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Is John Feinberg's Theodicy ABSTRACT THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, MODERN CALVINISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL: IS JOHN FEINBERG’S THEODICY A COHERENT RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRAGIC MORAL EVIL? Michael Olaseni Obanla, M.Div. Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012 Advisor: Dr. Edward N. Martin Reader: Dr. John Morrison Chair, M.Div. Program: Dr. Kevin L. King The thesis examines and evaluates Feinberg’s theistic defense against the problem of evil with a view to determining whether it represents a coherent and consistent resolution to the problem of tragic moral evil. The thesis relies on three criteria for the evaluation: the internal consistency of Feinberg’s theistic defense, its exegetical accuracy, and epistemic adequacy. Chapter 1 states the statement of purpose and position of the thesis, as well as, the limitations and the methodology of the study. This chapter introduces the basis of our evaluation. Chapter 2 provides a theological and philosophical review of the literature on the problem of evil. The chapter defines the concept of evil and explains multidimensionality of the problem of evil: the logical problem, the evidential problem, and the religious problem. It also explores the concepts of free will, moral responsibility, and soft determinism from a compatibilist’s perspective, and highlights the various arguments for and against compatibilism, including such arguments as Consequence Argument and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The chapter then presents a general overview of how contemporary Modified Rationalists see the problem of evil. Chapter 3 highlights Feinberg’s theodicy (or defense, as he prefers to call it), underscoring his theological belief as a moderate Calvinist with compatibilistic metaphysics and his theistic system as a Calvinistic version of Modified Rationalism with a non-consequential ethic. The chapter then highlights Feinberg’s defense against the logical problem of evil as the background to his theistic defense against the evidential problem of tragic moral evil. The chapter further highlights Feinberg’s arguments against the evidence from evil by focusing on his arguments against induction and probability as well as on the limitation of human knowledge, the problems of gratuitous evil, and quantity of evil. Chapter 4 evaluates John Feinberg’s theodicy on tragic moral evil on the basis of its internal consistency, exegetical accuracy and epistemic adequacy. The chapter affirms the internal consistency of Feinberg’s theistic defense against the problem of evil, but reveals some theological disagreements by this author with Feinberg on the exegetical accuracy of his theistic defense against the problem of tragic moral evil. Such disagreements center on what kind of man God intended to create and whether He created man with a non-glorified body in a morally imperfect state. The chapter affirms the epistemic adequacy of Feinberg’s theistic defense against the atheologian arguments from evil. Chapter 5 summarizes the materials of the first four chapters and presents the conclusion of the thesis: that the existence of evil does not negate in any way the omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence of God; neither does it make God to be malevolent nor impotent. Rather, the existence of evil is a logical and necessary outcome of the doctrines of God’s sovereignty and human freedom, the transcendence, and the righteousness of God. The chapter demonstrates that the existence of evil and its manifestation in pain and suffering has a purpose in the divine economy and that human beings can experience justice only by developing personal and intimate relationships with God. The chapter further argues that rather than hold God responsible for the effects of evil, the culpability should be laid at the doorsteps of moral agents (humans and Satan) ii and that no matter how much Satan tries, he cannot negate the eternal plan of God for the salvation and redemption of humanity, which God already sealed with the atoning death of His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ. Finally, the chapter encourages humankind to pursue a loving relationship with God. It is by so doing that they can be able to overcome evil with good and have hope of blissful existence in the new world to come. iii iv Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, MODERN CALVINISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL: IS JOHN FEINBERG’S THEODICY A COHERENT RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRAGIC MORAL EVIL? ----------------------------------------------- A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Divinity ----------------------------------------------- By Michael Olaseni Obanla ----------------------------------------------- Lynchburg, VA November 2012 v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 1 Statement of Purpose of the Thesis 2 Statement of Thesis Position 4 Limitations of the Study 6 Methodology of the Study 6 2. PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Evil: Definition of Terms 9 Multidimensionality of the Problem of Evil 9 The Logical Problem: Rationality of Theism 11 The Evidential Problem: Probability of Theism 14 The Religious Problem: Livability of Theism 20 The Concepts of Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Soft Determinism: A Compatibilist’s Perspective 21 Contemporary Modified Rationalism and the Problem of Evil 28 3. FEINBERG’S APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF TRAGIC MORAL EVIL 30 Theological Belief: Calvinism and Compatibilism 30 Theistic System: Modified Rationalism and Non-Consequentialism 38 Background to Feinberg’s Theodicy in Response to the Problem of Tragic Moral Evil 39 The Nature of Man 40 Sin and Moral Evil 42 The Price of Utopia 43 vi Feinberg’s Approach to the Resolution of the Evidential Problem of Tragic Moral Evil 47 The Problems with Inductive Arguments 48 The Problems with Probability Arguments 51 Limitation of Human Knowledge 53 The Problem of Gratuitous Evil 54 The Problem of the Quantity of Evil 56 4. THE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVIL: AN EVALUATION OF JOHN FEINBERG’S THEODICY IN RESPONSE TO TRAGIC MORAL EVIL Evaluation of Feinberg’s Theodicy on Tragic Moral Evil 60 Internal Consistency 61 Exegetical Accuracy 67 Epistemic Adequacy 77 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 84 The Central Issue: Sovereignty of God, Human Freedom, and Creatural Responsibility 87 A Morally Perfect World: An Eschatological and Christological Resolution 94 A Final Biblical Exegesis: Genesis 3:15 and I King 18:24-40 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY 100 vii INTRODUCTION Many of us have struggled to come to terms with horrendous and tragic evils that happened to someone we know or even ourselves. It is a well-known fact that Job, whom God called “blameless and upright,”1 suffered the most tragic evil resulting in complete destruction of all his life possessions including his children for no apparent just cause. Even when God decided to answer Job and his friends, He never explained why Job had to suffer such devastations but rather overwhelmed him with His sovereignty. Although God restored everything Job lost two-fold, the restoration rarely explained the justification for the tragic and moral evils that he had to endure neither did it portray God as the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. In the same manner, how does one comfort a mother whose child has just been raped and killed or the families of the victims of a school shooting that left many children dead? How does one justify a terrorist attack like the one witnessed in this country on September 11, 2001 or the kind of genocide visited on the Tutsis by Hutu power groups in Rwanda in 1994? Is there any justification for the atrocious moral evils that are being witnessed on a daily basis worldwide? Where is God in all these? Is the notion of God as the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent Being compatible with the existence of evil? Many scholars since Epicurus, theists and non-theists alike, have focused on the problem of evil. However, the jury is still out on how effective these attempts have been in answering or rebutting in particular the evidential problems of evil. It is generally acknowledged that the problem of evil comes in at least three forms: the logical problem, the evidential problem, and the existential or religious problem. While there is a consensus among scholars that the logical 1 Job 1:8, NIV 1 problem of evil which deals with the logical compatibility of God with the existence of evil has been mostly resolved since Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, the evidential problem of evil which has to do with the ubiquitousness of horrendous evil as probable evidence against God’s existence has been more problematic to resolve. There are several contemporary approaches to the resolution of evidential problem of evil. Such approaches include the compatibilist or modern Calvinistic perspectives that seek to establish the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with soft determinism. A major proponent of the Calvinistic approach to the resolution of the evidential problem of evil is John Feinberg. Feinberg, in his book The Many Faces of Evil, has extensively analyzed the evidential problem of evil and advanced a robust approach to resolving the problem of moral evil. However, is John Feinberg’s theodicy a coherent and consistent solution to the problem of tragic moral evil? This is a question we intend to explore and answer. Statement of Purpose of the Thesis The main purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate John Feinberg’s theodicy with a view to determining whether it represents a coherent and consistent resolution to the evidential problem of tragic moral evil. The horrendousness and preponderance of tragic moral evil has provided ammunition for atheists like William Rowe to postulate that the all-knowing, all- powerful, and all-good God of Christianity could not exist in the face of such horrendous evil like the Auschwitz genocide, especially when there was no perceivable good for the victims of such evil.2 2 William Rowe, “An Exchange on the Problem of Evil” in God and the Problem of Evil, edited by William Rowe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001): 130.
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