The Forthcoming Struggles and Wars According to Xi Jinping No
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ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Forthcoming Struggles and Wars According to Xi Jinping No. 595 Yossef Bodansky Jan 2019 The Forthcoming Struggles and Wars According to Xi Jinping Yossef Bodansky January 2019 Executive Summary * Xi Jinping increasingly bases his policies on the Legalism school best associated with Han Fei. * Xi Jinping keeps preparing the PRC for a protracted confrontation, perhaps violent war, with the US. Xi Jinping’s US strategy builds on Mao Zedong’s “protracted war” doctrine. * Given the magnitude of the core and vital Chinese interests in stark contradiction with the US - there is no hope that any Sino-US economic deal will avert a major confrontation. These endemic differences cannot be resolved fully because of the US profound and lingering misunderstanding of China. Indeed, China expects more US provocations rather than conflict resolution. * Hence, Xi Jinping ordered the PLA to intensify its training and preparations for war. He also ordered the development and fielding of new weapon systems. The PLA will increase its global footprint including the establishing of new overseas bases. About ISPSW The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) is a private institute for research and consultancy. The ISPSW is an objective, task-oriented and politically non-partisan institute. In the increasingly complex international environment of globalized economic processes and worldwide political, ecological, social and cultural change, which occasions both major opportunities and risks, decision- makers in the economic and political arena depend more than ever before on the advice of highly qualified experts. ISPSW offers a range of services, including strategic analyses, security consultancy, executive coaching and intercultural competency. ISPSW publications examine a wide range of topics connected with politics, the economy, international relations, and security/ defense. ISPSW network experts have held – in some cases for decades – executive positions and dispose over a wide range of experience in their respective fields of expertise. © Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW Giesebrechtstr. 9 Tel +49 (0)30 88 91 89 05 E-Mail: [email protected] 10629 Berlin Fax +49 (0)30 88 91 89 06 Website: http://www.ispsw.de Germany 1 ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Forthcoming Struggles and Wars According to Xi Jinping No. 595 Yossef Bodansky Jan 2019 Analysis A wise ruler, when he makes his laws, is bound to find himself in conflict with the world. - Han Fei (280-233 BC) If you wish to urge a policy of peaceful coexistence, then be sure to expound it in terms of lofty ideals, but also hint that it is commensurate with the ruler’s personal interests. - Han Fei Undertakings succeed through secrecy but fall through being found out. - Han Fei On 4 January 2019, Xu Wei wrote in the China Daily , President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the opening of the Academy of Chinese History Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The letter instructed Chinese historians to “improve their research and innovation to better summarize historical experience, reveal patterns and grasp the trend of history.” Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of history. “History is a mirror,” Xi’s letter said, “and drawing its lessons not only benefits contemporary endeavors but also enriches the mind. It is a fine tradition of China, with a civilization of over 5,000 years, to emphasize historical research and its use as a reference.” Given the current challenges facing China, Xi Jinping wrote, the role of history and precedents is becoming increasingly important for decision makers. “It is even more necessary to conduct systematic research into Chinese history and culture and learn more deeply about historical development patterns to adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.” The opening of the new Academy comes on the coattails of a slew of New Year editorials in the Chinese media stressing the historical continuity and Chinese heritage of the current policies as pursued by Xi Jinping and the Forbidden City. “China will tread its own path steadily in 2019” irrespective of the positions of the US-led West, was the defiant tone of these editorials. Xi Jinping’s close attention to Chinese history and heritage, particularly of the Imperial era, is clear from his policies and speeches. He is a firm believer in the Legalism school that promotes the powers of the central paramount leader, as well as the importance of “realism” - that is, “realpolitik”. The Legalism school is best associated with Han Fei (or Han Feizi, 280-233 BC). Han Fei and Qin Shi Huang (259-210 BC) - the emperor that adapted his theories - have long been favorites of the Chinese Communist ruling elites. China expert Francois Bougon writes in his 2018 book Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping that “Mao [Zedong] unashamedly laid claim to the revolution brought about by the Legalists. Just like the first emperor, he brought about a new, strong regime that wiped the slate clean, drawing a line under two millennia of empire. He described his own leadership as ‘Marx plus Qin Shi Huang’.” However, the depth of the adoption of, and reliance on, Han Fei and the Legalism school under Xi Jinping are unprecedented. This need not surprise. Modern Chinese intellectuals have long considered Han Fei as the key © Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW Giesebrechtstr. 9 Tel +49 (0)30 88 91 89 05 E-Mail: [email protected] 10629 Berlin Fax +49 (0)30 88 91 89 06 Website: http://www.ispsw.de Germany 2 ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Forthcoming Struggles and Wars According to Xi Jinping No. 595 Yossef Bodansky Jan 2019 to the salvation and modernization of China without losing its unique civilizational heritage, and as the key to overcoming the challenges posed by the sheer size of the land and the populace. The great Chinese intellectual Lin Yutang (1895-1976) delivered a lecture in October 1930 titled “Han Fei as a Cure for Modern China” in which he argued that China should consider “Han Fei as a modern prophet” whose philosophies should be widely adopted. Han Fei’s hardline realism and pragmatism can solve the endemic problems and address the huge challenges faced by a China seeking modernization and global ascent. Lin Yutang stressed that “the striking modernity of Han Fei is the best reason why” he should be considered the solution for contemporary China. Indeed, Bougon writes, it is frequently said that “Han Fei is Xi’s ‘favorite philosopher’.” Bougon notes that Xi Jinping frequently cites Han Fei approvingly in support of his own policies. For example, in September 2014, Xi Jinping quoted the following phrase from Han Fei: “When those who uphold the law are strong, the state is strong. When they are weak, the state is weak.” In a December 2015 article, Kerry Brown concurred that “Xi Jinping’s statecraft is influenced above all” by Han Fei’s teachings. Liu Yunshan, the Party’s chief ideologue, identified “traditional, splendid Chinese history and culture” as a huge asset for official Beijing. The legacy of Han Fei emerges as “one of the sources of legitimacy the Party in the 21st century appeals to. ... Strong laws, hatred of waste, and support for self-effacing bureaucrats promote one prime object for Han Fei: strengthening and preservation of the authority of the ruler. ... Authority is not the best bet, but the only bet for sound governance.” Having studied his speeches and writings to-date, Brown concludes, “Xi Jinping might have done more than glance at the suggestions about the exercise of power and realpolitik given in Han Fei’s writings, and heed the advice about being constantly wary and on guard.” Growing domestic-economic challenges are facing the PRC. For more than twenty years now, the three engines of China’s economy have been investment, domestic consumption and exports. In 2018, they all suffered substantial decline. Although Xi Jinping stressed the enduring success of the PRC’s “reconstructive reforms” in his New Year speech - Chinese liberal economists urge “averting a potentially devastating economic downturn.” Overall though, the vast majority of Chinese economists concur that the PRC would achieve its stated growth target of 6.5% for 2018. But this would be “the weakest rate in almost three decades” since the average annual growth rate was about 9.7% between 1978 and 2015. Beijing cannot ignore the slowdown of economic growth - as much because of internal transformations as a result of the trade and tariff war with the US. China is facing environmental problems. The growing shortages of food and water cannot be solved internally and larger quantities of food must be imported. Similarly, there is urgent imperative to import ever growing quantities of hydro-carbons. Local government debt threatens fiscal stability. Local corruption is mainly the result of the emergence of localized foci of self-interests - which, in Chinese history, were the harbingers of warlordism and the fracturing of empires. Most important is the demographic challenge of a maturing China with a small and shrinking number of working-age Chinese. This is the aggregate result of the one-child policies and the markedly improving public medical services (that keep people living longer). There is urgent imperative to readjust the rural population into more efficient food production and the urban population into supporting increasingly automated production. All these profound changes will take years to achieve. Add to this the growing resource allocation to the military/security sectors in order to address the requirements of the ascent of China. © Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW Giesebrechtstr.