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'Like Fish in Poisonous Waters': Attacks on Media Freedom in Somalia

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'Like Fish in Poisonous Waters': Attacks on Media Freedom in Somalia HUMAN RIGHTS “Like Fish in Poisonous Waters” Attacks on Media Freedom in Somalia WATCH “Like Fish in Poisonous Waters” Attacks on Media Freedom in Somalia Copyright © YEAR Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-33474 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org MAY 2016 ISBN: 978-1-6231-33474 “Like Fish in Poisonous Waters” Attacks on Media Freedom in Somalia Map .......................................................................................................... I Glossary ................................................................................................... II Summary ................................................................................................. 1 Recommendations .................................................................................... 6 Methodology .......................................................................................... 11 I. Background ......................................................................................... 13 II. Abuses against Journalists in South-Central Somalia and Puntland ....... 22 III. Al-Shabab Abuses against Journalists ................................................. 48 IV. Self-Censorship ................................................................................. 52 V. Dangers Faced By Female Journalists.................................................... 54 VI. Lack of Investigations and Fair Prosecutions ........................................ 56 VII. Applicable Legal Framework .............................................................. 63 VIII. Somalia’s International Partners ....................................................... 72 Acknowledgements ................................................................................. 74 Annexes ................................................................................................. 75 Map Adapted with the permission of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, from the map originally published in Mosley, J. (2015), Somalia’s Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities. I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | MAY 2016 Glossary Al-Shabab Islamist armed group controlling much of the countryside and key supply routes in south-central Somalia ASWJ Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a a Sufi Islamist group that controls two towns in Galgadud region CID Criminal Investigation Department, part of the Federal Police NISA National Intelligence and Security Agency, Somalia’s intelligence service Somalia’s internationally recognized administrations include: SFG Somali Federal Government, which came to power in 2012 after the end of the transition period, and is based in Mogadishu GIA Galmudug Interim Administration, interim administration comprising regions of Galgadud and part of Mudug IJA Interim Jubaland Administration, interim administration comprising regions of Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo ISWA Interim South West Administration, interim administration comprising regions of Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle “LIKE FISH IN POISONOUS WATERS” II Summary The authorities, the public, and the militants are all hostile to us. We are like fish in poisonous waters, we can be attacked or killed at any time. -Journalist working in Galkayo, February 2015 On October 12, 2014, Abdirisak Jama Elmi, known as “Black,” a veteran journalist working for the private Somali Channel TV, was outside his home in Mogadishu when a man in a car started shooting. “As I was trying to escape the man started shooting automatic rounds and I felt as though he hit me about 10 times in my back,” Abdirisak said. “I could hear several voices telling the shooter to aim better. I could hear them saying, ‘He is still alive!’” Bullets struck Abdirisak in the hand and several times in the back. He spent four months in the hospital and continues to receive weekly medical treatment. As a result of his injuries, he can no longer carry out his reporting activities. Following the attack, government officials including the head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) promised accountability. Yet, Abdirisak says he was never interviewed or asked to give a witness statement about his attack. He continues to live in fear: “The attackers are still alive, they know me and I don’t know them.” In 2015, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Somalia at the top of its list of countries where journalists’ killings go uninvestigated. Since 2014, 10 journalists have been killed in Somalia, four in apparent targeted attacks. In addition, six journalists survived assassination attempts, and three have been injured while reporting. Scores have received threatening phone calls and text messages urging them to change their reporting or face the consequences. While Somali authorities have often committed to holding those responsible for attacks against journalists to account, accountability has been both extremely limited and uneven. For incidents of killings of journalists which occurred since 2014, there has been only one prosecution. Somali journalists throughout south-central Somalia and Puntland told Human Rights Watch that over the last two years, freedom of the media has come under threat from all 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | MAY 2016 sides in ongoing fighting between governmental forces and various non-state armed groups. As Somalia prepares for an electoral process (without a popular vote) in late 2016, threats and attacks against journalists are undermining Somalis’ rights to basic and accurate information as media organizations censor themselves to survive. This report focuses on abuses by state and non-state actors against journalists and other media workers since 2014. It is based on over 50 interviews with journalists working throughout south-central Somalia and Puntland, the semi-autonomous state in northeastern Somalia. Beyond killings, attempted killings, and a range of threats, the report also documents how journalists in the new interim regional states and in Puntland face unique obstacles that undermine their reporting. Over the last two years, Somalia has experienced yet another period of heightened political and security instability since the collapse of the state in 1991. Politically, much of the recent attention of the Somali federal and regional authorities, as well as their donor and regional partners, has focused on efforts to establish a federal state system in Somalia with the establishment of interim regional administrations. This had been seen as a prerequisite for a political transition and a selection of a new government and legislature later in 2016. Tight political deadlines around the establishment of federal states, and the framework for the 2016 electoral process, along with the armed conflict with Al-Shabab in many parts of south-central Somalia have all increased the importance of access to information and political control of news content. Hopes that the new authorities who came to office in Mogadishu in 2012, in Puntland in 2014, and within newly created interim regional administrations would bring respite to journalists have been dashed. The government, the interim regional administrations, and Al-Shabab have all sought to manipulate the media to shape public opinion and enhance their power at a heavy cost to media freedom and the safety and security of journalists. The federal government and regional authorities have used a wide range of tactics to compel journalists to cover key issues in a way authorities deem acceptable. These include arbitrary arrests and forced closures of media outlets, threats, harassment, and occasionally the filing of criminal charges. Federal and regional authorities have temporarily closed 10 media outlets in 2014 and 2015. Intelligence service and security “LIKE FISH IN POISONOUS WATERS” 2 force officials have imposed bans on reporting specific issues, such as statements by Al- Shabab, and clamped down on media outlets that don’t comply with these orders. At the same time, threats, attacks and even killings go uninvestigated and unprosecuted. Regional authorities in contested towns – such as Baidoa in 2014, and Dhusamareb and Guri’el in the central region in 2015 – arbitrarily detained, threatened and closed down media outlets to control political coverage, particularly on issues related to debates over federalism and the establishment of interim regional states. After some initial respite, the new authorities in Puntland have carried out a number of arrests, closure of radio stations and in one instance the pursuit of criminal charges against a media outlet. Al-Shabab has not let-up in threats and attacks against journalists, treating them as extensions of the Somali government or foreign military forces. Female journalists in Somalia face additional
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