West Papuan Demographics Revisited; Settlers Dominate Coastal Regions but the Highlands Still Overwhelmingly Papuan

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The Great Divide: West Papuan Demographics Revisited; Settlers Dominate Coastal Regions but the Highlands Still Overwhelmingly Papuan

Jim Elmslie

Abstract is also occurring in the highlands from expansion of the oil/gas sector and mining This paper will reconsider previous work on the sector; the proliferation of new regencies (with demographic transition under way in West new bureaucracies) and the continuing Papua (the Indonesian provinces of Papua and development of new roads, all of which alienate Papua Barat) in the light of documents received traditional land and draw in migrants. from the Indonesian Statistics Office (Badan Meanwhile the conflict over the political status Pusat Statistic BPS) that give an ethnicof West Papua will continue, and indeed grow, breakdown across the 29 regencies that as external actors, such as the Pacific countries comprise Papua province and the eleven of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, shine a regencies in Papua Barat. They show that, spotlight on the conflict and advocate for the while the proportion of Papuan people as a right to self-determination for the West Papuan percentage of the entire population continues people. to decline, this process varies widely between different regencies. While some have a strong This essay is dedicated to Professor Peter King, majority of non-Papuan people other regencies who died in Sydney in August 2016. Peter and I are still overwhelmingly Papuan. Thiscofounded the West Papua Project at the dichotomy is closely linked with topography – Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the mountainous interior outside of urban areas Sydney University in 2000 and was my teacher, having a Papuan majority and the accessible mentor and friend for 24 years. lowlands a non-Papuan majority. The The Importance of West Papua to consequences of this dichotomy – a large chunk Indonesia of West Papua about the size of Great Britain is peopled almost exclusively by Melanesian The territory of West Papua (the Indonesian people, even as some of the coastal regions provinces of Papua and Papua Barat) makes up become non-Papuan majority– is profound. about 24% of Indonesia’s total landmass but West Papuans of the interior have not only contains only 1.7% of the nation’s population. It survived Indonesian occupation but have kept is also Indonesia’s richest region in terms of their lands and cultures largely intact, which natural resources with the largest extant tracts continues to underpin calls for an independent of rainforest in south-east Asia; vast oil and gas West Papua and conflict with the Indonesian reserves, and possibly the world’s largest government and its security forces. While deposits of copper and gold. Indeed Papua’s coastal regions continue to receive large giant Freeport Mine is the largest economic numbers of non-Papuan migrants resulting in entity in Indonesia and the country’s largest the increasing minoritisation of the Papuan taxpayer. people and their concomitant militarization, marginalization and dispossession. This process The economic exploitation of these resources,

1 15 | 2 | 1 APJ | JF especially in the establishment of massive oil palm plantations (millions of hectares are underway or planned), and the economic opportunities that arise from a fast growing local economy has drawn in hundreds of thousands of migrants from other regions of Indonesia motivated by self-interest and previously by government sponsored transmigration programs. The migrants differ starkly from the indigenous (mainly Christian) Melanesian inhabitants of West Papua, being light skinned Asians predominantly of the Muslim faith.

West Papua is also symbolically central to the self-conceptualization of the Indonesian state Map One showing the territory of West as an archipelago nation whose motto is Papua (the Indonesian provinces of Papua Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and it and Papua Barat), previously known as represents the final victory of the Indonesian Irian Jaya. Note the large chain of nationalists over the Dutch after 350 years of mountain ranges that run through the brutal colonial rule. This means that the future island of New Guinea all the way to the of West Papua, and the movement by Papuan Bird’s Head region and the flat coastal nationalists to break away from Indonesia, is a plains to the north and south of this first order concern for the Indonesian highlands region. government and military. The demographic transition now underway wherein new migrants West Papuan Demographic Transition have become the majority in many regencies is one of the underlying drivers of conflict in West In a series of papers since 2006 I have Papua and is fueling the widespread desire for examined the demographic transition that has independence amongst the Papuan people. This taken place in West Papua following Indonesian is resulting in a direct challenge to the takeover in 1962-63, and especially since the authority and legitimacy of the Indonesian state census of 1971, which found the total and its sovereignty over West Papua. population of 923,000 as being 96% Papuan and only 4%, or 36,000 people, as non-Papuan. The basis of this argument is that the non- Papuan sector of the population is growing faster than the Papuan sector due to large scale inward migration of non-Papuans from other parts of Indonesia and the vastly substandard living conditions of ethic Papuans, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, that cause a lower overall fertility rate. Due to patchy statistical information the rate of growth of the two population sectors had to be estimated from different censuses data and then extrapolated as a projection of a possible future demographic break down.

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While the trends are clear and unambiguous 1971 up to 2000. From my calculations this the actual population growth rates varymeant that indigenous Papuans comprised depending on assumptions about future inward about 48% of the entire population of West migration and respective fertility rates. It also Papua (Papua and Papua Barat provinces) in must be presumed that in a region as vast and 2010. The figures received from the BPS are as rugged as West Papua, census data will from the 2010 census and identify the always be incomplete, as well as containing inhabitants of Papua province as either Suku certain inaccuracies. Therefore while the data Papua (Papuan tribe) or Suku Bukan Papua allows one to establish trends with great (non-Papuan tribe). According to these figures confidence, the precise number of future out of a total population of 2,883,381 in Papua population segments should be taken as Province, some 2,121,436 were Papuan indicative (with the caveat that projections are (73.57%) and 658,708 Non-Papuan (22.84%), based on past growth rates remainingthe remainder being unknown. The BPS figures consistent, which may not always be the case). for Papua Barat show that the total population Nonetheless the population of West Papua is 753,399 of which 51.49% is Papuan. continues to grow and the percentage of the population which is non-Papuan also continues to rise. This is a driver of conflict: newcomers take resources such as land, forests and minerals from traditional land owners; the Indonesian security apparatus continues to grow to maintain control over the territory and resource extraction in particular; Papuan people are further marginalized and lose even their basic freedoms of speech and association, and so Papuan discontent at the Indonesian occupation also grows and with it the desire for independence. Therefore understanding the demographic transition that is underway is central to comprehending the nature of the conflict in West Papua.

Where this paper extends the argument made in previous works is in the examination of the Papuan population on a regency by regency basis. Whereas in previous analyses the figures Map Two showing the territory of West were largely conflated to look at the territory of Papua including the Indonesian provinces West Papua (both Papua and Papua Barat of Papua and Papua Barat (West Papua) provinces) as a whole, we are now able to and the administrative regions called rather forensically examine each particular kabupatan (regencies). region in isolation. This allows a deeper more finely grained insight into the process. Thus these BPS figures differ somewhat from My previous analysis determined that the long my previous figures where I estimated that in term annual growth rate for the Papuan 2010 for a combined population of Papua population was 1.84% and that of the non- Province and Papua Barat Province of Papuan population 10.82% for the period from 3,612,854 some 1,730,336 (47.89%) were

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Papuan and 1,882,517 (52.10%) were non- uncertainty of the data collected by BPS over Papuan. The new BPS figures now indicate that various census periods. I have derived my the Papuan proportion of the total population of figures from the 1971; 2000 and 2010 censuses Papua and Papua Barat provinces is 66.26%, or and extrapolated growth rates from the 2,409,670 Papuans out of a total population of changes in population numbers between 3,612,854. This means (according to the BPS censuses. It is very possible that: figures) that the historical growth rate of the Papuans for the period 1971-2000 (1.84%) and The 1971 census was inaccurate due to the non-Papuans (10.82%) have changed. the recent takeover of Irian Barat (as the However the total number of Papuans in the territory of West Papua was then 2000 Indonesian census, where there was a officially designated) by the Indonesian breakdown of tribal populations, was 1,505,405 military; the relatively loose state control while the number of Papuans in the 2010 over a vast and wild country and the Indonesian census (Papua and Papua Barat limited resources of the Indonesian state provinces) was 2,409,670. This seems hard to apparatus to conduct such a census. believe as it implies a Papuan population The 2000 census was inaccurate due to growth rate of nearly 5%. The historical Papuan the widespread turmoil that was growth rate was 1.84% (1971 to 2000). The unfolding across much of Eastern current estimated growth rate for the whole of Indonesia in the wake of the fall of Indonesia is 1.40%. The 2013 estimate for the President Suharto and the subsequent growth rate of PNG is 2.1%. How can a growth independence of East Timor. In West rate of 5% for the Papuan population be Papua militia and other groups were explained? The answer to this question explains active and the Indonesian state why there is a divergence of my previous apparatus was again poorly equipped to predictions and the figures released by BPS. undertake such a huge process as a census across the vast and restless One explanation is that previous and current stretches of West Papua. Indonesian governments have deliberately The 2010 census may well be accurate, pursued a policy that researcher and analyst, although given that West Papua remains Emil Ola Kleden describes as the ‘unclarity of a very large and relatively undeveloped ethnic composition in Papua [that] reflected region with low population densities Indonesia’s lasting political stand on this issue. spread throughout very rugged terrain Both Old and New Order regimes held the view where a low level insurgency still that knowing the ‘truth’ about ethnic continues it is highly likely some groups composition could result in social and political were not included. It is also possible that instability’. One example of this policy of groups of Papuans were included who ‘unclarity’ is that the BPS documents from the had not been included in previous census 2010 census relating to ethnicity quoted in this (which could go some way to explaining paper were only briefly displayed on the the rapid increase in the number of provincial BPS website before being taken Papuans). down. Anecdotally there has been an incentive for the local regent (bupati) and other Besides any deliberate Indonesian government local leaders and politicians to inflate the policy there are several other possible number of people in villages and tribes to explanations for the confusion over the Papuan leverage more resources from the population growth rate and the subsequent provincial government – funds allocated total Papuan population and they lie in the for health and education services for

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instance. This may or may not have had The percentage of Papuans as a an effect on census data. proportion of the total population of the Papua and Papua Barat is falling over Besides actual difficulties in data collection time, primarily due to inward migration. there are also assumptions embodied in the This process is ongoing. data that may impact the outcome – either In some regions the percentage of intentionally or unintentionally. For instance Papuans as a proportion of the Table One shows the average annual population has fallen catastrophically. population growth rates for Indonesian This is particularly true in most urban provinces going back to 1971 by decade. For centres such as Jayapura and Sorong, Papua (and previously Irian Jaya Province) the and in the flat coastal areas such as growth rates have been 2.31% (1971-1980); Merauke and Keerom. This process is 3.46% (1980-1990); 3.22% (1990-2000); 5.39% ongoing (see below). (200-2010) but just 1.99% for 2010-2014. This That in large areas of the highlands and last figure is an estimation as censuses are remote regions of both Papua and Papua conducted every ten years. This is counter Barat provinces Papuan people still make intuitive as the population growth rate has up in excess of 90% of the total been growing for four decades in a solid trend, population. inward migration of non-Papuans into Papua has been strong in recent years (not least due Figures from the BPS publication, Profil to massive development in the oil palm sector Penduduk Menurut Suku Hasil SP 2010 di that has brought in many workers), and there Papua, (Population Profile Result According to has been rapid growth in (non-PapuanTribe in Papua 2010), show that the most of the dominated) urban areas. Non-Papuan population reside in only a few of Papua’s 28 kabupatens (regencies). According Together the above points mean that the data to the Suku document 556,422 Non-Papuans provided by BPS must be used with a degree of (84.47%) out of the total 658,708 are found in caution. It is highly possible that Papuans who just seven of Papua’s 28 regencies, leaving just missed out on earlier censuses due to their 102,286 non-Papuans spread out in the isolation were included in subsequent censuses remaining 21 regencies. as the strengthening Indonesian state apparatus and modern communications and Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk menurut Provinsi transportation improved the efficiency of BPS Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per Tahun Provinsi 2010-2014 1971-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 field operatives. It is also quite possible that 2 the numbers of Papuan people living in remote Aceh 2,93 2,72 1,46 2.36 1 2,06 Sumatera Utara 2,60 2,06 1,32 1,10 1,39 regions have been inflated to secure more Sumatera Barat 2,21 1,62 0,63 1,34 1,34 government funding (and electoral advantage). Riau 3,11 4,30 4,35 3,58 2,64 Jambi 4,07 3,40 1,84 2,56 1,85 Sumatera Selatan 3,32 3,15 2,39 1,85 1,50 Does this mean that it is impossible to draw Bengkulu 4,39 4,38 2,97 1,67 1,74 Lampung 5,77 2,67 1,17 1,24 1,26 conclusions on the demographic transition that Kepulauan Bangka - - 0,97 3,14 2,23 Belitung is underway in West Papua? No. Even if precise Kepulauan Riau - - - 4,95 3,16 numbers might be elusive trends can clearly be DKI Jakarta 3,93 2,42 0,17 1,41 1,11 Jawa Barat 2,66 2,57 2,03 1,90 1,58 established from the BPS data which hold even Jawa Tengah 1,64 1,18 0,94 0,37 0,82 when the exact numbers of respectiveDI Yogyakarta 1,10 0,57 0,72 1,04 1,20 Jawa Timur 1,49 1,08 0,70 0,76 0,69 population groups are unclear. By examining Banten - - 3,21 2,78 2,30 the data from the 2010 census it is apparent Bali 1,69 1,18 1,31 2,15 1,24 Nusa Tenggara Barat 2,36 2,15 1,82 1,17 1,40 that: Nusa Tenggara Timur 1,95 1,79 1,64 2,07 1,71 Kalimantan Barat 2,31 2,65 2,29 0,91 1,68

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Kalimantan Tengah 3,43 3,88 2,99 1,79 2,38 Tolikara 99.04%; Yahukimo 98.57%; Paniai Kalimantan Selatan 2,16 2,32 1,45 1,99 1,87 Kalimantan Timur 5,73 4,42 2,81 3,81 2.64 3 97.58%, and Jayawijaya 90.79% Papuan. This Sulawesi Utara 2,31 1,60 1,33 1,28 1,17 dramatic population disparity is graphic shown Sulawesi Tengah 3,86 2,87 2,57 1,95 1,71 Sulawesi Selatan 1,74 1,42 1,49 1,17 1,13 in Table Three. Sulawesi Tenggara 3,09 3,66 3,15 2,08 2,20 Gorontalo - - 1,59 2,26 1,65 Sulawesi Barat - - - 2,68 1,95 Table Three, Jumlah Penduduk Suku Papua dan Maluku 2,88 2,79 0,08 2,80 1,82 Bukan Papua Menurut Topografi Wilayah di Maluku Utara - - 0,48 2,47 2,21 Papua Barat - - - 3,71 2,65 Papua, Tahun 2010 (Total Population of Tribe Papua 2,67 3,46 3,22 5,39 1,99 Papua and not Tribe Papua According to INDONESIA 2,31 1,98 1,49 1,49 1,40 Catatan: Topography in Papua Year 2010), is quite Tidak Termasuk Timor Timur 1 Rata-rata Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per tahun 2000–2010 untuk Aceh dihitung staggering in revealing the incredible dengan menggunakan data Sensus Penduduk Aceh Nias (SPAN) 2005 dan SP2010 inconsistency in the ethnic makeup of the 2 Hasil Proyeksi Penduduk Indonesia 2010-2035 (Pertengahan tahun/Juni) 3 Rata-rata Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per tahun 2010–2014 untuk Kalimantan various regencies in Papua Province. Table Timur merupakan gabungan antara Kalimantan Timur dan Kalimantan Utara Sumber : Three divides the regencies of Papua Province - Sensus Penduduk 1971, 1980 , 1990 , 2000 , 2010 dan Sensus Penduduk Antar into three geographical zones: Dataran Mudah Sensus (SUPAS) 1995 - Data Dikutip dari Publikasi Statistik Indonesia (easy plains); Dataran Sulit (difficult plains) and Pegunungan (mountain range). It is immediately apparent that the non-Papuan Table One showing average annual population is predominant in the hospitable population growth rates by decade. Source: ‘easy plains’, significant in the ‘difficult plains’, BPS. but very sparse in the ‘mountain ranges’. The non-Papuan population has moved to and It is clear that the trend of an increasing settled regions most conducive to types of proportion of non-Papuans in the overall agriculture of industrial development in line population of Papua and Papua Barat province with the economic models seen elsewhere in is continuing. What the Suku document shows Indonesia. They have not moved in large is that the non-Papuans are concentrated in a numbers to the mountainous regions – with few regencies, most of which are located in the some exceptions such as the fertile agricultural border region close to neighbouring PNG; in lands of the Baliem Valley where much land has Mimika near the Freeport Mine; on Biak Island been ‘bought’ from traditional Dani subsistence and in the urban centre of Nabire. Table Two farmers. shows the actual breakdown for each regency in Papua Province by ethnic group. This table In Papua Barat province the population divide shows that there are five regencies with a similarly runs between urban and remote majority of non-Papuans: Merauke (62.73%); areas. In Sorong regency Papuans make up Nabire (52.46%); Mimika (57.49%); Keerom only 36.07% of the population and non-Papuans (58.68%), and Jayapura City (65.09%). This 73.93% with Javanese being the single biggest means that there are still 23 regencies where ethnic group at 41.46%. Meanwhile the Papuans are in the majority although there are mountainous regencies of Trambraun and another six with substantial non-Papuan Maybrat both have Papuan populations in populations: Jayapura (rural) (38.52%); Yapen excess of 95% of the total populations. Waropen (21.91%); Biak Numfor (26.18%); Boven Digoel (33.04%); Sarmi (29.75%), and Waropen (20.41%). The remaining 17 regencies are all overwhelmingly Papuan in their ethnic composition, although with a non-Papuan presence concentrated heavily in the towns. For instance Lanny Jaya is 99.89% Papuan;

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cohorts and by geographic region into Dataran Mudah (easy plains); Dataran Sulit (difficult plains) and Pegunungan (mountain range). Source: Indonesian Statistics Office, BPS. Note that the non- Papuan population cohort is indicated by the darker shaded portion of the bar graphs and is predominantly in the Dataran Mudah (easy plains) region of Papuan province. Relatively few non- Papuan people live in the Pegunungan (mountain range) regions of the highlands.

This situation has echoes of the occupation of Australia by European settlers. The fertile ‘easy’ country of the coastal regions, particularly along the Eastern seaboard, was quickly taken over by farmer settlers, but the harsh interior and northern reaches of Australia were left alone for nearly a century from initial European invasion in 1788. It was really only with the expansion of the cattle industry in the late nineteenth century that large areas of the centre and north were Table Two showing the ethnic breakdown occupied by the colonialists, driven by of regencies into Papuan and Bukan commercial imperatives. Similar settlement Papuan (non-Papuan) charts in 2010. patterns unfolded in New Zealand, Canada and Source: Indonesian Statistics Office, BPS. the United States where the economics of settler colonization (where the colonisers never left) resulted in widespread land alienation

from traditional owners and the death of indigenous peoples on a massive scale. Will this same process unfold in Papua Province driven by mining projects, new regencies and roads as well as new military bases, rather than cattle?

Whereas in previous analysis’s I conflated the population segments and treated the population of West Papua (Papua Province and West Papua Province) as a single entity and extrapolated future population projections based on previous growth rates, the Suku, and other, documents allow for focused analysis. Table Three showing the regencies of The basic finding that the non-Papuan sector of Papua Province broken into Papuan and the population is growing faster than the Bukan Papuan (non-Papuan) population Papuan is sound, but with great regional

7 15 | 2 | 1 APJ | JF variance. The projection that the non-Papuan plantations are underway or in the planning sector of the population would come tostages – all on land taken from traditional dominate the Papuan sector and comprise a owners, often under coercion and with little or majority is correct in certain regencies, but no compensation. Papuans are even deprived of clearly not yet happening in other regencies, employment as labourers on the plantations as especially in the highlands. The non-Papuan workers are being brought in from Java, many sector of the population now clearly dominates of whom apparently do not speak the lingua the richest areas and the urban centres of franca and official national language, Bahasa power, with all the benefits that brings such as Indonesia (and are therefore unable to education and health services. communicate with local Papuans who can speak it). The Javanese are seen as more One region where the demographic transition reliable and dedicated workers than the has been well researched is Keerom, where Papuans – which may be true as the Papuans non-Papuans made up around 60% of the are used to the more relaxed lifestyle of population in 2010 (this figure would be subsistence farming. Apparently these Javanese significantly higher in 2017). From being 100% settlers have themselves been forced off their Papuan in 1963 the authors’ predict on current land in Java due to large scale industrial trends that the Papuan percentage of the developments, for example, the expansion of population will fall to 15-20% within the next Java’s network of freeways; there is therefore decade or so. The Papuans are systematically an economic imperative to resettle them discriminated against by having manifestly elsewhere and Papua is still seen as largely inferior health and education services, greatly ‘empty’. reduced access to sealed roads, piped water and electricity and have lost large areas of land Ethnic tension in Merauke is high and minor to migrant ‘land grabbing’ for both small scale incidents, such as traffic accidents, easily agriculture and large scale oil palm projects. escalate into violent stand offs where the Besides the racial divide the two populations (predominantly non-Papuan) police side with are also divided by religion – Papuans being the migrants. There are reports that police are predominantly Christian and migrantsalso arming migrants, who are fearful of the predominantly Muslim. Fear and mistrust Papuans’ ‘primitiveness’ and believe them to be characterize relations between the twouncivilized and violent. Further exacerbated by communities. As migrants continue to encroach religious differences this situation is a powder on Papuan land tension continues to simmer. keg contained only by a repressive military and Such conditions are a breeding ground for police presence. It is a situation where inter-ethnic violence, up to and including everyday life is one of oppression and misery genocide, which I have discussed at some for most of the Papuan population who suffer length in previous publications. the indignity of being an occupied population: having their traditional lands stolen; Another region where non-Papuan domination discrimination in employment; very poor levels has already become entrenched is in Merauke of health and education services and no basic Kabupaten, in the southern region of Papua freedoms of expression and association. province, where the Papuans comprised less Violence meted out to Papuans suspected of than 40 percent of the population in 2010 (this supporting ‘separatism’ is swift and ranges figure would be lower in 2017). This is a region from beatings, incarceration and torture to where huge oil palm development is proceeding extrajudicial killings. The police and military as part of the Merauke Integrated Food and act with impunity and the legal system is Energy Estate (MIFEE). Millions of hectares of effectively an arm of the security apparatus.

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Concluding Comments profound:

Previously I have predicted that, if the trends of The Papuan people living in regencies the past few decades remained constant, the such as Sorong, Merauke, Jayapura City, Papuan sector of the total population of West Keerom and Mimika are already a Papua would continue to fall until it was a minority and are set to become further ‘small and rapidly dwindling minority’. This marginalized as non-Papuan migrants paper extends that argument and finds while continue to arrive to work in the such a conclusion is correct for some agricultural sector and pursue other regencies, it is not for others. Indeed the economic opportunities. Non-Papuan situation predicted as a possible future for migrants clash with the Papuan West Papua as a whole – the minoritisation of population due to loss of traditional the Papuan people – is already a reality in rural lands; discrimination in employment, areas such as Keerom and Merauke, and urban health and education services; religious centres such as Jayapura and Sorong. tensions, and by the increasing suppression and human rights abuses The fact that only relatively small numbers of inflicted by Indonesian security forces, migrants have moved into the highlands especially in response to perceived regions of Papua and Papua Barat means the ‘separatist’ activity. This is set to highland Papuan groups, such as the Dani and continue and grow as more non-Papuan the Mee, are not in imminent danger of migrants arrive, fueling ethnic tensions becoming a ‘small and rapidly dwindling and laying the ground for violent, even minority’, even as their lowland brothers and genocidal, conflict. sisters suffer that fate. Migrants are The Papuan people living in regencies in increasingly drawn to the economic the mountainous interior of the country advantages, and relative safety, of the lowland are still the overwhelming majority. The regions where they can work on oil palm relatively small number of non-Papuan plantations or ‘own’ their own small migrants in these areas are involved in agricultural blocks, as well as works as traders, trade, civil service, the construction public servants and participants in the rapid industry and the security forces. While economic expansion that is underway. These new roads, airports and industrial opportunities are more limited in the highlands developments are underway, large but growing as new regencies are created and numbers of migrants will only arrive new roads and settlements built, and as mining when economic opportunities are and oil/gas projects proliferate. present, such as oil palm or other plantations (where possible); mines; gas While some regions are Papuan dominated and and oil fields are expanded or other others migrant dominated, regions such as projects are established. It seems likely Sarmi, Biak Numfor and Jayapura (rural) still that this will occur, at least in some have a Papuan majority but are receiving large areas, as the economic imperative numbers of migrants. If these trends continue driving development reaches ever further they will end up in the same pernicious into remote areas. Conflict over such situation as the migrant dominated areas resource development and the ongoing discussed above where the Papuans become security response with ‘sweeping’ marginalised and their future existence is put operations and military reprisals seems in peril. likely to continue under current Indonesian government policies. The The consequences of these new findings are

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situation can be described as ongoing settlement by recent non-Papuan migrants in insurgency which is now characterized the territory of West Papua is far from uniform. by non-violent resistance on the part of On the contrary most of the migrants have the Papuans demanding not just their settled in the coastal plains and urban centres basic human rights but also that of self- while the vast highlands regions remain determination, bolstered by rapidly populated predominantly by Papuan people. growing international support,However the highlands regions will be particularly from the small Pacific island increasingly attractive to migrants as the nations such as Vanuatu and theIndonesia government pursues aggressive Solomon Islands. economic development policies including Given the above the conflict in Papua creating new regencies (and their concomitant Province (and West Papua Province) will bureaucracies); building roads and developing only grow short of a fundamental shift in mineral; oil/gas and forestry resources. While Indonesian policy including: thethe Indonesian government claims that recognition of traditional land ownership accelerated development will help resolve rights; ceasing militarization and military Papuan grievances against Indonesian rule the impunity; respect for the fundamental opposite is likely as the Papuans get left behind human rights of free speech andin the development process in favour of non- association; progressive education, Papuan migrants; they become further health and employment opportunities, marginalized within an Asian Muslim society, and the emergence of politicaland their traditional lands are forcibly taken organisations that adequately reflect the over by government or commercial interests. interests of the Papuan people. At this Therefore it looks likely that the changing stage such policy shifts by the Indonesian demographic make of West Papua will continue government appear unlikely. to fuel conflict into the future. International support for the basic rights of the Papuan people is growing rapidly The author would like to thank Septer with a goal of taking the issue to the Manufandu for his insightful comments and United Nations, having (West) Papua put assistance with this essay, and Cammi Webb- back on the Schedule of Non-Self Gannon and Jason MacLeod, his colleagues at Governing Territories and, ultimately, the West Papua Project, for their ongoing having the flawed 1969 Act of Free support and vital feedback. Choice, whereby Indonesia gained sovereignty over the region, revisited. These figures mean that the ‘problem’ of West Papua will not be resolved any time soon by the effective minoritisation of the Papuan people, at least not in the highlands. On the contrary large portions of the Papuan people retain their lands and cultures intact and are quite capable of both having an open and honest vote on their integration into Indonesia, and, given the chance, functioning as an independent nation.

This paper shows how that the process of

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Here: MSG Headache, West Papuan Heartache? Indonesia's Melanesian Related articles Foray David Adam Stott, Here:Would An Cammelia Webb-Gannon, Here: Independent West Papua Be A Failing Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans State? in the Face of Australia-Indonesia David Adam Stott, Here:Indonesian Obstruction Colonisation, Resource Plunder and West Camellia Webb-Gannon and Jim Elmslie, Papuan Grievances

Jim Elmslie is Honorary Research Fellow and convener of the West Papua Project, the Department for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. His PhD entitled Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism, was published by the University of Hawaii Press. Jim has been closely involved with the Sepik River region of PNG since 1983 as a political economist, tribal art dealer, film consultant and cultural advisor. [email protected]

Notes

1 For instance, West Papua: Genocide, Demographic Change, the Issue of ‘Intent’ and the Australia-Indonesia Security Treaty, Australia Institute of International Affairs, Adelaide, 23/10/06; Not Just a Disaster, Papuan Claims of Genocide Deserve to be taken Seriously, Inside Indonesia Issue 97, July-Sept. 2009; West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” or Not?, Papua Papers No. 1, CPACS, University of Sydney, September, 2010. More recently with Camellia Webb-Gannon, A Slow Motion Genocide: Indonesian Rule in West Papua, Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity, Vol. 1(2), 2013, pp. 142-165. 2 See West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion genocide” or not? Op. cit. 3 Ibid. 4 Suku meaning ‘tribe’ and Bukan meaning ‘not’ in Bahasa Indonesia 5 Statistics on Ethnic Diversity in the Land of Papua, Indonesia, Aris Ananta; Dwi Retno Wilujeng Wahyu Utami; Nur Budi Handayani, Asia & Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 3, September 2016, p. 3. 6 There is some variance in the figures from the Badan Pusat Staistik of total populations etc. although these are statistically insignificant. 7 www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/print/id/1268 8 This quote is from a paper presented by Emil Ola Kleden, ‘Papua, Indonesia and Climate Change’ for the conference, At The Intersection: Climate Change in the Pacific and Resource Exploitation in West Papua, organized by the West Papua Project at the University of Western Sydney on November 3-4, 2016. Kleden refers to Ananta, A., Evi Nurvidya Arifin, M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi Handayani, Agus Pramono, Demography of Indonesia’s Ethnicity,

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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2015, p.10. 9 10 Statistics on Ethnic Diversity, op. cit. 11 Cypri J. P. Dale and John Djonga, The Papuan Paradox: The Patterns of Social Injustice, the Violations of Right to Development, and the Failure of Affirmative Policies in Kabupaten Keerom, Papua, Yayasan Teratai Hati Papua, Arso, Keerom, Papua, and Sunspirit for Justice and Peace, Flores, NTT, Indonesia, 2011, slide 45. 12 Ibid. 13 See Jim Elmslie and Cammi Webb-Gannon, A Slow-Motion Genocide: Indonesian Rule in West Papua, Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity, Vol. 1[2] 2013, pp. 142-165. 14 Confidential source with firsthand knowledge of conditions in Merauke. 15 Personal comment from a Papuan source who related that many Papuan people are unused to the controlled and repetitive regime of industrial agriculture, and intensely bored from such occupations as security ‘guards’. 16 Ibid. 17 For instance see, Jim Elmslie, West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” or not?, Papua Papers No. 1, West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2010, p.4.