Jakarta's Turn: a Discourse Analysis of the Indonesian Political Elite's Construction of Indonesia's Identity As a Democra
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Jakarta’s Turn: A discourse analysis of the Indonesian political elite’s construction of Indonesia’s identity as a democratic power of ASEAN and Southeast Asia from 2008-2012. Ciarán Gill S1959905 January 2019 Leiden University MA – International Relations (International Studies) 1 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 3 OUTLINE ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 1. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................. 6 1.1 INDONESIA’S ROLE AS A REGIONAL DEMOCRATIC POWER PRE-2008 ............................................................................. 6 1.2. IDENTITY ............................................................................................................................................. 9 2. THEORY AND METHODS .......................................................................................................... 14 2.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO IDENTITY ....................................................................................... 14 2.2. STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................ 15 3. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S OBLIQUE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY AS A DEMOCRATIC POWER WITHIN ASEAN SETTINGS .................................................................................................................. 17 3.1. THE ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT, 2009 (APSCB) ............................................................ 17 3.2. PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO, STATEMENT TO ASEAN TO MARK THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE ASEAN CHARTER, 2008 20 3.3. PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO, SPEECH TO ASEAN AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE 19TH ASEAN SUMMIT, 2011 21 4. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY AS A DEMOCRATIC POWER WITHIN NON-ASEAN SETTINGS ......................................................................................................... 23 4.1. PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO SPEECH TO THE BALI DEMOCRACY FORUM, 2010 ............................................................... 23 4.2. FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA STATEMENT AT THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE 66TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 2011 ................................................................................................... 26 5. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY WITH REGARDS TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MYANMAR, 2009-2012 ................................................................................... 28 5.1 PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO, SPEECH AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2009 ....... 28 5.2. FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA, CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2010 ............. 30 5.3. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM REPORT, 2012 ................................................. 31 6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 34 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................... 37 2 Introduction This thesis will attempt to elucidate the means by which the political elite of Indonesia has constructed an identity for the country as a ‘democratic power’ (Acharya 2015) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the region of Southeast Asia from 2008 to 2012. We can define political elites as “individuals and small, relatively cohesive, and stable groups with disproportionate power to affect national and supranational political outcomes on a continuing basis” (Best and Higley 2018: 3). A simple working definition of democracy is that it comprises two dimensions: liberal participation and electoral contestation (Dahl 1972 in Case 2015: 21). Intriguingly enough, Indonesia is the largest and most populous nation within Southeast Asia, yet the region itself has historically adopted a “recalcitrant” (Emmerson 1995: 227) approach to democracy. One line of reasoning for democracy’s general historic failure to acquire a foothold in the region points to Southeast Asian states’ weak bureaucratic capabilities (Case 2015: 4). Nonetheless, Indonesia’s development of a democratic identity has produced a striking contrast within the region, where the identity of its largest nation has been generally at odds with the identities of other states. This thesis will explore how the political elite of Indonesia has constructed an identity as a democratic power in the aftermath of the ASEAN Charter coming into force in 2008. It will analyse how Indonesia has constructed a particular identity in the wake of inculcating a democratic agenda within ASEAN. In turn, it will explore how Indonesia has constructed an identity, a Self, via the implicit delineation of an Other, namely the remaining ASEAN states and the Southeast Asia of the past. This thesis will accordingly explore to what extent Indonesia has developed an identity as a democratic power in a manner that is respectful of the norms associated with ASEAN members, namely the ‘ASEAN Way’. In 2007, ASEAN celebrated its fortieth birthday. As an accompaniment to the celebrations, the association adopted the ASEAN Charter. The emergence of this constituent instrument was the response to three primary aims of ASEAN (Woon 2017: 245): to provide the association with a legal personality, establish a robust institutional framework, and create a means of enforcing compliance to the multiple agreements and declarations that emerged from every interaction that took place under the ASEAN umbrella. By creating an institutional framework, ASEAN would therefore be able to realise its ambition of forming an ASEAN Community. This was to be comprised of three pillars: a Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio-cultural Community. All of this, however, theoretically amounted to 3 a legalistic turn that shifted away from the norms that governed ASEAN’s behaviour during the previous forty years: the ASEAN Way. This set of norms prioritised non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, the non- use of force to resolve disputes, the promotion of regional autonomy, and the rejection of military pacts (Acharya 2001: 47-79). Moreover, it emphasised relative informality over legalism, a focus on personal relations among actors, the promotion of consultations and a “reliance on consensus and on common interest rather than on binding commitments” (Severino and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2006: 11). The creation of the ASEAN Way was somewhat predicated upon the “lack of trust” (Emmerson 2008: 24) that had subsisted between Southeast Asian leaders in the years leading up to 1967. Moreover, it was built upon respective states’ wishes to build their economies in peaceful conditions. The ASEAN Way therefore stands in direct contrast to the legalism – complete with the “adversarial posturing” (Acharya 2001: 63) and majority vote procedures – that is found within Western multilateral institutions. The constrained nature of the ASEAN Way has historically led ASEAN to differ from other regional organisations such as the European Union or the African Union (Dosch 2008: 528), as it accordingly inhibited the promotion of political liberalism within the region. However, Article 1.7 of the ASEAN Charter 2007 proclaims that one of the purposes of the organisation is to “strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN” (ASEAN 2007). The association’s provision of this legalistic commitment to its member states – a commitment generally at odds with the soft authoritarian nature of ASEAN’s regimes (Dosch 2008: 529) – therefore implies a deviation from the ASEAN Way. Moreover, it implies a partial embrace of liberalism, rendering it more alike other regional organisations such as the European Union. Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, was the primary force behind the inclusion of democratic principles within the ASEAN Charter (Acharya 2015: 13). This accorded with the state’s overall aim of placing ASEAN on a more liberal footing (Ibid: 55), dragging it into line with its own embrace of democracy that had arisen in 1998 after the downfall of President Suharto. With the ASEAN Charter coming into force in 2008, how did Indonesia build upon this success to solidify and enhance its identity as a democratic power? This research is important, firstly, as it adds to the ever-expanding and cutting-edge literature on identity, utilising the insights of Rumelili (2004), Hansen (2006) and Lebow (2016) amongst others. It enables us to see how elites can performatively create an identity for 4 their country by utilising language. The ascertainment of a state’s identity, i.e. the state’s Self, is supremely important. This is because the state’s Self can be thought of as a “space of perceivable and acceptable options for not only what type of foreign policy is considered right, smart or legitimate, but also for the boundaries for what are possible and acceptable suggestions