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Truth Behind Bars Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S

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Truth Behind Bars Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S Truth Behind Bars Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S. Custody February 2010 International Human Rights Law Clinic University of California, Berkeley, School of Law 396 Simon Hall Berkeley, CA 94720-7200 phone: (510) 643-4800 humanrightsclinic.org International Human Rights Law Clinic University of California, Berkeley School of Law Truth Behind Bars colombian paramilitary leaders in u.s. custody February 2010 International Human Rights Law Clinic University of California, Berkeley, School of Law INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF LAW The International Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) designs and implements innovative human rights projects to advance the struggle for justice on behalf of individuals and marginalized communities through advocacy, research, and policy development. The IHRLC employs an interdisciplinary model that leverages the intellectual capital of the university to provide innovative solutions to emerging human rights issues. The IHRLC develops collaborative partnerships with researchers, scholars, and human rights activists worldwide. Students are integral to all phases of the IHRLC’s work and acquire unparal- leled experience generating knowledge and employing strategies to address the most urgent human rights issues of our day. For more information, please visit: www.humanrightsclinic.org. Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................2 Background ..........................................................................................................................................................4 Impacts of Extraditions on Colombia’s Accountability Measures .................................................................6 Policy Rationales for U.S. Support of Colombia’s Accountability Measures ...............................................8 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................11 Appendix ...........................................................................................................................................................12 Notes ..................................................................................................................................................................16 Authors and Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................28 executive summary On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to of Colombian trade unionists, an obstacle to se- Colom bia, William Brownfield, announced the curing a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement; extradition to the United States of fourteen lead- and (3) align U.S. foreign policy with inter- ers of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, national law. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self- 1 Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC), to face WE RECOMMEND THAT THE UNITED STATES: drug charges.2 These paramilitary leaders are im- plicated in terrorizing and killing thousands of »» Create» an» effective» and» efficient» procedure» innocent civilians. As part of their efforts to seize for» judicial» cooperation.» The United States control of territory and drug routes, paramili- should establish a procedure that provides tary leaders targeted trade unionists and other timely, consistent, and reliable access by Co- members of civil society who they perceived as lombian prosecutors, judges, and victims to threats. Ambassador Brownfield pledged that the extradited paramilitary commanders. This transfer of these individuals to the United States procedure should also ensure that informa- would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to tion obtained by U.S. law enforcement from hold paramilitaries accountable for mass atroci- extradited paramilitaries is shared with Co- ties in Colombia. Thirty former members of the lombian judicial authorities. AUC (Defendants) are currently in U.S. custody. »» Incentivize» extradited» paramilitary» leaders» Despite U.S. stated goals, review of available to» disclose» details» about» all» their» crimes» and» data indicates that the extraditions of paramili- the»identities»of»their»accomplices»in»the»mili- tary leaders have had adverse consequences for tary,» government» and» national» and» foreign» U.S. foreign policy by undermining rule of law busi»nesses.»The United States should actively in Colombia. The extraditions have (1) substan- encourage extra dited leaders to testify about tially diminished Defendants’ cooperation with their crimes and allies by conditioning sen- ongoing human rights and corruption investiga- tence reductions or other benefits achieved tions in Colombia; (2) severely curtailed access to through plea-bargaining on effective coopera- remedies for Colombian victims; and (3) under- tion. Possible benefits of cooperation should mined U.S. counternarcotics efforts by prompt- include provision of visas to family members ing a ruling by Colombia’s Supreme Court to of Defendants under threat in Colombia. block future extraditions of demobilized para- »» Initiate» investigations» for» torture» commit- militaries to the United States. ted» by» extradited» paramilitary» leaders.» The The United States should reform its policies and United States should hold extradited leaders practices regarding criminal prosecutions of extra- accountable for all their crimes under federal dited Colombian paramilitaries to better support law, including torture, and promote justice for U.S. foreign policy interests by promoting Defen- Colom bian victims. Torture prosecutions will dants’ cooperation with Colombian law enforce- also provide additional incentives for Defen- ment. Active U.S. support of Colombian account- dants to cooperate with Colombian and U.S. ability measures will (1) strengthen the rule of authorities. law in Colombia; (2) address unsolved murders 1 truth behind bars Colombian Paramilitary Commanders in U.S. Custody » Hernán Giraldo Serna was the commander of sev- of his troops.16 In January 2008, a Colombian court eral paramilitary blocs and was one of Colombia’s top convicted him of forcibly disappearing at least sixty- five cocaine traffickers.3 Giraldo Serna has confessed seven residents of the provincial capital, Medellín, to murdering several public officials.4 He is linked to including children as young as thirteen years old.17 hundreds of murders and is accused of ordering the » Guillermo Pérez Alzate was the commander of the forced disappearances of four government investiga- approximately 700 combatants of the Libertadores del tors5 and raping nineteen women, including girls as Sur Bloc which operated in the coca-growing zones.18 young as twelve years old.6 He has confessed to 120 murders19 and admitted to » Carlos Jiménez-Naranjo, a high-ranking leader of forcibly recruiting minors.20 Approximately 1,660 the AUC, was the commander of the 7,000 mem- individuals have registered as victims of his troops.21 bers of the Central Bolivar Bloc.7 During testimony » Rodrigo Tovar Pupo was the commander of the in Colombia, he admitted to 578 violent crimes, in- 4,500 members of the AUC’s Norte Bloc.22 Gov- cluding over 450 murders.8 More than 16,000 peo- ernment investigators have linked his troops to 768 ple have registered as victims of crimes committed by forced disappearances and 200 massacres.23 He has his troops.9 He was involved in the murder of Carlos confessed to over 600 crimes, including forcibly dis- Castaño, former head of the AUC, and is accused of appearing seven government investigators and killing plotting to kill more than 6,000 demobilized para- forty fishermen.24 Tovar-Pupo oversaw a campaign to militaries.10 exterminate union leaders in Northern Colombia.25 » Salvatore Mancuso Gómez was “one of the most » Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez was the commander of the powerful members of the AUC leadership.”11 Man- 2,700 fighters of the Mineros Bloc.26 He has con- cuso planned and executed several of Colombia’s fessed to participating in 235 homicides and was bloodiest massacres, including the 1997 torture and accused of several murders, kidnappings, and forced massacre of fifty residents of the town of Mapirip- recruitment of minors by Colombian prosecutors.27 án.12 Mancuso has confessed to 477 crimes involving Approximately 3,522 people have registered as vic- 881 victims, including murders, forced disappear- tims of his troops.28 ances, forced recruitment of minors and forced dis- » Hebert Veloza García commanded the AUC 13 Cali- placements. ma and Bananero Blocs, responsible for over 1,200 » Diego Murillo Bejarano served as the “de facto victims.29 Veloza confessed to ordering massacres, leader” of the AUC.14 He has confessed to involve- personally killing more than 100 people, and partici- ment in several massacres and has implicated Co- pating in thousands of other crimes including forced lombian security forces in human rights atrocities.15 displacements.30 Over 11,300 individuals have registered as victims Introduction groups created in the 1980s to fight left-wing guerillas, has become a powerful network of On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombian drug traffickers and warlords. Over Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the the
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