J Kisolo Ssonko
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On Collective Action: underpinning the plural subject with a model of planning agency Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield March 2014 Abstract This thesis aims to give an account of collective action. It starts with a detaile presentation of its underl!ing phenomenolog!. It is argue that in order to un erstan this phenomenolog!" we must move be!on the framework of individual agency$ thus re%ecting &ichael 'ratman's Share Cooperative Activit! Account. )oing so opens up a space for &argaret *ilbert's +lural Su#%ect Theor!. +lural Su#%ect Theor! is presente as capturing this phenomenolog! #! allowing that we can act as collective agents. ,owever" it also creates a pu--le centring on the relation #etween individual autonom! an constraint #! the collective will. The solution to this pu--le" this thesis argues" is to appl! 'ratman's planning theor! of agency to the collective agent. In doing so" *ilbert(s theor! is improve " such that it is #etter able to capture the sense in which living social lives entangles our sense of individual agentive identit! with our sense of collective agentive identit!. Acknowledgements I woul like to thank the .niversit! of Sheffiel Philosoph! Department for funding me to complete a research training &A and encouraging me to take up the Ph)$ the A,/C for providing me with the funding to allow me to undertake the Ph)$ and Steve )eegan for proofrea ing and recommending many a itional commas. I have #enefite greatl! from the guidance and support of m! supervisors" Paul 0aulkner and /osanna Keefe. In particular, their reigning me back from overambitious claims and making me concentrate hard on getting the fundamentals sorte " and Paul(s encouragement to go running to de-stress. Parts of this thesis began as" or forme the basis for, papers presente at the )epartment's Postgra uate Seminar, and benefite from the comments receive on those occasions. In particular, m! fellow postgra uate stu ents helpe me to get a grasp on the variet! of intuitions regarding 1uestions of autonom!. Similarl!" the comments from au ience members at the talks I gave at the 2th and 3th Conferences on Collective Intentionality" inclu ing those of &ichel 'ratman an &argaret *ilbert, helpe me hone m! ideas. 0ee back from anonymous referees, on m! two publishe papers, also helpe greatl!. The assistance of Jeff 4ancaster, in helping me to knock the final raft into what is hopefull! a goo shape" and shaking out any sneaky bugs" has #een much appreciate . I am eternall! grateful to m! mum" Susan Pascoe" for raising me in a wa! that allowe me" against the troubles I face , to reach a place where I coul complete this stu !. 0inall!" I woul like to thank m! partner Kim ,arrison, for bucketloa s of help with spelling and grammar 5particularl! for battling through some of the earl!" ver! rough" rafts6 and for providing me with the emotional support without which it is certain that I woul never have been able to get this far. Contents 0.0 – Introduction.............................................................................................................................p.1 1.0 – Our social lives......................................................................................................................... p. 4 1.1 – Capturing the phenomenology of the phenomenon............................................p.5 1.1.a – Unity 1.1.b – Collective intentionality 1.1.c – Detachment 1.1.d – Constraint 1.2 – The phenomenological state of play..................................................................... p. 20 1.3 – Why should we care?................................................................................................. p. 22 1.4 – Chapter summary...................................................................................................... p. 27 2.0 – Mere sums.............................................................................................................................. p. 29 2.1 – The framework of individual agency......................................................................p.31 2.2 – Mere sums -vs- the experience of unity.................................................................p.37 2.3 – Mere sums -vs- the feeling of collective intentionality......................................p.40 2.3.a – The problem of control 2.3.b – Bratman's solution to the problem of control 2.3.c – Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account 2.4 – Mere sums -vs- detachment..................................................................................... p. 54 2.5 – Mere sums -vs- constraint........................................................................................ p. 59 2.6 – Chapter summary......................................................................................................p.63 3.0 – Plural subjects.......................................................................................................................p.64 3.1 – The possibility of social unity..................................................................................p.66 3.1.a – Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory 3.2 – The we -vs- the feeling of unity...............................................................................p.74 3.3 – The we -vs- the feeling of collective intentionality.............................................p.79 3.4 – The we -vs- the feeling of detachment..................................................................p.83 3.5 – The we -vs- the feeling of constraint.....................................................................p.85 3.5.a – The complication of hierarchy and standing conventions 3.6 – Chapter summary......................................................................................................p.90 4.0 – Harmony, discord and autonomy.......................................................................................p.91 4.1 – Harmony and discord of wills..................................................................................p.93 4.2 – Harmony of commitments of the will.................................................................... p.9 6 4.3 – Discord between commitments of the will........................................................p.103 4.3.a – The puzzle of intersubjectivity 4.4 – Chapter summary....................................................................................................p.114 5.0 – Constraint by the will.........................................................................................................p.115 5a.0 – Constraint by the individual will.........................................................................p.118 5a.1 – Intentions as rational scaffolding 5a.2 – Why practical utility is not enough 5a.3 – Self-governance and having a where-I-stand 5b.0 – Constraint by the collective Will........................................................................ p.1 37 5b.1 – Constructing the plural agent 5b.2 – Identification 5b.3 – Inauthenticity and the transcendental argument 5c.1 – Chapter summary..................................................................................................p.153 6.0 – Modified PST.......................................................................................................................p.155 6.1 – Replacing pooling with entanglement................................................................p.156 6.2 – PST* as better capturing the phenomenology..................................................p.164 6.2.a – Romantic couples 6.2.b – Political obligation 6.3 – Chapter summary....................................................................................................p.174 7.0 – Conclusion...........................................................................................................................p.175 8.0 – Bibliography........................................................................................................................p.183 7... when we came down from the mountain, there was much foolish talk about who got there first … All this was nonsense. And in Kathmandu, to put a stop to such talk, Hillary and I signed a statement in which we said (we reached the summit together(89 Tenzing Norga!" on reaching the summit of ;verest together with ; mund Hillary Introduction: Social Life ven a mundane a! is likel! to involve social interaction. On the occasional mornings ;when I am not caring for m! chil ren" I like to bu! a newspaper from the corner shop. )oing so re1uires talking to the owner, an giving her m! mone!$ mone! I ha to get others to give to me. &oreover, even when I get back home and I am alone rea ing it, m! interpretation of the s!mbols on its pages involves their meaning having been efine #! m! linguistic community. The point is that, understanding these social interactions will clearl! pla! a vital part in understanding our actions. This thesis takes up a particular aspect 1 .llman, 1956, p.263. 1 of this task. Our actions can #e social not onl! in that the! ma! involve cooperation" as in the cornershop interaction, nor onl! in the fact that the! ma! epend on the actions of others. A itionall!" our actions can #e social in the sense that we feel ourselves to be able to do certain things together. In this wa!" I will #e examining what it means to sa! that we are capable of collective action. 'ecause the individual has ha such primacy in many inquiries into the nature of agenc!" we might think that collective