Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
HISTORICISM, PROGRESS, AND THE REDEMPTIVE CONSTITUTION Amy Kapczynski* From what are phenomena rescued? Notjust or not so much from the ill-repute and contempt into which they 'vefallen, but from the catastrophewhen a certainform of transmission often presents them in terms of their "value as heritage"-they are rescued by exhibiting the discontinuity that exists within them. There is a kind of transmission that is a catastrophe. -Walter Benjamin** It is frequently said that there is a necessary relationship between constitutionalism and history. As Stephen Griffin has written, "[c]onstitutional interpretation is always backward-looking ....It draws on the past in order to provide legal authority to the present. Even as it abstracts from historical context, then, constitutional interpretation is dependent on it for its status as law."1 To say this is to make two * Post-Doctoral Fellow in Law and Public Health, Yale Law School. J.D. 2003, Yale Law School. This Article has benefited enormously from the generous comments of many people, to whom I owe a deep debt of gratitude. In particular, I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Susan Gillespie, Serena Mayeri, Robert Post, Reva Siegel, and the editors of Cardozo Law Review. All errors, needless to say, are my own. .* Walter Benjamin, N [Re the Theory of Knowledge; Theory of Progress], in BENJAMIN: PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AESTHETICS 43, 63 (Leigh Hafrey & Richard Sieburth trans. & Gary Smith ed., 1983). 1 Stephen M. Griffin, ConstitutionalTheory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2129 (1999); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34 (1991) ("[T]he Constitution is more than an idea. It is an evolving historical practice, constituted by generations of Americans as they mobilized, argued, resolved their ongoing disputes over the nation's identity and destiny."); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage. The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 268 (1988) ("History is often intrinsic to constitutional adjudication, providing the initial assumptions, the thought structure, the terms of discourse, the backdrop of human experience, or all of these, for many instances of constitutional adjudication."). Other commentators point out that not just constitutional law, but law as a whole, is fundamentally backward-looking. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 43 (1999) (contending that the "historicity of law is its single most prominent feature"); Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of CriticalHistoricism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1997). Gordon writes: For lawyers the past is primarily a source of authority-if we interpret it correctly, it will tell us how to conduct ourselves now. History is not only a source of authority but of legitimacy: It reassures us that what we do now flows continuously out of our past, out of precedents, traditions, fidelity to statutory and Constitutional texts and 1041 HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1041 2004-2005 1042 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:3 related claims. The first one is that constitutions have an ineluctable relationship to history, because they arrive to us from the past.2 The second one is that constitutions always face a question of legitimacy that is also a question of history: How can this text from the past have legitimacy and authority over the people today? 3 One foundational question of constitutional interpretation, then, is: How can we provide an account of constitutional meaning that reconciles the historicity of the Constitution with its present day legitimacy? Accepting that we must think historically if we want to think constitutionally, and that we must, when thinking historically, also account for the present day legitimacy of the Constitution, what kind of history should we practice? This Article is concerned with constitutional historiography, which is to say, the question of how theorists, lawyers, and judges elaborate the past in constitutional context. How ought we conceive of and investigate constitutional history and the backward-looking development of meaning that U.S. constitutionalism is based upon? To explore these questions, this Article draws upon the writings of the Frankfurt School theorist Walter Benjamin, who thought a great deal meanings. Id. One can also look to doctrine to support this claim, since much of what judges and Justices do when they disagree about the Constitution is disagree about history. See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1987) ("The United States Supreme Court has long understood that the task of constitutional analysis requires historical research to discover the meaning imparted to constitutional provisions by those who enacted them."). To offer just a few out of many possible examples of cases that turn on approaches to the constitutional past, consider Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992) (separation of powers); and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-75 (1991) (Eighth Amendment). See also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 69-70 (1996) (discussing the use of history in the Warren Court's jurisprudence). 2 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1026 ("Every legal text is a historical artifact that must be brought into the present in order to be applied."). The importance of the past to contemporary meaning, and particularly linguistic meaning, is discussed in Part I, infra. 3 As Jed Rubenfeld puts the problem, "[d]emocratic freedom is conceived essentially as governance by the will of the actual people of the here and the now. As a result, a text that resists this present will becomes a deviance, a democratic scandal, a problem forever demanding and forever escaping explanation." JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 11 (2001). The question of how the Constitution's democratic aspect and its historical aspect can be reconciled has been one of the most generative and important questions for constitutional theorists in recent decades. It also underpins many recent major works in constitutional law. For example, Rubenfeld's theory of paradigm cases is an effort to answer it, see supra, as is Ackerman's theory of the dualist constitution, see ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3-33. This same question is at the root of Alexander Bickel's articulation of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which Bickel defines as the fact that judicial review can "thwart[] the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now." See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962). The question of judicial review and the question of constitutionalism can in principle be separated, of course, but they are emphatically run together in contemporary American constitutional discourse. The judge becomes the bearer of the Constitution's historical aspect, its ability to connect articulations in the past with the circumstances of the present. HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1042 2004-2005 20051 THE REDEMPTIVE CONSTITUTION 1043 about the concept of history, but little, if at all, about constitutionalism. By exploring Benjamin's concept of history, and his understanding of the three different methodological approaches to history that he postulates-historicism, progressivism, and redemptivism-1 hope to make more visible some of the ways that we think about constitutional history, and some of the effects that these modalities have on our present day constitutional order. My project here is to add to our understanding of constitutional practices, and to make visible the dangers of the most common methodologies through which constitutional thinkers approach the past. One central supposition of this Article-one that I will defend throughout its course-is that our view of history strongly influences our ability to understand and react to the needs of the present. Benjamin's concept of history is rooted in a categorical distinction between that which is "past" and that which is "historical." The past is all that has happened before. History, in contrast, is an interpretive act, or a kind of language, one in which we make meaning by juxtaposing moments of the past and present. Benjamin argues that we create history in relation to the past in the same way that we create constellations out of stars. The past is an "index"; it is the stuff of history, but it does not resemble it. This underlying concept of history grounds Benjamin's attempt to define and criticize what he understood to be the two dominant approaches towards history at the time he was writing: historicism and progressivism. The historicist methodology seeks to understand each moment in the past objectively, on its own terms, and write authoritative histories by relying upon official sources. Benjamin has two main criticisms of historicism. He contends, first, that it is not possible to know history scientifically, without influence from the present, or objectively, through the mere accumulation of facts. For Benjamin, history is always an act of construction, and no single or final answer can be given to any truly historical question. What we make of the past depends upon the interest that we take in it-an interest that is inevitably driven by the needs of today. Benjamin's second objection is that historicism in fact sympathizes with those he called the "victors" of history, and abandons most of the past (such as the past that has not been codified in official documents) as irrelevant. Historicism thus generates histories that claim neutrality but in fact justify the status quo. Benjamin is equally critical, however, of progressives: those who see the flaws of historicism and conclude that they ought to train their gaze on the future rather than the past. The progressive view of history, which Benjamin associated primarily with the Social Democratic Party in Germany between the World Wars, portrays history as a process of continual and inevitable improvement.