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Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915–1918 View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Wilfrid Laurier University Canadian Military History Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 2 1-23-2012 Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915–1918: Wartime Technological Progress Revisited Bill Rawling Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence Recommended Citation Rawling, Bill (1994) "Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915–1918: Wartime Technological Progress Revisited," Canadian Military History: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 2. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Rawling: Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915–1918: Wartime Technolo Communications in the Canadian Corps,l915-1918 Wartime Technological Progress Revisited Bill Rawling 6 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1994 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 2 arfare has, for millenia, been a rich sure his corrections were being monitored. W source of myth and legend, and one of As he had to carry out the observer's duties as the main reasons many historians proclaim well as his own, with no one to keep a look-out Herodotus to be the first to ply their trade is for enemy aircraft, it could not have been because, at least, he discounted divine popular work. 3 Radio-telephony, the intervention as the prime explanation for the transmission of human speech by wireless, ebb and flow of battle. Myths, however, had been under development since 1910 but persist to this day, one of the most popular in had not moved beyond basic experimentation our industrialized culture being a common at the end of 1914.4 belief that technological development accelerates in wartime. In many cases this On the ground signallers tried to sort out might be true; the First World War, for the communications problems of trench example, saw much innovation (this author warfare. In late 1914 and early 1915 the hesitates to use the word "progress") in the Canadians in England, still waiting to be sent development of tanks, aircraft, submarines, to the front, trained the men who would be and chemical warfare. In that same war, responsible for sending and receiving however, communications technology did not messages, though within battalions means of keep apace, ironic (especially in the British communication were limited and trainees Expeditionary Force) given commanders' thus concentrated on flag drill and lamps. 5 insistence that they needed to control their Telephones, the most convenient means of troops if they were to win battles. Though communication then available, were the much has been said of the impact of machine responsibility of brigade and division guns and quick-firing artillery on the Western signalers, who faced an almost impossible Front, another important source of heavy task; when laid on the ground, wire was casualties was the lack of communication easily destroyed by shelling, and the Germans between the troops in combat and the officers did not lack for artillery, and stringing it up responsible for providing artillery support or on poles increased its endurance only slightly, sending in reserves; 1 as a result men died in so the only recourse left to the short-handed hopeless, unsupported assaults or were signallers was to bury it. Finding labour for overwhelmed by counterattacks after such a task when infantry units, who normally capturing their objectives. Communications provided work parties, were busy digging were further complicated by the addition of their own trenches and dug-outs was not aircraft to the battlefield, with artillery easy, and a wire shortage made matters worse. observation and photo reconnaissance adding By July 1916 cable-laying was quick, but the war over land to the war on land. 2 only because an entire battalion worked on Maintaining contact between aircraft and the the project at any given time, 6 and soldiers troops they were supposed to support would digging trenches for telephone lines were be an ongoing challenge. subject to shelling and machine gun fire as they worked through the night. Wireless An indication of the state of the art in telegraphy, which as its name implies did 1914 could be found in the the most away with wire, was in the early years of the technologically advanced arm of the British war available only in small numbers, reflecting Expeditionary Force- the artillery. Batteries limited manufacturing resources. 7 could call on wireless aircraft to correct fall of shot, and in December what had simply been The limits of communications technology called the wireless unit became 9 Squadron, were all too evident when on 22 April and in which supplied aircraft and crews to other the days that followed the Canadian units as required, though its pilots did not Contingent fought its first major battle at lead easy lives, as the transmitter they carried Second Ypres, when the Germans attempted was so bulky they could not take an observer. a limited offensive using large quantities of Further, it required so much space in the poison gas on the Western Front for the first small observer's cockpit there was no room time. As often happened, German artillery for a receiver, so the pilot could not be entirely quickly cut telephone com-munications and 7 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/2 2 Rawling: Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915–1918: Wartime Technolo headquarters knew little of what was Complicating the development of happening. 8 One possible means of dispelling battlefield communications (as ifthe presence confusion was the contact patrol, where an of the enemy was not enough) were rules and aircraft overflew the front lines to see how the regulations designed to ensure security, as in troops were doing, and one of the first was mid-1915 the Germans were often well­ during Second Ypres, when the British lost informed of Allied intentions. "Carefully touch with units at St. Julien and sent aircraft planned raids were met by hostile fire exactly to locate them. 9 There was, as yet, no way for timed and directed. Relieving troops would troops on the ground to communicate with be greeted, if not by shells, by shouts of the aircraft that sought them out, and the welcome from the opposing trenches. One pilots had to rely on their own eyes to pick out day a Scottish battalion took over its new friendly from enemy soldiers and determine front to the strains of its regimental march their condition, so as a technique it left much played upon a German cornet!"14 Induction, room for refinement. It was also dangerous, by which a signal travelling along a wire also requiring pilots to fly low, within range of escaped into the surrounding earth, allowed small-arms fire. 10 the Germans to listen in on front-line conversations, from as far away as six hundred Heavy reliance on the telephone could yards, through loops of wire set up in no­ thus not be avoided, in spite of its vulnerable man's land or even within their own positions. cables. Raiders sometimes took the device The solution, developed in 1915, was the with them into enemy trenches, with a line Fullerphone, a telegraph which seriously crew laying wire through no-man's land. On diminished induction by way of a sophisticated one raid in mid-November 1915 a small electronic arrangement. 15 Given its Canadian assault fought its way into German complexity, however, the device was not positions, set up a telephone, and sent the universally available, and in 1916 signs posted message: "inandallgoingwell."11 Infantrymen in the front line still proclaimed that anyone also used telephones to keep in touch with giving away information which the Germans supporting artillery. Though the system was could pick up on listening sets would be far from perfect, troops often complained that court-martialled. 16 It had a further "Communication between heavies [artillery) disadvantage, being a Morse system, in and the trenches is one of our weak points,"12 requiring operators trained in that technique. as enemy shelling cut lines and prevented Thus, in the front line, officers and men were them from calling for retaliation. prohibited from discussing important matters over the telephone, nor were they allowed to A possible solution was soon mention unit identities, names of officers, forthcoming-laddering- a technique locations of ammunition stores, and above consisting in laying parallel cables about all, timings for reliefs ,I? The same applied to sixty yards apart connected by lateral lines. those developing or working with wireless. To shut down communications, artillery would One of the first times the device was used in have to cut both main cables between cross­ the front trenches was in March 1916, by an pieces. The method was not without its officer of the Princess Patricia's Canadian disadvantages, calling for more than double Light Infantry to control indirect machine the length of cable necessary for a single line, gun fire. His innovative approach led to his and requiring frequent overhauls, as the great arrest. 18 number of connections made for increased resistance, which worsened over time. 13 It Such setbacks proved minor, however, was, however, far quicker to prepare than and wireless telegraphy improved through buried line, and served well for short periods 1915. In September the British attacked of time, such as the consolidation phase after near Loos, and though the battle is best an assault when front-line infantry needed known for errors in allocating reserves that reliable communications with artillery to help eventually led to the replacement of Sir John defend against German counterattacks.
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