantial advancement within the state’s environmental movement. From an obscure observer on the fringes of an ineffective faction, his work to protect threatened bird species turned him into a primary voice. The genie would not go back in the bottle. He would spend the rest of his life in association with Texas environmentalists, retiring from private practice within a few years. Working to enact his vision, Ned became increasingly involved with each subsequent environmental battle in the state. He continued to focus on his strategy of marshalling the abilities of various groups into more effective organizations.

The essential benefit he worked to provide the movement at this stage was a firm commitment to coordination. Ned was sure that collaboration offered the opportunity to multiply their production and make positive changes on behalf of natural habitats. Even

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this early in his tenure, the cohesion he engendered for statewide groups was showing positive returns.

Another important result from the 1950s were the first stirrings of Ned’s growing radicalization. While he had yet to fully comprehend the steepness of the climb he was facing to change the Texan consensus on environmentalism, the resistance he encountered to simple proposals advocating protection of birds convinced him that

Austin would not be a prime location to effect change. His time with other conservationist organizations led to growing frustration with the current status of Texas environmental organizations, viewing them as not up to the task without making the changes he sought. Altering the traditional Texas approach and pushing for changes in the relationship between existing organizations revealed his eagerness to challenge the status quo. To Ned, these changes were necessary to see the success he wanted to bring to the state’s environmental movement.

At this point in his story, Ned was still swimming in the shallow waters of the

Texas environmental movement. He had seen manifestations of a burgeoning state movement, even participated in it at points, but was far from the most important member. His emergence within the movement and increasing responsibility coincided with a marked increase in the success of activism in protecting state ecology. For Ned, the 1950s served as an appetizer for involvement with conservation. He rode the wave of increasing public attention to environmental issues. Entering the movement at such an opportune time and recognizing the inherent flaws in their approach was fortunate.

His career experience offered him a unique perspective that colored his work and led him to push for substantial changes. As the 1960s began, he would find new

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opportunities to translate his beliefs into action. In the process, he would widen the scope of his connection to environmental causes and expand his influence on state conservationists. The simple solutions he prescribed, localizing protest and expertise, enlisting a much wider base of support, and cooperating with multiple groups to increase pressure in fights over environmental issues, were a manifestation of much of his own experiences. For now, these changes represented the highest level of innovation Ned was willing to go. As the movement progressed, the changes he proposed, as well as his own views, would continue to transform in the face of ever more complex challenges confronting Texan environmentalism.

46 CHAPTER 3

WELCOME TO THE WIDER WORLD OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

If the 1950s saw the birth of modern environmentalism, the 1960s was the decade that saw the movement begin to find its footing. The success found in a few prominent locations transformed the movement, bringing in new adherents and inoculating the population with the idea that environmental preservation was a civic duty. These ideas led to citizens identifying additional areas of concern. There were several milestones during the decade that propelled the environmental movement.

Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) warning of the dangers of pesticides, represented a significant turning point, revealing how the potential damage from environmental issues was not isolated in far-off places, but could be found in your own backyard. The

Cuyahoga River fire and Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969 furthered the narrative that there was a darker side to runaway development. The proliferation of nuclear arms raised the specter of large-scale, manmade disasters and created its own wing of environmental advocacy. These incidents ingrained the fallout from industrialization into the American psyche, leading the movement to new heights.

Ned Fritz’s path continued to parallel the evolution of environmentalism. Although he was increasingly active, he did not become essential to the movement in Texas overnight. His work in the 1950s laid the groundwork, gradually growing his profile to other environmentalists. The fruits of his labors would begin to ripen through his consistent place on the front lines of Texas activism in the subsequent decade. His work in high profile cases running the gamut of Texas environmental causes would earn him the level of influence necessary for him to begin to implement his goals for the state.

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The decade would also witness the creation of the primary vehicle he would use to stimulate fellow activists, the Texas Committee on Natural Resources. His leadership through three vital and conspicuous moments in the 1960s—the contentious battle over the state’s water plan, the opening of a long running effort to defend East Texas forests from timber interests, and his lawsuit under the auspices of 1969’s National

Environmental Policy Act—would burn his name in the annals of Texas environmental history.

Nationally, the 1960s were an important time in advancing American’s perception of their relationship to the environment. The decade saw the birth of new organizations like the WWF and Greenpeace, the passage of influential legislation concerning issues ranging from air quality to nuclear power, as well as a number of major incidents exposing the instability between America’s drive for growth and the cost of never-ending demand on the nation’s natural resources. Near misses were almost as important in changing American’s minds. A nuclear meltdown in Idaho killed three workers in

January of 1961 and the U.S. was fortunate to escape the fallout from the thalidomide disaster when an anti-nausea medication struck four countries, causing thousands of children to be born with birth defects. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring exposed the prevalence of harmful pesticides, eventually leading to the banning of DDT and convincing numerous Americans of the importance of environmental protection as a safety measure. Other forms of pollution garnered a great deal of attention as public awareness increased following a massive oil spill off the coast of California in 1969. The spill attracted national attention and became a reference point for the costs attached to continued development. The accumulation of events led a new round of legislation, with

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new controls on air and water pollution, the Endangered Species Act, and the Wild and

Scenic Rivers Act all working towards increased protection of the environment.

In March of 1968 Robert F. Kennedy tapped into the consciousness of many

Americans in a speech at the University of Kansas delineating his reasons for

supporting environmental legislation.

Too much and too long, we seem to have surrendered community excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our gross national product … if we should judge America by that — counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for those who break them. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear warhead, and armored cars for police who fight riots in our streets. It counts Whitman’s rifle and Speck’s knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children.

Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages; the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it tells us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans.63

Kennedy’s speech was strong evidence of the change that had taken place in

American’s conception of environmental causes had advanced to maturity. As would be the case for much of his history in the movement, a similar change was taking place in

Ned Fritz.

The 1960s was Ned's chance to coalesce the growing chorus of concerned voices into an active environmental movement. As the 1960s dawned, he was in an encouraging position to continue implementing changes to Texas conservation efforts.

63 Robert F. Kennedy, “Remarks at the University of Kansas,” (speech, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, March 18, 1968).

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Throughout the 1950s, he had begun the process of altering environmentalism activism to meet his ends, pushing for greater reliance on affected citizens and strategic coordination between organizations. To some allies, the job of raising awareness of environmental awareness in the state was nearly finished. That was not a view Ned shared. Over the course of the ensuing decade, he would take his crusade to new heights, embedding himself in environmental circles through his participation in less renowned conflicts over the future of protecting the state’s land and water and highly publicized events at Meridian State Park and the Big Thicket forest. Actions in the

1960s were crucial to determining the future course of Texas’s environmental movement. Ned’s lofty goals for advocacy in Texas saw substantial progress in the decade, but also witnessed some drawbacks in his personality that created greater difficulties for himself and the allies he was relying upon.

Ned’s growing environmental profile coincided with increased awareness of the many danger zones facing environmentalists in the state and a continued evolution of his own views in the face of repeated challenges when seeking solutions to environmental problems. Already responsible for the creation of his first advocacy organization in the Dallas chapter of the Audubon Society, the emerging threats of the

1960s would lead him to initiate the organization through which he realized his most significant impact on Texas environmentalism, the Texas Committee on Natural

Resources. TCONR was a manifestation of his frustration with the status quo of environmental organizations in Texas. Under its auspices, Ned would engage in numerous legal, political, and public campaigns on behalf of the state's natural habitats.

Along the way, his stubbornness and headstrong attitude would lead to fostering enmity

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among his opponents. His increasing brazenness was a result of his frustration with the

slow pace of environmental protection. Ned’s evolving approach was similar to the

changes occurring throughout the national movement. In much of the rest of the nation,

new organizations and approaches were emerging in response to the lackluster results

of environmental efforts and Ned was proving to be the herald of that shift in Texas.

For the first few years of the decade, Ned spent time on a number of endeavors directly and indirectly related to the environment. Although he continued to participate in both the Texas Ornithological and Dallas Audubon societies, he had not yet found a task that piqued his full interest. In lieu of channeled activism, Ned found an outlet in a brief effort to involve himself in the raging national debate over civil rights. In 1963, Ned constructed an essay titled "All Men Should Be Free."64 The unpublished manuscript

was one of a series of attempts to gain traction as a writer. Ned’s essay was aimed at

the controversial segregation policies in the Deep South. Building on his time as a

consumer credit attorney, the essay was another example of his stepping up as a

defender of minority communities. While his work failed to find traction, the essay is a

piece of the wider story of Ned’s willingness to defend communities he felt had not been

given a fair shake.

Ned also participated in some smaller environmental efforts as he built up his

resume. He attended meetings related to the Choctaw Creek Watershed in 1965, a

national beautification conference in 1966, and several activities related to pollution. He

studied multiple types of pollution, focusing on the effects of the air and noise levels

from local airports in connection to plans for Dallas/Fort Worth airport. He also became

64 Edward C. Fritz, “All Men Should Be Free,” (manuscript, 1963).

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interested in the role of pollution on the state’s coastal areas and large rivers.65

Although his focused attention on contamination was short-lived, Ned gradually gained an understanding of the importance of effluence as a significant component in his campaign to maintain Texas rivers. Similarly vital was Ned's initiation into land preservation, which also evolved out of his attention to pollution issues. Ned had been gradually moving towards preserving open spaces—particulary those in creeks and river bottoms—as the overarching strategy for environmentalism in Texas, a sensibility that would grow along with his understanding of the significant environmental threats

posed by dams, canals, and other water development projects.

As the decade progressed, Ned’s knowledge and experience with environmental issues expanded into new areas of concern. One of the most prominent fields Ned focused on was the ecological politics of water. Water issues had been a common concern of American preservationists ever since John Muir had tangled with the federal

government over plans to dam Hetch Hetchy valley around the turn of the century.66 In

Texas, the Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for planning and implementing

water development proposals in concert with political and government agencies.

Citizens were concerned with the environmental destruction wrought by this

conglomeration that Ned defined as “water hustlers.”67 With a growing population, a

wide disparity in the distribution of water sources, the constant threat of floods, and a

65 Edward C. Fritz to Franklin Jones, June 22, 1966. 66 Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: America’s Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21. 67 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 May 1997,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (May 17, 1997).

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strong desire for recreation among Texans, the opportunity for future confrontations was

strong.

Ned received assistance in his growing environmental profile from Genie Fritz’s

association with the Dallas League of Women’s Voters. A member since 1952, Genie

served as the organization’s president from 1963-1965.68 Following her tenure as

president of the Dallas chapter, Genie was named to the board of the Texas League of

Women’s Voters. Ned first became aware of the Texas state water plan through Genie

Fritz’s association with the League. By exposing Ned to the issues threatening Texas’s

waters, Genie Fritz set the table for the campaign to delay or prevent enactment of the

suggested changes and unwittingly opened him to a new realm of environmental

preservation that would come to be an essential component of his time in the

movement. The incident highlighted the ability of the couple to use their combined

efforts to effect positive changes in the state.

The water plan contained a holistic assessment of water issues facing Texas

from the movement and growth of population and the enactment of water development

projects long sought by the Army Corps of Engineers.69 The plan consisted of an

overview of the potential threats to the entire state from water problems, as well as

specific proposals for each of the central water basins in Texas. Created by the Texas

water development board, the document combined input from local and state politicians

and bureaucratic groups like the Corps of Engineers and the Texas Parks and Wildlife

68 Texas Land Conservancy Newsletter, “Profile of Genie Fritz: Conservationist, Advocate Leader,” (Fall 2012): 3. 69 S.D. Breeding et al., “Fifty Years of Water Development in Texas,” (Austin: Texas Water Commission, 1964), 23.

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Commission.70 The plan was controversial from the outset. Regional rivalries emerged

quickly in response to significant revelations of what the plan contained, which were

either a boon or an abomination depending on your geographical perspective. Joining

the have-nots was a growing groundswell from Texas citizens’ organizations.

Environmentalists found a mountain of items within the report that drew their ire, from

plans for increased recreational areas on the state's remaining protected lands to

proposals that would remake various rivers for poorly defined purposes. Requirements

attached to newly enacted legislation called for public meetings to allow citizens to

address their concerns with the proposals, providing an opening Ned soon looked to

capitalize upon.

The plan created to address Texas water issues confronted substantial obstacles from its earliest initiation. In terms of water, the state faced significant challenges from

the combination of growing demand and dwindling resources. Texas’s wide variation in

climate, geography, and available water meant that meeting the needs of the respective

regions would be a difficult needle to thread under optimal circumstances. The plan written by the six-member board led by Chairman Mills Cox intended to provide answers to these issues. Their primary solutions called for significant adjustments to state water sources. The state’s geography required that the majority of planning called for changes

in the east where most of the state’s natural water supply existed. These changes

included a 980-mile system of reservoirs, canals, channels, and pipelines that would

70 Texas Water Development Board, Preliminary Plan for Proposed Water Resources Development (San Antonio: Texas Water Development Board, 1966).

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redirect water from North Texas to the Gulf coast and Rio Grande Valley.71 The system

was to provide a water supply for Texans until 2020, defend from flood damage, and

increase recreational opportunities.72

Excluded from the bulk of the extensive eastern water system, West Texans had

major issues with the proposed water plan. In the West, the plan called for the creation

of nine reservoirs and the investigation of desalination innovations as potential answers

in that part of the state. Predictably, West Texans were opposed to the proposal. They

felt the board had ignored the difficulties they faced due to the absence of large rivers

such as those bisecting the eastern parts of the state. West Texans pointed to the

agricultural demands as the cause of the acute shortages that afflicted the region.73

They were also frustrated with the decision to leave long-term solutions to the western

region’s future water supply to nebulous out-of-state projects.74 As the water board

released their preliminary plans and opened the floor for public comment, challenges to

the proposals would crystallize, providing an opening for environmentalists like Ned to

offer alternative solutions.

Genie had spurred Ned’s involvement with the state water plan while he was still

new to the intersection between water development, state and national politics, and

environmentalism. Water issues were quite different from the bird protection he had

worked on previously. Confrontations over water were more intense than his preceding

involvement. Water scarcity in Texas only served to raise the stakes of state planning.

69 Texas Water Development Board, Preliminary Plan for Proposed Water Resources Development (San Antonio: Texas Water Development Board, 1966). 72 Ibid. 73 Katherine Duff, “West Texas Written Off in Water Plan?,” Abilene Reporter-News, July 3, 1966, 13. 74 Ibid, 13.

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The platform produced by the state was a quick initiation into the complex world of

water improvement projects.75 The regional issues raised by the designs called for by

the development board had already drawn the ire of invested citizens and local political

representatives. The concerns raised by environmentalists simply added to the list.

They were aghast at the sheer scale of the changes Texas would see in their natural

environment through enactment of the proposals. The plans for the eastern half of the

state called for some of the most substantial changes ever seen in relation to water

development.76 Ned was concerned that plans so extensive and wide-ranging might see approval without additional public input. He responded by organizing the Committee for a Balanced Water Plan in 1966.

The Committee for a Balanced Water Plan sought public participation in the meetings being held around the state to discuss the water plan. Ned believed that most

Texans were in favor of the dams and navigation projects contained in the report.77 He hoped to raise awareness of the complications that would result. He sought to enlist support from others who shared his belief that the projects threatened fish and other wildlife while removing portions of Texas's few undeveloped areas. Ned saw the public hearings regarding the state plans as an opportunity to advance Texas environmental efforts.78 While the report itself was not final, it proved to be an essential opportunity. He used the meetings across the state as a chance to recruit citizens who voiced concerns and spearheaded a protest movement. His response increased his knowledge of a vital

75 Edward C. Fritz to Franklin Jones, June 22, 1966. 76 Texas Water Development Board, Preliminary Plan for Proposed Water Resources Development, 1966. 77 Edward C. Fritz to Franklin Jones, June 22, 1966. 78 Ibid.

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aspect of state environmentalism, allowing him to prepare organized resistance with

capable allies before the plans neared fulfillment.

Ned’s work with the Committee for a Balanced Water Plan allowed him to interact with potential partners among statewide activists. One of the results of his involvement was his placement as a project administrator in the creation of the Texas Natural Areas

Survey.79 Begun in 1965 but not completed until 1971, the push to catalog the natural

areas of Texas was a suggestion by environmental students in a group named the

Student Council on Pollution and Environment.80 One of the students Ned worked with

on the project was law student and future Democratic Congressman John Bryant. The

two would work together on a number of environmental projects over the years.81 The

goal was in part to produce a survey as called for in federal guidelines for land

acquisition under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act passed in 1964.82 The

resulting inventory would allow for planning and land preservation in the state by

politicians, governments, or citizens to come from an informed position. Several

difficulties plagued the project. The state's sheer size made classification a challenge.

Texas contains elements of multiple distinct climatic regions, meaning that expertise

about a particular part might not translate to others. The state's size also indicated that it

held thousands of potential natural areas. Another complication was the desire to

maintain secrecy out of fear that developers or investors might use the information for

79 The Texas Natural Areas Survey, The Natural Areas of Texas: Preliminary Listing, 1971. 80 Ibid. 81 Genie Fritz, My Life with Ned Fritz, 28. 82 Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Statutes at Large 78, sec. 897 (1964).

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their own purposes.83 Solutions to those problems entailed a great deal of work on the

part of Ned and the students who worked on the document.

Trying to collect information on all of the state’s potential areas to protect, Ned

depended on the assistance of outside support. He adopted a strategy of enlisting aid

from as many people as possible to describe any local areas they thought merited

consideration for protection.84 He worked with Baylor professor Frederick Gehlbach to

design a simple template for all responders consisting of who was creating the record,

where the area was located, its size, who owned the lands, any significance attached to

the grounds, and where the area should fit in terms of priorities.85 Ned understood that

despite the simplicity of the response, the sheer scope of the project demanded as

many hands on deck as he could scrounge. He wrote to hundreds of Texans to request

support. Many of his targets declined to participate for a variety of reasons, from

ignorance of the issues to death or relocation, but the dozens of denials speak to Ned's

passion for the work and willingness to accept help from any locale. Despite the number

of refusals, he was able to garner enough responses to supplement the efforts of the

original team to catalog the state's natural areas.86 The resulting document created a

valuable resource for scientific researchers and environmentalists in their efforts to

protect various portions of the state. Containing over 750 areas, from state parks and national forests to smaller spaces like scenic creeks and watersheds, their work product

83 The Texas Natural Areas Survey, The Natural Areas of Texas: Preliminary Listing, 5. 84 Frederick R. Gehlbach to Edward C. Fritz, Nov. 1, 1971. 85 Ibid. 86 The Texas Natural Areas Survey, The Natural Areas of Texas: Preliminary Listing, 6.

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earned notice in the state as “The Little Green Book.”87 Ned’s central role in the creation

of the list benefited his relationships with other environmental activists, further

cementing his position as a leader in environmental circles.

Ned's continued search for worthwhile causes finally found a goal through his

involvement with a 1967 proposal to create a golf course on parkland in Meridian State

Park. Located only one hundred miles from his Dallas home, the golf course combined

a number of his pet causes; the removal of public space, political and bureaucratic

corruption, and dangers to threatened birds. The course had strong backing from the

Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission and state Senator J.P. Word.88 Word was the

local state representative also represented a group of investors, known as the Lakeview

Recreation Association, who intended to lease the state land for the course.

Environmentalists saw the park proposal as a needless sacrifice of public areas, funded

with taxpayer dollars, and pushed through with the help of governmental organizations

ostensibly intended to protect the park. The group seeking funding for the park was

reliant on a controversial federal program, the Farmer’s Home Association, which

sponsored similar projects across the country.89 Controversy had followed the group.

The loan program was plagued by financial difficulties, and the loans often ended up

delinquent. A greater concern developed as violations related to the Civil Rights Act

emerged on publicly funded golf courses. The issue was that public funding exposed

the racial discrimination common to American golf courses. While not his primary

87 Eugenia Fritz, interview by author, June 10, 2016, Dallas. 88 Austin Bureau, “Conservation Platform Presented During a Hot Meeting,” Denton Record-Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1968, 9. 89 Associated Press, “State Park Tree-Saving Trial Set,” Austin American-Statesman, Nov. 7, 1969, 2.

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objective, Ned’s stance against the Meridian course was another example of the intersection between his work on behalf of the environment and the concerns of minorities. Unwittingly, he was again standing for their rights by opposing federal funding of courses that would not be open to the entire public.

Ned sought to block approval of a $70,000 federal loan that would finance the lease. His work in Meridian was his first effort as leader of an environmental cause.

Successful protection of the state park and the wildlife would represent a significant step for Texas environmentalists, proving the effectiveness of Ned's holistic approach. The movement to prevent the formation of the course was a highlight of Ned's environmental career, providing a template for future success that he would continue to use to significant effect and further his legend among state environmentalists.

The 1967 campaign in Meridian State Park involved a range of competing stakeholders vying for their interests over the creation of a golf course with federal loans. Drawn into the conflict as a response to requests for assistance from fellow birders and allies in the movement, Ned’s involvement highlighted his increasing influence among his fellow environmentalists.90 The original release of plans for the course came in late 1967 and led Ned to seek support from public officials immediately.

In a letter to United States Senator Ralph Yarborough warning of the plans; Ned voiced concern that the Association was planning to begin bulldozing with an eye toward creating a fait accompli.91 He also expressed his belief that the fight was winnable and would “be a boon to conservationists.”92 He called on fellow environmentalists, initiating

90 Edward C. Fritz to Adele Wilson, Dec. 15, 1967. 91 Edward C. Fritz to Ralph Yarborough, Dec. 11, 1967. 92 Edward C. Fritz to Ralph Yarborough, Jan. 23, 1968.

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a letter campaign to Yarborough and other Texas politicians imploring for action to defend Meridian State Park.93 His partner in the Natural Areas Survey, Baylor professor

Frederick Gehlbach, joined Ned in his opposition to the proposal.94 Gehlbach was instrumental to the Meridian campaign due to his knowledge of the issues involved and his proximity to the proposed location. On the opposing side, Representative Word was the primary mover in favor of the course. With battle lines drawn, the two parties competed to lobby the government agencies who would approve the loan to their team.

Ned’s plan to confront proposed construction in Meridian helped him to streamline activism into a repeatable process that would continue to inform his approach to environmental causes for years to come. His approach to environmental activism, leaving no potential avenue of success unexplored, was on full display in the campaign against the golf course. His effort entailed a multifaceted strategy. Ned began with public opposition, with himself or other representatives attending and speaking out at public hearings required of changes, writing to media sources, and publishing newspaper and magazine articles to encourage and inform both established and potential allies.95 Privately, Ned took part in an intensive lobbying effort aimed at the state legislature, the U.S. Congress, and organizations such as the Texas Parks and

Wildlife Commission and the Department of Agriculture that would decide the fate of the proposed course.96 He also worked to garner broader support for the movement to protect the park, enlisting allies in the state amongst both the general population as well

93 John Tower to S.M. Melton Sr., Jan. 20, 1968. 94 Frederick Gehlbach to Edward C. Fritz, July 11,1968. 95 Edward C. Fritz to Walter Cronkite, Nov. 4, 1969. 96 Edward C. Fritz to William Gosdin, Feb. 25, 1968.

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as other organizations.97 Ned even attempted to leverage the concerns of national groups such as the NAACP in his attempt to derail construction. In the end, his anger at plans for the golf course and the deceitful tactics and motives on the part of the course proponents led him to file his first lawsuit under the banner of the newly formed Texas

Committee on Natural Resources.98 His passion was again forming a vital plank in his defense, serving as inspiration to continue in the face of adversity. Ned’s embrace of activities gleaned from his previous experiences in Texas conservation combined the strategies of disparate individuals and organizations into a unified approach that brought significant gains to the campaign against the course.

Ned pursued multiple angles to prevent the course’s construction. He argued that the course was a poor use of funds, surreptitiously designed for the benefit of its own proponents, and foisted upon Texans without following the procedures put in place to protect Texas land. His critique took issue with the necessity of the development in

Bosque County, arguing that the population of 895 people was not enough to support the project’s encroachment onto public space when other courses were already nearby.99 He pointed to the low-incomes of local farmers who were unable to acquire needed loans for agriculture. To Ned, politically powerful individuals who would use taxpayer funds on a golf course the farmers could not afford to use were superseding their interests. He argued that the course fees fostered inequality at the expense of cheaper recreational areas such as hiking and nature trails, neither of which would

97 Edward C. Fritz to Charles Gallison, Jan. 19, 1969 98 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States, 430 F. 2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970). 99 Edward C. Fritz to William Seaborn Assistant to the Secretary Department of Agriculture, Oct. 7, 1969.

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require significant disruption of the local environment.100 He questioned the priority of

rural golf courses in the stiff competition for federal dollars. His challenging of the need

for the courses and the appropriateness of federal funding added to his exposure of

corruption in the planning and formation of the course in Meridian State Park.

Ned attempted to raise the specter of corruption he felt was the driving factor in

the planning and financing of the golf course. He described the group receiving the loan as a mix of powerful local politicians and wealthy ranchers. Both Senator J.P. Word and his brother C.K. Mayor of Meridian were members of the association granted the loan.

Ned implied that the corruption ran into the Parks and Wildlife Commission who had helped shepherd the investment, taking particular issue with Chairman Will Odom. Ned

accused Odom of holding hearings on approval without advanced warning. He exposed

a number of violations in the approval process, including the failure of the Parks

Commission to create any report, to specify the location within the park, or to form an

agreement on the amount or duration of the lease. He concluded his financial and

political arguments against the park with the following summary,

This would amount to a windfall for the few at the expense of all taxpayers. The golfers got their land from the state, posed it as a basis for matching funds from the federal government, and plan to come up with a golf course for their own use (plus public use on payment of green fees) at an expense of only $100 per member, very low for any golf club membership.101

Ned's environmental instincts supplemented the economic and political factors

undergirding the case against Meridian State Park. His case included a plank compiling

the potential environmental risks associated with the removal of park space in favor of

100 Edward C. Fritz to William Seaborn Assistant to the Secretary Department of Agriculture, Oct. 7, 1969. 101 Texas Ornithological Society, “State Conservation Platform: Plank 12,” 1967.

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the course.102 In addition to the needlessness and favoritism the golf course represented, the existence of a rare bird species in the park, the Golden Cheeked

Warbler, served as an example of the destruction that could potentially accompany the construction of the golf course on state park lands. Ned pointed out that the warblers were "the only migratory species of which all individuals ever born were native

Texans."103 The presence of the warblers offered a robust framework Ned could use to create a defense of the park.

Ned added a number of potential damages to the critiques of the golf course. He raised ecological issues resulting from the location chosen for the course, arguing that the thin soil and steep hills of Meridian would exacerbate soil erosion. He cited the millions of dollars currently spent by the U.S. Bureau of Sports, Fisheries, and Wildlife to acquire lands in order to protect endangered species. He pointed to other examples in

Texas of state spending to preserve areas in their natural condition, with $75 million earmarked for the purpose.104 Ned argued that it would be counterproductive for the same entity working to protect species to be engaged in activities that would destroy habitats simultaneously. He contended that undeveloped open space was the best use of the remainder of the Meridian park. Ned also maintained that there were plenty of other potential locations for the golf course. The other sites also would not infringe on the state's meager stock of pristine areas. They had chosen Meridian because it was attainable through federal government loans. As he would in many subsequent engagements, Ned led Texas environmentalists to expand their approach beyond a

102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Texas Ornithological Society, “State Conservation Platform: Plank 12,” 1967.

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strict conservationist angle. He garnered wider support for his aims and increased his chances of success. This coupling of economic and environmental arguments was an essential factor in his success as a advocate. As the issue moved to the courts following the loan’s approval in 1968, he would need all the arguments he could muster to protect

Meridian State Park.

Despite his extensive campaign, funds for the project earned approval in the summer of 1968.105 With all of his labors close to being wasted, Ned turned to his roots as an attorney, filing a lawsuit to grant a temporary injunction to prevent the course’s formation.106 As it moved through the courts, it would become the first lawsuit to rely on the newly enacted National Environmental Policy Act. This marked a significant milestone in American environmental history. The Meridian State Park lawsuit was one of the first actions of Ned's new organization, the Texas Committee on Natural

Resources. The group was buttressed by another organization he began in the early

1960s, the Natural Area Preservation Association, that would eventually change into the

Texas Land Conservancy. The Texas Committee on Natural Resources, or TCONR, mimicked the National Committee and found inspiration in the coordination required of the effort to create the Texas Natural Areas Survey. NAPA was also a localized version of the larger national organization devoted to purchasing available land that might be eligible for preservation.107 The two organizations were the culmination of his long-held desire to advance state environmentalism. TCONR would handle the lawsuit against the

105 Edward C. Fritz to Senator Ralph Yarborough, Sept. 10, 1969. 106 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States (1970). 107 Edward C. Fritz, “Summary of Some of the Conservation Activities of Edward C. Fritz in 1967 and 1968,” (notes, 1968), 8.

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Farmer's Home Association, Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission, and the U.S.

Department of Agriculture funding the golf course. Ned compiled a laundry list of

justifications behind the filing. The golf course threatened natural habitats for Golden

Cheeked Warblers and made use of protected parklands despite widely available

private lands. It also depended on an increasingly antiquated practice of using

government loans for private recreation.108

Despite the strengths of the case, Ned's decision-making and gung-ho attitude imperiled the chances of the lawsuit. His actions endangered his relationships with other environmentalists and came close to compromising the goodwill he had earned over the previous decade. Baylor professor Gehlbach, who had given so much assistance to

Ned throughout the Natural Areas Survey, was upset with his actions on a number of occasions in relation to the Meridian campaign.109 Despite Gehlbach’s status as an

essential ally, Ned filed for a temporary injunction to halt the loan approval without

consulting his associate.110 Although usually done out of a sense of desperation, his

inability to discuss substantial aspects of his plans with his cohorts caused him a great

deal of trouble. Acting unilaterally under the banner of TCONR would continue to

frustrate potential allies throughout his career.

One of the problems caused by Ned’s assertive character arouse out of his

choice to rely on allies within the movement for legal representation. Long an instinct

that had stood him in good stead, his choice of legal counsel caused some issues

between Ned and his fellow environmentalists. In the summer of 1969, the new

108 “FHA to Abolish Program of Loans for Golf Courses,” Dallas Morning News, Oct. 23, 1969. 109 Frederick Gehlbach to Edward C. Fritz, Sept 7, 1969. 108 Ibid.

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Republican administration under Richard Nixon approved the Farmer’s Home

Association loan to the Lakeview group pursuing the golf course. Ned did not find out

about the loan approval until August 5.111 Ned picked lawyer Sam Houston Clinton as

co-counsel for the Meridian lawsuit. Well known in the Texas legal community, Clinton

had served as counsel for Jack Ruby, Lee Harvey Oswald’s killer, as well as notorious

atheist activist Madalyn Murray O’Hair.112 Clinton focused on the potential civil rights violations of the golf course. The NAACP had recently joined a lawsuit over a similar plan in Mississippi, arguing that the benefits of the course were racially exclusionary.113

The USDA was sensitive to the recent demands of federal entities from the Civil and

Voting Rights Acts. Clinton’s attempts to follow Ned’s line of thinking created conflict,

with multiple allies writing to criticize the idea and Clinton’s implementation.114 To

Gehlbach, who had been especially helpful in cataloging areas for the Natural Areas

survey, Ned’s dependence on Clinton was needlessly antagonistic. He told Ned that his

personal involvement in too many issues could stretch himself too thin.115 Gehlbach tried to convince Ned that his hard work building an active movement had already borne fruit and that he could take a more tactful approach. The reliance on Clinton increased the difficulty of achieving preservation of Merdian State Park.

The lawsuit filed to prevent the construction of the golf course proved

inconclusive. Ned responded to approval of the loan by suing to avoid the disbursement

109 Edward C. Fritz to Senator Ralph Yarborough, Sept 10, 1969. 110 “Justices of Texas 1836-1986: Samuel Houston Clinton, Jr. (1923-2004),” Tarlton Law Library, 2014, https://tarltonapps.law.utexas.edu/justices/profile/view/126. 111 “FHA to Abolish Program of Loans for Golf Courses,” Dallas Morning News, Oct. 23, 1969. 112 Frederick Gehlbach to Edward C. Fritz, Oct. 3, 1969. 113 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States (1970).

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of funds. The suit named the Farmer's Home Association, the Lakeview Recreation

Association, and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department as defendants.116 Ned’s suit relied on the legwork he had undertaken in the three years he had been working on the golf course. His argument consisted of the political and environmental frameworks he had cited while trying to drum up support for his side. After the 1970 trial, the district court dismissed the lawsuit.117 While they awaited appeal, the Farmer’s Home

Association shifted gears, deciding to get out of the business of funding recreational loans.118 The organization found private funding and picked a new location on private lands for the original proposal. While the Meridian suit undoubtedly helped, the

Mississippi case dealing with potential civil rights violations seemed to be the key to the decision. Despite the victory, Ned continued his appeal, sending his case to the fifth circuit court of appeals. The three-judge panel dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the decision. It was remanded to the district court to ensure that the judgment would not create legal precedent, and Ned settled for prevention of the course.

Although it had not come about in the method Ned would have preferred, the campaign against the Meridian golf course was a success. The parklands were safe from infringement and the Golden Cheeked Warbler habitats protected. The organization sponsoring taxpayer loans for golf courses on public lands had changed direction. While success had come about through factors out of his control, there is no way to know if the course would have pushed through much earlier without his

114 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States (1970). 115 Ibid. 116 “FHA to Abolish Program of Loans for Golf Courses,” Dallas Morning News, Oct. 23, 1969.

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campaign. Though it had taken a herculean effort on his part to prevent the course from

construction, his actions furthered his goal of protecting natural space.

As the Meridian campaign evolved, Ned finally fulfilled his desire for a permanent

statewide coalition for environmental protection. His creation of the Texas Committee on

Natural Resources in 1968 would prove vital to his future career. He created the state-

level organization after nomination as a member of the Board of Directors for the

National Citizens Committee on Natural Resources.119 Ned would serve as President of

the Texas organization for sixteen years. He served as primary attorney for an

additional twenty. Ned explained his motivation for forming the group,

The various groups were each out to effectuate some end of their own, which was about all that a small citizen group could do. And we got them together into a coalition, which became the Texas Committee on Natural Resources with-- representation from all over the state and from many different environmental groups.120

TCONR’s primary occupation in the early years was to house all of Ned’s

environmental work under a single umbrella organization. As the scope of his interests

expanded, monitoring environmental causes and legislation throughout the state while

maintaining his legal practice had become untenable. The group allowed Ned to bring

his legal expertise to bear on behalf of more environmental causes. Created during

movements to protect state and national parks from encroaching development, TCONR

would be his primary vehicle for ecological engagement for the remaining five decades

of his career.

117 Edward C. Fritz to Adele Wilson, Dec. 15, 1967. 118 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 May 1997,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (May 17, 1997).

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In addition to the legal battle over the golf course in Meridian State Park and the

creation of TCONR, 1968 also witnessed Ned’s entrance into one of the crises that

would define his environmental career, the controversy over the East Texas Big Thicket.

The Big Thicket was a portion of Sam Houston National Forest earmarked for timber.121

Inspired by fellow birder Geraldine Watson, Ned brought his newly created Committee to the forefront of a confrontation pitting environmentalists against the combined forces of the National Forest Service, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission, the well- entrenched East Texas timber industry, and most of the local population dependent on the industry. Ned’s fight with the forest service demanded all of his skills as an environmentalist; lobbying politicians, influencing public opinion, filing lawsuits, creating organizations, and leading other concerned citizens in a concerted effort to protect the threatened lands. The battle over the Big Thicket was the most recognizable prevention effort in Texas for nearly thirty years and Ned’s central role was essential in establishing his vitality to Texas environmentalism.

Success in the fight over the forests would not come without difficulty. The process of coordinating the different parties interested in the future of the Big Thicket was complicated, involving varied groups with their own competing interests, egos, and ideas about the best course of action. The heightened interest in the Big Thicket and growing attention from a new generation of environmentally conscious citizens raised the stakes. The Big Thicket was of such importance to Texans that gaining member representatives from other organizations was easy. Preservation of the Big Thicket was

119 Jim Cozine, “Defining the Big Thicket: Prelude to Preservation,” East Texas Historical Journal 31, no. 2. (October 1993): 62.

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not the only battle in the forest. The movement was also the proving grounds for the

vision of a new group of Texan activists. Despite significant variations in levels of

experience, training, and expertise among the younger cohort of environmentalists, they

demanded a seat at the table in ecological discussions. Ned’s role in this debate would

work to reach young activists and cement his position as a leader of the emerging

Texas environmental movement.

The Big Thicket is the standard terminology applied to an area of thick forests and vegetation in Southeast Texas. Preservation of the region was a decade's long process, with forty-seven years passing from the establishment of the first preservation organization, East Texas Big Thicket Association in 1927 to Gerald Ford's signature

creating the Big Thicket National Preserve in 1974.122 Exacerbating the difficulty in

forming a protected region within the forest were the struggles in defining the forest's

size. Depending on who was asked, the area encompassed anywhere from ten to

nearly three and a half million square miles of forests. Centered on Hardin County,

Texas, the Big Thicket in the broadest estimates covers parts of twenty-nine counties.

The report defining the area presented complications to establishing estimates

regarding the size of the Big Thicket. The report, published in 1937 as The Fauna and

Flora of the Big Thicket, set the limits of the region as the Sabine River to the east, the

Gulf of Mexico to the south, and the "Ancestral Brazos River" to the west.123 This crude

estimate led to the conclusion that the Thicket engrossed nearly 3,350,000 acres, a fact

preservationists recalled with great enthusiasm. Publication of the survey of the region

120 Cozine, Defining the Big Thicket, 57. 121 H.B. Parks and V.L. Cory, The Fauna and Flora of the Big Thicket Area (Huntsville, Texas: Sam Houston State Teacher's College, 1937), 10.

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led to an increase in calls for preservation, with citizens and journalists seeking protection for the sake of botany and biology.124 Unfortunately, for these early conservationists, oil strikes within the region in 1936 and 1942 forced a reassessment by local populations and killed any momentum for preservation.125 With the onset of

World War II, demand for timber skyrocketed and the early stage movement for Big

Thicket protection soon dissipated.

Despite the challenges of geopolitical and economic forces, the dream of a protected Big Thicket continued to animate some East Texans. Although the military necessity of lumber and the economic value of oil had decreased their influence to many East Texans, preservationists still believed the area was deserving of protection.

Twenty-five years after the first attempts at preservation fizzled out, Texas Governor

Price Daniel, a native of Liberty County in the region of the thicket, initiated a renewed run at a Big Thicket preserve. Daniel kept his plans close to the vest, traveling to the

Thicket to search for promising areas for a park with his wife and Speaker of the House

Sam Rayburn.126 Daniel hoped to entice more visitors to East Texas and tasked his hometown mayor, Dempsie Henley to survey the site. Daniel found difficulty in convincing the timber companies who owned the land to give up space for the proposed park and was soon out following John Connally’s election as governor in 1962.127 The study Daniel commissioned created a newly defined area for the Big Thicket. Known as

122 A.Y. Gunter, The Big Thicket: A Challenge for Conservation (Jenkins: Austin and New York, 1971), 69- 71. 123 Cozine, Defining the Big Thicket, 62. 124 James J. Cozine, Saving the Big Thicket: From Exploration to Preservation, 1685-2003 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2004), 91. 125 Cozine, Saving the Big Thicket: From Exploration to Preservation, 1685-2003, 62.

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the “string of pearls” design, the new area consisted of six distinct sites that would combine to form the new park. With the lumber companies unwilling to donate so much uncut forestland, Henley turned to U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough, for support, creating a competing power center contending for the vision of the Big Thicket.

Convinced that federal involvement would entail the loss of too much acreage, timber representatives and the leader of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department hashed out their own design for a smaller, 20,000-acre park.128 They recommended that the state design a plan for a park but leave the timber companies with final say on location and size. The idea for the 20,000-acre park failed to gain the support of the timber interests. They were convinced that the program would not satisfy the demands of environmentalists. There were also concerns that the idea took too much from a single timber company.129 Yarborough proceeded to propose a 75,000-acre park. A study to define the potential location soon benefited from boundaries created by Sam

Houston professor Dr. Claude McLeod. McLeod codified the Big Thicket as an approximately one and a half million-acre park covering nine Texas counties.130

Following McLeod’s definition and Yarborough’s push, Congress called for a 35,000- acre state park constructed on the string of pearls design. The area failed to qualify for a national park due to the proximity of development. Both Yarborough and the timber representatives were unsatisfied with the chosen size of the proposal, albeit for opposite reasons. Neither side was yet able to come to an agreement, pushing plans for a Big

126 Cozine, Defining the Big Thicket, 64. 127 Ibid, 64. 128 Cozine, Defining the Big Thicket, 66.

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Thicket preserve into the public relations arena and granting preservationists an increased role.

Failure of the timber industry to agree on a defined location and unwillingness to accept state plans before federal involvement paved the way for an environmental solution to the Big Thicket. In the absence of governmental response, a cadre of environmental organizations took up the mantle of Big Thicket preservation. Ned was one of the leading voices, taking advantage of the high level of interest to pursue his dream of coordination of various groups. He was a vital member of the newly formed

Big Thicket Association, a conglomeration of state and national environmental groups that attempted to pool resources and expertise in order to present a united front on behalf of the Thicket.131 Although the combination of so many groups had a number of positives, the fly in the ointment of Ned’s dream of collaboration, disunion from within environmentalist circles, revealed the darker side of coordination.

By 1968, Ned had spent fifteen years encouraging greater collaboration among

Texan environmental groups. His consistent pursuit of stronger alliances had benefited his own status as well as the broader environmental movement. In the Big Thicket, the strengths and weaknesses of coordinated efforts exposed Ned and his cause to the dangers ego and infighting could spell for environmentalists. In 1968, Ned collaborated with the Izaak Walton League to pursue a federally protected Big Thicket. At the

League’s Denver Convention in July of 1968, he authored a resolution in favor of establishing a 100,000-acre Big Thicket Preserve. He had determined the boundaries

129 Edward C. Fritz to Louis Hofferbert, Jan. 11, 1969.

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through personal inspection.132 His recommendation attempted to please both sides in the debate over the Thicket’s geography, implementing both the so-called string of pearls concept as well as more extensive spaces along waterways creating an interconnected corridor. Ten additional environmental organizations adopted Ned’s recommendation, and it became the standard goal for most Big Thicket preserve proposals.133 By the end of the year, the number of affiliated organizations had risen to twenty-four. The resolution Ned created consisted of an assessment of the Thicket, a description of the various options for preservation, and a strong statement regarding the need for protection. His recommendation was persuasive enough to find its way into

Congress, with Ralph Yarborough submitting Ned’s article into the record in support of his proposal.134 Ned discussed the numerous species that inhabited the region, the designs for the three watersheds, and the value of his chosen area as opposed to preceding or competing sites. The document listed the various areas that would be preserved and the usage restrictions recommended for the park. While the resolution and subsequent adoption represented a new codification of long-term preservationist goals, the rifts the document formed in its wake broadcast the cost of Ned’s independent actions.

Trouble related to the plan emerged late in 1968 at a meeting of the Big Thicket

Association in Silsbee, Texas. Ned had worked hard to organize a meeting of representatives from the various groups lobbying for the Thicket. The President of the

130 Edward C. Fritz, “Big Thicket National Riverways,” Outdoor America (October 1968), 10. 131 Ibid. 132 Congress, Senate, Ralph Yarborough speaking to Preserve Big Thicket’s Arterial Systems by Creating a National Park, Congressional Record 116, pt. 3 (17 February 1970): 3546.

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Association was long time Big Thicket advocate Dempsie Henley. Henley had some

extreme opinions on the future of the forest. The chief point of contention between

Henley and the newer brand of environmentalists concerned the size of the Big Thicket

proposal. While Ned’s resolution had called for a 100,000-acre preserve and Senator

Yarborough was recommending a 75,000-acre forest, Henley was still in favor of the

35,000-acre tract from his original assessment. He was convinced that any larger request ran the risk of alienating local industry and would not be successful.135 Henley

held other reservations with the course of Big Thicket activism, considering the new

groups led by Ned to be radicals, ill-suited to the task and unwilling to engage in the

diplomatic version of conservation common to the area. Ned could counter that absence

of a Big Thicket preserve after nearly four decades of pursuit was substantial evidence

in favor of a new approach to Texan environmentalism. Henley’s concerns only

deepened once the Silsbee meeting took place.

In addition to the difficulties environmentalists faced in agreeing to a defined area

for the Big Thicket, internal drama over the composition of the committee also

threatened the work of the movement. Henley’s issues with the BTA included

disagreement over membership on the Coordinating Committee within the BTA and the

selection process. The Coordinating Committee of the BTA was composed of

representatives from twenty-four state environmental organizations who had signed off

on the formal proposal. Ned had personally choosen members to serve, and the

meeting in Silsbee on December 14 was their first appearance.136 Henley unilaterally

133 Cozine, Saving the Big Thicket: From Exploration to Preservation, 120. 134 Edward C. Fritz to Ralph Yarborough, Oct. 2, 1968.

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issued a press release announcing the meeting. He represented his version as a statement speaking for the entire Big Thicket Association and reiterated their commitment to the 35,000-acre preserve.137 His support of the smaller area was contrary to the views of Ned’s cadre, who again expressed their support for the larger space in a subsequent meeting of the BTA Board of Directors on January 9.138 Ned was aware of the coming impasse, and his handwritten notes show his thought process once confronted with Henley's complaints.139 He debated between allowing the meeting to continue as planned, omitting Henley from a speaking role, or canceling the meeting altogether. The notes expose his primary concern as the perception that infighting would make on the forest industry. The BTA’s reputation as a conglomeration of so many state organizations was essential to presenting a united front. Publicizing Henley's disagreements threatened to undermine that notion before they could even get off the ground.

The controversy over the December 14 meeting of the BTA was a turning point for the group’s efforts and for Ned’s dream of coordination among state environmentalists. Henley’s press release airing his views on the future of Big Thicket preservation cast a pallor over the entire proceedings.140 Senator Yarborough attended and expressed his support, eventually increasing his Congressional proposal to the

BTA’s recommended 100,000 acres. The Sierra Club unleashed a new slideshow highlighting the potential losses if the forest was not preserved. The 150 in attendance

135 Edward C. Fritz to Louis Hofferbert, Jan. 11, 1969. 136 Ibid. 137 Edward C. Fritz, “Silsbee, TX Meeting,” (notes Dec.1968). 138 Louis Hofferbert to Edward C. Fritz, Jan. 8, 1969.

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also heard from representatives of the forest service. Henley had expressed his frustration with TCONR’s unilateral decision to select members of the Coordinating

Committee. Ned argued that the meeting was not an appropriate location for grievances. Instead, he couched the conference in terms of a rally.

Although many BTA members supported Ned, Henley was not without allies.

Houston Chronicle Nature writer Louis Hofferbert, who had attended the Silsbee meeting, was one of his defenders. In a series of contentious communications,

Hofferbert accused Ned of picking the coordinating committee without input and subsequently defending his choice out of a misguided desire for censorship of competing voices.141 He claimed the Texas Committee on Natural Resources was an ineffective organization that misrepresented themselves as representative of all Texas conservationists. Although he agreed with Ned’s position on the size of the Big Thicket, he felt that the meeting was a poor representation of Texas environmentalists and that the exclusionary tactics they had employed against Henley endangered efforts to widen their base. Ned had stepped on a hornet’s nest, a common occurrence in his drive for successful protection efforts. How he responded would be vital for determining the continued course of Texas environmentalism.

Although Henley certainly played the spoiler in stirring up trouble related to the

BTA, Ned was not without blame. Much of the problem stemmed from his own intensity, as his passion led him to jump at every opportunity that might help his cause. This had proven an attractive strategy during his time as a lone-wolf environmentalist. Now that he was amplifying his efforts by working with others, those same actions threatened to

139 Louis Hofferbert to Edward C. Fritz, Jan. 8, 1969.

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isolate him from his allies. What was the point of coordination if Ned was willing to

subvert it for any chance that he perceived to be beneficial? A common critique of Ned

was his supposed fixation on celebrity, attempting to wrest the spotlight from anyone

else. His actions in the BTA controversy, publishing the park proposal, pushing for

Congressional recognition, and trying to exclude dissenting voices from the BTA

coordinating committee, implied a need for personal accolades. Although Ned’s words

and future activity belie this conclusion, understanding the perception of his actions both inside and outside of environmental circles would be vital for him to continue as a leading voice in Texas.

In the fallout from the controversy, critical voices within the BTA spoke their

frustration over the disagreement between Henley and the new generation of

environmentalists. Geraldine Watson, the local birder and impetus behind Ned’s

personal involvement in the Big Thicket, wrote to voice her opinion on the internal dispute.142 She expressed frustration with Henley’s tactics and his motivations. Watson

considered him a con artist unconcerned with the truth. She felt that they would not be

able to dislodge him from the committee. The whole issue frustrated Watson enough to

cause her to swear off organized environmentalism altogether. Watson told Ned about

her disgust and informed Hofferbert, who had taken on the mantle of defending

Henley.143 Fellow member of the BTA Houston Thompson also came out in support of

Ned. Writing to Hofferbert, he expressed disdain with Henley’s continued complaints

despite a willingness to place him on the coordinating committee. The support for Ned

140 Geraldine Watson to Edward C. Fritz, Jan 15, 1969. 141 Geraldine Watson to Louis Hofferbert, Jan 13, 1969.

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shows that his behavior reflected BTA consensus, a point he would repeat in

subsequent defenses. His supporters also expose Henley’s actions as a reaction to

seeing the preservation movement in the Big Thicket passing him by.

Ned also defended himself in letters to Hofferbert, explaining that the accusations

of censorship failed to account for the opportunity they offered Henley to speak. He

claimed that their handling of Henley was a response to his decision to speak for the

whole group, undercutting the work of the majority pushing for the larger space. He also

decried the condition his dream of coordination was in, following the conflicts laid bare

in Silsbee.144 Ned had always envisioned cooperation as the solution to protecting

Texas’ natural resources. Representatives from TCONR were members of other

committees specifically to encourage this goal. He considered the unwillingness to work

together and a hypercritical attitude towards the new generation of environmentalists as

substantial roadblocks on the path to a robust Texas environmental movement. At the

moment, environmentalists and conservationists remained too divided to realize his

vision.

Despite the bickering, the BTA moved on without Henley’s involvement. The

Sierra Club’s Orrin Bonney became the new President of the thirty-one member

Coordinating Committee.145 He worked amicably with the remaining groups comprising

the BTA, although Ned was still concerned with the distribution of credit.146 He was

afraid that Bonney’s connection to the Sierra Club might overshadow the efforts of the

144 Edward C. Fritz to Louis Hofferbert, Jan. 11, 1969. 145 Edward C. Fritz, “Conservation Progress,” Texas Committee on Natural Resources Newsletter 13 (January 1969): 2. 146 Edward C. Fritz to Orrin Bonney, March 11, 1970.

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less renowned groups. The BTA had worked through the internal disagreements following the addition of so many new voices. They had decided to make a request for a much larger piece of the East Texas forests than previous efforts at creating a Big

Thicket preserve had imagined. They had successfully found Congressional sponsors who supported their vision. Despite these gains, the BTA still had a long road to completion. Government moves slowly and as the 1960s wound down, Ned and his allies in the movement continued to pursue their goal of protecting the forest.

His attempt to alter the course of Big Thicket preservation exposed the problem that is essential to understanding his environmental career. The very attributes that led to his success as an environmentalist, his persistence, stubbornness, and penchant for argument, were also his most significant obstacles. Setting fire to the established order in the hope for change was part of successful advocacy in a state with strong support for industry. The existing tradition built on diplomacy and compromise had failed. To

Ned, continuing an identical approach was a death sentence for Texas's environment. If the price of success required a few hurt feelings, he was willing to pay. However, his dreams also depended on the contributions of a wide range of individuals with differing goals, ideas, and motivations. Finding a balance between giving away too much in the interest of compromise and alienating the allies he needed for the coordination he believed to be of great importance would be difficult to find.

The conflict and competing ideas over the Thicket represented a turning point for

Texas environmentalists. Ned and his allies hailed a new brand of activism. They promoted ideas that were more radical at the cost of alienating traditional allies and long-held relationships between preservationists, industry, and politicians. They were in

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favor of coordination, but not at the expense of success. To their detractors, the shifts

that were taking place threatened their progress in increasing awareness of state

environmental issues. To Ned, the failure to preserve the Big Thicket was solid proof of

the folly an identical approach entailed. His only real test of success was in lands

preserved, animals protected. As the fifth decade of work towards a Big Thicket

preserve approached, Ned was confident that his side would be the one to see it

through to culmination. His was an amenable goal that would mean a great deal to his

position within Texas’s environmental movement. Little could he imagine that in only a

couple of decades, he would be the one decrying the methods of new activists, with the

center of many of those concerns found in the same stretch of East Texas forest.

The Big Thicket fight and the hubbub over the BTA Coordinating Committee

highlighted some subtle changes in Ned’s environmental views and his role as an

advocate. The new breed of environmentalists he brought to the committee heralded

the increasing radicalization he was undergoing as an advocate. Frustrated with the

glacial pace of change in the Big Thicket, Ned sought to accelerate preservation efforts, expand the scope of lands that would be protected, and push out the old guard. While these moves brought renewed energy to the committee, in the offing Ned’s actions threatened to alienate longtime advocates of a Big Thicket preserve.

Ned Fritz’s 1960s environmental activities highlighted the consistent pattern of cause and effect that worked to radicalize him into a more effective advocate for the environment. As he grew his reputation and moved into new realms of protection, he was included in more areas of interest for environmentalists. His experiences with government, bureaucracy, and traditional conservation organizations in new areas

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furthered his conviction that the status quo was an unacceptable alternative and that more comprehensive interventions were needed. Genie Fritz’s affiliation with the

League of Women Voters led him to protest the state’s preliminary plan for future water development. Responding to the planned alterations, Ned organized resistance in locations throughout the state. After forming the Committee for a Balanced Water Plan, he learned of plans for the creation of a golf course on lands devoted to a state park. He threw himself into resistance to the course’s construction, using his legal training to incorporate a broad range of opposing arguments. Organizing groups of citizens into the

Texas Committee on Natural Resources helped to coordinate lawsuits and public relation battles in defeating the golf course. Protection of Meridian State Park and the threatened Golden Cheeked Warblers represented another victory for his burgeoning role in the hierarchy of Texas environmentalism. While the case was still progressing, he gained connections to the central issue animating state environmentalists, the movement to preserve the Big Thicket. In East Texas's Big Thicket, Ned sought new protections for a wilderness area larger than his predecessors could have imagined.

Saving state parks and large parcels of forestland within the Sam Houston National

Forest thrust him into a leadership role in the movement. His leadership in the Big

Thicket worked to increase his credibility with other environmentalists, ensuring his involvement in subsequent environmental problems. While his role in the groups organizing resistance to the destruction of the Big Thicket boosted his profile, it also exposed some of the pitfalls of his uncompromising attitude. Despite the successes he could count in his ledger, criticism of his approach in the Big Thicket would continue to follow him for years afterward. Through a continued willingness to explore any issue

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and an internal desire to direct Texas’ growing environmentalist fervor properly, he was able to see significant gains in the success of state environmental efforts. Although his victory did not come without cost, Ned's work in the 1960s was vital to consolidating his position as the driving force behind Texas’ increasingly active environmental movement.

84 CHAPTER 4

FLOOD CONTROL: NED FRITZ AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TRINITY RIVER

CANAL

On the heels of his work with the Big Thicket Coordinating Committee, a proposal for a component of the Texas water plan created a new avenue for Ned Fritz’s emerging

Texas environmental movement. In 1965, a vote to fund the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers project to transform the Trinity River into a shipping channel sparked a resistance movement that marked a milestone in Ned’s environmental career. The work to preserve the Trinity River was essential in his modernization of the Texas environmental movement, showing the amenability of the state’s population to persuasion in favor of preserving the natural environment. The movement he inspired in response to threats to the river broadened his influence, highlighting the tangible benefits of the new brand of active, citizen-oriented environmentalism he was initiating across the state.

The Army Corps’ attempt to recreate the river into a canal connecting Dallas-Fort

Worth to the Gulf of Mexico would have fulfilled the dreams of Metroplex boosters and state politicians that had percolated since the middle of the 19th century. Unlike many of

Ned’s campaigns, little of the fight for the future of the Trinity was held inside courtrooms. Instead, Ned personally spearheaded an expansive public campaign, combining his local ecological expertise with groups of fiscal conservatives seeking to prevent the allotment of local funds required to begin the proposed development. The public vote to decide whether the Trinity proposal would be enacted represented a new challenge for Ned. He was forced to tailor his message to the general public. By turning

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the fight for preservation of the river into a fight over the power imbalance between the opposing sides, Ned was able to pit the concerned citizens he led against the established government and industrial structures of North Texas. Partly forced on him by the pro-canal side, an anti-establishment streak ran through much of the campaign.

His tireless efforts at organizing and implementing a public relations response to the

Corps’ plans for the Trinity River represented his most significant achievement as an environmental advocate. Although the effort was not his first successful crusade, his leadership facilitated increased involvement and cooperation with environmental causes and led to his retirement from private law practice so that he could devote more time to environmental protection. The eventual success of Ned’s advocacy work on the Trinity also laid the foundation for future campaigns by identifying political and legal pathways for challenging other proposed projects in Texas that threatened the environment.

Perhaps most importantly, the campaign also preserved an indispensable piece of

Texas’s natural history—the river that coursed through the city itself and had nurtured the earliest settlement of North Texas.

As Texas moved into the environmentally conscious decade of the 1970s, Ned’s sensibilities as an environmental advocate grew from their humble beginnings in bird watching and nature appreciation toward an increasingly ecosystemic perspective that focused on the wide-ranging, uncontrollable, and uncontainable effects of industrial development. His growing awareness of the ecological complexities of environmental issues meant that his advocacy work dominated more and more of his time by consistently leading him into environmental controversies. Ultimately, the stress pushed him to limit his private practice in favor of continued devotion to environmental causes.

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This decision, finalized by his retirement from his consumer law practice in 1974, paved the way for the expansion of his commitment into a full-time pursuit.147 The precipitating incident behind his move was the most publicized and arguably most influential of his many campaigns on behalf of the environment: the fight over the planned canalization of the Trinity River in 1973. Ned’s fight for the river was instrumental to his growing reputation as an environmentalist, showing his colleagues a path for successful preservation despite overwhelming odds.

Ned’s work against the Trinity River Barge Canal proposal was influenced by his earlier resistance to the Texas State Water Plan. His experiences confronting the shifting of water sources from East Texas to West Texas, as the plan called for, had already led Ned toward an interest in water policy. By the end of the 1960s, Ned had developed his own approach to water issues that he proposed at a National Water

Commission Conference held in New Orleans in 1969.148 Calling for a revolution to ensure water supply, he proposed radical solutions, shifting populations and controlling their growth, in response to continued threats. The summary of his suggestions established a framework for his future involvement in associated causes. In this manner, his solutions serve as a road map for the goals he sought to achieve.

Ned’s presentation in New Orleans attacked the prevailing public and private consensus on the necessity of water improvement projects, which conventional wisdom had long viewed as the only viable solution to supplying water to arid regions. Proposing radical solutions from multiple angles, taking issue with the environmental, economic,

147 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999. 148 Edward C. Fritz, “Some Solutions to National Water Resource Problems,” (statement, New Orleans, Louisiana, National Water Commission, Oct. 9, 1969).

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water supply, and flood control aspects, Ned envisioned nothing less than a complete

overhaul of humanity’s relationship with water. His speech promoted environmental

quality as an alternative to the rationales usually presented to justify dam construction.

He argued that their common economic justification was based on an unattainable

interest rate, an argument supported gleaned from future allies in the organization he

founded to lead the fight over the Trinity. He also questioned the government’s position

on the need for costly water improvement projects to increase the quantity of the water

supply based on speculative population increases. He wished to revolutionize the

standards for future decisions relating to water, seeking tangible proof of their

benefits.149

The radicalism that lay beneath the surface of much of his environmental career

was also present in Ned’s solutions. He began with a recommendation for government

intervention to control population growth to limit pressure on water supplies. He also

called for the decoupling of water planning from projections of future population sizes,

conceivably to encourage enactment of population control. Ned sought to engineer a

shift in major populations, moving people closer to water instead of moving water to

people. The idea was to prevent losing natural water in the transfer process.150 Far from

his younger conservativism, his proposals for a new approach to water issues were

much more drastic. The shift in attitude that had been slowly building as he became

more and more involved in environmental politics sped up in response to the threat to

149 Edward C. Fritz, “National Water Committee Conference Questions, Summer/Fall 1969,” (conference presentation, New Orleans, National Water Commission Conference, July 25, 1969). 150 Ibid, 1.

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the Trinity. The impending peril of dwindling water supplies as populations continued to expand justified an extreme response.

In addition to his proposals for changes to the population, he also sought to remake the economic component of governmental water development. He asked that plans for new developments no longer include tangentially related benefits in their cost/benefit estimates.151 He requested a change to the interest rate federal departments used in calculating potential benefits and spoke out in favor of accounting that would include the environmental losses their projects incurred.152 Ned also called for the ending of navigation and dam projects, arguing that desalination and alternative transportation options were more cost-effective and ecologically sound. He pointed to the limited shelf life that sedimentation brought to many water improvement projects as a substantial drawback that was often ignored. By attacking the long-held consensus over the necessity of altering natural habitats for poorly defined ends in the sake of water supply and flood control, he began the process of moving toward a new approach to water development issues.

Ned would not have to wait long to test out his new ideas for altering governmental changes to natural waterways. The plans for a substantial reimagining of the state’s water resources dominated a significant chunk of Ned’s environmental activism in the early 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapter; the Texas State

Water Plan Genie Fritz had informed him about contained a holistic assessment of the impact of plans for water development—from dams, lakes, and supply—on the

151 Fritz, “National Water Committee Conference Questions,” 1969. 152 Ibid, 2.

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environment. Although he was upset with multiple aspects of the plan’s potential for

environmental destruction, the plans for the Trinity River were particularly egregious.

The Corps of Engineers’ plans for Texas water sources called for a complete re-

engineering of the Trinity, repurposing the natural river into a shipping canal that would

open commercial routes from Dallas to the Gulf of Mexico.153 Understanding the

background of Trinity development will help to illuminate the achievement Ned’s effort to

protect the river represented.

History of the Trinity Barge Canal

The dream of opening a shipping channel to Dallas was nearly as old as the city

itself. Early settlers offered rewards for anyone who completed the trip. In 1868, Captain

James H. McGarvey won a $500 prize for successfully navigating a steamboat from

Galveston to Dallas.154 The route proved to be not practical as the trip took over a year

and ran into numerous obstacles and delays.155 Droughts and expense prevented

McGarvey’s route from taking hold. However, despite the failure of early attempts at

navigation, North Texans refused to give up their plans for a navigable Trinity River.156

At the end of the century, the considerable expense required to “fix” the Trinity River led

Dallas city leaders to Congress.

In 1899, Congress responded to extensive lobbying efforts seeking to create a

navigable route via the Trinity by earmarking $6000 for a study of the feasibility of a

153 Trinity Improvement Association, “Summary: Army Corps of Engineers Report on its Re-analysis of the Trinity River Project July 16, 1968,” (Arlington: Trinity Improvement Association, 1968). 154 Dallas Herald Jun. 13, 1868, 2. 155 Ibid, 2. 156 Edgar H. Brown, Trinity River Canalization (Dallas: Trinity River Canal Association, 1930), 40.

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canal.157 The early 1900s witnessed the first significant movement on plans for

navigating the Trinity River. Previous lobbying efforts had failed to sway Washington on

the need for a canal on the river; however, forces of nature interceded and brought the

river back to the attention of Congress. A 1908 flood inundated large swaths of Dallas,

resulting in five deaths and causing damages that ran into the millions.158 Flood

prevention began to animate new ideas about managing the Trinity River. Alongside

these plans, the idea of a navigation canal reappeared. Dallas residents realized that

the river would require substantial and expensive renovations to reach the Gulf of

Mexico. The flood or famine cycle of the Trinity made navigation on the river more

difficult. When the river was high, significant downpours often resulted in substantial

flooding. Months of drought resulted in a bed too low for sizable ships to navigate.159

Without substantial alterations, a navigable Trinity would never materialize. Although

Dallas boosters realized the daunting nature of their task, they failed to anticipate how

far their attempts to garner funds for the proposal would have to climb. With the steep

competition for federal water resource development and the political horse-trading that

often-preceded dam and canal construction, it was a lesson they would have to learn for

most of the twentieth century.

The idea of a Trinity canal continued to flounder in the face of several challenges.

The 1908 flood initiated a period of wide-ranging improvement and planning in Dallas.

Veteran city planner George Kessler arrived to design a new and improved city plan.

157 Brown, Trinity River Canalization, 44. 158 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Trinity River Corridor Project Chronology (Fort Worth: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, 2011), 1. 159 Floyd Durham, The Trinity River Paradox: Flood and Famine (Wichita Falls: Nortex Press, 1976), 25.

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The German immigrant was an acquaintance of Central Park designer Frederick Law

Olmsted and an advocate of the influential City Beautiful Movement. Kessler, familiar

with Dallas as the brains behind Fair Park, attempted to fashion a long-term answer to

floods. Most of his ideas concerned the construction of levees and the raising of

bridges.160 Remaking the Trinity was essential to his proposals.161 Growing concerns over the need for flood prevention added motivation to ideas about managing the Trinity

River. Concern over costs relegated Kessler’s plans for the city and the Trinity to the

dustbin following their original release in 1911.162 While portions of Kessler’s proposals

returned following a population influx and his return in 1918, advocates of the Trinity

canal found hope in the prospect of revived Congressional attention to the river.163

Suddenly, federal funding seemed more palatable. If Washington was willing to

acquiesce to the need for flood control along the river, how hard could it be to convince

them of the need to go a little further and create the canal? With congressional interest

piqued, the idea of a navigation canal increasingly appeared alongside the levees and

other flood control mechanisms in the requests that materialized in the early 1900s.

The cost of the canal was too substantial for city or state coffers to afford without

major adjustments. Congressional interest in the Trinity ran hot and cold from the

original flood prevention measures in the first decade of the 20th century. Congress

allocated over $2,000,000 to surveys and studies of the Trinity in the first two decades

160 Louis P. Head, The Kessler City Plan for Dallas A Review of the Plan and Progress on its Accomplishment (Dallas: Dallas Morning News, 1925), 6. 161 Ibid, 6. 162 Jennifer Anderson, “The Kessler Plan,” City of Dallas Historic Preservation Program, Jan. 19, 2018, https://cityofdallaspreservation.wordpress.com/2018/01/19/the-kessler-plan/. 163 Ibid.

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of the 1900s.164 World War I shifted Congressional focus overseas and diminished the

motivation for domestic development projects. By 1921, Congress had abandoned plans for extensive alterations of the Trinity as too costly.165 Trinity boosters witnessed a

bit of a renaissance following the election of Herbert Hoover in 1928. Pressure exerted

in Washington led to demands on the Corps of Engineers to reexamine the project.166

Boosters were hopeful that the funding of water development projects that followed

FDR's New Deal presented a new opportunity for the formation of the canal. Dams and

water improvement were essential components of the New Deal’s public works projects.

However, even the massive outlays of funds brought about by the federal response to

the Great Depression did not include money for the canal. Despite some optimism,

competitors again won out, and Dallas was not among the Corps of Engineers priorities.

Although the pressure of the Great Depression had gone a long way towards loosening

federal government coffers, the sheer size of the undertaking caused the Trinity canal’s

failure to garner the necessary support for any significant movement during Roosevelt’s

tenure.

Despite the difficulty of earning Congressional approval, the canal’s development

had no shortage of influential backers. Plans for navigating the Trinity benefited from

extensive connections to North Texas’ political and business elite. Dallas’ key early

booster for the canal was the powerful North Texas business leader, John William

Carpenter. Carpenter had made his start in the electric industry, rising from a day

164 Texas State Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas Online, “Trinity River Navigation Projects,” 2010, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/ett01. 165 Ibid. 166 John N. Furlong, Greg Ajemian, and Ms. Tommie McPherson, “History of the Dallas Floodway,” (lecture, American Society of Civil Engineers Meeting, Fall 2003), 3.

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laborer to President of Dallas Power and Light Co. in less than twenty years. Carpenter

expanded into steel, dairy farms and eventually insurance, running the nation’s fifteenth

largest publicly traded company, Standard Life Insurance.167 As a prominent local

executive, Carpenter understood the regional dependence on the Trinity River. The

economic damages from floods affected his bottom line.

Rival Amon Carter, the publisher of the Fort Worth Star Telegram, joined

Carpenter in the canal fight. Carter, born in a West Texas log cabin in 1879, had quickly

moved up the ladder in the publishing arena from his position in ad sales to president

and publisher by 1923. Carter established an extensive record as a booster for Fort

Worth, using his influence to establish the city in the growing aeronautical industry.

Carter was also a notoriously bitter opponent of Dallas. He famously titled Fort Worth as

the city where the West began. Dallas, Carter panned, was where the East petered out.

Famous for his good humor, boisterous personality, and relationship with numerous celebrities, Carter held enormous sway in Fort Worth civic activities.168 His acceptance and promotion of the canal, despite the lion’s share of the benefits seeming to go towards Dallas, was a substantial feather in the cap of plans for navigation. Carter was able to use his influence to lobby friends in Congress on behalf of plans for the canal.169

He was also perfectly happy to wield his newspaper to drum up support, giving plans for

the canal a media arm their opponents could not hope to match. Despite the significant

167 Texas State Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas Online, “John William Carpenter,” 2010, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fca60. 168 Wolfgang Saxon, “Amon G. Carter Jr., 62, Publisher of Fort Worth Newspaper, is Dead,” New York Times, July 25, 1982. 169 Brown, Trinity River Canalization, 44.

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firepower marshaled on behalf of the canal, outside events continued to delay the construction, a pattern that would repeat itself throughout the planning.

Long-term plans for the canal resulted from an amalgam of private and public.

Carpenter and Carter helped form advocacy associations devoted to controlling and navigating the Trinity River. The original group, known as Trinity River Canal

Association, formed through the assistance of local chambers of commerce from Dallas and Fort Worth in 1931.170 This organization would evolve into the Trinity Improvement

Association, the canal’s primary lobbying group. At the state level, the Trinity River

Authority served as the main booster for Trinity development. This agency had a close relationship with the Trinity Improvement Association. Many of the members of the state agency also served in the lobbying organization, a fact that opponents of the planned development on the river repeatedly referenced.171 The influence brought by the wide base of political support for the canal would earn the canal additional adherents. The

TRA was established in 1955 with the stated purpose of creating a holistic plan for the best possible use of the watershed’s soil and water resources. Its purview covered the whole Trinity River watershed.172 Additionally, the agency would serve as a sponsor for any federal water projects connected to the river. Canals were also a part of the mission of the TRA, as the law organizing the Authority delegated that the group “encourage, construct, and protect navigation canals.”173 TRA would be responsible for managing a vote for bonds, levies, or an ad-valorem tax that would fund water development within

170 "Dallas Joins Fort Worth in Trinity Fight," Dallas Morning News, May 23, 1930. 171 Dave McNeely and Lyke Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident,” Texas Monthly, June 1973. 172 Texas Congress, House, An Act To Create Trinity River Authority of Texas, H.R. 20, 54th Legislature, 1955. 173 Ibid.

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the basin.174 The state-level agency had a close relationship with the Trinity

Improvement Association.

Despite the failure of early attempts at seeing the canal created, new

opportunities began to appear in the 1940s and 1950s that alternatively encouraged

and dismayed supporters of the canal. A 1941 assessment of the proposal found that

the navigation aspects of the canal were not economically justifiable. The Corps

responded by pushing for approval of the whole project as an avenue to ensure

approval of the navigation portion. Passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945 led

the Army Corps of Engineers on a period of continued development on the Trinity

River.175 The reservoirs created in the wake of this legislation served as an impetus for

renewed attempts to create the canal. Funding for the canal’s construction was still the

central concern for navigation supporters. In 1958, then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson

secured endorsement for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to study canal proposals.176

This led to the 1963 signing of the Trinity River Basin Bill by John F. Kennedy.177

Gaining Congressional approval of the Corps’ decision on the feasibility of the project was an important step for the canal. Despite the optimism, finding the appropriations to fulfill their designs would create a new assortment of problems.

Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the ascension to the

presidency of Lyndon Johnson, Trinity backers believed that their time had arrived. A

174 Ibid. 175 An Act Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, Statutes at Large 59, sec. 11 (1945). 176 Frederic O. Sargent, “The Prospects of the U.S. Water Study Commission for Texas,” The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 41, no. 2, (September 1960): 156. 177 Julia Barton, “Been There, Done That” Dallas Observer, July 4, 2002, 3.

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native-born Texan, Johnson understood the important place water development

occupied in maintaining regional and bipartisan relationships in Congress. During his

tenure in Congress, Johnson had been a reliable backer of infrastructure improvements,

including dams. His stance extended to his presidency, and Johnson was amenable to

the original legislation containing provisions for the development of the canal.178

Proponents of the canal likely counted on continued support of their plans from the

White House. They were not shy about using their political clout to lobby their fellow

Texan in the Oval Office.179 As large, expensive, and visible reminders of their work,

representatives commonly advocated projects that displayed their ability to capture

federal funds and the accompanying jobs. This long-running scheme had come under

increasing scrutiny in the years following World War II. The movement against the

continued gravy train of federal water development largesse put the target on plans for

the Trinity.

Economist Charles Schultze, Director of the Budget Bureau, took a dim view of

the Trinity canal. Schultze questioned the economic benefits cited to rationalize the

project.180 Though supportive of the water quality and quantity aspects of the plan,

Schultze felt that the expense of the canal could not be justified.181 Other Washington

organizations backed Schultze’s position. The National Water Commission proffered

that the canal should receive funds from the businesses that would benefit by its

178 An Act Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, Statutes at Large 79, sec. 1089 (1965). 179 Charles Bartlett, “Army Engineers Reform from Old ‘Built-It’ Spirit,” Toledo Blade, May 7, 1971. 180 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident.” 181 Jim Wright, Balance of Power: Presidents and Congress from the Era of McCarthy to the Age of Gingrich (Nashville: Turner Publishing, 1996), 131.

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creation.182 The Environmental Policy Center termed the Trinity canal the nation’s

“number one boondoggle.”183 Combined with Schultze, they were successful in their attempt to reign in the President and convinced Johnson to withdraw support. The

President’s decision struck a huge blow to the canal’s promoters but failed to discourage them from continuing to lobby support for their cause.

Canal backers made the decision to seek Congressional approval without

Schultze’s backing. Despite Johnson’s advice that it was a fool’s errand, Congressman

Jim Wright, D-Fort Worth, decided to push the canal through.184 With Johnson no longer on their side, the TIA put on a full court press in Congress. Virtually every influential politician from the area participated in the effort.185 Wright was one of the most vocal advocates for the canal’s creation. Congressman Ray Roberts was also a supporter of

Trinity navigation. These two individuals would be the strongest advocates for

Congressional assistance to development on the river. Locally, the mayors of Dallas and Fort Worth both gave their assistance to the cause. Also supportive of canalization of the Trinity were Texas Governor Dolph Briscoe and former Governors John Connally,

Preston Smith, and Price Daniel.186 They sent a sizable contingent to Washington to lobby Congress. When the plans for the canal opened for comment, Ned paid his way to

Washington to voice his disapproval.187 At the time, he was the sole speaker against the

182 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident,”. 183 Ibid. 184 Jim Wright to Lyndon Baines Johnson, April 7, 1966. 185 Dallas Morning News, September 1, 1965. 186 George Otstott, Who’s For the Trinity and Who’s Against It? (Dallas: Trinity River Progress Committee, 1973). 187 Ibid.

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canal. Alternatively, the canal proponents argued that the canal was economically

beneficial for both the Dallas area and the nation.188 They disputed criticisms from

government agencies by pointing to the Corps’ position on the canal.189 Their campaign

in Washington finally found the success canal proponents had long sought.

In 1965, despite Johnson's refusal to support the Trinity canal, Congressman

Wright managed to gain Congressional approval for the Corps plan.190 Congress

tentatively approved the $911 million plans as part of the Rivers and Harbors Act.191

The language related to the Trinity stated:

The following works of improvement of rivers and harbors and other waterways for navigation, flood control, and other purposes are hereby adopted and authorized to be prosecuted under the direction of the Secretary of the Army and supervision of the Chief of Engineers, in accordance with the plans and subject to the conditions recommended by the Chief of Engineers in the respective reports hereinafter designated Trinity River and tributaries, Texas: House Document Numbered 276, Eighty-Ninth Congress, including navigation, except that the recommendations of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, dated March 14, 1963, shall apply, and there is hereby authorized $83,000,000 for initiation and partial accomplishment of the project. Prior to expenditure of any funds for construction of those features designed exclusively for navigation, the Chief of Engineers shall submit to the Congress a reevaluation based upon current criteria.192

Thus, construction of the Trinity canal, long simmering on the backburner of federal

water development projects, moved quickly from fantasy toward reality. The ability of

canal backers to protect their plans from changes in budget priorities was a testament to

188 George A. Otstott, For The Price of Two Cups of Coffee a Month You Can Have…, (Dallas: Trinity River Progress Committee 1973). 189 Wright, Balance of Power, 135. 190 An Act Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, Statutes at Large 79, sec. 1089 (1965). 191 Dallas Morning News, Sept. 1, 1965. 192 Ibid.

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the effectiveness of their sales pitch. Adherents of the necessity of the canal would soon

find North Texas voters harder to convince.

The wheels of government move very slowly. Although Congress granted

legislative approval in 1965, the actual start date of construction was still years away. In

the delay between legislation and construction, multiple opportunities for snags in the

development process remained. Following federal approval, the Army Corps of

Engineers undertook a renewed assessment of the navigability portions of the project.

Their report, released in July 1968, contained a detailed exposition on the benefits of

navigation on the Trinity as well as an overview of the changes canalization would

create.193 According to the COE, Trinity navigation would bring in $51.9 million annually,

almost all of that in proposed savings from transportation costs. With the total cost

already estimated at $1.1 billion dollars in 1967, transportation savings and recreational

benefits would have substantial ground to make up to meet the expense. The COE’s

financial planning determined that the overall transformation of the Trinity would accrue

approximately a 1.5 to 1 cost benefit ratio. Accounting for the potential profitability of the navigation aspects of the canal required reliance on an interest rate of 3.25 percent.

Although many of the estimates provided in their reassessment would change as the project came closer to completion, the figures and the manner in which they were calculated would be the subject of a great deal of debate once Ned committed to preventing the canal.

193 Trinity Improvement Association, “Summary: Army Corps of Engineers Report on its Re-analysis of the Trinity River Project July 16, 1968,” 1968.

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The Army Corps’ updated report on the project displayed the sheer size of the

planned undertaking for the Trinity.194 The changes called for the construction of

nineteen navigation dams and twenty-three locks that would create slack water pools

and lifts for barges and shipping traffic. The Trinity River would be re-created as a

concrete channel along a new route, reducing its natural length of 552 miles by

approximately 200 miles to 362.8 miles.195 This channel would widen to 200 feet to

accommodate two barge tows simultaneously. The plans included contingencies for a

future increase to a total of 250 feet. Also attached to the Trinity renovations were four

reservoirs for water supply and five flood control projects.196 With the level of changes to

the river called for in the proposals, their fulfillment would spell an end to the Trinity as a

natural body of water.

Ned Leads a Response to Save the Trinity

After overcoming a series of obstacles delaying federal funding, the project had finally earned Congressional approval in 1965. Proponents of canalizing the river probably believed that the decreasing influence of railroads, a common foil in previous attempts at canalization, foreshadowed good odds for the canal. However, what the pro- canal forces failed to anticipate was the arrival of a new, homegrown foe. In place of the traditional opponents of canalization efforts, a conglomeration of citizens, ranging from counterculture warriors to professors, stepped forward to express concern with the economic and ecological impacts of changes to the Trinity. Spearheaded by Ned, the

194 Trinity Improvement Association, “Summary: Army Corps of Engineers Report,” 1968, 4. 195 Trinity Improvement Association, “Summary: Army Corps of Engineers Report,” 1968, 4. 196 Ibid, 4.

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individuals and organizations already developed for environmental protection formed a ready-set resistance movement. These citizens had learned from the experiences of other movements riding the groundswell of environmental consciousness occurring across the nation. The two sides engaged in a tumultuous battle over the future of the

Trinity River in the early 1970s.

On December 12, 1971, Ned first brought his message of the Trinity River’s impending doom to North Texans with a speech to Dallas’s First Community Church.

Tailoring his words for the audience, he spoke about the ethical aspects of the Trinity project in addition to the ecological dangers presented by the Corps’ plans. He argued that devoting money to a canal that would displace marginalized populations and increase pollution was a poor allocation of resources. Texans could get better return on their investment with improvements to transportation, housing, crime fighting, or a host of other pressing social issues that plagued the city. Choosing instead to spend that money on a canal, he said, would not accurately reflect the values of North Texans.197

Economics were a vital part of his pitch. Pointing to the limited benefits of lower shipping costs, Ned contended that taxpayer funding of the project was akin to “socialism for the wealthy”. If the canal vote passed, the beneficiaries would be the scions of the gravel and newspaper industries, individuals unwilling to pay for the added expense of a canal.

Ned’s reference to marginalized populations in his speech at the church exposed the social justice component to his opposition to the Trinity canal. The canal plan called for some substantial movement of populations. Those effected were primarily lower-

197 Edward C. Fritz, “Trinity River,” (speech delivered at First Community Church, Dallas, Texas, Dec. 12, 1971).

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income citizens. The financing of the project was completely reliant on taxpayer dollars.

Ned argued that the canal would negatively affect poorer citizens both in asking for their

sacrifice and in sending the benefits of their tax dollars to a project that would benefit a

select few wealthy backers. Offering alternatives, he pointed out that the funds could

provide housing for 50,000 people or construct five new universities. Focus on issues

such as social justice could have also been an attempt by Ned to beef up what he felt

was a rather thin case against the Trinity canal. Ned’s belief that there was very little

concern among Texans for the ecological effects of the canal led him to prioritize the

ethical components of his case.198 While it could be argued that his attention to the

effects of the development on the lower class was self-serving, his prior history as an attorney for minorities suggests that his action was caused by a legitimate concern.

The meat of his presentation at the church was devoted to the ecological effects of the planned canal. He spoke about the Trinity Improvement Association’s plan to straighten the Trinity, removing 200 miles of river. Ned asserted that the TIA was engaged in a big lie, tricking Texans into believing that the canal would benefit the environment. He pointed to the hesitancy to wait on the completion of an Environmental

Impact Statement as evidence of the duplicitous nature of the group. Ned’s speeches embraced his lone wolf status, explicitly distancing himself from groups such as the

Sierra Club in an attempt to dissuade criticism. Disconnect from environmentalists perceived as radical allowed him to tailor his remarks in a conservative appeal to traditional values of family and fiscal prudence. Through his speeches, he was

198 Edward C. Fritz, “Trinity River,” (speech delivered at First Community Church, Dallas, Texas, Dec. 12, 1971).

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attempting to influence views on the canal before the issue reached the public consciousness of North Texas. Soon, the battle he had opened would see reinforcements from both sides.

Ned’s lonely opposition to the canal was short lived as concerned local citizens began to supplement his ranks as knowledge of the Corps’ plans for the Trinity spread.

Unlike Ned, most of the others opposed to the canal were motivated not by its environmental cost, but by its financial one. In early 1972, Southern Methodist

University economics professor Don Smith visited Ned and presented him with an assessment he had made of the Corps of Engineers financial justifications for the construction of the shipping canal.199 Smith argued that the corps was not presenting an honest accounting of the costs and benefits of the project. He agreed with Ned’s assessment of the unrealistic interest rate used by the Corps in their projections.

Smith’s colleagues at SMU were part of a cadre of local academics attempting to head off the Corps of Engineers plans. They had assembled a report highlighting the environmental and cultural resources within the Trinity Basin that could be jeopardized by alterations to the river. The report compiled a list of the wildlife and natural resources that could potentially be affected by canalization and concluded that more study was needed. 200 As the Trinity canal inched closer to realization, support for protection of the

Trinity would continue to grow.

As usual when approached in such a manner, Ned decided to encourage Smith to act while also promising to help. Another SMU professor, theologian Dr. James

199 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident,”. 200 James Scisenti ed. “Environmental and Cultural Resources Within the Trinity River Basin,” (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1971), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a096191.pdf.

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White, who undertook a personal campaign against government spending after completing his taxes, joined the pair.201 The group decided to form an organization with environmentally conscious students who had been trying to mount resistance to the canal. Their collaboration led to the formation of the Citizen’s Organization for a Sound

Trinity, or COST. The group began work on April 13, 1972, just eleven months prior to the vote on the bond.202 The organization sought to convince the public of the need to preserve the Trinity and the poor justification presented by canal supporters. The unique approach taken by COST was a result of the combination of environmentalists and fiscal conservatives. In this case, groups that usually had little in common worked together to formulate a response to navigation plans and protect the Trinity.

COST immediately began moving to prevent canalization of the river. They scheduled an appearance with U.S. Senate’s Public Works Subcommittee on

Appropriations and followed up the hearing with their first attempt at influencing public opinion by holding a meeting at SMU on May 23, 1972. 203 They posited their agenda as an attempt at telling the truth about the Trinity and outlining three specific angles for criticism of the Corp’s proposal.204 Don Smith would focus on the economic issues, Dr.

James Sciscenti from SMU’s Institute of Earth and Man worked on the legal and scientific aspects of the canal, and Ned would conclude with a passionate explanation

201 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident.” 202 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident.” 203 Kenneth J. Bousquet, Staff Assistant, Subcommittee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, to Prof. Donald Mitchell Smith, May 8, 1972. 204 Edward C. Fritz, “Outline of Citizen’s Organization for a Sound Trinity Public Meeting,” (meeting plan, May 23, 1972).

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of the ecological component.205 COST’s strategy at this point was primarily concerned with raising money and recruiting additional voices to write to Congress and the local media against the Trinity project. As their resistance gained publicity, their strategy would grow in complexity.

COST’s search for Congressional support was bolstered by an emerging candidate for Texas’ 5th Congressional district. Republican Congressional hopeful Alan

Steelman had excellent political instincts. He could sense the groundswell of conservative support for Republicans that would be the central development of Texas politics in the second half of the 20th century. Barely thirty years old, Steelman found economic concerns to be effective with the North Texas population.206 The Public Works

Acceleration Program had caused increases and made water development one of the biggest expenditures for federal spending.207 Steelman made his opposition to the canal a central tenet of his 1972 campaign.208 COST recognized the value inherent in

Steelman’s candidacy.209 Connecting the election to the canal would allow COST to present a solid case that the proposal was not representative of North Texans sentiments.

Unlike his relatively unknown opponent, Earle Cabell was an institution in Dallas politics. Cabell had transitioned from Mayor of Dallas to a four-term Democratic

205 Fritz, “Outline of Citizen’s Organization for a Sound Trinity Public Meeting.” 206 Steelman for Congress Headquarters, “Alan Steelman Will Work,” (political advertisement, Dallas, 1972). 207 Nancy H. Teeters, “The 1972 Budget: Where It Stands and Where it Might Go,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1971, no. 1 (1971): 232. 208 Gladwin Hill, “Environment as Election Issue Grows at State and Local Level,” New York Times, Oct. 1, 1972. 209 Elizabeth Boeckman et al., “Invitation to Coffee and Dessert at the Residence of Mrs. Elizabeth Boeckman in Honor of Alan Steelman,” 1972.

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Congressman.210 He had long been in favor of the canal’s construction, testifying before

Congress on behalf of the Trinity Improvement Association, serving as a steward of the canal project in Congress, and consistently reiterating Dallas’ support for the project.211

Tying Cabell to the canal was all too easy for Steelman. Cabell had made bringing the canal to Dallas the highlight of his primary campaign.212 Unbeknownst to Cabell and the rest of the Dallas political elite, local sentiment had shifted. On the other side,

Steelman’s opposition created a rallying cry for his supporters.

The Congressional campaign featuring divergent positions on the Trinity River

Canal served as an early test of local opinions on the project. Steelman spoke openly about his dissatisfaction with the canal, his objections stemming primarily from the economic side. Steelman believed that the benefits of its construction would largely devolve to business interests. The boon to powerful industries would come at the expense of the local taxpayers. He also thought that the industry brought by the canal would add crime and pollution to the city.213 All of these positions lined up strongly with the traditionally conservative views of Texans. Cabell extolled the virtues of the plan, arguing that turning the Trinity into a shipping canal would propel Dallas into the twentieth century, providing an economic boost while protecting the region’s tenuous water supplies. However, Steelman’s ability to tap into the economic conservatism that would become a hallmark of Texas politics over the next few decades led him to an

210 Alan W. Steelman, “The Trinity Canal - A Billion Dollar Ditch,” October 17, 1972. 211 Sean Cunningham, Cowboy Conservatism: Texas and the Rise of the Modern Right (Lexington: The Kentucky University Press, 2010), 131. 212 Ibid, 131. 213 Fort Worth Bureau, “Wright, Steelman Outline Conflicting Views of Canal,” Dallas Morning News, Jan. 14, 1973.

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upset victory.214 For the groups backing the Trinity canal, Steelman’s election was an

ominous sign for the project. Anxious to respond, the canal supporters would stumble

into an apparently promising solution that ultimately doomed their plans.

Steelman’s election raised concern among canal boosters that congressional

funding could be in danger. The new Congressman would be present in subsequent

committee meetings over the canal and could point to his election as proof of

unfavorable public sentiment towards the canal. Despite these obstacles, Wright and

the other supporters of the canal were confident the timing was right for the canal. They

viewed the reduced power and influence from railroads, corresponding with the growth

of DFW air traffic, as clearing the way for a water route for shipping. It was excusable

for canal backers to assume that the status quo of local opposition to the project would

remain minimal. However, as the need for a bond election became public, they would

soon realize their mistake.

Congressional approval of the Corps of Engineers designs for the canal came

with a substantial string attached; while the federal government would supply the bulk of

the funding, requirements for local seed money demanded that affected taxpayers

would have a say in determining the fate of the Trinity. The canal’s funding schedule

called for a local bond to provide $150 million, funded through an ad valorem tax, that

would be used to begin construction. The varying perspectives on the bond vote

illuminated the distance between the two sides in the run up to the canal’s formation.

Proponents of the canal would be able to point to the bond results as evidence of North

214 Carolyn Barta, “Steelman Holds Onto Lead to Upset Incumbent Cabell,” Dallas Morning News, Nov. 8, 1972.

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Texan’s favorable outlook towards the development. A successful vote would help to ensure that Trinity would not lose its place in the contentious fight for federal dollars, even if Steelman became an example of regional sentiment. COST could reference the bond as a rallying cry, a clear opportunity to prove the effectiveness of environmental action in Texas. Derailing the canal would be a boon to environmentalists, providing concrete proof of the growing change in Texans’ outlook toward developments that carried a high cost to local ecology. The high stakes attached to the bond election by both sides entailed an intense fight over the Trinity’s future.

As the canal vote approached, COST raised questions regarding the Corps of

Engineers’ justifications for the Trinity River Basin Comprehensive Project. COST was especially concerned with the failure of the project to follow laws created by new environmental legislation. The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act required all government-funded developments to produce an Environmental Impact Statement.215

Although the new legislation did not make judgments on the environmental effects of the proposals under its regulation, the disclosure it was intended to require was missing without the statement. The EIS assessed the effects of construction on natural habitats and wildlife. COST postulated that the absence of an EIS was intentional, designed to mask the true level of devastation that would come from the canal’s formation. They contended that allowing the canal to go forward without producing the statement threatened to be a Trojan horse for future developments. If the Trinity could go on in

215 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Statutes at Large 83, sec. 852 (1969).

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spite of the new legislation, one of the key provisions of the NEPA and environmental movements nationwide would suffer setbacks.216

The opposition to the canal devised a two-pronged approach to the campaign over the Trinity’s fate, tailoring their pitch primarily to cover the economic and environmental issues connected to the project. COST’s focus on financial justifications was a conscious choice and is expressed in the group’s name and advertisements.217

Ned and the other members of COST understood their need to sway public opinion depended on wide participation in opposition to the Corp of Engineers. They took part in a massive public relations campaign against the canal, taking aim at all the proposed rationales behind the project’s development. COST’s literature decried the purported necessity for the canal. They pointed out that projected economic benefits, even using the Corps’ own unrealistic accounting, failed to match the project’s expense.218 If the potential environmental damages were also included, the discrepancy only widened.

COST’s literature expanded on their critique of the economic arguments produced by the Corps in several ways. They pointed to the minimal number of beneficiaries to the taxpayer-funded project, painting the push for canalization as a giveaway to North Texas’s elite.219 They revealed that the benefits to the general public were small, especially considering that citizens were bearing all of the expense.220

216 James White, “Citizens' Organization for a Sound Trinity,” May 10, 1972. 217 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Vote NO on Trinity River Project, Tuesday, March 13,” (Dallas: Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, 1973). 218 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Trinity River Canal Barge Hearing,” 1973. 219 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Trinity River Canal Barge Hearing,” 1973. 220 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Vote NO on Trinity River Project, Tuesday, March 13,” 1973.

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COST argued constantly that the economic benefits provided by the project were unrealistic and would only reward the business community.221 The organization argued that all of the supposed benefits of the effort to transform the river were overstated.

COST also explained that while the numbers were not high in individual taxes, estimates of the expenses were consistently unreliable.222 Coupled with the long record of Corps projects total expenses failing to match early estimates and already carrying a

$1.3 billion price tag, similar increases could portend a much larger burden on local taxpayers.

COST summarized their opposition in the slogan, “Our Taxes…Their Canal,” which spoke to their utilization of financial concerns in their push to sway voters.223

COST termed the canal development “A Billion Dollar Ditch.”224 The group pointed out that the Trinity Canal would be the nation’s most expensive river project. The economic projections for the canal were also an area of focus for COST. According to COST’s findings, the project would only bring back $281 million of the one billion dollar price tag.225 This invalidated arguments for the economic feasibility of the canal. COST revealed that the proposal for the bond included provisions allowing the state to raise rates to cover additional expenses.226 The decision to employ fiscal austerity in addition

221 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Vote NO on Trinity River Project, Tuesday, March 13,” 1973. 222 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Vote NO on Trinity River Project, Tuesday, March 13,” 1973. 223 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Our Taxes…Their Canal! Vote NO March 13,” 1973. 224 Henry C. Fulcher and Jim White to Precinct Chairman, Feb. 16, 1973. 225 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Trinity River Barge Canal,” 1972. 226 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “A Billion Dollar Ditch: What Does the Barge Canal Mean to You in Dollars and Cents,” 1973.

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to an environmental approach expanded the potential support base for opposition to the

canal. Avoiding a single-minded attitude to the ecological problems that would result

from the canal’s construction proved to be a prescient choice. Their path lessened the

effectiveness of attacks affiliating COST with the radicalism associated with many

protest movements.227 Government spending was a more pressing concern to potential

North Texas voters. By tailoring their approach to the political culture of the region,

COST was able to make a more effective argument against funding the canal.

Ned Fritz’s involvement insured that COST was also opposed to the Trinity

Project on ecological grounds. In addition to fiscal issues, COST supporters raised

strenuous objections to the canal’s environmental impact. Canal boosters relied on

Corps of Engineers assessments of the project to claim that the changes were needed for pollution control. They argued that the canal would not be harmful to the environment and that failure to remake the Trinity “was the only thing that could save the river basin's environment against steady deterioration and eventual destruction.”228

In dispute, Ned pointed out that the schedule called for release of the canal’s

Environmental Impact Statement after the election. According to COST, this omission

was by design.229 COST identified significant environmental changes that would result

from the canal. The group explained that the changes to water flow could have a

negative impact on natural ecosystems.230 Altered pollution levels and sedimentation

would also accompany the changes to the river. The rush for approval did not allow time

227 Dallas Morning News, March 15, 1973. 228 “The Trinity River Project and a Better Environment,” (Arlington: Trinity Improvement Association 1973). 229 Citizens’ Organization for A Sound Trinity, “Trinity River Barge Canal,” 1972. 230 Ibid.

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for a proper study. COST’s implementation of environmental concerns widened the scope of their critique of the canal plan. Combined with their condemnation of the financial side, they made an effective case against the entire project.

COST pointed out that environmental damages from improving the Trinity would not be restricted to the Dallas-Fort Worth area. The creation of the canal was dependent on creating a new course for the Trinity, straightening the river along a new track intended to increase efficiency for the new shipping traffic.231 This process would entail cutting an entirely new track for the river across hundreds of miles of East Texas. Such a development would wreak havoc on the natural environment of the region, and there was no way to estimate the potential ramifications.232 Another ecological component of the damage from the canal proposal were the reservoirs planned for the river after the dam’s construction. In a press release, COST explained that just one of the reservoirs, the one planned for Tennessee Colony, would inundate 119,500 acres for the sole purpose of protecting fields and woods downstream from flooding.233

The forces in favor of the canal’s formation, recovering from their shock at the sudden appearance of substantial opposition, attempted to answer COST’s emergence with their own extensive political campaign. The Trinity Improvement Association made a significant financial investment on behalf of the canal, spending $500,000 on advertising.234 Their ads touted the low costs to individual taxpayers, beginning at only twenty cents per month. They pointed to the recreation improvements attached to the

231 Trinity Improvement Association, “Summary: Army Corps of Engineers Report on its Re-analysis of the Trinity River Project July 16, 1968,” (Arlington: Trinity Improvement Association 1973). 232 Scisenti, “Environmental and Cultural Resources Within the Trinity River Basin,” 298. 233 Citizens' Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Citizens' Organization for a Sound Trinity,” May 19, 1972. 234 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident,”.

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canal’s development, the boosts to the area’s water supply as population grew, and the flood protection the canal would provide.235 The TIA’s advertisements argued that the economic benefits of the canal would outweigh the minimal cost of the bonds.236 Their pitch included references to the job growth that would result from the canal. The lakes and reservoirs attached to the project also were a substantial portion of pro-canal advertising.237 The TIA claimed the water developments would provide improved water supply, protect the region from flooding, increase the quality of the area’s water, and create new recreational opportunities. To the TIA, the addition of other improvements meant that the project had a positive effect on the overall environment.238 In the minds of those opposed to creating the canal, these additions failed to outweigh the costs they would require.

At times, the canal campaign became personal, increasing the tension on both sides. The TIA worked to discredit their opponents by calling them communists. Indeed, many of the members of COST continued to face that charge from supporters of the canal decades after the fight.239 This was a laughable criticism of Ned, who had spent a part of the 1950s working to defend veterans’ organizations from Communist infiltration, including work with the Canal’s leading Congressional proponent, Fort Worth’s Jim

Wright. Despite his distaste for communism, he certainly looked the part of

235 George A. Otstott, “For The Price of Two Cups of Coffee a Month You Can Have…,”. 236 Trinity Improvement Association, “Historical Background on the Trinity River Project,” (Arlington: Trinity Improvement Association 1973). 237 George A. Otstott, “For The Price of Two Cups of Coffee a Month You Can Have…,”. 238 Trinity Improvement Association, “The Trinity River Project and a Better Environment,” (Arlington: Trinity Improvement Association 1973). 239 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident”.

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environmental radical. Embracing the spectacle as voter interest in the campaign grew from media attention, Ned and Genie Fritz organized canoe trips for journalists and politicians to expose them to the Trinity’s natural beauty. Decked out in jeans and plaid, with a bandana covering the shocks of his wild red hair, Ned cultivated the image of concerned environmentalist. Ned turned TIA’s own arguments against them when he released an advertisement listing the substantial support for the Trinity canal.

Juxtaposed against the long list of mayors, governors, Congressmen and influential local boosters were Ned and a couple of members of COST. Ned argued that the ad supported COST’s claims that the canal was a giveaway to powerful interests. By embracing the contrast, Ned was able to bank on the same anti-establishment sentiment that Steelman had relied on for his election.

The fate of the Trinity Canal came down to the March 13, 1973, bond election.

The vote was to approve issuing a $150 million bond package to serve as local seed money to begin the project. In order to pass, the bond had to meet two hurdles, a majority vote from voters in the seventeen Texas counties that would be affected by the canal. This election pitted the groups created to protest the environmental and economic ramifications against the political and business proponents advocating the canal’s formation.240 The campaign preceding the bond election proved intense, revealing the depth of feeling on both sides. Vote totals reflected the keen interest

Texas voters had taken in the campaign. Three weeks before the canal vote, Dallas city council elections had attracted only about half the number of voters that came out for

240 Citizens’ Organization for a Sound Trinity, “Our Taxes…Their Canal! Vote No on March 13.”

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the bond election.241 Despite the TIA’s significant financial advantages, voters proved to be more receptive to the arguments against the canal. The bond was defeated in the regional election with 140,000 votes against and 120,000 votes for.242 By a decent margin of voters, North Texas voters had banded together and rejected the proposal to re-create the Trinity as a concrete ditch.

The unsuccessful run at local approval was not the final effort to fashion the

Trinity into a barge canal. Although there would be future attempts to re-imagine the

Trinity, none would come as close as the one in 1973. On the heels of their defeat in the bond election, canal backers continued to investigate alternative ways to earn approval.

The municipal governments that were planning on the reservoirs and dams attached to the canal were still in need. One of the portions of the project already under construction was the Wallisville dam that had played a role in exposing the existence of the upcoming bond.243 The Sierra Club had filed suit to prevent the dam’s completion due to issues raised in the release of the Wallisville Environmental Impact Statement.244 While the suit advanced through the courts, the judge overseeing the case found merit in the environmentalists’ argument and ordered an injunction against further construction until the report’s release.245 The judgment against the dam spelled the conclusion of construction efforts for the near future. It would be another two decades before a new proposal for to create a canal on the Trinity would come within striking distance of

241 McNeely and Thompson, “The Unholy Trinity Incident.” 242 Dorothie Erwin, “Trinity Canal Goes Down to Defeat as Dallas County Votes Solid ‘No’,” Dallas Morning News, March 14, 1973. 243 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid.

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construction. When the next opportunity came, Ned would be there to meet the challenge head on.

Water improvement projects are essential to the history of the settlement of the

American West. Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert spun a fascinating tale of the West as a region with a climate too arid to support the burgeoning population. Despite the massive influx of population throughout the 20th century, the region was never really equipped to handle so many residents due to the limited supply of natural water sources. This lack of water led to an overreliance on water development. From the Hetch Hetchy controversy to the Grand Coulee Dam, issues of water supply, quality, and power have been a constant in the region. Continued expansion into more isolated regions and the demands of agriculture led substantial changes to waterways to be a constant in the

West. The long and storied history of attempts at canalization of the Trinity River fits well into the historiography of water development in the U.S. The hope for canalization was over 100-years-old by the time the issue came to a formal vote in 1973. The campaign and successful defeat of Corps of Engineers proposal for a water project was a unique event in America’s environmental history, and Ned was at the center of it all.

Understanding the history behind planning for the Trinity canal and the steps Ned and his ragtag group of environmentalists took to stop it reveal many of the factors leading to his importance to state environmentalism.

The Trinity campaign was a watershed for Texas environmentalism and Ned was instrumental in seeing it through. Despite the overwhelming financial and political support of the project, a group of determined individuals managed to protect the river by relying on both financial and environmental arguments. Overcoming the canal’s

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substantial backing, including most of the local, state, and national government, the

Army Corps of Engineers, business leaders, news media, politicians, and decades-old organizations committed to its fulfillment, he was able to lead a small band of citizens to prevent the canal’s formation. Although the dream of transforming the river would continue, the canal’s defeat represented the end to unchecked development in Texas.

The controversy over the Trinity ties into multiple threads of Ned’s life in the environmental movement. Part of the reason the issue was so important to him was the role the Trinity had played in his own life. The river formed a vital link in the chain leading Ned to a career in environmental advocacy. The canoe trips on which he led local media and political figures down the river to raise awareness to the threat posed by canalization were not new for him. The river had been a part of his life for years, and the idea of transforming it into a concrete ditch angered him personally. For Ned, who had spent his entire adult life in Dallas, the permanent transformation of the river for economic purposes threatened his personal enjoyment. The attack on the river, pushed by corrupt parties, with questionable financial justifications, at the expense of the general populace, offended his finely tuned sense of justice. Ned cited the ethical violations that would be enacted by the removal of marginalized communities in favor of a giveaway to investors banking on the canal’s formation. Ned would serve as an intervenor on behalf of those people as well as the river itself. Despite the long odds against him—the opposition was as well funded as it was connected—Ned chose to challenge the establishment forces pursuing the canal. As he had so often in life, with the river in danger of being lost forever, Ned stepped in to defend the defenseless.

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Ned’s personality and professional background were essential to the success of

the campaign to preserve the Trinity. His ability to organize an opposition to the plans

through the creation of COST was a manifestation of the public participation that had

animated his entire adult life. The combination of fiscal and ecological concerns brought

a wide cross-section of opponents that he was able to mine for varied skills needed

throughout the campaign. Canal supporters were not shy about their feelings towards

opponents of the project, depicting the opposition as extremist radicals standing in the

way of progress. Ned was not shy about pointing to the corruption inherent in both the

Corps of Engineers and the political forces in favor of the canal. He took issue with the

fact that the distribution of the canal funds was based on justifications from the Corps

itself.246 He also exposed the fact that a significant amount of land along the proposed

canal happened to be owned by some of its most ardent supporters.247 Ned’s

willingness to return fire in the face of establishment attacks encouraged his allies and worked to convince voters of the legitimacy of their cause.

The Trinity campaign also was reflective of many of Ned Fritz’s broader goals for

Texas environmentalism. Although he was aware of the plans to remake the river, his direct participation was a result of collaboration. He relied on individuals with specific subject area knowledge, trusting their expertise while he organized local forces and worked to garner support from other national and state level environmental organizations in opposition to planned developments. Content in the spotlight, Ned welcomed the resultant publicity, whether positive or negative, as an opportunity to

246 Edward C. Fritz, “The Proposed Trinity River Canal Would Be a Harmful Waste of the Taxpayer's Money,” (Dallas: Citizen’s Organization for a Sound Trinity, 1972). 247 Fritz, “The Proposed Trinity River Canal Would Be a Harmful Waste of the Taxpayer's Money.”

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expand awareness of environmental issues. With publicity surrounding both sides of the canal debate at high levels, the success of COST pointed toward a change in Texan attitudes toward environmental causes. In subsequent fights, Ned would find both hope and disappointment in the faith he placed in Texans’ approach to environmental issues.

Ned’s resistance created a template for successful Texan environmentalism, depicting the benefits of the modernization of environmental advocacy he had brought to the state. Ned’s actions to preserve the Trinity revealed the transformations he had undergone while working to improve Texas environmentalism. Despite his evolving beliefs, he understood the benefit of obscuring his more radical leanings. He cultivated his persona, recognizing the benefits to his cause the resulted from turning the fight over the Trinity into an anti-establishment crusade. Choosing to accentuate common- sense economic arguments made his case more acceptable to Texans and created ready-made allies out of many fiscal conservatives. Using recently enacted governmental regulations created new approaches that environmentalists soon brought to bear against development. The coordination between various organizations that was a hallmark of the conflict over the canal established a precedent that benefitted activists in future fights. Most important for future environmentalism was the success of the civic campaign. Not only had the groups defeated a strongly backed plan and saved a billion dollars, but they made strides in raising awareness of environmental issues from the publicity granted to the campaign. Along the way, they managed to maintain a natural

Trinity – certainly an improvement over the ditch that would have replaced it if they had failed.

120 CHAPTER 5

THE BATTLE OVER CLEAR-CUTTING: NED FRITZ’S FIGHT IN THE FOREST

Known as the environmental decade, the 1970s saw massive shifts taking place

in Americans’ understanding of their relationship with the natural environment.

Beginning with the push for Earth Day in 1970 and highlighted by the passage of

influential legislation such as the Clean Air and Water Acts and Endangered Species

Act, the decade witnessed widespread gains in the movement for environmental

activism. The era was termed the environmental decade due to the growing influence

that the powerful combination of new legislation and effective activism had on the

encroaching development in the nation’s natural areas. The year 1969 witnessed the

passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).248 The law sought to

encourage environmental enhancement, led to the creation of the Presidential Council

on Environmental Quality, and installed substantial requirements for all executive

Federal agencies. Following the enactment of the law on January 1, 1970, groups such

as the Forest Service and Corps of Engineers were required to create environmental

assessments and environmental impact statements for any planned development.

Passed in the shadow of a massive oil spill in Santa Barbara and protests over the

construction of the Interstate Highway System, the act marked the culmination of years

of growing concern for the environment.249 North Texas was no stranger to the changes

pulsating in the realm of environmental politics, with growing awareness of

248 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Statutes at Large 83, sec. 852 (1969). 249 J.C. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 26.

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environmental issues creating an avenue for popular resistance to planned developments.

Following passage of the NEPA, additional legislation such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act impelled corporations to reduce pollution.250 Wildlife gained increased protections following the Endangered Species Act. Government bodies and extractive industries were compelled to include the public in their decision-making process. Added to previous legislation such as the Wilderness Act, the changes led to the informal establishment of an environmental policy network. Consisting of competing interests from industry, government, and mainstream environmental organizations, the groups sought to work within the regulatory climate that developed in the aftermath of the changes. To an extent, many of the long-sought goals of environmentalists had been achieved. Although laws favoring stricter environmental regulation were now on the books, challenges remained. The enactment of new laws created additional issues of compliance in the trenches of the conflict over the environment. Smaller organizations such as TCONR would play an integral role in testing the boundaries of the new regulatory provisions. Ned’s legal background worked in his favor as he helped to define the extent and flaws of the new legislation, forming a new dimension of his environmental career.

The first development in Ned’s career in the 1970s was the formation of the

Texas League of Conservation Voters. One of the hallmarks of his philosophy toward effective environmental advocacy was that Democratic government would eventually

250 Clean Air Act of 1963, Statutes at Large 77, sec. 392 (1963).

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need to place control over natural resources with the population.251 Ned had long been

aware of the importance of politics to environmental protection, with lobbying as one of

his primary methods of activism. Despite connections to many politicians who shared

his concern for the environment, Ned found that the involvement did not always extend

to the ballot box. Experience had taught him that the general apathy towards ecological

issues among Texas voters was ingrained.252 To remedy this disconnect, Ned worked

with allies to form an organization that would attempt to marshal environmentally

concerned citizens to work with amenable political allies. Formed in July 1970, the

Texas League of Conservation Voters was led by his fellow environmentalists P.

Burgess Geirsenbeck, Dr. Daniel E. Willard, Margaret Louise Hancock and Dr. M. Lea

Rudee. Their mission statement consisted of three primary goals, to record votes of

Texan politicians, support environmentally-friendly candidates, and increase public

awareness of these issues.253 The group was decidedly nonpartisan, reflecting the

shifting political ground for state environmentalists in the face of rapid change in

attitudes and legislation related to environmental issues. Their stated goal was to prove

that those issues held the potential to determine elections. The foundation of the

League of Conservation Voters revealed Ned’s growing attention to politics, a move

borne of his belief that political will would develop into the determining factor in

environmental preservation. As the decade progressed, the prediction would prove

increasingly prescient.

251 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999. 252 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 May 1997,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (May 17, 1997). 253 “In Memoriam: Ned Fritz,” Texas League of Conservation Voters, 2008, http://www.tlcv.org/2008/12/in- memorium-ned-fritz/.

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Ned Fritz Finds His Nemesis: Clear-Cutting in the National Forests

Clear-cutting is a method of timber production that entails the complete removal of all trees in a forest.254 Trees are marked for sale to lumber companies who subsequently receive a contract from the Forest Service. The timber company constructs a road into the chosen area and cuts all the trees in the vicinity. Machines called skidders carve a trail through the forest to the cut logs. Afterwards, the logs are dragged to the road, stacked, and sent to mills. Once the trees are clear, bulldozers arrive to remove the remaining debris, brush, and tree stumps.255 Following this process is a period of regeneration of the destroyed forest by the planting of a single, more manageable species of tree that will create a forest that is even aged. Planted rows of seed leave a single species of the same age. The rows facilitate future cuts that are undertaken simultaneously, greatly increasing efficiency. The new stands of trees take many years to reach maturity and the Forest Service manages the area by removing roots of the natural hardwoods and completing prescribed burns to ensure that only the desired trees survive. The extensive reformation of a forest that has been clear-cut is easy to envision. To Ned, remaking a natural forest into a virtual timber factory was an ecological disaster that demanded a response. He would devote most of the rest of his time as an activist to preventing the practice.

Clear-cutting as a method of forest management on governmentally controlled lands was an offense that brought out all of Ned’s frustration at the administrators of federally protected forests. The Forest Service used several rationales to justify clear-

254 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 11. 255 Edward C. Fritz, Clearcutting: A Crime Against Nature (Woodway, TX: Eakin Press, 1989), xv.

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cutting. The practice endeavored to make the most efficient, cost-effective cuts of timber

stands. Also known as single-species management, clear-cutting as a tool for

silviculture was a much simpler version of lumber production.256 Since it did not require

any intensive screening or categorization of timber stands, foresters could simply select

the specific section containing the highest number of mature trees. The foresters

claimed that the process created the easiest path for new trees to return following a cut

due to their need for sunlight. They also claimed that the cuts were necessary to reclaim

long neglected forests with fallen trees and overgrown underbrush that were home to

snakes and ticks, posing a danger to loggers.257 For Ned, experience with various

methods of forest management exposed substantial reasons to avoid the practice. He

would spend the next decade attempting to convince others to do the same.

Ned was not the first to take issue with the damage clear-cutting wrought upon

the nation’s forests. The forest management technique first created controversy in New

York’s Adirondack forest in the late 19th century. Foresters in the area, led by the newly

created New York State College of Forestry at Cornell University, hatched a plan to

convert stands of the native broadleaf forests to conifer stands. Deforestation and

indiscriminate cuts had already been controversial in the area, with the 1885

establishment of a Forest Preserve a direct result of timber industry abuses.258 Under

the leadership of Bernhard Fernow, Cornell’s plans for the area turned into a complete

disaster. The trains used to haul the timber created numerous forest fires after igniting

256 Fritz, Clearcutting: A Crime Against Nature, 40.

257 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 5. 258 “Origins of the Adirondack Park and Forest Preserve,” Wild River Press, 2015, http://www.hiketheadirondacks.com/pages/Origins_of_the_Adirondack_Park.

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the logging slash left in the wake of the clear-cuts. Although it did not take long for the

newly initiated practice to bring trouble, the simplification of lumber production made

clear-cutting very resilient.

Weighing the costs of environmental damage to the surrounding area against the

benefits to timber interests began soon after the new experiment in forest management

started. The cuts angered residents and the influential community of wealthy magnates

who had chosen the area for its natural beauty and proximity to New York City. Unlike

the common areas tabbed for timber cutting, plans for the cutting near exclusive

neighborhoods confronted strong resistance from these powerful people. The owners

worked to preserve their vacation resort and the trees that created its beauty. The

combination of the destruction of the area’s scenic value and the influence of the elite

inhabitants of the area led New York’s Governor Ben Odell to refuse funding to the

Cornell Forestry School to appease powerful donors. Clear-cutting was temporarily defeated, and the stark reality of its effect on the scenic beauty was a boon for conservation. Instead of invigorating lumber production, the effort ended up spurring greater levels of protection for the forests used as a testing ground.

Early stage conservationists were unable to reproduce the success of their response in the Adirondacks in the rest of the national forests. Even-aged continued to be the primary method of forest management on both public and private lands until the

1930s. With the Great Depression lowering demand for timber, a forester in the Pacific

Northwest, C.J. Buck, took the opportunity to experiment with selective logging practices.259 Selective harvesting had foresters identifying specific trees for timber after

259 C.J. Buck, Regional Forester to Forest Supervisor, Oct. 16, 1934.

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a study of their health, location, and accessibility. Buck’s attempts gained the approval of former chiefs of the nation’s forest service, Henry Graves and Gifford Pinchot, following site visits in 1937. Pinchot, well known among conservationists for his moderate approach to conservation, wrote in favor of selective logging. He stated that:

One of the things which struck most was your wisdom in preferring the high forest selection system as against clear cutting. What I saw in that line convinced me completely that what you are doing is not only the right thing for the forest but also very much the right thing in its effect on public sentiment.260

Pinchot’s statement revealed his understanding of the potential political benefits of moving away from clear-cutting. Unfortunately, his successors in the Forest Service were less attuned to the political realities of forest management, as their subsequent decisions in favor of clear-cutting would reveal.

C.J. Buck’s experiment in the Pacific Northwest failed to set a precedent for other regions. His plans for altering forest management ended following a disagreement he had with President Franklin Roosevelt over the necessity of a National Park in

Washington State’s Olympic Peninsula. Buck’s outspoken nature and his belief that a

National Park was not needed, brought him a transfer to Forest Service HQ in

Washington D.C., a death sentence for a practicing forester.261 In the ensuing decades,

Forest Service research on forest management determined that even-aged management was the best way to harvest trees in the region. While the numbers supported such a conclusion from an economic and efficiency perspective, they failed to account for the substantial aesthetic and environmental factors that angered

260 Gifford Pinchot to C.J. Buck, Sept. 9, 1937. 261 Irving Brant, Adventures in Conservation with Franklin D. Roosevelt (Flagstaff, AZ: Northland Publishing, 1988), 132.

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environmentalists and the public. The Forest Service unintentionally acknowledged

these effects by making it a policy to hide the bald landscapes left in the wake of a

clear-cut from the public by keeping the cuts behind stands of trees.262 Clear-cutting continued to be the primary policy of the Forest Service until the 1960s, when growing demand for lumber led to an uptick in the use of clear-cuts, and opened up new fronts in the fight for the forests.

The governmental response to continued conflicts overregulating the timber industry in the national forests was the creation of new guidelines governing the process for determining the size of the clear-cuts. Answering protests and growing media attention, Idaho Senator Frank Church conducted a study and designed recommendations that would limit clear-cuts to no more than forty acres. The Forest

Service was dealing with several challenges on the conservation front, with the RARE

(Roadless Area Review and Evaluation) process as well as the NEPA both occupying a great deal of their attention. In 1972, the Forest Service voluntarily agreed to limit their cut recommendations to the size called for in the so-called “Church guidelines.”263 With the tumultuous climate of forest management during the 1970s, these rules would not stem the conflict over clear-cuts for long.

Developments in two national forests as the 1960s ended set the stage for a grassroots drive to stop clear-cutting. Bitterroot National Forest, located in Montana and parts of eastern Idaho, saw a new round of extensive clear-cuts as demand for lumber

262 Gerald W. Williams, The USDA Forest Service: The First Century (Washington: USDA Forest Service, 2005), 55. 263 Timothy Pryor Mulhern, “The National Forest Management Act of 1976: A Critical Examination,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 7, no.1 (1978): 100.

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returned. The cuts led to protests that brought media attention and eventually a

Congressional study. Forestry professor Arnold Bolle constructed a report that

concluded that the Bitterroot clear-cuts were even more damaging than usual. He

claimed that they were a form of mining that not only cut the entire area of forest, but

also left no possibility of re-growth of new trees.264 Bolle pointed to the Forest Service’s

overarching concern with the amount of timber cut and sold as evidence of the

indifference that their focus on even-aged management had created in the agency.

During the creation of the Bolle report, pressure on foresters in West Virginia’s

Monongahela National Forest from the state legislature led to a lawsuit by the Izaak

Walton League.265 The plaintiffs successfully argued that even-aged management

violated provisions of the 1897 Organic Act that regulated natural resource consumption

in the national forests.266 The 1973 Monongahela decision was a blow to further use of

clear-cuts and recommended a legislative solution to critiques of forest management

practices.267 Although it did not outright forbid clear-cutting, both foresters and environmentalists interpreted it as a ban on the practice.268 The ruling was the first clear

defeat of unimpeded bureaucratic control of forest management. Going forward, the

Monongahela decision would serve as a paradigm shift for efforts to preserve the

nation’s forests.

264 Arnold Bolle, “The Bolle Statement on Clearcutting,” High Country News, May 14, 1971, 6. 265 Williams, The USDA Forest Service- The First Century, 55. 266 Williams, The USDA Forest Service- The First Century, 56. 267 Toddi A. Steelman, “The Monongahela Controversy and Decision,” Forests and Forestry in the Americas: An Encyclopedia, 2. 268 Robert W. Haines, “Monongahela and the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” Environmental Law 7, no. 2 (1977): 345.

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The effects of the West Virginia finding against the Forest Service encouraged citizens seeking to maintain natural forests. In East Texas’s Big Thicket, the early seventies saw the Texas Committee on Natural Resources attempt to use the new legislative environment breaking out around the country to protect the long-contested forest. TCONR’s work paralleled the efforts of environmentalists attempting to preserve as much of the natural forest as possible. On the heels of the successful campaign against the Trinity Canal in 1973, members of the Big Thicket Association (BTA) continued to push for the formation of a protected space in East Texas’ Big Thicket. The brouhaha at the 1969 BTA meeting in Silsbee saw Ned and his cohorts manage to isolate BTA President Henley.269 Henley had advocated a more conciliatory relationship with the authorities, an approach Ned and his allies claimed had already proven unsuccessful. At the gathering in East Texas, Ned and like-minded environmentalists were able to replace Henley, following his outspoken resistance to their growing presence in the organization. His ouster represented a turning point, as his preference for a small, timber-friendly wilderness proposal made way for new ideas. In the wake of

Henley’s departure, the group kicked off a renewed effort at preservation. Henley returned to his real estate career.270 The larger prize in terms of acreage, always the primary goal of Ned’s group, became dominant among Texas environmentalists.

Although Ned and his cohort of newly minted leaders of the organization were not alone in the group, theirs were the loudest voices arguing for federal protection of the Thicket. Replacing Orrin Bonney, the temporary head of the coordinating

269 Edward C. Fritz, “Silsbee, TX Meeting,” (notes Dec.1968). CHAPTER 1.270 Cozine, Saving the Big Thicket: From Exploration to Preservation, 114.

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Committee was a new voice, Lamar University Professor Charles Wilbanks.271 He would attempt to manage the disparate elements within the organization. The group began lobbying for real action in the Big Thicket as congressional attention to forest management returned following the Monongahela decision. In his attempt to prevent the destruction wrecking the national forests from reaching a beloved portion of the Sam

Houston National Forest and derail Forest Service plans for indiscriminate cutting in the rest, Ned would have to navigate a delicate and complex minefield of stakeholders and invested parties. Understanding his thought process and actions as he maneuvered between industry, Congressional power brokers, and environmentalists was a vital component of the story of establishing the Big Thicket preserve.

At a United States Senate hearing in Beaumont, Texas, on May 12, 1970,

Congressional activity into the Big Thicket was restarted. Attended by representatives from the political, industrial, and environmental fields, the Beaumont meeting set the stage for further Congressional involvement in Big Thicket preservation. Texas

Democratic Senator Ralph Yarborough, author of the Endangered Species Act and the strongest ally for the BTA in Congress, was the first to testify.272 Yarborough argued that changes in the environmental awareness of Americans had created a climate in which passage of the long-sought preserve was possible. Seeking protection of the Thicket as a recreation area, Yarborough pointed to the proximity of large population centers, with

3.5 million people within 100 miles and another 13 million people with a 250-mile radius.

Yarborough’s speech also highlighted the low financial cost needed to establish the

271 “Wilbanks is Big Thicket President,” The Redbird (Beaumont, TX), Oct. 31, 1968, 10. 272 Gunter, The Big Thicket: A Challenge for Conservation, 105.

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park. As the nation became increasingly urbanized, the need for natural spaces would lead to continued migrations to spots like the Thicket.273

Yarborough attempted to rally popular fervor on behalf of the Big Thicket but encountered resistance by opponents of preservation. Ollie Crawford spoke to the gathering as the representative of the Texas Forestry Association. The timber-backed organization listed a few moves taken by companies in response to environmental concerns. Crawford sought to convince the gathering of the credibility of timber companies’ desire to protect the forests. Yarborough provided examples that contradicted Crawford’s portrayal of the TFA as beneficent toward the preserve. He detailed their continued efforts to avoid preservation and limit the potential size of the

Big Thicket.274 In addition to the lobbyists and politicians, the hearing witnessed testimony from several experts who spoke about the need for a park. Zoological and scientific experts testified to the need to protect space for wildlife and ecological concerns. Residents spoke about the relationship between the forest and East Texas culture and ways of life. The years following the first Senate hearing would begin to see substantial progress towards the formation of a preserve in the Big Thicket.

The attention given to the need for a Big Thicket park in numerous 1970 political campaigns revealed how far the notion had seeped into the consciousness of Texan voters. Yarborough faced a difficult primary challenge from Lloyd Bentsen.

Environmentalists were worried his defeat would imperil their chances of finalizing his

Big Thicket legislation. Bentsen’s victory in the 1970 primary left him facing off in the

273 Ibid, 105. 274 Gunter, The Big Thicket: A Challenge for Conservation, 110.

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general election against Houston Congressman George H.W. Bush. Bush read the political winds of East Texas well and made his recommendation for a 150,000-acre park a part of his platform in his 1970 campaign.275 Following his victory over Bush,

Bentsen relieved environmentalists by reiterating his support for Yarborough’s park proposal. Congressional representatives Earle Cabell and John Dowdy had filed a

House resolution calling for a creation of the timber industry-approved 35,000-acre park based on the string of pearls concept. East Texas Congressman Bob Eckhardt followed on the heels of Yarborough’s proposal, continuing his work with TCONR on a bill calling for a park of no less than 185,000 acres.276 Senator John Tower joined the fray with a call for an 81,000-acre preserve that would also protect 100,000 acres in surrounding parks. Even the New York Times got in on the act, publishing their support for a

191,000-acre section of the Thicket. Suddenly, the winds of change had come to East

Texas. While reconciling the diverse bills and shepherding them through Congress still awaited completion, the political will to see the dream of a Big Thicket preserve completed was manifest.

Despite the Congressional activity regarding the Big Thicket, the preserve still had hurdles to clear. The election cycle had proven that East Texas was home to multiple Congressmen whose malleability regarding the need for protection and the size of the Thicket varied according to their electoral prospects. Their outlook reflected the growing space environmental advocacy occupied as the public conscience increased,

275 Pete Gunter, The Big Thicket: An Ecological Reevaluation (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1993), 86. 276 Bob Eckhardt to Edward C. Fritz, Aug. 8, 1970.

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while exposing their reticence to overcommit and anger local industry.277 The movement

for preservation of the Big Thicket gained momentum following Yarborough’s 1970

defeat. In part as an olive branch to the outgoing Senator’s loyal supporters, Lloyd

Bentsen promised to take up the mantle of the BTA in his absence. Congress

responded by working to balance an increasingly tenuous position regarding the move

for protected wilderness areas. On one hand, environmentalism as a public concern had

reached its zenith in the early 1970s and Congressmen had to stay attuned to the public

will. However, their desire to fulfill the wishes of voters competed with their concern

about offending the East Texas lumber mills that dominated the region’s economy.

Estimates placed timber as responsible for the employment and down-stream spending

of two-thirds of the area’s economic activity.278 Even as the need for some level of

preservation in the forest became widely accepted, to the point of acquiescence by the

timber companies themselves, harmony over the size of the proposed area remained

absent. For “Timber” Charlie Wilson, George H.W. Bush, Ralph Yarborough, and Bob

Eckhardt, the East Texas Congressmen at the center of the fight for a Big Thicket

preserve, finding a way to please their voters without alienating the influential lumber

interests would prove an arduous task.

BTACC worked to translate Congressional activity into action. The emergence of

the results of even-aged management, single species pine tree plantations intended

only for lumber, presented environmentalists with a visual reminder of the cost of timber

277 Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2005), 152. 278 Al Reinert, “The Big Thicket Tangle,” Texas Monthly (July 1973).

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production in national forests.279 These plantations had pine trees planted, allowed to grow, and then clear-cut specifically for their lumber. By 1970, the pine plantations in the Thicket had come to dominate Texas timber production, with the eight mills feeding from them equaling the production of the remaining 132 mills in the region.280 With pines rapidly replacing the natural diversity in the Thicket, the impetus for saving the forest took on a greater level of meaning. The BTACC used the visual destruction left in

Thicket to leverage concern among the general population.

BTA’s strategy for a renewed effort at approval for the creation of a nature preserve that would maintain the remaining forest required allies in Congress. To accomplish this goal, BTA would need to find someone to replace Ralph Yarborough after he was defeated in the 1970 primary.281 One potential replacement was Charlie

Wilson. An institution in East Texas politics, Wilson’s close ties with the timber industry made him an unlikely advocate for forest preservation. He had hemmed and hawed on support for various-sized iterations of the Big Thicket preserve, serving as a

Congressional weathervane for environmentalists. Lumber interests had occasionally come out in favor of Ned’s vision for a protected Big Thicket. They had attended the tumultuous Silsbee meeting and had previously fashioned proposals for a preserve within the Thicket.282 The stance of timber giant Eastex, which stood as the main driver of opposition to the renewed effort at a Big Thicket preserve, was informative for the rest of the industry. In February of 1973, the Eastex and Temple Industries merged

279 Edward C. Fritz, Sterile Forest, 78. 280 Cozine, Saving the Big Thicket, 123. CHAPTER 2.281 Martin Waldron, “Conservative Beats Yarborough in Democratic Primary in Texas,” New York Times, May 3, 1970, 1. 282 Gunter, Big Thicket Challenge, 110.

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following their purchase by Time Inc., forming Temple-Eastex, the largest timber combination in Texas. The merger threw the new plans for a 100,000-acre park into limbo. Wilson suddenly found himself arrayed against not only the timber industry, but also the labor unions that depended on the related shipping and manufacturing. With much of his base of support threatened, Wilson quickly changed gears, becoming amenable to the smaller proposals favored by the timber corporations.283

Wilson’s situation in relation to the Big Thicket was a difficult balancing act. The area comprised most of his Congressional district. His nickname, “Timber Charlie,” spoke to his strong ties to the East Texas timber industry, where he had started his career as an accountant for the family-owned Temple industries.284 When Ned first broached the idea of working with Wilson, Genie chuckled when she reminded him of the nickname.285 Temple’s status as the most accepting timber company concerning conservation issues caused expectations of Wilson from his connections to the industry to be somewhat leavened. When a $40,000 timber purchase was discovered to be from a unit of the preserve, the BTA asked that the agreement be canceled. When an estate representing one of the sellers refused, Temple took the loss.286 This was especially true once Time Inc. gained control of the company. From the time of its original Texas timber purchases in 1952, the publishing giant had been unique in their approach to conservation. They were the first company to acquiesce to the necessity of a protected

283 Fred Bonavita, “Timber Firms Pledge to Ban Cutting in Big Thicket,” Houston Post, July 18, 1973. 284 Paul Burka, “The King of the Forest,” Texas Monthly, August 1982. 285 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 11.

286 Renee Hart Wells, Big Thicket Region, (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2018), 126.

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space within the Big Thicket. They were also the only East Texas lumber concern that refused to engage in clear-cutting. Time Inc.’s liberal environmental policy still had limits. The company wanted to minimize the most contentious aspect of the new attempt at establishing a preserve, the size of the cordoned area.287 By the time the Big Thicket preserve was approaching realization, Wilson, a young Congressman but already an institution in East Texas due to his long history in the Texas legislature, occupied a vital position as an intercessory between Congress and timber interests. His role was vital in balancing the competing interests of the various stakeholders in the future of the Big

Thicket.

Ned was indispensable in the push for local and Congressional support for the

Big Thicket preserve. He knocked on doors to assuage fears over having federally owned land added to the neighborhood. He devoted much of his attention to Congress, speaking in Senate hearings over the proposed site in 1974 and working to mitigate disagreements between Congressmen Eckhardt and Wilson. Congress finally worked out their differences related to the Big Thicket in 1974, passing legislation creating the

Big Thicket National Biological Preserve.288 Although the Department of Interior had proposed a smaller, 68,000 acre area, the inclusion of the stream corridors that the BTA had insisted be protected created an 84,000-acre preserve.289 Sponsored in the House by Charlie Wilson, the bill President Gerald Ford signed into law included a much larger area than the timber companies had proposed. The legislation was the fulfillment of

287 Congress, House, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Statement of James Shepley, President of Time Incorporated, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., July 17, 1973. 288 A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Big Thicket National Preserve in the State of Texas and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. 93-439, 93rd Congress, H.R. 11546, October 11, 1974. 289 Fritz, “Big Thicket National Riverways,” 10.

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years of work by Texas environmentalists, concerned citizens, and environmentally

conscious legislators.290 There was little time for celebration though. For the Big Thicket

Association, the fight over the forest would soon merge with the debate over clear-

cutting, calling them back into action.

The creation of a wilderness area in the Big Thicket preserve was not the final

bell in the fight over forest protection in East Texas. For Ned, the ongoing operations of the Forest Service in the area, particularly their persistent reliance on clear-cuts, represented a continued threat. He was anxious to take action in response to the growing menace of clear-cutting in the forests. Texas was no exception to the growing dependence on even-aged management of the national forests. The Monongahela decision pushed conservationists nationwide to use the changes in legislation regulating forest management for protection. In Ned’s view, the Forest Service’s justifications for the practice failed to merit its high cost to the surrounding environment. In 1976, his frustration with the practice and his personal animosity toward the officials in charge of forest management in the state led him to file a lawsuit to cease the clear-cuts. His suit

would initiate a decade-long battle over the fate of hundreds of thousands of acres in

East Texas. Through this case, Ned would challenge the prevailing wisdom of U.S.

forest management in relation to clear-cutting. It was a battle that was of vital

importance to him and one that would consume the better part of his remaining career

as an environmentalist.

290 A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Big Thicket National Preserve in the State of Texas and for Other Purposes, 1974.

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Differing strategies of how to prosecute the fight over forest management

emerged in the wake of West Virginia’s restriction on the Forest Service.291 National

organizations were alarmed at the potential fallout from the Monongahela decision. The

West Virginia case had challenged the practice of clearcutting as a violation of the

Organic Act’s requirement that “dead, physically mature and large growth trees,

individually marked for cutting, were eligible for sale.”292 In 1975, the Monongahela decision was upheld by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, leading to the end of

clearcutting in four states, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

The Sierra Club was concerned that the successful suit could lead to the timber industry

lobbying to overturn the 1897 Organic Act, which had established much of the nation’s

wilderness protections.293 If Congress felt the legal underpinnings of forest regulation

required an update, the Sierra Club was concerned that the delicate balance protecting

vast amounts of natural resources could end. Ned wanted to apply the same logic used

in West Virginia to Texas and felt the need to protect forests outweighed the potential

damage to environmental laws. Such disagreements obviously spelled trouble for his

vision for collaboration and tested the strength of bonds between different levels of

environmental organizations. In part a result of the success in spreading awareness of

conservation issues to new corners, finding compromise on strategy and goals for

success would become a vital issue for citizens concerned with the environment.

291 Haines, “Monongahela and the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” 354. 292 Anthony Godfrey, The Ever-Changing View: A History of the National Forests in California 1891-1987, (Washington: USDA Forest Service Publishers, 2005), 468. 293 Douglas Bevington, The Rebirth of Environmentalism: Grassroots Activism from the Spotted Owl to the Polar Bear, (Washington: Island Press, 2009), 244.

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Ned Fritz Sues the Forest Service

Ned’s motivation to file a rogue suit against the Forest Service started with a call warning of an impending burn from local activist Madeline Framson in April of 1976.294

The area chosen for the burn was the Four Notch, a portion of East Texas’ Sam

Houston National Forest preserved since the 1940s. The 6,200-acre area was a common site for Forest Service experimentation with various forest management strategies. Framson warned that the area was under consideration for an upcoming prescribed burn to prepare for a clear-cut.295 Ned had a lifelong blind spot regarding burns, viewing the process as an invasive change that altered the natural life cycle of the forest.296 Unlike most of the scientific aspects of deforestation and silviculture where his understanding was comparable to trained scientists, he was unable to recognize the potential benefits of burns. He could not see past the fact that humanity was interfering with the forests, despite the prevailing consensus that the practice was beneficial by clearing underbrush and revitalizing the health of the forest floor. The association of burns with clear-cutting (the Forest Service would set fires prior to a cut) convinced Ned that they were dangerous to the ecology of the forest. His sensitivity on the issue of burns and the threat to the Four Notch that they represented formed a potent elixir, pushing him towards a suit against the Forest Service.

Following the warning by Framson, Ned planned a visit to the area. Framson,

Mike Frome, a nature journalist associated with the Sierra Club, and Forest Service

Regional Supervisor John Courtenay, accompanied him on his tour. Courtenay was the

294 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 1. 295 Ibid, 1. 296 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999.

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primary decision maker for the Forest Service in Texas’ National Forests. He and Ned

would lock horns for most of the next decade.297 Their respective appearances

presented a stark contrast between the groups contending over the future of forests;

Courtenay with his clean-cut appearance and button up shirt against Ned’s now graying

but still wild and curly hair.298 Ned considered Courtenay a tool of the timber industry,

prioritizing timber harvests over all other factors in the forests. During the visit, he

questioned Courtenay about the necessity of the impending cut. The visit confirmed his

suspicion that the area was being prepared for a cut. He pushed Courtenay to approve

a change in status that would classify the area as protected. He wrote out a formal

request for the Forest Service to study the Four Notch’s potential as a wilderness area

and handed it to Courtenay on the spot.299 Courtenay was reticent to show his hand

regarding the possibility of a wilderness designation. While he did promise to give the

request due consideration, Ned was convinced that the decision had already been

made to cut the forest. He would have to play new cards if he hoped to prevent the

sawblade from taking the Four Notch.

In his years as an environmentalist, Ned had been reticent to rely on the courts

unless necessary. Despite, or perhaps because of his personal familiarity with the legal

system, he was hesitant to undertake lawsuits in the search for legal protection. His

resistance stemmed from several factors. He worried that, for example, even an

injunction saving one area would only apply to that area, allowing the Forest Service to

297 Betty Jones, “History of Litigation on the National Forests in Texas,” Forest History Today (Spring/Fall 2004): 38. 298 Ibid, 38. 299 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. of Texas 1977), 917.

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continue clear-cutting elsewhere. Environmental issues attracted wide attention, with the inherent risk that a loss could discourage the growing environmental movement.

The counter to this view was that a government loss on the clear-cutting issue over a single area could potentially inspire a wider push against the practice.300 Invoking previous iterations of social justice movements, Ned compared the potential windfall from a defeat to abolitionist sentiment in the years after their defeat following the

Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision.301 The sentiment also offered the possibility of increased pressure from local activists and citizens who learned about even-aged management through the trial. There was also a personal variable to his decision. Ned’s approach to both environmental endeavors and trials led to an overwhelming commitment to any case and so took a lot out of him. The combination of the two could prove overwhelming. Determining whether a lawsuit was the best method of preserving the Four Notch was a difficult decision.

Before filing a lawsuit to preserve the Four Notch, every potential avenue for remedy beyond litigation had to be exhausted. His first step involved requesting a study of the area’s potential as a protected wilderness. Following his visit to the Four Notch, he wrote a formal request to Courtenay for a study of the area.302 Wilderness designation would ensure that the Four Notch remained and eliminate the need for a suit. The Forest Service’s response to his request for a status change in the area came back negative. Courtenay pointed to the existence of roads and infrastructure as

300 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 9. 301 Ibid, 9. 302 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 917.

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reasons to disqualify the space as wilderness.303 Courtenay said that the sales would

continue out of concern for the local economy in Hardin County.304 He also cited the

presence of abandoned oil wells and abandoned cars as examples of civilization on the

land. There were also several acres within the area that had already been clear-cut. The

Forest Service cited previous cuts as the primary reason that it did not qualify for

preservation. This tortured logic helped inflame his desire to force the Forest Service

into more environmentally friendly actions. Most frustrating to Ned was Courtenay’s

focus on the two abandoned cars. Ned considered two cars to be a poor justification for

abandoning thousands of acres. He soon set about channeling his irritation with their

reply into action. Reading the response from the Forest Service went a long way toward

convincing him of the necessity of a lawsuit to prevent the impending clear-cutting of the

Four Notch.305 As events unfolded during his exploration of the case’s feasibility, the

decision would become much clearer.

While Ned considered a lawsuit, he constructed a response to Courtenay’s denial

of wilderness protection to his request for reconsideration on the forest service decision to continue with timber sales within the Four Notch. Courtenay and Ned had a long-

shared history of little love lost between the two. In his brief interview for this work,

Courtenay replied with a short epithet aimed at Ned and would not speak of any particulars.306 For his part, Ned had long held a grudge at what he viewed as

Courtenay’s duplicitous nature. Unbeknownst to the forester, Ned was aware of

303 John Courtenay to Edward C. Fritz, May 26, 1976. 304 Ibid. 305 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 10. 306 John Courtenay, phone interview by author, May 24, 2016, Forney, TX.

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Courtenay’s service to multiple boards of timber concerns.307 He knew that behind the scenes Courtenay was working against wilderness preservation efforts. While

Courtenay had convinced many environmental organizations that he was dealing in good faith, Ned’s experience taught him to be wary.308 Events in the Four Notch would only further cement this view.

In the immediate aftermath of Courtenay’s denial, Ned sought Congressional support for a wilderness study of the Four Notch.309 A wilderness study served two important purposes. The move would cover his requirement to exhaust every potential avenue for a solution before proceeding with litigation. Moreover, the Forest Service could not harvest in areas under study. Finding the area suitable for wilderness protection would spare the Four Notch, and the confrontation with the Forest Service would disintegrate. For assistance, Ned turned to the East Texas Congressmen most knowledgeable about the situation on the ground in Hardin County. Bob Eckhardt, with

Charlie Wilson’s approval, agreed to propose the area as a potential wilderness.310 In a surprise move, Senator John Tower, no regular friend to environmental causes, also agreed to support the proposal.311 Ned reasoned that Tower was attempting to appease voters concerned with environmental issues. With the threat to the Four Notch so close, he would take any help he could muster.

307 “State Secrets,” Texas Monthly, April 1979. 308 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 32. 309 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 23. 310 Congress, House, A Bill to Study Certain Lands for Suitability as Wilderness, 94th Cong. 1st sess., H.R. 13861, (1976). 311 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 21.

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While awaiting Congressional action on his study request, Ned continued to

apply pressure to preserve the Four Notch. One of the strategies he employed while he

weighed his options was the creation of a public relations campaign pushing for a

protected wilderness in the forest. He made phone calls to fellow environmentalists and

lobbyists for the Sierra Club seeking their blessing for his suit.312 He wrote letters to

Congressmen from the area, seeking their influence on the Forest Service. TCONR

sent out a bulletin warning of the threat to the Four Notch and calling for a letter-writing

campaign to Supervisor Courtenay. He even enlisted the support of the Boy Scouts of

America, seeking volunteers to traverse the affected area and create a report of all the birds, wildlife, and plant life that would suffer from a clear-cut.313 Ned’s experience in

conservation efforts allowed him to supplement his legal maneuvering with an effective

publicity drive.

Ned’s relationship with the Sierra Club regarding his decision to sue the Forest

Service was one of the more complicating factors in the run up to the case. His choice

on filing a suit required a careful weighing of the delicate balance between conservation

groups and their contrasting stances on the National Forests. A united front was

essential for environmentalists. If a discontinuity between strategies became public,

advocates of clear-cuts could exploit the differences to continue the practice unabated.

Aiming to maintain ties with allies, Ned first spoke with Emil Kindschy, a

representative of the Houston chapter of the Sierra Club and fellow member of the Big

Thicket Association. Kindschy attempted to discourage him from filing suit against

312 Gordon Robinson, “Gordon Robinson: Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club,” interview by Harold K. Steen, (Sierra Club History Committee: San Francisco, 1979): 87. 313 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 12.

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Courtenay and the Forest Service. The group was engaged in their own negotiations

over the formation of multiple wilderness areas in East Texas. Kindschy’s group was in

the process of carving out a 1,800-acre Wilderness Area overlapping a portion of the

Four Notch in a compromise with the Forest Service and local timber interests. Ned

remained steadfast in his refusal to compromise for such a small space. He believed

that Courtenay was simply leading the Houston chapter on and had no intention of

acquiescing to any wilderness protections. The Club felt that the potential loss of the

rest of the Four Notch was not important enough to sacrifice the detente between

various stakeholders in East Texas. Ned sought to assuage the Houston chapter’s

concern on a visit to the national headquarters in Washington in May 1976.314 The

conflict there stemmed more from his plan to file under the recent Monongahela

decision. The Sierra Club was anxious to avoid any implication that could allow that

decision to lose its applicability in other locations. They were afraid of further angering

the timber industry, which they felt would lead to the repeal of the Organic Act of 1897,

potentially opening an entirely new paradigm in forest management regulation.

Balancing the competing interests and the established arrangements between the

Forest Service and powerful environmental organizations complicated Ned’s plans for protecting the Four Notch.

While in D.C., Ned also met with representatives of other national organizations to seek their blessing to pursue his suit. The groups, including the Environmental Policy

Center and the National Resources Defense Council adopted a more accommodating stance. Tom Barlow, the legislative expert from the NRDC advised Ned that he was free

314 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 22.

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to proceed with his suit, although it might be short lived.315 The NFMA was about to be enacted and would alter the basis of the Four Notch suit. Barlow and Ned determined that the failure to complete an Environmental Impact Statement and the Forest

Service’s failure to follow the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act would still allow for standing in the suit. The separation between the outlooks of national and local organizations and the specter of new legislation continued to plague approaches to dealing with clear-cutting and associated forest management issues.

There are some discrepancies between Ned and his fellow environmentalists in their views of what happened next. The Sierra Club's primary forestry consultant

Gordon Robinson, who would advise Ned on strategy before and during the Four Notch trial, recommended that he check with the Washington lobbyists and legal defense team before undertaking any suits. Ned wrote that Robinson agreed with his conclusion that clear-cutting violated the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act and was just as anxious as

Ned was to get a judge's agreement.316 Robinson claimed that Ned went ahead with the lawsuit without consultation, leaving members of the Sierra Club angry with both men.317 Robinson’s issues compounded once news media reports surfaced tagging him as the primary witness for Ned's suit. After consulting with his Sierra Club colleagues,

Robinson went forward with his testimony regarding clear-cutting out of concern that a loss in Texas could damage conservation efforts in the national forests.

Ned got more bad news from Washington when Congressman Eckhardt withdrew his support of the proposal to classify the Four Notch as a wilderness area in

315 Ibid, 131. 316 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 56. 317 Steen, “Gordon Robinson: Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club,” 87.

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the summer of 1976. Despite Wilson's earlier support, the merger of the Temple and

Eastex timber companies had increased pressure on him, and he had pushed Eckhart

to delay filing, placing the area in peril.318 Unsurprisingly, Ned disagreed with

Courtenay’s motivations at denying the wilderness study. The message Courtenay sent

to Congressman Eckhardt was similar to those he had used in his response to Ned.319

With Forest Service reluctance to protect the area and Congressional pressures from

special interests, he was running out of options to preserve the Four Notch. With each

setback, the chances he would force a lawsuit increased.

Following Courtenay’s denial and Congressional reversal on wilderness

consideration, Ned entered the final stages of his decision on the lawsuit. He was afraid

that a sudden change might spell the end for the Four Notch. With few good choices

remaining, he determined to stop the Forest Service from clear-cutting by seeking an

injunction to cease all such cutting in the National Forest. Filing the lawsuit to cease the

destruction of the Four Notch was a step he arrived at only after considering a number of competing variables. Legal action seemed to be the only option that would preserve the area.

The Four Notch Lawsuit

Through the aegis of TCONR, Ned finally chose to file suit to stop clear-cutting in

the Four Notch area of Sam Houston National Forest on July 2, 1976.320 The lawsuit was a strange amalgam of the coordination he had worked to foster and his willingness

318 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 53. 319 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 2572. 320 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland.

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to reject the status quo. Despite the concerns other environmentalists had brought up

and the disagreements throughout the process leading up to the suit, Ned would rely

heavily on his allies following the filing.321 The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society

offered support in both testimony and legal assistance. TCONR benefited from the

assistance of Dallas attorneys Bill Kugle and Hank Skelton, who served as pro bono

publico attorneys throughout the trial. This freed Ned so that he could serve as a

witness in the case. The suit accused the Forest Service and accompanying

organizations and individuals ranging from timber company representatives to the

Department of Agriculture of violating a series of federal regulations. TCONR took aim

at the management techniques implemented by the Forest Service in East Texas,

claiming they represented violations of the NEPA by harming the environment more

than alternative methods would.322 The clear-cutting policy, the suit argued, conflicted with parts of the Wilderness Act, Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, and Endangered

Species Act. Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Earl L. Butz, Secretary of

Agriculture would form an important component of his record as an environmentalist.323

TCONR’s case was heard in the United States District Court, Eastern District in

Tyler, Texas. Ned thought that the judge in the case, William Wayne Justice, was a

fortunate draw who would allow the case to proceed without too much interference.

Justice did little to dissuade this view when he explained his views on even-aged

management.324 In a July 1976 pre-trial hearing for a preliminary injunction against

321 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 2. 322 Ibid, 1245. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid, 1240.

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further harvesting in the Four Notch, TCONR argued that the Forest Service’s stance

towards forest management failed to follow the legal provisions established for

regulation of National Forests. They cited violations under the Multiple Use Sustained

Yield Act, arguing that the Forest Service had not provided options for continued use of

the forest.325 In his decision on the injunction, Justice agreed that the cuts were in

violation of the Multiple Use Act and NEPA and blocked further cuts until the final

judgement.326 With the fate of the Four Notch uncertain, the stage was set for the

ensuing trial, scheduled for December. In the interval between the hearing and the trial,

a new piece of legislation concerning forest management came online, adding an

additional layer of complexity to Ned’s case.

The Congressional answer to lawsuits threatening bureaucratic hegemony in the national forests would play a major role in Ned’s further interactions with forest protection. Responding to the 1973 Monongahela decision, the bureaucrats, timber lobbyists, and their Congressional allies had pursued a redefining of forest management regulations. In 1976, environmental organizations worked with Congress to influence the legislation in a move towards compromise.327 Although the Forest Service was

primarily seeking an easy solution for relief from continued lawsuits, Congress was

interested in a well-rounded piece of legislation to adjust the role of industry, experts,

and regulators in managing natural forest resources.328 The environmental groups,

resigned to the fact that new legislation was coming one way or another, attempted to

325 Ibid, 1241. 326 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 89. 327 Haines, “Monongahela and the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” Environmental Law, 357. 328 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 20.

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use amendments carving out specific areas to protect as a means to influence the process.329

The movement to rework regulations governing forest management was occurring just as Ned was developing his lawsuit challenging Forest Service practices in

Texas, further complicating his case. He was in Washington as the new bill, the National

Forest Management Act or NFMA, was up for debate in the summer of 1976. He had many issues with the potential ramifications of the act. Congressional participants assumed the Forest Service was a disinterested middle party that could make the decisions that best served all the competing interests in the national forests. Ned's experience with the Service led him to conclude that the legislation would serve only to streamline clear-cutting in the National Forest. He felt the close relationship between

Forest Service employees, the nation’s forestry schools that produced them, and the timber industry they were supposed to regulate would override any legislative challenges. Personally, Ned opposed the legislation because it failed to address clear- cutting. He did try to get an anti-clear-cutting amendment applied to the legislation, but ran into resistance from Congressional representatives and the Sierra Club.330 He thought that replacing the Organic Act with legislation that gave the Forest Service more discretion to choose the best method of forest management would spell disaster.331

Ned’s views on the impact of the legislation would prove to be correct, and he would spend a great deal of his remaining years dealing with the repercussions.

329 Ibid, 20. 330 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 133. 331 Ibid, 21.

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Despite his misgivings, Congress passed the proposed bill creating a new regulatory environment in the national forests. The resulting legislation, the National

Forest Management Act of 1976, passed in October.332 NFMA was a clarification of earlier legislation, the 1974 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, designed to regulate the commercial use of natural resources on national forest lands.333 Ned disagreed with the conventional wisdom among mainstream environmental organizations regarding the law. The Sierra Club had chosen to support the legislation in the belief that while NFMA would allow clear-cutting, it was limited only to locations where the Forest Service found it to be the optimal method.334 Ned was sure that the Forest Service would interpret this requirement as a blank check for clear- cutting, considering their growing dependence on the practice. Although the law intended to clarify issues raised in lawsuits such as the Monongahela suit, the NFMA quickly became a basis for them.

Disagreements between national environmental organizations and smaller, more localized groups focused on specific issues affecting their communities were a common occurrence in the second half of the twentieth century. Robert Gottlieb made the shifting alliances and conflicts following the establishment of an environmental policy framework a central theme in his history of the movement, Forcing the Spring. Gottlieb focused on the sifting process through which powerful, mainstream organizations attempted to corral less established groups. Managing success proved a difficult task. In exchange for a more robust legislative and policy network, an achievement few could have

332 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Statutes at Large 90, sec. 2949 (1976). 332 Ibid. 334 Haines, “Monongahela and the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” Environmental Law, 357.

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imagined at the outset of the decade, the groups adopted a more conciliatory position reliant on the usual methods of enacting change in Washington D.C., lobbying and compromise. This new arrangement left small organizations such as TCONR on the outside looking in. Engaging in suits that tested the boundaries of existing legislation potentially threatened the delicate balance the larger groups had worked so hard to achieve. Asking for a larger preserve in the Big Thicket proved Ned’s unwillingness to forgo his own hopes and dreams for environmental preservation. On the other side, the ascension of the movement, while laudable, left smaller organizations scrambling for solutions to their own concerns. The conflicting interests in the dispute over the proper approach to Big Thicket preservation was an example of the problems plaguing environmental organizations following their unexpected successes throughout the

1970s.

The new regulations had been fashioned specifically to avoid further confusion between regulators, industry, and environmentalists. With such disparate motivations and perspectives existing between these groups, competing interpretations sprang up as soon as the ink was dry. Ned would soon find himself in the middle of the fight over implementation. NFMA required the Forest Service to study a number of alternative approaches to forest management, to assess any potential environmental impacts from timber production, and to avoid any alterations that might spell permanent damage to the national forests.335 As usual with the passage of influential environmental legislation, settling the details of the implementation came in legal wrangling over the definition and application of the new provisions. For Ned, navigating the shifting grounds of forest

335 National Forest Management Act of 1976.

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management in light of the revelations from other court decisions and changing

legislative landscape would prove a difficult task.

With the new legislation as a backdrop, TCONR v. Butz was heard during more

than ten days of testimony in the East Texas Federal District courthouse in Tyler,

Texas, in December of 1976.336 Following the passage of the NFMA in October of 1976,

Ned became the first to sue under its parameters after he amended his lawsuit for its

inclusion.337 He also continued to make the case against the Forest Service based on its failure to follow additional governmental regulations. He pointed to violations of requirements in the Church Guidelines from earlier in the decade regulating the size of

clear-cuts. According to consultations with other environmentalists, the refusal of the

Forest Service to implement environmental protocols was the best chance to protect the

Four Notch.338 Ned, aiming at a more long-term blow to clear-cutting, expanded his suit

beyond the Four Notch to other Forest Service violations and the justifiability of the

practice in general.

Ned dominated much of the testimony, spending two full days testifying to the dangers of clear-cutting and poking holes in the government’s support of the practice. In his testimony, Ned raised issues with each of the justifications provided to rationalize clear-cutting. He viewed most of the reasons offered by the bureaucrats as excuses that sacrificed the ecological health of the forests in favor of convenience for the regulators and loggers. He questioned the financial benefits of even-aged management, pointing to examples of timber businesses that managed to maintain profitability without

336 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland. 337 Ibid, 40. 338 Steen, “Gordon Robinson: Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club,” 88.

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resorting to the practice.339 While the examples he cited were much smaller than the

areas managed by the Forest Service, Ned felt that unwillingness to attempt a strategy

that could protect thousands of trees was tantamount to acquiescence in environmental

damages. He argued that the practice was not appreciably more economically sound

then alternative forestry methods, primarily selective harvesting, while also much

costlier to the natural environment. His critique of the minimal economic benefits of

clear-cutting buttressed his belief that much of the dependence on single species

silviculture was a response to protection efforts. Here he was able to point out areas cut

while under consideration for reclassification as protected areas.340 To Ned, the Forest

Service’s approving these cuts was in part out of anger at attempts to control destruction of the national forests.

Ned focused on the process by which the Forest Service managed the National

Forests, arguing that their perspective had a bias towards clear-cutting at every step.

He accused the Service of failing to investigate alternative methods of forest management to continue with clear-cuts before new rules took effect. He contended that overreliance on the strategy was borne out of structural failures within the Forest

Service’s process for forest control. In addition to a penchant for laziness that favored clear-cuts as a method to ease their own workload, he pointed to the timber industry, with its close ties to the regulating body, as the primary beneficiary of single species forest stands.341 He also blamed regulators’ ignorance of other methods of forestry and

animosity toward resentment of environmentalists who impinged on their expertise

339 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 1252. 340 Ibid, 1237. 341 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 2573.

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regarding forest issues. Ned thus approached his suit from multiple angles in his attempt to protect the remaining areas of the Four Notch.

Ned lined up numerous experts, foresters, local lumbermen, and people living in the area for testimony about the economic, aesthetic, and recreational aspects of the

Four Notch. Environmentalists such as the Sierra Club’s Mike Frome, an influential environmental author and journalist, as well as Gordon Robinson, the Club’s Chief

Forestry Consultant, provided notable testimony.342 Robinson talked strategy with Ned before and during the trial and testified extensively on behalf of the Four Notch. In his testimony, Robinson stated that clear-cutting was a violation of the forest management legislation designed to protect the national forests. Robinson argued that the proposals for clear-cutting in the Four Notch were in violation of the concept of multiple use due to their effect on watershed protection, soil erosion, and the loss of valuable nutrients that came because of the cuts.343 He also believed that the destruction of the aesthetic image of the forests represented a violation of recreational use. Robinson supported

Ned’s stance on the dangers of clear-cutting to natural habitats for wildlife. He described how the replacement of insect-eating birds with seed-eating birds disrupted the natural ecosystem and replaced it with a manufactured version.344

Mike Frome had an interesting perspective on the lawsuit, having worked with the Forest Service as a writer, contributing his own experiences with the recreation aspects of the national forests in addition to his involvement with the Sierra Club. His testimony spoke to concerns about the failure of clear-cutting to meet basic standards of

342 Ibid, 231. 343 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 231. 344 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 187.

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multiple use.345 Frome also spoke about the Organic Act of 1897, providing background

on Gifford Pinchot and the multiple use approach that had been standard since the turn

of the century.346 Frome was especially concerned with recreational effects of clear- cutting, with the Forest Service often citing wilderness restrictions on hunting as justification to continue harvesting. Frome pointed out that either decision would influence recreational uses of the forest. Although the Sierra Club had been reticent about fully supporting the Four Notch case, the member’s testimony provided expertise to supplement Ned’s own views on clear-cutting.

Ned’s personal primary motivation to file a suit and cease the clear-cutting was the consolidated damage to the scenic value and ecological life of the surrounding habitat the practice created. The strategy of hiding the cuts was not enough in his mind.

Clear-cuts brought a new level of destruction to deforestation of the national forests, attacking wildlife, nature, and aesthetics alike. The case itself consisted of a substantial amount of detail related to topics ranging from the ecological status of the Four Notch area to the amount of timber harvested in Texas’s National Forests. TCONR relied on expert witnesses who testified regarding the scientific and scenic ramifications of even- aged management. In their testimony, environmentalists testified about the natural habitats the Forest Service’s plan would threaten. They also explained the alternative forest management methods used in some areas outside of Texas.347 Ned buttressed

their scientific approach with appeals to the sublime. He was particularly fond of

345 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 571. 346 Ibid, 570. 347 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 236.

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slideshows showing before and after shots of recent clear-cuts.348 While his attachment to the Texas forests was deeply personal, Ned balanced his emotional appeal with facts in making the case for protection.

On the other side, the government relied on both members of the bureaucracy and private industry to assist their case. Courtenay and David G. Oates, the Forest

Service’s Resources Staff Officer, served as the primary representatives of the Forest

Service. Legal representation for the government was led by Mark Wine, a Justice

Department attorney; Houston Abel, an Assistant U.S. District Attorney; and Elbert Cole, who served for the Department of Agriculture. Early in the case, Judge Justice allowed legal representation from the timber industry to serve as intervenors opposing Ned’s suit. The Forestry Association’s legal team consisted of Houston attorney James G.

Ulmer, Michael Skelton, and Lawrence McNamara.349 According to Ned, their primary strategy was to personalize the case, making it about his past actions, tiring him out in long depositions, and searching through TCONR’s files for any potential ammunition.350

The government and timber lawyers attacked Ned from multiple angles. The opposing attorneys consistently objected to his legitimacy as an expert witness, questioning his expertise on both legal and environmental matters. They also used

Ned’s gung-ho attitude against him, pointing out that his rogue suit had not involved consideration of other groups.351 There was an attempt to connect his attitude towards other conservation groups, his hounding of the Forest Service, and legal spats he

348 Ibid, 824. 349 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 3. 360 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 161. 351 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 920.

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fought with the city of Dallas over his lawn. The intention of this line of questioning was

to cast Ned as a rabble-rouser, unwilling to work with others and unqualified to question

the expertise of the Forest Service. The Foresters attempted to explain the rationale

behind their preference for even-aged techniques in economic terms, claiming it

presented the best possible return. The widespread adoption of the practice by timber

companies was justified as a natural result of market forces, a charge TCONR’s experts

disagreed with in testimony.352 The timber industry attempted to make an economic

appeal to the need for clear-cutting. Drawing on testimony from local construction

employees and others on the supply chain from harvesting to distribution, they tried to

connect preservation with harmful effects on the East Texas economy.353

The Forest Service argued that they had fulfilled the requirements of all

environmental regulations in their process undertaken before harvesting in the Four

Notch. Courtenay testified that an EIS created for a cut in Conroe, Texas, should apply

to the area.354 The remainder fell under a ‘negative declaration’, a form that the

foresters had filled out regarding the Four Notch. On cross-examination from Bill Kugle,

Courtenay admitted that the one EIS covering East Texas national forests only studied

about 75,000 of the 600,000 acres. They argued that their decision to circumvent

environmental legislation was borne of a misunderstanding, claiming that the EIS for

other areas of Texas should cover the Notch.355 Additionally, the government provided their own scientific testimony on the value of the practice. They attempted to prove that

352 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 196. 353 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 81. 354 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 49. 355 Ibid, 49.

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the cuts were a justified and scientifically backed method of forest management and

that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide a disagreement over differing scientific

interpretations. The foresters claimed that the Court’s role was strictly to ensure

compliance with NEPA, NFMA, and other governing legislation.

In his judgment, Judge Justice agreed with several TCONR’s arguments

regarding the effects of clear-cutting and the Forest Service’s actions in approving plans

for Sam Houston. Justice’s decision relied upon the arguments of both sides in the case

as well as a range of case law from previous environmental suits. He cited several

precedents from cases involving the Environmental Defense Fund’s suits against the

Corps of Engineers.356 The judge pointed out that clear-cutting caused a greater risk for

fire damage because of the decreased moisture within the forest floor. The rise of new

disease-carrying insects brought a corresponding increase in the potential for epidemics

infecting the forest in comparison to the Natural Forest.357 The court agreed with Ned's

arguments regarding productivity of the land affected by clear-cuts, accepting his

argument that the symbiotic nature of the forest was disrupted by the lowering the

variation and number of species within the forest. Justice also concluded that TCONR’s argument regarding the damage clear-cutting wrought upon the quality of timber, reduced in clear-cuts that took place while the trees were in their greatest period of growth, was sound. He found that the Forest Service had failed to follow their own requirement to preserve the residual living and growing timber while keeping favorable conditions for water flow. Instead, the even aged management failed to promote

356 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 1248. 357 Ibid, 1240.

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younger growth of trees and disrupted the natural water flow. Most importantly, Justice

concluded that the failure of the foresters to assess the potential environmental

damages before a change merited the suit. Considering Justice’s decision, TCONR’s

suit had been successful by nearly every measure.

Ned’s success against the Forest Service was short-lived. The appeals process

began almost immediately after the decision, and the appeal went to the conservative

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. He was not confident in his chance of

success in the Fifth Circuit, a court he had dubbed “the court of death” due to their

stringent stance on conservation issues.358 Ned felt that his best chance would be for

the decision to come down to the court’s interpretation of the Forest Service’s role in

administering the new regulations under NEPA. Essentially, the Fifth could decide that

the failure of the Forest Service to follow the requirement that they produce an

environmental impact statement before going ahead with a clear-cut meant that their

planned harvesting in the Four Notch could not go forward. Unfortunately for his case, the court’s judges followed a common refrain in refusing to go against the Forest

Service’s judgment. In their ruling, they explained that,

An effort to place the initial technical, management responsibility for the application of the NFMA guidelines on the responsible government agency, in this case the Forest Service. [w]ithin... its parameters, the management decision belongs to the agency and should not be second-guessed by a court.359

With this decision, the court removed Judge Justice’s ruling in relation to the Four

Notch. Their statement posited that the suit opened the possibility for continued reinterpretation of the forest legislation. The Appeals Court Judges believed that the

358 Tom Wolf, “Fritz vs the Feds,” American Forests 97, no. 11-12 (Nov. Dec. 1991): 66. 359 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978), 210.

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Congressional intent was to defer to expertise of the regulators. To Ned, the decision

ignored the reality of the situation on the ground, where the interdependence of the

regulators, bureaucrats, and timber industry ensured a closed system unfettered by

outside influence. Even though his case had brought gains to his cause of fighting clear-

cutting, the defeat in New Orleans revealed just how long a path he would have to take

to stop the practice.

In the years following the Trinity River canal fight, Ned Fritz continued to expand

his list of environmental causes. Following his rise in the Big Thicket Association and

the formation of the Texas Committee on Natural Resources, Ned looked to consolidate

his leadership within the Texas environmental movement by taking on new challenges.

Constantly seeking new angles for environmental advocacy, Ned found a cause célèbre worthy of his attention in the clearcutting taking place in the national forests. The issue was tailor made for Ned. Clearcutting entailed the removal of hundreds of acres worth of trees, making the way for plantations of the species the timber industry sought for sale, primarily pine trees. Such cuttings left massive destruction in their wake, providing a visual reminder of the costs demanded of the nation’s natural resources.

Timing was critical for Ned’s fight against clearcutting. New legislation like the

NEPA and the NFMA and judicial decisions like the 1973 Monongahela decision

banning clearcuts in much of the Southeast altered the landscape for forest

management. His legal background enhanced his ability to contribute to the reform

effort as he was one of the first to recognize the advantages of legal maneuver to

exploit newly enacted legislation. For Ned, the 1970s were the hallmark of his

environmentalist career. He would experience his greatest achievements in the battle

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over the reformation of the Trinity River into a canal and in substantial victories in the

continuing conflict over the future of East Texas’ Big Thicket. Ned, never one to rest on

his laurels, was predictably unsatisfied with the results of his efforts. Although the

decade was the high tide of his environmental career, he would continue to pursue

success in old avenues such as water development and forest management while

finding new causes to occupy his attention for many more years.

Despite the setback in the Fifth Circuit, Ned could find several positive aspects to

view the lawsuit as a success. The formation of advocacy groups pushing for Big

Thicket preservation, the national and local media attention granted to the case, and the

emerging awareness of environmental issues from public concern over the Four Notch

all proved invaluable to environmentalists. At the outset of the case, he had

acknowledged the potential benefits of a defeat. In the years following the decision he

began seeing the fulfillment of his prediction. Clear-cutting increasingly drew the ire of

citizens both in Texas and throughout the nation’s forests. Ned continued to pursue

protection efforts against clear-cutting in the National Forests. The Thicket would be the

primary vehicle for his environmental efforts for most of the next two decades. He would

file multiple lawsuits in the ensuing decade that took aim at the practice. In addition to

the benefits to the wider movement, Ned’s experience with the courts helped him to

refine his strategy. While he would continue to stick with the legal system he knew so

well, repeated failures in the appeals process gradually led him to seek alternative

options. As he continued the fight against clear-cutting into the ensuing decade, the effect of this change in approach would begin to bear fruit.

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The primary driving force in Ned’s environmental advocacy of the late 70s was the issue of clear-cutting in the national forests. Ned explained his response to the threat in his advocacy book, Sterile Forest: The Case Against Clearcutting, that he wrote covering his lawsuit to prevent the practice.360 The book itself was another component of his multi-pronged assault on forest management. Through discussions of his options with his informal advisor, Genie, it was determined that a book chronicling his attacks on clear-cutting would be beneficial. Genie contributed to the book in more ways than simply typing for Ned. She also served as an uncredited co-author, distilling

Ned’s eclectic thoughts into an organized, manageable work. She was willing to speak her mind to Ned as they went through the case, arguing correctly that while she thought he could win his case against the Forest Service, changing Congress was a longer shot.361 Ned’s writings, and Genie’s assistance in their creation, were a force multiplier for advancing Texan environmental causes.

The flare up in the Four Notch was the clearest example yet of the changes

Ned’s involvement was bringing to the Texas environmental movement. His decision to file a lawsuit was evidence of an aggressive decision that propelled Texas environmentalism to new heights and importance to national environmental efforts. The case tested the boundaries of newly enacted legislation and provided a template for the dependence on legal maneuver as a primary battleground as a bulwark against unchecked development. His lawsuit was the first to fall in the aftermath of the NFMA, with TCONR’s suit accusing the Forest Service of myriad violations of law in the

360 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 11. 361 Ibid, 174.

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prosecution of their regulatory duties. Clearly, the intention of legislation establishing management practices that tasked regulators simultaneously with overseeing both the long-term preservation of the nation’s forests and ensuring a continuing supply of timber for the lumber mills had been corrupted. Although lost on appeal out of deference to regulatory oversight, the suit was instrumental in furthering Ned’s influence on his fellow environmentalists. He had taken on the federal government, the timber industry, and the

Forest Service and emerged with a temporary victory. The fate of the Four Notch was still undecided, but the saw’s blade had been delayed. Ned would continue to endeavor to maintain it for as long as possible.

Again, fortuitous timing worked in Ned’s favor in the battle for the Four Notch.

The Monongahela decision and passage of the NFMA set the stage for further lawsuits clarifying Forest Service management of the National Forests. His service on the BTA led to foreknowledge of threats to the Four Notch. His successful takeover of the group in the late 1960s placed him in an influential position to gauge the necessity of a lawsuit.

His position was bolstered by the successful adoption of a larger Big Thicket National

Preserve that contained many of the specific geographic carve outs he had called for, proving the benefit his participation could have in Texan environmental endeavors. If he had joined the movement later, many of the factors that facilitated his success would not have been available.

Passion was essential to the Ned’s work to preserve of the Four Notch. The personal cost he described in the run up to the lawsuit, the stress of a trial was very hard on him and his wife, could only be overcome with an abundance of will.362 Forest

362 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 25.

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Service actions emboldened his desire to defend. Courtenay’s status as an employee of the government while serving on the boards of timber interests bothered Ned. After being informed of the potential destruction of the tract, the frustration with Courtenay metastasized into an obsession. Ned’s competitive nature cast the two as opponents with the Four Notch as the prize. This passion was essential to the survival of the area, propelling Ned to file the suit and sustaining him throughout the ordeal of a trial challenging the major financial sector driving the East Texas economy.

Thus, the 1970s were a vital decade for Ned’s career as an environmentalist.

The seeds he had planted in the early days of his environmentalism began to bear fruit as he and the groups he had established played an instrumental part in battles that propelled Texas’s environmental movement to new heights. The environmental decade pulsated with changes to Americans relationship with their natural environment across social, political, and legal fields. These changes also worked to transform Ned into a new breed of environmentalist. His experience with the BTA convinced him that more aggressive approaches could bring success, even to battles that were decades old by the time he joined the fray. His involvement with the Forest Service in the Four Notch led to the recognition that sticking to the same script would allow the status quo to continue. His decision to embark on his lawsuit, despite the strain it placed on his relationship with other environmentalists, preserved the Four Notch and did not bring the end of national wilderness preservation. Navigating the new brand of environmentalism created in the wake of these shifts only strengthened his abilities as an advocate. His work in the Big Thicket and Trinity Canal fights, combined with his penchant for the dramatic and his engaging personality, brought national attention to his

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efforts while broadening his base of support. The legislative and legal battlegrounds were ready made for his background. The shift of the environmental movement to the courts to define interpretation of new legislation and regulations left lawyers with more meaningful roles in the fight. His suits assisted in the formation of a new understanding of the limits of environmental legislation and the potential weak spots in established regulations. As his profile grew and the suits he filed failed to find success, Ned became increasingly exasperated with the slow pace of progress. In contrast with these successes, there were growing cracks between varying levels of environmental organizations. Mainstream groups had increasing doubts about the decisions of grassroots associations. With the environmental decade in the past, he would face a new series of challenges in the confrontation over clear-cutting.

167 CHAPTER 6

NED FRITZ IN THE 80S: NEW FRONTS IN THE FIGHT FOR THE FORESTS

The beginning of the eighties was a period of transition for the ongoing battle over the environment. The previous three decades had seen the movement experience phenomenal growth, but in the ensuing years, political and social transformations brought a new climate for environmental organizations. Following the Presidential election of 1980, a new administration instituted policy that consistently favored free market solutions at the expense of governmental regulations. The shift in the political winds increased the divide between national and local environmentalists as the Reagan administration radically altered the relationship between government and environmental issues. The administration’s approach to environmental policy conflicted with the growing awareness of ecological issues among the population. The appearance of new actors complicated issues between national and local organizations over the growing professionalization of environmental advocacy. Simultaneously, the shrinking pie of federal budgets for areas like regulation and wilderness acquisition fostered simmering rifts between groups on the best approach to take in an increasingly hostile environment. Fissures were deepened by the appearance of more radical environmentalists who were less restrained in their defense of nature. The influence of the concept of social justice, which appealed to marginalized members of society not usually represented by traditional environmental organizations, created an additional new layer of complications. For Ned Fritz, someone who had already proven his willingness to take risks on behalf of his pet causes, finding his way in the political

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minefield these changes fostered in the environmental movement would require a delicate balance.

A new political climate was the start of an altered playing field for environmental activists. Jimmy Carter did not have a perfect environmental record, but his administration had been willing to maintain contact with environmental advocates and had taken their causes into consideration in policy decisions.363 Carter had discovered the difficulties of dealing with the entrenched forces Ned had been battling for decades when he confronted severe negative reaction in response to his attempt to rein in the

Army Corps’ planned water development projects.364 His first reform effort did not go as well as he would have hoped, leading to an extended confrontation with congressmen who were quite fond of the water projects that brought federal dollars home and bore their names.365 Despite Carter’s problem, his attempt was in line with environmental disputes with water improvement proposals. As the calendar dawned on a new administration, they would find a much less amenable occupant in the White House.

The election of Ronald Reagan represented an important landmark in the history of U.S. environmentalism. The administration brought a change in basic assumptions to governmental calculations that held dangers for natural environments.366 When the administration entered the White House, effective environmental regulation was still in its infancy. The Wilderness Act was in its teens, the EPA had just turned ten, and

363 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 168. 364 Paul E. Scheele "President Carter and the Water Projects: A Case Study in Presidential and Congressional Decision-Making," Presidential Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (Fall 1978): 348. 365 Mary Russell and Art Pine, “Carter Warns of Public Works Bill Veto,” Washington Post, June 15, 1978. 366 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 167.

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legislation such as the Clear Air and Water Acts was not much older.367 Up to this point,

the association between Washington and the modern environmental movement, while

not necessarily smooth, had usually been undertaken in good faith. A more hostile

relationship between activists and politicians had not been seen since the initiation of

substantial environmental legislation. The Reagan administration soon set about

establishing a different tone.

New Secretary of the Interior James Watt, who would become the bane of many

environmentalists due to his abrasive nature and ties to less-environmentally friendly

industries, had already threatened the established order.368 From its earliest days, the

administration adopted an aggressive tone towards environmentalists, with Watt tagging

environmentalists as extremists during his confirmation hearings.369 Watt proclaimed

that the administration was going to follow through on their campaign promises to re-

imagine the status of natural resource extraction on the nation’s public lands.370 The conservative rebirth carried with it a business-oriented approach to economic development that saw little use in regulations they considered harmful. Leaders in the

Reagan Administration interpreted their political victory as a mandate to reset the

priorities for natural resource management to one favoring economic growth.371 They

targeted the wilderness system, pushing for allowances that could entail oil and gas

367 Wilderness Act, Statutes at Large 78, sec. 890 (1964). Clean Air Act, Statutes at Large 77, sec. 392 (1963). Clean Water Act, Statutes at Large 86, sec. 816 (1972). 368 “Environmentalists Confer with Watt”, New York Times, May 16, 1981. 369 R. McGreggor Cawley and William Chaloupka, “James Watt and the Environmentalists: A Clash of Ideologies,” Policy Studies Journal 14, no. 2 (Dec. 1985): 244. 370 Nash, Wilderness & the American Mind, 300. 371 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 172.

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exploration on lands protected as federal wildernesses.372 The brinkmanship of the

Reagan Administration rippled throughout the environmental movement, forging

attempts to maintain the established environmental policy system in the face of new

obstacles.

The issues raised by the new political reality were worsened by changes

amongst environmentalists following the ascension of the Reagan-era conservatives.

Watt had opened his tenure by painting his opponents as "a left-wing cult dedicated to

bringing down the type of government I believe in."373 Environmentalists responded in

kind, embracing the benefits of increased hostility from the White House, couching their

efforts as a life and death conflict.374 The substantial concerns of environmentalists led

to a collaboration between the leading representatives from the ten most influential

environmental groups called the Group of Ten.375 Cooperation between

environmentalists and government would no longer be the norm. Antagonism and a

refusal to consider environmental concerns in policymaking threatened to erase the

hard-earned gains of previous decades. Political lines had been drawn. For Ned and

other concerned activists, advancing environmental protection with the levels of

bipartisan support they had seen in the earlier years would prove challenging. The

problem would be compounded by the unintended benefits that resulted from having a

new and identifiable enemy for environmentalists.

372 “Environmentalists Confer with Watt”, New York Times, May 16, 1981. 373 Joshua P. Howe, Behind the Curve: Science and the Politics of Global Warming (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014), 124. 374 Dale Russakoff, “Watt's Adversaries Would Almost Hate To See Him Resign,” Washington Post, Oct 6, 1983. 375 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 173.

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Shifting from a conciliatory and defensive attitude to more direct political attacks

proved a boon for the fundraising that environmental groups depended on for much of their work. Controversy sells, and both the politicians and the environmentalists soon acceded to language depicting head-on confrontations that tapped into the emotions of passionate supporters on their respective sides. Faced with the increasingly strong rhetoric around their key issues, environmentalists responded by starting a petition that garnered over a million signatures calling for Watt’s removal.376 The ‘Dump Watt’

campaign led by the Sierra Club showed the benefits antagonisms could have for

groups, as it saw membership balloon from 183,000 to 245,000 in the year after the

election.377 The Audubon Society saw a ten-fold increase in fundraising efforts following

the switch.378 The new rhetorical climate created a cloud over debates regarding

environmental regulation. Radicalization was both a blessing and a curse for

environmentalists like Ned. While drawing in a new generation of activists brought new

foot soldiers for the movements he looked to lead, adoption of more extreme rhetoric

and strategies could antagonize more traditional support.

Accompanying the new political environment was a growing divide between local

grassroots groups and well-established national organizations. The Group of Ten,

including groups such as the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League, the National Wildlife

Fund, and others had settled on a policy of seeking the extension of existing legislation.379 This decision pursued the promise of small gains at the expense of

376 Charles Fotheringham, Glory Hole: The Elusive Pursuit of Gold, Love And Truth (Pittsburgh: Red Lead Press, 2011), 201. 377 Edward Roby, UPI, “Dump Watt Petitions Go to Congress,” Oct. 18, 1981. 378 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 173. 379 Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 173.

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sacrificing more expansive legislative victories. The modest approach put traditional

organizations in conflict with the goals of newer, more radical environmental activists.

More concerned with local issues and concepts of social justice, grassroots

organizations threatened the delicate balance that had led to significant legislative gains

throughout the 1970s.380 Their aggressive approach also complicated continued efforts

at raising awareness of environmental issues across the wider population, creating

convenient scapegoats for opponents of protection.

The tumult that defined environmentalism in the decade effected Ned as well, forcing him to spend most of his golden years scrambling to maintain momentum in the face of new challenges. He had come a long way in his views and brought Texas’s environmental movement into the modern era, increasing organization, coordination, and effectiveness. Despite these successes, he was forced to return to the scene of previous victories following new threats to the Big Thicket. He responded with the push

for a wilderness preserve, brought a new lawsuit to prevent cutting, and moved to

create a national network aimed at clear-cutting. While the more active approach he had brought to Texas environmentalism sometimes made his path more difficult, the

controversies and disagreements between his desires and those of other groups did not

minimize his appetite.

Ned and the citizens’ organizations he had developed over the previous two

decades occupied an interesting spot in the internal debates over environmental policy.

His relationships with allies in the environmental organizations were sometimes

380 Ibid, 327.

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strained.381 His single-minded approach often conflicted with the goals of larger organizations and sometimes his own as was shown in the Big Thicket fight. Ned was inspirational to many of the younger environmentalists he met in the 1980s who appreciated his relentless attitude.382 Pushing against the status quo brought success, accolades, and occasional rebukes from people who felt his actions endangered settled arrangements. Although the controversial actions caused some strained relationships within the community, the development of his views had come about as a result of constant frustration with the resistance of established power centers in industry and government. The evolution of his own philosophy of environmental protection was a natural process borne of his experiences with the corruption and duplicitous nature of the entrenched elements controlling the levers of the country’s natural resources.

The decade also witnessed the growing divide between his views and the organizations he had collaborated with in the past. Like many of the mainstream groups,

Ned did not hold the new administration in high esteem, describing them in an interview as responsible for attempts to minimize citizen input into environmental decisions.383

Unlike his allies, he was less willing to settle, fixing his mind to build on past success to achieve greater levels of protection. By the 1980s, he had evolved far beyond his conservative instincts from his youth into a committed environmentalist. Politically, Ned was usually a largely single-issue voter and was not fond of either party, explaining that he would work with any politician who wanted to help the environment.384 He was also

381 Edward C. Fritz to Louis Hofferbert, Jan. 11, 1969. 382 Mark Donham, “Long Strange Trip,” Heartbeat, Spring, 2010, 19. 383 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 7 February 1983,” Texas Legacy Project, 1983. 384 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999.

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careful not to alienate any potential allies. Despite his feelings towards both parties and his history of working with politicians on both sides of the aisle, he viewed the conservative rebirth of the 1980s as a threat to environmental success. For Ned, the changing political landscape was simply another in a long line of obstacles that needed to be overcome with greater effort, persistence, and strategic thinking.

Fresh from a series of actions that represented the pinnacle of his environmental career, Ned would find that victory brought both challenges and benefits. Given his successes in previous battles, Ned in the 1980s witnessed increasing reliance on his celebrity in the fight over Texas natural areas. From public and media appearances to fundraisers using his face on T-shirts, he grew to embody statewide environmental advocacy.385 The use of Ned’s persona as a tool for recruitment and fundraising is a testament to his influence in crafting an increasingly modern environmental movement in the state. However, the opportunities that accompanied his success were leavened by the increasingly difficult climate for activists in the period. New attacks on areas he had already fought altered the trajectory of his environmental engagement. Instead of expanding the scope of his efforts, much of his activity during the period would find him treading old ground, continuing his fight for the protection of the forests against new encroachments on the natural resources of Texas.

Most of Ned’s activism in the decade was spent working to establish wilderness areas in the East Texas National Forests, improve Forest Service practices, and nationalize his crusade against clear-cutting. Clear-cutting remained the primary target of his reform effort. He designed a multifaceted approach to confronting the Forest

385 Edward C. Fritz, “Roast Nets $8,000,” Conservation Progress 114 (Oct. 29, 1983): 1.

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Service, continuing to press lawsuits against the bureaucracy and drawing in new

acolytes for his fight. He started Forest Pow Wows with concerned citizens convening in

East Texas to celebrate the national forests. These meetings lead to the establishment

of the first national grassroots movement committed to issues in the national forests.

The organizations he headed mounted a renewed and ultimately successful effort

creating the first wilderness areas in East Texas. He engaged in a long running legal

battle with the Forest Service over efforts to control pests that threatened the health of

the forests. While he found time to devote to several other environmental causes, Ned’s

growing commitment to the forests was evident.

Ned’s work in the forests attracted resistance from many of the same of the

parties that had been a hindrance to forest preservation since the beginnings of his

involvement. The bureaucrats in the Forest Service and their allies in the timber industry

continued to put up a vociferous defense of their prerogatives in the forests. Their

stance was consistently supported by judicial decisions deferring to their judgment over

implementation of congressionally authored regulations, much to his chagrin.386 Their support from the courts had confounded his arguments against clear-cutting in the national forests. Legislative proposals such as NFMA had only broadened Forest

Service authority in the forests, much as he had predicted.387 In order to confront the

Forest Service and stop clear-cutting, he decided to expand his approach to the

problem.

386 Edward C. Fritz, “Broadening Judicial Review Under the National Forest Management Act,” Wisconsin Environmental Law Journal 27 (1996): 30. 387 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 21.

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For years Ned had wanted to marshal support for forest preservation through

awareness campaigns. Therefore, during the 1980s he worked with the Dallas Audubon

Society and the Sierra Club to devise a program for Wilderness Pow Wows that would

bring in groups of citizens for a spiritual and educational retreat in the East Texas

forests. The first of what would become annual Pow Wows was held in the Upland

Island Wilderness area in March of 1980.388 Ned sought to inspire new generations with

his love for the forest. Four hundred attended the first Pow Wow, which enlisted folk

singers, politicians, naturalist authors, and famous storyteller John Henry Faulk who

described the beauty of the forest they were visiting. Ned opened the festivities with a

spiritual dedication that he would repeat at Wilderness events for many years,

Oh Great Spirit of Earth and Sky, Once again we, your children, are returned unto you. We are penitent about the devastation we have committed upon Earth… and the pollution we have spread to the skies. We pledge that we will make all sacrifices necessary to clean up our corruption will share our bounty with all other living creatures that do not threaten our survival. As tokens of our sincerity, we dedicate the finest remaining examples of our natural heritage as wildernesses, never to be abused or befouled, always to be enjoyed and cherished.389

The weekend included nature walks and the sighting of large trees for entry into the

national register, one of his favorite activities.390 Through the foundation of these

wilderness Pow Wows, he worked to craft a deeper connection between activists and

the nature they looked to conserve. Through his innovation and leadership, the Pow

Wows would become an annual tradition for Texas environmentalists, engineering a

ready-made group of concerned citizens for future fights for forest preservation.

388 Edward C. Fritz, Conservation Progress 85 (Jan. 5, 1980): 1. 389 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 51. 390 Edward C. Fritz, “Wilderness Pow Wow at Indian Mounds April 4,” Conservation Progress 94, (Jan. 5, 1981): 1.

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The battle for forest protection never rested. As the earliest Pow Wows were

working to build a stronger coalition to battle on behalf of the forests, Ned continued

looking to expand the acreage protected as wilderness. The Indian Mounds area of East

Texas was a 12,000-acre track of forest within the Sabine National Forest near

Hemphill, Texas.391 The area housed some of the state’s only examples of yellow lady’s

slipper orchids, motivating Ned to fight for the area’s preservation. As it had in the Four

Notch, Forest Service activity in the area early in 1981 sparked his earliest interest in the wilderness. Charged with managing the National Forests, the Forest Service had approved the construction of an oil well in the heart of the forest. Working with the

Sierra Club and other concerned citizens, Ned coordinated with a new group, Save

Indian Mounds, that raised awareness of the plans for the well.392

In July of 1981, Ned and the Sierra Club took their complaints about the designs

for well construction to W.M. Lannan, the new Supervisor of National Forests in Texas,

requesting that the area be classified as a special botanical area due to the proximity of

rare orchids.393 The Supervisor refused the request but agreed to work with the

organizations to undertake “special considerations for protective action” in locations

determined by TCONR and the Sierra Club following a visit in 1981.394 In the ensuing

months, his tune changed. While the environmentalists sought to appeal the denial of a

change in status as a botanical area, the Forest Service permitted the construction of

391 Texas State Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas Online, “Indian Mounds Wilderness Area,” 2010, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/gki02. 392 Edward C. Fritz, “Chief Overrules Appeal of Indian Mounds Sales,” Conservation Progress 94 (Jan. 5, 1981): 5. 393 Edward C. Fritz, “Forest Service Assaults Yellow Lady’s Slipper,” Conservation Progress 103 (April 14, 1982): 3. 394 Edward C. Fritz, “Supervisor Sees Botanical Areas,” Conservation Progress 98 (July 14, 1981): 3.

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the oil wells to go forward.395 By February of 1982, the Forest Supervisor had rescinded his offer of cooperation. His basis for doing so was a belief that the environmentalists had exaggerated the scarcity of the wild plants.396 He explained that “no protection was indicated and no further studies are planned.”397 To Ned, the experience in Indian

Mounds further eroded his trust in the Forest Service while confirming the need for additional wilderness classification in East Texas’s National Forest. His exasperation with the potential loss of the area led him to include Indian Mounds in the Texas

Wilderness bill he was working on with Congressman John Bryant, a process he would begin in earnest in the upcoming years.

Confrontations over wilderness classification continued to dominate much of his activism in the early 80s. His next battle was over a legislative proposal from

Washington Democratic Congressman Thomas Foley. Foley crafted a Congressional proposal for a major adjustment in wilderness classification.398 The legislation would remove all areas under consideration for wilderness that had not been granted that classification from protected status. The proposed law, H.R. 6542, known as the

Wilderness Protection Act of 1982, was designed to open thousands of acres to drilling through oil and gas leases.399 If successful, the bill would be a severe retraction of much of the progress gained in earlier environmental efforts.

395 Edward C. Fritz, “Oil Leaks in Indian Mounds,” Conservation Progress 110 (March 31, 1983): 3. 396 Edward C. Fritz, “If It Has a Name it Must be Common,” Conservation Progress 104 (June 15, 1982): 5. 397 Ibid, 4. 398 Congress, House, Wilderness Protection Act of 1982, 97th Congress H.R. 6542, (1981-1982). 399 Congress, House, Wilderness Protection Act of 1982, 97th Congress H.R. 6542, (1981-1982).

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Ned and other environmentalists had another term for the bill, naming it the

“Timber Industry Nationwide Anti-Wilderness Bill”. He lobbied against the bill, pointing to

the damage the change in status would have in Texas’s National Forests.400 In Texas alone, thousands of acres that had been reserved for future study or protected as potential wilderness would be susceptible to harvesting. Although the Foley amendment was defeated, the legislation was a signpost of the shift in the debate from making gains to avoiding losses.401 Foley’s attempt was an example of the new tone in Washington.

Gone were the heady days of substantial environmental legislation. The Reagan

administration had successfully moved the line and placed the environmentalists on the

defensive. For environmentalists who were intent on continued progress, it was an

ominous sign of the new climate for environmental activism. However, despite the

sinister undertones of Foley’s amendment, progress could still be made in conserving

lands from the push for resource extraction. Ned’s later work on establishing protected

wilderness would prove his ability to thread that needle.

Establishing the First Texas Wilderness

Forest Service activities in East Texas created the conditions necessary for the

push for the establishment of the first wilderness areas in Texas forests. A systematic

classification known as the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, or RARE II, had led

to the temporary protection of 62 million acres within the National Forest system.402 The

RARE process entailed recommendations of specific areas by the public followed by an

400 Edward C. Fritz, “Foley Puts Squeeze,” Conservation Progress 87 (Jan. 5, 1980): 5. 401 Edward C. Fritz, “Foley Tries Second Bill,” Conservation Progress 89 (April 9, 1980): 4. 402 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Final Environmental Statement: Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan. 1979), i.

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investigation into how to categorize the particular section of forest.403 The areas were

classified as wilderness, non-wilderness or multiple-use, or set aside for further study.

Following his Four Notch suit, Ned remained active in search for preservation of East

Texas Wilderness. As the recommendations began to encapsulate new areas for

various stages of preservation, the opportunity to expand the amount of protected

acreage in Texas proved tempting for Ned. He would make establishing the first

wilderness preservation in the Texas National Forests his next goal for Texas environmentalism.

The easiest solution to ongoing threats to specific areas was the enactment of counterbalancing legislation creating protected wilderness. Texas had no wilderness areas. Wilderness preservation would circumvent any attempts to by-pass the NFMA and keep the areas under their current classification. Although the area’s vast experience with clearcuts had altered their natural state, a common prerequisite for wilderness classification, Ned argued that exposure to harvesting was a poor reason to deny further protection.404 The original request was for 65,000-acres.405 The proposal

would only encapsulate ½ percent of East Texas timberland.406 Despite the meager

request, Ned had learned how difficult preservation could be through his work in the Big

Thicket. For several reasons, the creation of new wilderness areas was not a smooth

process.

403 Ibid, i. 404 Edward C. Fritz, “Basic Facts on East Texas Wilderness Proposal,” Conservation Progress 112 (June 23, 1983): 5. 405 Ibid, 5. 406 Ibid, 5.

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In 1983, Democratic Congressman John Bryant became the sponsor of Texas

wilderness proposals, agreeing to shepherd the citizen’s recommendations through the

legislative process.407 He struggled to gain traction in his early attempts to enlist added

sponsors. By 1983, Representative Charlie Wilson had ascended to a more powerful

role in Congress. The areas TCNOR wanted to preserve fell mostly within the

boundaries of his district, which contained eight of the ten areas proposed for

protection. Tradition held that such a proposal would hold little chance of success

without his approval.408 The quarrel that developed between Congressman Bryant and

“Timber Charlie” Wilson could have condemned the passage of wilderness legislation.

An unexpected ally during the Big Thicket preservation effort, Wilson’s feathers were

ruffled by what he felt was Bryant’s incursion into his territory.409 Wilson’s long-

established ties to the timber industry might have been partially responsible for his

reticence to accept the original boundaries proposed by Bryant and Ned. Bridging the

divide would go a long way to ensuring the bill’s passage.

Ned created a list of responses about the wilderness proposal to counteract

many of the potential issues that could delay its passage. Competing with a variety of

stakeholders called for satisfying the divergent concerns of multiple parties. Differences

had to be reconciled between the Forest Service’s desires, timber interests, and

advocates of preservation. Many wilderness proposals suffered from disagreements

over mineral rights, but the existence of leases for all the proposed acres in the East

407 Edward C. Fritz, “John Bryant Bill Would Save Texas Wilderness,” Conservation Progress 113 (Sept. 6, 1983): 1. 408 Edward C. Fritz, “Wilderness Bill Surmounts Big Hurdle, Faces Others,” Conservation Progress 117 (March 14, 1984): 3. 409 Molly Ivins, Dallas Times Herald, August 11, 1983.

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Texas bill removed that issue.410 Ned focused on the absence of additional taxes due to the fact that most of the lands proposed for wilderness already were federal holdings.

He was concerned that the Forest Service requests for unbroken acreage could complicate matters, but a solution was found through purchases of small pockets of privately held lands.411 Congressional passage required acquiescence of local members and lobbying for additional support. Ned worked to lobby Congress, gather newspaper endorsements throughout East Texas, enlist the support of other environmental organizations, and publicize the importance of the legislation.412

The land purchases needed to maintain continuous borders for the new wilderness preserve led to a new organization through which Ned and Genie worked towards preservation of Texas wilderness. Each of the purchases had to be negotiated, an arduous process that delayed the establishment of the wilderness area. The purchasing process led to Ned and Genie Fritz’s 1982 foundation of the Texas Land

Conservancy; an organization that grew out of the Natural Area Preservation

Association that continued to purchase land for preservation purposes throughout

Texas.413 Through Ned and Genie, TLC became Texas’s largest land trust not affiliated with a national organization, eventually protecting over 85,000 acres.414 The process of creating protected wilderness in East Texas was another important area in which the

Fritz’s were able to contribute their combined talents.

410 Fritz, “Basic Facts on East Texas Wilderness Proposal,” 5. 411 Fritz, “Basic Facts on East Texas Wilderness Proposal,” 5. 412 Fritz, “John Bryant Bill Would Save Texan Wilderness,” 1. 413 “Ned Fritz Society,” Texas Land Conservancy, https://texaslandconservancy.org/ned-fritz-society/. 414 Robert Wilonsky, “Dallas Trail Renamed for Ned and Genie Fritz, Who Helped Save the Great Trinity Forest,” Dallas Morning News, Jun. 12, 2019.

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As was the case in the Big Thicket preserve, setting the boundaries was a crucial step to wilderness formation. The Secretary of Agriculture recommended around 10,000 acres; Ned had requested closer to 65,000 acres spread throughout the East Texas national forests.415 The areas that citizens recommended for protection tended to be those with the oldest trees.416 As they had in the Big Thicket fight, timber interests also had a say in determining the size of the wilderness preserve. The 65,000-acre space shrunk to around 34,000 acres before passage, in part due to their influence.417 In

March of 1984, the two Congressmen were able to agree to a compromise that settled on the smaller proposed area.418 Bryant attributed Wilson’s change of heart to the pressure from grassroots organizations in his home district. While the smaller proposal required sacrifice from both parties, the switch greased the wheels for the act’s passage.

The Texas Wilderness Act of 1984 created the first protected wilderness areas in

Texas. Preserving 34,000 acres in East Texas, the act was the culmination of two decades of activism in the region’s forests. Sponsored by Congressman John Bryant and supported by Texas Senators Lloyd Bentsen and John Tower, the bill created five new areas that were added to the National Wilderness Preservation System.419 The areas included parts of the Angelina, Davy Crockett, Sabine and Sam Houston national

415 Fritz, “Basic Facts on East Texas Wilderness Proposal,” 5. 416 Texas State Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas Online, “Wilderness Areas,” 2010. 417 Texas State Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas Online, “Wilderness Areas,” 2010. 418 Edward C. Fritz, “Wilderness Bill Surmounts Big Hurdle, Faces Others,” Conservation Progress 117 (March 14, 1981): 3. 419 Texas Wilderness Act of 1984, Statutes at Large 98-574, sec. 3051 (1984).

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forests.420 The legislation also made arrangements for the purchase of portions of the

Indian Mounds, Upland Island, and Little Lake Creek wildernesses that timber interests already controlled.421 The passage of the Texas Wilderness Act revealed the contributions Ned had brought to Texas environmentalism more clearly than many other examples of his work. Created through localized pressure on political and business interests, the act’s passage was the tangible result of decades of groundwork he had laid. Successful establishment of the five East Texas Wilderness areas was a crowning achievement for Ned and his colleagues in the state. Ned’s collaboration with

Congressman Bryant led him to a new area of environmental concern that stretched the bounds of many of the relationships he had developed over the years.

Ned Fritz’s Radical Interlude: Population and Immigration Control

As Ned evolved in his views on environmental issues to adapt to changing circumstances, he returned to one of his original positions on the steps necessary to preserve the planet: overpopulation. He had first addressed the issue in his 1960s presentation in New Orleans concerning water supply issues. His later focus on population issues and immigration caused consternation within his political circle. Many environmentalists were as committed to humanitarian crises as they were to the natural environment. Ned’s solution of limiting population growth, while a logical step in his progression, threatened the alliances he had so carefully created. Throwing the support of the members of his organizations behind issues they disagreed with could harm future work, alienating allies he was dependent upon for success. Through his

420 Texas Wilderness Act of 1984, Statutes at Large 98-574, sec. 3051 (1984). 421 Ibid.

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association with making population an environmental issue, Ned would veer into potentially dangerous territory for his role as a leader of Texan environmentalists.

Fortunately for Ned, the resistance of some members and the continued fight for forest preservation would eventually require enough of his attention that population issues receded into the background.

Population had been a concern to Ned since some of his earliest environmental work over water issues in the 1960s.422 He had long viewed population control as a necessary outgrowth of awareness of long-term environmental decay.423 In his attempt to solve the crisis of dwindling water supplies, Ned had proposed radical solutions like mass relocation of population to sources of water, and he dabbled with population control. Most of these suggestions were limited to less public functions. He wanted to mitigate the need for continued expansion of fresh water supplies.424 To his thinking, preserving the environment required substantial sacrifices, and his logical mind found population control a solution to the growth and development that continued to threaten natural spaces. Even though he viewed lower population as an eventual necessity, he was politically perceptive enough to understand the difficulties such solutions would entail for environmentalists. Publicly suggesting something as radical as limiting birth rates or sterilization would have been too extreme for him early in his career. As the losses for environmentalists piled up, his willingness to advocate solutions that were more radical would grow out of his frustration with the status quo.

422 Edward C. Fritz, “Some Solutions to National Water Resource Problems,” New Orleans, Louisiana, 9 Oct. 1969. 423 Ibid. 424 Fritz, “Solutions to Water Resource Problems.”

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Although changing attitudes helped move him to a more radical strain of environmentalism, the issues he focused on created strained relationships with the allies he had worked to cultivate. One example was his growing infatuation with population control. He spawned a great deal of controversy with an essay he published in a 1984 edition of TCNR’s newsletter.425 Titled “Should You Help Feed Starving

Ethiopians?” the article in Conservation Progress concerned the famine crisis in

Ethiopia. Blaming the famine on unsound environmental practices, Ned cautioned environmentally conscious citizens to consider the potential effect of food donations on overpopulation.426 He cited a lack of birth control, failures to conserve resources, and general greed as causes of the famine. He was concerned that donations to feed the hungry could interfere with teaching better environmental practices that could prevent future famines. He viewed education as more important than relief efforts that could allow the problem to continue. Ned recommended that followers send donations to organizations focused on population issues instead of alleviating the famine.427 Out of a concern for preserving natural resources, he had talked himself into an untenable position, and it did not take long for his constituents to voice their displeasure with his stance.

Ned’s essay raised criticism from members of TCONR. Subscribers to the newsletter wrote back voicing their displeasure at the heartlessness evident in his view of the crisis in Africa. In their letters, members complained that Fritz’s position was

425 Edward C. Fritz, “Should You Help Feed Starving Ethiopians,” Conservation Progress 124, Feb. 15, 1984, 6. 426 Ibid, 6. 427 Fritz, “Should You Help Feed Starving Ethiopians,” 6.

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borne out of ignorance of the situation on the ground. One writer, Tom Reidy, explained that the think tanks he recommended for donations were not equipped to address the problems in the third world.428 He wrote that his experience in the Peace Corps had left him convinced that there was little value in contributions to the Population Institute as

Ned had suggested. Another member, Tom Goyers, criticized the callousness towards the people in Africa, claiming that our first duty as activists was to “eliminate human suffering.”429 Ned’s stance towards overpopulation issues exposed him to greater levels of controversy as it conflicted with the majority position of the primarily liberal membership of TCONR. As he expanded his involvement with overpopulation into immigration issues, the contrast between him and many of his members would only grow.

Ned’s growing attention to population issues led to involvement in immigration debates over two pieces of legislation that worked their way through Congress in the

1980s. Immigration became a hot button political topic during the decade, spawning policy shifts such as the Immigration Control and Reform Act, Supreme Court cases, and eventually amnesty.430 Immigration was a contentious issue that stirred deep feelings on all sides of the debate, and Ned’s involvement entangled him in debates that helped push him to positions that were more radical and caused a divide with other environmentalists. Members of the TCONR board were among those opposed to his views on immigration. As Fritz became more involved with the political debate over

428 Tom Reidy to Edward C. Fritz and TCNR, Feb. 26, 1985. 429 Tom Goyers to Edward C. Fritz, March 11, 1985. 430 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-603, 99 Stat. 1200 (1986).

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potential legislation related to immigration, he would have to separate his views from

those of TCONR as a whole.

The first piece of immigration legislation Ned took an interest in was the Moakley-

DeConcini bill. The bill attempted to manage the refugee crisis caused by civil conflicts

in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In the latter nation, human rights violations by both the

Sandinista rebels and the American-supported Contras had led to over 60,000 civilian

deaths.431 By 1987, over 20 percent of Nicaragua’s population had become refugees to

the United States.432 As immigration reform became an important political litmus test,

efforts to carve out special exemptions for refugees from conflicts the nation had helped

initiate became a contentious political football. The Reagan administration held that the

refugees were here only to improve their economic situation and were not legitimate

asylum seekers.433 Ned echoed these arguments and claimed that the bill was needed

to “hold the line” against continued population growth.434 Advocates of loosening

restrictions on the flood of refugees believed that the rules for asylum seekers would

provide protection. The Moakley-DeConcini bill, first introduced in 1983, intended to

provide safety to the 250,000 Salvadoran refugees.435 Protections similar to those

offered in the legislation already existed for asylum seekers from many other nations.

As the legislation worked its way through Congress, the bill grew to grant 525,000 to

431 Daniel Beegan, “Moakley, DeConcini Optimistic Congress Will Pass Refugee Bill,” AP News, Jan. 21, 1987. 432 Kathy Alfred, “Effects of U.S. and Canadian Policies on Latin American Refugees,” Refuge: Canada’s Periodical on Refugees 7 no. 1, September 1987, 3. 433 Alfred, “Effects of U.S. and Canadian Policies on Latin American Refugees,” 3. 434 Edward C. Fritz, “Salvador Engenders Population Debate,” Conservation Progress 131, Jan. 15, 1986. 435 L. McMahon, “The Moakley-DeConcini Bill,” Refuge: Canada’s Periodical on Refugees, 7 no. 1, Sept. 1987, 4.

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900,000 refugees the right to stay for an additional two years.436 Ned’s dogged approach to pursuing changes and his attempt to speak for allies in the environmental movement on an issue many disagreed with caused friction within TCONR.

Some members of TCONR were very upset with what they viewed as his attempt to take an anti-immigration stance on the proposed legislation under the group’s banner.437 TCONR’s board was wary of fully adopting Ned’s positions on the proposed legislation. The group’s response was to adopt a bit of a middle ground that sought to satisfy the concerns of both Ned and the wider membership.438 Ned skirted the line with

TCONR in the response to the proposed bill to manage the refugee crisis stemming from Central America. He tried to drum up opposition to the bill amongst the rest of

TCONR’s board, but the reticence of four board members led the group to decide on a neutral policy towards the legislation.439 Despite the pressure to provide relief to the refugees, the Moakley-DeConcini bill remained stuck in Congress for most of the decade. Congressional disagreements could not be reconciled.440 Nevertheless, interest in immigration remained high. The administration soon sought a new round of legislative reforms that Ned again viewed as a potential solution to population issues in Texas.

Predictably, Ned staked out a controversial position over the central immigration bill of the 1980s, the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Congressman Bryant helped to shepherd the legislation through Congress, Consisting of restrictions aimed at

436 Edward C. Fritz, “Salvador Engenders Population Debate.” 437 Ibid. 438 Edward C. Fritz to Henry Drake, May 12, 1986. 439 Edward C. Fritz to Henry Drake, May 12, 1986. 440 McMahon, “The Moakley-DeConcini Bill,” 5.

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employers who hired illegal aliens and amnesty for immigrants who could prove they

had arrived before 1982, the act was an attempt at a holistic reform that found a

compromise between a number of diverging political factions to manage immigration

policy.441 As it had with the Moakley-DeConcini bill, Ned’s guiding influence on TCONR policy towards immigration was opposed by members who were not in favor of reform.

Support for immigration reform was still unpopular with much of the TCONR’s

membership. They viewed the new legislation as xenophobic and discriminatory

towards Mexican Americans.442 Barging ahead, Ned pressed a number of interventions

designed to curtail population including the creation of a population platform that

explicitly came out against immigration, the courting of support from think tanks devoted

to population control, and his support of immigration reform legislation.443 Congressman

Bryant reached out with thanks for Ned’s support of the legislation following its

passage.444 However, Ned’s increasing radicalization threatened the cooperation he

sought amongst his fellow environmentalists. If he continued to involve his organization in partisan showdowns, he could potentially alienate the allies he needed for effective environmentalism. For the first time in his career, the accusations of radicalism he had been plagued with since his earliest days as a conservationist threatened to harm his

effectiveness. Fortunately for Fritz and other Texas environmentalists, he soon returned

his focus to the forests he had worked for so long to protect. While population issues

continued to be a theme of his own views regarding the environment, it seems that he

441 Robert Pear, “President Signs Landmark Bill on Immigration,” New York Times, Nov. 7, 1986. A12. 442 Henry Drake to TCNR, Nov. 2, 1986. 443 Edward C. Fritz to Dr. M. Rupert Cutler, Executive Director, Population-Environment Balance, Nov. 17, 1986. 444 John Bryant to Ned and Eugenia Fritz, Nov. 11, 1986.

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was able to reign in his baser impulses to maintain relationships with his fellow

environmentalists. As he returned to the attempt to reform the Forest Service, he would

need all the support he could muster.

Pine Beetles and Woodpeckers: Escalation in the Fight over East Texas Forests

The East Texas Wilderness bill was not the final salvo in the battle over Texas

forests. While removing wilderness following its preservation was much more difficult

after classification, there were some paths to continuing timber harvesting that could

again threaten the forest. The most important one for the state would be in the form of

the Forest Service’s mandate to manage the national forests against all threats. When

Southern Pine Beetles, or SPB, began appearing in the Four Notch soon after the

establishment of the wildernesses, the ongoing danger of this mandate would be

realized.

Controversy over the protected areas was still prevalent.445 The Forest Service continued to propose new cuts in lands Ned considered full of wilderness potential such as Indian Mounds.446 Although less than one percent of Texas forests had been set

aside as wilderness, the timber interests still hungered for more to cut. In another sign

of the shaky ground for environmentalists in East Texas, a report on the timber industry

maintained that the national forests, particularly in the Southern United States, would

need to continue to supply the bulk of the nation’s needed lumber.447 Despite his years

445 Dave Foreman, “Earth First!,” The Progressive 45, no. 10 (Oct. 1981): 39. 446 Edward C. Fritz, “The New Battle for Indian Mounds,” Conservation Progress 92 (Sept. 4, 1980): 3. 447 Fritz, “Will East Texas Become the Sawmill of the Nation,” 6.

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of work, when the forests came under threat from a new enemy in the form of the SPB,

Ned would find that mounting a defense had not gotten any easier.

The onset of the SPB outbreak led Ned on a roundabout path back to his

ornithological roots. Embarking on another effort that held echoes of his previous work,

the battle over control of SPB in East Texas challenged environmentalists and those in

charge of managing the forests. The appearance of the SPB pitted the desire to

preserve trees against the potential destruction by the pests. Methods to control the

beetles entailed more cutting to create a protective barrier around uninfected trees.448

With the Four Notch and the newly established Texas Wilderness Areas in the bug’s

path, planned cuts threatened to erase the protections Ned had worked so hard to

reach. The conflict held dangerous prospects for trees and eventually for the protection

of red-cockaded woodpecker habitats that were faced with destruction from control of

the beetles. The inclusion of the birds’ impending doom in Sam Houston National Forest

synthesized his interest in land preservation for bird habitats with the fight against clear- cuts. The lawsuit over the SPB would serve as a turning point for Ned, leading him to expand his fight for protection and gaining wider recognition as a voice for environmentalism issues.

The fight over controlling the outbreak of SPB in East Texas pitted a range of powerful industries, influential legislators, environmentalists, and Mother Nature against one another for control of the forest. Further complexity was added to attempts to control the SPB by the presence of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker or RCW.

448 Stephen R. Clarke, John J. Riggins, and Frederick M. Stephen, “Forest Management and Southern Pine Beetle Outbreaks: A Historical Perspective,” Forest Science 62, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 166.

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Knowledge of the bird’s residence in East Texas was not new, but threats to their existence had intensified since the original establishment of the Big Thicket Preserve.449

Control efforts held the potential to doom the species. The issue also held wider implications for the rest of the nation’s forests. Ned’s insistence on involving as much media attention as possible to create a groundswell for reforming the Forest Service raised the stakes in the forests for both sides. For Ned, his actions in his continued push to protect the area would hold substantial ramifications for his status within Texan and national environmental circles.

The onslaught of the SPB created unique challenges for maintaining the forests.

A seasonal insect that can destroy forestlands rapidly, the bugs’ return created an intense scene for environmental conflict. The bugs had first appeared in an aerial survey of Indian Mounds in July of 1982.450 The survey was followed by a ground search that discovered more “spots”, or areas infected by the beetles. At issue was the effect of Forest Service control efforts on the infected trees. As usual, the bureaucratic solution was extensive cuts that disregarded protection agreements, national forest management regulations, and the results of previous suits from TCONR and the Sierra

Club.451 Ned’s original reaction to plans to control the SPB outbreak was suspicion.

Fresh off the Forest Service attempt to allow oil wells in Indian Mounds, Ned viewed concern over the bugs as the next excuse for exploitation.452 SPB outbreaks were

449 Brent Ortego, Richard Conner, and Craig Rudolph, “Status of the Red-cockaded Woodpecker in Texas, 1985-1987,” Bulletin of the Texas Ornithological Society 21, no.1-2 (1988): 23. 450 Edward C. Fritz, “Pine Beetles to the Rescue,” Conservation Progress, 105 (July 22, 1982): 3. 451 Edward C. Fritz, “Beetles in the Wilderness: An Up to Date Summary,” Conservation Progress 124 (Feb. 15, 1984): 4. 452 Fritz, “Pine Beetles to the Rescue,” 3.

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cyclical, but the intensity of environmental efforts in East Texas led to acrimonious accusations of blame on both sides. Ned attributed the onset of the infestations to damage to bark from clear-cuts, claiming that salvage operations aimed at controlling the outbreaks only exacerbated the problem by fostering the insects spread.453 As events unfolded in the forests, the Forest Service would lay the blame for the intensity of the invasion on Ned himself.

The SPB is as popular among foresters as fires. The invasive, destructive species can wreak severe havoc among the pine forests they latch onto.454 Classified as an eruptive pest, outbreaks of the beetles can destroy vast swaths of timber. Spread by the females of the species, pheromones attract large numbers of both male and female beetles.455 As the population density of the beetle expands, the destructive effects on host trees see a corresponding increase. High density forests, such as the pine plantations planted by the Forest Service, are the most susceptible hosts for the

SPB.456 The higher density allows the pests to expand their reach and increase the speed of their destruction. The infestations are especially disastrous to the loblolly and shortleaf pine trees that made up most Texas forests in the Sam Houston National

Forest in the early 1980s. With the appearance of the SPB in Texas, the stage was set for a confrontation between environmentalists working to stop clear-cutting and the federal bureaucracy tasked with managing the forests.

453 Fritz, “An Up to Date Summary,” 4. 454 Clarke, et al., “Forest Management and Southern Pine Beetle Outbreaks,” 166. 455 T.D. Paine, K.F. Raffa, and T.C. Harrington, “Interactions Among Scolytid Bark Beetles, Their Associated Fungi, and Live Host Conifers,” Annual Review of Entomology 42 (1997): 179. 456 Fritz, Clearcutting: A Crime Against Nature, 82.

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To the Forest Service, the scope and size of damage from SPB infestations demanded an intensive program to remove the host spots and prevent future incursions. Their appearance in 1982 was hardly a surprise to the regulators. Fully aware of the potential damage that can accompany the appearance of beetles, the

National Forest Service had prepared an eradication plan designed to destroy beetle infestations and prevent their spread.457 The approach taken was known as mechanical control, a system that updated previous reliance on insecticide use that had fallen out of favor by the early 1970s.458 They considered their methods necessary despite their own previous assertions that “there is no proven effective method of controlling the dread

Southern Pine Beetle.”459 Mechanical control instead implemented strategic cuts of salvage trees infected with spots of SPB. There were two types of cuts that could be used.460 The cut and remove strategy entailed the cutting and removal of all brood trees plus the destruction of a wide swath of surrounding forests. The cut and leave approach is similar except that the destroyed trees are left on-site after the cuts. Neither choice held much appeal to environmentalists fighting to preserve the forests.

Obviously, the Forest Service’s plan to confront the beetle infestations in the

Sam Houston National Forest drew Ned’s attention. The cutting used in controlling the beetle would bring the same destruction as the clear-cutting he had worked so hard to

457 Ronald Billings, “Mechanical Control of Southern Beetle Infestations,” in Southern Pine Beetle II, eds. R. N. Coulson and Kier Klepzig (Asheville, NC: U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, Southern Research Station, 2011), 399. 458 Ibid, 399. 459 Fritz, “Beetles in the Wilderness: An Up to Date Summary,” 3. 460 Ibid, 3.

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prevent. The Forest Service cuts in the 6,200-acre Four Notch area frustrated Ned.461 In

the outbreak’s peak of 1983-1984, they ramped up their cuts to 30 million board feet of

timber. Despite the extensive cuts, spots of the insects continued to spread. The fifty- four spots in wilderness areas in 1983 expanded to eighty-nine by 1984. In the same year, there were over 700 infected areas throughout the Texas National Forests.462 With the Forest Service prepared to continue their cuts in the Texas Wilderness Areas in an effort to control the beetles, TCNOR filed for an injunction.463 Working with the

Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club, their suit asked the court to halt all timber

cutting in the Texas Wilderness Areas. The original complaint held similarities to older

TCONR litigation, again analyzing the failure to include Environmental Impact

Statements related to specific locations.464 The Texas Wilderness Act of 1984 had

seemed to ensure that the selected areas would be preserved. Challenging the Forest

Service interpretation of the NFMA, Ned argued that the decision to use cuts to control

the beetles violated their own regulations. The growth of the SPB populations led the

Forest Service to adopt policies for eradication that entailed great damage to the

surrounding forests.

Ned’s first goal was to convince a judge to grant an injunction against future cuts

while the case worked its way through the courts. There were three standards for

earning a preliminary injunction that would stop the Forest Service until the full case

could be decided; the likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and balancing the losses

461 Fritz, “Beetles in the Wilderness: An Up to Date Summary,” 3. 462 Fritz, “Beetles in the Wilderness: An Up to Date Summary,” 3. 463 Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985). 464 Ibid, 136.

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between the potential damage with or without an injunction. TCONR cited three

previous cases that had found Environmental Assessments were not enough to remove

the requirement for an EIS.465 The only major change from the time of the 1983

assessment was the shift in classification from RARE areas to wilderness areas. Both

sides met the necessary standard for irreparable harm. The loss of trees from either the

beetle infestations or the attempts to remove them both held the potential to destroy a

good portion of the forests. TCONR raised issues with the scientific backing of the

Forest Service’s control methods, arguing that their technique of spot cutting near areas

the beetles were found was unproven.466

The court had an arduous task in trying to balance which side would suffer more

from the injunction. Either solution entailed the loss of trees. The decision came down in

June of 1985. The judge determined that none of the cases TCONR cited was

comparable to the situation in Texas since the assessments had specifically examined

eradication efforts for the beetles. In his judgement on the request for injunctive relief,

Judge William Steger found TCONR’s case for preliminary relief lacking.467 In refusing

the injunction, Judge Steger concluded that it would be more risky to cease all control

efforts despite the absence of scientific proof of their usefulness.468 Despite his refusal to stop the cutting completely, Steger did attempt to rein in some harvesting. The judgment denied TCONR’s motion for an injunction but did agree with some of their

465 Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985), 136. 466 Fritz, “Beetles: An Up to Date Summary,” 3. 467 Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985), 140. 466 Ibid, 141.

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criticisms of Forest Service actions.469 He admonished the Forest Service for their

indiscriminate overreliance on clear-cuts, requiring that “All cutting of hardwood trees

shall cease except where absolutely essential to control operations. The presumption is

now against the cutting of any hardwood trees, and the government shall bear the

burden of justifying any hardwood cutting that is done.”470 Although the

environmentalists failed to stop the cutting completely, the judge’s order left some hope

that they might find relief from the court in their battle to reform the Forest Service.

The Texas Attorney General, Jim Mattox, also interceded to stop cutting as a

method of control of the beetles. In 1986, he filed suit alleging that the Forest Service

had violated the National Environmental Policy Act in their refusal to produce an EIS

specific to their proposed cut of the Four Notch.471 In a decision that covered much of

the same ground as his attempt at an injunction, the Fifth Circuit again found the

Environmental Assessment and overall Environmental Impact Statement to be

acceptable.472 The court determined that the planned overhaul of the Four Notch did not

represent a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment,” that was required to necessitate a new EIS.473 The AG’s office was

unhappy with the judge’s decision, arguing that the absence of the EIS was evidence of

a lack of planning on behalf of the Forest Service.474 Even with the help of the state government, the Four Notch seemed doomed to destruction.

469 Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tex. 1985), 140. 470 Ibid, 140. 471 Texas v. United States Forest Service, 805 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1986). 472 Texas v. United States Forest Service, 805 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1986). 473 Ibid, 817. 474 David Hanners, “Judge Won’t Halt Forest Clear-Cutting,” Dallas Morning News, Nov. 19, 1986.

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Losing the fight for the injunction threatened to undermine the gains Ned had earned through his years of work in preservation. The SPB control efforts continued unabated in the recently established wilderness areas. If, as he thought, the Forest

Service was there in part out of spite for his success in establishing wilderness areas, they had not yet drawn their fill of blood.475 While the appeals process worked its way through the courts, fate intervened and opened a new angle that offered a chance for the goal of forest preservation to be realized. A report on the status of red-cockaded woodpeckers produced by the Forest Service concluded that the colonies were in a steady decline over the previous five years.476 Scientists from the Southern Forest

Experiment Station in Nacogdoches, Texas, chronicled the decline.477 In three of the four national forests in Texas, the declines measured close to 50 percent.478 Classified as an Endangered Species in 1970, the RCW was eligible for legal protections that the rest of the national forests did not qualify for. With the Forest Service’s own report documenting the damage to protected wildlife, Ned had an opening that improved his prospects for success.

Controlling the emergence of SPB populations in the Four Notch was complicated by the existence of red-cockaded woodpecker colonies. RCWs were the only species of North American woodpeckers that had found a way to live without the

475 Wolf, “Fritz vs the Feds,” 66. 476 Ortego et al., “Status of the Red-cockaded Woodpecker in Texas, 1985-1987,” 23. 477 Ibid, 22. 478 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 74.

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decaying hardwood trees most woodpeckers used as a habitat.479 Instead, the RCW’s

had adapted to living pines in the Southern forests.480 Woodpecker populations in living

pines were already severely reduced by deforestation. Although unclear on the

implications of harvesting, the authors of the Forest Service study concluded that “the

decline of the woodpecker during a period when clear-cutting is the usual management

method does not speak well of its effect on red-cockaded woodpeckers.”481 With few

available home sites, the population density of the RCW was in continual decline.482 If

the few remaining colonies were further reduced by the control of the pine beetles, the

species could face extinction.

The struggle of RCW populations was worsened by the rotation cycle used by

the Forest Service in their management of the forests. Maintaining trees on the proper

timeline for management of the woodpecker colonies created ready-made home sites

for the SPB. Clear-cuts called for a rotation calendar to cut trees, but the intervals

between cuts could span decades while the timber industry waited for the trees to

mature.483 This left a shortage of old-growth forests, with trees at least sixty years old, in

which the woodpeckers could nest. For the RCW that relied upon the trees for a home,

shortages of well-aged trees could be devastating.484 Scientists consider the RCW to be

479 Richard N. Conner et al., “The Red-Cockaded Woodpecker’s Role in the Southern Pine Ecosystem, Population Trends and Relationships with Southern Pine Beetles,” The Texas Journal of Science 49 (1997): 139. 480 Ibid, 139. 481 Richard N. Conner and Kathleen O’Halloran, “Cavity-Tree Selection by Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers as Related to Growth Dynamics of Southern Pines,” The Wilson Bulletin 99, no.3 (1987): 409. 482 Conner et al., “Red Cockaded Woodpecker’s Role,” 143. 483 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1265. 484 Conner, et al., 1997, 139.

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a keystone species, responsible for creating cavities that will eventually be home to a number of other animals, including squirrels, foxes, and owls.485 Due to their importance in creating a hospitable environment for other species, RCW’s failure to thrive can easily limit the diversity of a forest habitat and spread the damage from the absence of one small part of the ecosystem to other wildlife. The effects of control for the beetles on the wider ecosystem developed into a vital component of Ned’s case against the Forest

Service. With so many species in danger, Ned’s defense of the RCW’s reflected more than just his long love affair with birds. His lawsuit represented a clear example of his philosophical desire for defense of the nonhuman world. The RCW would come to define much of his environmental career and played a role in the perception of Ned as a bulwark for those unable to defend themselves against the arrayed forces of development.

The presence of the woodpeckers allowed the amending of Ned’s complaint. He added the Endangered Species Act to the legislation under which he filed for an injunction to stop any added cutting for the purposes of beetle control in July of 1987.486

Ned accused the Forest Service of cutting and poisoning trees in the wilderness areas of Texas. Buffering his case, the existence of the colonies encouraged support from mainstream environmental organizations, allowing the Sierra Club and Wilderness

Society to join his suit.487 The threats to the woodpeckers created a symbol that environmentalists were able to point to as an exemplar of the damage going on in the national forests. The bird’s addition to the suit created a firestorm around the battle over

485 Ibid, 139. 486 Sierra Club v. Block, 694 F. Supp. 1255, (E.D. Tex. 1987). 487 Sierra Club v. Block, 694 F. Supp. 1255, (E.D. Tex. 1987).

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control of the Southern Pine Beetles, drawing in more stakeholders and wider media

attention. The results of the case would be essential to determining the future for forest

reform in the national forests.

The attention Ned had drawn to the Four Notch paid off while the remanded case

worked its way towards a trial. Although the Forest Service continued to harvest trees

as a method to control the beetles’ spread, outside actors worked to supplement Ned’s

case for protecting the trees. In 1987, the Forest Service proposed crushing the trees

and underbrush in 2,600 acres of the Four Notch in order to facilitate more control

efforts.488 Ned received an assist from another environmental organization, Earth First!

A group of Earth Firsters from Austin joined Ned to prevent additional cutting in the Four

Notch. They named the tree crusher tasked with removing the trees “Godzilla.”489 One

member, Bugis Cargis, chained himself to a tree with a Kryptonite lock, with the Forest

Service forced to remove the lock before cutting.490 Another activist, Jacob Jackson,

was paralyzed after the Forest Service cut down a tree he was living in as a protest.491

Multiple activists were arrested in the public spectacle. Folk singer Bill Oliver composed a song memorializing Cargis. The protest drew a great deal of media attention to the

Four Notch but did not prevent the destruction.492 Despite pulling back on their plan for

crushing, on September 8, 1987, the Forest Service napalmed the remaining felled

488 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 31. 489 Earth First!, “Four Notch to be Napalmed” (Sept. 23, 1987): 12. 490 George Russell, “Interview of George Russell,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (Oct. 7, 1999). 491 George Russell, “Interview of George Russell,” Texas Legacy Project. 492 Earth First! “Four Notch to be Napalmed,” 12.

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trees and brush in a stretch of the Four Notch.493 Ned’s goal of growing awareness to

forest issues was paying benefits from the attention the RCW’s plight brought to Forest

Service practices.

Ignoring the growing public outcry, the Forest Service remained steadfast in their

determination to create a pine plantation in the Texas Wilderness Areas. They

encapsulated their long-range goals for the forests in a new plan, the Final Land and

Resource Management Plan, National Forests and Grasslands, Texas.494 NFMA

required a plan for natural resource management in all national forests.495 The plan

revealed the forest service’s natural inclination towards harvesting timber. The SPB

were not a primary concern of the foresters according to the plan, only meriting two

mentions throughout the statement.496 Ned and the cooperating environmental groups appealed to the Forest Supervisor to challenge the results of the plan following its release.497 Judge Parker ruled that the cutting that would go on while the appeal made

its way to the Supervisor did not merit an injunction.498 Ned’s suspicion of their motives

and rationales to continue cutting was also justified. Their history of actions, from a

general distaste for modest preservation proposals to cutting in proposed wilderness

areas, warranted a level of distrust. The fate of the forest and the RCW would depend

on Ned’s case.

493 The Erinyes, “Four Notch Fried,” Earth First! 7, no. 3 (2 Feb. 1987). 494 Gordon Steele, Final Environmental Impact Statement-Land and Resource Management Plan National Forests & Grasslands-Texas U.S. Department of Agriculture- Forest Service, (Lufkin, TX March 1987). 495 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Statues at Large 90 Stat. 2949 (1976). 495 Steel, Final EIS, 1. 497 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 498 Ibid.

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The two sides met again in Judge Parker’s Eastern District Court in Lufkin,

Texas, for a five day trial from Feb. 29 to March 3, 1988.499 Although Ned had lost his attempt at a temporary restraining order in late October of 1987 the Forest Service had promised to preserve a tract in the Angelina National Forest that had been scheduled for removal until after the trial.500 TCONR, the Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society sued under several pieces of legislation. In addition to citing multiple sections of the

Endangered Species Act in their treatment of the RCW, the plaintiffs alleged that the

Forest Service’s control of the SPB was in violation of the Wilderness and

Administrative Procedure Acts. The APA was included because the NFMA did not contain an avenue to challenge the regulatory agencies' decisions, as Ned had already discovered.501 Finally, the suit alleged that the failure to create a specific EIS was a violation of the NEPA. With no shortage of legislative prerogatives, Ned left as many potential avenues for relief open to the courts.

In the suit, TCONR argued that the years of even-aged management, ongoing since 1964, had threatened the “survivability” of the East Texas forests.502 They argued that NFMA called for a level of natural diversity that the pine plantations prevented.

They cited the use of motor vehicles in controlling the beetles. TCONR stipulated that the vehicles and roads represented a violation of the Wilderness Act’s requirement that vehicles be the least invasive tool and necessary to the prosecution of their duties. The

Forest Service countered that diversity was only required across an entire forest, not a

499 Ibid. 500 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1988),1262. 501 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1276. 502 Ibid, 1269.

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specific acre or tract of land. They argued that clear-cutting was still the best method of control of the beetles and that roads were a necessary component. Ned claimed that the cutting recommended by the Service increased the onslaught of the SPB by sending tree-under-stress signals to scout beetles.503 Ned recommended the Forest Service instead leave the beetles and let nature run its course.504 As they had in the trial over the injunction, both the Forest Service and the environmentalists had legitimate arguments regarding cutting trees to control SPB outbreaks and their effect on the

RCW. The judge would be forced to sift through the mountains of scientific documentation and the precedents of hundreds of previous cases to make his decision on who would prevail.

Parker’s June 17, 1988, judgment held positives and negatives for environmentalists and the Forest Service. Parker determined that the effects of Forest

Service management practices were in violation of the Endangered Species Act due to their effect on RCW colonies.505 He considered the “taking” of the woodpeckers to be the most important aspect of the case, found that the Forest Service actions did represent a violation of Section 9 of the ESA, and judged their actions in the forests to be a factor in the diminishing populations.506 He agreed with the documentation of their precipitous decline, concluding that the birds would be extinct by 1995 without intervention.507 Parker quoted from the ESA, “all Federal departments and agencies

503 Wolf, “Fritz vs the Feds,” 66. 504 Fritz, “An Up to Date Summary,” 5. 505 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1277. 506 Ibid, 1263. 507 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1266.

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shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."508 Citing Conner’s reports tracking the decline of the birds, Parker found that the Forest Service’s harvesting of trees in East Texas represented a failure to follow their duty to protect endangered wildlife.509 The success of the ESA portions of the case failed, however, to transfer to other areas of Ned’s litigation.

In his judgement on the violations of the Wilderness Act, Parker stayed close to the arguments of the Forest Service regarding their discretion. Quoting from a D.C.

District court ruling the Sierra Club had brought against beetle control efforts,

Plaintiffs read the act too broadly. First, there is no ground for concluding that Congress used the term necessary in the absolute sense urged by plaintiffs. Under the statute, various measures are authorized to the extent that they "may be necessary in the control ... of insects. ..." The most natural reading of the Section focuses on the phrase "necessary in the control." In this context "necessary" simply embraces measures needed to achieve a certain result or effect, (citations omitted) that is, measures that are needed as part of a program designed to control, in the sense of restrain or curb, beetle infestations.510

Familiar with the precedents established in earlier decisions against TCONR, Parker found no compelling reason to restrict the Forest Service’s authority to determine the proper management approach for the forests. Ned had contended that the Forest

Service could not support the effectiveness of the control efforts, making any claim to their necessity lacking. Parker found that their control efforts were efficacious to some degree.511 His decision to allow the Forest Service to continue attempts to manage the

508 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1266. 509 Ibid, 1277. 510 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987), 559. 511 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1275.

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beetle populations, with restrictions to protect woodpeckers, represented a compromise to a complex situation.

Parker also weighed in on clear-cutting, agreeing with many of Ned’s long-held beliefs, but deferring to the discretion of the regulators within the framework of beetle control. Parker found that as opposed to clear-cutting, selection management was more economically advantageous, that it produced more wood, and that it left forests less susceptible to beetle infestations.512 These conclusions could have been lifted straight from one of Ned's books. Parker also deduced that the reason the Forest Service continued with a more expensive, less effective practice for forest management was due to corruption. Clear-cutting was favored by the timber companies and “the Forest

Service is an agency that has experienced a high degree of the "revolving door" phenomenon between governmental and private interests.”513 Published in the findings of fact section of Parker’s decision, the judge’s determination was a vindication of sorts for Ned. Although the laws as written would potentially allow the Forest Service the discretion to continue clear-cutting, many of his beliefs about the weakness of the practice were now codified to an extent. Jurisdictional issues complicated the appeals process for the case, pushing resolution into the next decade. Ned would not wait for conclusions as he quickly sought to translate the opening Parker gave him into further restrictions on Forest Service actions in East Texas.

Evaluating the battle over the red-cockaded woodpecker and SPB infestations reveals faults on both sides of the ledger. The two sides argued in public assessments

512 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1267. 513 Ibid, 1267.

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in national journals covering forest issues. Ned’s actions in the Four Notch drew

national attention both during and after the conflict, attracting a write up in the 1991

issue of American Forests.514 The article began with a short biography chronicling his

long history of environmental work and quotes from friends and enemies regarding his

relentless attitude in pursuit of environmental protection. The author then focused on the

battle over the SPB. From Ned’s position, protection of the RCW dovetailed well with his

other forest preservation efforts.515 Part of his concern with Forest Service efforts to control the SPB in Four Notch was his view that their behavior was in part motivated by spite. He felt they were retaliating for the injunctions against clear-cutting, passage of the East Texas Wilderness Act, and other measures that dulled the Forest Service’s purview in the National Forests. He pointed to the replacement of the Supervisor of

National Forests in Texas as an example, stating that “The regional forester sent us a supervisor determined to get even for our temporary wilderness victory”.516 Ned did not

come off all that well in the article, with the author concluding that Ned was to blame for

disrupting the Forest Service’s strategy of reducing the number and size of trees per

acre. Nevertheless, the Forest Service felt impugned by the article’s portrayal and

constructed a vociferous defense.

The article’s tepid vindication of Ned’s behavior during the SPB outbreaks in the

National Forests drew the ire of his opponents in the Forest Service. The foresters had

a different perspective on Ned’s role in the Four Notch and published a response to the

sympathetic portrayal. They blamed him for both the extent and intensity of the

514 Wolf, “Fritz vs the Feds,” 66. 515 Ibid, 65. 516 Ibid, 66.

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conflagration of the Southern Pine Beetles due to his 1976 lawsuit and later efforts to prevent control methods in 1983.517 They pointed to the appeals TCONR filed to prevent early attempts at controlling the infestations as a major cause for the intensity of the outbreak. Even though the suits were unsuccessful, the Forest Service considered the delays to have been detrimental to defeating the spread as the SPB advanced along a fifty-mile front in the Four Notch. In a play on Ned’s informal title of “Father of Texas

Wilderness,” the foresters claimed he would be more accurately described as the

“Father of the 1983 Four Notch Disaster.”518 After Hurricane Alicia struck in August of

1983, severe flooding caused further delays, exacerbating the lack of control efforts and furthering the onslaught of the bugs. When injunctions sought by Ned over the newly established Texas Wilderness Areas were denied and control was initiated in 1985, the

Forest Service’s aggressive use of helicopters and tree crushers opened another angle of complaint for activists that the foresters considered a necessary step in controlling the outbreak.

The beetle infestation and the conflict between control of the bugs and maintaining woodpecker populations created a complex situation with few clear solutions. Ned was naturally suspicious of Forest Service solutions that included the destruction of healthy trees alongside trees infected with spots. The intensity of the spread could have arisen from several factors, but Forest Service personnel placed much of the blame on Ned. They cited his interference with the rotation cycle of cuts as forming the conditions necessary for the beetles to thrive. A District Ranger from the

517 R.F. Billings, “Fritz vs. the Feds: A Rebuttal,” American Forestry (Mar/Apr. 1992): 75. 518 Billings, “A Rebuttal,” 75.

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Forest Service, Tim Bigler, stated, “If Ned would let us follow our forest plan, working on

a rotation of 70 to 80 years, we would eventually have 150-year-old trees at harvest.”519

Although both Ned and the Forest Service blamed their opposition for creating the circumstances that allowed the beetles to thrive, the cyclical nature of the bugs implies a more natural provenance.

Despite the feelings of both parties, the case over the control efforts for the SPB resulted in tangible changes in the management practices for RCW populations. After

1988, the Forest Service instituted a number of alterations to their strategy for protecting

RCWs in East Texas.520 They limited the distance between colonies of the birds and

their buffer cuts to a minimum of 100 feet.521 Even-aged management could not be used

within 1,200 meters of RCW colony sites. Instead, Ned’s preferred method of selective

management would be deployed to maintain as much “old growth” as possible. The goal

was for the older trees to allow the RCW sites to expand. Another restriction limited the

construction of roads within the 1,200-meter barrier.522 According to the same Forest

Service scientists who had first documented the decline of the colonies, the results of

the changes had the desired effect and RCW colonies regained a footing in the

forest.523 Although not mentioned by the reports delineating the improved prospects for

the RCW, Ned’s efforts had been vital to their continued existence, another significant

achievement in his ledger.

519 Billings, “A Rebuttal,” 76. 520 Conner, et al., 1997, 139. 521 Conner, et al., 1997, 139. 522 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), 1268. 523 Conner, et al., 1997, 139.

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The case against the Forest Service over SPB control continued on appeal.

Judge Parker’s findings from the East Texas District Court did not spell the end of the case over the RCW. Following his judgment, the Forest Service and timber industry challenged his ruling through a series of appeals. Ned, however, had bigger dreams for reform that could not wait. In the wake of the 1988 decision over the RCW, he embarked on a renewed campaign to spread his message of Forest Service abuses.

Taking the restrictions on clear-cutting and protections to the RCW habitats as an opening, he worked to parlay Parker’s injunction into a wider and more aggressive posture for his attacks on clear-cutting. After two decades of activism in the East Texas forests, the late 80s and early 90s saw him take the campaign nationwide. Beginning with the Pow Wow he organized in Indian Mounds, a growing consensus regarding the ills of clear-cutting began to percolate among citizens concerned with forest management. Hoping to gain a wider perspective, he organized a tour of the Southern national forests where he spoke with a number of concerned activists about forestry issues.524 Ned worked with his contacts from the Pow Wows and tour to create a national grassroots network devoted to reforming forest management practices. The full-court press following the opening provided by Parker animated a movement to reform Forest Service practices in the National Forests.

In the aftermath of the Parker’s restrictions, Ned found that Congressional interference, judicial discretion given to the Forest Service, and financial motivations for clear-cutting created a toxic mix for preservation. Even though clear-cutting was on pause following the injunction, Ned was intimately familiar with the folly of relying on

524 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, xi.

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injunctive relief for permanent solutions. The attention to clear-cutting was growing throughout the nation, and the Pow Wows had attracted a growing number of interested parties concerned with the same issues Ned was trying to solve. Sensing an opportunity, TCONR and activists from other states decided to expand the meetings outside of Texas.525 The result of their collaboration would allow the sharing of information and resources in confrontations over management of the national forests.526

The growth of the Pow Wows and the growing awareness of forest issues allowed the fight against clear-cutting to penetrate into a number of areas that had little representation in the environmental movement. In much the same way as he had done in Texas, Ned used the Pow Wows to increase coordination between various groups on behalf of the environment.

In 1987, Ned advanced his push for nationwide recognition of the problems created by clear-cutting with a barnstorming tour of a number of the country’s national forests.527 Planning his trip, he and his friend and pilot, Charles Jamieson, mapped out a route that would take their single-engine Cessna to as many national forests as possible. In addition to viewing clear-cuts in the forests, they hoped to reach a number of local grassroots organizations connected to forest issues.528 His trip led him to

Indiana, Illinois, and national forests throughout the South. According to environmentalist Mark Donham, who Ned met on his tour, having an elder statesman for the environmental movement visit and discuss strategy made a huge difference in his

525 Edward C. Fritz, “National Pow Wow Sept. 26-28,” Conservation Progress 141, (May 27, 1987): 1. 526 Andy Mahler, “Heartwood: 20 Years in Review,” Heartbeat (Spring, 2010): 1. 527 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, xi. 528 Mahler, “Heartwood: 20 Years in Review,” 1.

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life.529 Donham, who continued to work with grassroots organizations over forest reform in the Ohio River Valley for the next three decades, was an example of the leadership

Ned was able to provide to other environmentalists. By his presence and willingness to engage more voices in the fight against clear-cutting, the goal of coordination began seeing gains across the country.

The nationalization of the clear-cutting campaign took off following the air tour of the national forests. Allies from the trip and the Pow Wows he had organized at the beginning of the decade planned a national Pow Wow devoted to forest management reform.530 Ned had met Protect Our Wood’s director Andy Mahler on his nationwide flying tour of national forests. Ned suggested that the group host the first national Pow

Wow.531 Coordinating with TCONR, activists hosted the first National Forest Reform

Pow Wow in Indiana’s Hoosier National Forest in 1987.532 Mahler credited Ned with most of the effort in establishing the national movement, claiming, “Ned was truly the godfather of the national grassroots forest protection movement.”533 The Pow Wows fostered deeper connections between activists working on similar issues across the country.

By the time of the second annual national forest Pow Wow in 1988, Ned and the other environmentalists he worked with had established a program of reforms that they

520 Mark Donham, “Long Strange Trip,” Heartbeat (Spring, 2010): 19. 530 Mahler, “Heartwood: 20 Years in Review,” 1. 531 Ibid, 1. 532 Ibid, 1. 533 Andy Mahler, “Ned Fritz Remembrance,” Save America’s Forests, 2010.

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believed could salvage forest management practices.534 In addition to their target of

ending clear-cutting, they hoped to establish more wilderness areas and preserve native

diversity. They sought repeal of the Knutson-Vandenberg and Brush Control Acts that

encouraged the Forest Service to increase their budgets through harvesting.535 They wanted the Forest Service to cease below-cost sales, limit road construction, and protect endangered species and streams.536 While many of these goals had been

common in Ned’s critiques of the forest service, his understanding of the pitfalls of clear-

cutting deepened by his collaboration with outside experts. With a firm set of goals for

the future of forest management, Ned turned to legislative action to solve the issue of

clear-cutting.

Ned attempted to push Congress for permanent changes that would restrict the

Forest Service. His first proposal was a reworking of the Renewable Resources Act.

Congressman John Bryant proposed H.R. 2406, known as the Clear-cutting Restraint

Act, in 1989.537 The bill intended to limit any clear-cutting after 10 percent of the

available timber acreage in a forest was harvested. Not finding success, Ned then

worked with Congressman Bryant to transfer the goals that developed out of the Pow

Wows into a comprehensive legislative package that would finally solve the ills brought

by clear-cutting in the national forests.

The next bill, the Forest Biodiversity and Clear-cutting Prohibition Act, was the

first complete attempt at a legislative overhaul of forest management since the passage

534 Edward C. Fritz, “Clearcutting Tops National Pow Wow Goals,” Conservation Progress 150, (May 27, 1988): 3. 535 Fritz, “Clearcutting Tops National Pow Wow Goals,” 3. 536 Fritz, “Clearcutting Tops National Pow Wow Goals,” 3. 537 Clearcut Restraint Act, HR. 2406, 101st Cong., 1st sess., (1989).

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of 1976’s NFMA.538 The legislation would replace the NFMA and the Rangeland

Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 and end all even-aged management within

one year of passage.539 To Ned, the legislation represented the best chance to rectify

the ills contained in past bills. Explaining the bill’s motivations, he pointed to the

common use of selective management by private foresters, groups without the same

requirement to maintain biodiversity or natural heritage that the Forest Service was

expected to preserve.540 The bill allowed forest activists to point to a clear solution to the

ills plaguing the Forest Service. The problem with the legislation was that it failed to

satisfy both moderate and extremist environmentalists. Moderates felt that passage

could endanger compromises; radicals felt that by allowing some clear-cutting, the bill

did not go far enough.541 With opponents on both sides, the bill failed to leave

committee after its introduction by Bryant in 1989.542 Many aspects of the legislation were incorporated into the Save America’s Forests bill in 1996. That bill also failed to pass, although it continued to be regularly introduced to Congress into the 2000s.

Despite the failure of legislative solutions to forest reform, the creation of new legislation after a decade of dependence on the flawed NFMA was a milestone in the history of forest protection.

539 Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act, HR. 1164, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., (1994). 539 Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act, HR. 1164, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., (1994). 540 Edward C. Fritz, “Finding Friends Eases Pain of Forest Abuses,” Conservation Progress 141, (May 27, 1987): 4. 541 Lauren Esserman, “Breaking the Conventional Wisdom: The Saga of the Bryant Bill,” Wild Forest Review (Nov. 1994). Reed Noss, “Legislation Dialogue: Science Editor’s Response,” Wild Earth (Summer 1992): 47. 542 Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act, 1994.

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With the timeline for passage of the legislation in limbo, Ned escalated his

nationalization effort by authoring an advocacy book confronting clear-cutting directly.

The connections he had made through the Pow Wows had led to the affiliation of a

number of individuals and local organizations committed to fighting clear-cuts. There

was traction in the legislative proposals to reform the Forest Service. His book would

build on these projects by making the first comprehensive comparison of various

management techniques in order to expose the poor rationales supporting use of even-

aged management in the National Forests. He published his case in 1989 with

“Clearcutting: A Crime Against Nature.”543 Genie was an important contributor to Ned’s

writing.

Ned’s book built on a growing body of literature that criticized Forest Service

practices and advocated selective management techniques. Gordon Robinson, who had

testified in the first trial over the Four Notch, had written about the havoc clear-cutting

was wreaking in the national forests in his book, The Forest and the Trees.544 Robinson

favored a return to selective management practices from an ecological perspective.

Wisconsin forester Charles H. Stoddard had to balance his government employment,

serving at one time as the director of the Bureau of Land Management, with concern

over the environment. Stoddard had been a conservationist before and during his

federal employment, first confronting the timber industry over their control over the

Forest Service in 1967.545 His activism gave him insight into Forest Service practices.

543 Fritz, Crime Against Nature. 544 Gordon Robinson, The Forest and the Trees: A Guide to Excellent Forestry (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1988), 142. 545 Nancy Langston, Sustaining Lake Superior: An Extraordinary Lake in a Changing World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 122.

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Stoddard wrote in favor of selective harvesting and even developed his own approach

to conservation forestry.546 Thus, Ned’s choice to write about the ills of clear-cutting in the national forests contributed to a growing chorus of voices against the practice.

Crime Against Nature interspersed personal anecdotes from his years of fighting over forest issues with detailed examinations of the situation on the ground in the national forests. Focusing primarily on his own experiences in Texas, he created a narrative around Forest Service behaviors that exposed corruption and attempted to expose the practices that made the bureaucracy unfit to manage the nation’s resources.547 Nationally, Ned used the stories of Forest Service abuses he had learned

on his trip across the country to trace the history of clear-cutting. He explained the

historical roots of forest management, the legislation that had fostered dependence on

clear-cuts, and the evolving regulatory climate following the passage of NFMA.548 In his view, that legislation had granted too much authority to the regulators, giving them purview over the interpretation of the rules supposedly intended to govern their actions in the forests.549 He added his personal experience with the wide latitude Congress had

granted the regulatory agencies. Judicial decisions in his suits repeatedly concluded

that clear-cutting was permissible due to shaky claims by the Forest Service that it

represented the best method.

546 R.K. McIntyre, S.B. Jack, R.J. Mitchell, J.K. Hiers, L.W. Neel, Multiple Value Management: The Stoddard-Neel Approach to Ecological Forestry in Longleaf Pine Grasslands (Newton, Georgia: Joseph W. Jones Ecological Research Center, 2008), 10. 547 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 67. 548 Ibid, 107. 549 Fritz, Sterile Forest, 133.

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In addition to complaints over current Forest Service actions, Ned also included

attacks on the corruption he viewed as the cause of so many of the problems affecting

the organization. Chief among his targets were the Knutson-Vandenberg Act, legislation

from 1930 intended to ensure that timber companies would be financially responsible for

the cost of reforestation and related work.550 In the ensuing decades, the original intent

had been misconstrued, leaving the act as a sort of running tab for the Forest Service.

Since timber companies reimbursed the cost of returning cuts to their original state, the

Forest Service had a clear incentive to recommend management styles that caused the

most damage. Although this would appear to be an abrogation of their call for finding

the wisest use of the natural resources they were responsible for, it is easy to see the

temptation from the Forest Service’s perspective. The differences in clear-cutting compared to other management were minimal in terms of economic returns. Clear- cutting was easier in terms of labor for the Forest Service, because the timber companies did most of the work. The only significant difference between management styles was in their relative effects on the environment and their cost to repair. Those were not substantial enough to force an adjustment on their own. Why remove their primary method of financial support for such indeterminate gains?

Ned focused on more than just exposing the practices that were harming the national forests. His work also included recommendations for legislative solutions he had long been pursuing to reform the Forest Service. He sought to enforce protections for native diversity within national forests.551 NFMA had failed to include strong enough

550 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 53. 551 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 64.

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guidelines requiring preserving natural diversity in national forests, leading to single-

species plantations that threatened dependent wildlife. He took issue with what he

termed the “clear-cutting loophole”, the provision in NFMA that allowed the Forest

Service to consult themselves on the optimum method of harvesting. He recommended

limiting the amount of Forest Service available to be clear-cut to a maximum of 10

percent of the existing forest. This would protect the forests, allow for clear-cutting in the

areas where it was the best method, and still maintain some level of natural resource

extraction from the national forests.552 In addition to his proposals for legislative relief,

he also called for changes to the bureaucracy itself in his crusade to remake the

national forests.

Much of Ned’s work confronted the conclusions of another book. Randal

O’Toole’s Forest Service Reform constructed a slightly more sympathetic appraisal of

the services. O’Toole, who writes on issues related to government regulations for the

Cato Institute, published his book out of frustration with the financial losses the Forest

Service incurred in harvesting available timber.553 His work dismissed many of the

environmentalist critiques of management practices, arguing that the regulators

operated inefficiently due to Congressional incompetence. Demand on the Forest

Service to supply jobs and income from timber sales came from Congress.554 O’Toole attributed the lion’s share of the blame for poor forest management practices to

Congress. Where Ned argued that it was due to the latitude bills had granted to regulatory agencies, O’Toole blamed the pressure for economic returns.

552 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, 68. 553 Randal O’Toole, Forest Service Reform (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1988), xii. 554 O’Toole, Reforming the Forest Service, xii.

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Although written from a contrasting perspective, O’Toole’s work targeted some of

the practices with the Forest Service that had frustrated Ned for years. One of the main

factors he attributed to the increasing bias within the bureaucracy was legislation such

as the Knutson-Vandenberg Act of 1930.555 He argued similarly to Ned that the act

created an incentive for the bureaucrats in the service to recommend more and more

clear-cuts since their budget allotment was attached to a specific percentage of the total

costs of preparation and clean up from harvesting.556 This meant that the groups

responsible for regulating timber interests in the national forests were dependent on the

corporations doing the cutting for any budget increases. With staff running on skeleton

crews compared to their European counterparts, it was hard to imagine any decision

makers in the Forest Service making recommendations that might limit cutting. Knutson-

Vandenberg funds were a common criticism of Ned and other environmentalists, and

O’Toole’s book cited their existence as a needless agitator between the government

and citizens.557 While the books disagreed on many of the issues related to forest management, the similarities in some of their arguments was strong evidence of the necessity of reform.

Ned and his allies from the Pow Wows formed the National Forest Reform

Network as an advocacy organization to promote the Forest Biodiversity and Clear- cutting Prohibition Act and other reforms of the Forest Service. He explained that the purpose of the group was to apply greater pressure on Congress from a national as

555 Ibid, 183. 556 O’Toole, Reforming the Forest Service, 183. 557 Ibid, 235.

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opposed to a state-level perspective.558 Not a lobbying group per se, the organization’s

main contribution to environmentalism was in the form of a newsletter sent out to alert

the local organizations of opportunities to influence Congress.559 This arrangement

allowed the group to maintain tax-deductible status. Ned made an appearance before

the House Agricultural Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy in June of

1992 as Chair of the organization.560

Testifying in a hearing about clear-cutting in the National Forests in favor of H.R.

1969, Ned’s main theme was the ills of the practice. In a tan suit and with wisps of red still visible in his hair, he was still determined to earn Congressional support for his crusade on behalf of forest resources. After correcting some of the misinformation on selective compared to even-aged management, Ned stuck to his main theme of the potential losses if the natural forest diversity continued to suffer from the Forest

Service’s dream of pine plantations. He also sought to explain the aesthetic damages from even-aged management, providing pictures of the devastation left in the wake of clear-cuts.561 Despite his age, Ned was his usual contentious self, engaging in a debate

with the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Congressman Harold Volkmer, D-Missouri.

Volkmer cited an advertisement printed by the Wilderness Society over concerns about

the loss of Pacific Yew, which was used for cancer medication.562 The ad was an

558 Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 June 1999,” Texas Legacy Project, 1999. 559 Ibid. 560 Congress, House, Agriculture Subcommittee on Forest, Family Farms, and Energy, Clearcutting of National Forests: Hearing Before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 16 June 1992. 561 Wilderness Society, “Some of the Mammals Endangered by Cutting the Ancient Forest are More Familiar than you Think,” Washington Post, June 16, 1992. 562 Clearcutting Hearing Before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy, 1992.

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example of the more extreme rhetoric environmental organizations had adopted. Printed

with a picture of a nursing mother, the ad attempted to relate damages from

deforestation to shortages of a cancer drug. Ned pleaded ignorance of the ad but

attempted to tie the message to his own views about the potential losses from clear-

cuts. Ned’s testimony failed to persuade Congress, as the Subcommittee hearing was

as far as the proposed bill went. Nevertheless, his work with the Forest Reform Network

was an important aspect of his legacy in environmentalism. The organization was an

outgrowth of the Pow Wows he had begun and worked to popularize his goals for forest

reform.

Writing Crime Against Nature, establishing a network of activists, and publicizing

his fight against the Forest Service were important aspects of the campaign to

nationalize activism in the national forests. Through his writings, Ned helped to clear

misconceptions over the status of the nation’s bounty of timber resources. He engaged

with the growing literature about clear-cuts and poor practices on the part of the Forest

Service. Ned’s combative approach encouraged his allies, inspiring the coordination he had envisioned for Texas environmentalists. The grassroots approach to regulation of the Forest Service created a network able to respond to varied threats in areas they were familiar with, enabling organizations to design the most appropriate response. The movement brought renewed attention to the problems in the National Forests. Although their end goal of removing clear-cutting failed, their rewards were visible in the growing

attention to the practices of the Forest Service in the nation’s forests.

When examining his work throughout the decade of the 1980s, Ned could point

to the increases in the number of active RCW colonies as a success. From teetering on

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the verge of extinction, the bird’s recovery represented a victory for environmental efforts in East Texas. Their continued existence spoke to the worth of Ned’s crusade to reform the Forest Service. While Parker did not agree with Ned’s attempt to rein in the

Forest Service’s ability to determine the appropriate use of the national forests, the decision placed some limits on clear-cutting. Although appeals would continue into the next decade, Ned took the recommendations Parker had made to the Forest Service as a mandate for further action. Working with a host of allies from national and local organizations, Ned had realized vital improvements to forest management in the Texas

National Forests. He had seen the establishment of the first Texas wilderness areas, protected a species vital to forest ecosystems, and for the second time in two decades, secured a substantial reproach of Forest Service management practices.

As it had throughout its history, TCONR and Ned’s willingness to challenge the status quo of national environmental organizations opened new opportunities for activism. The nationalization of the fight in the national forests was a grassroots movement borne out of the Pow Wows he initiated.563 The meetings established collaborative networks, a manifestation of the objectives he had long sought to bring to

Texas. Large-scale movements to protect forest areas usually focused on the iconic forests of the Pacific Northwest.564 The pressures of fundraising led environmental organizations to focus their efforts on the areas that best fit their notion of spectacle.

Ned and other attendees of the Pow Wows valued the remaining forests and wanted to preserve as much as possible. Although the old growth forests in East Texas did not

563 Fritz, Crime Against Nature, xi. 564 Marsh, Drawing Lines in the Forest, 7.

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attract as strong of a following, they were home to valuable natural resources. Through

hard work and determination, TCONR was able to work with concerned citizen’s

organizations to create a campaign that made progress towards the forest management

reform he had been seeking for twenty-five years.

Ned’s campaign against clear-cutting saw tangible benefits for himself and the movement to reform Forest Service practices throughout the 80s. His lawsuit seeking protection for the red-cockaded woodpecker drew widespread media attention in an era of increasingly high-profile environmental activism. Although the case would roll over into the next decade on appeal, Ned worked to capitalize on the positive aspects of

Parker’s decision before it could be overturned. The increasing fame the forest campaign brought him allowed TCONR and his other organizations to cash in on his growing celebrity financially, funding greater lobbying and influence operations.565 The

most tangible beneficiary was Ned himself. The increased attention greased the wheels

for his move to nationalize the fight against clear-cutting. The Pow Wows he initiated got

the ball rolling on a national network of groups committed to forest reform. The

organization that grew out of the meetings in the forests represented the first nationwide

group working on issues in the national forests. He also benefitted from the increased

attention. He was one of 56 Americans awarded the first Teddy Roosevelt Award in

1990. Congressman Steve Bartlett’s nomination for the award credited Ned as “the

premier environmentalist in Texas.”566 This was followed by his receiving an honorary

565 Texas Committee on Natural Resources, “Ned’s Right-Off-His-Back Shirt Offer: Order a Piece of the Madras,” Conservation Progress 150 (May 27, 1988): 6. 566 Annette Strauss, “City of Dallas Special Recognition of Ned Fritz,” 1997.

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doctorate by his alma mater Southern Methodist University in 1991.567 Bringing greater

organization and collaboration by informed and affected locals raised awareness of

forest issues to new heights. Through his efforts in the forests throughout the 1980s,

Ned saw the fulfillment of many of his long-sought goals for environmental activism.

The 1980s were the culmination of many of the changes Ned Fritz, and the

environmental movement he had worked to improve, had undergone during his career.

His standing as the central representative of the emergence of an active environmental

movement was revealed in his creation of an influential grassroots campaign in defense

of the Four Notch and against clear-cutting. Transforming the issue from isolated protests against the powerful combination of Forest Service bureaucrats, timber interests, and their political allies, Ned recognized the commonality faced by environmentalists concerned with forest management nationwide. His campaign put renewed pressure on Congress with the creation of bills aimed at reform for the Forest

Service. The campaign he sponsored in the Four Notch and the appropriation of the

RCW was a manifestation of the changes Ned had brought to the state. No longer a backwater, the clear-cutting campaign represented a new level of advocacy for Texas.

For the first time, the issues facing the state and the citizen’s response to them were causing waves on a national scale. The 1980s witnessed the positive changes that could accompany Ned’s modernization of Texas environmentalism.

Politically, the 1980s saw the fulfillment of Ned’s evolution into a more radicalized actor. Far from his anti-communist upbringing, thirty years of environmentalism had convinced Ned that politics was both the only method for long-term environmental

567 Kenneth Pye to Edward C. Fritz, May 24, 1990.

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preservation as well as a poor barricade against the powerful interests arrayed on the opposing side. Ned’s work with Earth First! took him down a new path. Although he was not a participant in the more interventionist strategies adopted by many of his new colleagues, he recognized the benefits of the publicity their antics garnered for the Four

Notch. Embracing immigration reform for the purpose of population control took Ned down a darker path than many of his allies were comfortable traveling. Plagued throughout his career with charges of being a radical and a communist for standing in the way of progress, Ned’s thoughts regarding famine relief was the first time that the attacks he had long confronted rang true. Despite his constant pursuit of cooperation,

Ned’s political turn in relation to immigration threatened the relationships upon which many of his important environmental movements had been founded. The 1980s exposed both the breadth of change in his views and the dangers that could accompany continued radicalization.

Ned’s political views were not the only area which he experienced changes as he remained involved in environmental efforts. The case over the Forest Service also related to Ned’s continuing progression in his approach to environmental advocacy. The

SPB lawsuit and the use of the red-cockaded woodpecker epitomized the way his legal innovations followed the ongoing evolution in his environmental philosophy. The discovery of the RCW was a boon to environmentalists seeking protection of forests infected by pine beetles. For Ned, the precarious status of the birds represented more than a symbol to increase fundraising. His defense postulated that protection of the bird was as important to future generations as it was to preservation of their forest habitats.

The use of the Endangered Species Act was more than an innovative method to win his

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case. To Ned, it was an opportunity to establish permanent protections of the natural habitat, maintaining the chance for future generations to enjoy the colonies and the wildlife that eventually occupied their nests as well as any other potential benefits from the forest.

The decade also witnessed another substantial contribution from Genie Fritz, who worked with Ned to establish and lead the Texas Land Conservancy. The organization began with the goal of overseeing the land purchases necessary to create the first protected wilderness areas in Texas. After successfully negotiating the land needed to maintain a contiguous space, the group expanded its mission to include new spaces. Eventually preserving over 85,000 acres in Texas, TLC represented a significant addition to Ned and Genie’s growing roster of organizations added to Texas environmental groups and was another manifestation of the effect of their combined efforts.

228 CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: NED FRITZ’S LATE STAGE ENVIRONMENTALISM, 1988-2008

Ned’s fight in the forests spilled into the 1990s with the appeals process from the

SPB case ongoing until 1999.568 By that time, his active involvement in environmental

issues was on the downswing. He turned eighty-three before the case finally concluded.

Poor health had limited his direct participation. Fortunately, the network of local and national organizations he had nurtured into existence in Texas left responding to environmental threats in capable hands. He would continue to take part in protection campaigns for the rest of his life, working on cases against clear-cutting and memorializing his own experiences and the history of environmental activism in Texas until his final days. While the level of activity receded in his later years, the dream of effective Texan environmentalism continued. The effectiveness of that movement as he aged and in the years after his death was a testament to the efficacy of his years in environmental circles.

Due to his age, Ned was less involved in the cases that he had begun over the

Forest Service’s plans for clear-cutting large portions of East Texas forests. Despite his smaller role, the outcomes of the lawsuits he had initiated are an important part of the story of his career in Texan environmentalism. More than a decade passed after the first filing before the original case against the SPB control efforts concluded. Would

Congressional deference to the Forest Service prevail, or would the absence of scientific support for clear-cutting and control methods force new practices in the forests? The Eastern District court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals were still the

568 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1999).

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setting for appeals of TCONR’s SPB case. His history with the appellate court was mostly negative. They had already overturned his first big victory over the Forest

Service from 1976.569 In 1988, the Forest Service responded to Parker by producing a new comprehensive timber management plan that was published in December. The new plan did not follow many of Parker’s edicts, especially since it still allowed some clear-cutting.570 After consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service, the government agencies determined that the restrictions Parker had required were unrealistic.571 They filed a jeopardy opinion against Parker’s orders. Joined by the Texas Forestry

Association and the Southern Timber Council, the timber interests and their regulators sought to overturn Parker’s ruling.572

In the case now styled Sierra Club v. Yeutter, in 1991 the Fifth Circuit found that

Parker had gone too far in some of his restrictions on the Forest Service’s purview in the National Forests.573 Appellate judge William Garwood wrote the decision. He determined that the Court had overstepped when they set the instructions for Forest

Service planning in relation to RCW, not allowing enough flexibility for the consultation process between the Forest Service and other agencies such as the US Fish and

Wildlife Service to hold any meaning. While the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Court had a right to find the Forest Service in violation of the ESA and other legislation, they decided that Parker had exceeded his authority by setting such explicit instructions for the

569 Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland. 570 Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), 438. 571 Ibid, 432. 572 Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 431. 573 Ibid, 441.

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consultation between regulatory agencies.574 The case was remanded to the district court to investigate the new plan for RCW management. The court was enjoined to investigate the plans the Forest Service had created for the RCW for compliance with the ESA. Before the district court was able to reconsider the first comprehensive plan or even see the second plan, the Forest Service filed its Motion to Approve Plan on June

17, 1992.575 The legality of these actions again went to the Texas courts.

In Sierra Club v. Espy, 1994, the ramifications of Parker’s decision again made their way to the Fifth Circuit appeals court.576 This time, the focus was on the legislative violations of the NEPA and NFMA Parker had found. Those violations had formed the basis for his restrictions on clear-cutting. Parker’s finding that the legislation allowed clear-cutting only in exceptional circumstances did not stand on appeal.577 Writing for the appeals court, Judge Patrick Higginbotham ruled that Parker had “erected too high a barrier to even-aged management.”578 While the court admitted that language within the legislation revealed Congressional reticence about even-aged management, it was allowed as long as the Forest Service followed the specific requirements set forth by

Congress. TCONR had also argued that the Environmental Assessments of specific timber sales failed to protect the forest diversity demanded of the Service in the NFMA.

Again, the appeals court disagreed with the district court’s decision, finding that the EA’s accounted for different management approaches as evidenced by their use in different

574 Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 440. 575 Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995), 93. 576 Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1994). 577 Ibid, 794. 578 Ibid, 794.

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compartments of the proposed sales.579 They also agreed that the Service, while having some level of effect on diversity, were within their congressionally enacted boundaries.

The Court admitted that the choices for which species might be harmed by the sales were difficult; it was the job of the Forest Service to make those decisions.580 Finally, the

Appeals court disagreed with Parker’s determination that EA’s failed to satisfy the requirements of the NEPA. Instead, they concluded that despite being “low-budget environmental impact statements,” the court considered “the EAs adequately address the need for the proposal, the alternative, the environmental consequences, and the agencies and persons consulted.”581

The Espy decision undermined most of the gains TCONR had earned through the SPB case. Ned had expected that the injunctions might not hold and had sought to use the Parker decision before it was overturned through the nationalization of his fight over clear-cutting. Slowly, the Fifth Circuit Court had chipped away at the progress environmentalists had earned following Parker’s judgment. The next hole in the dike would come in a 1995 decision over the appeals of the RCW portions of the case. The case was a continuation of the 1991 Yeutter case. Following the 1992 Motion to

Approve Plan, a Superseding Order from the district court in 1994 struck down the guidelines the Forest Service had created.582 The plan had created Interim Guidelines for management of the RCW’s, but the district court had determined that they did not go far enough in protecting the RCW colonies. The appeals court determined that the

579 Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1994). 801. 580 Ibid, 802. 581 Ibid, 803. 582 Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995), 93.

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district court had misinterpreted the directives they had passed in the Yeutter case. The district court had investigated the guidelines for their eligibility under the Endangered

Species Act under too wide a scope. In his decision, Judge John Duhe Jr. cited the conclusion from Yeutter, “If the agency produces a plan that is legally sufficient, when reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the district court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to which particular features might be most desirable or efficacious."583 More aspects of Parker’s decision fell back on appeal.

Ned’s premonition about the likelihood for success of his case in the Fifth Circuit continued to be prescient.

After dealing with the SPB aspects of the case in 1988, jurisdictional squabbles over Parker’s restrictions in 1991, even-aged management in 1994, and issues related to RCW management in 1995, the next stage of the case took place in Lufkin’s Eastern

District court in 1997 in a case titled Sierra Club v. Glickman.584 The Chief of the Forest

Service had inspired the suit by again denying TCONR’s request for review of policies favoring even-aged management. TCONR sued alleging violations of the NFMA. The

Sierra Club and its allies were able to convince the judge, Richard Schell, of violations on the part of the Forest Service.585 Schell determined that the Forest Service had in fact violated the NFMA and agreed that the Service had legitimate constraints placed on them from the legislation. They had to balance staffing and budgetary concerns while simultaneously protecting forest diversity and soil, watershed, and wildlife resources for

583 Ibid, 97. 584 Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp 905 (E.D. Tex. 1997), 910. 585 Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp 905 (E.D. Tex. 1997), 910.

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subsequent generations.586 This was not an easy task; nevertheless, it was their congressionally mandated duty to act in accordance with the law. Schell agreed with

TCONR that they had not done so. He found that they had violated the NFMA in not protecting soil, watershed, and wildlife resources. He agreed that they had failed to properly inventory and monitor wildlife as called for in the NFMA.587 He ruled in favor of a permanent injunction, holding that the actions of the Forest Service held the potential for irreparable injury to the soil and watershed resources. Schell sided with the environmentalists due to the Forest Service’s poor patterns of behavior, finding that there was often “a wide gap between what the Forest Service represents in its planning documents and what it actually does on-the-ground.”588

Although Schell’s injunction did not permanently bar the Forest Service from using even-aged management, it did attempt to force the agency to use the practice only within the parameters of the NFMA. The timber interests again appealed, alleging that the district court had overstepped its authority by applying its own interpretation of the Forest Service’s fulfillment of the requirements under the NFMA.589 Although the

NFMA, much to Ned’s chagrin, did not provide for judicial review, the court had again used the standards from the Administrative Procedures Act.590 For once, the appeals court disagreed with the timber interests. Schell’s district court decision was upheld in

586 Ibid, 946. 587 Ibid, 943. 588 Ibid, 943. 589 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1999), 352. 590 Edward C. Fritz, “Broadening Judicial Review Under the National Forest Management Act,” Wisconsin Environmental Law Journal 3, no. 1, (1996): 27.

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1999 in Sierra Club v. Peterson.591 The majority upheld the standing in the case and

made the decision that Schell had interpreted the Forest Service’s actions as a failure to

fulfill Congressional mandates. Ned’s fifteen-year court fight had gone through many

difficulties. Despite the rollercoaster, the contributions to the environmental movement

from SPB case are laudable. The challenges TCONR brought against Forest Service

actions changed the landscape of forest management in the National forests. The

constant disruptions forced the agency to anticipate legal challenges to their plans for

the forests. The fight against the Four Notch brought national media attention, helping to

bring the need for forest reform into the larger lexicon of environmentalism. Inspired by

the court’s agreement, he translated the win into a nationalized movement for forests

reform.

As he aged, Ned sought to transfer his experiences and the environmental

philosophy he had developed to future generations through interviews and writing. The

Texas Legacy Project was an oral video history of environmental activism in Texas. The

project was created by an Austin area lawyer and environmentalist David Todd. Todd

had worked with Ned through the Sierra Club and Texas League of Conservation

Voters. The project chronicled the social movement of environmental history in Texas,

seeking to credit the individuals responsible for developing environmentalism in the

state.592 Ned was a central figure in the project, sitting for three interviews in addition to

the oral history interview he had completed in 1983. Todd felt a connection to Ned and

viewed him as one of the most influential Texas environmental actors. He explained that

591 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 352. 592 David Todd, “David Todd Interview, Part 1 of 1,” interview by David Weisman, Texas Legacy Project, (Oct. 10, 2002).

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Ned, as an environmental attorney and champion for the public in such a wide range of issues, opened him up to the many others involved in Texas environmental issues. A brain aneurysm Ned suffered, combined with his advancing age, inspired Todd to attempt begin the project before it was too late.593 He also took up blogging near the end of his life. His “Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Blog” offered a brief view of his philosophy over the importance of environmental protection. Passing on his own experiences helped to continue his goal of converting additional adherents to environmental issues among future generations.

Ned Fritz passed away on December 19, 2008, at the age of ninety-two. He was suffering from kidney failure and complications from the illness led to his death.594 Up until his passing, he was still active; speaking against the planned Trinity Toll Road that he viewed as a miniature attempt at recreating the Trinity Canal.595 He had slowly receded into the background of the environmental movement as he aged. Nevertheless, he remained a celebrity among his fellow environmentalists. His legacy lived on past his years. Although clear-cutting continues, the widespread acknowledgement of its harm is in large part thanks to his work raising awareness.596 The organizations he founded and the young environmentalists he inspired remain an integral part of the Texas environmental movement. His influence is still visible and acknowledged. In 2019,

Dallas renamed the Texas Buckeye Trail within the Great Trinity Forest the Ned and

593 Robert Wilonsky, “They Saved Texas’s Land, Piece by Piece. He Saved their Stories,” Dallas Observer, December 23, 2008. 594 Joe Simnacher, “Lawyer, Had Finger in Every Conservation Pie,” Dallas Morning News, Dec. 20, 2008. 595 Laray Polk, “The Trinity Project: Fighting for Open Space,” D Magazine, Oct. 17, 2016. 596 Michelle M. Haggerty and Mary Pearl Meuth eds., Texas Master Naturalist (College Station: Texas A&M UP, 2019), 566.

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Genie Fritz Texas Buckeye Trail in recognition of their protection efforts along the river.597 Ned Fritz was an essential figure in the development of an effective activist movement on behalf of Texas natural areas and the wildlife that called them home.

Ned’s history witnessed both the positive and negative ramifications that followed the growth in awareness of the dangers of never-ending development. Additionally,

Ned’s passion for environmentalism increased his effectiveness as an advocate for preservation actions, equipping him with the ability to overcome the substantial challenges facing ecological protection. In a state with the cultural and political climate of Texas, an advocate who retreated at the first sign of trouble would have had little chance of success. Ned was quite the opposite, relishing the controversy his endless pursuit of justice for the environment often entailed. His strong sense of justice, stubborn hard-headedness, and near endless energy supply shaped him into an ideal environmental warrior. These attributes were somewhat leavened by a combative attitude he could never quite mask for long. Ned’s personality was an asset for his environmental career, although it was also occasionally his own worst enemy. The same traits that made his path more difficult were responsible for his effectiveness. On the ledger between the hurdles his attitude created and the value he added to the movement, his victories in court and in the court of public opinion outweighed the drawbacks. Finding the proper balance between his abilities without letting his frustration overcome him was a lifelong struggle.

597 Robert Wilonsky, “Dallas Trail Renamed for Ned and Genie Fritz, Who Helped Save the Great Trinity Forest,” Dallas Morning News, Jun. 12, 2019.

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Ned’s contributions to active environmental efforts overshadowed others of his generation. Coming of age in the earliest stages of environmental awareness, Ned’s life coincided and fostered fantastic growth in the movement to alter the relationship between man and his national environment. The timing of his interest in the environment allowed Ned to take part in Texas environmental efforts from the proverbial ground floor. Buttressing the effect of this timing, his legal experience offered tangible value to environmentalists, creating an opportunity for him to fill a needed role. Many of the shifts in Texas environmentalism coincided with his participation. Before his involvement, Texas conservationists had seen little progress. Business was not competing on a level playing field with environmental concerns. Bureaucrats and politicians were able to call their own shots when it came to projects that could entail damage to the natural environment. As he grew in influence within the movement, substantive transformations were taking place across the nation. In Texas, Ned best represented the effects of those changes. Bringing Texas into the modern era of environmental advocacy, his efforts transformed the state from an afterthought in the field of environmentalism to a state at the forefront of the movement. The results of his influence are revealed in the effectiveness of his primary movements; the preservation of the Trinity River, protection of the red-cockaded woodpecker, and the lawsuit and grassroots attack on the practice of clear-cutting. Ned’s time in the Texas environmental movement brought about a shift from passive and often unsuccessful conservation to full-throated environmentalism. The creative approaches to environmental problems resulted in a conversion of ecological advocacy from the compromising, but often ineffective work of previous generations into an aggressive and effective force that

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demanded a seat at the table in decisions on development. The change ushered in a new era and resulted in a significant curtailing of government and industry prerogatives for projects that portended damage to the natural environment.

One of the identifiable aspects present throughout Ned’s biography was the shifts that his own political outlook underwent through his association with environmental politics. While Ned was undertaking substantial labors to change the course of Texas environmentalism, the transformations he oversaw were simultaneously affecting his own views. He began his adult life as a committed anti-communist. Working with multiple veteran’s groups, Ned saw firsthand the potential of communist infiltration and acted to prevent it wherever it was found. As he grew more involved with environmental pursuits, Ned’s political opinions witnessed a significant evolution. Exposure to the corruption of regulatory agencies, political and business insiders, and even cooperating environmental organizations worked to radicalize Ned’s politics. These changes were not on a directly partisan line. Republicans and Democrats were both present in many of the movements he sponsored. He recognized both positive and negative aspects of both sides of the American political sphere and was willing to work with any party or politician who could benefit environmental causes. The radicalization spawned by his frustration with the ongoing environmental threats manifested itself in the immigration stances he adopted as a means of population control. Although his shift towards an aggressive anti-immigrant position was unpopular with many of his allies, the new view revealed the evolution his views had experienced through his time in the movement.

Another common trait of Ned’s time in the Texas environmental movement was the parallel construction of his creative legal strategies and his defense of the

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nonhuman world. The connections between his two primary careers were in their

composition as an outlet for public service. Most of his legal career was devoted to

advocacy on behalf of marginalized communities dealing with much more powerful

interests. His area of legal expertise, consumer credit, was not known as a financially

rewarding one. He would find a similar situation facing his new clientele in threatened

aspects of nature. Fritz explained that he represented a “normally underrepresented

class, Nature itself which cannot speak and has no ability to hire lawyers.”598 Through

his years of environmental work, Ned developed his own ethos about the natural world.

He came to believe that all of nature held value. With no ability to protect itself from

encroaching civilization, Ned put himself forward as defender. He devoted himself to the

preservation of as much wildlife, rivers, and trees as possible, saving natural resources

for future generations. His lawsuits tested the boundaries of the new legislation that

emerged as awareness of environmental issues grew. His dependence on the red-

cockaded woodpecker protections contained in the Endangered Species Act introduced

a new angle to challenge development that became a fixture of environmental litigation.

Although the field of legal environmentalism would eventually become a staple for many

attorneys, he was one of the first; blazing a trail that many legal minds would eventually

follow.

Ned Fritz's importance to the environmental movement in Texas is difficult to

quantify. The easiest guideline to determine his standing as a Texan environmentalist is

deciding whether he was able to achieve the goals he envisioned for the movement.

598 Edward C. Fritz, “Ned Fritz, 17 May 1997,” interview by David Todd, Texas Legacy Project, (May 17, 1997).

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Coordination, a major goal of Ned’s dream of reforming Texas environmental efforts, was visible throughout his career in the state. While he was innovative and tireless in his search for causes, he understood his dependence on others for funding, help with his lawsuits, and local pressure on planned developments. His most influential legal actions were accompanied by sister organizations. Although his relationship with other environmentalists was sometimes contentious, he was able to cooperate with the Sierra

Club and Wilderness Society in numerous lawsuits against the Forest Service. Other environmentalists initiated many of his campaigns. From Geraldine Watson and Pete

Gunter in the Big Thicket, and Madeline Framson in the Four Notch to Don Smith with the Trinity River Canal, his involvement was often a response to allies. The cooperation between other individuals and organizations was the fulfillment of one of his main ideas for sparking effective environmental efforts in Texas.

Ned’s influence among Texas environmentalists primarily stemmed from the changes that accompanied his time in the movement. The tangible gains were significant. He led the first successful preservation of a wilderness area in the state.

Groups he founded were responsible for the purchase of thousands of additional acres for Texas wilderness. He was a member of the Audubon Society, the Izaak Walton

League, the Sierra Club, the Texas League of Conservation Voters, the Texas

Committee on Natural Resources, the Texas Land Conservancy, the Big Thicket

Conservation Association, the Wilderness Society, the American Forestry Association, and the Forest Reform Network.599 He authored legislation that led to protection of

599 Edward C. Fritz, “Thumbnail Sketch of Edward C. Fritz,” Ned Fritz’ Red Cockaded Blog, Jan. 2, 2007, http://redcockaded.blogspot.com/2007/01/thumbnail-sketch-of-edward-c-fritz.html.

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thousands of acres. He helped maintain populations of endangered birds such as the

Golden Eagle and red-cockaded woodpecker. He wrote books and articles to raise awareness of numerous environmental issues. Although the battle to win hearts and minds brought substantial challenges, the effectiveness of Texas environmental efforts during his time in the movement speaks to his contributions. He was an active participant in changing people's perception of the relationship between continued development and its effects on natural areas. The organizations he founded were at the forefront of Texas environmental activities for five decades. Their legacy has continued even after Fritz's passing. Environmentalists in the state have come a long way, and there is ample reason to conclude that without Fritz's involvement, the movement would not have reached the heights it saw during his life.

Despite the tangible successes he could point to in return for years of effort,

Ned’s experiences also exposed the limits of Texas activism. Forced to spend valuable resources repeating his battles over forest management convinced him that committed vigilance was essential for protecting the environment. The corruption of the government regulators that had first tweaked his sense of justice continued unabated.

The judicial system's willingness to defer to the nation's regulatory agencies would remain the default until the final appeal was settled in 1999. Although he had struck a blow against the establishment, the fight for environmental protection of natural areas was unceasing. Ned’s legacy ensured that the fight would continue.

For his achievements, Ned received many awards. He was honored early in his career with the American Motors Conservation Award in 1970, the Oak Leaf Award of the Nature Conservancy in 1975, the 1978 Feinstone Foundation Award, and the 1985

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Sierra Club national achievement award. After his fight against clear-cutting, he

received the 1990 Teddy Roosevelt Conservation Award from the White House, a 1990

Special Recognition by the City of Dallas, a 1992 Special Service Award from the Sierra

Club, Lone Star Chapter, a 1992 Conservation Forester of the Year Award by

Sportsmen Conservationists of Texas, the 1993 Merit Award by the Texas Organization

for Endangered Species, a 1994 Environmental Excellence Award from CEED, a 1996

Floyd Potter Award for outstanding achievement in endangered species conservation,

and the 1997 Merle and Edith Hoyt Volunteer of the Year award by the Dallas County

Audubon Society. Later in life he was honored with the 2000 Lifetime Achievement

Award from the Audubon Society, another lifetime achievement award from the National

Wildlife Federation in 2002, and the Daughters of the American Revolution

Conservation Medal in 2007.600

Genie Fritz has been the recipient of environmental awards as well. For her time

as president of the Dallas League of Women’s Voters and on the board of the Texas

League of Women’s Voters Genie was awarded the 2013 North Texas Master Naturalist

Dragonfly Award.601 The organizations that chose the couple for these awards

recognized that their success was based on more than just Ned’s persistence,

creativity, and constant energy in protecting the environment. They also credited Genie

Fritz for her role both in support of Ned as well as her own contribution to civic service

600 Edward C. Fritz, “Thumbnail Sketch of Edward C. Fritz,” Ned Fritz’ Red Cockaded Blog, Jan. 2, 2007, http://redcockaded.blogspot.com/2007/01/thumbnail-sketch-of-edward-c-fritz.html. “A Tribute to Edward C. Fritz: Environmental Defender, Activist, and Author "The father of Texas wilderness”,” Save America’s Forests, https://www.saveamericasforests.org/Ned%20Fritz/index.html. 601 Susie Swasso, Feb. 26, 2014. https://www.news-journal.com/charm-view/spotlight-genie- fritz/article_7f83b05b-3218-5ad5-9ae7-14f1fbdf51d4.html

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and as an inspiration to younger generations. The value Genie added to Ned’s environmental work was immeasurable. Her constant presence was a common sight in his own works as well as in the numerous write-ups of the pair throughout their career.

Ned explained the benefits having Genie by his side provided by pointing out that she was able to complete aspects of his work, organizing his writing, planning his schedule, and cultivating their extensive relationships with other environmentalists and organizations, while he was engaged in other tasks. This method allowed the couple to maximizing each of their strengths. Their combined approach amplified each of their efforts, leading environmentalists in the state to a higher level of flexibility, facilitating a more effective response to various threats to the natural world.

Ned Fritz was a talented environmentalist, wholly dedicated to the preservation of humanity’s natural bounty. Unlike the conservationists who had preceded him in Texas,

Ned grew to embody a generation of citizens who sought to move beyond the acquiescence that had defined their predecessors. The approach necessary to shake things up in Texas required a disruptor, someone willing to challenge conventional wisdom and withstand the barbs and attacks such an approach entailed. Ned proved to be ideal for this role. Far from an easygoing person, his determination and passion distinguished him from his predecessors as well as many of his contemporaries and was a primary factor in his success. His dissatisfaction with the status quo in Texas encouraged him to challenge incursions into the environment in novel ways on the theory that a different approach might yield better results. Leading multiple grassroots movements in the state, his story is an exemplar of the ability of individuals to effect change through the combination of sheer effort and indefatigable commitment. Although

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he was arguably the person most responsible for the preservation of the Trinity River, the East Texas Wilderness areas, and the Big Thicket, his true legacy was the modernization of the Texas environmental movement. More than the specific locations he protected, altering the trajectory of environmental protection best revealed his outsized influence. It was this contribution that continues to reverberate in organizations and environmentalists throughout the state.

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602 Gary Barnett, Ned Fritz, 1970, photograph.

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603

603 “Trinity River Basin,” Trinity Waters, https://trinitywaters.org/about/trinity-river-basin

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604

604 “Big Thicket National Preserve,” National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/bith/learn/management/big-thicket-biosphere-reserve.htm.

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