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SIMEON DAMIANOV (Sofia, Bulgaria) The Great Powers and the Eastern Crisis of 1875-76 The powerful revival of the Balkan Peoples' national liberation struggles in the course of 1875 and 1876 once again drew the attention of the Great Powers to the problems of Southeastern Europe. Intervention in these events, which shook the European territories of the sultan, was dictated principally by the Great Powers' own proper considerations and interests. Actually this made impossible the coordination of their respective policies and the solution of the crisis through peaceful means, by collective pressure on the Ottoman government in favor of the autonomy of the provinces which had risen in revolt. Although the Eastern Crisis began with the insurrections in Bosnia and Hercegovina during the summer of 1875, its decisive expansion is linked with the April Uprising in Bulgaria in 1876. The latter was not only the apogee of Bulgarian National Revolution; it heated up the political atmosphere in Southeastern Europe and became the most important international event in 1876. It accelerated the war of Serbia and Montenegro with Turkey and gathered into focus all the contradictions of the Great Powers regarding the important questions of their Near Eastern policies. The heroes of the April Uprising are to be credited with historic merit, for through their great sac- rifice the name of Bulgaria, which had been half forgotten by then, came to the fore throughout the world; and the question concerning the indepen- dence of Bulgaria was placed in the center of European diplomacy. Setting out on a deadly struggle against their age-old enslavers, the organizers of the April Uprising were deeply convinced that the shedding of Bulgarian blood would discredit Turkey in the eyes of Europe, be instrumental in neutralizing European diplomacy, and create favorable conditions for an energetic inter- vention on the part of Russia. They regarded the armed assistance of Russia as a most important strategic reserve and decisive prerequisite for the success- 1 ful outcome of the Bulgarian national-liberation revolution 1. In this respect the declarations of Georgi Benkovski, the leader of the April Upris- ing in the Fourth Revolutionary District, were very indicative. Looking at the burning of Panagiurishtehe spoke with tears in his eyes: "My aim is already attained! I have open- ed such a wound in the tyrant's heart that will never heal. As far as Russiais concerned- she is welcome!" This is from Z. Stoianov's Zapiski po bulgarskite vgstaniia. Razkazi po ochevidtsi 1870-1876 (Soma: Liberalinii klub, 1892), p. 395. Tsanko Diustabanov, one of the well-known leaders of the Turnovo Revolutionary District, declared in front of the Turkish court: "I know very well that your kingdom is very large, that all power in 201 The road which the Great Powers traversed in the course of these eventful years-from the flaring up of the uprisings in the Balkans in 1875 to Russia's historic decision to declare war on Turkey-was difficult and complex. Russia, having remained without allies after the Crimean War, feared inter- national isolation and searched continuously for a peaceful solution to the Eastern Crisis. It was persuaded to follow such a course of action by almost all the other powers belonging to the "Concert of Europe," who had declared themselves against the infringement upon the status quo in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. But the situation created in the Balkans after the events of 1875 called to life new factors, weakening the resistance of the West European monarchies and compelling Russia to wage war on Turkey with a view to liberating the Slavs across the Danube River. *** The diplomatic struggles in Europe for the solution of the Eastern Crisis and the prerequisites for the declaration of the Russo-Turkish War (24 April 1877) can be properly evaluated only by considering the interests of the Great Powers in the Near East and the Balkans on the eve of the crisis. Of all the European countries, Russia was the most interested in the events occurring in the Balkans during 1875-76. In spite of the fact that by 1871 it had succeeded in regaining its prestige as a great power (having rejected the humiliating clauses of the 1856 Paris Treaty) it continued to subordinate the Eastern Question to the important problems of its general European policy and to the reforms which had been put into effect during the 1860s. Natu- rally, Russia was anxious to consolidate its authority among the Balkan Christians as their protector and advocate in the face of Turkish arbitrariness. It was not prepared to wage war on Turkey, but preferred acting within the framework of its diplomatic possibilities, coordinating its demarches with the remaining great powers and mostly with its allies grouped in the Three Emperors League in order to alleviate the problems of the Balkan Christians.2 The champion of this diplomatic point of view regarding the Eastern Ques- tion, was the chancellor, Prince A: M. Gorchakov, who enjoyed the un- your hands, that we will not be able to beat you through force; but I also know that you are tyrants and barbarians, that because of the uprising you will fall upon innocent and peaceful people and you will commit outrages. Our aim has not been to defeat you through force but only to provoke you to commit these atrocities, which you have al- ready carried out to the extreme. You have thus been discredited in the eyes of the en- tire civilizedworld. Therefore,our aim has already been achieved: we have defeated you!" Quoted from Iu. Todorov, Vúspominaniiapo vustaniiata v 7iirnovski sandzhak prez 1876 i po sudeneto na bulgarskite vustanitsi v Turnovo (Ruse: Spiro Gulabchev, 1879), pp. 105-06. 2. S. S. Tatischev,Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, 2 vols. (St. Pe- tersburg :A. S. Suvorin, 1903), II, 75, 110. .

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