BYU Law Review Volume 1978 | Issue 1 Article 3 3-1-1978 Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test James W. Torke Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons Recommended Citation James W. Torke, Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1978 BYU L. Rev. 1 (1978). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1978/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test James W. Torke* Since its formulation in 1919 in Schenck v. United States,' the clear and present danger test has drifted uncertainly through changing styles of free speech doctrine. Promulgated by a unani- mous C~urt,~next used as a dissenters' banner,3 then employed by majorities4 and even an apparent, if occasional, con~ensus,~ sometime after its drastic reformulation in 1951 in Dennis u. United States6 it surely fell from whatever general grace it had enjoyed. Since that time, its use, at least its explicit use, has been confined to a few specific instances such as contempt cases in- volving free speech claims.' Later I will contend that the clear and present danger test has been more widely used, although in masked form, than has been admitted and that its value lies in more than its vivid form.8 But for now I wish to suggest the extent of its rejection.