Using Mobile Platforms for Sensitive Government Business
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
UNCLASSIFIED Using Mobile Platforms for Sensitive Government Business Samuel Chenoweth Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Division Defence Science and Technology Organisation DSTO-GD-0722 ABSTRACT Mobile platforms such as smartphones are becoming increasingly popular for both personal and commercial use. When the data being stored and transmitted by these devices is sensitive this can introduce a host of security issues, some of which are discussed in this report. A summary is provided of existing practices for the use of mobile devices with sensitive information, in both governmental and business contexts, and emerging technologies for improving security are reviewed. Finally, some recommendations are offered for policymakers interested in increasing the role that mobile devices are allowed to play within the Australian Public Service and elsewhere. RELEASE LIMITATION Approved for public release UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Published by Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Division DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation PO Box 1500 Edinburgh South Australia 5111 Australia Telephone: (08) 7389 5555 Fax: (08) 7389 6567 © Commonwealth of Australia 2013 AR-015-497 January 2013 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Using Mobile Platforms for Sensitive Government Business Executive Summary This report investigates the issues and risks that are involved when mobile platforms, such as smartphones, are used for conducting sensitive government business. The objective of this work is to develop fresh but well researched perspectives on the manner in which these devices may be used without compromising security, so that policymakers within Defence and elsewhere in Australian government can be better informed when making decisions. The report offers specific advice on how smartphone policies and research efforts may be adjusted to improve smartphone utility in government, better protect confidential information and save on certification costs. A range of general security issues associated with smartphones are discussed. Additional issues are also identified that arise in specific usage scenarios, namely the traditional corporate technology paradigm where the organisation owns and administers the device and the bring-your-own device paradigm. Some of the known smartphone vulnerabilities are outlined, along with the threats that may exploit these. A survey of current and emerging smartphone technologies is presented, with a focus of technology for improving smartphone security or facilitating the integration of employee-owned smartphones with corporate or government systems. This survey includes a review of smartphone technology certified for use within the Australian government. Existing policy and practice for professional smartphone use is reviewed and critiqued, considering the experiences of private industry, the United States Government and the Australian government. Finally, some suggestions are made for how Australian government policy could be improved to provide better utility for professional smartphone users within government, whilst minimising the security risks. Based on technology which is currently available, this report recommends that the present policy of certifying popular commercial smartphone operating systems and allowing users to use personal devices for professional purposes should be reviewed, in favour of forcing users to use a government owned smartphone with a certified hypervisor operating system. Such a system provides secure separation of a number of different enclaves on the phone, which the user may switch between. The advantage of this is that there can be several professional enclaves on the phone, each administered by the organisation and at its own individual classification level, with the operating systems installed and configured by the organisation’s information technology staff (e.g. a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED previously certified operating system such as Windows Mobile). Moreover, there can also be a personal enclave running an operating system of the employee’s choice (e.g. Android), which is fully controlled by the employee and which can become compromised without affecting the security of the other enclaves or the privacy of any sensitive information stored on them. Some suggestions are also made for areas worthy of future research. In particular, it is recommended that head-mounted audiovisual displays be investigated as a means for allowing the private use of smartphones in public. As an extension of this, it is also proposed that a trusted input / output device be developed, which can allow a user to interact with remote applications on a secure government network, over a virtual private network connection through a personal smartphone and the Internet service provided by the carrier (both of which may be considered to be untrusted). UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DSTO-GD-0722 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1 2. GENERAL SECURITY ISSUES, VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS................. 1 2.1 Data Storage Confidentiality.................................................................................. 2 2.2 User Authentication ................................................................................................. 2 2.2.1 A Case Study – The iPhone 4S............................................................... 3 2.3 Phone to Network Authentication......................................................................... 5 2.4 Network to Phone Authentication......................................................................... 6 2.4.1 GSM........................................................................................................... 6 2.4.2 UMTS ........................................................................................................ 6 2.5 Data Transmission Confidentiality....................................................................... 7 2.6 Data Transmission Integrity................................................................................... 7 2.7 Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication using Other Protocols ........... 7 2.7.1 NFC ........................................................................................................... 8 2.7.2 Bluetooth................................................................................................... 9 2.7.3 WiFi ........................................................................................................... 9 2.8 Security Policy Consistency.................................................................................... 9 2.9 Side-Channels.......................................................................................................... 10 2.10 Application Level Vulnerabilities....................................................................... 12 2.11 Confidentiality in the User’s Physical Environment ....................................... 13 2.12 Privacy Issues........................................................................................................... 14 3. ADDITIONAL ISSUES IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT .................................... 14 3.1 Additional Issues Under the Traditional Corporate Information Technology Paradigm ............................................................................................ 14 3.1.1 Information Separation and Ownership ............................................ 15 3.1.2 Loss of Authorised Custody of the Smartphone............................... 15 3.1.3 Sharing Administration Rights with the User................................... 16 3.1.4 Personnel and Safety Issues ................................................................. 16 3.1.5 Financial Issues ...................................................................................... 17 3.2 Additional Issues Under the Bring-Your-Own-Device Paradigm................. 18 3.2.1 Information separation and ownership.............................................. 18 3.2.2 Loss of Custody of the Smartphone.................................................... 19 3.2.3 Sharing Administration Rights with the Organisation.................... 19 3.2.4 Personnel and Safety Issues ................................................................. 20 3.2.5 Financial Issues ...................................................................................... 20 3.3 Issues Specific to the Australian Government Context................................... 20 4. SMARTPHONE TECHNOLOGY REVIEW................................................................. 22 4.1 Emerging Security Technology ............................................................................ 22 4.1.1 Security Enhancing Software............................................................... 22 4.1.2 User Authentication Technology ........................................................ 22 4.1.3 Side Channel Countermeasures .......................................................... 25 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DSTO-GD-0722 4.2 Technology for Mixed Professional and Personal Use of Smartphones...... 27 4.2.1 Enterproid’s Divide............................................................................... 27 4.2.2 Redbend’s vLogix.................................................................................. 28 4.2.3 VMWare’s Mobile Virtualization Platform........................................ 28 4.2.4 Green Hills Platform for Trusted