Federal Register/Vol. 77, No. 53/Monday, March 19, 2012/Notices
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices 16091 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2012–0068] Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Effective Immediately) In the Matter of: ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES AND HOLDERS OF CON- Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1) License Nos. (as shown in STRUCTION PERMITS IN ACTIVE OR DEFERRED STATUS. Attachment 1) or Construction Permit Nos. (as shown in Attach- ment 1)) EA–12–049 I Approximately 40 minutes following As directed by the Commission’s staff the earthquake and shutdown of the requirements memorandum (SRM) for The Licensees and construction SECY–11–0093, the NRC staff reviewed 1 operating units, the first large tsunami permits (CP) holders identified in wave inundated the site, followed by the NTTF recommendations within the Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses additional waves. The tsunami caused context of the NRC’s existing regulatory and CPs issued by the U.S. Nuclear extensive damage to site facilities and framework and considered the various Regulatory Commission (NRC or resulted in a complete loss of all ac regulatory vehicles available to the NRC Commission) authorizing operation and/ electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a to implement the recommendations. or construction of nuclear power plants condition known as station blackout. In SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11–0137 in accordance with the Atomic Energy addition, all direct current electrical established the staff’s prioritization of Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 power was lost early in the event on the recommendations based upon the of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 Units 1 and 2 and after some period of potential safety enhancements. CFR) Part 50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of time at the other units. Unit 6 retained Since receiving the Commission’s Production and Utilization Facilities,’’ the function of one air-cooled EDG. direction in SRM–SECY–11–0124 and and Part 52, ‘‘Licenses, Certifications, Despite their actions, the operators lost SRM–SECY–11–0137, the NRC staff and Approvals for Nuclear Power the ability to cool the fuel in the Unit conducted public meetings to discuss Plants.’’ 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit enhanced mitigation strategies intended II 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the to maintain or restore core cooling, Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, containment, and SFP cooling On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel capabilities following beyond-design- earthquake struck off the coast of the shortly after the loss of cooling basis external events. At these meetings, Japanese island of Honshu. The capabilities. the industry described its proposal for a earthquake resulted in a large tsunami, Diverse and Flexible Mitigation estimated to have exceeded 14 meters Following the events at the Capability (FLEX), as documented in the (45 feet) in height, that inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI’s) letter Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant plant, the NRC established a senior-level dated December 16, 2011 (Agency site. The earthquake and tsunami agency task force referred to as the Near- Documents Access and Management produced widespread devastation across Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF System (ADAMS) Accession No. northeastern Japan and significantly was tasked with conducting a ML11353A008). FLEX is proposed as a affected the infrastructure and industry systematic and methodical review of the strategy to fulfill the key safety in the northeastern coastal areas of NRC regulations and processes and functions of core cooling, containment Japan. determining if the agency should make integrity, and spent fuel cooling. additional improvements to these When the earthquake occurred, Stakeholder input influenced the staff to programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 pursue a more performance-based Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 approach to improve the safety of review, the NTTF developed a were shut down for routine refueling operating power reactors than comprehensive set of recommendations, and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 envisioned in NTTF Recommendation documented in SECY–11–0093, ‘‘Near- reactor fuel was offloaded to the Unit 4 4.2, SECY–11–0124, and SECY–11– Term Report and Recommendations for spent fuel pool (SFP). Following the 0137. Agency Actions Following the Events in Current regulatory requirements and earthquake, the three operating units Japan,’’ dated July 12, 2011. These existing plant capabilities allow the automatically shut down and offsite recommendations were enhanced by the NRC to conclude that a sequence of power was lost to the entire facility. The NRC staff following interactions with events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi emergency diesel generators (EDGs) stakeholders. Documentation of the accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. started at all six units providing staff’s efforts is contained in SECY–11– Therefore, continued operation and alternating current (ac) electrical power 0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions to be continued licensing activities do not to critical systems at each unit. The Taken Without Delay From the Near- pose an imminent threat to public facility response to the earthquake Term Task Force Report,’’ dated health and safety. However, NRC’s appears to have been normal. September 9, 2011, and SECY–11–0137, assessment of new insights from the ‘‘Prioritization of Recommended events at Fukushima Dai-ichi leads the 1 CP holders, as used in this Order, includes CPs, staff to conclude that additional in active or deferred status, as identified in Actions to be Taken in Response to Attachment 1 to this Order (i.e., Watts Bar, Unit 2; Fukushima Lessons Learned,’’ dated requirements must be imposed on and Bellefonte, Units 1 and 2) October 3, 2011. Licensees or CP holders to increase the VerDate Mar<15>2010 13:40 Mar 16, 2012 Jkt 226001 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\19MRN1.SGM 19MRN1 emcdonald on DSK29S0YB1PROD with NOTICES 16092 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices capability of nuclear power plants to accident occur; and (3) emergency beyond design basis external events, mitigate beyond-design-basis external preparedness programs that include this Order requires strategies with events. These additional requirements measures such as sheltering and increased capacity to implement are needed to provide adequate evacuation. The defense-in-depth protective actions concurrently at protection to public health and safety, strategy also provides for multiple multiple units at a site. The strategies as set forth in Section III of this Order. physical barriers to contain the shall be developed to add multiple ways Guidance and strategies required by radioactive materials in the event of an to maintain or restore core cooling, this Order would be available if the loss accident. The barriers are the fuel containment and SFP cooling of power, motive force, and normal cladding, the reactor coolant pressure capabilities in order to improve the access to the ultimate heat sink to boundary, and the containment. These defense-in-depth of licensed nuclear prevent fuel damage in the reactor and defense-in-depth features are embodied power reactors. SFP, affected all units at a site in the existing regulatory requirements The Commission has determined that simultaneously. This Order requires a and thereby provide adequate protection ensuring adequate protection of public three-phase approach for mitigating of the public health and safety. health and safety requires that power beyond-design-basis external events. Following the events of September 11, reactor Licensees and CP holders The initial phase requires the use of 2001, the NRC issued Order EA–02–026, develop, implement and maintain installed equipment and resources to dated February 25, 2002, which guidance and strategies to restore or maintain or restore core cooling, required Licensees to develop mitigating maintain core cooling, containment, and containment, and SFP cooling. The strategies related to the key safety SFP cooling capabilities in the event of transition phase requires providing functions of core cooling, containment, a beyond-design-basis external event. sufficient, portable, onsite equipment and SFP cooling. NEI Document 06–12, These new requirements provide a and consumables to maintain or restore ‘‘B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline’’ greater mitigation capability consistent these functions until they can be (ADAMS Accession No. ML070090060) with the overall defense-in-depth accomplished with resources brought provides guidelines that describe the philosophy, and, therefore, greater from off site. The final phase requires necessary mitigating strategies. The NRC assurance that the challenges posed by obtaining sufficient offsite resources to endorsed these guidelines in a letter beyond-design-basis external events to sustain those functions indefinitely. dated December 22, 2006, designated as power reactors do not pose an undue Additional details on an acceptable Official Use Only. Those mitigating risk to public health and safety. In order approach for complying with this Order strategies were developed in the context to provide reasonable assurance of will be contained in final Interim Staff of a localized event that was envisioned adequate protection of public health and Guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued to challenge portions of a single unit. safety, all operating reactor licenses and by the NRC in August 2012. This The events at Fukushima, however, CPs under Part 50 identified in guidance will also include a template to demonstrate that beyond-design-basis Attachment 1 to this Order shall be be used for the plan that will be external events may adversely affect: (1) modified to include the requirements submitted in accordance with Section More than one unit at a site with two identified in Attachment 2 to this Order.