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Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities

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Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities RECOGNIZING JUSTICE FOR CITIZENS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES by KACEY BROOKE WARREN B.A. California State University Sacramento, 2005 M.A. University of Colorado at Boulder, 2008 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy 2012 This dissertation entitled: Recognizing Justice For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities written by Kacey Brooke Warren has been approved for the Department of Philosophy ____________________________ Dr. Alison Jaggar (Chair) ____________________________ Dr. Eva Kittay ____________________________ Dr. Celeste Montoya-Kirk ____________________________ Dr. Alastair Norcross ____________________________ Dr. Michael Zimmerman Date___________ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. iii Warren, Kacey Brooke (Ph.D., Philosophy, Department of Philosophy) “Recognizing Justice For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities” A dissertation directed by College Professor of Distinction Alison Jaggar Citizens with cognitive disabilities represent a growing constituency in Western liberal democratic societies and, indeed, within the globe. There are currently millions of citizens with cognitive disabilities living in the United States alone. Most people will experience cognitive disability as some point in their lives, or at least will know and likely care for someone who does. The question of what justice requires for citizens with cognitive disabilities is citizens therefore a topic that any normatively adequate theory of justice must neither to overlook, nor ignore. Central to any liberal theory of justice are the values of political equality and liberty and with these the need to provide justification for all those who are subject to the coercive legal and social institutions that the theory specifies. Although undeniably subject to any political regime and, indeed, to any liberal theory of justice intended to govern one, citizens with cognitive disabilities have frequently and without justification been denied equal justice. This, I suggest, marks a lurking bias in the structure of these theories of justice—the extent of which becomes evident only in light of the plausibility that alternative theories of justice can meet a standard of political equality and liberty for citizens with cognitive disabilities. In light of this I assess four of the most influential contemporary theories of justice: John Rawls’s justice as fairness; Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach; Eva Kittay’s connection- iv based approach and Axel Honneth’s theory of differentiated recognition according to these two standards. My analysis clarifies how in the first three, certain of the theorist’s methodological commitments precludes the theory of justice he or she advances from meeting either one or the other or both standards. I conclude that of the four, Axel Honneth’s theory of differentiated recognition is the most promising. I then propose an approach to justification in terms of contextual transparency that complements Honneth’s theory and has potential for upholding a standard of political equality and the liberal standard of justification. v Acknowledgments It is a pleasure for me to thank David Boonin, Amandine Catala, Alison, Jaggar, Audra King, Eva Kittay, Claudia Mills, Celeste Montoya-Kirk, Marlisa Moschella, Alastair Norcross, Giovana Nurena, Edwin Rhine, Kevin and Rhiannon Thompson, Michael Zimmerman, and my parents Gary and Linda Warren, all of whom have made this dissertation possible. I owe my most profound gratitude to Alison Jaggar for her exceptional assistance and dedication as director of my dissertation. I feel extremely fortunate to work under Alison who has served as an inspirational figure in my life, even prior to attending graduate school. It was because of her work, namely in Feminist Politics and Human Nature, that I chose to attend graduate school and that CU Boulder was my top choice. Many years later, it is because of her continued work, most certainly as distinguished professor at CU Boulder and an unparalleled author in feminist philosophy in the United States as well as abroad, but also as an advisor and role-model for female graduate students like myself, that I now have the confidence, knowledge, and privilege to issue forth my own work. I am deeply indebted to Alison for the countless drafts she has read, the precision with which she has criticized them, and the guidance she has offered for restructuring and clarifying the ideas presented in them. I do hope that this dissertation is something that not only I but she too can be proud of. I am also honored to have Alastair Norcross, Michael Zimmerman, Celeste Montoya-Kirk and Eva Kittay as members of my doctoral dissertation committee. It is a special honor for me to work with Eva Kittay who is widely recognized as one of the most distinguished philosophers working on moral issues, including of justice, for citizens with cognitive disabilities in the vi United States. She has extended herself far beyond any commitments she may have at SUNY Stonybrook and graciously offered her assistance as a member of my committee and for this I am both privileged and grateful. I am also grateful for the efforts of Alastair Norcross who has participated not only on this committee but also on my prospectus committee alongside David Boonin and Claudia Mills, whose assistance I appreciate very much too. Finally, I would like to thank Christine Hollister, Giovana Nurena, and Edwin Rhine for their copy-editing assistance, Amandine Catala, Audra King, and Marlisa Moschella for the numerous discussions where I clarified my ideas and for offering substantive commentary on early drafts of the dissertation, and those precious friends and family members (in particular, my parents, Marlisa Moschella, Giovana Nurena, Edwin Rhine, and Kevin and Rhiannon Thompson) who provided me with much needed and appreciated moral support during those times where I questioned my ability to continue. I am deeply thankful for Marlisa’s unwavering confidence and friendship, as well as for our numerous philosophy talks over coffee or over the phone, which so often gave me the nudge I needed to get the ideas out of my head and onto paper. vii Table of Contents 1. What Does Justice Require For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities? The Need For Moral Analysis 1.1 Disability and Political Philosophy......................................................................................1 1.2 The Challenge Cognitive Disability Poses to Liberalism....................................................5 1.3 Two Necessary Standards of Adequacy For a Liberal Theory of Justice..........................10 1.4 Toward a Liberal Theory of Justice For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities ........................................................................................................................15 2. Political Equality For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities 2.1 Liberalism and Presumptive Political Equality..................................................................17 2.2 What is “Disability”: The Social Model of Disability and The American’s With Disabilities Act.......................................................................................18 2.3 Cognitive Disability and Political Equality: Three Important Considerations .................23 2.4 Meeting the Standard of Presumptive Political Equality: Equal Basic Rights and Equal Moral Consideration..........................................................................................................33 3. Liberty and the Liberal Standard of Justification: 3.1 The Liberal Standard of Justification: An Interpretation of Equal Liberty.......................37 3.2. Original Position Reasoning..............................................................................................37 3.3 Wide Reflective Equilibrium.............................................................................................42 3.4 Overlapping Consensus.....................................................................................................46 viii 3.5 Operationalizing the Liberal Standard of Justification For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities.........................................................................................................................51 4. Can Justice As Fairness Uphold the Values of Political Equality and Liberty For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities? 4.1 Justice as Fairness and the Exclusion of Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities..................53 4.2 An Overview of Justice as Fairness...................................................................................55 4.3 Can Justice as Fairness Plausibly Address Concerns for the Equal Treatment of Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities Who Have Medical Impairment?...........................................64 4.4 Can Justice as Fairness Plausibly Address Concerns for the Equal Treatment of Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities Who Are Socially and Politically Excluded?........................67 4.5 Can Justice as Fairness Plausibly Address Concerns for the Equal Treatment of Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities Who are Stigmatized?.............................................70 4.6 Is Justice as Fairness Justifiable to Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities via Wide-Reflective Equilibrium?...........................................................................................74
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