Cross-Border for Burmese Democracy Struggle
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Cross-border civil society for Burmese democracy struggle By Sai Thet Naing Oo, University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) The struggle for democracy in Burma has been a long haul, and the political deadlock since the general elections in 1990 reveals that the ruling military elites has no intention to change their way of running the country. Burmese opposition groups now face not only the world’s most ruthless military dictator but also the calamity of their own grand strategy in bringing about democratic change. For more than two decades, since the nation-wide democracy movement in 1988, the strategy of Burmese opposition groups, in general, has focused on elite-level regime change by mean of looking for international community pressure. However, the Burmese military junta has remained in total control of the country for the last twenty years surviving the suspension of economic aid, the ban of investment and trade sanctions, the imposition of an arms embargo and ban on visas for senior military officials (Callahan 2000; South 2004). The pro-democracy groups have received support from sympathetic nations and the UN has offered assistances to pave the way out of the political deadlock. However, these efforts have not been able to bring about democratic reform in Burma. Observers agree that civil society in Burma is weak and this has been seen as a major holdup in Burma’s democratic transformation (Mutebi 2000; South 2004; Toe Zaw Lat 2005; Lorch 2006 and Steinberg 2007). On the other hand, , the Burmese opposition groups have yet paid little attention to the role of civil society, which is essential in building sustainable democratization (South 2004). When common people band together for a common purpose or purposes to pursue the interests of their communities through group activities and peaceful ways, effective changes can be made in the face of authoritarian regimes (Dhammar Vappa 2004). The ruling military elites in Burma are obsessed with massively expanding the Tatmadaw or the army. The Burmese military regime currently allocates about 40% of annual national budget to military spending, and in the first ten years of its rule (1988- 1998), the Tatmadaw expanded from less than 200 000 to more than 400 000 soldiers and Burma now has the second largest army in Southeast Asia (Altsean: Aug 2009). In the meantime, the country is going through economic hardship and living standards have dropped dramatically. A Thailand based NGO called Alternative Asean Network on Burma (Altsean- Burma), which has been working to improve democracy in Burma for more than ten years, reports that the number of people living under the poverty line has increased dramatically in the past decade. In 2007, 90% were living on less than $1 per day and malnutrition among children was common (Altsean: Aug 2009). HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB) are among serious epidemics and the number of people dies with these diseases has increased every year. Million of people have migrated to neighboring countries for jobs as they could not find decent employment in their homeland. In the 1990s, the military junta initiated cease-fire deals with a number of armed resistance groups. More than fifteen armed resistance groups have entered cease-fire deals with the regime (The Irrawaddy: Research website: List of Cease-fire Agreements with the Junta accessed 21/4/10). However, the livelihood of the people on the ground 1 has not improved, in some cases, the local people were forced to work on military construction projects and lands were confiscated for military use (South: 2004). In recent decade, a number of self-help groups and community based organizations have appeared to provide basic healthcare, education and social welfare in cease-fire areas. However, independent civil society organizations in Burma have been tightly restricted from being able to make effective contributions (Human Right Watch, April 2010). Burma’s civil war in the past fifty years has resulted more than 700 000 Burmese seeking refugees and asylum in different countries, and nearly half a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country (Altsean: Aug 2009). Burmese refugee camps are scattered in border areas of its neighboring countries, mainly, in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. In the last decade, a new type of civil society has emerged along the border areas. This type of civil society has appeared to embrace the principles of democracy and engage in social change movements. I term this as cross-order civil society. This paper will discuss civil society in categories in the context of Burma, the notion of cross-border civil society and the role of informal adult education in cross-border civil society activities. This paper argues that intervention from the outside of the system is necessary to speed up the momentum of democratic change and cross-border civil society has been presented as the most feasible option for a sustainable democratization. Concepts of civil society and democracy Conceptualizations of civil society are largely found to be based on two perspectives in terms of the space civil society organizations occupy and their function. The first perspective conceptualizes civil society as a space located “between” the state, the economy and the private sphere or family. This space is usually characterized by multi- function of social self-organizations in which social movements and NGOs act. The idea of civil society as being a public space outside the state is essential to maintain democracy in its most effective function (Havel 2004). The latter is “function–related” perspective that sees civil society’s contribution as being helpful or essential to implementing and stabilizing democracy (Goeswinkel 2005, p.13). Civil society is often viewed in instrumental terms. The pluralists emphasize the role of civil society as facilitating in democratic settings such as helping to ensure that the democratic state has the information to meet the needs of citizens. Liberal groups, on the other hand, view civil society in term of the function of power in the society and points out civil society function is to counterbalance the state in order to prevent an over- concentration of power in the hand of the state (Baker 2002, 147). Contemporary definitions of “civil society” are varied and often overlapping, but the essential characteristic of civil society lies in its autonomy from the state. Civil society is also seen as a precondition for democratization or as a monitoring centre of democratic self-government. Goeswinkel (2005:16) explains that in most conceptualizations, the definition of civil society “contains a genuinely liberal core promoting differentiable and repeatable (ideas and opinions) in contrast to a dictatorial or totalitarian system of government tending to embrace all areas and abolish all differentiation”. Tolerance, 2 compromise, and willingness to recognize differences are most common values of civil society while free associations, autonomy and self-organization, and reference to the public interest are the key characters of civil society actors. Steinberg (1999) reminds us that what is more important than having a standard or universal definition for civil society is to recognize the concept of civil society as “an analytical tool to explore societies lies in the hypothesis that if civil society is strong and if citizens band together for the common good based on a sense of community or programmatic trust in the political process of democracy or democratization and lead to diffusion of the centralized power of the state”.… “civil society is thus an essential element of political pluralism” (1-3). Civil society in Burma Defining civil society in the context of Burma Civil society in Burma is an extreme case and defining civil society in the context of Burma is even more convoluted. Independent civil society activities in an authoritarian country like Burma where the state suspicious of any kind of free association, symbolize a struggle to break down barriers to freedom and democracy. Under the Burmese authoritarian regime, civil society organizations have very limited space and civil society in such circumstance is often unrecognizable. Traditionally, civil society, in the western sense, does not exist in Burma. However, it will be misleading to assume that civil society does not have a role in Burmese society. Civil society in Burma is hard to detect and their functions are often overlooked by observers. Civil society under in Burma functions under the banner of traditional activities and religious motto. Civil society in such situation does not fit in the definitions that are common in free societies. Many Burma observers conclude that democratic culture in Burma is weak and this is largely due to the lack of independent and vibrant civil society and a democratic change in Burma is dependent upon the strength and role of free civil society organizations that is yet to emerge (Steinberg 2000; ICG 2001; South 2004; Toe Zaw Latt 2005; Lorch 2006). Many explanations for the lack of civil society in Burma draw from historical and cultural context. Rigid social hierarchy and strong monarchy rule in the country’s past suggest that the weakness of civil society lies in societal-cultural practices. Burmese’s political institution, since pre-colonial monarch time, allows little room for legal opponents and public opinion in governance and legislative matters. Some also see that the Burmese’s perception of “power” is vested in individual more than the ideology or the ruling system of the state (Steinberg 2000). Others have gone further to say that civil society in the view of the West does not have its root in Burmese culture and those civil society organizations instigated in the earlier twenty century were quickly eliminated. Htun Aung Kyaw (1997), a leading Burmese democracy activist and who founded a Burmese civil society foundation in 1997 in the USA observes that “Civil Society in the western sense has no equivalent in the Burmese lexicon.