Middle East & North Africa Regional Summary
April 15, 2014
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Month Day, Year
Executive Summary
Across the Middle East and North Africa, tensions remain high amidst political turmoil
across the region, linked largely to upcoming elections in various states and concerns over
spillover from the Syrian conflict. In Libya, despite the impending end to oil terminal blockades in the restive eastern regions, anti-government sentiments continue to rise amidst persistent insecurity, resulting in ten-day civil disobedience campaigns in Tripoli and Benghazi. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood protests continue on a weekly basis, while displaying an increasingly violent nature, particularly following the resignation of former
Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi ahead of his bid for the presidency. In Tunisia,
meanwhile, crackdowns on extremist preachers and mosques sparked clashes in outlying
areas, while security forces continue to dismantle militant cells in urban areas, most recently in Sfax. Finally, in Algeria, unrest in outlying areas persists in the lead up to April HIGH17 RISK presidential elections, with concerns rising over a possible escalation in anti- government protest campaigns in the event of incumbent President Bouteflika's expected victory.
Meanwhile in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions peaked in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, highlighted by Israel's cancellation of a fourth prisoner release and the Palestinian
Authority's application for membership in numerous international conventions. In
addition, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham militants continue to entrench their positions
outside of Baghdad, amidst concerns over rising violence ahead of parliamentary elections
on April 30. In Lebanon, the implementation of security plans in Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley underscores government efforts to mitigate escalating sectarian tensions and violence related to the ongoing Syrian conflict . Page
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Similar concerns have impacted countries in the Persian Gulf region, amidst legislation in numerous Gulf States imposing penalties on participating in or funding foreign conflicts, as well as setting deadlines for the return of combatants. In particular, such measures were recently instated in Bahrain, amidst an uptick in militant attacks surrounding the Formula 1 Gulf Air Grand Prix. Finally, in Iran, the government reportedly continues to adhere to agreements regarding its nuclear program, with negotiations on a permanent agreement likely to continue despite regional tensions.
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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past two weeks. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.
HIGH RISK Egypt ...... 4 Iraq...... 8 Lebanon ...... 12 Libya...... 16 MEDIUM RISK Algeria ...... 21 Bahrain ...... 25 Iran...... 30 Israel & Palestinian Territories ...... 34 Tunisia ...... 37 Notable Dates for the period of April 15-30 ...... 41
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HIGH RISK Egypt Near-daily Muslim Brotherhood student protests on university campuses characterized by increasing incidents of violence, including the use of explosive devices, and an uptick in clashes with security forces resulting in deaths of protesters. Sinai Peninsula militancy persists despite Egyptian military campaigns, including the killing of a prominent militant in the northern Sinai on April 11 Labor strikes harm Egyptian industry, underscoring deep social and economic discontent in working class We advise against all nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at this time due to the persistent risk of civil unrest in major cities, militant attacks, and violence targeting foreigners. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Muslim Brotherhood protest campaign Clashes between security forces and students supporting ousted president Mohammed Morsi continued through April, culminating in a series of explosions at Cairo University on April 2, killing three, including a high-ranking police officer. Protests have focused on three universities in Cairo, al-Azhar University, Ain Shams University, and Cairo University. The leading protest group, Students Against the Coup, has reported over 200 students arrested since the beginning of protests, with dozens of injuries and several dead, most recently on April 14 during clashes between student activists and security forces at Cairo University during protests organized by the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (NASL). In response to the protests, security forces have heightened their presence on the campuses. The explosions at Cairo University underscore increasingly violent civil unrest targeting university campuses, which has expanded from the use of Molotov cocktails and burning of police cars to the use of improvised explosive devices. Recently, security forces dismantled 12 explosive devices at Ain Shams University on April 8, as well as an additional seven a day earlier. In response to the uptick in violence, police have established a more permanent presence on university campuses. This presence comes despite a court ruling in 2010, which ordered police guards to be removed from
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universities and to be replaced by civilian security guards. 4
Meanwhile, the recent uptick in violence and growing police presence on campuses underlines growing tension between authorities and Islamists in the run-up to elections in May, which former Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi is expected to win. As long as security forces maintain their presence on campuses, student protests are expected to continue, as well as violence aimed at said security forces. In addition, Interim President Adly Mansour recently issued a decree, giving university heads expanded powers to expel students who are found guilty of "committing subversive acts and disruption of
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the educational process". Additional expulsions, of which there have been dozens, may add to tensions on campus and fuel protest campaigns.
Militancy During the past two weeks militants have continued to target security officers and installations in the capital, as well as in the Sinai Peninsula and Nile Delta, highlighted by the April 2 bombings on Cairo University, for which militant group Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) claimed responsibility. In addition, the Egyptian military announced that they had killed a prominent Islamist militant in north Sinai, Nour Hamdeen. Hamdeen has been reported as a leader in Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM). The U.S. State Department labeled ABM a foreign terrorist organization on April 9, in a move followed by the Egyptian government’s designation of the group as such on April 14. Meanwhile, on April 7 security forces claimed to arrest Thirwat Salah Shehata, an Egyptian who long served as one Ayman al Zawahiri's top deputies, in a Cairo suburb. An official source claimed the militant was planning attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh Since July 2013, over 330 reported attacks have taken place in the Sinai Peninsula, carried out mostly against security forces. The persistency of these militant organizations, along with their extended reach into Egypt’s largest cities, underline the growth of both organized and unsophisticated militancy in Egypt, and the long-term threat it presents to Egyptian security. In this context, Shehata’s arrest in Cairo underscores the presence of militant factions in the capital, despite heightened security measures and counter-militancy efforts, further highlighted by previous sophisticated militant attacks in the capital including a January 24 bombing of the Cairo Security Directorate. Such considerations, as well as the U.S. precedent, likely prompted the Cairo Court of First Instance to declare ABM a terrorist organization. ❖ With this in mind, the April 14 designation, the State Department designation, and Hamdeen’s death increase the potential for reprisal attacks by ABM and other linked militant groups over the coming weeks and months. This additionally includes by organizations such as Ajnad Misr, through the use of unsophisticated improvised explosive devices during Brotherhood protests, as well as sophisticated attacks by ABM and more organized militant factions. Such attacks are likely to increase as elections approach.
Socio-economic discontent
Thousands of Egyptian laborers have been striking throughout the past several months, Page disrupting a wide range of industries. Tens of thousands of textiles workers ended their 5
strike after 12 days in February, transport workers in Alexandria launched a strike in March, and 70 percent of postal workers in the country are still on strike. Workers are striking for reasons including a nationwide minimum wage, higher salaries, and better working conditions. One incident which highlights the depth of the issue took place in February, when about 100,000 garage workers in Cairo stopped working, forcing the army to operate the city’s bus system. Most labor strikes revolve around the lack of a minimum wage in the private sector, with labor leaders calling for at least 2000 Egyptian Pounds per month. Government officials
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claim that Egypt cannot afford that sum. Given that striker’s demands have still not been met, and national elections will be taking place on May 26-27, an increase of labor strikes can be expected nationwide. Industries most sensitive to strikes, including transit, post, and telecommunications, with the intention to cripple the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, it remains possible that in the lead up to elections, Muslim Brotherhood activists may attempt to harness such rising socio-economic discontent to bolster protest campaigns against the military-backed government.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We advise against all nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at this time due to the persistent risk of civil unrest in major cities, militant attacks, and violence targeting foreigners. 2. We further advise against all nonessential travel to the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal zone, the Upper Nile area, and the Nile Delta region due to an increased risk of unrest and the heightened risk of militant attacks. Before traveling to Sharm al Sheikh, confirm that flight operations are continuing and have not been impacted by recent militant threats. 3. Avoid all travel to the Northern Sinai Governorate and border areas with Libya, Sudan, and Israel due to the persistent risk for militant attacks, kidnappings, and general lawlessness. 4. In Cairo, maintain heightened vigilance and continue to allot extra time for travel due to possible delays emanating from increased security deployments, checkpoints, and closures throughout the capital. Minimize unnecessary movement during the night hours. 5. Remain vigilant in the vicinities of government installations, police stations, and religious centers as these locations remain under threat of militant attacks. 6. Those with shipping or other operational interests in the Suez Canal zone are advised to remain cognizant of shifting security conditions and security measures in place due to the heightened risk of militant attacks. 7. As a general rule, nationals from North America, Western Europe, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf are advised to keep a low profile throughout Egypt, given increased negative sentiment against various foreign governments by protesting factions. Refrain from discussions with locals on the current security situation, the transition process, the Muslim Brotherhood, and criticism toward the government. In addition, refrain from
photographing or documenting protests and security installations at all costs, as such Page actions may draw hostility from local residents or confiscation of equipment by security 6
forces, or possible detainment.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 25, 2014 Sinai Liberation Day An annual national parade is slated to commemorates the take place in Sinai. In addition, a rally final Israeli troop will take place in Tahrir Square in Cairo. withdrawal from the Anticipate mass pro-military rallies, as
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Sinai Peninsula as well as Muslim Brotherhood efforts to predetermined by the use the date to mobilize against the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace government and military. Avoid Accords nonessential travel to the vicinity of Tahrir Square.
April 28, 2014 683 Muslim As Mohammed Badie, leader of the Brotherhood members Muslim Brotherhood, and other stand trial on an array influential members possibly face the of charges, including death penalty, expect large murder, destroying Brotherhood protests on this day public property and throughout the country. Avoid disturbing the peace. All nonessential travel to Brotherhood charges are related to protest locales, including Ennahda
violence that broke out Square, Rabaa al-Adaweya Square, and in Minya following the the campuses of Ain Shams, al-Azhar, dispersal of the Rabaa and Cairo Universities. al-Adaweya and Ennahda Square sit-ins.
April 28, 2014 The verdict on the legal Due to the April 6 Youth movement's status of the April 6 role in the January 25 Revolution, and Youth Movement will its ability to call for mass protests, be delivered. There is a expect large demonstrations in possibility the group downtown Cairo on this date in support may be banned. of the youth movement, especially in the area of Tahrir Square, where protests that overthrow the Mubarak government took place.
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HIGH RISK Iraq ● The April 30 Parliamentary elections arrive amidst increasing political tensions and violence. ● Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants continue to expand their presence to areas surrounding Baghdad ahead of the upcoming election. ● We advise against nonessential travel to Baghdad and Basra at this time. If travel is essential, contact us for itinerary based consultation and on-ground support. ● Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS April 30 Elections As the Iraqi elections approach, 9,000 candidates will vie for 328 Parliamentary seats on April 30. These elections come amidst ongoing tensions within parliament, particularly regarding difficulties connected to the budget law’s passage. This is highlighted by reports from April 6 that al-Maliki supporters from the State of Law Coalition (SLC) protested against the continued boycott of the Kurdistan Alliance and Motahedon Coalition at Parliamentary sessions. Such boycotts resulted in a lack of quorum and the inability to pass the aforementioned budget law, which has reportedly been postponed until after elections. Such tensions were further highlighted by the March 25 resignation of the board of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), due to reported disagreements with parliamentary and judicial rulings regarding the exclusion of candidates; however, the IHEC later withdrew its resignation on March 30. Tensions have also increased between rival factions. In March, multiple anti al-Maliki protests by the Sadrist Movement were recorded in various locales throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad and Basra. In addition, Iraqi Shiite cleric Kadhem al-Haeri, who reportedly maintains ties to the Iranian regime and al-Maliki’s Dawa Party, issued a fatwa, or religious judgment, banning secular candidates from participating in the elections. Despite rivalry between Sunni and Shiite factions in Iraq, parties from both sides have criticized secular candidates, highlighting the use of religion to both demonstrate credentials to lead and gain support among constituents. Meanwhile, in addition to tensions among political parties, reports indicate a growing threat stemming from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants ahead of the
Page elections. In this context, the ISIS have reportedly denounced the elections as un-Islamic
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and launched campaigns aiming to deter Sunnis adherents from participating in the upcoming polls. This is underlined by warnings that the group would carry out attacks against electoral polling centers, which was demonstrated on April 7 when ISIS militants targeted a polling station in al-Ramadi, stormed the locale, and stole more than 2,000 ballots in the process. In addition, leading local political officials in the Anbar Province have informed the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) that elections cannot be held in at least half of the province, particularly in Fallujah and parts of Ramadi where ISIS maintains heavy presences.
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In this context, Iraqi security forces have attempted to increase security measures ahead of and surrounding elections, particularly in Baghdad. This includes potential curfews, underscored by a campaigning curfew imposed in Kirkuk at 21:00 (local time) in an effort to decrease election-related violence. Security forces have also claimed that a unique security plan will be implemented for polling stations. However, given limited resources and a general inability to prevent militancy, it remains likely that increased security measures will fail to thwart all attempted attacks, which remain liable to significantly increase surrounding this date. Polling stations, political offices, and political figures are likely to be focal points for attacks on April 30, highlighted by recent assassination attempt against the Sunni deputy Prime Minister on April 11 during his visit to Abu Ghraib. Finally, given prevailing tensions among political parties and reports that polling stations in many areas may be unable to open, it remains possible that accusations of fraud, vote tampering, or other allegations will arise. This is particularly likely given that the Anbar Province, in which at least half of the locale reportedly cannot hold elections, is home to large populations of the Sunni minority. In this context, this area has also witnessed increased rates of anti-government sentiment, particularly following the forced dispersal of a protest encampment in al-Ramadi in December 2013.
ISIS expansion surrounding of Baghdad The first half of April has witnessed reports of increased ISIS expansion to areas surrounding Baghdad, likely from bases of operation in the Anbar Province, where fighting between ISIS and the Iraqi military. In this context, reports indicate that the group remains in control of Anbar’s Fallujah, with Iraqi government officials estimating that 80 percent of the city’s residents have fled ongoing shelling by the country’s military. Further evidence of their presence in the province, along with near-daily reports of clashes, includes claims that a pro-government militia foiled an attack by ISIS militants against the Nuaimiyah Dam. Closer to Baghdad, reports indicate an increased ISIS presence in Abu Ghraib, located 20 km west of the capital. On April 1, the group reportedly held a military parade involving hundreds of vehicles and displaying heavy weaponry, including anti-aircraft guns. Such reports led to the relocation of prisoners from the Abu Ghraib prison in addition to the transfer of troops from the Basra Province in order to increase security at the complex. North of Baghdad, increased ISIS deployments were recorded in Nibai, 25 km from the
capital. Attempts by ISIS militants to seize an Iraqi military base in Yusifiyah, 31 km south Page of Baghdad, on April 3 led to the death of approximately 40 militants. 9
Amidst such incidents, al-Maliki stated on April 9 that the issue has become "more dangerous and bigger for us". That said, there has been a relative decrease in large-scale attacks in the capital in recent weeks, although a wave of car bombings was recorded on April 9 to coincide with the eleventh anniversary of the invasion of Baghdad by U.S. forces in 2001. With this in mind, and given that such a decrease follows the uptick that was recorded following the January 19 call to “creep toward Baghdad” by the ISIS leader and start of military operations in Anbar, it is possible that ISIS aims to isolate Baghdad. In addition, the group could potentially be attempting to entrench itself around the
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capital in an effort to coordinate increased attacks in Baghdad at a later date, including surrounding the upcoming elections, which have been deemed “un-Islamic”. With this in mind, and amidst the U.S. State Department’s April 10 warning that ISIS is becoming increasingly resurgent, it remains likely that continued attacks and clashes with security forces will be recorded in cities and villages near Baghdad. These are further likely to increase in scale and scope as the elections draw closer. However, while we assess that there remains a risk for asymmetric and mass casualty attacks in the capital, particularly in the days surrounding elections, it is possible that ISIS will focus on entrenching itself in areas around the Baghdad prior to this date. In this context, the ISIS’s expanding presence and ongoing attacks underline the inability of security forces to mitigate the threat posed by the group. Although security forces have, on occasion, proven capable of thwarting attacks by ISIS, highlighted by its success in repelling ISIS’s attack in Yusifiyah, the military has also been unable to consistently do so. As a result, ISIS militants will likely find themselves able to conduct successful attacks in surrounding cities, as well as in the capital, despite likely heightened security measures accompanying upcoming elections.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We advise against nonessential travel to Baghdad and Basra at this time. If travel is essential, contact us for itinerary based consultation and on-ground support. 2. Travel to outlying areas outside of Baghdad and Basra should be avoided at this time, particularly in the Anbar Province areas of al-Ramadi and Fallujah, due to the persistence of Sunni militancy and clashes. 3. Travel to Iraqi Kurdistan may continue as at this time, while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and militancy. It is advised to avoid all demonstrations and political gatherings throughout the KRG, while protests in the Sulaymaniyah Province are more prone to violence. Given ongoing tensions between Iraqi and Kurdish forces in disputed areas, it is advised to avoid border areas. 4. Before traveling overland to the Anbar and Salahuddin Provinces, confirm main routes are open and have not been blocked. Be advised that protests that have taken place inside the cities of al-Ramadi, Fallujah, and Samarra have witnessed strong anti-U.S. sentiment for the American government’s perceived support of the Maliki administration. Protests should be avoided. 5. Those conducting essential travel in Baghdad are advised to minimize movement,
maintain a low profile, and avoid mosques, bus stations, restaurants, sporting events, Page markets, squares, parking lots, car parks, political offices, government buildings, and
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6. Those operating natural gas or oil facilities are advised to obtain security consultation for facilities in outlying areas, specific to the nationalities and operational needs of their employees. 7. Those operating or residing in Iraq on April 30, including in Baghdad and Basra, are advised to minimize movement, given the heightened threat of attacks emanating from Election Day.
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Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 23, 2014 On April 23, 2003, the April 23 marks the anniversary of the U.S. 82nd Airborne entrance of U.S. troops into Fallujah Division entered after the invasion of Iraq. While the Fallujah. Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) currently maintains positions within Fallujah, April 23 may witness increased militancy, similar to that witnessed on the April 9 anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Baghdad. Maintain heightened vigilance in the immediate vicinity of government installations, police stations, and religious centers as these locations remain under threat of militant attacks.
April 30, 2014 Iraq’s Parliamentary Election day in Iraq will likely witness an elections. uptick in militant attacks, in addition to increased security measures throughout the country, particularly in Baghdad. Anticipate related attacks, particularly on polling stations, political offices, and against political figures, as well as targeting military forces at checkpoints, and military installations. Minimize all nonessential travel on April 30.
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HIGH RISK Lebanon Following vote of confidence in national unity government on March 20, Parliament slated to vote for the selection of a new President prior to May 15. Tripoli, Bekaa Valley security plans underline central government’s continuing effort to mitigate deteriorating security conditions in outlying areas; prevent spillover violence from Syria. We advise against all nonessential travel to Lebanon at this time, while restricting travel to Beirut’s northern districts. Before traveling, ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans remain updated, as sectarian attacks in Lebanon can quickly deteriorate into broader violence. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Selection of new President On March 15, the Lebanese Cabinet approve a draft version of the Ministerial Statement which calls on the state to “liberate the Shebaa Farms, Kfar Shouba hills, and the Lebanese area of al-Ghajar through all legitimate means”. Former Prime Minister and leader of the March 14 alliances Saad Hariri has indicated that the policy statement is open to interpretation, however that it guarantees the invalidation of the “army-people- resistance” formula. On March 20, Parliament passed a vote of confidence in the new government on March 20, ending a period of political deadlock which had prevailed since the resignation of former Prime Minister Najib Mikati in March 2013. On April 9, Parliamentary Nabih Berri indicated that he will call for a special parliamentary session on April 22 to select a new President. According to the constitution, Parliament has until May 15 to select a new president, given Incumbent President Michael Suleiman’s six- year term is slated to conclude on May 25. In the event that no President is appointed, on May 15, Parliament will be considered convened for an emergency 10 day session in order to compel the selection of a new head of state. The Future Movement (FM)-led March 14 alliance announced on March 9 that it will submit one candidate for the presidency, however, March 14-aligned Lebanese Forces (LF) head, Samir Geagea announced his candidacy in early April. Geagea has additionally expressed hope that he will become the March 14’s sole candidate. Meanwhile, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
Page chief Michel Aoun, has not announced his candidacy for president, stating that he will
only do so if he is supported by a political consensus. The President must be of Christian 02
Maronite origin. Geagea and Aoun are both prominent Maronite Christian political figures however Geagea remains staunchly opposed to Hezbollah, while Aoun is viewed as aligned to the March 8 coalition. In this context it remains possible that both of the potential front runners at this time will be unable to garner a consensus in Parliament during the vote in late April. Similar to previous political hurdles which have hindered the return of political normalcy over recent months, rival parties in the March 14 and March 8 alliances,
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continue to remain divided over Hezbollah’s continued maintenance of an armed militia outside of the state’s authority and involvement in the Syrian conflict. Despite the formation of a ministerial statement and approval of a government, such divides continue to hinder political reconciliation. In this context, the ministerial statement agreement between rival parties served as a mechanism to defer political confrontation in order to form a limited government with the authority to select a new President. We therefore assess that despite prevailing political divides, Lebanon’s leading political figures are concerned with a political power vacuum which would result by failing to elect a President by May 15, particularly amidst deteriorating security conditions resulting from spillover of the Syrian conflict. In this context, similar to recent political landmarks, most notably the appointment of Tamam Salam to Prime Minister-designate and approval of a ministerial statement in March, it is likely that rival parties will arrive upon a consensual candidate. In the interim, over the coming weeks, tensions between rival parties may elevate during deliberations to select such a personality. Increased discussions surrounding the extension of Suleiman’s term, will be an indication of deepening political divides suggesting that parties have reached an impasse over the selection of a new president.
Tripoli, Bekaa Valley security plans On March 16, Assad regime and Hezbollah forces captured the Syrian city of Yabroud located in the Qalamoun region near the border with Lebanon. Hundreds to a thousand rebel fighters subsequently fled into Lebanon, reportedly infiltrating into the predominantly Sunni, and rebel-supportive town of Arsal. In the days that followed a series of attacks carried out by both rebel and regime forces in Syria, targeted Shiite and Sunni locales in Lebanon. Additionally the following days and weeks witnessed an uptick in militancy in the Bekaa Valley targeting known Hezbollah locales, as well as Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) positions. Most notably, suicide car bombings were reported on March 16 in Nabi Othman, March 29 near Arsal. At the same time, the most recent round of hostilities in Tripoli between Sunni factions in the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Alawite groups in the Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods remained ongoing from March 13 until April 2, resulting in over dozens of casualties. On April 1, the central government implemented a revamp security plan in the city, carrying out a series of arrest operations, detained over 75 Sunni, Alawite and Shiite militants involved in the violence. In response, such groups have increasingly condemned the measures, holding anti-LAF
demonstrations on several occasions, while the targeting of LAF forces has similarly Page increased.
03 In response to deteriorating conditions in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon implemented a
similar security plan, coming into effect on April 4. As part of the heightened security measures, the LAF has imposed a series of checkpoints throughout the outlying region, particularly on the outskirts of predominantly Shiite cities which have come under increasing threat of attack, as well as on the outskirts of Arsal, a known staging ground for Sunni militancy. Furthermore, the LAF has elevated border security measures along the border with Syria, particularly following the significant influx of rebel fighters following the fall of Yabroud, while on April 6m Hezbollah checkpoints outside Baalbek,
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Hermel, and outside of Arsal were removed. Despite the immediate spike in militancy in Lebanon immediately following the regime’s capture of Yabroud, the following weeks have witnessed a marked decrease to the frequency of attacks, both in outlying areas as well as in the capital. In particular, while in late 2013, Beirut was witnessed near monthly mass casualty incidents, the last such incident in the capital was recorded in February 2014. This marked decrease in militancy can be attributed to increased LAF counter militancy operations, as well as the Assad regime’s pacification of rebel positions in the Qalamoun region bordering Lebanon. The Qalamoun city of Yabroud in particular served as a central staging ground for the transfer of explosive laden vehicles into Lebanon, many of which entered the country into Arsal, subsequently traveling to targets in Beirut. Despite the diminished frequency of successful militant attacks relative to recent months, there remains prevailing potential for additional incidents both in outlying areas and in the capital. That said, LAF military positions remain at the most pronounced risk of being targeted by militant attacks, particularly deployments stationed within and at the entrances to cities in outlying areas of the country including Tripoli, Hermel, Bekaa, and Arsal. In Beirut there remains a pronounced threat for attacks in the Hezbollah- affiliated southern suburbs, as well as at military positions monitoring routes leading into the capital.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We advise against all nonessential travel to Lebanon at this time, while restricting travel to Beirut’s northern districts. Before traveling, ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans remain updated, as sectarian attacks in Lebanon can quickly deteriorate into broader violence. 2. Avoid entering the interior of Beirut’s southern suburbs, in addition to Palestinian refugee camps. 3. Due to ongoing instability, it is advised to avoid all travel to Lebanon’s outlying areas, particularly the Syrian border, given persistent fighting resulting from the Syrian conflict, lawlessness, and the threat of kidnappings. Refrain from traveling to the area south of the Litani River and the Israeli border area due to persistent tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. 4. We advise against all travel to the cities of Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre due to increased security risks resulting from ongoing sectarian tensions.
5. Travelers are additionally advised to keep identification and travel documents on their Page persons at all times, due to the increasing prevalence of Lebanese military or Hezbollah
04 checkpoints in Beirut. When coming in contact with a security checkpoint, comply with
the instructions of security personnel, regardless of their affiliation, avoiding behavior which may be viewed as threatening. 6. It is further advised to remain vigilant for suspicious packages, persons, or vehicles, particularly small SUV’s which have increasingly been used to carry out militant attacks. The discovery of such vehicles has on several occasions lead to the prevention of imminent bombings in Beirut.
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Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 1983 The U.S. Embassy in Memorial services will likely be held at Beirut was bombed, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. No action killing 63 people, necessary including 17 Americans. A U.S. court determined years later that Hezbollah was responsible for the attack.
April 22, 2014 Planned Parliamentary On April 22 and the surrounding days sessions to select a there will likely be a heightened security President presence in the vicinity of the Parliament. Remain cognizant of the fact that this date may change.
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HIGH RISK Libya Tripoli-based central government lifts force majeure on eastern oil terminal after reaching deal with Political Bureau of Cyrenaica, although tensions on fundamental federalist demands likely to persist. General National Congress passes Election Law; however, absence of finalized polling date likely to exacerbate prevailing discontent with central government. Near-daily militant attacks continue in Benghazi, with local city residents likely to increasingly pressure municipal government for security, given perceived central government failure to ensure stability. We advise against all nonessential travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent uptick in violence and threats against foreigners. For essential travel, consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations, tactical monitoring, and ground support options. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Reopening of eastern oil fields On April 6, the Tripoli-based central government and Political Bureau of Cyrenaica (PBC) reportedly reached a deal to reopen the PBC-blockaded oil terminals in eastern Libya, which include the Zueitina, Ras Lanuf, and Sidra oil terminals. The eastern Hariga oil terminal was also blockaded by separate protesters demanding employment, although reportedly allied to PBC leader Ibrahim al-Jathran. Reports indicate that Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC) lifted the force majeure on the Hariga oil terminal recovered from federalist forces at 12:00 (local time) on April 10. The port has a daily capacity of 110,000 barrels of oil per day. According to an April 10 statement from the Oil Ministry Measurement Director Ibrahim al-Awami, a shipment of one million barrels is due to depart from Hariga in five days. Meanwhile, despite indications that the force majeure was to be additionally lifted at the Zueitina oil terminal, such measures have not yet been taken, while the Ras Lanuf and Sidra terminals are slated to reopen in two to four weeks. The lifting of the force majeure at the Hariga oil terminal underscores a significant development in central government-federalist negotiations, implying that the National
Page Oil Corporation is now complete control of the facility, as the first phase of the
agreement with the PBC is implemented. However, force majeure was only imposed on 06 the facility in mid-March 2014. While protesters at the facility were reportedly allied with al-Jathran, those blockading the terminal were more strongly motivated by demands for employment, suggesting that this may have been the easiest oil terminal over which the government could gain control during negotiations with the PBC. In this context, the delays in the lifting of the force majeure at the Zueitina terminal casts doubts on the government’s reported control over the facility, although it remains possible that the delay is linked with technical issues. With this in mind, we assess that
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the central government is likely to face continued obstacles in securing the reopening of the Zueitina terminal, as well as the Ras Lanuf and Sidra installations. This is further reflected in persistent tensions regarding federalist demands. While the government has reportedly responded positively to meeting concessions, including allocating part of national oil revenues for development in the east, investigations regarding cases of potential oil fraud, the payment of oil facility guard salaries, the withdrawal of charges against several federalists and oil guards, and rescinding the threat of military actions against the PBC, it remains unlikely that Tripoli will concede to the final demand of holding a referendum on the federalization of the state. With this in mind, even in the event that all four oil terminals are successfully placed under the central government’s control over the coming weeks, tensions regarding the federalist issue are unlikely to dissipate. The government’s awareness of this is further likely to push Tripoli into pursuing development projects and providing aid to the region, while there will remain a potential for a resurgence in federalist mobilization in accordance with progress on the country’s constitution and ahead of eventual general elections.
Political developments On March 30, the General National Congress (GNC) passed the Elections Law for the replacement of Parliament. The law is due to be handed over to the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), which will set a date for elections. The law additionally removes the party list system, which was previously used to elect the GNC. The candidates can be members of a political party, however they will not run under a single party list. The passage of the Elections Law for the future House of Representatives represents a significant step forward in the transitional process, while highlighting efforts to progress with the GNC’s replacement in general elections following its statements in February that it had agreed to hold early polls. The measure reflects an effort to placate protesters, as well as anti-GNC militias, which oppose the GNC’s extension of its mandate beyond its original expiration date of February 7. That being said, despite the approval of the Elections Law, a timeline for such elections has yet to be released. In a February 3 vote revising the roadmap for the extension of the GNC’s mandate, the body stipulated that its lifespan would be tied to progress on the constitution, with the vote for the Constitutional Assembly held on February 20. At
the earliest, elections would likely be held in June 2014, dependent on whether the Page Constitutional Assembly would decide by May if it will finish the constitution within 120
07 days of its first meeting, which was slated for March 2014. However, vacancies of 13
seats in the body due to boycotts by ethnic minorities, in addition to polling station violence and threats against those seeking to vote in multiple areas of the country, have prevented the Constitutional Assembly from meeting. This, in turn, has prevented the finalization of a timeline for the GNC’s replacement. As a result, the failure of the GNC to finalize a date for elections has likely hampered the legislature’s ability to gain popular support for the passage of the Elections Law, further prompting calls for civil disobedience campaigns in Tripoli and Benghazi demanding that
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the GNC to step down. Mobilization for the campaigns was likely further heightened following the GNC’s appointment of interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni as the full premier until after elections for the future House of Representatives are held, a move likely perceived as a legislative effort to entrench the control of factions that ousted former Prime Minister Ali Zidan. While al-Thinni stated his intent to resign on April 13, the selection of a new prime minister is unlikely to appease anti-GNC activists and militias, given that the selection will likely be perceived as a further step by the GNC to control the post of premier. With this in mind, over the coming weeks, we assess that the GNC’s ability to announce a date for general elections will serve as an indicator of both political stability, as well as on-the-ground potential for popular mobilization against the body. This includes by Libyan residents in general, as well as by anti-GNC militias such as the al-Qaqaa and al- Sawaiq Brigades, which have previously deployed in Tripoli in an effort to pressure the GNC to step down. In this context, the potential failure of the GNC to finalize a polling date in the next several weeks will increase the potential for such groups to mobilize, as already noted in the ten-day civil disobedience campaigns.
Militancy in Benghazi Despite government announcements of increased security measures in major cities, most recently in statements by Interior Minister Salah Mazig that 30 percent of closed- circuit television (CCTV) security cameras have been installed, militant attacks continue to destabilize Benghazi in particular. Such attacks partially prompted the ten-day civil disobedience campaign in the city. Most recently, the death of an Air Force officer during an explosion targeting his vehicle on April 9 resulted in protests in the city along Eshreen Street. Furthermore, persistent attacks in Benghazi have also increasingly triggered protests in the eastern city, as underscored by the April 9 demonstrations. The persistence of security concerns in the city is additionally highlighted by statements from the head of the Thunderbolt Special Forces Brigade in Benghazi, Colonel Wanis Bukhamada, who stated in a televised interview that the GNC was responsible for “destroying the state army and police”. He also added that the Thunderbolt “will hold the GNC accountable for growing terrorism in Benghazi”. In this context, the April 6 commencement of the civil disobedience campaign highlights widespread sentiment among residents that the GNC is not willing to devote the resources to tackle the current security crisis and wave
of assassinations in the city. Page Although the civil disobedience campaign is slated to end on April 15, such
08 dissatisfaction is likely to persist. It is also likely to trigger calls for the Benghazi
municipal government to secure funds from the central government to establish local security measures, rather than relying upon central government progress in promised security projects, such as the installation of the CCTV cameras. Furthermore, the aftermath of the upcoming municipal elections in Benghazi, slated for April 19, are likely to serve as an indicator of the potential for additional protest campaigns, with residents likely to pressure the new city government for progress on security issues. That being said, should the elections be postponed due to safety concerns and the threat of militant
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attacks, Benghazi residents may also renew civil disobedience campaigns in order to pressure the central government to quickly heighten security deployments.
RECOMMENDATIONS ● We advise against all nonessential travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent uptick in violence and threats against foreigners. For essential travel, consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations, tactical monitoring, and ground support options. ● We further advise against all travel to Libya’s border areas at this time due to persistent violence and lawlessness in these regions. ● Foreign corporations operating in outlying areas throughout Libya are advised to increase security for their personnel and installations. Be advised that travel to locations south of the International Coastal Road may require government approval, or may otherwise be entirely off limits to foreigners. ● Avoid all travel to Sirte and the Sidra, Zueitina, and Ras Lanuf terminals at this time due to the potential for militia violence relating to current tensions between the central government and Cyrenaica federalists. ● Those in Tripoli and Benghazi are advised to strictly avoid all nighttime travel, including to and from the airport, due to the elevated risk for militant attacks, clashes, and acts of civil unrest during that time. ● Avoid the immediate vicinities of government buildings, police stations, media outlet offices, and political party and militia headquarters, given that these locales have been targeted by militia groups in the past and recently by protesters, and thus, remain at increased risk for violence and unrest. ● On April 19, those operating or residing in Benghazi are advised to avoid the immediate vicinity of all facilities used as polling stations, given the threat of militant attacks targeting these locales.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 2014 Supreme Court to hear The hearing was initially postponed appeal against Political from February 24, on which date Isolation Law, banning hundreds of protesters gathered Gaddafi-era figures outside of the court. Anticipate similar from participation in demonstrations on April 18. Avoid government. nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Page Supreme Court in Tripoli.
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April 19, 2014 Municipal elections Anticipate an uptick in militant attacks slated to be held in and threats against polling stations and Benghazi candidates participating in elections. The potential for such violence may result in the postponement of elections. Avoid the immediate vicinity of all
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facilities used as polling stations, given such threats.
April 21, 2014 First meeting of The first meeting was postponed from Constitutional Assembly April 14, given the presence of only 47 slated to be held in of the body's 60 total members; the 13 Beida remaining members were not elected due to election boycotts, and polling station violence. The session may be further delayed. No action is necessary.
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MEDIUM RISK Algeria Anticipated use of fraud, low participation in upcoming presidential election likely to prompt calls for protests denouncing elections results as illegitimate. Uptick in violence and unrest in outlying areas will likely encourage anti-Bouteflika groups and political parties to renew calls for protests in these regions, as means to “lay the ground” for protest in Algiers. Violence in Ghardaia continues despite heavy security deployment, while its persistence likely to further increase the anti-government sentiment in the city. Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Potential for protests following April 17 presidential election On April 11, a member of Ali Benflis’ election team stated that the former premier and main contender against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was preparing to call for protests should there be any sign of fraud during the upcoming April 17 presidential election. Benflis has repeatedly warned on several occasion against the use of fraud during the polls, while in the latest of such accusations, on April 9, the candidate stated that “in case of fraud I will not stay put”. Additionally, while such mobilization has not been called organized, reports indicate that a coalition of opposition parties that previously called for the boycotting of the election is considering a general strike on April 17, as a “pre-emptive strike” against concerns avoid anticipated fraudulent voting by the pro- Bouteflika camp Allegations of fraud are not uncommon in Algeria, given opposition parties and political candidates, including Benflis during the 2004 elections, which he lost to Bouteflika, have accused the regime of using such methods. However, despite such accusations being common, in light of ongoing tensions between rival clans in Algeria’s deep state and a localized yet notable wave of protests, such accusations are likely intended to prepare for calls for protests denouncing the election. This is furthermore likely given an anticipated low participation during the election, increasing the weight of claims that
Page the election’s results will be illegitimate and do not represent the Algerian choice. Early
Election Day voting in foreign countries where Algerian expatriates are situated has 20
already witnessed low turnouts. With this in mind, in Benflis’ case, his repeated accusations of fraud, before the holding the vote itself, likely signals that he will not accept the result of the polls on April 17, with his campaign serving as a way to prepare his supporters for the aftermath of Bouteflika’s expected victory, and which may manifest in calls for protests led by Bouteflika’s main rival. Such protest could witness higher turnouts given the relatively high participation in Benflis’ meeting during the campaign and heightened media
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attention due to the campaign. Benflis’s last campaign meeting drew tens of thousands of supporters on April 13.
Uptick in violence during Presidential campaign 15 people were injured during riots involving hundreds of protesters, which broke out on April 5 in Bejaia, Eastern Algeria, following a planned meeting by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s campaign leader, Abdelmalek Sellal. The meeting, which was due to be held in Bejaia’s Cultural House, was cancelled due to the protest, with demonstrators storming the locale and setting fire to the Cultural House. In Zeralda, in the outskirts of Algiers, a pro-Bouteflika activist stabbed a resident to death after several residents of the neighborhood asked them to stop chanting slogans. On April 9 scuffles between security forces and youth protesters in Metlili, in the Ghardaia Province, disrupted a political meeting held by former Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal. Protesters said they were demonstrating against youth unemployment in the region. Finally, Bouteflika reportedly accused Benflis of being behind the relative uptick in violence during the political campaign. While the two incidents remained localized, the arson of the Cultural House in Bejaia, which was due to host Sellal’s meeting, represents a relatively unprecedented uptick in political violence. The incident was furthermore the most violent among other, more localized disruptions of pro-Bouteflika meetings, which have been intermittently cancelled in outlying areas. In this context, we assess that while frustration with Bouteflika’s bid for a fourth mandate is widespread in most regions of the country, outlying areas marked by exacerbated socio-economic discontent are at a higher risk for protests and unrest. With this in mind, given protests have mobilized heightened turn-outs in outlying areas, anti-Bouteflika activists and opposition parties will likely continue to call for protests in such regions. This is furthermore likely for boycotting parties which seek to mobilize anti-Bouteflika protesters after the elections and see protests in outlying areas as means to “lay the ground” for protests in Algiers by gaining momentum in such areas outside the capital.
Ghardaia inter-ethnic violence Inter-ethnic violence has resumed since April 7 between rival protesters, while reports indicate that security forces deployed in Ghardaia used tear gas to separate
demonstrators. Renewed clashes in the southern city injured 40, with 19 shops and Page residential buildings reportedly set ablaze. On April 12 dozens of Mozabites (Berbers)
22 gathered in front of the Tahar Djaout press house in Algiers to express their anger and
call for attention to the violence in the city. Intermittent clashes in Ghardaia linked to an ongoing conflict between the Mozabites (Berber) and the Chaamba (Arab) tribes have prompted successive security deployments, reaching 10,000 police officers on March 19. However despite such deployments, clashes have continued, becoming increasingly violent with the deaths of three residents of the city on March 15, and the injury of an estimated 400 since the beginning of the conflict last December. Additionally, in the context of the upcoming
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April 17 elections, the crisis in Ghardaia is likely perceived as a significant failure for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, since his campaign platform partly focuses on security. With this in mind, while the government is likely to send negotiating teams to solve the inter-ethnic conflict, past attempts have not succeeded in permanently doing so, likely due to a lack of trust from the Mozabites which have constantly accused the government of “taking sides”. In this context, a continuation of unrest in the city is likely over the coming days and weeks.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations. 2. In Algiers and other major cities, remain vigilant in the vicinities of public squares, government buildings, and police stations, as these serve as focal points for protests and militant attacks. 3. Remain cognizant of pro-Bouteflika meetings in outlying areas, given the elevated risk of anti-government protests and clashes prompted by the meetings. As a general security precaution, remain cognizant of calls for anti-Bouteflika protests particularly in the aftermath of the elections after April 17. 4. Avoid all nonessential travel to the Kabylie and border regions of Algeria, given the heightened risk of violent protests and militant activity.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 16, 2014 National Organization of While clashes are unlikely there remains Retirees calls for sit-in a possibility for localized traffic at the military regions disruptions. at the Qum El Bouaghi on April 15
April 16, 2014 Rally for Culture and Given already existing anti-government Democracy (RCD) calls sentiments in Kabylie, and a wave of for protests across the protests across the governorate Kabylie governorate witnessed during the past weeks, the protests are likely to witness high turnouts, while bearing a relatively Page heightened chance for localized
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violence.
April 16, 2014 Barakat protest slated The Barakat protest is likely to remain for Algiers University peaceful, while witnessing a slightly heightened turnout due to the election the following day
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April 17, 2014 Election day. Alliance of While there remains a heightened boycotting parties is threat of militant attacks during the reportedly planning to election, we assess that thus far call for a general strike. Algerian counterinsurgency operations Algerian authorities are likely have mitigated such threats, also bolstering their particularly in major cities. Meanwhile efforts to secure the calls for a general strike, should it polling stations, materialize, could hinder business including deployment of continuity in Algiers, most likely 66,000 police officers to including the transportation system. For protect the stations. the duration of April 17, avoid nonessential travel to the vicinity of polling stations, while generally allotting extra time for travel in the capital and other major cities.
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MEDIUM RISK Bahrain A petition calling for an end to demonstrations along the Budaiya Highway highlights the effect of persistent opposition activity on day-to-day life in the country. Continued reports of militancy highlights the growing perception of violence as an efficient tool to achieve opposition goals, while decreased reporting by the MOI suggests efforts to mitigate media coverage. Recent efforts to target acts deemed as terrorism underlines ongoing efforts to target militancy in the country. Travel to Manama's business and diplomatic districts can continue at this time, while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and low-level militancy. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Bahrain’s opposition Reports on April 8 indicate that residents from the Budaiya village, located along the western end of the Budaiya Highway, submitted a petition to the government requesting that marches along the highway be prevented and alternate locales for gatherings be allocated. In the petition, the residents stated that the organization and participation in protests is a right of everyone, but that "closing a commercial street and the entrance to the village for two hours or more" infringes on the freedoms of others. Moreover, the residents argued that the protests, along with frequent incidents in which activists blocking the route with burning tires, have led to disruptions of two to six hours. The residents have further stated that the demonstrations tend to intensify during the holiday periods, which already witness heavy traffic disruptions, and which increases the inconvenience. Such an example was recorded on April 4, when al-Wefaq march, meant to coincide with the first day of the Formula 1 Gulf Air Grand Prix, commenced along the Budaiya Highway. The demonstration, which witnessed large turnout, was also accompanied by heightened security measures, causing heavy traffic disruptions along the route. While not a holiday, the Formula 1 period witnessed similarly heightened traffic, as thousands of participants and audience members traveled to Bahrain for the event. The reported petition underscores further reports indicating that such demonstrations
Page and disruptions have affected local businesses, including during the holiday, due to
customers finding it difficult to reach such locales, thereby seeking alternate places of 25
business. The economic implications of the opposition demonstrations are also underlined by reports from March 17, which indicate that over 5,000 small businesses in Bahrain are in constant threat of closure. This is reportedly connected to a failure to recover financially from the 2011 unrest, with 84.6 percent of local businesses reporting a loss of income following these events. Additionally, opposition activists have also organized events meant to directly affect the country’s economy, highlighted by the February 14 Youth Coalition's call for a three-day strike campaign from February 13-15 in
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commemoration of the February 14 anniversary of the 2011 Shiite uprising. The strike included the closure of stores and commercial centers and a call to cease commercial and banking transactions as well as the use of gas stations. Meanwhile, on April 9, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Chief of Public Security Major- General Tariq al-Hassan banned an al-Wefaq demonstration slated for April 11 in Meqsha’s Freedom Square, located in the near to the Budaiya Highway. In addition, al- Hassan also warned that, should the gathering be held anyway, legal steps will be taken against the participants. In response to the ban, al-Wefaq called for participation in the gathering, and denounced the statement, stating that this ban is “invalid and illegal”. Subsequently, although al-Wefaq demonstrations tend to conclude without incident, the demonstration on April 11 was dispersed by security forces, with reports that tear gas was utilized against participants. This incident underlines the government’s strict policy regarding banned demonstrations, including official political parties. Moreover, given that the demonstration came shortly after the April 8 petition, in addition to its proximity to the Budaiya Highway, it is possible that the two events are connected. In this context, the government may be attempting to capitalize on frustration by the population regarding the detrimental effect of daily opposition activity in order to crack down on demonstrations, while also highlighting its efforts to mitigate the phenomenon. With this in mind, in addition to increased reports of forcible dispersal of opposition demonstrations, it remains possible that a more strict approach by the government towards such demonstrations will be taken. This could include further bans on al-Wefaq marches, continued crackdowns on protests and increases in government raids and arrests. Such actions bear the potential to trigger further demonstrations, while protests denouncing opposition activity or further petitions should not be ruled out.
Militancy across the island An uptick in unsophisticated acts of militancy was recorded in the lead up to and surrounding the Formula 1 Gulf Air Grand Prix, which occurred in Bahrain from April 4-6. This uptick is underlined by multiple claims of attacks, including the detonation of a homemade explosive device along the Budaiya Highway near Bani Jamra on April 4, the first day of the race. No injuries were reported in the incident, while the explosion reportedly caused the collapse of part of the village’s cemetery wall. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) did not confirm the incident, although the Shiite militant group Popular Resistance Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack. The MOI similarly did not confirm any of incidents reported during the days of the race, Page until April 7 when the MOI reported that a homemade bomb placed in a vehicle
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detonated in Manama Adliyah area on April 6. The Popular Resistance Brigades also claimed responsibility for this incident, stating that a “car bomb” had exploded near Manama’s Ministry of Interior Investigations Headquarters. In this context, there are several possible reasons for the MOI's actions. Firstly, the April 6 incident occurred in Manama, as opposed to the other incidents, which were reported in the vicinity of Shiite villages outside of the capital, which may have forced the MOI to report on the incident. In addition, this event received media attention, preventing the ministry from ignoring
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the explosion. Conversely, the MOI likely refrained from reporting on other incidents recorded during this time period in order to mitigate media coverage that likely would have likely drawn attention to the country's security forces and may have triggered suggestions that the MOI is unable to avert such incidents. The country likely wishes to avoid such coverage, particularly during a time when thousands of visitors are in the country for an international event. Meanwhile, on April 1, the MOI also reported that one person died in al-Eker during the early morning hours of as a result of a fire that broke out in the victim’s home. The deceased, Hussein Sharaf, was declared "martyr" by opposition activists, while, notably, the Shiite militant al-Mukhtar Brigades stated that Sharaf was a member of the group. Following this event, an increase in unsophisticated attacks was recorded condemning his death, particularly in al-Eker. This uptick was highlighted when, on the day of Sharaf’s funeral, the al-Mukhtar Brigades claimed responsibility for targeting and wounding security forces in the village with two homemade explosive devices. They claimed a similar attack on April 6-7 as well, while the al-Ashtar Brigades also claimed responsibility for three incidents targeting security forces, also in al-Eker. Both of the groups stated that the attacks were conducted in commemoration of Hussein Sharaf. While deaths of activists have previously triggered retaliatory attacks targeting security forces, the uptick in incidents following the alleged death of a member underscores the sensitivity regarding this issue within the group. As a result, further deaths of members, including potential arrests or harsh sentences, are liable to trigger similar reports of persistent incidents focused to an area specific to the individual or individuals involved. Finally, while upticks in militancy are usually witnessed surrounding symbolic opposition dates, the days following the Formula 1 race have also witnessed multiple claim of attacks. These includes on April 11, when the Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported that a police officer was injured by a homemade bomb explosion in the village of Daih that was claimed by the al-Mukhtar Brigades. On April 8, a series of unsophisticated attacks were also reported telecommunications cables belonging to the Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco) in Jid Hafs, Tubli, al-Shamaliya, Shahrakkan, and Salmabad. Similar reports against such cables were also reported on April 3 in the Abu Saiba-Mugaba area and April 12 in Jannusan, highlighting the notion that state-owned corporations are similarly perceived as legitimate targets. In this context, and given that these actions are likely perceived as an efficient tool to draw attention to the their cause, while more capable of effecting change than nonviolent demonstrations, such unsophisticated acts
of militancy are likely to continue in the coming weeks and months. As a result, Page intensified government raids and arrests, which are often recorded following these
27 incidents, are likely to lead to retaliatory attacks targeting security forces.
Political developments On April 8, a disagreement was recorded in the Shura Council, or the upper house of the National Assembly, regarding a decree aimed at combating terror funding, causing in a postponement to the vote. The decree, which would require societies and clubs to request permission from the Social Development and Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments ministries prior to collecting any donations. In their request, they would
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need to describe the amount of money collected and explain how it would be spent. Failure to use the money as described could trigger the seizure of their funds or a cancellation of their permit to collect donations. The decree comes amidst several reports connected to actions taken by the government to mitigate or prevent acts deemed as terrorism. This includes a two week grace period issued on March 27 to Bahraini nationals fighting in foreign conflict that would allow such individuals to turn themselves in and avoid punishment. Additionally, reports indicate that a new amendment to the terror law was submitted to the Council. In this context, the aforementioned reports indicate an increased emphasis on policies aimed at preventing militancy within the country. Such an emphasis likely stems from frequency reports of unsophisticated acts of militancy in the country, largely conducted by Shiite militant groups. There are also likely growing concerns that nationals fighting or receiving training abroad will return with the ability or interest in engaging in militancy. In this context, attacks recorded in Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s were largely attributed to jihadists that had returned from fighting and training in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, reports from April 4 indicate that, during a visit to the house of deceased activist Hussein Sharaf, members of the al-Wefaq opposition movement requested that family members issue a message denying Sharaf's alleged membership in the al-Mukhtar Brigades. The family reportedly denied the request. This report highlights ongoing attempts by al-Wefaq movement to distance itself and the broader opposition from the persistent acts of violence and militancy. It is likely also intended to underline its commitment to nonviolence, while potentially also attempting to demonstrate that it still maintains a connection to on-the-ground events. However, the increase in militancy surrounding his death, along with claims that Sharaf was a member of a militant group, suggests a growing perception among the unofficial opposition that such acts of violence are more efficient than the peaceful approach espoused by al-Wefaq and expressed by its demonstrations and participation in the National Dialogue (ND). With this in mind, and while we assess that al-Wefaq will continue participating in the ND, as highlighted by reports from April 7 that discussions remain ongoing, there will likely be a growing perception of the official opposition as unlikely to enact change on the ground.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Travel to Manama's business and diplomatic districts can continue at this time, while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and low-level militancy. 2. Continue to avoid nonessential travel to the interiors of villages outside of Manama, Page particularly along the Budaiya Highway, Sitra Island, and villages to its south, north of
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Bahrain International Airport, and the southern Governorate villages of Karzakkan, al- Malikiyah, and Dar Kulaib, in addition to the Manama Souq and Interior Ministry areas. 3. As a general, rule, remain vigilant at checkpoints and when travelling during the nighttime hours due to an increase likelihood for unrest. In case a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently, while cooperating with security personnel. Additionally, refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events.
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4. Be advised that government installations, checkpoints, and police stations are all potential targets for unsophisticated militant attacks involving Molotov cocktails or improvised explosive devices. Therefore, it is advised to avoid the vicinity of these locations, and practice vigilance for suspected items or personnel as a standard security precaution. 5. As a basic security precaution, avoid all demonstrations and political gatherings in Bahrain due to unrest emanating from such events.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 15-19, 2014 The February 14 Youth The February 14 Youth Coalition issues Coalition called for a multiple, often back-to-back extended nationwide campaign of protest campaigns, with the most protests in solidarity recent one coinciding with the Formula with detained activists 1 Gulf Air Grand Prix. During such under the slogan campaigns, small-scale demonstrations "leadership of glory". often occur in multiple locations On April 15, a gathering throughout the country, and is slated for Meqsha. On particularly at opposition hubs, even April 16, rallies under when only one or two villages have the banner been specified in the announcement. “International Labor Fridays and Saturdays, corresponding to Day for this year” have April 18-19, often witness an increased been called for as-yet number of such protests. Such protests unspecified locales. On are likely to witness increased security April 19, the movement presence in their vicinity, in addition to called for a march to forcible dispersal, particularly if activists begin at the al-Barbaghi attempt to march to sensitive locales. It Mosque in A'ali. is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Meqsha on April 15 and A’ali on April 19.
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MEDIUM RISK Iran
Reports indicate continued Iranian adherence to agreements regarding its nuclear program, highlighted by the ongoing talks and payment of frozen assets. Negotiations regarding a permanent agreement are liable to continue despite concerns regarding Iran's ballistic missiles, a potential oil-for-goods deal with Russia, and tensions between Iran and the West. Western nationals are advised against all nonessential travel to Iran due to persistent negative sentiment toward the United States and other North American and Western European nations. For non-Western nationals, travel to Tehran, Esfahan, and other major cities in Iran may continue while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and adherence to cultural norms. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Nuclear negotiations Following the third round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran in Vienna from April 8-9 regarding a final agreement, statements were released indicating that "a lot of intensive work" remained. The next round of talks has reportedly been scheduled for May 13. Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general, Yukiya Amano, reportedly stated on April 9 that Iran was implementing the Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) "as planned" and is "cooperative" regarding the November 13, 2011 separate agreement signed with the IAEA. In this context, a fifth payment of 450 million USD in frozen assets is expected to go forward on or around April 15, which is reportedly conditional on Tehran diluting its remaining stockpile of higher level enriched uranium. On April 11, Hamid Baidinejad, the Foreign Ministry Political and International Director, reportedly stated that the fourth installment of 550 million USD, originally scheduled for April 10, had been received. Thus far, available evidence indicates continued Iranian adherence to the terms of the Joint Action Plan and the separate agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was signed on November 11, 2013. This is particularly highlighted by Amano’s statements, the reported fourth payment of frozen assets, and a lack of
reports suggesting any significant delay for the fifth installment. With this in mind, and Page despite U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s testimony to Congress that Iran has a “breakout period” of two months, which refers to the time period necessary to produce 31
sufficient fissile material for a nuclear bomb, we assess that Tehran continues to remain interested in adhering to its agreements. This is largely due to efforts to improve Iran’s economy, which continues to suffer from high rate of inflation and unemployment. While some improvements have been noted, highlighted by reports that Iran’s trade surplus and oil exports have increased, reports indicate that international companies continue to remain wary of entering Iran’s market. This is underlined by reports stating that an unnamed “major multinational company”
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refused Tehran’s request for aircraft maintenance services “on grounds that the company could not complete the work by the end of July”. Given that the JPoA is scheduled to expire on July 20, it is likely that the company was concerned with entering into a contract that may not be completed prior to July 20, when sanctions that were suspended may be re-implemented. As a result, and in addition to its interest in regaining frozen funds, more significant economic improvement will likely rely on further sanctions relief, which can largely be achieved through a nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Iran has continued to emphasize its intention to preserve its domestic nuclear program. This was underscored by the April 9 announcement by Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Ali Salehi’s announcement regarding a new control room for the Tehran Research Reactor. According to Salehi, it is the “first research reactor control room that has been designed in Iran”. This followed statements by Supreme Leader Khamenei that Iran’s nuclear research and development would “never stop”. In this context, we assess that such statements and activity are meant to appease hardliners, who staunchly support a domestic program and opposed to what is perceived as capitulation to excessive Western demands. It is further unlikely to affect ongoing talks, particularly given that the Joint Plan of Action states that Iran is permitted to continue research and development, so long as it is not intended for the accumulation of higher level enriched uranium.
Events that could potentially affect talks Despite indications of Iran's adherence to its international agreements and continued negotiations regarding a permanent solution, there remains the possibility that talks could be affected by events within the negotiations and non-nuclear related issues. This includes the topic of Iran’s ballistic missiles, which Western powers consider to be concerning, in part because of their potential to could carry nuclear warheads. However, Iran has repeatedly stated that its ballistic missile program is nonnegotiable. In this context, Tehran likely perceives its program as a core component of its defense policy, while continued pursuit and advancement of its ballistic missiles can appease hardliners by underlining the government’s commitment to advancing Tehran’s defense establishment. With this in mind, it remains possible that Iran will consider discussion regarding this issue as a red line, with any increased pressure by Western powers to place it on the agenda potentially triggering a suspension of talks. Should this scenario arise, and given the emphasis and importance placed on negotiating an end to the
nuclear issue by U.S. President Obama, highlighted by the announcement of his Page intended veto should further nuclear sanctions be passed by Congress, the U.S. may
30 ultimately forego such discussion in order to achieve agreement.
In addition, current talks have continued amidst increasing tensions between Iran and Western parties, despite recent thaws connected to the nuclear talks. This includes the White House's April 11 announcement that newly-appointed envoy to the U.N., Hamid Aboutalebi, would not be permitted entry into the United States due to his alleged connection to the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The announcement followed a Congressional bill that similarly banned his entry, and which passed the Senate and House of Representatives on April 7 and 10, respectively. Iran, however, has
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stated that it will not name another envoy, and that the U.S. decision is "in contravention of international law". In addition, Iran announced on April 8 that it had cancelled a parliamentary delegation visit to Europe in protest of the April 3 passage by the European Parliament of a resolution expressing concern regarding human rights in Iran. It further called on E.U. member countries to include the subject during its interactions with Tehran. A protest by Basij members, a government-affiliated paramilitary volunteer organization, was also recorded on April 8 outside of the Greek Embassy in Tehran. Greece currently holds the presidency of the E.U. That said, it remains unlikely that such non-nuclear related issues will affect the talks. This is underscored by reports that an unnamed Iranian official specifically stated that the incident will not have an effect on ongoing negotiations. In addition, the April 8-9 also talks proceeded as planned without any indication that such tensions negatively affected the meeting. In this context, Tehran must balance between the thaw in relations connected to negotiations and the ongoing presence of anti-Western sentiment in the country, highlighted by a recent demonstration in Isfahan protesting against the burial of an American scholar. With this in mind, the appointment of Aboutalebi and the cancellation of the parliamentary delegation may be intended to appease domestic hardliners, by demonstrating that the presence of negotiations does not necessary translate into good relations. Moreover, Iran reportedly suspended plans to dispatch warships near the U.S. maritime border in the Atlantic Ocean due to the "situation in the region", which may be an attempt to reduce heightened tensions under the cover of increased reports of piracy. Finally, it is possible that talks could be affected by recent reports that Iran and Russia may enter into an "oil-for-goods" deal. The proposed deal is valued at approximately 20 billion USD and would reportedly provide 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day in exchange for Russian equipment and goods. Russia's finance minister has stated that the potential deal will follow "U.N. rules on sanctions, not U.S. rules", while U.S. Treasury Secretary stated on April 10 that the deal could "trigger sanctions against any entity or individual involved in any related transactions". Iranian oil minister stated he would "neither confirm nor deny this topic". Despite Russian statements, the proposed agreement would likely exceed the quota of oil exports permitted to Iran as part of the JPoA, which allows Iran to continue exporting a total of one million barrels of oil per day (bpd) to existing buyers, of which Russia was not included. Although Iranian exports reportedly reached 1.3 million bpd in March, a decrease from the 1.4 million bpd
reported in February, the U.S. administration reportedly believes that decreasing Page exports will allow an ultimately average of one million bpd. However, the oil for goods
32 deal with Iran is likely to prevent such an average from being reached, thereby breaking
one of the terms of the agreement. Moreover, tensions between the P5+1 could directly affect talks, given that decisions require unanimity, and particularly if sanctions against Russian entities are triggered should this proposed deal go forward. That said, reports from January indicate that a similar proposed deal involving a 1.5 billion USD per month oil-for-goods agreement between Russia and Iran did not go forward. With this in mind, and given that the proposed deal is in the discussion phase, that Russia lacks a need for imported oil, that tensions between the West and Russia regarding Ukraine have thus
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far remained separate from the nuclear negotiations, and the interest of all parties to reach a permanent deal, we assess that, under current circumstances, the potential oil- for-goods agreement will not affect ongoing talks at this time.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Western nationals are advised against all nonessential travel to Iran due to persistent negative sentiment toward the United States and other North American and Western European nations. For non-Western nationals, travel to Tehran, Esfahan, and other major cities in Iran may continue while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and adherence to cultural norms. 2. We advise against all nonessential travel to outlying border areas with Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Armenia due to ongoing militant activity. 3. Those traveling to Iran should anticipate prolonged questioning by customs officials. Refrain from traveling with sophisticated cameras or other features affiliated with journalists. Cooperate with all security officials and respond to questioning in a respectable and calm manner. 4. Refrain from discussing the current political situation, Iran’s nuclear program, or tensions with the United States and Israel with local residents as a basic precaution. Be advised that authorities may monitor communications from hotels and other facilities frequented by foreigners, while internet access may be limited. 5. In the event that embassy services are required, it is advised to check the operational status of pertinent embassies and consulates. Consular services for U.S. citizens are provided through the auspices of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, while those for British citizens are provided through any E.U. embassy.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 2014 Iranian National Army New missile defense and radar systems Day celebrates the will reportedly be revealed on this day. formation of the Iranian In addition, allot extra time for travel Army and will likely be throughout Iran, particularly in Tehran marked with given the possibility for large celebrations, rallies, gatherings, celebrations, and traffic speeches, and rhetoric congestion emanating from the holiday. from the government emphasizes Iran's Page military strength.
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MEDIUM RISK & HIGH RISK Israel & Palestinian Territories Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations continue despite significant lack of progress and disagreement over key issues. Hezbollah claims responsibility for attack on IDF patrol on Israel-Lebanon border, raising concerns over possible reduction in Israeli deterrence since 2006 war. Travel to major cities in Israel, including western areas of Jerusalem, may continue while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and terrorism. Business- essential travel to Ramallah can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions regarding the threats of civil unrest and militancy. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Palestinian Israeli Negotiations U.S.-mediated Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are slated to continue until the April 29 negotiation deadline. The deadline was set by the U.S. at the beginning of the current round of negotiations last July. However, both parties have reportedly stated that an agreement is not likely to be reached by this date. Most recently, on April 10, Israel and Palestinian Authority (PA) negotiators met again but were unable to break the present deadlock. Meanwhile, on April 9, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered government ministries to cease cooperation with PA institutions, with an Israeli government official stating that the move was in response to "Palestinian violations", likely referring to the recent Palestinian application to sign 15 international conventions. The Palestinian move arrived amidst an April 3 announcement by Israel's chief negotiator and justice minister, Tzipi Livni, that Israel will not release the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners. We assess that, while it remains unlikely that a breakthrough in talks will be reached by April 29, it is possible that, with continued U.S. mediation, negotiations will extend beyond the deadline. In this context, although the talks on April 10 ended without an agreement, a source reportedly close to Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams indicated following the meeting that gaps between the two sides were narrowing. That being said, tensions between and with both camps may hinder the extension of the talks, most recently underscored by reports that the right-wing Bayit Yehudi ("Jewish Home") party threatened to withdraw from the Israeli ruling coalition should Israel agree
Page to release the fourth round of Palestinian prisoners.
Furthermore, given such heightened tensions, there remains a heightened potential for 34
an uptick in confrontations between Palestinian and Israeli communities, as well as Israeli security forces in the West Bank in the lead up and aftermath of the April 29 date. This is underscored by a recent uptick in lone-wolf attacks targeting Jewish settlers. In this context, on April 14, an Israeli family was shot west of Hebron while traveling along Route 35 in a suspected terror attack, with one person reportedly killed. There further remains a possibility for attacks carried out by organized militant networks, including the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, although such confrontations are
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more likely to develop in the event of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) arrest operations, as reflected by March 21 clashes in Jenin.
Northern border tensions On April 6, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publicly claimed the group's responsibility for a March 14 roadside bombing targeting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops in the Har Dov area along the Lebanese-Israeli border, which injured four IDF soldiers. The bombing was reportedly in retaliation for an Israel Air Force (IAF) airstrike on Hezbollah weapons facilities in the Bekaa Valley on February 24. In the same statement, Nasrallah also claimed responsibility for two August 2013 IED attacks that targeted IDF forces patrolling the border. While additionally underscoring heightened tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border, Nasrallah's statement is notable given that, following the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah purposefully refrained from claiming responsibility for attacks against Israeli military targets in the vicinity of the border. This was likely due to concerns of regarding Israeli retaliatory strikes. As a result, the recent and rare claim of responsibility is likely linked to internal political tensions in Lebanon, given domestic debates surrounding the organization's role in resisting Israel. In this context, Israel will likely then be pressured to consider the possibility of a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s policy and a shift in Israel's own deterrence. While it is not expected that Israel would refrain from attacking when it deems a target to be in its national security interests, as evidenced by an IDF attack against a Hezbollah surveillance post immediately after the March 14 attack, the Israeli military is likely to remain cognizant of potential future counter strikes by Hezbollah. It is further likely to increase the readiness of IDF forces in the northern sector following any attack on a Hezbollah target. Such measures would further serve to underscore Israeli concerns of and preparations for a broader escalation in violence along the northern border region.
RECOMMENDATIONS: ISRAEL 1. Travel to major cities in Israel, including western areas of Jerusalem, may continue while adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and terrorism. 2. Avoid all nonessential visits to the immediate vicinity of Lebanese and Syrian borders. Avoid the vicinity of the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian borders due to an increased threat of militant attacks.
3. Those traveling in the 20 km area surrounding the Gaza Strip should continue adhering Page to all safety precautions regarding early warning sirens for incoming rockets. In case you
35 hear a siren, seek shelter in a protected area and remain inside for at least 10 minutes.
4. Those in Israel are advised to regularly review their emergency and contingency procedures as a basic security precaution, as a broad conflict with Hezbollah or Hamas would involve the targeting of major urban centers in Israel. Consult with us for emergency evacuation and contingency planning.
RECOMMENDATIONS: PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
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1. Business-essential travel to Ramallah can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions regarding the threats of civil unrest and militancy. Consult with us for itinerary-based recommendations and ground support options. 2. Avoid nonessential travel to other Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank at this time given ongoing civil unrest. 3. We advise against all travel to the Gaza Strip at this time due to continuous border crossing closures and the threat of militant activity. 4. In major cities such as Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron, as well as Arab areas of East Jerusalem, avoid the vicinities of central squares as these locations serve as focal points for demonstrations. 5. If travel is essential, prior to entering Palestinian-controlled areas from Jerusalem-area checkpoints, confirm that crossings remain open and no unrest is taking place. Crossings near the cities of Jenin, Qalqilya, and Tul Karem remain less prone to violence. 6. Minimize night travel in major cities, as the majority of IDF and P.A. security operations occur at this time, particularly in the vicinities of Palestinian refugee camps.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 27, 2014 Holocaust Memorial Most places of business and Day entertainment will be closed on the evening of the holiday (April 27); however, most will reopen on the day of remembrance. A two-minute siren will be heard throughout the country at 10:00 (local time) in which citizens throughout the country stand in silence. Public transportation will run as normal.
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MEDIUM RISK Tunisia Arrests of alleged militants in Sfax after homemade grenade accidentally exploded in the city underscore growth of local militant cells in urban areas. Additionally, security forces continue crackdown on perceived extreme Islamist elements, particularly targeting Salafist mosques and communities, while triggering protests and unrest. Socio-economic discontent continues, with increasing unrest in outlying areas, while government attempts to negotiate to prevent escalation in dissatisfaction. Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based tactical monitoring and ground support options. Back to table of contents
ASSESSMENTS Militancy Security forces continue to dismantle militant cells in major cities, most recently in Sfax, when two suspects were arrested on April 5 after a homemade grenade accidentally exploded, injuring one suspected militant. Authorities also confiscated quantities of ammonium nitrate, a material used for making explosives, during the arrest. The investigation into the incident led to the subsequent arrest of eight individuals on April 6 in the city. The eight were accused on April 12 by the Court of the First Instance in Tunis as belonging to a group called the al-Khattab Brigades, while group members additionally claimed to part of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). The April 6 arrest was followed by a subsequent detention of four members of the same alleged cell during the overnight hours of April 11-12, with authorities noting that one member remains at large. Reports indicate the group was about to commit a series of attacks in “sensitive areas” of the city. The Court of First Instance’s naming of a previously little known militant group underscores the proliferation of such localized cells across the country, including in metropolitan areas. Such growth comes despite reports indicating a recent increase in the dismantling of militant cells, particularly surrounding Tunis. With this in mind, the likely recent rise in the number of these groups is likely connected to the return of as
Page many as 800 fighters from Syria. Although authorities claim that they are monitoring the
returning fighters closely, we assess that the return of Tunisians from Syria, 37
compounded by a March 24 statement from Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) leader Abu Ayyoub al-Tunisi praising Muslim youth efforts to “haunt the West”, reflect militant efforts to reorganize following recent government raids. Furthermore, while the connection between the organizations remains unconfirmed, the suspects’ admission of membership to Ansar al-Sharia signifies the potential connection of this new militant group to the overarching Islamist militant organization present in
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Tunisia, while additionally suggesting that AST may hold links, organizational ties, and possibly control with localized militant cells. In this context, continued arrests, dismantling of militant cells, and discoveries of militant plots remain likely in the coming months, including in coastal cities that serve as tourist destinations, although security forces are likely to escalate measures in order to mitigate such threats.
Crackdowns on Salafist extremists In recent weeks Tunisia has experienced a significant uptick in security forces’ crackdowns on perceived radical Islamist elements in Tunisia, particularly targeting Salafist mosques and communities. This is highlighted by the April 7 arrest of 16 men who belonged to a local mosque in Rouhia, 300 km southwest of Tunis in the Siliana Governorate, spurring April 11 and April 9 protests by hundreds of Salafists in front of the Rouhia police station. The spokesman from the Interior Ministry announced that 16 “radicals” were arrested, including three imams who had recently returned from Syria. Additionally, on April 4, an imam of a local mosque in the Brakat al-Sahel in the area of Nabeul was arrested after security forces deemed at least 15 speeches to be inciting violence against police and military forces and encouraging the funding of Tunisian youth to join the “jihad” in Syria. Following his arrest security forces discovered 24 Molotov cocktails in the mosque. In addition, citizens reportedly protested against the imam’s arrest outside the mosque on April 4 following his detainment. The two incidents underscore the ongoing crackdown by security forces against perceived extreme Islamist elements in Tunisia in an attempt to prevent the spread of such radical sentiment, particularly given fears over the return of battle-hardened jihadists from Syria. Tunisian law requires that imams be licensed by the government, which has assisted the government in asserting control over activities within mosques, underscored by the arrest of the imam in the Brakat al-Sahel area. In this context, concerns over the radicalization of communities by local imams and mosques highlights government perceptions that such ideologies constitute existential threats to the state, extending beyond rhetoric to the likely support of militancy within such communities. Such concerns are further underscored by the discovery of 24 Molotov cocktails and the alleged content of the imam’s speeches in Brakat al-Sahel. Meanwhile, the protests in Rouhia highlight the perceived isolation of Salafists through restrictive laws and crackdowns, which is likely to increase the potential for additional
protests in the coming weeks and months as government security forces continue to Page limit the influence of such radical preachers and mosques.
38
Socio-economic unrest On April 13, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) called on interim Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa to explain the economic situation to the Tunisian people and review its progress while implementing agreements with the trade union federation. Meanwhile, on April 2 the UGTT offices in Ben Guerdane, near the Libyan border, were set ablaze by town residents denouncing the closure of the nearby border crossing of Ras Jedir.
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Following protests, the Libyan and Tunisian government officials agreed to reopen the border on April 6. While the country’s economic situation is still in a state of instability, the government has increased efforts to negotiate with unions and appease workers’ demands. Increased negotiations underscores the fact that frequent strikes and protests since the 2010-2011 revolution have increased pressure on the government to address issues surrounding worker dissatisfaction. In this context, the UGTT announced on March 28 that successful negotiations resulted in wage increases for 300 employees at a metallurgy company in the Sousse governorate. Meanwhile, the burning of the UGTT headquarters in Ben Guerdane, highlights outlying areas dependence on the black market involving the smuggling of both drugs and weapons into Tunisia from Ras Jedir. Security incidents have prompted the sporadic closure of the Ras Jedir checkpoint, while security forces have bolstered their efforts to tackle such smuggling efforts. Given that such activities have been known to support segments of the local economy, the restriction of illicit markets has likely further fueled demands from local residents for increased governmental support, while antagonizing part of the local population whose main resources are linked to the black-market economy. Given that stabilization of the Ben Guerdane region is additionally dependent on issues related to regional security conditions, particularly the security vacuum in Libya, we assess that similar closures and corresponding protests are likely in the coming months. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based tactical monitoring and ground support options. 2. We currently advise against nonessential travel to outlying towns and cities in Tunisia due to lacking travel and tourist infrastructure as well as a heightened risk for civil unrest and militancy. 3. The Kasserine, Kef, and Jendouba Provinces, in addition to all border areas, should particularly be avoided due to the elevated threat of jihadist activity. 4. As a general precaution, avoid the vicinity of all protests and political gatherings in Tunisia due to the incidental risk emanating from clashes between rival groups and security forces. 5. Maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of the National Constituent Assembly as
well as the Kasbah district, as these remain protest focal points. Those traveling or Page operating in Tunis are advised to anticipate a heightened security presence around
39 government buildings and political party offices given the uptick in the threat of attacks.
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 22-24, 2014 Administrative authority There remains a potential for protests of country officials in Tunis related to the calls for a strike. decided on March 31 to Remain cognizant for such calls, while go on a three-day strike avoiding the immediate vicinity of all
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due to the non- protests as a basic security precaution. activation of several agreements established with the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).
April 27, 2014 The Independent In the case that the ISIE's creation is not Supreme Electoral finalized by this date, there is an Committee (ISIE)'s increased potential for an uptick in creation is due to be political tensions and resulting protests. finalized by this date, three months after the ratification of the Constitution.
April 28, 2014 The case of the There remains a potential for protests dissolution of the by LPR members in front of the Court of League for the the First Instance in Tunis and Kasbah Protection of the Square. Avoid the immediate vicinity of Revolution (LPR), a all such gatherings as a basic security major Islamist precaution. organization, is slated to be held.
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Notable Dates for the period of April 15-30
Algeria Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 16, 2014 National Organization of While clashes are unlikely there remains Retirees calls for sit-in a possibility for localized traffic at the military regions disruptions. at the Qum El Bouaghi on April 15
April 16, 2014 Rally for Culture and Given already existing anti-government Democracy (RCD) calls sentiments in Kabylie, and a wave of for protests across the protests across the governorate Kabylie governorate witnessed during the past weeks, the protests are likely to witness high turnouts, while bearing a relatively heightened chance for localized violence.
April 16, 2014 Barakat protest slated The Barakat protest is likely to remain for Algiers University peaceful, while witnessing a slightly heightened turnout due to the election the following day
April 17, 2014 Election day. Alliance of While there remains a heightened boycotting parties is threat of militant attacks during the reportedly planning to election, we assess that thus far call for a general strike. Algerian counterinsurgency operations Algerian authorities are likely have mitigated such threats, also bolstering their particularly in major cities. Meanwhile efforts to secure the calls for a general strike, should it polling stations, materialize, could hinder business including deployment of continuity in Algiers, most likely 66,000 police officers to including the transportation system. For
protect the stations. the duration of April 17, avoid Page nonessential travel to the vicinity of
40
polling stations, while generally allotting extra time for travel in the capital and other major cities.
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Bahrain Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 15-19, 2014 The February 14 Youth The February 14 Youth Coalition issues Coalition called for a multiple, often back-to-back extended nationwide campaign of protest campaigns, with the most protests in solidarity recent one coinciding with the Formula with detained activists 1 Gulf Air Grand Prix. During such under the slogan campaigns, small-scale demonstrations "leadership of glory". often occur in multiple locations On April 15, a gathering throughout the country, and is slated for Meqsha. On particularly at opposition hubs, even April 16, rallies under when only one or two villages have the banner been specified in the announcement. “International Labor Fridays and Saturdays, corresponding to Day for this year” have April 18-19, often witness an increased been called for as-yet number of such protests. Such protests unspecified locales. On are likely to witness increased security April 19, the movement presence in their vicinity, in addition to called for a march to forcible dispersal, particularly if activists begin at the al-Barbaghi attempt to march to sensitive locales. It Mosque in A'ali. is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Meqsha on April 15 and A’ali on April 19.
Egypt Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 25, 2014 Sinai Liberation Day An annual national parade is slated to commemorates the take place in Sinai. In addition, a rally final Israeli troop will take place in Tahrir Square in Cairo. withdrawal from the Anticipate mass pro-military rallies, as Sinai Peninsula as well as Muslim Brotherhood efforts to predetermined by the use the date to mobilize against the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace government and military. Avoid
Page Accords nonessential travel to the vicinity of
Tahrir Square. 42
April 28, 2014 683 Muslim As Mohammed Badie, leader of the Brotherhood members Muslim Brotherhood, and other stand trial on an array influential members possibly face the of charges, including death penalty, expect large murder, destroying Brotherhood protests on this day public property and throughout the country. Avoid
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disturbing the peace. All nonessential travel to Brotherhood charges are related to protest locales, including Ennahda violence that broke out Square, Rabaa al-Adaweya Square, and in Minya following the the campuses of Ain Shams, al-Azhar, dispersal of the Rabaa and Cairo Universities. al-Adaweya and Ennahda Square sit-ins.
April 28, 2014 The verdict on the legal Due to the April 6 Youth movement's status of the April 6 role in the January 25 Revolution, and Youth Movement will its ability to call for mass protests, be delivered. There is a expect large demonstrations in possibility the group downtown Cairo on this date in support may be banned. of the youth movement, especially in the area of Tahrir Square, where protests that overthrow the Mubarak government took place.
Iran Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 2014 Iranian National Army New missile defense and radar systems Day celebrates the will reportedly be revealed on this day. formation of the Iranian In addition, allot extra time for travel Army and will likely be throughout Iran, particularly in Tehran marked with given the possibility for large celebrations, rallies, gatherings, celebrations, and traffic speeches, and rhetoric congestion emanating from the holiday. from the government emphasizes Iran's military strength.
Iraq
Page Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
April 23, 2014 On April 23, 2003, the April 23 marks the anniversary of the 43
U.S. 82nd Airborne entrance of U.S. troops into Fallujah Division entered after the invasion of Iraq. While the Fallujah. Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) currently maintains positions within Fallujah, April 23 may witness increased militancy, similar to that witnessed on the April 9 anniversary of the U.S.
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invasion of Baghdad. Maintain heightened vigilance in the immediate vicinity of government installations, police stations, and religious centers as these locations remain under threat of militant attacks.
April 30, 2014 Iraq’s Parliamentary Election day in Iraq will likely witness an elections. uptick in militant attacks, in addition to increased security measures throughout the country, particularly in Baghdad. Anticipate related attacks, particularly on polling stations, political offices, and against political figures, as well as targeting military forces at checkpoints, and military installations. Minimize all nonessential travel on April 30.
Israel Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 27, 2014 Holocaust Memorial Most places of business and Day entertainment will be closed on the evening of the holiday (April 27); however, most will reopen on the day of remembrance. A two-minute siren will be heard throughout the country at 10:00 (local time) in which citizens throughout the country stand in silence. Public transportation will run as normal.
Lebanon Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 1983 The U.S. Embassy in Memorial services will likely be held at
Page Beirut was bombed, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. No action
killing 63 people, necessary 44
including 17 Americans. A U.S. court determined years later that Hezbollah was responsible for the attack.
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April 22, 2014 Planned Parliamentary On April 22 and the surrounding days sessions to select a there will likely be a heightened security President presence in the vicinity of the Parliament. Remain cognizant of the fact that this date may change.
Libya Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 18, 2014 Supreme Court to hear The hearing was initially postponed appeal against Political from February 24, on which date Isolation Law, banning hundreds of protesters gathered Gaddafi-era figures outside of the court. Anticipate similar from participation in demonstrations on April 18. Avoid government. nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Supreme Court in Tripoli.
April 19, 2014 Municipal elections Anticipate an uptick in militant attacks slated to be held in and threats against polling stations and Benghazi candidates participating in elections. The potential for such violence may result in the postponement of elections. Avoid the immediate vicinity of all facilities used as polling stations, given such threats.
April 21, 2014 First meeting of The first meeting was postponed from Constitutional Assembly April 14, given the presence of only 47 slated to be held in of the body's 60 total members; the 13 Beida remaining members were not elected due to election boycotts, and polling station violence. The session may be further delayed. No action is necessary.
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Tunisia 45
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 22-24, 2014 Administrative authority There remains a potential for protests of country officials in Tunis related to the calls for a strike. decided on March 31 to Remain cognizant for such calls, while go on a three-day strike avoiding the immediate vicinity of all due to the non- protests as a basic security precaution. activation of several
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agreements established with the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).
April 27, 2014 The Independent In the case that the ISIE's creation is not Supreme Electoral finalized by this date, there is an Committee (ISIE)'s increased potential for an uptick in creation is due to be political tensions and resulting protests. finalized by this date, three months after the ratification of the Constitution.
April 28, 2014 The case of the There remains a potential for protests dissolution of the by LPR members in front of the Court of League for the the First Instance in Tunis and Kasbah Protection of the Square. Avoid the immediate vicinity of Revolution (LPR), a all such gatherings as a basic security major Islamist precaution. organization, is slated to be held.
Yemen Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation April 27, 1994 April 27 marks the In addition to a “million-man” march anniversary of the 1994 that has been called in the port city of civil war between Mukalla, located in the Hadramaut northern and southern Governorate, this anniversary is liable forces. to be witness marches and rallies calling for independence throughout southern Yemen towns and cities, including Aden, the former capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Such demonstrations in Aden are often held Page
in al-Urud (Parade) Square, while 46
additional potential focal points include al-Mansoura, Ma’ala, al-Tawahi, Kraytar, and Shaykh Uthman. Particularly in larger port cities such as Aden and Mukalla, heightened security is liable to accompany such demonstrations, with past precedent
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indicating a potential for scuffles between activists and security forces. On April 27, it is advised to avoid nonessential travel to the aforementioned locales within Aden, due to the increased possibility unrest, while avoiding the areas should demonstrations arise.
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