European View

Volume 17 Number 2 autumn 2018

European View

Bigger, better, braver: Can Europe defend and deliver?

EDITORIAL Bigger, better, braver: Can Europe defend and deliver? 113 Mikuláš Dzurinda

Bigger, better, braver: can Europe defend and deliver? The future of the Economic and Monetary Union to 116 2025 and beyond: the need for convergence Kaloyan Dimitrov Simeonov Euro-economics: Too much trust in redistribution 126 Eckhard Wurzel International challenges and opportunities: Putting 136 the EU’s positions into words Petteri Orpo Radicalisation in Europe after the fall of Islamic State: 145 Trends and risks Sara Brzuszkiewicz After homo sovieticus: Democratic governance gaps and 155 societal vulnerabilities in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood Igor Merheim-Eyre Beyond emergency measures: The need for a holistic 163 and truly European approach to migration Loredana Teodorescu Dealing with climate change: A European centre–right 172 perspective Dimitar Lilkov

CURRENT AFFAIRS How to boost the Western response to Russian hostile 181 influence operations Jakub Janda Resilience-building in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: 189 Towards a tailored regional approach from the EU Teona Lavrelashvili The road to Sophia: Explaining the EU’s naval 197 operation in the Mediterranean Niklas Nováky Socio-economic challenges to Tunisia’s democratic transition 210 Ragnar Weilandt Europe, the US and the Iran deal: The need to 218 resolve transatlantic disagreements Daniel Schwammenthal Saudi Arabia: A prince’s revolution 227 Jihan Chara

SATIRICAL REVIEW Jungle politics: Animal metaphors in international relations 235 Ioana Lung

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES France’s European Intervention Initiative: Towards a 238 Culture of Burden Sharing Niklas Nováky Brexit and the Irish question IN FOCUS: Part one: 239 Ireland’s Slow Road to Peace Michael O’Neill North Korea IN FOCUS: Towards a More Effective EU Policy 240 Ramon Pacheco Pardo The Future of Work: Robots Cooking Free Lunches? 241 Ziga Turk Differentiation, not Disintegration 242 János Martonyi Filling the Void: Why the EU Must Step Up Support for 243 Russian Civil Society Barbara von Ow-Freytag European Energy Security IN FOCUS: The Case 244 Against Nord Stream 2 Dimitar Lilkov and Roland Freudenstein EUV0010.1177/1781685818813005European ViewDzurinda editorial8130052018

Editorial

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 113–115 Bigger, better, braver: Can © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813005DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813005 Europe defend and deliver? journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

Mikuláš Dzurinda

In November 1999, when I was serving as the Prime Minister of Slovakia, I appealed to then US President Bill Clinton, requesting that my country should be admitted to NATO—the most successful military alliance in history and the one that had stood against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Our neighbours in Czechia, Poland and Hungary had already started their accession negotiations with both NATO and the EU in 1997. Slovakia, however, was excluded from this process due to violations of basic democratic rules by the government of then Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. At that time Slovakia was in a state of economic quagmire. Traditional sectors (the defence industry, mining and heavy chemicals) were dying, and no new ones were being created. Moreover, Slovak society was suffering from a lack of strong democratic institutions and the absence of the rule of law. Therefore, Clinton responded to my request by saying that we had missed the boat and that we were now politically and economically isolated from the other countries in Central Europe. Nevertheless, after implementing a huge programme of political and economic reform, Slovakia joined NATO and the EU in 2004, along with other Central and Eastern European countries. We had managed to regain the trust of our Western partners and had overcome one of the biggest challenges in Slovakia’s history.

In recent years I have given a lot of thought to Slovakia in the European context, especially in the search to find answers that would enable us to advance Europe’s security and prosperity. I am convinced that many of the principles that proved to be effective on the path to our domestic reforms in Slovakia could also help our Europe to defend democratic values, as well as deliver them outside the EU’s borders. The world of today is different from the world at the turn of the millennium, but in today’s Europe we are also facing some of the biggest challenges in our common history. It seems that in the last few years Europe has moved from one emergency to the next, without finding effective and long-term solutions to its challenges. This is certainly due to the global financial and economic crisis. However, it is undoubtedly the case that a few specific issues remain Europeans’ top concerns.

First, while the EU member states’ economic interdependence has boosted growth and prosperity over the last 25 years, issues such as budget deficits and macroeconomic

Second, since 2004 the EU has grown dramatically, and our new neighbours have generated instability and complex challenges for European security. This is due to our incapacity to work as a whole and find joint solutions to our common problems. On our Eastern side, EU member states have failed to work effectively as a coalition to respond to the Russian hostile influence in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as within some EU member states. On the other hand, the many EU summits devoted to issues related to economic migrants and political refugees from the Mediterranean region have not been able to find a credible solution to the problem. We have to be aware that it is our responsibility to look for answers to the challenges posed by the twenty-first-century world. As in Slovakia in 1999, today the EU needs to emerge from this crisis by maintaining its collective faith in universal values such as democracy, the rule of law and economic freedom, and by creating new ways to achieve durable prosperity. I believe that we are reluctant to undertake the reforms our European project very much needs because they could be painful and hurt our politicians’ chances of getting re-elected. This plays into the hands of populists. But we need to develop credible and long-term solutions to make the EU capable of delivering for and defending our citizens.

This issue of the European View provides abundant food for thought on long-lasting and collective improvements to the European project. The first section provides important contributions to how we can shape the European project and make the EU capable of defending its values in an increasingly globalised world. For instance, the contributions of both Loredana Teodorescu and Sara Brzuszkiewicz ask whether our measures to tackle illegal migration and radicalisation are effective enough. The authors propose solutions that go beyond emergency measures, including strengthening the operational capacity of Europol and further cooperation with third countries. Other articles, such as Kaloyan Simeonov’s, address prosperity and growth. These topics need our fullest attention as it is crucial to respond quickly to the technological revolution, which is not only transforming our economic models, but also challenging our economic unity. As Finland’s Finance Minister Petteri Orpo stresses in his article, it is time for a strong EU that is capable of representing its member states and achieving well-being for its citizens more fully than each member state can do on its own. The current affairs section gives an overview of long-term external challenges, such as the US withdrawal from the Iran deal and the political instability in northern Africa. Several contributors, including Jakub Janda and Daniel Schwammenthal, argue for the need to adhere to our democratic principles when cooperating with non-EU countries. This is particularly important, as a strong EU must be capable of spreading its political and cultural values worldwide.

I conclude with a reminder that today we must clearly distinguish those matters that have real value for our citizens and be steadfast in our pursuit of them. We followed these Dzurinda 115 principles in Slovakia in 1999. In 2018 we need to do the same in the EU and in its member states to ensure that Europe does not miss the boat to a brighter future. Dear readers, I invite you to keep these principles in mind and engage with the articles in this issue of the European View.

Author biography Mikuláš Dzurinda is President of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and a former Prime Minister of Slovakia. EUV0010.1177/1781685818805678European ViewSimeonov 805678research-article2018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 116–125 The future of the Economic © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805678DOI: 10.1177/1781685818805678 and Monetary Union to 2025 journals.sagepub.com/home/euv and beyond: the need for convergence

Kaloyan Dimitrov Simeonov

Abstract As set forth in the Maastricht Treaty, the objective of establishing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was based mainly on the need to achieve nominal convergence. However, the global economic and financial crisis has since proved that the EMU architecture is not solid enough. Therefore, EU institutions and member states have developed and started to implement plans for the completion of the EMU. The main focus of these plans up to 2025 is on institutional and regulatory reform. However, more attention should be paid to other types of convergence: real convergence, social convergence, financial convergence, cyclical convergence and structural convergence. This would lead to sustainable and strong all-round convergence in the EMU. This article outlines recommendations for the completion and sustainable maintenance of the EMU, concentrating on social, financial and cyclical convergence.

Keywords Convergence, EMU reforms, Euro area, Future of Europe

Introduction The architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was designed in relatively stable economic conditions. The EU’s leaders love to make comparisons between the EMU and a common house (Juncker et al. 2015, 4). They knew from the beginning that this house was not complete and that it would be difficult for a supranational

Corresponding author: K. D. Simeonov, Sofia University ‘St. Kliment Ohridksi’, European Studies Department, 125 Tsarigradsko Shosse Blvd., bl.2, floor 4, Sofia, Bulgaria. Email: [email protected]

The recent ‘storm’ (the last global economic and financial crisis) demonstrated in a much clearer way that this ‘house’ (the EMU) is indeed not finished. Therefore, major ‘repairs’ (reforms) have been started to complete the ‘roof’ and to make the ‘walls’ and ‘insulation’ much more solid. However, these changes focus mainly on institutional and regulatory reforms.1 Some of the measures aim to achieve different types of sustainable convergence among the member states, including real, cyclical, structural, social and financial convergence.

The start of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU—that is, the Brexit process—provoked another debate in the EU on what the future of Europe should look like, at least by 2025. The withdrawal of the second-largest EU economy raises many questions—one of which is how to structure the EMU in a future EU27 where only about 15% of the gross domestic product will be produced in non-euro-area member states. Therefore, the European Commission has launched a profound and intense debate about the future of the EU, including the future of the EMU.

This paper will first outline the main building blocks of the EMU reforms so far. Then it will briefly present some of the key concepts of convergence and how they should be tackled at the EU level. Finally, some conclusions and a summary of the recommendations will be provided. This article argues that attention should be paid not only to EMU institutional and regulatory reforms but, in order for the EMU to be sustainable to 2025 and beyond, also to achieving real, social, financial, cyclical and structural convergence. This paper will focus specifically on social, financial and cyclical convergence.2

Reforms to complete the EMU Many years ago, a Bulgarian writer wrote a famous crime novel titled, There Is Nothing Better Than Bad Weather. If one prefers just sunshine and does not agree with this concept, it may be worth looking at the trigger for the last round of EMU reforms. The storm that was produced by the last global economic and financial crisis damaged the unfin- ished architecture of the EMU but did not destroy it. On the contrary, it showed in a much clearer way where the problems are, and where there is a need for the reform, repair and completion of the architecture.

One of the first results of the reforms was the introduction of the European Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As part of the framework for these mechanisms and procedures the EU provides concrete recommendations for individual member states, outlining the main policy areas where national reform measures are needed.

The presidents of the EU institutions, led by the president of the European Council, presented their ideas for EMU reform in late 2012 in the so-called Four Presidents’ 118 European View 17(2)

Report (Van Rompuy et al. 2012). The report aimed to foster integrated financial, budgetary and economic policy reforms, as well as enhanced democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EMU. In late 2012 the European Commission also outlined its vision for EMU reform, focusing on some more medium- and long-term measures (European Commission 2012).

The next strategic paper that outlined the need for EMU reform was the Five Presidents’ Report published in June 2015. In addition to the president of the European Council, the president of the European Commission, the president of the Eurogroup and the president of the European Central Bank, the co-authors of this report included the president of the European Parliament. In a further difference from the Four Presidents’ Report, the lead this time was taken by the president of the European Commission. The main focus of the suggested reforms was the completion of economic, fiscal, financial and political union (Juncker et al. 2015).

The European Commission’s White Paper from March 2017 aimed to highlight five possible scenarios for the future of Europe (European Commission 2017f). The EMU was presented in light of these five scenarios and its development was explained in the framework of the realisation of each individual scenario. The White Paper was accompanied by five additional sectoral reflection papers that aimed to provide more detailed discussion on topics such as globalisation, EU finances and budget, defence policy and the social dimension of Europe. The fifth paper was dedicated to the development of the EMU to 2025 (European Commission 2017b). It develops further the ideas of the Five Presidents’ Report and other strategic papers related to the EMU. The reflection paper on the EMU also offers several new or reframed ideas.

Another important milestone for the reform of the EMU was the 6 December 2017 package of measures announced by the European Commission. This package included the Communication on Further Steps Towards Completing the EMU, together with some legislative proposals and other documents. Some of the main elements of the reforms in the package relate to the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism, the completion of the Banking Union, and measures relating to an economic and fiscal union, as well as plans for better accountability and more effective governance in the EMU (European Commission 2017a).

The Commission proposal for a new Multiannual Financial Framework from spring 2018 also contains draft reform measures that would enforce the functioning of the EMU if accepted by the Council and the European Parliament:

•• A Reform Support Programme would support priority reforms in all EU member states, with an overall planned budget of €25 billion for the period 2021–7. It would comprise three elements: a tool to provide financial support for reforms, an instrument providing technical expertise and a convergence facility to help member states that are on their way to joining the euro. Simeonov 119

•• A European Investment Stabilisation Function, which is intended to help with stabilising public investment levels and facilitating rapid economic recovery in cases of significant economic shocks both in euro-area member states and in those states participating in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (European Commission 2018).

These Commission proposals have already received criticism from researchers as insufficient and limited in their possible impact (Claeys 2018). However, in June 2018 France and Germany agreed to work on a budget for the euro area. They proposed a euro-area budget ‘within the framework of the European Union to promote competitiveness, convergence and stabilisation in the euro area, starting in 2021’ (France, Ministry for the Economy and Finance 2018, 4). The Franco-German roadmap for the euro area also contains concrete proposals for European Stability Mechanism reforms as well as the establishment of a European Unemployment Stabilisation Fund that would be used to secure the social safety net and supplement national unemployment schemes in the euro area. None of these ideas is completely new, but it is the first time that any have been endorsed by leading EU member states in an official statement. The challenge now is to define a concrete design for these proposals and persuade the other member states to support these reforms.

All current EMU reforms and plans focus mainly on institutional and regulatory reforms, with some limited plans for how to foster the different types of convergence. This article provides some thoughts on three types of convergence: social, financial and cyclical. This does not mean that the importance of real, nominal, structural and other forms of convergence, which are extensively discussed in the literature, is underestimated by the author. The recommendations below are focused on the selected three types of convergence as these have been explored to a lesser extent in the current literature and have only recently become a topic for research in relation to the reform and completion of the EMU.

Social convergence The establishment of the EMU was expected to lead to greater prosperity and social inclusion in the participating member states. However this did not prove to be the case in the years after the introduction of the euro. The last economic and financial crisis only helped to increase social divergence in the EU. For example, there has been a divergence in the ratio of the total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income compared to the 20% of the population with the lowest income (European Commission 2017d, 15).

This situation provoked further scepticism among the public regarding the EMU and the single currency after the crisis. However, support for the euro has increased since the economic recovery and the emergence of growth in recent years (European Commission 2017e, 6). 120 European View 17(2)

This social divergence also increased the influence of Eurosceptic political parties, with the departure of their countries from the euro area openly being promoted by some of them, such as the former French National Front (Front national), now renamed National Rally (Rassemblement national) (France 24 2017). In order to increase the resilience and stability of the EMU it is not only necessary to maintain political support for the single currency among the major non-Eurosceptic political parties but also to increase support for it among the EU’s citizens. In order to achieve this, greater social inclusion and convergence is needed in the EMU.

Social convergence among EU member states has been reported as having been weakened in the years after the establishment of the euro area (European Commission 2017d, 15). This is particularly true in the founding member states of the EMU. Poverty rates and social exclusion indicators have also not improved in the last decade. There are new social challenges being caused by globalisation and the introduction of new technologies. These problems and challenges have become so pressing that in order to ensure the future of Europe up to 2025 the European Commission has placed a special focus on this social dimension. As already mentioned, one of the five reflection papers that accompanied the March 2017 White Paper was dedicated specifically to the social dimension of Europe (European Commission 2017c).

It is not possible to establish a fully fledged social union in the EMU as there are different social models across the various euro-area member states. However, some recommendations can be highlighted as ways to achieve greater social convergence. These recommendations include:

•• The need to create a list of more targeted social standards. Such standards were developed as part of the Europe 2020 strategy and the MIP but they need to be further developed and detailed. •• The possibility of introducing legal requirements that would limit the investment of EU money to only those member states that complete the reforms and measures needed to meet these social standards. •• A focus on further implementing the recently established 20 key principles in the framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights. •• An increase in national and EU funding for meeting social standards. •• The stimulation of cooperation and exchange of best practices among member states in the social area. •• The enhancement of current EU requirements in relation to labour mobility, and health and safety at work. •• The development of measures that will deal with the challenges and opportunities that are provided by the digital market and digital society. Simeonov 121

•• Stimulation of a dialogue with social partners and the further engagement of civil society with EU reforms, including in relation to deepening and completing the EMU.

The majority of these recommendations are presented in the European Commission’s Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe. The challenge now is how to implement this wide variety of actions and measures. Social convergence is necessary in order to streamline social inclusion and prosperity in the EMU. Greater social convergence will also facilitate public support for EMU reforms, as well as greater real and cyclical convergence among the member states.

Financial convergence Financial convergence or the convergence of financial cycles is one of the types of convergence that has not been analysed in detail before. This type of convergence is also important in light of achieving a sustainable and resilient EMU. So far, financial services have been regulated and developed within the framework of the efforts to finalise the EU’s internal market. The last global economic and financial crisis also changed how the convergence of financial cycles is dealt with. It proved that the financial sector, instead of being the financial intermediary for the real economy, could also create problems that could lead to major economic recession if financial crises are not prevented and tackled properly.

Financial cycles are not easy to measure, partly because the concept is new, but also because it is difficult to select the relevant financial indicators from those available and because there is not sufficient data available as yet (European Commission 2017d, 17). However, more attention should be paid to financial cycle synchronisation in the EMU as financial cycles and crises may also affect real, nominal, cyclical, social and other types of convergence. The level of synchronisation of the member states’ financial cycles fell in the first years after the introduction of the euro but then rose again in the wake of the last crisis. However, similar to the synchronisation of business cycles, the major challenge in the euro area is caused by the large disparities in amplitudes across national financial cycles (Franks et al. 2018, 15–17).

There are several recommendations that should be highlighted in relation to streamlining the synchronisation of financial cycles. One possible measure is to further develop and implement the monitoring of financial indicators in the MIP. Currently there is only one headline financial indicator in this procedure, that is, the year-on-year changes in total financial sector liabilities, with a threshold of 16.5% at which such a procedure is triggered. Although this is an important and summarising indicator, more developed and detailed financial indicators would ensure a safer and more prudent financial cycle environment. Possible indicators in the banking area that might be included in the MIP as headline or auxiliary indicators are those that are currently elaborated in relation to the efforts to enforce risk-reduction measures in the EU banking sector.3 122 European View 17(2)

Another measure that would improve financial cycle convergence in the EU is the finalisation of the institutional structure of the Financial Union.4 The financial services area is one of the areas of convergence where there is a clear connection between institutional reforms and greater convergence within the EMU. The EU Banking Union is a unique example of a developed supranational supervision and resolution mechanism in a multilateral economic and monetary union. However, it has still not been completely finalised and the EU is currently discussing measures for its completion, including the adoption of a legal framework for the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme. Completing the Banking Union will enhance financial stability in the euro area and will also lead to greater convergence in the EMU. The link between the institutional structure of the Banking Union and greater convergence can be ascertained from the current literature (Gros 2018, 5–6).

The EU’s financial sector is still dominated by the banking sector. However, the measures in sectors such as capital markets and insurance services should also stimulate further financial cycle synchronisation in the EMU. The measures being implemented to establish the EU’s Capital Markets Union are therefore actions in the right direction.

Cyclical convergence Cyclical convergence received even less attention during the establishment of the euro area. However, in recent years EU institutions and literature have devoted much more attention to it. Cyclical convergence happens when countries are in the same stage of the business cycle. This can be measured by the gross domestic product growth rates on a quarterly basis or by another indicator. As the European Commission has recognised, achieving cyclical convergence is important for the EMU because following a single monetary policy is harder and possibly less effective when countries are at very different stages of the economic cycle. When they are cyclically divergent some member states will need more restrictive or expansionary policy stances than others (European Commission 2017b).

The current figures show that there was some business cycle synchronisation after the introduction of the euro. However, the amplitudes of their business cycles have since started to diverge among euro-area member states (Franks et al. 2018, 15), especially since the onset of the economic and financial crisis.

Some recent research has shown that cyclical convergence may even be more important for EMU sustainability than real convergence. It has also highlighted that business cycle convergence can be achieved through structural reforms. These possible structural reforms could be outlined as recommendations for stimulating greater cyclical convergence. Some of the reforms include the improvement of competition in the EU’s internal market, including through enhanced market entry and exit conditions; boosting investments in the private and public sectors; and increasing labour market flexibility (Brinke et al. 2016, 1). Simeonov 123

Conclusions EMU reforms aim to complete the construction of the euro area, with the goal of establishing a more sustainable and resilient EMU by 2025. The EMU was created in the late twentieth century based on nominal convergence criteria. The EU has now begun to place more focus on real and structural convergence. Recently EU institutions and research organisations have also started to focus their efforts on social, financial and cyclical convergence too.

Social convergence is an important pillar of current EMU reforms. However, much more work is needed to establish a proper list of social standards, to make a link between these standards and EU financing, to implement key principles in the social area, to enhance cooperation among member states in this area, to better prepare for the challenges of the digital era and so on. One cannot expect sustained and improving public support for the euro if social conditions and convergence are not further developed.

The convergence of financial cycles could be enforced in the EU through measures such as the inclusion of new and more detailed headline and auxiliary indicators in the MIP, the institutional development and completion of the Banking Union, and the finalisation of the Financial Union. The latter should be achieved through actions that aim to foster the growth of non-banking financial services in the EU, such as capital markets and insurance sector services. The establishment and development of the Capital Markets Union is a step in the right direction.

Business cycle convergence is also of great importance for the resilience of the EMU. To streamline this, the member states should conduct more targeted structural reforms, including in the areas of competition, private and public investment, and the flexibility of the labour markets.

Institutional and regulatory reforms need to be achieved in order to make the EMU more stable by 2025. However, if this stability is to be sustained beyond 2025, further convergence must be achieved among the EMU member states, including in the social, financial and cyclical areas.

Notes 1. Some of these reforms include the establishment of new institutions and mechanisms, such as the European Stability Mechanism and the Banking Union; new fiscal capacities; and major regulatory reforms, such as those in the financial services area. It should be stressed that some of the institutional reforms will also stimulate greater convergence in the EMU. Some examples are provided in the text below. 2. This paper is focused on three types of convergence: social, financial and cyclical. However, it should be stressed that the measures in relation to real convergence (including income and productivity convergence), nominal convergence (including further enhancement of measures to preserve fiscal stability), structural convergence and other types of convergence should be also achieved and streamlined. 124 European View 17(2)

3. The bank risk-reduction measures are also perceived as a prerequisite for risk-sharing advancement in the EU’s Banking Union. The risk-reduction indicators that are currently under discussion in the banking sector are capital ratio, leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding ratio, indicators related to the minimum requirements for eligible liabilities and non-performing loan indicators. Other measures that are being debated relating to bank risk reduction are improved organisation in the anti-money-laundering area and insolvency procedures in the banking sector, among others. 4. The Financial Union was introduced as a concept in the 2015 Five Presidents’ Report. Currently this concept comprises the completion of the Banking Union and the development of the Capital Markets Union.

References Brinke, A., Enderlein, H., & Haas, J. (2016). Why the eurozone can’t agree on convergence and how structural reforms can help. Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper 165. Berlin, 24 May. http://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ConvergenceEuroArea -BrinkeEnderleinHaas-JDIB-May16.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. Claeys, G. (2018). New EMU stabilisation tool within the MFF will have minimal impact without deeper EU budget reform. Bruegel, 9 May. http://bruegel.org/2018/05/new-emu-stabilisation -tool-within-the-mff-will-have-minimal-impact-without-deeper-eu-budget-reform/ Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2012). A blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European debate. Communication, COM (2012) 777 final, 28 November. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0777:FIN:EN:PDF. Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017a). Further steps towards completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: A roadmap. Communication, COM (2017) 821 final, 6 December. https:// ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/com_2017_821.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017b). Reflection paper on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union. Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 291 final, 31 May. https://ec.europa.eu/commission /sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017c). Reflection paper on the social dimension of Europe. Reflection Paper, COM (2017) 206 final, 26 April. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political /files/reflection-paper-social-dimension-europe_en.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017d). Sustainable convergence in the euro area: A multi-dimensional process. Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 16(3), 9–24. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info /files/economy-finance/ip072_en_i_sustainable_convergence_euro_area.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017e). The euro area. Flash Eurobarometer 458, Report. December. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download /DocumentKy/80850 Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2017f). White paper on the future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. White Paper, COM (2017) 2025 final, 1 March. https://ec.europa .eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf Accessed 28 July 2018. European Commission. (2018). EU budget: A reform support programme and an investment stabilisation function to strengthen Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Press release, 31 May. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18–3972_en.htm. Accessed 6 July 2018. Simeonov 125

France, Ministry for the Economy and Finance. (2018). French German roadmap for the euro area. 19 June. https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/2018/Finances-Euro_Area _Roadmap-EN.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2018. France 24. (2017). France’s far-right National Front keeps policy to exit euro. 22 July. http://www .france24.com/en/20170722-frances-far-right-national-front-keep-policy-exit-euro Accessed 28 July 2018. Franks, J., Barkbu, B., Blavy, R., Oman, W., & Schoelermann, H. (2018). Economic convergence in the euro area: Coming together or drifting apart? International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/18/10. 23 January. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/23 /Economic-Convergence-in-the-Euro-Area-Coming-Together-or-Drifting-Apart-45575. Accessed 28 July 2018. Gros, D. (2018). Convergence in the European Union: Inside and outside the euro area. Contribution for the informal meeting of economic and financial affairs ministers, Sofia, 27 and 28 April. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/DG _ConvergenceEU.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. Juncker, J. C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M., & Schulz, M. (2015). Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Brussels, June. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta -political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2018. Van Rompuy, H., Barroso, J. M., Juncker, J. C., & Draghi, M. (2012). Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. 5 December. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23818/134069. pdf Accessed 28 July 2018.

Author biography Kaloyan Simeonov is chair of the European Studies Department at Sofia University St Kliment Ohridksi. He is an associate professor and Dr. habil in political sciences at the same university. He also has more than 20 years’ experience in the field of European integration in the Bulgarian administration. EUV0010.1177/1781685818805679European ViewWurzel 805679research-article2018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 126–135 Euro-economics: Too much © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805679DOI: 10.1177/1781685818805679 trust in redistribution journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

Eckhard Wurzel

Abstract Favourable conditions for resource reallocation and structural economic change are needed to lift the growth and employment potential of the euro area. To create these conditions, preserving government incentives for ensuring sound public finances and structural reform is crucial. The article points to a few redistributive EU policies, in place or proposed, that are or risk diminishing market dynamics and governments’ accountability for healthy fiscal positions and economic reform. The Common Agricultural Policy hampers structural change and causes high social costs. Regional policies might be able to aid cohesion, but too many objectives, rules and monitoring requirements risk reducing effectiveness. The proposed transfers to cushion ‘asymmetric shocks’ are loaded with conceptual problems and could undermine incentives to increase economic resilience. Finally, the Commission’s proposal to create an instrument designed to financially stimulate governments to carry out reforms risks producing the opposite effect. The article concludes that these policies need revision.

Keywords Agriculture, Asymmetric shocks, Cohesion, Safe assets, Structural reforms, Rent-seeking

Introduction Economists would readily agree that a core mandate of the EU is to provide public goods designed to lift the union’s growth and employment potential. In particular, this comprises setting and securing appropriate framework conditions that support the functioning of the Single Market. The task is a dynamic one. The financial crisis in the euro area revealed that, under the conditions of a currency union, the EU’s regulatory infrastructure was seriously deficient in containing the risk of adverse spillovers from excessive government debt, unbalanced risk accumulation in banks’ balance sheets and

Corresponding author: E. Wurzel, Universität Konstanz, Fach 124, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. Email: [email protected]

At the same time, an enduring strand in EU policy thinking puts much emphasis on EU-level redistribution measures to bring about deeper integration, economic stability and higher growth. While redistributive policies have merit in supporting economic convergence, they can also detract from the framework conditions that are needed to reap the single market’s potential to increase employment and productivity. This potential is based inter alia on resource reallocation and structural economic change. In the same vein, it is essential to preserve government incentives for ensuring sound public finances and structural reform. This article highlights—selectively—a few EU redistributive policies, both in operation and under discussion, and argues that they need to be revised if favourable conditions for growth-enhancing economic adjustment are to be supported.

A large part of the EU budget is inefficient: a call for change Big things first—and the biggest thing, at least in terms of its share of the EU budget (almost 40%), is spending on agriculture. Its largest component, 71%, is spent on direct payments to farmers, with the main purpose being to support agricultural incomes (European Commission 2018a). For comparison, direct payments to farmers are about three times as large as the UK’s contribution to the EU budget.

According to estimates by the OECD, in 2017 overall financial support for agriculture—including the subsidy equivalents of raising the price of agricultural products above world market levels—totalled 0.6% of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD 2018). On average, agriculture accounts for some 1.5% of EU GDP. Thus, the total subsidies amount to some 40% of the value added produced by the agricultural sector—a striking figure indeed. Of the total support accruing to agricultural producers, 20% is estimated to stem from raising prices above world market level. Correspondingly, about a fifth of the support for producers was financed at the expense of consumers. This figure does not include the consumer tax burden to finance the subsidies, nor the welfare loss implied by the impediments to structural change caused by the policies.

Since direct payments to farmers are linked to the size of farmland, they are poorly targeted in terms of income support (Matthews 2016). Also, many of the farmers have secondary incomes (and some also receive pensions and social transfers), systematic data for which are apparently hard to obtain. Independently of whether or not these features weaken the case for income support for farmers, the fact that lower farming incomes fall significantly short of higher ones can hardly be a viable justification for EU subsidies. In other sectors, unequal earnings do not trigger EU transfers. On the contrary, relative earnings act as a signal for structural change.

In recent years, a large part of the direct payments to farmers has been linked to achieving environmental goals. While this can be considered a positive development, it 128 European View 17(2) is also clear that sectoral income support wrapped in environmental requirements is not an efficient substitute for policies that are genuinely geared towards protecting the environment. Indeed, as is well documented, the environmental problems caused by the agricultural sector, such as the pollution of water with nutrients and chemicals, and high emissions of greenhouse gases, are significant. Overall, the Common Agricultural Policy in its present form has high social costs, and direct payments should gradually and pre- dictably be phased out. Dealing with income inequality should be a matter of general income taxation and social transfer systems rather than sectoral subsidies that distort the structure and the evolution of the European economy, and divert resources away from other uses.

Approximately another third of the EU budget is allocated to regional and cohesion policies (spending related to agriculture and fisheries not included). Empirical investigations into the impact of support on economic convergence are difficult, and studies show very mixed results. In an attempt to increase the effectiveness of regional support, procedures for the granting of aid have been significantly amended, linking financial support to economic performance (Europe 2020 targets) and sustainable development objectives. Moreover, some of the aid is being re-channelled to support the development of more effective administration.

These amendments might well have their benefits in supporting cohesion. However, having too many objectives, rules and monitoring requirements runs the risk of reducing the effectiveness of support, devoting a large share of resources to administrative processing and making the evaluation of policy effectiveness difficult. Procedural com- plexities encourage rent-seeking, and rent-seeking is synonymous with wasting resources and reducing performance. Empirical evidence shows that productivity spillovers across regions can be significant drivers of regional development (e.g. OECD 2016). This suggests that the focus of aid should be on supporting knowledge transfers, training and education, and investment in network infrastructure that is associated with positive external effects across borders (as in the areas of transport and information and communication technology).

Incidentally, it is inefficient policy to spread EU funding of local projects throughout all EU member countries, even those with a high income per capita. Is there any convincing reason—apart from obscure political economy considerations—why high-income countries should not themselves pay for domestic local spending projects that are lacking significant cross-border externalities, rather than running their funds through an EU redistribution device only to receive them back after a delay? EU regional aid should concentrate on low-income countries.

The case for transfers to cushion ‘asymmetric shocks’ is not convincing The European Commission considers it necessary for deeper integration of the Economic and Monetary Union and for underlying growth to create a European fiscal capacity for Wurzel 129 the euro area that protects countries against large ‘asymmetric’ economic shocks (European Commission 2017; 2018c). These denote cyclical fluctuations in demand that hit different countries differentially. The device proposed to provide such protection is intended to supplement national budgetary stabilisers. Two main proposals for such an instrument have been made: transfers and loans to the affected country to protect its investments against unforeseen declines in GDP, and unemployment reinsurance. The Commission links the proposals to the condition that aid must not lead to permanent transfers between states. Also, the instrument should contribute to sound fiscal policy, minimising the potential for moral hazard.

The logic behind the idea appears straightforward. In a common currency area, nominal exchange rates, differentiated by country, are no longer available to cushion country- specific external demand shocks. Nor can monetary policy be tailored to regional demand conditions. Thus, provided shocks are indeed asymmetric between countries, a common fiscal stabilisation capacity could be considered as an insurance policy, aiding the absorp- tion of economic shocks in the countries that constitute the insurance pool.

However, a closer look raises many serious questions about the rationale behind such a device (Wurzel 2019). Business cycles in the euro area are highly synchronised. If one accepts output gaps—the difference between actual and estimated potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of (potential) GDP—as an informative measure for an economy’s cyclical position, inspection of the Commission’s current set of output gap estimates suggests that at the beginning of the financial crisis almost all euro-area countries turned within a single year from a state of over-utilisation of production capacities (in 2008) to a state of under-utilisation (in 2009). The redistribution of resources at this juncture would almost exclusively have been amongst losers. What made the economic activity ‘asymmetric’ across countries were the differences in the amplitude of GDP and in the evolution of the trend of GDP in the years following the initial output contraction. Both features relate to a large extent to the structural characteristics of the labour and product markets and to financial market regulation. What is often called an ‘economic shock’ is, in fact, a reflection of the ability of the economy (or the lack of the same) to adjust, which depends on the economy’s structural parameters. Consequently, remedies are largely a matter of structural policies rather than fiscal demand stimulus.

Transfers meant to help protect investments from cyclical downswings must, by definition, be coupled to some measure of a country’s position in the business cycle. To this end, various proposals have been made. However, it is almost impossible to differentiate between transitory and permanent ‘shocks’ to economic activity, and assessments of cyclical positions are highly volatile. Different vintages of the Commission’s estimates of output gaps for the crisis years illustrate this point. For Greece, the Commission projected in autumn 2008 that in 2009 actual GDP would exceed potential GDP by +0.7%. In 2012, the estimate for the same year, 2009, stood at -1.6%. Finally, the most recent estimate, from spring 2018, shows the output gap in 2009 at +0.5%, close to the initial projection. On this basis, a transfer in 2009 would have been judged inappropriate in 2008, retrospectively appropriate in 2012 and inappropriate again in 2018. For other 130 European View 17(2) countries too, the assessment changed profoundly, in some cases including the signs of the estimated output gaps. Estimates of cyclical positions also differ significantly by approach.

This example illustrates both a lack of robust information about the appropriateness of ‘countercyclical’ transfers as well as the fact that permanent transfers cannot be ruled out by linking transfers to some measure of cyclical activity. Several further questions arise. For example, what criteria should be used when it comes to deciding which national-spending projects should be supported? And which entities should take these decisions? Due to all its ambiguities, a transfer instrument meant to compensate for ‘shocks’ would be prone to controversial disputes between governments and EU institutions once established. The existing experience with EU fiscal rules is evidence enough to make this statement almost a safe bet.

The other proposal, to reinsure countries against strong increases in unemployment, has the advantage that unemployment benefits are a major automatic stabiliser against conjunctural fluctuations, and that financial support from the euro area could kick in automatically. But would it be worth it? The proposal includes the option that governments would be able to borrow from a European fund. This is reminiscent of the federal supplementary unemployment benefit scheme in the US, under which during times of high unemployment US states can obtain federal loans to extend unemployment benefits. The loans have to be paid back. However, the US scheme cannot be taken as a model for a reinsurance system that avoids permanent redistribution: in recessions, the federal government has repeatedly funded extensions of unemployment benefits on its own (Whittaker and Isaacs 2012). In Europe, pressure for permanent funding could build up—reducing the incentive for governments to improve their economies’ resilience to unemployment problems, which is clearly a policy-related issue. Also, funding a euro- area benefit scheme might increase taxation, while allowing the scheme to be debt- financed would risk shifting government debt accumulation from the national level to the level of the euro area.

More generally, the US system of fiscal relations between the states and the federal government is sometimes referred to as evidence that fiscal governance in the euro area is deficient. In the US, the supplementary unemployment benefits paid by the federal government and the tax contributions by the states to the federal budget allow for a certain degree of inter-temporal income smoothing. Empirical investigations show that the US federal government plays a significantly larger role in smoothing private and public sector consumption in the states of the US than the EU budget does for consumption within EU countries (see, for example, Cimadomo et al. 2018). However, such a comparison would need to take into account that almost all US states have balanced budget requirements for their operational expenses, with these requirements tending to be pro- cyclical in economic downswings. Thus, transfers from the US federal government offset potentially pro-cyclical fiscal restraint at the state level. By contrast, there is nothing in the EU’s fiscal rules that would require EU-level budgetary interventions to offset pro-cyclical policies in EU member states. If general government budgets are roughly Wurzel 131 balanced in cyclically adjusted terms, as the euro area’s Fiscal Compact requires, GDP could fall by some six percentage points below its normal-capacity level without government budgets hitting the famous 3% of GDP deficit limit.1 Moreover, in deep recessions exceptions apply that mean fiscal consolidation requirements can be waived.

Incidentally, empirical work also shows that the smoothing of private-sector incomes due to the operation of in-country automatic stabilisers (as opposed to interstate income flows) is greater on average in the euro area than it is in the US (Dolls et al. 2011). The reason for this is that, on average, unemployment benefits are more generous and income taxes more progressive in Europe than in the US.

Reform in capital markets should continue—without policy digressions Perhaps even more importantly, empirical investigations in the US and elsewhere show that the largest part of interstate cyclical income smoothing in federations does not come from intergovernmental transfers but from interstate income flows transmitted via capital markets. In this respect, the euro area has turned out to be an exceptionally bad performer. Cross-border credit markets in the euro area amplified the financial crisis rather than smoothing it—with pre-crisis regulatory failures, notably in the banking sector, having played a major role in generating this negative outcome.

The corollary to this finding is that pushing for a banking union in the euro area was the right response to the crisis. The limited experience with the new institutions since then also suggests that for them to function properly some national regulations and practices will need to be adapted. In a similar vein, certain provisions for banking and capital markets at the level of the euro area will also need to be developed. Equity capital partici- pations are a much more stable source of cross-border funding and risk sharing than bank credit. Ongoing initiatives to support the integration of equity capital markets are therefore welcome.

The preferential treatment of government debt in EU capital adequacy requirements and regulation for banks—in particular the zero-risk weighting of government debt and the lack of limits to large exposures—is still a major cause of distortions in the allocation of capital, a major impediment to long-term fiscal consolidation, and furthers the reap- pearance of negative feedback loops between the balance sheets of governments and banks, which amplified the crisis in the recent past. The problem has long been known: what is missing is a reliable trajectory to gradually phase out these undue regulatory preferences. A gradual and transparent phasing-out schedule would allow the banks to adapt to the new regulatory environment.

Cutting back excessive government debt levels and requiring banks to provision government bond holdings with equity capital would go a long way towards diversify- ing banks’ balance sheets in favour of relatively safe assets. Unfortunately the 132 European View 17(2)

Commission’s recent proposal to create ‘sovereign bond-backed securities’ (SBBS) looks more like a digression (European Commission 2018b). The issuing of SBBS would be based on portfolios of government bonds, and the banks’ demand for SBBS would be stimulated by extending the regulatory preferences for government debt regarding capital adequacy to SBBS. Instead of removing the regulatory bias in favour of government debt, SBBS would contribute to increasing it. At the same time, it is widely thought that SBBS might not succeed in creating a broad market for relatively safe assets. For example, Standard and Poor’s, in a preliminary assessment, suggested that the senior (low-risk) tranche of government-bonds-backed securities (the SBBS) might be rated in low investment-grade categories (S&P Global Ratings 2017). The fact that the Commission considers the common issuing of debt on the European level as a possible further step in the more distant future might also signal that confidence in the capacity of SBBS is rather limited.

SBBS are neither sufficient nor necessary for generating relatively safe assets. Instead, governments could be restricted to issuing junior bonds only—which absorb the full loss in case of a default—if the state’s structural government deficit exceeds 0.5% of GDP, which is the Fiscal Compact’s mandatory medium-term deficit limit (Fuest and Heinemann 2017). This would raise risk premiums in terms of interest rates for the issu- ances of highly indebted governments that continue to run high structural deficits. At the same time, there would be a greater incentive for banks to hold relatively safe bonds with low risk premiums—provided the preferential treatment of government debt in the capital adequacy regulation for banks is phased out.

EU financial aid for reforms runs a high risk of being counterproductive There is widespread agreement that structural reforms in the labour and product markets, education systems, and tax and transfers systems are key to supporting higher resource utilisation, innovation and productivity growth. They can also increase resilience against economic downswings. Recognition of these links has motivated the surveillance of reforms within the European Semester, including the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, even if it is less clear whether the current procedures are useful tools for fostering reform.

To supplement the European Semester, the European Commission is proposing to create a new EU financial instrument, meant to give governments financial incentives to carry out reforms (European Commission 2017; 2018d). The aid would be based on a commitment to reforms, mutually agreed between the respective government and the Commission, including timelines and milestones for the implementation of reform measures.

In trying to understand the incentive effects associated with such a funding instrument, is it far-fetched to sense that recipients might engage in rent-seeking and trying Wurzel 133 to cash in on windfall gains? It could be even worse: what would prevent governments from being reluctant to carry out reforms unless there was ‘appropriate’ financial compensation from the EU budget? Seen from the perspective of programme administration: on what facts would the financial compensation be based? What bureaucratic procedure would be required to verify that a reforming government was not backsliding on its commitment? And if the government did let things slide, or if a successor government—acting on its election platform—repealed the reforms of its predecessor, would the country need to pay back the funds it had received from the EU?

In any case, a new layer of commitments and procedures would make economic governance in the EU even more complex than it is already. How would a new layer of transfers relate to the conditions associated with the structural and cohesion funds and other support programmes? An increasingly complex network of rules and transfers increases the odds of disputes and diverts resources to administration and rent-seeking. It has been suggested that this reform-delivery instrument would support national ‘ownership’ of reforms. How would another complicated layer of transfers from the EU foster national reform ownership?

After all, structural reform is meant to increase a country’s potential for growth and employment. What regulatory reform could be so costly that the EU would need to step in financially to create reform incentives? Frequently, the costs of reform are not monetary at all. But they might be political, as politicians might fear losing support from their constituencies. Are EU transfers meant to reduce opposition to reform amongst electorates? A more explicit earlier explanation by the Commission seems to suggest this, since it mentions as a main purpose of the funding scheme the ability to overcome the possible social and political difficulties of implementing reforms (European Commission 2013). Is there a risk that this approach could backfire amongst electorates? There are enough examples in the EU and the OECD area of governments that are willing and able to convince their constituencies about the usefulness or necessity of structural reform. Governments should reject this proposal.

Conclusion Favourable conditions for structural economic change are vital for robust growth and employment. To secure these conditions, government incentives to ensure sound public finances and structural reform need to be preserved. The article highlighted some policies which need adjustment to serve this framework. The Common Agricultural Policy—the biggest single item in the EU budget—hampers structural change and has high social costs. Direct payments to farmers should be phased out. Regional and cohesion policies must not be overburdened with objectives and procedural rules. EU funding should focus on low-income countries; on fields with the highest potential to foster regional catch-up, notably training and education and infrastructure that supports positive knowledge and productivity spillovers across regions. 134 European View 17(2)

The proposal to create a euro-area fiscal capacity to counter ‘asymmetric shocks’ suf- fers from a lack of proper conditioning on cyclical developments and risks leading to permanent transfers and reducing governments’ efforts to strengthen economic resilience. At the same time, funding the instrument would burden the economy. Instead, there is a case for regulatory reform, notably in capital markets. For example, equity capital partici- pations are a much more stable source of cross-border funding and risk sharing than bank credit; initiatives supporting the deeper integration of equity markets are therefore welcome. The preferential treatment of government securities in EU banking regulation dis- torts capital allocation and impedes the establishment of ‘safe assets’ in the banking sector. These regulatory preferences should gradually be phased out, allowing banks to adapt to the new regulatory environment. Governments should be restricted to issuing junior bonds only—which fully absorb losses in case of a default—if the structural government deficit exceeds the critical level specified in the Fiscal Compact. This would support debt reduction and the diversification of banks’ balance sheets towards relatively safe assets. Finally, the Commission’s proposal to create an instrument designed to financially incentivise governments to carry out reforms risks producing the opposite effect. Governments should reject this proposal.

Note 1. This follows on from Commission estimates of the semi-elasticity of the responsiveness of general government budgets with respect to variations in output gaps.

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European Commission. (2018d). Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the Reform Support Programme. COM (2018) 391 final, 31 May. https://ec.europa.eu/commission /sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-reform-support-programme-regulation_en.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2018. Fuest, C., & Heinemann, F. (2017). Accountability bonds—Reconciling fiscal policy based on market discipline with financial stability. European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research, EconPol Policy Brief 03/2017. http://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2018–01 /EconPol_Policy_Brief_3_2017_Accountability_Bonds.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2018. Matthews, A. (2016). The future of direct payments. In European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy Department B, Structural and Cohesion Policies (ed.), Research for AGRI Committee—CAP reform post-2020: Challenges in agriculture (pp. 3–86). http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU(2016)585898 _EN.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2018. OECD. (2016). OECD regional outlook 2016: Productive regions for inclusive societies. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/gov/oecd-regional-outlook -2016-9789264260245-en.htm. Accessed 3 August 2018. OECD. (2018). Agricultural policy monitoring and evaluation 2018. Paris: OECD Publishing. S&P Global Ratings. (2017). How S&P Global Ratings would assess European ‘Safe’ bonds (ESBies). S&P Ratings Direct, 25 April. https://www.politico.eu/wp-content /uploads/2017/05/2017_04-How-we-would-rate-ESBies.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2018. Whittaker, J., & Isaacs, K. (2012). Unemployment insurance: Programs and benefits. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report. Washington, DC. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33362.pdf. Accessed 3 August 2018. Wurzel, E. (2019). Europäische Integration wohin? Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, forthcoming.

Author biography Dr Eckhard Wurzel is Honorarprofessor at the University of Konstanz, and a lecturer at the University of Göttingen. He formerly served as the Head of Bureau for the euro area and the EU in the OECD’s Economics Department. EUV0010.1177/1781685818813763European ViewOrpo 813763research-article2018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 136–144 International challenges © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813763DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813763 and opportunities: Putting journals.sagepub.com/home/euv the EU’s positions into words

Petteri Orpo

Abstract Europe is facing numerous challenges, many of which are unprecedented either in their scale or in their nature. These challenges include uncertainties about the future of the liberal international order and the rise of populist movements in the West. And there are also tensions and reform pressures in the areas of international trade, climate change and extreme weather events; pressures linked to migration from the Middle East and North Africa; hybrid threats and cyberattacks; and problems related to the expected departure of the UK from the EU by the end of March 2019. During its forthcoming Council Presidency in autumn 2019, Finland will have the opportunity to propose new solutions to these and other challenges. This article argues that it is important for Europe’s leaders to clearly articulate and put into words what the EU’s positions and objectives are on the world stage. Without clear positions and objectives, the EU will not be able to represent its member states and citizens as effectively as it should.

Keywords Finland, Foreign policy, EU Council Presidency, Values, Multilateralism, Security

Introduction In Finland the summer of 2018 will be remembered for two reasons in particular: the record-breaking heatwaves and the meeting of US President Donald J. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki on 16 July, which attracted widespread international attention. The actual results of the meeting were modest, but it was a success for Finland and for the country’s foreign policy. In particular, it was a demonstration of our competence and proof that we are internationally trusted. According to a media study commissioned by

Corresponding author: P. Orpo, Ministry of Finance, Snellmaninkatu 1 A, Helsinki PO Box 28, 00023 Government, Finland. Email: [email protected]

Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the City of Helsinki, through hosting the meeting, Helsinki gained visibility worth more than three billion euros (Finnish Government 2018a). This same study showed that the media had portrayed Finland as a liberal and progressive country. To me, this does not sound like Finland looked like a ‘Cold War-era meeting point between East and West’ (Standish 2018) or a ‘grey zone between Europe and Russia’ (Oksanen 2018). Let me be clear. Finland is not a neutral country. We chose sides when we joined the EU with Austria and Sweden in 1995. Yet, such statements remind us that building Finland’s image is a continuing process. Although one meeting in Helsinki between Presidents Trump and Putin will not swing it in one direction or another, we politicians nevertheless have the responsibility to say aloud what Finland’s position is and what it is not. In other words, we have to put into words what Finland’s foreign-policy position and objectives are because otherwise other people will do it for us.

The same holds true for the EU’s foreign policy and positions in the world. For this reason, I want to use this article to discuss some of the main challenges Europe is currently facing, which are many and difficult in nature. These include uncertainties about the future of the liberal international order and the rise of populist movements in the West. And there are also tensions and reform pressures in the areas of international trade, climate change and extreme weather events; pressures linked to migration from the Middle East and North Africa; increased hybrid threats and cyberattacks; and problems related to the expected departure of the UK from the EU by the end of March 2019. The rest of the article is divided into four main sections. The first looks at some of the biggest challenges that Europe is currently facing. The second discusses what Finland could do about them during its forthcoming EU Council Presidency in autumn 2019. The third reflects on what the EU should focus on in the longer term beyond 2019. The fourth and final section concludes the article and summarises its main points.

Current challenges In my opinion, there are currently six challenges that should be of major concern to the EU. The first is the uncertain outlook for the world economy. The general outlook for world trade is good and the current economic boom is expected to continue in the coming years. This growth will continue apace, led by the US and the emerging economies. However, many leading indicators suggest that there will be a slight slowdown in the growth of the world economy (e.g. WTO 2018). The rising protectionism around the world is a threat to economic growth and is increasing uncertainty. Uncertainty is also growing on account of the ongoing Brexit negotiations, the lack of clarity concerning the economic policy of Italy’s new government and the economic difficulties in the EU’s large neighbour Turkey. The factors threatening to make the outlook for the world economy less positive have one thing in common: their political nature.

The second is the retreat away from multilateral cooperation. The world needs multilateral cooperation to solve its shared problems, and this is why Finland must also continue to speak in favour of a world order founded on rule-based world trade and international institutions. Stating how things are does matter and talking about values is 138 European View 17(2) not futile. Finland alone will not be able to ensure that multilateral cooperation continues around the world. But when it acts collectively with other member states through the EU, it can make a real difference. Yet, the Union also needs allies around the world, and this is why Europeans should look further out to Australia, India, Korea and Latin America for partners with whom they can promote shared goals in international organisations. Together with other like-minded countries, the EU can make a change.

The third challenge is climate change and extreme weather events. In the summer of 2018, Finland experienced a rare heatwave along with the entire northern hemisphere. Spain and Portugal struggled in the scorching forty-degree heat, and record-high temperatures were witnessed on the Korean peninsula and in Japan, Algeria and Canada. Furthermore, drought caused extensive forest fires in different parts of Sweden, which were extinguished with the help of firefighters and equipment from several EU countries, including Finland. This serves as a practical demonstration of the importance and value of quick European solidarity towards a country that is experiencing a crisis. Climate change is not something one country can solve on its own, but this is not a reason to take an unam- bitious stance towards mitigating it. The Finnish government has made the decision to ban the use of coal for energy in 2029 (Finnish Government 2018b). However, more measures are required. Finland is one of the first countries in the world to have integrated sustainable development into its budget proposal. The aim is to make an effective tool out of sustainable development budget planning, which Finland can then promote internationally.

The fourth challenge is migration pressures from the Middle East and North Africa. Tens of millions of people have been forced to leave their homes to flee from wars, persecution and conflicts. In countries where the population is growing faster than the economy, employment and future prospects, people move away and look for opportunities elsewhere. The management of migration requires massive measures from the EU and from us, the member states. It means more development cooperation, crisis management, private investment, trade and bilateral cooperation in general. The EU needs a better common asylum policy. The EU’s external borders must work effectively and securely. The legal ways of entry must be in order. If the EU does not succeed in this, there will be more poverty, conflicts, refugees and radicalisation. Moreover, there will be more social unrest in the EU member states. Climate change, too, makes people leave their homes and become refugees.

The fifth is Africa’s demographic explosion. The EU must also do all it can to support sustainable economic growth in Africa. Development cooperation is important, but it alone will not solve the multitude of problems in the continent. I will give one example. As Africa’s population is growing, more than two million hectares of the continent’s forests are disappearing every year (FAO 2015). Everyone understands that the global climate simply cannot afford to lose the forests of Africa. But everyone also understands that the people in African countries have needs. Africa’s population is expected to double to 2.5 billion by 2050, by far the biggest increase in any of the globe’s continents (Tempest 2016). This means that there will also be a corresponding increase in the demand for jobs, wood and arable land on the continent. An essential Orpo 139 part of the solution is sustainable forest management. This means protecting and managing forests in ways that are sustainable and that also provide work and economic benefits to the surrounding areas. In fact, Finland is already an important player in the management of Africa’s forests. For example, through development cooperation, thousands of hectares of forests have been planted in Tanzania with our support (Finland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018b).

Sixth and finally, there are the challenges of low intensity violence and hybrid threats. It is more than one year since Finland’s first terrorist attack, which took place in the city of Turku on 18 August 2017. In this attack, two people were killed and eight more were injured (Yle 2017). The Turku attack can be seen as part of a broader wave of terrorist attacks which has hit multiple countries in Europe over the past years. In addition to terrorism, Europe is increasingly under threat from various ‘hybrid threats’. The choice of methods available in hybrid influencing is constantly becoming broader, which is a threat to democracy and to free elections in particular. European societies must prepare for a multitude of serious hybrid threats and cyberthreats. To prevent new and old security risks, both hard and soft power must be used. Hybrid threats are so diverse that both the EU and NATO are needed to respond to them. In this joint response, a key role is played by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which was established in Helsinki in 2017. It seeks to improve our understanding of hybrid threats and to promote the development of comprehensive ‘whole-of- government’ responses to them at the national level and coordinated EU–NATO responses at the European level (Hybrid CoE 2018).

Finland’s EU Council Presidency In the second half of 2019, Finland will hold the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. Given that the member state holding the Presidency chairs most meetings of the Council and sets its agenda and work programme, Finland will have the opportunity to draw the EU’s collective attention to the challenges discussed above among others. Finland will have two important objectives for its Presidency: (1) to influence the work programme of the new Commission that will be appointed in autumn 2019, so that issues important to us will be given the weight we want them to have; and (2) to raise our profile with the other member states.

With regard to the first objective, our Presidency will coincide with the opening of the 2019–24 European Parliament and the appointment of new people to the EU’s most senior positions (i.e. Commission president and his/her team, European Council president, and high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy). Furthermore, the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework will be finalised during this period. The Commission has proposed that more money be allocated to the management of migration, to defence cooperation, and to research and development. Investment in research and development and innovation supports economic growth, employment and the pursuit of knowledge everywhere in Europe. Europeans expect the EU to act in matters related to migration and defence. 140 European View 17(2)

In recent years, there has been great concern within the EU about actions that have undermined the rule of law in certain member states and discussions about what to do about them. One widely discussed idea is to make fostering the rule of law a precondition for receiving EU cohesion funding, which is a welcome change. The rule of law framework was originally developed from a joint letter sent to then Commission President José Manuel Barroso by the foreign ministers of Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in March 2013. The greatest challenge each member state faces is to avoid focusing solely on the funding it receives, but rather, to look to the future and remember that the budget is drawn up with the interests of the entire EU in mind. The overall spending level must be assessed through the content of the Commission’s proposal. Any payments that exceed the current level of spending must provide added value to Europeans.

When Finland’s Presidency begins, the UK will already have left the EU due to Brexit, and a controlled transition stage will hopefully be underway during which the EU and the UK must rebuild their relationship. Both parties must rapidly adapt to the post-Brexit situation, with or without an agreement. Finland wants to base this new relationship on an agreement that is good for the EU and the UK, but not at any cost. The UK is a very highly valued partner for us, not least in the fields of trade and security cooperation, so it is essential that we get the future relationship right. At the same time, the EU cannot compromise its greatest achievement, the single market, or the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. In spite of the differences of opinion, I believe the EU and the UK will come to an understanding. They are highly motivated to reach an agreement because this is very much in the interests of both sides. It speaks well of the EU that we have managed to speak with one voice and remain united behind Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier in the negotiations.

The departure of the UK means that Finland and the other northern EU countries lose an important partner. The UK shared with us the important objectives of defending competition and opposing protectionism. It played an important role in keeping these goals on the EU’s agenda. Finland must not merely adapt to the new situation and to the UK’s departure, but has to systematically build good relationships with like-minded EU countries that share with us the objectives of anti-protectionism and managing finances responsibly. A good example is the ‘new Hanseatic League’ (Khan 2018), which I have established with the ministers of finance of the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It has focused on issues related to developing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Finland, Ministry of Finance 2018a). Developing the banking union and the capital markets union are priorities for the new Hanseatic League, and we share similar objectives regarding them. Finland’s policy has been that problems are not solved by money or by increasing solidarity through transfer payments. Attempting to deepen solidarity in this manner is more likely to tear the euro area apart than to bring it together.

The declaration on the further development of the EU made by Germany and France at Meseberg Castle in June 2018 is a good starting point for developing the Orpo 141

EMU (Germany, Federal Government 2018). The declaration proposes several steps to ‘strengthen and deepen’ the eurozone and ‘make it a genuine economic union’. These include changing the treaty on the European Stability Mechanism and incorporating the Mechanism into EU law; introducing euro-area collective action clauses; using stability support in case of the risk of liquidity shortages; and establishing a eurozone budget to promote competitiveness, convergence and stabilisation in the euro area. My rough estimate is that 80% of the declaration is acceptable, 10% still needs to be polished and 10% is not compatible with Finnish objectives. Given this situation, it is very possible to reach an agreement. The development of the EU has always meant reconciling different visions. The worst situation would be one in which it was not possible to reach an agreement about the long-term vision and, as a result, the development work started to drag on. It is important to proceed with developing the EMU.

With regard to the second objective, working on the issues that I outlined above during our forthcoming Council Presidency will also raise Finland’s profile among the EU member states. Yet, given that Finland is widely known as an ‘education superpower’, my opinion is that skills and education would also be a natural focus area for Finland’s Presidency. Strengthening skills and raising the level of education is the key to dealing with digitalisation, automation and the other challenges related to the transformation of working life that is affecting the EU member states. By raising the level of education and skills, we can turn these challenges into opportunities. What is essential is to enable people to acquire the knowledge, skills and competence needed to help Europe become successful in the use of digitality, the application of artificial intelligence and the promotion of sustainable growth. Education is Europe’s strong point in the sphere of global competition. Education is a way to fight poverty and the lack of prospects. Education is the foundation of Europe’s welfare society. And Finland is already known as an education superpower.

Looking further to the future Although 2019 will be a year of change for the EU, it is important to also evaluate the past and reflect on what the EU should focus on next. In my opinion, ‘[b]eing big on big things and small on small things’ will continue to be a good general rule (Juncker 2014), and there are at least three major challenges that the EU needs to overcome.

The first is people’s fluctuating support for the European project. Brexit has forced the remaining EU member states, the EU27, to think about the vision and mission of the EU after the UK has left. Against all odds, Brexit has pulled us together. The difficulties with Brexit have shown us how bad a choice it is to exit the EU. However, the rise of populism, growing challenges to the rule of law in certain member states and the UK’s decision to leave the EU are loud alarm bells warning us not to take the people’s support for European integration for granted. People will support and believe in the EU as long as the EU does things that seem relevant to them, but this support is not cast in stone. I believe we should focus on areas in which, as we act together, the EU can provide more 142 European View 17(2) added value to the EU citizens and member states. These areas include climate change, the single market, and security and defence, to name a few.

The second is the need to find new sources of sustainable economic growth. I expect the next Commission to focus even more strongly on the sustainable growth of the economy and on the well-being of citizens. New growth must be based on clean technology; low carbon emissions; and the use of sustainable, renewable and recyclable materials. The EU’s commitment to the promotion of a low-carbon economy requires that industrial production and the use of natural resources should be sustainable. Sustainability is not an obstacle, but an opportunity! The availability of a qualified workforce is an essential growth factor in the internal market. Removing the obstacles to mobility is one effective way to increase the size of the available workforce. I expect the next Commission to be even more strongly outward looking and to focus on promoting and strengthening an open, rule-based trade system.

The third is the need for the EU to do more to strengthen Europe’s security and defence in a challenging geopolitical environment. EU member states need to cooperate more in defence matters. We have to ensure that the various new European initiatives launched since 2017 within and outside the EU (e.g. Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Defence Fund, European Intervention Initiative) are implemented effectively. It is important to highlight how defence initiatives help to protect Europe. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, the ‘mutual assistance clause’, has been activated once so far—after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. It is important that we should further develop our ability to assist each other in all crises and in particular in the face of military aggression. It was with this in mind that in 2017 Finland adopted a new law enabling us to give and receive military assistance (Finnish Government 2017). Another practical way for the member states to cooperate would be to organise joint exercises where the participating countries could put Article 42(7) into practice. A variety of situations could be simulated, from hybrid activities to conventional military operations against one or several member states. Joint exercises can serve as means to find weaknesses, to develop processes and finally, to increase the EU’s credibility as a security provider.

Conclusion In this article I have provided an overview of some of the most pressing challenges that Europe and the world are currently facing. I have also discussed Finland’s forthcoming EU Council Presidency in autumn 2019 and outlined some of the main issues to which the country, in cooperation with its EU partners, will have the opportunity and responsibility to propose solutions. Finland must take an ambitious stance towards its Presidency and its EU policy in general. The EU is not an object of lobbying. We are the EU. It is time for us to understand that the stronger the EU, the stronger its member states. Our policy is not to slow down European integration but to take it in the direction we would like it to go. I would like to see the EU move towards becoming unified and strong. The EU must be capable of representing its member states and citizens in international Orpo 143 arenas. And it must be able to produce more security and well-being for its citizens than each member state could provide on its own.

References Finnish Government. (2017). Finland will be better prepared to provide and receive international assistance. Press release 68/2017, 28 June. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_pub lisher/1410869/suomen-valmiuksia-antaa-ja-vastaanottaa-kansainvalista-apua-parannetaan. Accessed 10 September 2018. Finnish Government. (2018a). Meeting of US and Russian presidents provided Helsinki and Finland with significant media exposure. Press release, 9 August. https://valtioneuvosto. fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/meeting-of-us-and-russian-presidents-provided-helsinki-and -finland-with-significant-media-exposure. Accessed 7 September 2018. Finnish Government. (2018b). Minister Tiilikainen: Finland to ban coal in 2029: Incentives package for faster phase-out. Press release, 10 April. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/artikkeli /-/asset_publisher/1410877/ministeri-tiilikainen-kivihiilen-kielto-2029-kannustepaketti-no peille-luopujille. Accessed 7 September 2018. Finland, Ministry of Finance. (2018a). Finance ministers from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden underline their shared views and values in the discussion on the architecture of the EMU. https://vm.fi/documents/10623/6305483/Pos ition+EMU+Denmark+Estonia+Finland+Ireland+Latvia+Lithuania+the+Netherland s+and+Sweden.pdf/99e70c41-6348-4c06-8ff8-ed2965d16700/Position+EMU+Denmark +Estonia+Finland+Ireland+Latvia+Lithuania+the+Netherlands+and+Sweden.pdf.pdf. Accessed on 7 September 2018. Finland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018b). Finland’s development cooperation in Tanzania. https://um.fi/development-cooperation-tanzania. Accessed 10 September 2018. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). (2015). World deforestation slows down as more forests are better managed. 7 September. http://www.fao.org/news /story/en/item/326911/icode/. Accessed 10 September 2018. Germany, Federal Government. (2018). Meseberg declaration. 19 June. https://www.bundesr egierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2018/2018-06-19-meseberg-declaration .html. Accessed 7 September 2018. Hybrid CoE (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats). (2018). About us. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us/. Accessed 4 October 2018. Juncker, J.-C. (2014). The Juncker Commission: The right team to deliver change. Press conference held in Brussels on 10 September 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release _SPEECH-14-585_fi.htm. Accessed 26 November 2018. Khan, M. (2018). EU’s new Hanseatic League picks its next battle. Financial Times, 19 July. https://www.ft.com/content/aedbe32a-8af7-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543. Accessed 26 September 2018. Oksanen, S. A. (2018). Soviet shadow looms over the Putin-Trump summit in Helsinki. The Guardian, 11 July. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/11/putin-trump -helsinki-summit-finland-finlandisation-soviet-union. Accessed 26 September 2018. Standish, R. (2018). The meaning of a U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki. The Atlantic, 28 June. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/finland-helsinki-russia-trump -united-states-summit/564074/. Accessed 26 September 2018. Tempest, M. (2016). Africa’s population set to double by 2050, says new report. EURACTIV, 26 August. https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/africas-population-set -to-double-by-2050-says-new-report/. Accessed 4 October 2018. 144 European View 17(2)

WTO (World Trade Organization). (2018). World Trade Outlook Indicator. 9 August. https://www .wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/wtoi_09aug18_e.pdf. Accessed 4 October 2018. Yle. (2017). Two dead, several injured in Turku knife attack. News, 18 August. https://yle.fi /uutiset/osasto/news/two_dead_several_injured_in_turku_knife_attack/9784909. Accessed 4 October 2018.

Author biography Petteri Orpo is currently Finland’s Minister of Finance and a Member of the Parliament of Finland. He has been the leader of the Finnish National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) since 2016. EUV0010.1177/1781685818805677European ViewBrzuszkiewicz research-article8056772018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 145–154 Radicalisation in Europe © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805677DOI: 10.1177/1781685818805677 after the fall of Islamic journals.sagepub.com/home/euv State: Trends and risks

Sara Brzuszkiewicz

Abstract The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has experienced repeated defeats since 2017. To develop more effective counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies, the counterterrorism community has started to focus on the possible consequences in Europe of these defeats. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it aims to address the resilience of jihadism and the major challenges that Europe has to face in dealing with it. Second, it gives an overview of the best practices that should be adopted to face the persistent risks that will have to be addressed in the short and medium terms. Moreover, it argues that understanding the concepts of re-Qaedisation—the process that might cause ISIS-affiliated cells to bear a greater resemblance to the al-Qaeda model—and old-style recruitment—a set of recruitment patterns based on face- to-face interaction, pre-existing bonds and a shared radical milieu—will be crucial to reaching the above-mentioned objectives.

Keywords Terrorism, ISIS, Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation, Foreign fighters, Far Enemy

Introduction At its peak in late 2014, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more than 100,000 km² of territory—almost the size of Iceland—containing more than 11 million people (Jones et al. 2017). By February 2018,1 98% of the territory ISIS had once held in Syria and Iraq had been recaptured, including the Caliphate’s most important cities, Raqqa and Mosul. Of the forty thousand men who had once fought for ISIS, only three thousand were thought to be left (Neumann 2018a).

Corresponding author: Sara Brzuszkiewicz, Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Largo A. Gemelli 1, Milan, Italy. Email: [email protected]

Counterterrorism experts (Brzuszkiewicz 2017b; Callimachi 2017; Hassan 2018) have, however, reached a universal consensus that, in spite of this huge deprivation, the physical loss of territory corresponds neither to decreased terrorist activity abroad nor to diminished ideological appeal. In fact, the most creditable perspective suggests the opposite: in order for ISIS to survive, the movement is likely to focus more and more on attacks abroad and on the ideological recruitment of new adherents. In other words, the goal is now ideological survival as a terrorist movement, and it is not by chance that, since 2017, ISIS propaganda has gradually evolved towards more insistent exhortations for its supporters to stay where they are and fight the kuffār (infidels) where it hurts the most—that is, in their own countries.

This change implies the abandonment—temporary in the hopes of the movement—of one of its most crucial narratives, that of the hijra (migration) to ISIS-controlled territories, which used to represent the climax of the radicalisation path for every new recruit. Indeed, the new fighters, after being fully radicalised, were exhorted to leave the Dār al-Kufr (‘Land of Impiety’), and move to the so-called Islamic State in order to live under the only authentic guardian of the Dār al-Islam (‘Land of Islam’). This momen- tous strategic and narrative shift relies on the notorious jihadi resilience, a resource that ISIS has taken to a new level. Indeed, not only does ISIS as an organisation continue to exist, but it also has unprecedented adaptability, which suggests that its external action, in Europe in particular, might increase, especially when one bears in mind that the conflicts that played a major role in fuelling its rise—most importantly the Syrian Civil War—are far from being completely resolved.

ISIS has never just been a territorial project—it is also the embodiment of a jihadi utopia and a transnational network—so there is no reason to think that without territory it will cease to exist. It is more likely to evolve, probably towards bearing a greater resemblance to the older model of al-Qaeda (Brzuszkiewicz 2017b). In other words, the group will return to its origins, undergoing a re-Qaedisation that will allow it to survive even without territory. In redefining itself after its territorial losses, the group will likely try to intensify its activity in the West, which has always been a crucial aspect of its strategy: between June 2014 and June 2017, 51 successful attacks were carried out in Europe and North America, causing 395 deaths, excluding those of the perpetrators (Vidino et al. 2017, 15). It is not by chance that, before being killed in 2016, the group’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared that ISIS would continue fighting even without territory (Brzuszkiewicz 2017b). Territorial control and administration were essential for the group in building up its founding myth: that of being the sole jihadi movement that was able to become a State.

Now that the founding narrative has been consolidated, there is no risk that ISIS could disappear as a myth simply because it has been defeated on the ground. The rhetoric on territorial conquests will probably be realigned and shifted to an indistinct utopian level—as in the case of al-Qaeda—wherein the noble jihadi sovereignty will be revived and re-established once and for all. As a consequence, the future wave of jihadism will probably focus on the ‘Far Enemy’,2 relying on small sleeper cells with weak or no Brzuszkiewicz 147 formal ties to the central leadership perpetrating low-cost attacks, as in some of the recent terror events in Europe. Nice (14 July 2016), Berlin (19 December 2016), and Barcelona and Cambrils (17/18 August 2017), for example, were logistically quite simple attacks and did not require substantial personnel or long-term planning. In this ever- changing scenario, Europe is called to face a number of crucial challenges, which can be grouped into three macro-areas: (1) old and new recruitment patterns, (2) returning foreign terrorist fighters, and (3) dilemmas related to the counterterrorism response, including intra-European cooperation and the ability to implement enhanced responses.

Radicalisation in Europe Old-style recruitment In this article, the notion of old-style recruitment includes the whole range of recruiting strategies, radicalisation patterns and forms of socialisation with radicalising agents that largely or completely exclude online affiliations, virtual propaganda, encrypted messaging and more general use of computerised communication.

Old-style recruitment relies mainly on face-to-face interactions, which take place within given peer groups and are usually based on pre-existing relations and a shared social background, such as a school, neighbourhood, mosque or family. In the context of old-style recruitment, local radicalising agents exploit old bonds of trust—or build new ones—to radicalise impressionable youths. Indeed, along with pre-existing relations, old-style recruitment relies on individuals with leadership skills in a given locale. Therefore, these days, as an uncertain number of foreign fighters is returning from Syria and Iraq to Europe, recourse to old-style recruitment is likely to increase due to the renewed presence of a higher number of experienced radical units.

The radicalising actors are able to systematically exploit two main narratives. The first is a narrative of self-pity, aimed at underlining the injustices that Muslim people face, whether in Muslim-majority countries or in Europe. The second is a discourse concerning empowerment and redemption from any sins that the recruits feel they have committed in the past, which is strikingly effective in the prison environment and in contexts of marginalisation and urban blight.3 In spite of the fascination that online radicalisation and recruitment exerts on scholars and terrorism experts, traditional recruitment should not be overlooked. Indeed, as long ago as 2014, the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs released a report stating that, while communication technologies have changed the ways in which jihadists communicate, cooperate and plan attacks, violent actions do not stem from purely virtual relations. In other words, contemporary jihad inevitably requires direct social interactions (Bigo et al. 2014, 16).

Between 2014 and 2017, terrorist attacks carried out in Europe by individuals with no connections to formal jihadi groups comprised 26% of the total number of attacks, whereas attacks carried out by individuals who had some form of connection to jihadi 148 European View 17(2) groups—mainly ISIS—but acted independently, represented 66% of the attacks (Vidino et al. 2017, 17). This thus confirms the crucial role of face-to-face interactions in small groups.

The Barcelona and Cambrils attacks provide an illustration of the old-style recruitment phenomenon. The mastermind, Abdelbaki el-Satti, was a Moroccan citizen who had moved to Spain in 2002 and was the imam of a mosque in Ripoll, a small town north of Barcelona. All members of the cell except one hailed from there as well (Peréz Colomé et al. 2017). The nexus between el-Satti and the other members of the cell provides an emblematic example of old-style recruitment: the same town, pre-existing relations, radicalisation that was fostered in jail, a local charismatic leader (el-Satti) and face-to- face interactions rather than virtual contacts.

These radicalisation patterns are not new to Europe. The Belgian branch of Sharia4, Sharia4Belgium, allegedly recruited 80 foreign fighters all over the country, largely by relying on face-to-face interactions and informal meetings (Van Vlierden 2015).4 Within the same borders, the Zerkani Network—which was particularly active in Molenbeek, the most notorious Belgian jihadist hotbed—sent at least 59 individuals to Syria and Iraq, according to available reports (Brzuszkiewicz 2017c).5 One of them was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who is thought to have led the group that carried out the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the Brussels attacks in March 2016. As in the Spanish cell, recruitment within this network used to take place during sporting and recreational activities with the aim of strengthening group unity and increasing the appeal of the leader, who only focused on indoctrination at a later stage (Van Vlierden 2016).

In comparing old-style recruitment with jihadist recruitment in the virtual world, a key contrast emerges: while online radicalisation may win from a quantitative perspective, the older form is likely to be more effective from a qualitative point of view—especially now that efforts to counter online radicalisation are constantly increasing. In other words, online propaganda may reach thousands of individuals worldwide, but only a small fraction of them will go on to develop the operational skills necessary to perpetrate attacks. Moreover, online radicalisation is a highly atomised phenomenon, which means that the radicalising agents are unable to leverage peer pressure on recruits in the same way as they can through personal interaction.

Returning foreign terrorist fighters The plague of the so-called returnees6 is something that the Middle East and North Africa region shares with Europe:7 around 5,000 Europeans have left for Syria and Iraq since 2012 to fight alongside various groups, but primarily with what would become ISIS, and, of them, around 1,500 have returned so far (Renard 2018).8 In dealing with the risks represented by these demobilised combatants, Europe has to be aware of a relatively positive factor: the number of returnees directly involved in attacks on European soil is low compared to their overall number. Nevertheless, the threat might generate a multi- layered risk. First, the involvement of veteran fighters increases both the probability of Brzuszkiewicz 149 success of a plot and its lethality (Hegghammer 2010; Leduc 2016)—the attacks in Paris and Brussels are emblematic illustrations of this phenomenon. Second, the mere presence of returnees within the social fabric can generate long-term ideological risks. Indeed, through their charisma and appeal, and since they are usually not de-radicalised but only—perhaps temporarily—disengaged, they can easily become radicalising agents and create extremist feeder organisations both inside and outside prison, thus exploiting the aura of heroism that they achieved by actually fighting for ISIS.

Counterterrorism response: coordination and the pooling of sovereignty The first organic attempt to give the EU a communal vision in counterterrorism dates back to 2005, with the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was signed by the European Council and based on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. With the goal of strengthening the pillar of prevention, in 2008 the Council adopted the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (Van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016, 5). After the emergence of ISIS as a regional and international player, and in light of trends such as lone-actor terrorism, foreign fighters and the new use of social media by terrorists, the strategy was revised in 2014.

In January 2016, Europol created the European Counter Terrorism Centre, a centre of expertise whose major activities include providing operational support on request to EU member states for investigations, sharing intelligence on terrorism financing (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit), monitoring online terrorist propaganda (through the EU Internet Referral Unit) and illegal arms trafficking, and fostering international cooperation among counterterrorism authorities (European Law Enforcement Agency 2016).

A somewhat similar role is played by the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network, which brings together practitioners from around Europe working on the prevention of radicalisation. The network’s specialism is its focus on activities on the ground, and the practitioners involved include police and prison authorities, teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives and local authorities. Divided into working groups, the practitioners provide recommendations to policymakers through a bottom-up process that is likely to be particularly effective in the realm of prevention (European Commission 2018). A few years ago, Europe also implemented a continent-wide arrest warrant that expedites the extradition of terrorism suspects and approved the collection of passenger name records for flights entering and departing the EU (Council of the EU 2016).

In spite of the rapid growth in the number and quality of European apparatuses and actions to fight radicalisation and terrorism, there are long-standing problems that have yet to be addressed. First, even though European authorities have improved efforts to thwart complex, large-scale attacks, low-cost and poorly planned—but effective—terrorist actions, such as those perpetrated with knives and by running over pedestrians, might represent the priority for the next few years. Indeed, jihadi resilience is already 150 European View 17(2) leading terrorists to bypass the obstacles that they would encounter when planning large-scale attacks. Moreover, the contemporary jihadi cells in Europe, especially those not directly connected to formal international networks, do not have the same financial and logistical capabilities that characterised, for instance, the 9/11 hijackers. Second, the current pooling of sovereignty in security matters is largely insufficient, and this creates a hiatus between the terrorist networks, which are free to move around the continent, and the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which still operate predominantly within their own national borders. Intelligence sharing among EU countries remains unsatisfactory and patchy (Argomaniz et al. 2016, 61), both in terms of legal and cultural resistance.9

The relevance of counter-narratives Counterterrorist narratives are created and disseminated by a number of different actors on the international, regional, national and sub-national levels. A recent report commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Reed et al. 2018) provides an exhaustive overview of the actions taken and projects set up on a global level. However, in this article three key points will be highlighted.

First, a preliminary, unambiguous identification of the target audience is crucial to an effective counter-narrative, and this entails identifying the recipients among the intended and unintended audience, supporters, adversaries and neutrals. In other words, going viral should not be the aim of counter-narratives. Second, the messaging needs to be synchronised with activities on the ground, thereby reducing the risk of a perceived ‘say– do gap’ (Reed 2018). Third, the entire spectrum of counterterrorism actors must monitor the support given to the counter-narrative by technology companies, many of which are engaged in strategic communications. This is a remarkably sensitive issue, particularly given the potential of Internet platforms to facilitate the spread of radical narratives; in order to mitigate this problem technology companies have developed a number of responses. One example is the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which was launched in 2017 by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube with the goals of providing technical solutions and increasing knowledge sharing in the sector.10

Conclusions During the last decade, the terrorism threat in Europe has evolved and expanded, producing some unprecedented trends that require appropriate and effective responses from policymakers and the counterterrorism community. One of the major challenges is embodied by what has been termed old-style recruitment, which poses a different set of problems to those of online radicalisation and recruitment. Indeed, the former involves penetrating on-the-ground, human networks with pre-existing links, where members share a stronger sense of belonging and a camaraderie that it is hard to compete with. The issue of old-style recruitment should not be underestimated, especially considering its Brzuszkiewicz 151 potential connection with the influx of returning foreign terrorist fighters to Europe, which is likely to increase the risk of new cells forming through traditional methods on the continent.

A further set of challenges relates to the pooling of sovereignty and cooperation between counterterrorism actors in Europe, which will need to become more systematic. Some issues are particularly delicate: Europol does not have operational powers yet, and it still lacks the authority to make arrests; no EU country has fully implemented the Passenger Name Record directive yet; and the laws concerning returning foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing vary widely from one country to another.

As far as counter-narratives are concerned, the factors to take into account are diverse, with the major ones including the relevance of properly individuating the target; monitoring and evaluating the efficacy of the implemented strategies; and being aware that, in fighting radicalisation, there is no magical formula for success.

Notes 1. The most recent reliable data can be found in BBC (2018). 2. The concepts of the Near and Far Enemy (al-’adū al-qarīb wa al-’adū al-baʻīd) were theo- rised by al-Jihad al-Islamy’s main ideologue ‘Abdel Salām Farağ. Al-Jihad al-Islamy was an Egyptian jihadi group active in the last three decades of the twentieth century. In his ‘al-Farīḍa al-Ghā’iba’ (The Absent Obligation), Farağ stated that the Near Enemy took priority over the Far one. In contrast, with the ascent of al-Qaeda at the end of the 1990s jihad went global, and the Far Enemy—the US, Israel and the West in general—was prioritised over the Near Enemy—the Arab regimes and the religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries. 3. In the last few years, a vast body of research has addressed the issue of radicalisation in prison. Virtually every European country is now facing significant numbers of radicalised inmates, with Belgium alone having between 230 and 450 radicalised inmates, according to various estimates. However, this is not an exclusively European problem, since even in Muslim-majority countries, a number of prominent jihadists have been radicalised, at least in part, in prison, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. 4. Sharia4 is a radical Islamist set of networks—now largely dismantled—that had various connections with Anjem Choudary, the British Islamist who founded al-Muhajiroun—later Islam4UK—in 2002 and was sentenced to five and a half years in prison in 2016. 5. The Zerkani Network is named after Khalid Zerkani, a Moroccan citizen arrested in 2015 and sentenced to 15 years in prison for his recruiting activities. 6. The term ‘foreign fighters’ is not fully satisfactory: it describes nationals of one country who travel to participate in a conflict in another country. A more exhaustive definition implies that these individuals are driven mainly by ideology or religion. The international community, in order to bypass some of the existing legal limits to address non-state actors and terrorist groups, has developed the term ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, which seems to have a stronger explanatory power. 7. As of early December 2016, at least eight hundred of the more than six thousand Tunisian foreign terrorist fighters had returned home, and the figure is probably much higher now. 8. Some of the most reliable figures are available for the Balkans and Eastern Europe: for instance, we know that by the end of 2016 more than 100 Bosnians, 117 Kosovans and 86 152 European View 17(2)

citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had returned to their homelands (Holmer and Shtuni 2017). 9. Furthermore, European countries vary widely in the degree of professionalism of their domestic security services. 10. Each of these companies has its own individual counter-speech initiative, see YouTube (n.d.), Facebook (2015) and Microsoft’s partnership with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

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Author biography Sara Brzuszkiewicz is editor-in-chief of European Eye on Radicalization and a Ph.D. student at the Catholic University of Sacred Heart (Milan). Her research interests focus on radicalisation, de-radicalisation and jihadism in Europe. EUV0010.1177/1781685818808715European ViewMerheim-Eyre research-article8087152018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 155–162 After homo sovieticus: © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818808715DOI: 10.1177/1781685818808715 Democratic governance gaps journals.sagepub.com/home/euv and societal vulnerabilities in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Igor Merheim-Eyre

Abstract This article explores three intertwining issues facing the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: (1) the continued legacy of homo sovieticus or the ‘Soviet Man’, (2) the state of democratic governance and (3) societal vulnerabilities. Existing since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they can be seen as both barriers to reform as well as vulnerabilities exploited by domestic and foreign actors for the purposes of division and subversion. The article argues that if the EU or the wider transatlantic community wants to support the countries of the eastern neighbourhood on their road to security, democracy and prosperity, we must place the dignity of the individual at the heart of our policies. This requires (a) fostering deeper social and cultural capital, and (b) ensuring that we strengthen the resilience of society rather than that of autocratic leaders and oligarchic structures.

Keywords Homo sovieticus, Eastern Partnership, Democratic governance, Societal vulnerabilities, Resilience

Introduction The countries of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood face multiple challenges and vulnerabilities that hamper their development and continue to be exploited by domestic and foreign actors. In this regard, it is important not to lose sight of the intersection of the

Corresponding author: I. Merheim-Eyre, Rutherford College, School of Politics & International Relations, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent CT2 7NX, UK. Email: [email protected]

Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 156 European View 17(2) macro (e.g. geopolitical questions, the conditions of state institutions and the state of the countries’ economies) and the micro (e.g. the mentalities governing people’s everyday conduct or the everyday conditions of day-to-day life). Or as French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1992, 21) noted, one has ‘to discover externality at the heart of internality, banality in the illusion of rarity, the common in the pursuit of the unique’. To this end, this article explores three intertwining issues for the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: (1) the continued legacy of homo sovieticus or the ‘Soviet Man’, (2) the state of democratic governance, and (3) societal vulnerabilities.

The purpose of the article is to look into the vulnerabilities that have continued to exist in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The term ‘vulnerabilities’ is understood to mean ‘conditions that make communities susceptible to harm’ (Bergstrand et al. 2015, 392). The main body of the article is divided into four sections. The first explains the concept of homo sovieticus and its continued relevance to understanding the social dynamics within the individual countries as well as the broader region. The second and third explore the continuing gaps in democratic governance and societal vulnerabilities respectively. The fourth and concluding section argues that if we, as European and transatlantic policymakers and practitioners, seek to support these countries on their road to security, democracy and prosperity, we must place the dignity of the individual at the heart of our policies, by (a) fostering deeper social and cultural capital, and (b) ensuring that we strengthen societal resilience rather than that of autocratic leaders and oligarchic structures.

Homo sovieticus As the 2015 Belarusian Nobel Laureate for Literature, Svetlana Alexievich (2016, 2), observed following the collapse of the Soviet Union: ‘socialism has ended, but we stayed’. Even after the leading role of the Communist Party disappeared from state institutions and McDonald’s restaurants appeared on street corners, homo sovieticus, with his/her memories and experiences, remained and had to interpret this new world for himself or herself. Homo sovieticus was, as Alexievich further noted in her seminal work on the phenomenon, Second-Hand Time (Vremya Sekond-Khend), probably the most successful Soviet project. However, where Soviet ideologues were hoping to create their own version of Superman, years of totalitarian Communist rule (mixed with historical experiences of feudalism, monarchy, fascism, national socialism and some liberal democracy), repression and the denial of basic human dignity instead depleted human capital and created a demoralised individual.

As was recently noted in The Moscow Times (2017), homo sovieticus ‘is the archetype of a person born in and shaped by a totalitarian regime’. Opinion polls conducted across the post-Soviet space (Levada Center 2017; Pew Research Center 2017; IRI 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) continue to show that former Soviet citizens feel apathy, a sense of disillusionment, insecurity about their identity, and an odd mixture of nostalgia for the Communist times on the one hand and a need to safeguard Christian values on the other. For example, although church attendance continues to increase, Christianity is increasingly correlated with the Merheim-Eyre 157 individual’s fluid identity rather than religious belief, while the individual prefers to focus more on the private environment (The Moscow Times 2017). Moreover, his/her relationship with state institutions is based on suspicion and distrust, while pessimism about the future continues to impact his/her daily conduct.

For example, while 67% of Georgians say that their country is heading in the wrong direction (IRI 2018b), as many as 71% of Ukrainians (IRI 2018a) and 73% of Moldovans say the same (IRI 2018c). At the same time, these traits are further driven by all too often genuine (and visible) social, political and economic conditions which together hamper the possibility of reform and open up the possibility for subversion by oligarchic groups, foreign states or other actors.

Gaps in democratic governance As the late US President Ronald Reagan (1961) used to remark, ‘democracy is never more than one generation away from extinction’: in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood democratic governance continues to be vulnerable to authoritarianism, oligarchy and state capture. Despite two ‘Maidans’ in Ukraine (in 2004 and 2013/2014), the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) and the Velvet Revolution in Armenia (2018), the gaps in democratic governance continue to be significant, the chances of meaningful change sketchy, and homo sovieticus continues to exist in a state of pessimism.

Furthermore, despite the removal by the EU of the largely redundant sanctions against Belarus, the release of its last political prisoners in 2015 (Freedom House 2015), and some positive steps in technical cooperation and low-key dialogue (especially on border management), the political situation in the country remains by and large unchanged. In fact, political repression continues through other means, including legal and administrative routes (Human Rights Watch 2018), and to this day no meaningful reforms have been undertaken. Freedom of assembly, of association and of expression remain curbed, and the police brutality on the streets of Minsk in April 2017, against people protesting over the worsening socio-economic conditions and an ultimately cancelled ‘parasite tax’ on unemployed individuals (Miller 2017), highlights the regime’s continued preparedness to use naked force to suppress any show of discontent. The argument that the level of brutality shown was more restrained than in 2010 (Preiherman 2017) is sadly insufficient, especially as the regime’s machinery of repression continues to grind and find new means to suppress dissent.

In Azerbaijan, too, political repression continues, while it remains questionable whether the new Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will be able to break the oligarchic stranglehold upon the country. In Moldova, the level of state capture has been exposed through the disappearance of $1 billion from its banking system in 2014 (Gherasimov 2017), the recent invalidation of the mayoral election results in Chisinau (Jozwiak 2018), and the continued presence of the shadowy eminence Vladimir Plahotniuc—a wealthy businessman and politician. Thus, as Emerson and Noutcheva (2018, 5) note: ‘One of the main manifestations of poor governance across 158 European View 17(2) the wider neighbourhood has been widespread corruption and impunity for officehold- ers. Weak rule of law and inefficient law enforcement institutions have been common- place in nearly all neighbouring states and have allowed incumbents to act with impunity while in office.’

Such statements are not exaggerated. For example, Moldova and Ukraine consistently rank well below other countries in the region (Georgia is 46th) in Transparency International’s 2017 corruption rankings, and even below the worst performers in the Western Balkans, such as North Macedonia (107th) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (91st)— Moldova is ranked 122nd and Ukraine 130th out of 180 countries worldwide (in Emerson and Noutcheva 2018). A similar trend can be seen in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index (2018).

In this regard, state capture, authoritarianism and oligarchy continue to dominate the governance of the eastern neighbourhood countries, feeding (and, in some cases, even furthering) the extent of corruption and the weak rule of law. In turn, the citizens’ continued mixture of distrust and disillusionment, as well as the all too apparent poor social and economic conditions continue to limit the possibilities for further reform.

Social and economic vulnerabilities Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, institutional structures remained rigid in the post-Soviet states, but this did not necessarily translate into effective (let alone, in a number of cases, democratic) governance, resulting in the collapse of the welfare system (except, perhaps, in Belarus), poverty, high unemployment, social inequality and low levels of economic development. For example, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the eastern neighbourhood remains the lowest in wider Europe: in 2016, Moldova’s GDP per capita was $5,332 and in Ukraine it had increased from $6,663 in 1990 to $8,269 by 2016. By comparison it was $10,004 in Georgia ($5,174 in 1990) and $18,060 ($5,399 in 1990) in Belarus. Even in Kosovo, the worst performer among the Western Balkans countries, it was $10,063 (Emerson and Noutcheva 2018, 12).

This combination of factors is significant, as social policy is often seen as a precondition for ‘economic growth and creation’ in order to produce high levels of employment (Zimmermann 2017, 6). Instead, we see a region marred by socio-economic problems and experiencing high levels of emigration as a means of escaping the conditions there.

The EU tends to look at cross-border mobility as a glass half-full situation. For example, it is highlighted that in the first year of the visa-free regime with Moldova (May 2014–May 2015), some 500,000 citizens made use of the new opportunity to travel to the EU (Merheim-Eyre 2017). However, what remains in the glass is a more complex mixture. For example, visa liberalisation with Moldova was partly a response to widespread applications for Romanian passports. However, the mass emigration of Moldovans to the EU via this option has created both an economic drain on the EU and an unresolved migration issue that requires better management. Merheim-Eyre 159

More broadly, comprising 60.4% of the total, in 2013 the 666,000 Ukrainians represented the highest (official) number of migrants in the EU from the eastern neighbourhood. There were also 210,000 Moldovan, 78,000 Belarusian, 69,000 Armenian, 55,000 Georgian and 24,000 Azerbaijani migrants in the EU (Pluim et al. 2014, 6). As in the case of migration from these countries to Russia, the unofficial numbers are much higher. For example, it is estimated that there are circa 200,000 Moldovans in Italy alone, some working illegally and others using Romanian passports. The number of Belarusians and Ukrainians is also higher, as it excludes not only those working illegally, but also those making use of the Polish Card, which is obtainable for those able to prove their Polish ancestry (Bara et al. 2013, 7).

Thus, while social policies usually seek to ‘strengthen peoples’ capacity to fully participate in employment and social life’ (Zimmermann 2017, 6) and thus ensure high employment and successful economic governance, the present conditions mean that remittances from abroad still constitute a significant part of the countries’ economies. According to the UN Development Programme, in 2012 remittances represented almost 23% of Moldovan household income (down from 26% in 2008) (IOM 2013). Of this, 9% came from Russia, but a staggering 52% came from Italy, 5% came from the UK and 4% came from Spain (ETF 2012).1 According to the International Organization for Migration, without remittances, the poverty rate in Moldova would be circa 40% (currently it is circa 8%).

At the same time, in 2012 over 71% of surveyed Moldovan migrants expressed a wish to return home (ETF 2012). The response of the Moldovan institutions, together with the EU and other international partners, has been to focus on the concept of ‘circular migration’ in order to ‘mobilise human and financial resources of Moldovan migrant workers for the sustainable development of Moldova’s economy’ (ETF 2012).

For example, under a Swedish-led project (involving Bulgaria, Italy and other EU member states, 2009–12), 30 Moldovan wine specialists were trained in prestigious Italian vocational training schools (Migration4Development 2012), while Germany led an EU-funded programme focusing on the circular migration of medical professionals (IOM 2014). Although these schemes serve as models for circular migration projects, they are limited in scope, and wider implementation and strategic foresight are still lacking.

In other words, despite attempts to mitigate the continued emigration and brain-drain from neighbouring countries, emigration, all too often, is a response by citizens to existing vulnerabilities, as well as to the continued gaps in democratic governance. While emigration is a testimony to citizens’ endeavours to overcome the personal and societal vulnerabilities facing them, the factors leading to emigration and its consequences should also serve as a raison d’etre for supporting our neighbours and their citizens in the pursuit of security, democracy and prosperity.

Conclusion In its Global Strategy (EEAS 2016), the EU emphasised the need to strengthen the resilience of the countries in its neighbourhood, acknowledging the ongoing vulnerabilities facing 160 European View 17(2) individual countries across both the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. However, all too often we overlook the intersecting vulnerabilities on both the micro and macro levels which hamper the possibility of reform. This article has sought to highlight some of the ongoing vulnerabilities and gaps in democratic governance facing the countries of the eastern neighbourhood, and also the continued legacy of homo sovieticus which, though hard to quantify, represents an important phenomenon in the post-Soviet societies.

Despite this, it is imperative that neither policymakers nor practitioners simply fall prey to helpless gloom. The need to support the countries on their road to security, democracy and prosperity remains crucial, but we must also not be afraid to critically assess our own policies and approaches. To this end, European and transatlantic policymakers and practitioners must place the dignity of the individual at the heart of our policies, by (a) fostering deeper social and cultural capital, and (b) ensuring that we strengthen societal resilience rather than that of autocratic leaders and oligarchic structures.

For example, to engage in a principled approach with Belarus, the EU and transatlantic donors must recognise that while policies of sanctions and isolation against Belarus have failed to foster any meaningful change, simply going along with President Lukashenko in the name of regional stability will not bring about any meaningful change either, whether in the short, medium or long term. Instead, Lukashenko (as well as other autocrats and oligarchs in the neighbourhood) will use such overtures to his own benefit, namely to strengthen his own position and legitimacy at home and abroad. To this end, we must continue to remind ourselves that free and dignified people invested in the countries’ commonwealth, and not autocrats and oligarchs, should determine the countries’ futures.

Note 1. According to the International Organization for Migration, these are only the official figures; remittances sent through unofficial channels (including cash) would add further to this but the figures are not known.

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Emerson, M., & Noutcheva, G. (2018). Political and economic governance in the Balkans and Eastern Europe compared. Centre for European Policy Studies. Brussels. ETF (European Training Foundation). (2012). Programme on attracting remittances into the [Moldovan] economy Pare 1+1. Seminar on ‘Migration and skills’, 6–7 March. Turin. Freedom House. (2015). Belarus releases six political prisoners. Press Release, 24 August. https: //freedomhouse.org/article/belarus-releases-six-political-prisoners. Accessed 28 June 2018. Gherasimov, C. (2017). Moldova: The captured state on Europe’s edge. Chatham House, 8 March. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/moldova-captured-state-europe-s-edge. Accessed 20 June 2018. Human Rights Watch. (2018). UN rights body: Strengthen scrutiny of human rights in Belarus. 25 June. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/25/un-rights-body-strengthen-scrutiny-human -rights-belarus. Accessed 25 June 2018. IOM (International Organization for Migration). (2013). Extended migration profile of the Republic of Moldova 2007–2012. Chisinau. IOM (International Organization for Migration). (2014). Extended migration profile of the Republic of Moldova 2009–2014. Chisinau. IRI (International Republican Institute). (2018a). Public opinion survey of the residents of Ukraine, March 15–31, 2018. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018–5–21_ukraine _poll_presentation_0.pdf. Accessed 29 June 2018. IRI. (2018b). Public opinion survey: Residents of Georgia, April 10–22, 2018. http://www.iri.org /sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf. Accessed 29 June 2018. IRI. (2018c). Public opinion survey: Residents of Moldova, February–March 2018. http://www .iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-3-29_moldova_poll_presentation.pdf. Accessed 29 June 2018. Jozwiak, R. (2018). EU Parliament blasts ‘state capture’ of Moldova courts. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 5 July. https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-freezes-aid-moldova-citing-court-nullification -chisinau-mayoral-election-nastase-/29339723.html. Accessed 5 July 2018. Korosteleva, E., Merheim-Eyre, I., & van Gils, E. (2018). ‘The politics’ and ‘the political’ of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. London: Routledge. Levada Center. (2017). Nostalgia for the USSR. Press release. Moscow. https://www.levada.ru /en/2017/12/25/nostalgia-for-the-ussr/. Accessed 7 September 2018. Merheim-Eyre, I. (2017). Exploring the European Union’s rationalities of governing: The case of cross-border mobility in the Eastern Partnership. East European Politics, 33(3), 371–87. Migration4Development. (2012). Strengthening Moldova’s capacity to manage labour and return integration. http://www.migration4development.org/en/projects/strengthening-moldova’ -capacity-manage-labour-and-return-integration. Accessed 20 June 2018. Miller, C. (2017). With ‘nothing to left to lose’, Belarus’ ‘social parasites’ make a stand. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 24 March. https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-protests-antigovernment -protests-lukashenka-crackdown-russia-parasite-tax/28389254.html. Accessed 24 June 2018. Pew Research Center. (2017). Religious belief and national belonging in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC. Pluim, M., Hofmann, M., Zak, R., & Bara, A. (2014). Changing migration realities: Why migration between the EU, Russia and the eastern neighbourhood will change. International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Working Paper 7. Vienna. Preiherman, Y. (2017). Illusions and lack of reason revealed by new protests in Belarus. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 27 March. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/illusions -lack-reason-revealed-new-protests-belarus/. Accessed 27 June 2018. Reagan, R. (1961). ‘Encroaching Control’. Speech made to the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, 30 March 1961. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gf9Y7UgGi0. Accessed 7 September 2018. 162 European View 17(2)

The Moscow Times. (2017). The evolution of homo sovieticus to Putin’s man. 13 October. https: //themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-evolution-of-homo-sovieticus-to-putins-man-59189. Accessed 25 May 2018. World Justice Project. (2018). WJP rule of law index 2017–2018. https://worldjusticeproject.org /our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2017–2018. Accessed 27 June 2018. Zimmermann, A. (2017). Social vulnerability as an analytical perspective. Munich: Max Planck Institute, Population Europe, Discussion Paper 4.

Author biography Dr Igor Merheim-Eyre is a research fellow at the Global Europe Centre (University of Kent) and within the UPTAKE Horizon2020 Project. His research focuses on issues of wider European security, and he works in the field of international democracy support. EUV0010.1177/1781685818809334European ViewTeodorescu research-article8093342018

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European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 163–171 Beyond emergency measures: © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818809334DOI: 10.1177/1781685818809334 The need for a holistic and journals.sagepub.com/home/euv truly European approach to migration

Loredana Teodorescu

Abstract Since mid-2017 there has been a reduction in irregular migrant arrivals, and this has partially been attributed to the various initiatives undertaken by the EU. However, migration remains a controversial and pressing issue for which the EU is still struggling to find an adequate and shared response. Migration has become a divisive issue among EU member states, calling into question the meaning of solidarity within the EU and within the member states themselves. This article argues that it is time to move beyond short-term emergency measures and work on a long-term, holistic and truly European approach to migration, combining internal and external policies. Reinforcing control of the European borders will not be enough. While it is necessary to reduce the number of irregular arrivals, the EU needs to equip itself with a future-proof, efficient migration policy that also addresses the Union’s internal weaknesses, as the challenge is not only to reduce the number of arrivals, but also to increase the capacity to manage the flows.

Keywords Migration, Mediterranean, Africa, Third countries, External dimension, Externalisation, Dublin reform

Introduction Since 2015 migration has dominated the EU and national agendas. Since mid-2017 there has been a reduction in the number of irregular migrant arrivals. This has been partially attributed to the various initiatives undertaken by the EU, including closer cooperation

Corresponding author: L. Teodorescu, Istituto Luigi Sturzo, 35 Via delle Coppelle, 00186 Rome, Italy. Email: [email protected]

Migration has become a divisive issue among EU member states, calling into question the meaning of solidarity and the sense of unity. This is also happening within the member states themselves, where extremist or populist parties are exploiting the issue of migration for political reward, contributing to an increase in fear and xenophobic sentiments. The result is significant disagreement on the solutions to be taken, especially at the EU level, and a more general lack of a common vision. These problems are combined with the difficulty of addressing the issue in a realistic and thorough way, which seems to be less appealing to public opinion.

The aim of this article is to review concrete proposals to overcome the emergency and manage the phenomenon, both within and outside the EU, highlighting the interconnec- tion between the different policies. It argues that it is time to move beyond short-term emergency measures and work on a long-term, holistic and truly European approach to migration, combining internal and external policies without losing momentum and while also considering possible future challenges which might affect migratory flows.

After setting out the current situation, the article will discuss three main policy elements of the EU response: (1) actions outside EU borders; (2) the possibility of externalising the asylum process; and (3) the revision of the EU migration and asylum system, in particular, reform of the Dublin system. Finally, the article will outline ways to move forward.

The situation on the ground Since the ‘migration crisis’ erupted in 2015, migration has been recognised as a priority for the EU as a whole. Under the European Agenda for Migration, the EU has made an enormous effort to overcome the challenge, trying to restore efficient management of the migratory flows through new or reinforced measures (for the major policy and legislative initiatives, see e.g. Atanassov et al. 2018). The crisis revealed the limits and weaknesses of the entire system developed for asylum and migration. The main problem centred on the difficulties of promoting collective action within the Union on an issue considered highly sensitive and strictly related to national sovereignty and interests. The crisis therefore called not only for a reactive response to overcome it, but also for a strategic rethink- ing of the EU’s approach to migration, including its own competences, values and shared priorities.

The EU member states found it easier to reach consensus on two points: (1) the need to restore control of the external borders of the EU; and (2) the need to reaffirm the importance of cooperation with partner countries outside the EU, notably the countries of origin and transit of the migratory flows. As regards the former, while the whole bor- derless Schengen system has been put under attack, a reinforced agency to strengthen the external borders, the European Border and Coast Guard, was approved in record time (European Parliament and Council 2016). Moreover, EUNAVFOR Med or Operation Teodorescu 165

Sophia, a mission in the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy focused on the fight against the smuggler and trafficker networks in the Central Mediterranean, was launched in 2015 (Council of the EU 2015). Outside its borders, the EU has launched various initiatives to instigate cooperation on the specific challenge of managing migratory flows by establishing migration partnerships with key countries, especially in Africa (e.g. Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Ethiopia). Other initiatives have aimed to address the root causes of emigration, for instance, providing support to numerous projects for job creation or access to education through the newly established EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

When it comes to the management of flows inside Europe, however, tensions have arisen and the EU has revealed its fragilities. The whole Dublin system, established to identify the EU member state responsible for examining each specific asylum application, collapsed, with EU member states unable to cope with the increasingly mixed flows and the consequent secondary movements. Reinforced support for front-line member states, in terms of financial assistance and operational support on the ground through the hotspot system, was adopted, but attempts to redistribute the refugees within the EU through a temporary relocation system created major disagreements.

Through a combination of various factors and initiatives, irregular arrivals to the EU dropped by around 60% in 2017 (Frontex 2018b) and even more in the first half of 2018.1 Yet migration still represents one of the most controversial and debated issues at the European level. According to Frontex, overall pressure on Europe’s external borders has remained relatively high, while there have already been some changes to the migratory routes being used, with numbers travelling via the Western Mediterranean route hitting a record high and the relative share of African nationals increasing (Frontex 2018b). The situation is fragile, and so are the national migration systems. Moreover, even if the numbers dropped significantly, the trend for the years to come and factors in migration dynamics, such as climate change, and security and demography in the EU and its neighbourhood, point to migration remaining a challenge for decades (European Commission 2017, 2). With a turbulent neighbourhood and the risk of new routes opening up, Europe urgently needs to equip itself with a system capable of coping efficiently with any future crisis.

Cooperating with third countries The biggest challenge for the EU remains effective management of the flows, which should disincentivise irregular migration and ensure the security of the external borders, while protecting people in real need. This process already starts outside the EU’s borders, with an attempt to intervene at the earliest possible stage in the countries of transit and origin of the migrants and asylum seekers.

Strengthened cooperation with third countries has therefore achieved greater consensus among the EU member states, becoming one of the EU’s core responses. On the one hand, this cooperation aims to promote co-responsibility between all the actors involved in the migration flows, which are called upon to jointly manage the phenomenon. To this end, new initiatives promoted and led by the EU have flourished, such as the migration 166 European View 17(2) compacts and ad-hoc forms of cooperation, like the EU–Turkey deal. Cooperation with third countries is based on the assumption that migration presents common challenges that can be managed better and more efficiently together. On the other hand, the external migration policy is related to the need to address the root causes of migration, such as instability, poverty and a lack of democracy. This constitutes a long-term approach, which is associated only to some extent with migration-related objectives (for a definition of external migration policy, see Boswell 2003).

The EU is surrounded by an unstable neighbourhood, and demographic projections for the African continent show not only that Africa has the youngest population in the world, with 41% of its population under the age of 15, but also that it is growing fast (Yahya 2017). Africa is projected to see the largest increase in its population over the next years, with an additional 1.3 billion people on the continent by 2050 (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2017). A long-term approach is needed to deal with some of the most frequent reasons for people to leave their countries and to give opportunities to the younger generations at the local or regional level.

On a more general level, while involving third countries in migration management is essential, it requires a critical evaluation of the impact of such cooperation in terms of the coherence of EU action and the respect of human rights (on coherence in migration policy, see e.g. Angenendt et al. 2017), and raises some challenges in terms of the incentives used to ensure cooperation and the use of conditionality.

Moreover, there is still a great need for a clear consensus on the EU’s goal and the tools it can use to reach it. Better coordination between EU member states is essential, not only internally, but also to build the EU’s credibility as a reliable and coherent partner, able to speak with one voice when addressing third countries. This means clearly identifying the role the EU is expected to play and embedding bilateral initiatives in a comprehensive European strategy, for instance, using privileged relations with third countries—for historical, cultural or other reasons—to obtain fruitful cooperation for the EU as a whole, and including a commitment to all the initiatives developed at the EU level (for further analysis, see Teodorescu 2017).

Finally, while strengthened EU external action on migration is indeed a fundamental component of the EU response to the challenge, it cannot replace internal solutions. Solving the problem of irregular migration very much depends on enhanced coordination between member states and their capacity to act as a whole, as a single actor in the international arena.

Externalising the asylum process One proposal related to cooperation with third countries has recently been regaining attention. This is the idea of externalising the asylum process, making it possible for asylum seekers to ask for international protection while outside the EU (for further analysis, see Garlick 2015; Collet 2016; Carrera and Guild 2017). The territoriality principle at the core of the current EU asylum system, which requires asylum seekers to reach EU territory before claiming asylum, mostly in an irregular way, seems ill-suited to address Teodorescu 167 the current challenges being faced at Europe’s borders. Indeed, the idea of processing applications in countries of first asylum, which re-emerged in the most recent debates and also in relation to the new concept of disembarkation platforms (European Council 2018), aims to provide immediate protection to people in need closer to their homes, reducing the incentive to undertake the dangerous and risky journey to Europe, while facilitating the return of people whose asylum applications have been rejected. Thus this proposal would respond to both the migration management and the humanitarian challenges at Europe’s external borders.

This proposal raises many questions, such as legal and procedural issues, possible violations of the principle of non-refoulement,2 and the need to rely on the cooperation and willingness of third countries. To become a realistic alternative to the dangerous journeys to Europe and to comply with international and European legal requirements, such a process would need to be quick and efficient, and this would require substantial funding. It would likely exist in conjunction with the ordinary territorial asylum system, as it is neither possible nor desirable to return asylum seekers to third countries without processing their asylum claims (see European Commission 2018b). Most importantly, if the process is to be introduced on an EU-wide basis, at protection centres, national con- sulates or EU delegation headquarters, a definition of the criteria for the distribution of refugees is needed. However, the recent experience of dividing refugees between member states shows the difficulties of establishing an EU-wide redistribution system. Finally, the proposal again highlights that any solutions outside the EU’s borders need to be combined with an efficient system within the EU.

While debates and reflections on the issue should continue, at present the most feasible solution seems to be to enhance the support provided to third countries hosting refugees and to increase the opportunities for resettlement as a legal avenue for access to the EU by swiftly adopting the EU Resettlement Framework (European Commission 2016). Private sponsorship schemes that allow and facilitate private groups or civil society organisations to organise and finance resettlements in accordance with national legislation should also be considered (for further analysis, see Collet et al. 2016; Collyer et al. 2017). In this way it would be possible to find a balance between protecting refugees inside and outside Europe.

Acting within the EU’s borders Under the pressure of the crisis, EU member states showed a lack of collective action and solidarity. Some front-line member states did not properly implement the EU’s migration and asylum policies, while others refused to take their fair share of responsibility. Achieving a common vision depends on the political willingness of the member states, including when it comes to the clear need to rethink the EU migration and asylum system. However there are diverging views on the role the EU should play, which recall the broader dilemma of ‘more or less Europe’.

First of all, a reform of the Dublin system is needed. The whole system collapsed with the arrival of more than one million people in 2015, putting an excessive burden on the 168 European View 17(2)

EU countries of first entry, contributing to the temporary loss of control of the EU’s external borders and overwhelming reception centres, with consequent security and political risks for all member states. The same system, created 15 years ago in a completely different environment and only slightly reformed over the years, seems unable to cope with the current and possible future scenarios. It is therefore important to create new and expanded criteria for establishing the country responsible for assessing asylum claims and giving protection to genuine refugees, as the migrant flow is currently une- venly affecting some member states. In addition, a stronger focus on the correct and efficient implementation of policies on the ground by individual countries is necessary, for instance, making national procedures regarding registration, assessment and return more effective.

The real test for the EU and the reform of the system relates to burden sharing. The rising divide between the Western and the Central and Eastern European countries is linked to different perceptions of the migratory phenomenon, which affects these countries in different ways. In an increasingly thorny debate, a lot of attention has been given to relocation decisions, which has created a climate of scaremongering in some countries while not really solving the issue for the most affected ones. As consequence of these tensions, after two years of negotiation on reform of the Dublin system, talks are still stalling, with the risk that there will not be any concrete results until the end of the current European institutions’ mandate. Moreover, any attempt to revise the internal system, or to introduce new concepts, such as the voluntary ‘controlled centres’ that are to be eventually set up in the member states (European Commission 2018a), requires the reinforced engagement of the EU. And this same engagement is required to redistribute those who are genuine refugees and to return the others.

Finally, while advancing on the issues where there is consensus, EU member states should also bear in mind that all the policies are interlinked and go hand in hand. The question of how to share the burden within the EU and reform the Dublin system is unavoidable; it needs to be dealt with and diplomatically solved in order to elaborate an efficient response. More solutions are on the table, and the most feasible one seems to be a combination of the different proposals, supporting and showing real and concrete solidarity with the states most affected and taking into consideration the fears and anxieties of some of the countries that are less experienced with migration management. A prerequisite of creating an EU solution to the migration phenomenon is to recognise that a joint response is in the interests of both the EU member states and the EU as a whole. In order to overcome the current deadlock, a coalition of willing states, likely those most affected, could advance in a more coordinated manner, paving the way; but there is a concrete risk that this would undermine the unity of the EU as a whole, as the thorny debate on burden sharing and quotas has already gone too far.

Conclusion While it is necessary to reduce the numbers of irregular arrivals, the EU needs to equip itself with a future-proof, efficient migration policy: the challenge is not only to limit the Teodorescu 169 numbers, but also to increase the capacity to manage the flows. As recent events have shown, the EU has reduced the migration crisis in terms of individuals, but is facing a challenge in terms of policies and management at the EU level, and is struggling to find an adequate response to cope with future crises. At the same time, the recent tensions among states are calling into question the whole European structure, along with its unity and sense of community.

Therefore the EU needs to develop a truly European, revised approach to migration. This includes changing its narrative to communicate its ability to bring together European and national efforts to effectively address migration, overcome divisions and restore citizens’ confidence. The revised approach should be holistic, taking into consideration all the elements and policies which are essential to efficient management, and which are all inter-connected. Cooperation with third countries is an essential element. However, this should not serve as a substitute for joint EU solutions on immigration, asylum and external border control. The EU member states should advance further on the issues where there is consensus, such as cooperation with third countries and external border management, taking into consideration the impact and coherence of their actions. Member states should also widely recognise that the migration challenge is common and therefore the response should be too. Thus, it is important to develop a way to address the challenge internally and alleviate the burden on the front-line EU member states, whose inability to cope with excessive pressure may result in security and political risks for all. Finally, it is time to move beyond the emergency and work on a long-term strategy both within and without the EU, incorporating the lessons learned in recent years, without undermining the efforts made and the results obtained so far. There is no alternative to pressing forward. The stakes are too high and go beyond the current migration challenge.

Notes 1. According to Frontex (2018a), the total number of irregular border crossings fell 46% in the first five months of 2018 compared to a year ago, mainly due to lower migratory pressure on the Central Mediterranean route. 2. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits returning people to a country in which they would likely be in danger of persecution for discriminatory reasons.

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Carrera, S., & Guild, E. (2017). Offshore processing of asylum applications: Out of sight, out of mind? CEPS Commentaries, Brussels. https://www.ceps.eu/publications/offshore-processing-asylum-applications-out-sight-out-mind. Accessed 29 July 2018. Collet, E., Clewett, P., & Fratzke, S. (2016). No way out? Making additional migration channels work for refugees. Migration Policy Institute Europe, Report. Brussels. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/no-way-out-making-additional-migration-channels-work-refugees. Accessed 29 July 2018. Collyer, M., Mancinelli, M., & Petito, F. (2017). Humanitarian corridors: Safe and legal pathways to Europe. University of Sussex, Policy Briefing. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72424/1/Policy%20 briefing%20-%20Humanitarian%20corridors.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2018. Council of the EU. (2015). Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/972 launching the European Union military operation in the southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED). OJ L157 (22 June), 51. European Commission. (2016). Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) no. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council. COM (2016) 468 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=COM:2016:0468:FIN. Accessed 20 July 2018. European Commission. (2017). Migration: A roadmap. The Commission’s contribution to the leaders’ agenda. Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/ policies/european-agenda-migration/20171207_communication_on_commission_contribu- tion_to_the_eu_leaders_thematic_debate_on_way_forward_on_external_and_internal_ dimension_migration_policy_en.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2018. European Commission. (2018a). Migration: ‘Controlled centres’ in EU member states. Follow-up to the European Council conclusions of 28 June 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180724_factsheet-controlled-centres-eu-member-states_en.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2018. European Commission. (2018b). The legal and practical feasibility of disembarkation options. Follow-up to the informal working meeting of 24 June 2018. Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/sites/beta-political/files/migration-disembarkation-june2018_en.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2018. European Council. (2018). European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018. Press release 421/18. 29 June. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco- conclusions-final/pdf. Accessed 29 July 2018. European Parliament and Council. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and repealing Regulation (EC) no. 863/2007, Council Regulation (EC) no. 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. OJ L251 (14 September), 1. Frontex. (2018a). Migratory flows in May: Decreasing trend, but pressure remains. News release, 18 June. https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-may-decreasing- trend-but-pressure-remains-D6yq3Q. Accessed 2 August 2018. Frontex. (2018b). Risk analysis for 2018. Warsaw, 20 February. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/ Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis_for_2018.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2018. Garlick, M. (2015). The potential and pitfalls of extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. Migration Policy Institute, March. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/potential-and-pitfalls-extraterritorial-processing-asylum-claims. Accessed 29 July 2018. Teodorescu, L. (2017). Ambition versus reality: Partnering with our neighbours on migration. European View, 16(1), 121–30. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12290-017-0448- 4. Accessed 29 July 2018. Teodorescu 171

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Author biography Loredana Teodorescu, Ph.D., is the EU and international affairs coordinator at Istituto Luigi Sturzo, Rome, and a research associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. Her main areas of expertise are migration, links between European internal security and foreign policy, borders and neighbourhood policies. EUV0010.1177/1781685818808720European ViewLilkov 808720research-article2018

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European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 172–180 Dealing with climate change: © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818808720DOI: 10.1177/1781685818808720 A European centre–right journals.sagepub.com/home/euv perspective

Dimitar Lilkov

Abstract The fight against climate change is sometimes inaccurately perceived as a topic which inherently belongs to those on the left of the political spectrum. This article maps out the most important aspects of climate change and its prevention from a centre–right perspective, and ventures to show that a both sensible and successful approach to this problem is entirely consistent with centre–right tenets and values. It starts by discussing the principle of stewardship and how to address this issue on the individual level. It then argues that the involvement of local and regional actors is of great importance when it comes to the implementation of internationally set climate goals or specific commitments. The article proceeds with a brief overview of how the private sector and emerging technologies can play their part in the fight against climate change. Lastly, it makes the case for the reinforced engagement of the EU through coordinated investment, an improved emissions trading scheme and global leadership.

Keywords Climate change, Centre–right, Emissions trading scheme, Energy, Local governance

Introduction Climate change remains one of the main challenges facing the global community. Scientific evidence of the impact of human activity on the planet’s climate system is unequivocal, and the twenty-first century has provided a series of grim examples. The year 2016 was the third in a row to set a new record for global average surface temperatures (NASA 2017). Instances of shrinking ice sheets, sea level rises and extreme weather anomalies are not isolated events and remind us that the topic of climate change

Corresponding author: D. V. Lilkov, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue de Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

This article endeavours to approach the topic from various viewpoints, ranging from the individual response to the supranational one, in order to provide a concise narrative which is consistent with centre–right1 tenets and values. It contends that some of the recent developments in the sphere of environmental protection within the EU are largely consistent with these principles, and thus they should be framed and communicated accordingly. The only way to successfully address this global challenge is through a continuous European-led international effort which involves multiple levels of governance and provides specific incentives and balanced policies.

Centre–right worldview and values The aim of preventing environmental degradation remains a classic collective action problem in which a multitude of agents could all benefit from a specific action but the associated costs may lead to a lack of incentive for rational agents to contribute (Olson 1965, 2). The response of Europe’s centre–right to the problem of environmental degradation relies on human motivations and solutions, and these are rooted in the core values of the European People’s Party (EPP). Part of the current generations’ responsibility is to pass on to their successors ‘better opportunities . . . by defending freedom and democracy, ensuring solid public finances and preserving a healthy environment’ (EPP 2012, 2).

Based on these ideas, the motivation to protect the environment lies in the conservative and Christian Democratic principle of ‘stewardship’, which is quintessential to the conservative mindset (Moraru 2017). As society is ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’ (Burke 1951, 93), the principle of stewardship can be extended to the preser- vation of the natural environment, as we have a duty not to squander our inheritance.

The principle of stewardship offers the main motivation for every individual to engage in environmental protection. According to conservative tradition, the most important thing which individuals can do is settle down, make a home and pass it on to their children. As a consequence of the overriding affection towards the ‘home’, which is understood to include the environment, individuals engage at the local and national levels in associations formed to protect their environmental inheritance. This represents a local- ised, highly personal motivator which has much more power than the impersonal mission of saving the planet (Moraru 2017).

Climate-related risks should be acknowledged sensibly and without yielding to climate catastrophism or climate grief (Cass 2017), which could lead to emotional numbing and individual detachment from this important issue. A centre–right approach to this 174 European View 17(2) problem also clearly distances itself from the specific line of reasoning which questions whether individuals should cut down their carbon footprint by not having children (Basshuysen 2018) or whether it is immoral to bring up children in a potentially devas- tated future world (Bry 2016).

Importance of the local and regional levels The overall narrative on tackling climate change is usually politically communicated by citing emissions targets and specific pledges which are set by global intergovernmental agreements. The importance of such international goal-setting and the political pressure to achieve synergies in the fight against climate change are beyond doubt. However, when it comes to implementation, the agreements produce mixed results. The success of the Kyoto Protocol (in effect since 2005), for example, remains highly disputed, given both its exemption of developing countries from having to reduce their carbon footprint and its unrealistic target-setting, which has proved to be over-optimistic. The lack of major progress through international treaties on these issues is due, among other factors, to the top-down nature of the commitments, which are negotiated by high-level governmental representatives but ultimately have to be implemented on the local level. That this top-down approach has achieved lacklustre results is related to the fact that existing multinational institutions such as the UN are simply ill-designed for dealing with global environmental problems and producing responses to them (Dirix et al. 2013, 366).

More than half of the world’s population is centred in or around cities, and current projections estimate that this figure may reach 68% by 2050 due to migratory trends and the overall growth of the global population (UN DESA 2018). As such, cities and megalopo- lises contribute directly to more than 70% of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Leahy 2018). The traditional top-down approach of high-level commitments—which are problematic to implement, as the history of the Kyoto Protocol shows—may not be the optimal strategy for tackling such a global challenge (Grunbaum 2015). Based on subsidiarity— that is, the concept according to which a central authority should perform ‘only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2018)—decentrali- sation is a key principle of the centre–right paradigm and should be fully applied in this case. Regional authorities, local councils, municipalities and local non-state actors should be fully involved in target-setting and the actual implementation of climate-change policies. Certain estimates project that regional and local authorities will be responsible for implementing more than 70% of climate-change reduction measures and up to 90% of climate-change adaptation measures (Committee of the Regions 2017). This paradigm was reflected in the 2015 Paris Agreement. During the period that began with the unsuccessful Copenhagen Conference of the Parties and led up to this agreement, those involved became more favourable towards bottom-up approaches, meaning that there was better inclusion of cities, companies and transnational coalitions on climate change (Hale 2016, 14).

International coalitions and initiatives, such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy,2 have led exemplary efforts which should be welcomed and further encouraged. From an EU-led initiative in 2008, the Global Covenant has grown into an Lilkov 175 international alliance of cities and local governments with a shared long-term vision of promoting action to combat climate change. An additional telling example is the recent ‘We are Still In’ initiative, which more than 230 cities from all of the American states have joined. It serves as a global pledge that the US will adhere to the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, regardless of the puzzling intention of President Trump to withdraw from the global pact. This initiative brings together local mayors and governors, business representatives and community leaders who are committed to reducing the carbon footprint of American cities. Only with the fully fledged involvement of such actors can the implementation of climate-change measures and international agreements bring about effective results in the long run.

Economic opportunities, technology and private-sector involvement It must be highlighted that all of the targets set for greenhouse-gas reduction, renewable- energy production and energy efficiency also have to keep in mind the impact on businesses and industry and ensure a stable transition which does not negatively impact the competitiveness of the sectors involved. There should not be an obligatory trade-off between reversing the effects of climate change and radically altering people’s lifestyles or sacrificing whole industrial sectors. Economic data from the previous two decades indicates that the low-carbon transition within the EU is compatible with economic growth (European Political Strategy Centre 2017, 7). The goal of a greener, more sustainable low-carbon economy can also be perceived as a potential economic opportunity. There has been a rapid growth in new employment opportunities in Europe—more than one million people are directly or indirectly employed in renewable energy–related sectors, for example (EurObserver 2016, 4). Future scenarios for the jobs market in 2050 take into account the displacement of coal-related jobs but also project that the newly created positions in the renewable-energy, energy-efficiency, grid-enhancement and energy-flexibility industries will lead to a net gain of 11.6 million jobs (IRENA 2018a, 12). Potential job creation is only one aspect. Climate-related extreme events such as floods, tropical storms or prolonged droughts in the EU and European Economic Area partner countries accounted for more than €400 billion of economic losses between 1980 and 2018 (European Environment Agency 2017, 8). These figures may well increase and move the price tag of climate change several percentage points up the scale of the EU’s gross domestic product.

Support for entrepreneurship and technological innovation is key and could aid the fight against climate change, alongside a coordinated government effort. A case can be made for the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises, which could be negatively impacted by climate change but also have the opportunity to adapt to such challenges and contribute to tackling environmental problems. Renewable-energy technologies, digital solutions for energy efficiency and innovative tools to fight climate change are prominently on the rise and have the potential to reshape the whole approach to this issue. At the moment even the distributed-database technology of Blockchain is being explored as a possible aid to carbon-emissions trading, renewable-energy trade and 176 European View 17(2) climate-action crowdfunding (UN Climate Change 2017). Numerous green start-ups and entrepreneurs could tap into the possibilities offered by technological breakthroughs and explore new solutions to these challenges. Creating the necessary conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups to thrive, adapt to and address environmental concerns is a must.

Bigger businesses also have to be incentivised to contribute to this global effort. The greatest bulk of greenhouse gas comes from the energy and transport industries (US EPA 2017), which are lagging behind in sufficiently cutting down their carbon footprints and adopting greener alternatives due to technical difficulties and associated costs. Realistic targets have to be pursued for the deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency— there is a lasting trend in the falling price of renewables, which are projected to become cheaper than fossil fuels within the next decade, leading to a significant shift in the energy paradigm (IRENA 2018b, 3). At the same time, new technologies for carbon capture and storage should be further developed as they are key to limiting CO2 emissions. When it comes to the transport industry, technological improvement is also one of the most viable options within the sector, which has seen a rise in emissions in recent years. The electrifica- tion of vehicles and the use of hydrogen and biofuels offer paths for a stable transition within the next decade.

The falling costs of eco-friendly technology, limited government intervention in the form of emissions trading and an internal push for environmental sustainability could be the biggest drivers behind the private sector playing an essential role in the pursuit of reduced carbon emissions.

European leadership This coordinated effort between government and business to invest in climate-related measures is of paramount importance in the upcoming decade. The current European Commission, headed by President Jean-Claude Juncker, has emphasised the need for incentives for private and public investment, most notably through the 2014–20 EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which made substantial commitments to climate mainstreaming.3 The MFF not only set a 20% goal for climate mainstreaming, but also ensured the inclusion of technical provisions to secure climate goals as an integral part of the EU’s spending (European Commission 2016, 41). The EU is on track to reach its target by 2020, totalling approximately €200 billion of climate-relevant spending over the entire seven-year period (European Commission 2016, 21). The current Commission proposal for the next MFF (2021–7) goes even further and features a target of at least 25% of EU expenditure contributing to climate objectives (European Commission 2018).

The recent reform of the EU’s carbon market, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), represents an integral part of the EU’s response to climate change. The EPP rec- ognises the importance of the ETS as a vital pillar of EU climate policy as the system applies to more than 11,000 industrial sites in Europe and aims to contribute to the substantial reduction of CO2 emissions in the next decade. However, two of the biggest Lilkov 177 challenges that remain for the ETS post-2020 are the price of carbon allowances and carbon leakage. One inherent problem of the ETS is the annual surplus of emissions allowances which has built up, especially since the economic crisis of 2008/9. The surplus of allowances lowers the carbon prices within the ETS, which ultimately removes the incentive for industries to reduce their emissions. Even though the ETS price per tonne for carbon has more than tripled in the last 18 months (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2018), it still remains volatile and relatively low. Measures such as the Market Stability Reserve4 should be reinforced in order to prevent imbalances between the supply and demand of ETS allowances. Furthermore, the EU should make a continuous effort to prevent carbon leakage—that is, the migration of businesses to third countries that have laxer environmental rules, which can even lead to increases in overall CO2 emissions. This has to be achieved through improved cooperation with third countries and also through continuous efforts to uphold global commitments and specific climate-related targets. The ETS remains the world’s biggest emissions-trading market and its long-term success would enable it to set the global benchmark.

This brings us to the ultimate point. Most importantly, the EU should further enhance its role as a leader in environmental protection on the global stage. In the case of climate change, a hallmark achievement for EU institutions and member states was the adoption of the 2015 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement. EU leaders, the Juncker Commission and the French presidency of the UN Conference of the Parties played vital roles in the historic negotiations.5 Given the disappointing intention of the US to leave the Agreement in the near future, the EU should step up its continued support for implementing the global pledge and also ensure that vital players, such as China, are on board. The potential departure of the US from the Paris Agreement leaves a vacuum in global climate leadership (Palackova 2017, 253) which could be filled by the EU in the coming decade.

Conclusion The centre–right is sometimes criticised as not being ambitious enough with regard to climate change. However, environmental protection is entirely consistent with the centre–right’s tenets and its core values, which can serve as a template for addressing this global issue. Such an ambitious effort should involve as many stakeholders as possible and transfer ownership to local and regional authorities, which should be engaged in both the design and the implementation of climate-change policies. Coordinated governmental efforts should also facilitate the involvement of the private sector by creating the necessary environment for businesses and start-ups to develop new solutions and tap into nascent technologies which could have a tangible impact in the future.

Lastly, the EU should pursue an ambitious and coherent strategy based on three main pillars. A sizeable part of the EU budget should be devoted to climate-related objectives, and European funds invested in agriculture or regional policy should be in line with climate goals for reduced emissions. The European Commission should also step up its 178 European View 17(2) efforts to improve the ETS in the next decade and promote a balanced and effective mechanism to deal with the negative environmental externalities caused by the industrial sector. As a final step, the EU should make full use of the opportunity to lead the global effort on climate change by designing specific policies and also by convincing third- country actors to honour their environmental commitments and bear the corresponding responsibility for their carbon footprints.

Notes 1. The term ‘centre–right’ is used here as equivalent to the EPP and its member parties—that is, it includes Christian Democrats, conservatives, centrists, and other like-minded parties in the EU and its neighbourhood. 2. The Global Covenant of Mayors is a unique international alliance of cities and local governments with a common long-term strategy for tackling climate change. Further details can be found at https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/. 3. Integrating climate change mitigation and adaptation measures into policy across different policy sectors. 4. As of 2019 the Market Stability Reserve will try to address the current surpluses and manage emissions allowances placed in reserve with the aim of balancing the supply and demand of emissions allowances. 5. For a further discussion, see Oberthür 2016.

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Author biography Dimitar Lilkov is a research officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre, where he is responsible for topics related to the digital economy, energy and the environment. He has a master’s degree in politics and government in the EU from the London School of Economics and a BA in international relations from Sofia University. EUV0010.1177/1781685818803524European ViewJanda research-article8035242018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 181–188 How to boost the Western © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818803524DOI: 10.1177/1781685818803524 response to Russian hostile journals.sagepub.com/home/euv influence operations

Jakub Janda

Abstract The Russian Federation has become a rogue state in international relations, invading and occupying the territories of three European countries (Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine), waging war in the Ukrainian territory, producing massive disinformation campaigns against the West, threatening the Baltic republics, and interfering in various elections and referendums. Despite Russia’s aggressive behaviour, the West’s response to it has been significantly limited, particularly when it comes to non-military deterrence by Continental Europe. The US and the UK are leading the punishment of Russia’s aggression, while many countries, mainly in Western and Southern Europe, are hesitant to respond to this threat. This article makes recommendations as to what should be done in practical terms to boost the European portion of the Western response to Russian aggression from the political and policy points of view.

Keywords Russia, Disinformation, Subversion, Deterrence, EU, NATO, Elections

Introduction In the early to mid-2000s, Russia watchers started to argue that the revanchism led by President Vladimir Putin and his closest advisers was something the West should take seriously. Most of the countries in the democratic West had essentially ignored the internal developments in Russia and were then surprised by the actions taken by the Russian state. Russia’s military occupation of parts of Moldova was basically considered a non-issue. When Russia invaded Georgian territory in 2008, the West decided not to take major punishment and deterrence measures. However, in 2014 Russia invaded

Corresponding author: J. Janda, European Values Think-Tank, Na Baste sv Jiri 11, Prague 6, ZIP 160 00, Czech Republic. Email: [email protected]

Ukraine and even the most hesitant Western political leaders had to take notice and, later, action. Flash forward to 2018, and arguably the Russian Federation has become a disrup- tor of international relations, invading and occupying the territories of three European countries (Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine), waging war in the Ukrainian territory, producing massive disinformation campaigns against the West, threatening the Baltic republics, and interfering in various elections and referendums. The West’s response to this aggressive behaviour has been significantly limited, particularly when it comes to non- military deterrence by Continental Europe. The US and the UK are leading the punishment of Russian aggression, while many countries, mainly in Western and Southern Europe, are hesitant to respond to this threat. This article makes recommendations as to what should be done in practical terms to boost the European part of the Western response to Russian aggression. The following text is divided into three parts. First, Russia’s hostile activities in Europe are described and categorised. Second, the major trends in the Western response to these hostile activities are highlighted. In the third part of this article, specific recommendations are proposed which would boost the response to Russia’s hostility.

Russia’s hostile activities in Europe Let us sum up what is meant when speaking about ‘Russian aggression’. The European Values think tank (Richter 2018) suggests that Russia’s hostile actions in Europe can be grouped into five broad categories.

1. Military aggression and revanchism. Russia invades, occupies and destabilises countries near its borders that seek to align themselves with the West and creates frozen conflicts to maintain control over these countries; as a result, conventional war in Europe is no longer merely theoretical. 2. Support for political extremism (far-left and far-right). In pursuit of its goal to destabilise liberal democracy, Russia fuels and abets extremist sentiments and political movements in Europe on both the far left and the far right by providing funding, supporting disinformation campaigns and legitimising extremist voices through its own media. 3. Offensive cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. Russian cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns against Western states are growing increasingly audacious and belligerent, designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions and civic cohesion, as well as destabilise state infrastructure, democratic processes (that is, elections and referenda) and other key public services. 4. Using energy as a ‘wedge strategy’ against energy-dependent states. Russia uses its energy resources to increase its strategic influence in the EU and the shared neighbourhood, exploiting the energy dependence of states in these spaces via political and economic blackmail to further its geostrategic interests and coerce compliance. It also seeks to establish new means of energy dominance in Europe Janda 183

(such as the planned Nord Stream 2 pipeline) to ‘divide and conquer’ and undermine EU solidarity. 5. Exportation of weaponised corruption. Russia uses financial dealings with political strings attached to exert political and business pressure on other states, including providing funding for pro-Kremlin political parties or individuals in Europe that comes from clandestine sources. Russian pro-Kremlin oligarchs also use Western financial havens to protect their assets, investing abroad to avoid taxes in Russia.

Despite the ongoing Russian aggression, the Western response is lacking in comprehen- siveness and intensity. The EU and the US imposed economic sanctions on parts of the Russian economy and selected individuals after 2014, but the only states which have effectively stepped up their sanctions against escalating Russian aggression have been the US, after the Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections, and, to a lesser degree, the UK, following the Skripal poisoning incident in the spring of 2018. The European Values think tank has also assessed the responses of the EU member states to Russian subversion efforts on a year-to-year basis (Kremlin Watch 2018). On the one hand, positive political and policy developments (meaning increasing resistance to this threat) from 2017 to 2018 can be spotted in Sweden, the UK, Denmark, France, Slovakia and Croatia. On the other hand, negative political and policy developments from 2017 to 2018 (meaning decreasing resistance to this threat) can be spotted in the Czech Republic, Austria, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Germany and Italy.

Major trends in the Western response to Russian aggression After studying the Western reaction to the above-mentioned aggressive activities of the Russian Federation, there are five major trends which can be observed, as outlined below.

First, Europe lacks non-military forms of deterrence and is a constant target. The point of deterrence is to stop the adversary from attacking again by raising the expected costs of such an activity (Freedman 2009). In military terms, the West has so far deterred Russia from attacking a NATO member state, although the Russian military has been actively provoking the Baltic republics. However in non-military terms, it is clear that the West and, more specifically, EU member states are failing to come up with meaningful forms of deterrence. This is clear from the fact that Russian aggression is escalating and does not show any signs of stopping. Just a few examples include Russian interference in the 2016 Dutch EU–Ukraine Association Agreement referendum, the 2016 Brexit referendum, the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum, the 2017 French presidential elections, the 2017 Catalonia crisis and the 2017 German parliamentary elections (Noack 2018). The West has not punished Russia for any of these hostile acts. There have been no meaningful sanctions imposed on Russia, only diplomatic talk and negative media coverage. If we ask the question, ‘Does the Kremlin see European counteractions as 184 European View 17(2) strong and does the Russian government fear the European reaction when it interferes in European domestic affairs?’, the answer is clearly no. Russia has no incentive to stop its hostile influence activities in Europe because it does not fear strong retaliation.

Second, only the US (and to some extent the UK) is willing to escalate defensive sanctions and deterrence measures. If we take a big-picture look at the West, there is a major difference between the actions of Continental Europe and those of the US, accompanied by the UK. While Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election caused the strategic awakening of a large portion of the American political establishment to the Russian threat (with the exception of the president), Europeans seem to be much more submissive and unwilling to take even defensive action to stop the aggressor. In practical terms, Washington has put in place extensive and escalating sanctions against Russian behaviour and has invested large sums in countering Russian influence and disinformation in Europe too (Harris 2018). In contrast most of the Western European political establishment has been rhetorically defensive on this issue, but has failed to implement practical policy measures. The UK has experienced two stages of awakening: one following the Russian chemical attack on UK soil in spring 2018 (the Skripal poisoning case) (BBC News 2018) and the second as a ramification of ongoing investigations into Russian influence in the 2016 Brexit vote (UK Parliament, Digital Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2018). It is no surprise that special parliamentary enquiries into Russian interference in their respective domestic elections are only ongoing in Washington (VOA 2017) and London (UK Parliament, Digital Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2018), and not on the Continent. Russia can keep buying political influence in Western Europe because there is no resistance to it. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron has been vocal on the issue of Russian disinformation and his administration’s plans to propose legislation on disinformation (France 24 2018), but there has been no visible effort to counter the Russian influence in French politics. Very recently, political parties with direct institutional links to Russian entities have even entered governments within the EU—in Italy and Austria.

Third, the Western map of approaches to the Russian threat has been drawn up, with no major changes expected in the coming years. The coalition of EU member states con- fronting the Russian threat is stable, yet weak. It consists of 10–12 member states (Kremlin Watch 2018), comprising most of the states from Central and Eastern Europe, plus the UK. Since 2014 there have been no major shifts in the alliance. While some Western European EU member states have experienced awakenings and public debate about the issue following major Russian interference incidents (e.g. Spain, the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands), there has been no strategic shift that has changed the balance of power in terms of countering this threat from within the EU. It is therefore likely that no major shifts can be expected in the coming years, given the fact that escalating Russian aggression has not been a game-changer. Two negative developments are already on the horizon. First, Brexit will mean that not only will the UK voice and vote be missed in the various EU formats, but the experience and expertise of British civil servants will also disappear from the EU institutions. The effect of this might not be felt instantly, but the strategic impact of such a withdrawal will have to be assessed over Janda 185 time. Second, the new Italian government, which entered office in the summer of 2018, will make it even harder for the EU to keep the existing sanctions in place, as they have to be renewed by unanimous decision. It can be expected that Rome will keep threatening to unilaterally block the future extension of EU sanctions in order to add leverage to its negotiations with other member states regarding budgets and migration.

Fourth, Germany has not taken a leading role in stopping Russian aggression. While Germany is considered to have the most influence on essentially any EU decision, it is clear that its political establishment is unwilling to take a leading role in countering this threat. Chancellor Angela Merkel has been the driving force behind EU sanctions against Russia and is probably the main reason why they still hold, but the sanctions are essentially basic and there is no political will among the EU member states to boost them. The German political establishment is also determined to push the Nord Stream 2 project through, despite the objections of its allies and the arguments of security experts (European Values 2018). This selfishness and unwillingness to take the lead in punishing Russia for its numerous atrocities and other hostile actions effectively means that there can be no expectation that Berlin could be the leading principled power. Russia can have no major fear that Germany might step up the Western response to its aggressive activities.

Fifth, EU member states are not willing to defend themselves from Russian subversion, and offensive measures are (very much) out of the question. Most European efforts do not focus on stopping the aggressor, but on making attacks on the target more difficult. A review of policy countermeasures by EU member states (Kremlin Watch 2018) shows that the political will to implement structural policies to counter this threat is limited. The main reason for this is a lack of understanding of the urgency of the threat, combined with the high degree of political sensitivity to the matter which is clearly present in many Western and Southern European member states. Because of this political environment, it is unlikely that Europe will soon engage in punishing Russian behaviour and therefore in effectively trying to deter the aggressor. We are still in the phase of discussion about whether and what the states should do domestically to decrease their vulnerabilities. It is a much more politically demanding and sensitive matter to implement significant policies to deter and stop Russia. Therefore it is unlikely that European countries will engage in offensive measures, because so far they have failed to take their own defence seriously.

Conclusion There have been lively expert and political debates in the West on how democratic nations should respond to this threat. The best summary of the relevant policy papers and strategies can be found on the website of the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) East STRATCOM Task Force, a European Council mandated EU body created with the aim of countering pro-Kremlin disinformation (EUvsDisinfo 2017). As well as dozens of expert and sometimes technical policy steps, the website also includes one initiative that sets seven strategic priorities. This initiative has been co-signed by 65 security experts 186 European View 17(2) from 21 Western countries. The Prague Declaration, ‘How the Democratic West Should Stop Putin’ (European Values 2017), is the only document which has been signed by such a large number of Western security experts, and its seven steps serve as a solid framework for building up the Western response through practical and realistic measures. These steps are as follows.

First, political leaders must acknowledge the threat. President Putin’s Russia poses a major threat to Western democracies. The Kremlin’s use of subversive tools and tactics to exercise hostile influence over the internal affairs of democratic countries is unacceptable and must be countered with resolute defensive actions to deter further aggression. So far, any such substantial countermeasures have been non-existent. If Moscow remains unde- terred, additional sanctions targeting members of the Russian elite’s inner circle should be imposed to increase pressure on the leadership. Currently, the lack of punitive measures is an invitation for the Kremlin to continue or potentially ramp up its offensive.

Second, hostile activities in the national contexts should be investigated and exposed. Beyond the ongoing stream of anti-Western disinformation narratives stemming from Russia, the Kremlin also employs temporary, intense campaigns to influence national elections and referenda in Western countries. In this context, national parliaments should form investigative panels to collect and publicise evidence of Moscow’s disinformation and influence operations. Transparency is the best tool that democracies have at their disposal: thus, full disclosure of Russia’s subversive efforts is the most effective—and also legitimate—way to inform the public about this threat.

Third, research should be carried out to establish where Russian actions are most successful. EU member states should jointly conduct targeted research (through detailed polling, for example) to obtain data about which demographic groups typically believe the Kremlin’s disinformation narratives. Only such comparative and in-depth exercises can expose the reach of Moscow’s efforts to sway public opinion.

Fourth, the EU’s only expert body in this area should be empowered. The EEAS East STRATCOM Task Force, established by EU leaders two years ago to counter Russian disinformation campaigns, remains gravely understaffed, with only three experts focusing on the crucial task of Europe’s defence against Russian hostile influence. These three experts alone—who are paid by their home states rather than by the EEAS—cannot fulfil the tasks set forth by the European Council. Accordingly, the EEAS should triple the capacity of the Task Force so that it has the resources to fulfil its mandate. Indeed, given the current staff size and budget of the EEAS, it would be reasonable to request the addition of at least seven further experts who would be paid from the EEAS budget. The EEAS East STRATCOM Task Force has established itself as a highly specialised expert pillar in Europe and is widely respected within Western intelligence and security circles. This unit should therefore be transformed from a temporary assignment into a permanent EEAS structure and receive at least one million euros for targeted research. Allied structures exist to coordinate messaging vis-à-vis the Islamic State; a similar structure should now be put in place to counter pro-Kremlin disinformation. Janda 187

Fifth, the aggressor should be confronted politically. Despite the gravity of the threat, few Western political leaders have openly identified the Kremlin as the aggressor. For example, Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has spent the last two years endeavouring to avoid naming Russia as the primary source of hostile disinformation within the EU. Crucially, if Europe wants to defeat this threat, its leaders must confront the aggressor head on: the Russian leadership must hear European representatives declare that its subversive efforts will not be tolerated.

Sixth, a working group of like-minded EU and NATO member states should be set up. Although at least 12 EU member states consider the Russian hostile influence to be a serious threat, they have so far failed to work effectively as a coalition. However, this threat can only be defeated through collective action: as such, these countries must set up mechanisms such as cross-border working groups to develop and implement concrete countermeasures (e.g. in message coordination).

Seventh, understanding of the threat posed by Russia should be promoted outside the expert community. Thus far information-sharing between EU member states has been sparse. Central and Eastern European governments and civil society groups must actively deliver the lessons learned from their experiences of countering Moscow’s hostile influence operations to Western European countries, where the understanding of this threat is comparatively limited. Moreover, while an expert community on Russian influence and disinformation operations is emerging in Europe and the US, it is essential to deliver rudi- mentary knowledge to people beyond the specialist community about threat assessment, the modus operandi of the Kremlin and its proxies, and viable policy options. In-depth training programmes and briefings for non-specialists in government and the wider political establishment, as well as in the media and non-profit sector, are greatly needed.

References BBC News. (2018). Russian spy: What we know so far. 10 April. http://www.bbc.com/news /uk-43315636. Accessed 20 July 2018. European Values. (2017). Prague declaration on seven urgent steps proposed by Western security experts: ‘How the democratic West should stop Putin’. Prague. www.europeanvalues.net /declaration. Accessed 30 June 2018. European Values. (2018). Public appeal of security experts from EU member states: 6 reasons Nord Stream 2 will be Germany’s strategic mistake for decades to come. www.europeanvalues.net /nordstream/. Accessed 30 June 2018. EUvsDisinfo. (2017). Recommendations. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/reading-list/recommendations/. Accessed 30 June 2018. France 24. (2018). Macron wants new law to fight fake news. 3 January. http://www.france24 .com/en/20180103-watch-live-macron-addresses-french-press-corps-media. Accessed 20 July 2018. Freedman, L. (2009). Deterrence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Harris, G. (2018). State dept. was granted $120 million to fight Russian meddling. It has spent $0. New York Times, 4 March. http://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/europe/state -department-russia-global-engagement-center.html. Accessed 20 July 2018. 188 European View 17(2)

Kremlin Watch. (2018). 2018 ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations. European Values. Prague. http://www.kremlinwatch.eu/userfiles/2018-ranking -of-countermeasures-by-the-eu28-to-the-kremlin-s-subversion-operations.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2018. Noack, R. (2018). Everything we know so far about Russian election meddling in Europe. Washington Post, 10 January. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews /wp/2018/01/10/everything-we-know-so-far-about-russian-election-meddling-in-europe/. Accessed 20 July 2018. Richter, M. (2018). Punishing and deterring Russia’s hostile activities: European Values think tank guide to response measures. Prague. (Policy paper to be published in late 2018.) UK Parliament, Digital Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2018). Fake news. http://www .parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-media -and-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/fake-news-17–19/. Accessed 20 July 2018. VOA. (2017). Four congressional committees looking into Trump–Russia Links. 17 March. http://www.voanews.com/a/congress-committees-investigating-trump-russia-ties/3771636 .html. Accessed 20 July 2018.

Author biography Jakub Janda is head of the Kremlin Watch programme and director of the European Values think tank based in Prague. He specialises in the response of democratic states to hostile disinformation and influence operations. EUV0010.1177/1781685818805680European ViewLavrelashvili research-article8056802018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 189–196 Resilience-building in Georgia, © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805680DOI: 10.1177/1781685818805680 Moldova and Ukraine: journals.sagepub.com/home/euv Towards a tailored regional approach from the EU

Teona Lavrelashvili

Abstract The article considers the dimensions and specificity of the concept of ‘resilience’ as applied to the concrete cases of three Eastern neighbourhood states: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It argues that EU policymakers should acknowledge the similarities and differences between the three when considering policies to strengthen these countries’ resilience. At the same time, however, they need to recognise that the biggest common threat to their security emanates from neighbouring Russia. The article further suggests that fostering regional cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as working with political institutions such as the political parties in these countries, will contribute to strengthening their resilience.

Keywords Resilience, Security, Eastern neighbourhood, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

Introduction ‘Resilience’ has become a popular political buzzword, signifying one of the five priorities of the EU Global Strategy (European External Action Service 2016, 9). Originally a term more often used in the disaster-preparedness domain (Biermann et al. 2015, 60), the concept is nowadays increasingly applied to describe institutions and states. It refers to their toughness and their capacity to adjust to challenges and to recover from difficulties. I argue that while the concept of resilience remains ambiguous, it is still possible to operationalise and use it by acknowledging its key dimensions and the

Corresponding author: T. Lavrelashvili, European Commission DG NEAR, Rue de la Loi, Building L15, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 190 European View 17(2) factors affecting it. This article argues that the EU should carefully assess the different dimensions of and trends in resilience among its Eastern partners before promoting intra-regional and cross-regional cooperation policies as an effective way to increase resilience through the employment of synergies and economies of scale. It also argues that any effective policy to support state resilience should be a combination of general, pan-regional approaches and country-specific ones that consider each country’s unique constellation of factors and establish clear-cut benchmarks based on their stage of Europeanisation and integration. The article first provides a definition of the concept of resilience that draws on the existing literature and outlines the challenges to resilience in the selected countries. This is followed by a brief discussion of the EU’s involvement in the region. Finally, it proposes several forms of assistance that could promote resilience in the selected countries.

Resilience In the EU’s Global Strategy resilience is defined as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’ (European External Action Service 2016, 23). The OECD defines resilience as a ‘feature of states and more precisely social contracts’ that helps to adjust policy interventions on the ability to cope with changes in three dimensions: capacity effectiveness and legitimacy (OECD 2008, p 17). While there is no universal agreement on the concept, resilience has been embraced to describe a multitude of contexts, and its inherent ambiguity has helped it to gain acceptability (Wagner and Anholt 2016, 4–5). Thus using this concept enables new practices and forms of cooperation: according to Duffield (2012, 475–92), in the political lingua franca, resilience refers to preparedness, adaptation and survivability, and is radically multidisciplinary. In addition, resilience is highly context and issue specific and prompts the questions of ‘resilience to what?’ and the ‘resilience of whom?’ (Prior and Hagmann 2015, 281–98). Some analysts have expressed doubt as to whether resilience as conceptualised in the EU’s Global Strategy can serve as a guiding principle—that is, whether it is operationalisable in the political context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a way to add value to the existing approach that pro- motes stability, prosperity and democracy (Manoli 2017, 124–40). Nevertheless, the concept of resilience has firmly found its way into the EU’s foreign-policy discourse. The revised ENP was one of the first documents to introduce resilience-building as a foreign-policy goal (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015, 4).

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine This article focuses on the EU’s efforts to strengthen resilience in the three Eastern neighbourhood countries which have signed Association Agreements with the EU and aspire to join it eventually—Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The resilience of these states is important due to their geography, and their history of ethno-territorial conflicts (Rezvani 2013) and/or Russian interference in their affairs. In addition to the risk of instability at the EU periphery potentially causing an inflow of refugees, Lavrelashvili 191

Russian expansionism—including the ongoing militarisation of the Black Sea—can be countered here by stabilising the region while also promoting a positive model of post-Soviet development. These countries are also important due to their sheer size and economic potential, as in the case of Ukraine, where the quality of the human capital is also quite high (World Economic Forum 2014, 4–34); due to their transit function, as in case of Georgia, which has an important role in developing the Southern Gas Corridor (which will bring gas from the Caspian Basin to the EU); and due to their geographic location, as in the case of Moldova, which is situated between Ukraine and the EU member state of Romania.

Let us first outline the similarities and differences between the three countries. All of them are experiencing the potential or immediate threat of military action and have lost control of significant parts of their territory due to the direct involvement of Russia, which maintains military bases in formally or informally annexed territories1 while mili- tarily supporting secessionist entities2 (Pugsley and Wesslau 2016), as well as carrying out various forms of economic blackmail, sanctions and embargoes (Makkoff 2016). All are suffering from a lack of trust between their frustrated populations and marginally competent governments (European Parliament 2017, 8–75) and have experienced significant out-migration, which has caused a brain drain but also brings in important financial remittances (Barbone et al., 2013). Finally, all have signed Association Agreements with the EU, enjoying preferential treatment in trade (through Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Agreements) and a visa-free regime within the Schengen zone.

At the same time, there are many differences between these three countries. Ukraine is a very different case due to its size, economic potential and the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, where Russia is leading a hybrid war, having also formally annexed Ukrainian Crimea. Ukraine and Moldova also suffer from widespread corruption, which is causing mass frustration among their citizens (Nodia et al. 2017, 12–15). In Georgia and especially Moldova there is widespread poverty, which is also present, to a lesser extent, in Ukraine (IndexMundi 2018). Georgia lost a five-day war with Russia in August 2008 and two of its secessionist territories are recognised by Russia as independent states. Moldova and Ukraine have common borders with EU member states, unlike Georgia; while Moldova, in contrast to Ukraine and Georgia, has no common border with Russia—however, up to a third of its population hold Romanian passports (Pienkowski 2018, 2).

Thus, resilience-wise the key external challenge for all three countries is an assertive and aggressive Russia, including its relative military and economic might, its neglect of international norms and its powerful propaganda. However, the outside world can or wants to do little to guarantee these countries’ security or to help reinstate their territorial integrity. Therefore, the field of security is the area where resilience is the weakest, and where external assistance is the most limited.

Another challenge is the need for good governance, which is an absolute necessity in the uncertain geopolitical and geo-economic environments of these countries, where 192 European View 17(2) there are growing frustrations among the respective populations about the increasing income gap and stumbling economic development (Eurostat 2017). While everyday corruption is seen as less of a problem in Georgia than in Moldova and Ukraine (Open Media Hub 2017), this factor is offset by Georgia’s unfavourable geographic location, remoteness from the EU’s borders and lack of natural geopolitical allies, such as Romania in the case of Moldova or Poland in the case of Ukraine.

Finally, their distorted and ineffective economies pose a serious long-term threat. Ukraine, with its considerable industrial potential, needs huge, yet prudent investment (IndexMundi 2018b), along with stability and functional institutions. In the cases of Moldova (IndexMundi 2018a) and Georgia (Babich and Mzhavanadze 2018), low-productivity agriculture plays too great a role in their economies, while their industrial potential remains tragically underdeveloped as the inferior quality of education hinders the prospects of building a modern knowledge-based economy. Inefficient governance and a lack of strategic vision preclude all three countries from fully utilising their free- trade agreements with the EU and other partners.

Resilience puzzle The question now is to what extent have the EU’s efforts to promote resilience in the three ENP states been effective in translating desired goals into practice (de Waal 2018). The EU is committed to using its ‘enduring power of attraction’ to ‘support different paths to resilience . . . focusing on the most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where it can make a meaningful difference’ (European External Action Service 2016, 25). However these efforts are not enough and, despite some tangible results achieved by all three countries in terms of the EU’s reform agenda, there remain risks that the progress achieved by these countries could be reversed and result in democratic backsliding. As these risks lie mostly in the areas of security and democracy consolidation, they require more political will, commitment, creativity and incentives on the part of the EU than simply providing traditional economic or technical assistance, which is where it excels.

To tackle this challenge without committing to too much, the EU should try to gradually shift its position away from the enlargement rhetoric and instead place emphasis on local ownership, focusing more on persuasion and less on bargaining—that is, more on adherence than on norm compliance (Marciacq and Flessenkemper 2017). However, the EU is being too vague in defining its future relationship with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries—this was the principal message from the Eastern Partnership Reflection Forum, a meeting of think tanks held in Minsk in December 2017 (Marciacq and Flessenkemper 2017, 2).

But would, for example, acknowledging the possibility of membership prospects for the EaP states increase their resilience? The answer is not clear; such a move could both strengthen the motivation for reform and also trigger more aggressive action on the part of Russia. The experience of the Western Balkans shows that even an explicitly offered Lavrelashvili 193 prospect of EU membership can yield somewhat mixed results (Kmezić and Bieber 2017, 2–10). At the same time, automatically assuming that the same would happen to the three EaP countries is not fully justified, since these states have followed a funda- mentally different development path and are experiencing different geopolitical pressures.

Currently the capacity of the EU to influence the security-related resilience of these three countries is rather limited, both due to disagreements within the EU regarding its EaP policy and due to its lack of hard power amid concerns over the security of its own member states, such as the Baltic countries. While special attention should be paid to demotivating Russia from making any security-related threats against these three former Soviet republics, there is not much that the EU can do without the ability to provide any form of direct military assistance. The disagreements with the US and the ambiguous attitude of the latter’s leadership towards the EU, NATO and Russia, amid the developing trade wars, are also not helpful.

As has been noted above, resilience has three main aspects: preparedness, adaptation and recovery. While the EU has limited options for helping with preparedness, it is good at providing technical and financial assistance, that is, it tends to focus more on adaptation and recovery in a post-conflict context (World Bank 2018). However, it can assist the countries with developing their internal resilience to external shocks by helping to build and strengthen institutions, including defence and security (including cybersecu- rity) agencies, and also by helping to strengthen internal cohesion, improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance systems, build the national economies, assist with technological advancement, and support regional cooperation and mutual assistance.

While security is of the greatest immediate concern for at least two out of the three countries—Ukraine and Georgia—in the long term we believe that there are other areas in which improvements would also strengthen resilience. This means that, at present, discouraging Russia from causing problems, working with other international partners (the US and NATO in the first place) to achieve this goal and strengthening defence capabilities should be balanced with other longer-term assistance priorities. Helping to build effective governments is the key to all dimensions of development, including security. It is also clear that without dramatically improving the overall quality of life, including the quality of education and healthcare, as well as ensuring smart urbanisation and the modernisation of their economies, the three countries cannot become self-sufficient and resilient in the long run.

While assisting in building resilience is a complex, multifaceted task, let us consider just two possible directions that such assistance could take. The first is the rich experience of subregional groups within the EU, such as the three Baltic or four Visegrád states, which used synergy and cooperation to great effect on their respective paths to EU accession (e.g. Schmidt 2016, 120). It is also obvious that grouping together the six countries of the EaP should be supplemented by creating more focused approaches for the three countries that have signed Association Agreements with the EU. Much can be 194 European View 17(2) done to help these three countries create and institutionalise effective instruments for coordination, cooperation and synergy building, such as engaging subregional groups within the EU (e.g. the Nordic or Benelux countries in addition to the Visegrád Group and the Baltic states) and helping to create regional forums, parliamentary associations and so on.

Engaging Euro-parties is another interesting and promising area of work. While some of the bigger Euro-parties and their affiliated institutions do assist their fully fledged or associate member parties from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the areas of reforming and streamlining internal structures, developing political agendas and communication strategies, assisting with integration into multilateral political institutions, and providing educational programmes for the leadership or the rank and file of sister parties, there could be a more specific focus on supporting regional integration. The European People’s Party has started to acknowledge the need for regional integration, and in its resolution on the EaP explicitly encourages the relevant countries to take advantage of the synergies created by such cooperation (European People’s Party 2017). There should also be more focus on how to build resilient institutions within these respective countries—as the parties in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine play key political roles, either as the ruling entities or as the opposition.

Conclusion Various dimensions of resilience must be considered when planning action to support these states that exist in this complex geopolitical environment: threatened by an external aggressive power, that is, Russia, and also burdened by the legacy of a totalitarian past and centralised economy, widespread poverty, weak institutions and unconsolidated democracy. Promoting resilience in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine requires more proac- tive and effective policies, but also more political commitment and smart resource allocation. The EU should design policies tailored to the specific needs of each of the three countries, with security being the common main concern. Supporting cooperation between the three countries should become a priority, as regional cooperation has already demonstrated its usefulness in the European integration process. However, it is also important to engage more non-state actors in this process. This should include involving Euro-parties that possess significant potential for promoting democratic development in friendly societies.

Notes 1. Crimea, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 2. To the above list Eastern Ukraine should be added.

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Barbone, L., Bonch-Osmolovskiy, M., & Luecke, M. (2013). Labour migration from the Eastern Partnership countries: Evolution and policy options for better outcomes. European Commission ‘Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership’ project, CountriesEuropeAid/130215/C/SER/Multi, April. http://citeseerx.ist .psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.310.8576&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed 16 July 2018. Biermann, M., Hillmer-Pegram, K., Knapp, C. N., & Hum, R. E. (2016). Approaching a critical turn? A content analysis of the politics of resilience in key bodies of resilience literature. Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, 4(2), 59–78. de Waal, T., & Youngs, R. (2015). Reform as resilience: An agenda for the Eastern Partnership. Carnegie Europe, 14 May. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/05/14/reform-as-resilience -agenda-for-eastern-partnership-pub-60086. Accessed 10 June 2018. Duffield, M. (2012). Challenging environments: Danger, resilience and the aid industry. Security Dialogue, 43(5), 475–92. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Communication, JOIN (2015) 50 final, 18 November. European External Action Service. (2016). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. June. https://europa .eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2018. European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies. (2017). The state of implementation of the associations and free trade agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova. http://www. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/133501/The%20state%20of%20the%20implementation%20 of%20the%20associations%20and%20free%20trade%20agreements%20with%20 Ukraine,%20Georgia%20and%20Moldova.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2018. European People’s Party. (2017). Sixth EPP Eastern Partnership leaders meeting: EPP declaration for the EU’s EaP Brussels summit. Brussels, 23 November. http://www.epp.eu/papers /epp-declaration-for-the-eus-eap-brussels-summit/. Accessed 28 June 2018. Eurostat. (2017). European Neighbourhood Policy—East: Living conditions statistics. December. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/European_Neighbourhood_ Policy_-_East_-_living_conditions_statistics. Accessed 25 June 2018. IndexMundi. (2018a). Moldova economy profile 2018. https://www.indexmundi.com/moldova /economy_profile.html. Accessed 9 July 2018. IndexMundi. (2018b). Ukraine economy profile 2018. https://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine /economy_profile.html. Accessed 10 July 2018. Joseph, J. (2014). The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building resilience as a distant form of governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(2), 285–301. Juncos, A. E. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: A pragmatist turn? European Security, 26(1), 1–18. Kmezić, M., & Bieber, F. (2017). The crisis of democracy in the Western Balkans. An anatomy of stabilitocracy and the limits of EU democracy promotion. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, Policy Paper. Belgrade, March. http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03 /BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU -Stabilitocracy-web.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2018. Makkoff, J. (2016). Russia’s challenge to the European security order. German Marshall Fund of the United States, Policy Brief no. 39. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/russias-challenge -european-security-order. Accessed 10 July 2018. 196 European View 17(2)

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Author biography Teona Lavrelashvili is a policy officer at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations and a Ph.D. researcher at KU Leuven. Her research focuses on party politics, Euro- parties and European neighbourhood policies. EUV0010.1177/1781685818810359European ViewNováky research-article8103592018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 197–209 The road to Sophia: © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818810359DOI: 10.1177/1781685818810359 Explaining the EU’s naval journals.sagepub.com/home/euv operation in the Mediterranean

Niklas Nováky

Abstract This article analyses the process through which Operation Sophia came into being. The EU’s on-going anti-smuggling naval operation in the Mediterranean, Sophia was launched during the height of the 2015 migration crisis. The article argues that Sophia is essentially an Italian strategy to deal with the security and humanitarian aspects of the Mediterranean migration problem. It was in 2013 that Italy first proposed an EU naval operation to tackle human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean. However, the idea collapsed because other EU member states saw illegal migration in the Mediterranean as mainly a national problem facing Italy. In the spring of 2015 the European Commission revisited the proposal as part of its 10-point plan to deal with the migration problem. This time it succeeded because Italy’s partners could no longer oppose it without appearing callous towards the plight of the migrants.

Keywords CSDP, Sophia, EUNAVFOR, Mediterranean, Migration, Human trafficking

Introduction In April 2015 the Mediterranean became the centre of the world’s attention when over 800 migrants drowned after the overcrowded fishing boat they were using to travel from Libya to Europe capsized. Although thousands of migrants had perished there in the preceding decades, the unprecedented scale of the incident forced the EU into action to minimise further loss of life close to its shores. As an immediate step, it launched an operation in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Initially

Corresponding author: N. Novaky, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 20 Rue du Commerce, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

This article analyses the process through which Operation Sophia came into being. It argues that the operation can be seen as an Italian strategy to deal with the security and humanitarian aspects of the migration crisis. Italy had already begun to push for an EU naval operation in 2013 because it wanted the Union to share the burden of dealing with the migration problem and sought a hedge against the threats this problem posed. Despite Rome’s efforts to convince its partners, its initial proposal failed because the operation’s expected benefits seemed to be disproportionally in Italy’s favour. However, the migration problem became much more acute in spring 2015 as the death toll in the Mediterranean rose to new heights. It is likely that many of the deaths could have been prevented if the EU had agreed to Italy’s plan in 2013 or had replaced Rome’s Mare Nostrum operation with an equally strong operation in 2014. Since it did neither, the Union could no longer oppose the operation without appearing callous towards the migrants’ plight when the idea was raised for a second time.

This article uses the qualitative method of ‘process tracing’ and is based on 16 semi- structured interviews with 20 officials who were involved in the development of Operation Sophia (George and Bennett 2005, 206). The interviews were conducted in Brussels in 2015–16. They were held under the Chatham House Rule, which means that neither the identity nor the affiliation of the interviewees can be revealed. The interviewees include three Political and Security Committee ambassadors, 10 Politico- Military Group delegates, four EU Military Committee officials, one official from the Permanent Representatives Committee II, one Commission official and one official from the European External Action Service. Where possible the article uses newspaper articles and official documents to verify the interview data (George and Bennett 2005, 206). The article is divided into two sections. The first discusses the CSDP’s ability to deal with illegal migration in the run-up to the 2015 crisis, while the second provides a detailed analysis of the 2013 and 2015 attempts to organise an EU anti-smuggling naval operation.

CSDP and illegal migration Over the past years, the EU has developed a readiness to address the causes of illegal migration, particularly in the maritime domain, through its CSDP. The literature published before the 2015 migration crisis and the launch of Operation Sophia tended to overlook the possibility that migration concerns could drive the creation of EU military operations. Howorth, for example, does not address this at all in his textbook on the Union’s security and defence policy (Howorth 2014). However, there are exceptions. Olsen (2009, 246), for example, writes that EU decision-makers see the Union’s crisis management activities in Africa as a useful way to take care of certain specific European Nováky 199 interests, such as preventing migration. Similarly, Ginsberg and Penksa (2012, 67) con- tend that Africa has become ‘the primary location for CSDP engagement’ because it is a source of migration and other negative externalities that affect the Union. Pohl (2014, 169–70) argues that the shared security goals that the member states have pursued through the CSDP have been linked to these countries’ domestic concerns, such as migration. However, these scholars provide only anecdotal evidence for a link between CSDP action and migration.

To understand how the CSDP became an additional instrument for the EU to use to tackle the causes of illegal migration, one must look at certain strategic documents published before the launch of Operation Sophia in 2015. The 2003 document A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (ESS) identified five key threats to the EU’s security, the last of which was organised crime. It explained that organised crime often has an impact that goes well beyond the regions directly involved because cross-border trafficking in, among others, women and illegal migrants, ‘accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs’ (Council of the EU 2003, 4). The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy elevated the status of organised crime—including trafficking in human beings—by placing it in the same category as terrorism and listing it as the second key threat to the EU’s security. With regard to illegal migration, the report saw it mainly as a negative spillover effect of state failure (Council of the EU 2008, 1). However, neither document specified how the EU would actually deal with threats linked to illegal migration.

The far-reaching consequences of illegal migration are also highlighted in the EU’s internal security documents. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy identified organised crime as the second key threat to the Union’s internal security and described human trafficking as one of the main crime-related threats facing the EU (Council of the EU 2010, 7). Furthermore, the 2005 Communication A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice emphasised that the growing sophistication of organised crime, including human trafficking, ‘can only be countered through improved law enforcement and judicial cooperation, both within the EU and externally, and through support for capacity-building in third countries’ (European Commission 2005, 4). The mention of the possibility of addressing organised crime through capacity building in third countries suggested an increased willingness on the EU’s part to address the causes of illegal migration beyond its borders. Although not mentioned explicitly, it is clear that such capacity-building efforts also included civilian CSDP missions. The EU’s Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, for example, was established in 2013 to support Libyan authorities in strengthening their border services and to advise them on the development of a new border management strategy (Council of the EU 2013b, 15).

Since illegal migration to the EU has an important maritime dimension, the Union has also developed the naval readiness to address it. The 2014 Maritime Security Strategy listed cross-border and organised crime as a key threat to the EU’s maritime security (Council of the EU 2014, 7). It explained that the Union responds to maritime threats through a variety of instruments, including the CSDP (Council of the EU 2014, 9). The 200 European View 17(2) specific ways in which the CSDP can deal with maritime threats are outlined in the 2012 Maritime Security Operations Concept, which essentially sketches out what can be described as the EU’s Maritime Petersberg Tasks (Council of the EU 2012). It explains that the member states’ maritime forces engaged in CSDP operations should be able to carry out five core and three additional tasks, several of which are suitable for dealing with illegal migration and the problems that give rise to it (Council of the EU 2012, 12). For example, the EU could use naval forces to keep the migration routes under surveillance. This would deter smugglers and traffickers, and any vessels used for trafficking that EU forces encountered could be impounded.

The development of an EU anti-smuggling naval operation First attempt Due to increased chaos in Libya, the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean surged in late 2013. This resulted in several major incidents because the migrants made the crossing in rickety, crowded vessels that could capsize, sink or catch fire. The worst accident of 2013 took place on 3 October, when a boat sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa, resulting in the deaths of 366 migrants. A day later, 36 migrants lost their lives off Malta. To prevent further loss of life, Italy launched Operation Mare Nostrum. It was a naval search and rescue operation that was meant to scare off people smugglers and, as then Defence Minister Mario Mauro explained, ‘help those in trouble at sea’ (Thuburn 2013). However, the operation also served Italy’s security interests by hedging against the threats posed by the increased instability in Libya. Due to its geographical proximity to the country, Italy was concerned about the threat of Islamic radicalism (ANSAmed 2013a). Then Foreign Minister Emma Bonino explained that the country suspected ‘that jihadists or Al-Qa’idah members may be lurking among the poor wretches bound for Europe’ (BBC Monitoring Europe 2013b). As a result, Italy reinforced its coastal services, placed its security services on high alert and made preparations to reinforce controls on navigation and migration in the Mediterranean. Mare Nostrum contributed to this effort by deterring human smugglers and reducing migration flows, in this way making Italy better protected against the negative consequences of Libyan instability.

However, Italy wanted its partners to share the burden of dealing with the migration problem. In late 2013 Italy’s Permanent Representation to the EU proposed to Rome that the Union should launch an anti-trafficking naval operation that would replace Mare Nostrum (interview, February 2016). Rome was so impressed with the proposal that in October Foreign Minister Bonino and Defence Minister Mauro sent a joint letter on the matter to then High Representative Catherine Ashton. They requested that ‘all possible options be explored for a joint security and defense operation conducted by the EU against human trafficking in the Mediterranean to discourage criminal organisations’ (ANSAmed 2013b). According to the ministers, it would concentrate on the struggle against human trafficking and could be ‘highly effective and operative’ due to the experience gained from EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EU’s anti-piracy naval operation off the Nováky 201 coast of Somalia (ANSAmed 2013b). They also emphasised that the operation should be ‘complementary’ to the Union’s existing activities in the Sahel and Libya, such as EUBAM Libya (BBC Monitoring Europe 2013a). Furthermore, the ministers argued that the operation would extend the CSDP’s ‘humanitarian dimension’ by ‘increasing civilian–military integration and cooperation with the instruments’. According to them, possible options for the operation could be discussed at the 18–19 November meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) (ANSAmed 2013b).

During the meeting, Italy tried to make the case for the operation by arguing that ‘human trafficking is hateful and dangerous’ for the people directly involved, but also ‘a security problem’ for the EU (BBC Monitoring Europe 2013b). At the time, however, its partners responded unenthusiastically. The FAC stated that the Union was ‘committed to enhance its cooperation with and assistance to the Libyan government to improve Libya’s capacity to manage the security of all its borders and to combat human smuggling and trafficking, illicit smuggling of goods and weapons, and in the fight against terrorism’ (Council of the EU 2013a, 9). Furthermore, it noted that the EU ‘will respond to these challenges with all appropriate instruments’. With the exception of Malta, however, the other member states did not consider the CSDP an appropriate instrument for dealing with migration (interview, February 2016). They dismissed Italy’s proposal as ‘fanciful’ and ‘unhelpful’ and argued that it blurred the distinction between external and internal (interviews, July 2015).

After the FAC, Foreign Minister Bonino explained that the issue of the proposed CSDP operation had been postponed until December, when the Commission-led Task Force Mediterranean would report on how the EU could deal with the migration situation more effectively (BBC Monitoring Europe 2013b).1 However, when it did report, it addressed Italy’s proposal only indirectly by noting that ‘[t]he on-going reflections about the use of appropriate CSDP instruments in order to support the fight against criminal organisations in third countries will also have to be taken into account’ (European Commission 2013, 14). The Task Force’s report was discussed at the 5–6 December meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, and the outcome of that discussion was presented to the European Council on 19–20 December. Although the European Council called for ‘actions to fight smuggling and human trafficking’ in the Mediterranean, Italy’s EU partners were simply not interested in its proposal (European Council 2013, 21). They believed it blurred the distinction between external and internal politics and suspected it was a smoke screen for Italy to fight the migrants rather than the traffickers (interviews with national officials, 2015–16). Most importantly, the situation in the Mediterranean was seen as a national issue for Italy to resolve, which is why its partners were unenthusiastic about having to deal with it with their own forces (interview with a national official, 22 February 2016). Thus, the idea of a CSDP operation was buried for the time being.

Second attempt After its 2013 attempt to establish an EU anti-smuggling naval operation had failed, Italy continued to pressure the Union to get more involved in dealing with the 202 European View 17(2) migration problem. The reason for this was that Mare Nostrum was both expensive and domestically unpopular. First, Italy could no longer afford to run the operation by itself. Although it was initially estimated that its monthly running costs would be €1.5 million, they ended up climbing to €9.5 million (The Economist 2014). Second, Mare Nostrum was domestically unpopular because it was seen as a ‘pull factor’ that incentivised migrants to cross the Mediterranean. Among others, the leader of the populist Northern League (Lega Nord) party Matteo Salvini called for the operation’s suspension because it was too expensive and contributed to the ‘invasion’ of Italian shores (ANSAmed 2014a). Due to these pressures, then Interior Minister Angelino Alfano explained that Mare Nostrum ‘can’t last forever’ and that ‘Europe must replace Italy’ in the effort (ANSAmed 2014b). However, none of the three biggest EU member states agreed. The UK wanted Mare Nostrum to end because it believed that the operation had acted as an unintended pull factor that encouraged migrants to cross the Mediterranean, thereby causing more deaths (Travis 2014). Similarly, Germany viewed the operation as having created a bridge to Europe for migrants and believed that the EU should focus more on controlling its borders than on search and rescue (Germany, Federal Ministry of the Interior 2014). France was also in favour of an operation that would focus more on surveillance and border control closer to Europe’s shores (Agence France-Presse 2014).

In August it was announced that Frontex Plus, an expanded operation based on the EU border agency’s Hermes and Aeneas operations, would replace Mare Nostrum. In reality, there was no question of replacing Mare Nostrum because Frontex Plus—later renamed ‘Triton’—had ‘much more limited funds at its disposal’ and lacked ‘the competence to specifically aim at search and rescue’ (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015, 467). Whereas Mare Nostrum had had a monthly budget of €9.5 million and a mandate that allowed it to conduct search and rescue operations throughout the Mediterranean, Triton’s monthly budget was only €2.9 million and its patrols were restricted to EU member states’ territorial waters. As a result, the UN and several non-governmental organisations warned that replacing Mare Nostrum with Triton would increase the death toll in the Mediterranean (Davies 2014; Amnesty International 2014, 8). Human Rights Watch, for example, claimed that ‘Frontex Plus turns out to be more of a Frontex Minus’ (Ward 2014). Despite these warnings, Italy continued to portray Triton as Mare Nostrum’s replacement because it wanted to bring the expensive and unpopular operation to an end. Interior Minister Alfano explained that it should be terminated after Triton’s launch because the operation ‘had a timeframe and Italy could not and should not take charge of the Mediterranean border on its own’ (ANSAmed 2014c). On another occasion, he explained that Italy would ‘not have two lines of defense’ for its borders in the form of Mare Nostrum and Triton (ANSAmed 2014d). Thus, Mare Nostrum ended on 31 October and Triton was launched on 1 November.

The EU’s attitude towards the migration problem changed dramatically in the spring of 2015. On 19 April a ship capsized off the Libyan coast and more than 800 people drowned. It was the worst maritime disaster in the Mediterranean since the Second World War. Two days later the Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs Councils held a joint session, the conclusions for which were essentially written by Italy (interview, July 2015). In Nováky 203 them, the Council ‘confirmed a strong commitment to act so as to prevent tragedies like the recent events in the Mediterranean’ and noted that work would be taken forward along three different strands: the fight against organised crime networks and human traffickers, more effective efforts to save lives at sea, and a fairer sharing of responsibilities regarding resettlement and relocation projects (Council of the EU 2015a, 3). With regard to the first strand, the Council discussed several options ‘including stepping up work on the routes of travel used by migrants and enhanced police cooperation on counter-measures against smugglers’ (Council of the EU 2015a, 3).

At the meeting Dimitris Avramopoulos—the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship—presented a 10-point plan on the immediate actions to be taken in response to the migration crisis. The ministers gave the plan their ‘full backing’ (European Commission 2015). Avramopoulos and High Representative Mogherini, who had succeeded Ashton in November 2014, explained that they would convey the plan to the European Council, which was to hold an extraordinary meeting on the migration crisis three days later (European Commission 2015). One of the points included in the plan referred to a ‘systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers.’ It continues with ‘The positive results obtained with the Atalanta operation should inspire us to similar operations against smugglers in the Mediterranean’ (European Commission 2015). The 10-point plan had been drafted in a matter of hours during the weekend by a small group of people within the Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (interview, December 2015). The naval operation point was inspired by Italy’s 2013 proposal and the experience of EUNAVFOR Atalanta (interview, December 2015). However, Italy did not propose it and Mogherini was not involved in drafting the plan (interviews, 2015–16). Thus, for the first time in the CSDP’s history, the Commission had proposed launching an EU military operation.

Although the naval operation point was intended as something to be considered, High Representative Mogherini took it as something to be delivered and began to push hard for it (interviews, July 2015). That she was operating in an emotional political environment which was conducive for the operation aided her efforts. When the 10-point plan was presented, not all member states were enthusiastic about the proposed operation. However, due to the seriousness of the migration crisis and the fact that the death toll would likely have been lower if the EU had replaced Mare Nostrum with an equally strong operation, they became caught up in it—it would have been difficult for anyone to oppose it publicly (interviews, 2015–16). The then German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, for example, supported the idea of destroying the smugglers’ ships, while then French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius promised a determined fight against the smugglers (Agence France-Presse 2015). Even the British Home Secretary at that time, Theresa May, welcomed the operation as part of a ‘widescale approach’ to tackling the migration crisis (Waterfield 2015).

In a statement issued after the emergency meeting on 23 April, the European Council declared the situation in the Mediterranean to be a ‘tragedy’. It promised that the EU would ‘mobilise all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea’ and to 204 European View 17(2) tackle the root causes of the ‘human emergency’. Its immediate priority, however, was ‘to prevent more people from dying’, which is why it had decided to strengthen the EU’s presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility (European Council 2015). Several member states made concrete contributions to help in search and rescue efforts. Germany, for example, offered a frigate and 10 ships, while France committed itself to providing a plane for a fortnight in September and a patrol boat for November (Traynor 2015). The UK even offered the Royal Navy’s flagship, the HMS Bulwark, despite its earlier criticism of search and rescue efforts. The reason that the UK now offered this support was that, although Home Secretary May and then Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond had resisted increasing the UK’s involvement in search and rescue to save face due to their earlier opposition to Mare Nostrum, then Prime Minister David Cameron had become convinced that the British people saw the migration crisis as a humanitarian rather than an immigration issue (Travis 2015). With regard to the human traffickers, the European Council wanted to ‘disrupt trafficking networks, bring the perpetrators to justice and seize their assets’ and ‘undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers’ (European Council 2015). To this end, it invited High Representative Mogherini ‘to immediately begin preparations for a possible CSDP operation’ so that the matter could be discussed at the 18 May meeting of the FAC (European Council 2015; interview, July 2015).

The Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which describes how the CSDP can address particular problems, was developed quickly. It was based on the Political Framework for Crisis Approach, which had been revised on 10 April. This framework had identified a maritime surveillance operation as one of five options for possible CSDP action in Libya (interviews, July 2015). The CMC explained that the situation in the Mediterranean ‘has extremely serious implications for the EU and requires urgent action’ (Council of the EU 2015b, 3). It laid stress, in particular, on the ‘security and stability implications’ of this situation and emphasised ‘the need to prevent links between criminal networks and terrorist organisations’ (Council of the EU 2015b, 6). The CMC stated that the operation needed ‘an executive mandate and could be military and joint (e.g. naval and air) in nature’ (Council of the EU 2015b, 7). Thus, it developed a four-phase operation that would ‘disrupt the business model of the smugglers’ by ‘undertaking systematic efforts to identify, seize/capture and destroy vessels and assets’ before they could be used (Council of the EU 2015b, 1). Phase 1 would focus on intelligence gathering, Phase 2 on seizing the smugglers’ vessels and assets, Phase 3 on destroying their vessels within Libya’s territorial waters, and Phase 4 on withdrawing and concluding the operation (Council of the EU 2015b, 1). The reasons for organising the operation in phases were threefold: first, conducting it would be easier if it was divided into clearly defined phases; second, the EU needed to gather intelligence on the smugglers and their networks before it could start acting against them; and third, the Union did not yet have the necessary legal mandate that would allow it to conduct all Phase 2 and 3 activities from the very beginning (interviews, July 2015).

Early in the planning process, diplomats estimated that it might take ‘several months and even up to a year’ before the operation could be launched (Traynor 2015). However, Nováky 205 due to a ‘sense of political imperative’ to move quickly, the operation was fast tracked (interview, July 2015). The fast-track process had been introduced when CSDP planning procedures were revised in 2013. It simplifies the standard planning process by eliminat- ing certain steps to give the EU the option to deploy operations ‘at very short notice’ and launch them ‘within a few days of the approval of the CMC’ (Council of the EU 2013c, 28). Due to the public outcry over the deaths in the Mediterranean, EU member states were under pressure to act. As a result, they wanted to launch the operation as soon as possible to show to their domestic constituents that they were doing something about the situation (interviews, July 2015). Furthermore, both Italy and High Representative Mogherini were pushing strongly for a quick launch of the operation. Mogherini argued that the summer peak season for the flow of migrants was about to start, which meant that more of them were likely to die if the operation were not launched soon (interviews, July 2015). Moreover, they understood that the 19 April incident had created a limited window of opportunity for setting up the EU anti-smuggling naval operation that Rome had wanted since 2013 (interviews, July 2015). Thus, to obtain the commitment of the other member states, Italy and Mogherini used the emotional political climate to their advantage.

Various challenges arose during the planning process. At the start of the process, the Council Legal Service gave the opinion that the operation could be launched without a UN mandate. However, the EU member states believed that this mandate, or at least an invitation from Libya, would be necessary. Later in the discussions, military planners told them that Phase 1 could be launched without a UN mandate or Libyan consent because sufficient legal grounds already existed, such as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. There were also disagreements over the nature of the operation. The great powers contended that it should focus on dealing with the human smugglers and traffickers. However, a number of other member states, such as Sweden and Austria, held that the operation should also focus on search and rescue because they were sensitive to the humanitarian dimension of the migration crisis. In the end the Operational Plan had to be revised due to Sweden’s and Austria’s questions over the issue (interview, July 2015). In addition, it was initially unclear what would happen to the migrants the operation would rescue. Just four days before the 18 May meeting of the FAC, the member states were still discussing ports of disembarkation and the legal aspects of what to do with the migrants. As a result, it seemed unclear whether the operation could be established on schedule. However, High Representative Mogherini gave her assurances that it would be established on time, and it was decided that Frontex would take the migrants picked up by the operation and bring them to Italy or elsewhere (interviews, July 2015).

The CMC and the Council Decision establishing Operation Sophia were adopted, as planned, at the 18 May meeting of the FAC. Since Italy had offered to serve as the operation’s framework nation, Italian Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino was chosen as the Operation Commander, and the Joint Operations Headquarters in Rome were selected as the location of the Operation Headquarters. Since Sophia was to be conducted in phases, its force generation process was divided into three phases. This 206 European View 17(2) meant that force generation was initially conducted only for Phase 1. The first force generation conference was held on 5 June and focused on manning the Operation Headquarters and the Force Headquarters. The first force generation conference for assets was held on 11 June, the second on 18 June and the third on 19 June (interview, July 2015). Thus, force generation for Sophia’s first phase was completed in little over a week. It was made easier by Italy’s significant contribution, which included the air- craft carrier Cavour and two helicopters. Germany also made a significant contribution by providing the frigate Schleswig-Holstein and the supply ship Werra. Berlin had initially hesitated about making this contribution to Sophia because it had concerns over certain aspects of the Operational Plan and because it faced legal questions at home. However, in a last-minute announcement at the Political and Security Committee, it declared its willingness to contribute to the effort. This gave Operation Commander Credendino enough assets to conduct the first phase of the operation and allowed the FAC to launch it on 22 June.

Conclusion This article has analysed the process that led to the launch of Operation Sophia, the EU’s anti-smuggling naval operation in the Mediterranean. Italy initially attempted to set up such an operation following the Lampedusa shipwreck in October 2013. At the time, however, the proposal failed to gain steam because other member states saw illegal migration in the Mediterranean mainly as an Italian problem. Furthermore, the proposed operation would have benefited Italy disproportionally because, by making it more difficult for human smugglers and traffickers to operate in the Mediterranean, it would have provided direct benefits to the country in the form of fewer illegal sea arrivals and reduced costs of patrolling the sea. For most of its partners, however, it would have produced only an indirect benefit in the form of improved maritime safety for the migrants. Thus, since Italy would have been the main beneficiary of the operation, its partners were unwilling to support it out of solidarity.

The second attempt to set up the operation took place when the Commission revisited Italy’s 2013 proposal following the death of over 800 migrants in April 2015. This time it received instant support and led to the launch of Operation Sophia two months later. This attempt succeeded because the EU could no longer oppose the operation without appearing callous towards the plight of the migrants. It is likely that many of the deaths in the Mediterranean could have been prevented if the great powers had supported replacing Mare Nostrum with an equally strong operation in 2014. When it was announced that Mare Nostrum would end, the humanitarian community explicitly warned that the move was likely to cause increased casualties because Triton had fewer resources and a more limited mandate than its predecessor. Thus, when the Commission revisited the idea of deploying an anti-smuggling naval operation after the 19 April disaster, EU member states had no option but to accept it. If they had opposed it, Italy could have shamed them publicly for their lack of compassion and solidarity, which would have damaged their reputations among their domestic constituents. Nováky 207

Note 1. The October 2013 Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed to set up Task Force Mediterranean in response to the Lampedusa disaster. Its establishment was also welcomed later in the same month by the European Council.

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Author biography Niklas Nováky, Ph.D., is a Research Officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. He focuses on foreign, security and defence policy. He is also the Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the European View, the Martens Centre’s biannual policy journal. He is author of the book European Union Military Operations: A Collective Action Perspective (Routledge 2018). EUV0010.1177/1781685818805681European ViewWeilandt 805681research-article2018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 210–217 Socio-economic challenges to © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805681DOI: 10.1177/1781685818805681 Tunisia’s democratic transition journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

Ragnar Weilandt

Abstract Among those countries that faced the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia is the last one for which hope for a successful democratic transition remains justified. However, the country’s comparatively favourable institutional evolution has led to a dangerous complacency not only in Europe but across the West. While important reforms have been implemented, democracy has so far failed to fulfil the high expectations it has raised within the population. Tunisians’ discontent with their living conditions and the new system’s perceived inability to deliver are fundamental threats to the country’s transition. This article argues that the EU has a major interest in making Tunisia a democratic and socio-economic success story, as failure would not only constitute a lost opportunity to create a role model in the region but would also jeopardise European security interests. The EU should therefore provide more substantial support with the aim of realising socio-economic improvements in Tunisia.

Keywords Tunisia, EU, Mediterranean, Socio-economic challenges, Resilience, Democratisation

Introduction More than half a decade after the so-called Arab Spring, the series of popular uprisings that sent shockwaves across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, Tunisia remains the only country for which hope for a sustainable democratic transition remains justified. A range of factors have helped the northern African state avoid following the disastrous paths of Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Its security services were far-sighted enough to accept that long-time dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s time was over. In contrast to Egypt, where an almighty military controls not only the country’s politics but also its economy

Corresponding author: R. Weilandt, Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 39, B-1050 Brussels. Email: [email protected]

Notably, the Islamist Ennahda or Renaissance Party (Hizbu Ḥarakatu n-Nahḍah) worked peacefully and fairly productively with the same political forces that had vio- lently persecuted its members for decades. In July 2015, I spoke to Abdelkarim Harouni, who was one of their ministers from 2011 to 2014. Harouni was imprisoned for 16 years, several of which he spent in solitary confinement. He was tortured, and continued to be harassed after he was released in 2007 (Human Rights Watch 2010, 11). I asked him how he felt about working with those political forces that had been responsible for his ordeals. ‘Before the revolution, there was always a police car behind me. When I became a minister, there was always a police car in front of me,’ he joked. ‘What is the point of seeking revenge? It doesn’t help anyone. The best way to annoy them is by being part of the political process.’1 If one compares this attitude with how senior members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood spoke about their political opponents, one begins to understand why Tunisia’s path has been so different.

This is not to say that post-2011 Tunisia did not and does not face major obstacles. Shortly after the armed forces ousted President Mohamed Morsi and ended Egypt’s democratic experiment, the second political assassination within months and major public disenchantment with the Ennahda-led government brought Tunisia to the brink as well. However, the country’s strong civil society saved the day. The Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian General Labour Union) joined forces with the Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts); the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (Tunisian Human Rights League); and the Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie (Tunisian Order of Lawyers) to establish and moderate a ‘national dialogue’ that brought all of the different political factions together (Kéfi 2015). This quartet’s medi- ation led to the creation of a technocratic government, paved the way for the adoption of a remarkably progressive constitution and was rewarded with the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts.

However, although post-2011 Tunisia has the most democratic and liberal political system in the region (Economist Intelligence Unit 2017; Freedom House 2018), the political transition remains a highly fragile process. Notably, crucial parts of the new constitution, such as the creation of a constitutional court, have not yet been implemented. Although police violence was a major factor behind the Tunisian uprising, abu- sive behaviour from the security services, ranging from harassment to torture, is making a comeback. The rise of insufficiently regulated police unions that are able to pressure judges and politicians is preventing officials’ misdemeanours and felonies from being sanctioned, and obstructing more serious security sector reform (Grewal 2018). Meanwhile, the political spectrum is fragmented: parties are not yet highly institutional- ised and are facing questions about their internal democratic processes. 212 European View 17(2)

Most crucially, however, major social and economic grievances remain. The end of the Ben Ali era and the transition to democracy have created high expectations among the population. But the new democratic system has so far failed to satisfy peoples’ hopes for improved living standards. In fact, it has presided over their deterioration.

This article argues that Tunisians’ discontent with their living conditions and the new system’s perceived inability to deliver are the most fundamental threats to the democratic transition. It contends that the EU should further increase its efforts to support socio- economic development in Tunisia. The failure of or even a further delay to the transition would not only represent a lost opportunity: in light of the North African nation’s proximity to the EU’s southern borders, the consequences of such a failure would also jeopardise European security interests.

The 2016 EU Global Strategy identified state and societal resilience in the EU’s neighbourhood as a key strategic objective of its external action. Tunisia’s democratisation offers a major opportunity for the EU to help achieve its ambition of changing its southern neighbourhood accordingly. Helping the country’s democratic and socio- economic transition to succeed would ensure Tunisia’s stability and transform it into a role model that citizens and elites across the region might seek to emulate in their states. In contrast, the failure of the Tunisian socio-economic transition could result in further increases in irregular migration and create a breeding ground for radicalisation and violent extremism less than 70 kilometres away from the EU’s external border.

Tunisia’s socio-economic woes On 14 January 2018, on the seventh anniversary of Ben Ali’s fall, major protests and riots erupted in various Tunisian cities and villages. They were triggered by new austerity measures introduced in order to obtain a $2.9 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had demanded a reduction of the budgetary deficit to below 5%. To meet these conditions, the Tunisian government introduced a package of fiscal measures that included various tax increases, cuts in subsidies and a freeze in public-sector hiring (Gallien 2018).

For Tunisia’s lower and middle classes things were tough enough before these new austerity measures came into effect. Economic growth is slow, and in 2017 unemployment was at 15% nationwide and as high as 28% in some regions. Across the country, a third of university graduates are without a job (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 3). While both the minimum wage and average public-sector salaries have risen in recent years, the increases remain substantially below the increases in basic food prices. Inflation is projected to reach 7% in 2018, drastically decreasing people’s purchasing power (Statista 2018a). Today’s minimum wage buys 20% less food than it did in 2010. As a result of the latest austerity measures, Tunisians will now have to cope with frozen or reduced salaries and social welfare services as well as rising prices for basic goods including food, energy and fuel. Weilandt 213

The demonstrations and riots in January were not the first of their kind. In recent years, Tunisia has seen a range of protests reminiscent of those that brought down Ben Ali. And while the situation is unsatisfactory across the country, it is disastrous in those parts of Tunisia where the 2010–11 uprisings originated. While some parts of Tunisia’s northern coastal regions are reminiscent of southern Europe, the country’s southern and interior regions fare poorly on almost all socio-economic indicators. Overall poverty is 10 times higher in the cities of Kairouan (34.9%) and Kef (34.2%) than in the city of Tunis (3.5%). On average, 88% of the Tunisian population has access to drinkable tap water. While this covers almost 100% of the population in the affluent parts of the country, it only includes half of the citizens of Sidi Bouzid, where the self-immolation of fruit-seller Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010 sparked the Tunisian uprising. Less than 20% of households in Sidi Bouzid are connected to the sewage system, compared to a national average of 58% and between 80% and 90% in Greater Tunis. While there are 84 medical specialists per 100,000 inhabitants in Tunis, there are just 11 in Sidi Bouzid (Magouri et al. 2018). These disparities are deeply enshrined and strengthen each other. The lack of infrastructure combined with a deteriorating security situation make it hard to attract investment or tourists to the interior regions. And while recent efforts to politically decentralise the country are trying to reverse these trends, it will take a long time to make up for decades of neglect.

A second major division runs between the generations. Large parts of Tunisia’s youth feel excluded from the country’s political and economic opportunities. In 2017, youth unemployment stood at 35.4% (Statista 2018b). While the situation was bad before the Tunisian uprising, it has deteriorated since. Moreover, with formal politics dominated by the older generation, those who were crucial in initiating the uprising—and thus in enabling the changes we have seen since—have been shut out of shaping their country’s future. This has led to major disenchantment with politics among young people, which is reflected in their very low electoral participation: only a third of 18–34 year-olds voted in the 2014 parliamentary elections (Yerkes 2017, 11).

Socio-economic threats to the democratic transition The dire socio-economic situation, regional inequality and exclusion of the youth pose major risks to the democratic transition. Contrary to what many Western observers believed at the time, the 2011 Arab uprisings were not primarily, let alone exclusively, about replacing an autocratic system of government with liberal democracy. When Tunisians started to take to the streets in late 2010, protestors were calling for ‘bread, freedom and dignity’ (The Economist 2018). They were fed up with the Ben Ali regime, which had failed to deliver these while simultaneously shamelessly plundering the state coffers. Their anger was not primarily directed against autocracy. It was first and fore- most directed against one particular autocrat and his clique, as well as their audacious greed and corruption.

This is not to say that there is no support for democratic forms of government. According to a 2014 poll by the ArabTrans project, 77.7% of Tunisian respondents 214 European View 17(2) deemed democracy preferable to its alternatives (Teti 2017). However, the respondents’ idea of democracy is closely linked to socio-economic rights. The risk of Tunisian democracy not delivering on those rights is illustrated by a 2017 poll conducted for the International Republican Institute (2017). According to this poll, 68% of respondents described the current economic situation in Tunisia as very bad, and a further 21% described it as somewhat bad. Sixty-one per cent felt that the incumbent government was bad or very bad at creating jobs. Strikingly, 83% felt that the country was heading in the wrong direction. And while there is widespread support for democracy in principle, 41% said that economic prosperity was ‘definitely more important’ to them and a further 21% deemed it ‘somewhat more important’. Hence, if the new democratic system does not deliver, this could be exploited by political forces pushing for a more authoritarian form of government.

The dire socio-economic conditions and the lack of prospects for young Tunisians could have even more immediate and sinister consequences, as they seem to be making some youths receptive to the simplistic messages of radical Islamism. This helps to explain one of the most puzzling developments in the country. Despite Tunisia being one of the most liberal countries in the Arab world and the region’s only democratic success story, it has become one of the most fertile recruiting grounds for the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Tunisia has not only been a major exporter of jihadists but has also itself been the target of terrorist attacks committed by local radicalised youths (Fahmi and Meddeb 2015). The student who killed 38 tourists in Sousse in 2015 was reported to have had a girlfriend and have been a local breakdancing celebrity. He drank alcohol and was a passionate Real Madrid football club supporter (Mendick 2016). Young Tunisians like him are not becoming Islamist terrorists by default.

Addressing Tunisia’s challenges The Tunisian government urgently needs to tackle the dire socio-economic situation and work towards overcoming the country’s major inequalities. This will require both dereg- ulation as well as major economic interventions by the state. Structural economic reforms are necessary to reduce the bureaucracy that primarily serves to uphold the old ruling clique’s grip on business and provides the basis for the country’s endemic corruption. The government needs to create a level playing field to give new Tunisian businesses a chance to thrive and to attract foreign investors. Moreover, Tunisia will have to gradually slim down its bloated public sector, which currently constitutes an unsustainable system of political patronage. Public-sector employment provides every fifth job and swallows almost half of the country’s budget (IMF 2018), and thus uses financial means that are urgently needed elsewhere.

Having said that, the trimming of the public sector must be gradual and should take regional and demographic differences into account. Moreover, it has to be accompanied by major investment, particularly in the country’s marginalised regions. Creating a level playing field is a precondition for economic growth. However, it is far from sufficient to overcome the regional disparities between the affluent coastal north and the interior Weilandt 215 regions—disparities that date back to colonial times and were reproduced after inde- pendence. Structural reforms cannot make up for the lack of infrastructure, education or security that the interior regions will need to attract investment and to produce competi- tive local businesses. Creating a genuinely level playing field and ending the interior regions’ downward spiral will require substantial positive discrimination. It will neces- sitate major state investment in infrastructure and the improvement of basic public health, education and welfare services. The recent efforts directed at political decentrali- sation may help in this regard, but local government will only be able to address fundamental local needs if it is equipped with the necessary financial means.

Facing budgetary constraints and IMF conditions, the Tunisian government currently lacks the necessary room for manoeuvre for such investments. Hence, external assistance will be crucial. Having the biggest stake in the success of the Tunisian transition, it will largely fall to the EU’s institutions and member states to enable these efforts. Brussels should push the Tunisian government to invest in the interior regions’ infrastructure and further increase financial assistance for such efforts. National development banks as well as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development should provide further favourably conditioned loans for Tunisian public and private investment. At the same time, the EU should unilaterally liberalise trade with Tunisia, particularly for agricultural products. Rather than waiting for completion of the EU–Tunisia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that is currently being negotiated, Tunisia should be offered a more limited deal that asymmetrically liberalises trade, with Tunisian companies getting immediate access to the EU market and Tunisia opening its own market only gradually. Such a move could create jobs and alleviate the temporary negative effects caused by carefully and gradually implemented structural reforms.

Furthermore, the EU—or rather its member states—should provide more legal ways for Tunisians to pursue opportunities in Europe. The current anti-immigration sentiments make facilitating Tunisian citizens’ access to visas and work permits a tough sell. But giving young Tunisians the chance to work in Europe would reduce pressure on the domestic labour market and increase remittance flows to Tunisia. It would also result in Europe finally fulfilling its promise, made in the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian uprising, to increase mobility.

Conclusions Many Tunisians do not understand why Europe is not doing more to support them. Some feel that they should be rewarded for their struggle for democracy. Others think that Europe should make up for having propped up the Ben Ali regime for so long or for having created serious security challenges for Tunisia by destabilising neighbouring Libya. But most importantly, there is a general sentiment that providing more substantial support is very much in the EU’s own interest. With only 70 kilometres separating Italy from Tunisia, Tunisian problems could quickly become the EU’s problems should the country’s transition fail. 216 European View 17(2)

Tunisia may not have the natural resources that neighbouring Libya and Algeria have in abundance. But it has a modern and fairly well-educated population. It could be transformed into a well-governed and fairly affluent country in the medium term. A lot has already been achieved since 2011, but Tunisia’s new institutional order should not be taken for granted yet. The country could do with and deserves more substantial external support—particularly from the northern shores of the Mediterranean. And it is in the EU’s interest to provide such support.

Note 1. Author’s semi-structured interview with Abdelkarim Harouni, conducted on 1 July 2015 in Tunis.

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Author biography Ragnar Weilandt is a Ph.D. fellow at the University of Warwick and the Université libre de Bruxelles. His doctoral research focuses on EU democracy promotion in Tunisia, while his broader research agenda includes the impact of Brexit on the EU, the EU’s external action regarding its southern neighbourhood, and civil society and democratic transition in the Arab world. EUV0010.1177/1781685818808713European ViewSchwammenthal 808713research-article2018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 218–226 Europe, the US and the Iran © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818808713DOI: 10.1177/1781685818808713 deal: The need to resolve journals.sagepub.com/home/euv transatlantic disagreements

Daniel Schwammenthal

Abstract The importance of the transatlantic relationship and the seriousness of the Iranian threat demand that Europe and the US try their utmost to resolve their disagreement over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—also known as the ‘Iran nuclear deal’ or simply the ‘Iran deal’. For the EU this means reviewing the legal and political context of Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal and acknowledging the agreement’s shortcomings. European leaders themselves have identified Iran’s aggression as a major security threat and have also confirmed that the deal is not ‘sufficient’. This being the case, the article argues that, to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional aggression, the EU ought to cooperate with the US even after the latter’s withdrawal from the deal.

Keywords Iran, JCPOA, Nuclear, Transatlantic, Security, Missiles, Hezbollah

Introduction US President Donald Trump’s 8 May decision to withdraw from the so-called Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has led to serious transatlantic tensions. The disagreement over Iran comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is already strained by other disputes, such as trade tariffs and US complaints about Europe’s low defence spending.

The US policy change on the nuclear deal collided with the stated EU consensus that the JCPOA is not only the best way to prevent a nuclear Iran, but that the deal is also a

Corresponding author: D. Schwammenthal, AJC Transatlantic Institute, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

In addition to the political fallout, the US move has had financial repercussions. The threat of American secondary sanctions, which could cut off non-American companies from the US market and financial system for doing business in Iran (Moehr 2018), is forc- ing European companies to choose between the $19.4-trillion US economy and the $440-billion Iranian economy (World Bank 2018), one that is compromised by corruption, terror financing and close entanglements with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While this will be a fairly easy business decision for most firms, it nevertheless deprives European companies of potentially lucrative business deals. Therefore infuriated by the extraterritorial aspects of the US sanctions, the EU is looking for ways to neutralise them through a so-called blocking statute and a Special Purpose Vehicle. These efforts, while unlikely to succeed, are bound to intensify the tensions between the US and the EU.

Multinationals that have important US operations cannot be forced against their own business interests to remain in Iran. Indeed, numerous European companies have already announced their withdrawal from the Iranian market, and French President Emmanuel Macron has acknowledged that governments cannot interfere with the business decisions of private companies (France24 2017). The blocking statute and Special Purpose Vehicle may help smaller companies that do not have any US activities anyway. But even they may be hesitant to enter or to stay in Iran, as individual company heads could be sanctioned and because they may find it difficult to find the necessary business partners or financing (Soussan et al. 2018). Likewise, the €18 million the European Commission announced on 23 August ‘in support of sustainable economic and social development in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ will do little in the end for the troubled Iranian economy (European Commission 2018). But the announcement will have no doubt further angered Washington.

The disagreement over the Iran nuclear deal is worrying and not only because it dam- ages the already strained transatlantic relationship. The underlying issue—how to deal with the revolutionary regime in Tehran—is one of the West’s most urgent national security challenges. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, aggression in the region and support for terrorism call for unprecedented transatlantic unity. Instead, the West is divided.

There are additional circumstances that unnecessarily intensify the disagreement about the Iran deal, which, if removed, could help both sides find common ground. Chief among them is Europe’s misinterpretation of the political and legal context in which the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA. Moreover, the lack of an informed debate within the EU about both the nuclear deal’s shortcomings and the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic also stands in the way of transatlantic understanding on this critical issue. At the same time, recent public statements by European leaders have shown that they, like the Americans, are worried about Tehran’s behaviour and some of 220 European View 17(2) the deal’s flaws. This ought to drive forward transatlantic cooperation to contain Iran, notwithstanding the dispute over the US withdrawal.

The political and legal context of the US withdrawal Beyond the substantive disagreement over the US policy change on Iran, one often-heard European complaint is that the US had no right to withdraw from the JCPOA (EEAS 2018a). For the EU, which likes to define itself as a ‘community of law’ (Mańko 2017), the suggestion that the US violated international law or norms has made the US move particularly difficult to accept. That charge, however, is a misreading of the legal and political situation.

On 19 November 2015, Julia Frifield, then assistant secretary for legal affairs in the US State Department under Secretary of State John Kerry, sent a letter to then US House Representative Mike Pompeo (now President Trump’s secretary of state) underlining the wholly political, rather than legal, nature of the Iran deal:

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments.

The success of the JCPOA will depend not on whether it is legally binding or signed, but rather on the extensive verification measures we have put in place, as well as Iran’s understanding that we have the capacity to re-impose—and ramp up—our sanctions if Iran does not meet its commitments. (French 2018)

However, few in Europe are aware that the JCPOA is not a signed document, and even fewer appreciate the legal consequences of this fact. Under US constitutional law, only international treaties that are ratified by Congress are legally binding. No such ratifica- tion took place, though. On the contrary, clear majorities in both houses of Congress rejected the agreement (United States Institute of Peace 2015).

It is another misconception that UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, created legally binding obligations. The relevant operative paragraph simply ‘calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA’ (UN Security Council 2015, 2). As Bellinger (2015) makes clear, because the text does not say ‘decide’ and because this paragraph was not adopted under Article 41, it merely urges member states to implement the JCPOA. It does not require them to do so as a matter of international law.

The reason why former US President Barack Obama was able to implement the Iran nuclear deal—that is, waive sanctions—was not because Congress passed new legislation, because the P5+11 reached an unsigned agreement or because of some UN resolution. Schwammenthal 221

Rather, President Obama had the power to waive US sanctions because the previous legislation under which Congress had originally authorised sanctions against Iran also gave the president the authority to lift them. And that same legislation gave President Trump the right to re-impose sanctions (Rennack 2018).

Another criticism of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA is that it was supposedly another example of Washington snubbing its allies. But this is a rather Eurocentric view of international relations. As the underwriter of global security, the US has to take into consideration the interests of many allies, beyond just those in Europe. While the transatlantic alliance is of unique importance, that does not mean that Europe is always the most important ally Washington has to consider.

When it comes to Iran, the concerns of Israel and the Gulf countries—in other words those allies that are immediately threatened by Tehran—simply weigh more than the concerns of allies geographically more removed and not (yet) directly targeted by the Iranian regime. Similarly, if this were a policy dispute about security challenges from Russia, few would argue that the concerns of, say, Israel or Portugal were as relevant as, let alone more important than, those of Poland or the Baltic states.

Finally, it is also important to note that this decision falls into a separate category from other areas of transatlantic conflict. Unlike President Trump’s position on tariffs or some of his statements on NATO, his policy on Iran enjoys broad political support, certainly within his party. And while in other policy areas President Trump seems to be breaking with long-held US policy positions, on Iran he is actually returning to more traditional US foreign policy.

This does not mean that Europeans have to agree with the US decision. But a more factual analysis of the legal and political context in which the Trump decision took place and the realisation that the EU would likely face similar challenges under a President Marco Rubio or Ted Cruz ought to help lower the tensions. This, in turn, should make it easier to reassess the actual policy differences at hand.

The flaws of the Iran deal Of course, acknowledging that President Trump’s decision was not only legal under both US and international law, but also enjoyed the political backing of his party and allies in the region, does not yet mean it was the right step to take. To properly assess this decision, Europe ought to finally have an informed debate about the JCPOA. Unlike in the US, where the JCPOA triggered an intense public discussion—carried out among experts, on the opinion pages of major newspapers and in Congress—no such public vetting took place in Europe.

Astonishingly, even when European leaders recently backtracked somewhat and acknowledged the deal’s shortcomings, this too failed to trigger a public debate. During EU–US negotiations designed to preserve the JCPOA, French President Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said publicly what no EU leader had said before—that 222 European View 17(2) the agreement needed to be amended (Sen 2018; Times of Israel 2018). Strangely, the same people who had hailed the JCPOA as a major diplomatic breakthrough remained conspicuously silent when Europe’s leaders redefined that very same breakthrough as ‘not sufficient’ (Times of Israel 2018).

As Dubowitz (2017) has repeatedly pointed out, the major problem with the JCPOA is that Iran does not have to violate it to become a nuclear weapons threshold state. Tehran simply has to patiently implement the agreement to gain an industrial-sized enrichment programme with near-zero nuclear break-out capacity, complete with the means to deliver nuclear weapons.

Any attempt to produce an exhaustive list of the deal’s shortcomings would be far beyond the scope of this article. The following is thus a brief discussion of the deal’s five major flaws that will (a) allow Iran to emerge in a few years as a nuclear threshold state, and (b) prevent the EU from effectively countering the regime’s aggression at home or abroad.

Ballistic missiles Every nuclear programme has three components: fissile material, nuclear warheads and delivery systems—that is, missiles. Iran’s work on ballistic missiles was left out of the deal, a strategic blunder in its own right. Even worse, previous restrictions on the regime’s missile tests were watered down as a consequence of the JCPOA.

UN Security Council Resolution 1929 originally demanded that ‘Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology’ (UN Security Council 2010, 5). In its stead, UN Resolution 2231, adopted in July 2015 in the context of the nuclear agreement, says that Iran is only ‘called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the [JCPOA] Adoption Day’ (UN Security Council 2015, 99). The new resolution thus replaced a strict prohibition (‘shall not’) with a mere urging (‘called upon’). In addition, this much softer restriction comes with an expiry date. And instead of targeting all missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, the new resolution says that the missiles must have been specifically designed to do so. This creates a legal loophole for Iran and its Russian UN backer to protect Tehran from Security Council condemnation for its missile tests. As Joyner (2016) has pointed out, Iranian ballistic missile tests are thus no longer in violation of international law: ‘The most that could be said about them is that they are not in harmony with the UN Security Council’s legally non-binding exhortation in Resolution 2231’.

Possible military dimension Iran was originally supposed to come clean about the ‘possible military dimension’ of its nuclear programme—that is, its work on nuclear warheads and trigger mechanisms. However, it never properly did so. Without full knowledge of Iran’s past activities in this area, and without knowing who conducted this research and where it used to take Schwammenthal 223 place, it is difficult for inspectors to know whom and what to monitor (Michek 2015). The Iranian nuclear archive Israeli agents discovered and shipped out of the country, an archive that the regime actively moved and hid after the nuclear deal was reached, suggests that Tehran has not given up on its nuclear military aspirations (Ahren 2018).

Inspections Before and even during negotiations, Western diplomats made promises about anytime– anywhere inspections, the only reasonable approach given Iran’s history of nuclear deception. Instead, the convoluted mechanism agreed upon in the JCPOA would give Iran not 24 hours but 24 days, and possibly more, before having to grant access to a suspect site. As Tobey (2015) suggests, depending on the interpretation of the ambiguous text and Iran’s readiness for brinkmanship, that period could be even longer, giving Tehran ample time to clean up any evidence before granting access to suspect sites.

What is more, Iran insists that military sites are off-limits to inspectors, which of course renders the entire monitoring mechanism absurd (Singh 2018).

Sunset clause The nuclear deal’s fatal flaw is the so-called sunset clause (Doran 2018). This stipulates that the most important restrictions agreed upon in the JCPOA, as well as in the UN sanctions linked to the agreement, will expire in 8 to 13 years from now (Dubowitz and Fixler 2015). As a result, within this period the already weakened ballistic missile restrictions will fall away and Iran will be able to install and ultimately operate advanced centrifuges which are several times more efficient than Iran’s current models. This would allow Iran to produce much more rapidly than now enough fissile material for an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons. Tehran would at the same time be in possession of advanced ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The deal’s faithful implementation would thus inevitably pave the way for Iran to become a nuclear power threshold state— and one enjoying full international legitimacy to boot.

Before the JCPOA, Iran’s break-out time, the time needed to produce enough fissile material for one bomb, was believed to be about three months. The restrictions of the nuclear agreement are believed to have increased this break-out time to between 9 and 12 months. Once the sunset clause fully kicks in, in about a decade, that break-out time will shrink to almost nothing, as President Obama himself acknowledged at the time (NPR 2015).

The argument that there is little to worry about because even after the sunset clause expires Iran would still be bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol is not convincing. The restrictions were deemed necessary precisely because Iran’s history of deception and violations means that the regime simply cannot be trusted to respect international treaties.

Beyond the disagreement over whether the JCPOA adequately blocks Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the EU and the US disagree about the deal’s impact on Iran’s aggression in the region. 224 European View 17(2)

The EU position is that the nuclear deal is about just that, Iran’s nuclear programme, and that the question of Tehran’s behaviour must be handled separately. But that is precisely the problem. The fact that the JCPOA negotiators excluded Iran’s conventional threat was a strategic mistake. Even worse, the deal has made addressing Iran’s aggression much more difficult.

The very logic of the nuclear deal demands that Iran must economically benefit from it, something the EU continues to underline (EEAS 2018b). This consequently precludes the use of any serious sanctions to pressure Iran about its aggression in the region and instead provides the regime with additional resources for its nefarious activities. The desired deepening of economic and trade relationships with Iran also necessitates deepening diplomatic relations. As a result, numerous delegations of European ministers, com- missioners and members of parliament have visited Tehran in the past three years, while corresponding official Iranian visits to Europe have taken place. It is therefore difficult to see the EU being able or willing to use the other major non-military tool to contain Iran’s aggression: diplomatic pressure. For example, the EU continues to refuse to list Hezbollah, Iran’s terror proxy in Lebanon and Syria, in its entirety as a terror organisation. Likewise, even Iran’s own terror operations on European soil have so far failed to trigger any serious European diplomatic reaction or discussions about listing, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terror organisation (Gulf News 2018).

Conclusion The disagreement over the nuclear deal with Iran is one of the many transatlantic crisis points. The importance of the Western alliance and the seriousness of the national security challenge posed by Iran require that both sides find as much unity as possible. It is therefore incumbent on the EU to overcome its misunderstandings about the legal and political context of the US withdrawal, which are unnecessarily aggravating the tensions.

It is equally important for the EU to make up for past failures to conduct a rigorous public debate about the deal. An evidence-based look at the JCPOA would help European leaders gain public support to act upon the deal’s shortcomings that they themselves have recently acknowledged. During the EU–US talks before President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, President Macron and others were vocal about the need to expand on the nuclear deal to address its problems. Unless this was just a negotiating tactic designed to preserve the agreement, the EU has a duty, even after the US withdrawal, to devise effective policies to fix the deal’s shortcomings and counter Iran’s aggression.

While visiting Jordan in June, Chancellor Merkel said, ‘Iran’s aggressive tendencies must not only be discussed, but rather we need solutions urgently’ (Rinke 2018). The challenges for which these solutions are needed are formidable. They range from stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions to pushing back against its aggression—whether in the form of ethnic cleansing in Syria, threats to destroy Israel, support for terrorism or even the plotting of terrorist attacks right here in Europe.

It is high time for European leaders to match their rhetoric with action. Even after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, transatlantic cooperation on countering Iran remains vital. Schwammenthal 225

Note 1. The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—that is, China, France, Russia, the UK and the US—plus Germany.

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Author biography Daniel Schwammenthal has been the director of the AJC Transatlantic Institute since 2011. Before joining the Institute, Mr Schwammenthal worked for seven years as an editorial page writer and op-ed editor for The Wall Street Journal Europe in Brussels and Amsterdam, writing about EU politics and economics, the Arab–Israeli conflict, Iran, radical Islam and terrorism. EUV0010.1177/1781685818803525European ViewChara research-article8035252018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 227–234 Saudi Arabia: A prince’s © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818803525DOI: 10.1177/1781685818803525 revolution journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

Jihan Chara

Abstract Over the past decades, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have emerged as the leaders of the Middle East and North Africa region. They have also proved to be the safest Arab allies for the EU due to their stability and prosperity, despite being the only regimes in the region whose leaders are not elected by universal direct suffrage. In recent months, Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been anxious to re-establish its leadership in the region through disruptive structural changes. Even though it remains difficult to make sense of these reforms, many analysts have speculated about their purported future relevance. This article argues that the changes undermine the social contract that has prevailed in the kingdom for decades, whereby citizens enjoy material comfort in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. Thus these changes threaten to destabilise the country, with potential lasting effects on the region and collateral consequences for Europe.

Keywords Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Bin Salman, MBS, Structural reforms, Wahhabism

Introduction In 2017 the geopolitics of the Gulf Cooperation Council underwent a profound transformation. On 5 June Saudi Arabia, supported by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, decided to impose an embargo on Qatar for its alleged involvement in the financing of terrorism and its attempts to destabilise the region (Wintour 2017). Days later, on 21 June, King Salman announced that his son, the young Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), then second in the line of succession and minister of defence, was to be the direct heir to the throne. Although this appointment might have been trivial in other kingdoms, it was essentially a palace revolution for the Arabian monarchy, which has always distinguished

Corresponding author: Jihan Chara, Bussola Institute, 28 Square de Meeûs, 1000, Brussels. Email: [email protected]

These two events were harbingers of a wave of disruptive reforms. This article aims to evaluate their content, analyse their intricacies and ponder their potential international impact, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia’s relations with Europe. Because they undermine the main pillars on which the Saudi state was built, these reforms might eventually lead to the destabilisation of the regime and, consequently, of the whole region. In order to make this point, the article will explore the reasons behind the implementation of the reforms, drawing upon the country’s historical background, while investigating how they break with the Saudi social contract through which the regime provides state subsidies in return for the citizens’ loyalty. It will then consider their potential repercussions on Europe.

The monarchy The House of Saud has long praised itself for the absence of apparent discord between its various branches: the horizontal consensus between all members has generally taken precedence over all other forms of hierarchy and ensured the stability of the state (Al-Rasheed 2018; Stenslie 2018). This is explained by the historical situation and the pragmatic strategy applied by the founder of modern Saudi Arabia.

In 1932, six years before oil was first discovered, Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman al- Saud, or ‘Ibn Saud’, managed to gather together all the tribal, religious and regional groups of Arabia to form what is now called the third Saudi state. However, to ensure the survival of his political project, Ibn Saud was not content with drawing borders; he wanted to instil a sense of nationalism in his people. He thus implemented a strategy of long-proven efficiency: marriage. The ruler allegedly married no less than 30 women from different parts of Arabia, thereby gaining the support of its most powerful tribes, which saw in these marriages a way to ensure the continuity of their executive power within a centralised state. In that sense, Saudi Arabia is ‘a state imposed on people without a historical memory of unity or national heritage’ (Al-Rasheed 2002, 3). However, these marriages (a strategy further utilised by subsequent kings) produced no fewer than ten thousand potential crown princes. It is therefore no wonder that dissent within the Saud dynasty should exist today (Mabon 2017; Stenslie 2018).

To ensure the survival of his dynasty, Ibn Saud was also eager to emphasise his religious legitimacy by striking an alliance with Wahhabi clerics, taking advantage of the long-standing relationship between the House of Saud and Muhammed Bin Abd al-Wah- hab’s heirs.1 This pragmatic alliance served as a bulwark against any popular opposition: any dissent against the House of Saud was akin to opposition to the state and, by association, to God (Mabon 2017; Stenslie 2018). Chara 229

By undermining the entente cordiale between the different branches of the family, the actions of King Salman and his son weaken not only internal stability but also their relationship to the citizens, since many tribes will feel aggrieved at the outcome. Despite these possibilities, the crown prince seems determined to impose a new form of nationalism on the entire population, based on allegiance to a single authoritarian figure, who is meant to embody progress and development. As such, the reform of the Saudi monarchy appears to be a way for MBS to impose his vision by departing from the potential threats posed by some contenders to the throne.2

Religion In October 2017, at the ‘Riyadh’s Future Investment Initiative’ conference, MBS stated that Saudi Arabia had to go back to a ‘moderate Islam’ (Meredith 2017). This announcement can be analysed through two different lenses. First, the crown prince, who presented the cornerstone of his economic strategy during the forum, urgently needed to reassure international investors put off by the risks of religious and political instability in order to secure foreign direct investment to finance his project. Second, the crown prince was asserting himself, nationally and internationally, as the sole authority behind the reforms and distancing himself from the Wahhabi clerics who had once been part of the decision-making process. Similarly, ‘through the control of the religious discourse, MBS eliminates the existence of an independent Islam that could have been a danger in the future’ (Al Alaoui 2018). Thereby, MBS clearly intends to reshape the alliance once struck with the Wahhabi movement (Al Alaoui 2018). This domestic component also has an international resonance: the eradication of the most radical movements is a way of consolidating Saudi Arabia’s relations with its Western allies and guaranteeing their continuous support. A few days after his announcement, MBS, together with other allied Sunni states, launched a counterterrorism coalition, demonstrating to the world his firm intention to combat all forms of extremism at a time when Saudi Arabia is regarded by many as the state that once served as its main propeller (Mabon 2017; Stenslie 2018).

The economy and representation With citizens under 30 years old accounting for just over 70% of the population, an excessive reliance on foreign labour and a bloated public sector, MBS quickly realised that the rentier economy was unsustainable in circumstances of a booming demography and low oil revenues. To diversify the state’s sources of income, MBS, in partnership with McKinsey, conceived ‘Vision 2030’, a structural reform of the Saudi economy in the post-oil era. This strategy is largely based on the expected success of NEOM, a zero- carbon megalopolis that is to be erected in the desert and is conceived as the embodiment of all technological innovations. Alongside Vision 2030,3 the government announced an initial public offering of 5% of state-owned oil company Aramco, the development of the entertainment sector (facilitated by the lifting of the ban on cinemas and concerts) and the unprecedented introduction of many taxes. By investing in the private sector, MBS aims to increase job opportunities for the youth and achieve the ‘Saudisation’ of the work 230 European View 17(2) force, which would reduce the number of Saudis working in public administration4 (Hubbard 2016; Khashan 2017; Stenslie 2018).

These reforms are undoubtedly necessary. However, MBS’s strategy here again under- mines the social contract implicitly concluded with the citizens and is likely to increase the discontent of citizens used to state allowances. Indeed, the oil industry assured the state tremendous revenues. This money was redistributed to the people in the form of subsidies to ensure the sustainability of the regime, following the strategy of the ‘authoritarian bargain’ through which the citizens’ rights were curbed in exchange for material comfort and the absence of taxes (Stenslie 2018). MBS has broken with this model. Economic openness and popular taxation should hence be accompanied by some sort of political representation. However, even though the crown prince has set modernisation as his main objective, representation does not seem to be part of his agenda. Nonetheless, with the advent of the Internet, many Saudis have begun to express their discontent on the web and are urging others to demand more social freedoms. For the moment, MBS is not really threatened by this movement, whose supporters are too spread out. However, the end of the social contract could lead the Saudi people as a whole to formulate a common demand: increased popular representation in power (Al Alaoui 2018; Stenslie 2018).

Social reforms Three months after becoming crown prince, MBS announced the lifting of the driving ban imposed on Saudi women, further asserting his intention to reform all aspects of society in accordance with his conception of the economy and the consolidation of his own rule. Even though allowing women to drive might be regarded as some progress on the path to increased social freedoms, it is also another way for MBS to reduce the authority of the Wahhabi clerics and impose his own in the reshaping of social norms: through this decree, MBS has further reduced the decision-making power granted to the religious authorities who had favoured this customary law as a way to meet the demands of the most radical fringes of society. However, lifting the ban does not increase women’s rights but rather shifts the decision-making power from the public to the private sphere: women can no longer be arrested and imprisoned for taking the wheel, but that does not mean that families must allow women to drive, especially when we consider that the guardianship system is still in place (Al Alaoui 2018). Although these changes seem revolutionary and progressive, they are mainly economic in essence: by allowing women to drive, MBS reduces job opportunities for foreign workers and increases women’s mobility, thereby encouraging them to join the labour force. The disruptiveness of the decision and its direct consequence (i.e. the increasing presence of women in the public space) might, however, alienate the most traditional parts of society, which would see in these new norms an ‘innovation’ that contravenes their ways.

Foreign policy Since his debut on the international scene in 2015 as minister of defence, MBS has demonstrated his intention to change the country’s foreign policy on many regional issues by Chara 231 pursuing a more aggressive anti-Iranian rhetoric and getting involved in proxy wars against the country’s Shia neighbour. The Saudi rivalry with Iran is nothing new. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Saudi Arabia has zealously competed to establish itself as the symbol of Islamic authenticity, at home and abroad, in order to protect itself against the Shia regime’s growing influence. Iran, which was anxious to export its revolution and restore its fading power in the region through stronger alliances with Shia allies, quickly became a danger to Saudi Arabia, which saw its influence being challenged both domestically (i.e. Saudi Arabia is home to a large Shia minority) and regionally (i.e. in Lebanon and Iraq). And while Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of unlawful involvement in the internal affairs of foreign countries, it has largely implemented similar strategies to maintain its influence in the region if the recent resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is taken into account. However, through his vehement rhetoric against Iran, MBS is further alienating the Saudi Shias, thereby increasing the pervasive social tensions in some of the country’s regions (Mabon 2017; Al Alaoui 2018).

Aside from his anti-Iranian strategy, MBS has also changed (though covertly) Saudi Arabia’s position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The first signs of the detente in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel became clear during US President Donald J. Trump’s official visit to the country: upon completion of the visit, Air Force One—the presidential plane—took off from Riyadh destined directly for Israel. Since then, Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and envoy to the Middle East, has paid several unofficial visits to Riyadh during which he allegedly discussed with MBS the terms of the ‘Deal of the Century’, a US-designed strategy to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Barnard et al. 2017). While seemingly a positive development, this strategy might however also bring about social discontent within Saudi, since the Palestinian conflict is a cause that Arabs consider their own.

In spite of this, the rapprochement with Israel fits perfectly into MBS’s strategy: Israel is the only military power in the region able to stand up to Iran. It is also the only neighbour that has a complete command of nuclear technology, which is of vital importance to Saudi Arabia since the announcement of its intention to start a nuclear programme that will allow further economic diversification, reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil, counter Iran’s nuclear capability and ensure the country’s position as the ultimate power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is now negotiating the terms of a nuclear agreement with the US, which might view the Saudi endeavour as a way to counter the Iranian enemy (Shay 2018).

Implications for Europe Europe has long enjoyed cordial relations with Saudi Arabia. Despite the regime’s authoritarianism, poor human rights record and alleged involvement in the export of radical Islam, diplomatic relations have never been cut off, as Saudi Arabia remains a crucial ally for the West. The reforms implemented could have both a positive and a negative impact for Europe but are unlikely to change the nature of the relationship between Saudis and Europeans. 232 European View 17(2)

Economic reforms could prove lucrative for European economies as NEOM is set to serve as a symbol for the world’s technological know-how. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s announcement of its intention to launch a nuclear programme means that the kingdom will have to rely on foreign technology, with potential economic benefits for a nuclear powerhouse such as France (Shay 2018). However, the nuclearisation of Saudi Arabia, even if allegedly merely for energy purposes, might nonetheless negatively impact EU– Saudi relations as European leaders are currently struggling to stop the nuclear arms race. Furthermore, a nuclear agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia might lead other allies to claim their rights to nuclear capabilities, with dangerous consequences in high-tension regions such as Eastern Europe (Storey 2018). Similarly, should the US give it the green light, the Saudi programme might further undermine the Iranian nuclear deal, especially if the Shia regime considers that Saudi Arabia is being given preferential treatment. Regarding the religious reforms, these might prove beneficial to those European states that are facing radicalisation problems, especially among Sunni Muslims, who tend to regard Saudi Arabia as the spiritual leader of their community.

However, because of their ‘disruptiveness’ and their unbridled speed, the reforms could prove fatal for the kingdom, with catastrophic consequences not only for the region but also for Europe. Due to its still predominantly tribal structure, on top of which sectarian divisions must be added, the country could sink into a chaos similar to that in Libya if MBS were to be toppled. The economies supported by the regime (e.g. Egypt and Jordan) could also be bankrupted, increasing instability at the gates of Israel and in the entire Mediterranean region. Instability in Saudi Arabia would also have an inevitable impact on the oil industry and its prices, creating the possibility of a new international recession (Stenslie 2018). Similarly, the aggressive policy pursued against Iran, which is based solely on attack rather than negotiation, could foreshadow a regional war that would see Saudi Arabia and its allies, possibly including Israel, confront Iran, which would potentially be supported by Russia, China and Turkey. Such a scenario could have dramatic repercussions on the stability of regional states with complex sectarian compo- sitions (i.e. Lebanon and Iraq), and create a new wave of refugees fleeing to Europe.

The end of the Saudi regime, though unlikely, is nonetheless a possibility. The essential pillars of the regime’s stability, with the exception of the long-standing privileged relationship with the US, have been shaken. And if MBS does not manage to bring balance back into his relationship with his people, the whole country may well eventually collapse.

Conclusion Whichever way you consider the reforms and MBS’s excessive concentration of power, it remains a fact that they are of unavoidable international relevance: for Europe, they could bring about the best in terms of trade and investment, as well as having a positive social impact on Europe’s Muslim communities. However, the way the reforms have been implemented, and the speed with which they have been imposed, might eventually prove counterproductive and alienate the entire population, potentially leading to national instability with international economic and political consequences. Similarly, the Saudi Chara 233 race for nuclear technology might unnerve European leaders already struggling to save the nuclear deal with Iran. Should the US allow the Saudis to enrich uranium, the possibility of dangerous escalatory cycles and regional war would not remain a far-fetched illusion for long, with potentially dramatic consequences for Europe.

Notes 1. Muhammad Bin Saud, the tribal ruler who started the Saud Dynasty in Nejd (Riyadh region) in 1744, first struck an alliance with Muhammed Bin Abd al-Wahhab to expand his influence throughout the peninsula (Al-Rasheed 2002). 2. Under the cover of cracking down on rampant state corruption, MBS also dismissed and imprisoned many of the princes who could have stood as a potential threat to his rule (Stenslie 2018). 3. However, despite the potential of the strategy, many experts have expressed doubts as to how it can actually improve the economy (Khashan 2017). According to Hertog (2017), the economic reforms are ‘practically unattainable as they implicitly require faster economic and export growth than any mid- or high-income country has ever attained in human history’. 4. Nearly two-thirds of active Saudis work in public administration, which represents another financial burden for the state (Stenslie 2018).

References //:Al Quds Al Arabi, 5 January. http .النزعة االستبدادية الخطيرة لمحمد بن سلمان .(Al Alaoui, M. H. (2018 www.alquds.co.uk/?p=855621. Accessed 8 January 2018. Al-Rasheed, M. (2002). A history of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Rasheed, M. (2018). House of Saud’s power struggle could turn bloody. Middle East Eye, 8 January. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/house-sauds-power-struggle-may-turn -bloody-737583439. Accessed 2 June 2018. Barnard, A., Halbfinger, D. M., & Baker, P. (2017). Talk of a peace plan that snubs Palestinians roils Middle East. New York Times, 3 December. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03 /world/middleeast/palestinian-saudi-peace-plan.html. Accessed 20 June 2018. Hertog, S. (2017). A new Saudi state? LSE Institute for Global Affairs. http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga /events/2017/a-new-saudi-state. Accessed 23 June 2018. Hubbard, B. (2016). Young Saudis see cushy jobs vanish along with nation’s oil wealth. New York Times, 16 February. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/young-saudis -see-cushy-jobs-vanish-along-with-nations-oil-wealth.html. Accessed 15 May 2018. Khashan, H. (2017). Saudi Arabia’s flawed ‘Vision 2030’. Middle East Quarterly, 24(1), 1–8. Mabon, S. (2017). It’s a family affair: Religion, geopolitics and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman. Insight Turkey, 20(2), 51–66. Meredith, S. (2017). Saudi Arabia promises a return to ‘moderate Islam’. CNBC, 25 October. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-promises-a-return-to-moderate-islam.html. Accessed 26 August 2018. Shay, S. (2018). Saudi Arabia and the ‘nuclearization’ of the Middle East. Institute for Policy and Strategy. March. https://www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/publication/5/Shaul _Shay18_03_18.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2018. Stenslie, S. (2018). The end of elite unity and the stability of Saudi Arabia. The Washington Quarterly, 41(1), 61–82. Storey, H. (2018). The tenth nuclear state? Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. Foreign Brief, 6 May. https://www.foreignbrief.com/middle-east/the-tenth-nuclear-state-saudi-arabias -nuclear-program. Accessed 3 July 2018. 234 European View 17(2)

Wintour, P. (2017). Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties with Qatar. The Guardian, 5 June. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain -break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism. Accessed 15 May 2018.

Author biography Jihan Chara is a former political adviser on the Middle East and North Africa to the European People’s Party. EUV0010.1177/1781685818809330European ViewLung research-article8093302018

Article

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 235–237 Jungle politics: Animal © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818809330DOI: 10.1177/1781685818809330 metaphors in international journals.sagepub.com/home/euv relations

Ioana Lung

In the animal kingdom, the rule is, eat or be eaten; in the human kingdom, define or be defined. Thomas Szasz We are the storytelling animal. Salman Rushdie

It is 1984. In the US, an advertisement starts playing on the television: a grizzly bear is wandering through a forest. A narrator’s voice accompanies it, suggesting that the bear could be dangerous and that it would be wise to be prepared. During the final scene, a man appears, causing the bear to retreat. The advertisement ends with the tagline: ‘President Reagan: Prepared for Peace’ (Museum of the Moving Image 2016).

Without directly mentioning his Democrat opponent, defence spending or the threat from the Soviet Union, the advertisement’s imagery and narrative positioned Reagan (who would eventually win a sweeping victory) as better equipped to identify and tackle global threats. It is also believed to have swayed public opinion away from the more conciliatory position of the Democrat candidate, Walter Mondale, who wanted to negoti- ate with the Soviet Union. Through a simple, yet subtle and powerful metaphor, the advertisement helped to clarify in the public imagination the complex nature of the Soviet threat and how the US should respond to it.

This is just one of many anecdotes that has as its starting point the animal metaphors that portray many of the world’s countries. In the rich and complex zoo that is our world system, the American eagle, the Chinese dragon, the Russian bear, the French rooster, and many other large and small beasts of many colours and shapes coexist peacefully. Or,

Corresponding author: I. Lung, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 20 Rue du Commere, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

But why use metaphors at all? It does not take a full course in semantics, a Ph.D. in discourse analysis or a fancy term such as ‘metaphoric storytelling’ for one to know that metaphors, along with allegories and storytelling, are ultimately not just a means of communication, but weapons that can be used to project power. Our ability to make and understand metaphors appears to be an automatic cognitive process, one that likely evolved along with our linguistic ability. Because metaphors are processed automatically, without conscious appraisal, they help us to communicate and clarify complex ideas and processes. They create emotions: pride, fear, courage and ambition. Sometimes, especially in times of great change and upheaval, they can also help to manipulate, prop- agandise and distort.

Where do countries get their animal metaphors from? Inspiration is drawn from the natural world, and national habitats and ecosystems, as well as national myths, legends and religions; even the most obscure ones have a history and a purpose. And the power of the animal metaphor is not exclusively linked to the world of the written word. The use of political symbolism and iconography spans from the heraldry of medieval times and royal seals, to the political cartoons of the nineteenth century, pre-war zoomorphic propaganda maps and the colourful fauna of the Economist covers of today.

But in contrast to the natural world, some national animals do change their spots. After all, the line between symbol and stereotype is a fine one; all it takes is a good spin doctor (or should we say spin vet?) to turn a derisory name into a matter of national pride. That is exactly what happened to the Russian bear: originally used by the British and other Westerners as early as the sixteenth century to ridicule the big, brutal and clumsy Russia, it was later adopted and embraced by Russia itself as a symbol that projected power (and instilled fear). Its adoption is so absolute that few know that the actual official animal of Russia is the double-headed eagle (another powerful metaphor for a country looking both to the East and the West, but that is a story for another time). During the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, at the height of the Cold War, the same spin doctors turned the beast into a mascot named ‘Misha the Bear’ in order to alleviate the West’s unease. At this point, one cannot but wonder: if Russia wins the ongoing Arctic race, will the Russian bear be rebranded as a polar bear?

Unfortunately, for others the story has happened in reverse. For years, Ireland was proudly known as the Celtic tiger, thanks to the country’s economic miracle and unprecedented growth. However, by 2008 the Celtic tiger had gone the way of the dodo. Having failed to secure even a soft landing (approaching, but avoiding, a recession), it instead crashed in the midst of a much less glamorous group of animals: the PIGS (i.e. Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain). Finally, for others, it is just a matter of optics: when some look Lung 237 at the Indian elephant, they see the strength, wisdom and pacifism of a superior sacred creature, while others see unrealised might and untapped potential (elephants are also slow, heavy and stubborn).

Speaking of elephants, the time has finally come to tackle the E(U)lephant in the room: if the EU had a symbolic animal, what would it be? Could it be a turtle, crawling slowly but steadily to eventually win the race, as in the famous fable? Could it be a dove, due to its pacifist nature (or its reluctance to spend more on defence, as critics would point out)? Or could it, perhaps, even be a unicorn, reflecting the almost-mythical nature of the whole European project? Hopefully the political animals of the EU will come up with an answer before others label us in a way that benefits their own narrative. It is too bad that the creator of Reagan’s ‘Bear in the woods’ advertisement will not be around to produce the commercial once this happens!

Reference Museum of the Moving Image. (2016). Bear. The Living Room Candidate: Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952–2016. http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984/bear#4095. Accessed 5 October 2018.

Author biography Ioana Lung is Senior Communications and Marketing Officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. EUV0010.1177/1781685818811062European ViewNováky research-article8110622018

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 238 France’s European © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818811062DOI: 10.1177/1781685818811062 Intervention Initiative: journals.sagepub.com/home/euv Towards a Culture of Burden Sharing

Niklas Nováky

On 25 June 2018, ministers from nine European countries met in Luxembourg to sign a Letter of Intent (LoI) on the development of the new European Intervention Initiative (EI2). The creation of the EI2 had been proposed nine months earlier by French President Emmanuel Macron in his ‘Initiative for Europe’ speech at Paris’s Sorbonne University. According to Macron, recent initiatives to boost the EU’s underdeveloped defence dimension needed to be supplemented with the EI2, which would help European countries ‘to better integrate’ their armed forces ‘at every stage’. However, the exact nature of the EI2 remained unclear until its launch, as did its relationship to existing structures and initiatives within the EU and its relationship to NATO. In public, senior French officials described it in vague terms, which raised more questions than answers. In October 2017, for example, French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly said that the EI2 would be a ‘quick and operational process’ for putting together forces from different European countries if necessary. This paper analyses the development and purpose of the EI2, and examines just how valuable the initiative is likely to be. It also seeks to contribute to the embryonic but rapidly growing literature on the initiative, which has been spearheaded primarily by think-tankers.

Corresponding author: N. Nováky, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 20 Rue du Commerce, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 239 Brexit and the Irish question © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813012DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813012 IN FOCUS: Part one: journals.sagepub.com/home/euv Ireland’s Slow Road to Peace

Michael O’Neill

The outcome of the 2016 British referendum on EU membership will have significant and lasting consequences. For the United Kingdom and its relations with European neighbours, for the constitutional fabric of the British State and for the EU at a time of uncertainty over the future of the European project. The consequences of this decision will have no greater impact however than on the still-fragile peace process known as the ‘Good Friday’ or Belfast Agreement, negotiated in 1998 by parties representing Northern Ireland’s principal cultural communities and the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This historic event brought to an end decades of political violence and centuries of sectarian bitterness, or so it was thought at the time. Brexit has thrown into doubt the future of that peace process

Author biography Michael O’Neill is a Reader in Politics and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Politics at Nottingham Trent University.

Corresponding author: M. Oneill, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare St, Nottingham NG1 4FQ, UK. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 240 North Korea IN FOCUS: © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813764DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813764 Towards a More Effective journals.sagepub.com/home/euv EU Policy

Ramon Pacheco Pardo

The EU has an important role to play in the management of the threat posed by North Korea. Indeed, Brussels already has a policy of ‘critical engagement’ towards Pyongyang which combines diplomatic and economic carrots with a number of sticks. This policy, however, is in need of an update to attend to two recent developments on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear power and the flurry of engagement and diplomacy involving North Korea— including top-level meetings with the US, South Korea and China. In this context, the EU should support its partners, South Korea and the US, as they launch a process that could lead to sustainable engagement with North Korea, denuclearisation, and, as a result, a more stable Korean Peninsula. Working with its partners, Europe should creatively use its power of engagement and cooperation to change behaviour. This will enhance the position of the EU as a constructive actor in Asian affairs, support efforts by the US and South Korea to engage North Korea and, ultimately, offer a better opportunity for the EU to achieve its goals.

Author biography Ramon Pacheco Pardo is senior lecturer in international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Corresponding author: Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Department of European & International Studies, King’s College London, Virginia Woolf Building, 22 Kingsway, London WC2B 6LE. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 241 The Future of Work: Robots © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813010DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813010 Cooking Free Lunches? journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

Ziga Turk

The rapid technological progress in automation, robotisation and artificial intelligence is raising fears, but also hopes, that in the future the nature of work will change significantly. There will be changes in what we do, how we form workplace relations, how we find work and the role of work in a society. Some believe that these changes will be for the better: we will need to work less and thus will have more free time. Others think that the changes will be for the worse: there will be fewer ways to earn a living. The central question of this paper is this: will adages such as ‘By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food’ and ‘No bees, no honey, no work, no money’ become obsolete? Will work disappear and with it the societal relations and inequalities that result from differing success in work? If this is going to happen, what policy options do we have to address the issue?

Author biography Žiga Turk is a Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. As academic he studies design communication, internet science and scenarios of future global developments, particularly the role of technology and innovation

Corresponding author: Z. Turk, FGG-IKPIR-KGI, Jamova 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 242 Differentiation, not © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813011DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813011 Disintegration journals.sagepub.com/home/euv

János Martonyi

This paper reflects on the notion of differentiated integration in the context of the future of Europe. It argues that differentiation is only acceptable as an instrument of ‘unity in diversity’ and within strict limits. All forms of differentiation that risk fragmenting the Union and its institutional framework should be excluded. In the field of external policies existing treaties and the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice allow the Union to speak with one voice and to privilege unity over differentiation. As far as internal EU divides are concerned– from divisions over migration to those involving the rise of regional groups of countries—they are all transient and changeable and are not relevant subjects for differentiation. Finally, attempts to redefine the euro area as the new ‘hard core’ of European integration should be rejected, as they can only lead to the disintegration of the European project. Out of all the available legal techniques of differentiation, enhanced cooperation carries the lowest risk.

Author biography János Martonyi is a university professor and politician. He is author of numerous books, essays and articles primarily in the field of international trade law, competition policy and European integration.

Corresponding author: J.Martony, Arany János u. 5 Szada, 2111 Hungary. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 243 Filling the Void: Why the © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818813294DOI: 10.1177/1781685818813294 EU Must Step Up Support journals.sagepub.com/home/euv for Russian Civil Society

Barbara von Ow-Freytag

Over the past 15 years, the space for civic engagement in Russia has continuously shrunk, and it looks set to be cut further during Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term. Following a wave of repressive measures, it is already more restricted than it has been since 1991. Non-governmental organisations and activists have been stripped of funds as their activities have been criminalised. They increasingly face a double disconnect: from international partners and within their own society. The clampdown on civil society reflects the growing repression of Russian society as a whole. But growing local initiatives and rising protests across the country undercut the narrative that Russian civil society is dead. And despite the pressure, Russian civil society is proving to be more active, resilient and diverse than is generally assumed. It continues to have new ideas and the capacity to be a key agent of development and social change in Russia. Many groups and individuals continue to have a vision for the country’s future and are willing to work with Western partners. The example of Ukraine shows that civil society is an indispensable factor in overcoming the authoritarian legacy of post-Soviet societies.

Author biography Barbara von Ow-Freytag is a journalist, political scientist and expert on Russian civil society. She is currently International Relations and Advocacy Advisor at the Prague Civil Society Centre.

Corresponding author: B. von Ow-Freytag, Av. Franklin Roosevelt 186/8 1050 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

Executive Summary

European View 2018, Vol. 17(2) 244 European Energy Security IN © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818811064DOI: 10.1177/1781685818811064 FOCUS: The Case Against journals.sagepub.com/home/euv Nord Stream 2

Dimitar Lilkov and Roland Freudenstein

The Nord Stream 2 project aims to double the capacity Russia currently possesses for delivering natural gas directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea. This paper provides an overview of the current developments surrounding the project and of opposition to the pipeline by the European Commission and a growing number of EU member states. It goes on to analyse the risks involved in the new gas infrastructure and argues that Nord Stream 2 would be detrimental to the energy security of a number of Central and Eastern European member states and of Ukraine. The paper contends that while the pipeline offers uncertain economic gains, it would dangerously weaken the EU’s strategic goals in Eastern Europe, disrupt the European Energy Security Strategy and damage member state unity. Ultimately, the new German government should recognise this and take the necessary measures to stop Nord Stream 2.

Author biographies Dimitar Lilkov is a Research Officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, where he focuses on Economic Affairs and Digital Economy, Energy and Environment. Roland Freudenstein is the policy director of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.

Corresponding author: D. Lilkov, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 20 Rue du Commerce, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Email: [email protected]