Islam and Diversity in Contemporary Indonesia

Volume 110 • Number 4• Autumn 2020 e Muslimth WORLD

Islam and Diversity in Contemporary Indonesia: Belief, Gender, and Politics Guest Editors Muhamad Ali University of California, Riverside Muhammad Afdillah Hartford Seminary/UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya e Muslimth WORLD

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Volume 110 ● Number 4 ● Autumn 2020 Contents

I NTRODUCTION

455 Islam and Diversity in Contemporary Indonesia: Belief, Gender, and Politics

O RIGINAL ARTICLES

458 Between Faith and Social Relations: The Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’s Fatwas and Ideas on Non-Muslims and Interreligious Relations Muhamad Ali

481 The Politics of Interreligious Dialogue in Indonesia: An Analysis of the Ulama’s Anti-Kristenisasi Fatwas and Their Challenge to the Government’s Interreligious Harmony Project Muhammad Afdillah

502 Say “No” to Christmas? An Analysis of the Islamic Fatwa on the Prohibition against Wearing Non-Muslim Symbols in Indonesia Hans A. Harmakaputra

518 Against All Heteredoxies: Accounts of the Deviant Groups (Aliran-Aliran Sesat) in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Literature Ismatu Ropi

535 Cherishing the Ideology of Silence: Islam, Christianity, and Interreligious Relations among the Madurese People Akhmad Siddiq 553 Contours of the Divine Feminine: Islamic and Christian Feminist Theologies in Indonesia Lailatul Fitriyah

572 The Role of Women in Interreligious Dialogue in Indonesia: A Study on the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB) Wiwin S.A. Rohmawati

589 Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues Ken Miichi

605 The Populism of Islamist Preachers in Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Election Yuka Kayane

625 List of Contributors and List of Book Reviewers

B OOK REVIEWS

628 Bernard Adeney-Risakotta: Living in a Sacred Cosmos: Indonesia and the Future of Islam Hans A. Harmakaputra

631 Greg Fealy and Ronit Ricci: Contentious Belonging: The Place of Minorities in Indonesia Mikhael Sihotang

634 Kevin Fogg: Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution Abraham Silo Wilar Against All Heteredoxies: Accounts of the Deviant Groups (Aliran-Aliran Sesat) in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Literature

Ismatu Ropi UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta/PPIM UIN Jakarta

Introduction n 2007 the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Ulama Council) issued a fatwa on the criteria of aliran sesat (deviant sects). The fatwa contains ten major principles to prohibit any actions, teachings and movements that have ‘exceeded the bounds’ of legit- Iimate dissent and have entered the realm of offence against the sacred according to Islamic doctrines. This legal statement was issued in response to certain attitudes and actions of individuals and groups who were seen to cross the boundary lines of acceptability of Islamic doctrines or to violate the sanctity of the Prophet Muhammad. For many, this MUI’s legal statement on those issues represents the prolonged contestation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Indonesia. On the surface, the distinction between the two domains in Islamic scholarship in general seems clear and simple. Various studies, however, have shown that the division is in fact not as it seems. In this article, the two opposing words are meant as follows: orthodoxy has to do with the notion of following mainstream doctrines, and heterodoxy has to do with any schism divorcing ‘deviated’ doctrines from those of the mainstream. The issue of authority who has the right to consider themselves as the mainstream–and thus constituting the orthodox–and those as the minority to be labelled as the heterodox, may be a point that involves multiple perspectives. Throughout Indonesia’s long history, contestation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy has had its strong roots. Unfortunately, historical records on the issue are scarce while it is really important to see the fluctuation of religious tensions in Indonesia. Since the coming of Islam in the archipelago in the thirteenth century, cases on the matter have occurred quite frequently. The works of Hamzah Fansuri, a prominent ulama and the judge during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh Darussalam kingdom, were accused by his successor, Nuruddin al-Raniri, of having disgraced the majesty of Islam. The latter suggested that all of the works of Fansuri be burnt in public. Elsewhere, in the history of the Islamization of Java, the story turns even more tragic. Siti Jenar was found guilty by Wali Songo (the Commission

© 2020 Hartford Seminary DOI: 10.1111/muwo.12353 518 Against All Heteredoxies of Nine Saints) led by Sunan Giri, as the former taught ‘real knowledge’ to laymen. Siti Jenar ended up being executed. Despite the fact that many scholars have questioned its historical reliability, the story of Siti Jenar vis-à-vis the commission of the Javanese saints represents the mild tension between the mainstream and the peripheral doctrines.1 The issuance of the above MUI fatwa in recent time, in conjunction with other controver- sial fatwas on the Shiite group, the Ahmadiyah, and secularism, pluralism and liberalism has risen some questions such as: what constitutes offence not only against the sacred in Islamic law but also against orthodoxy? What is its background? It is purely theological or political? Is the contestation between the orthodox vis-à-vis the heterodox? Do some works by Muslim scholars that discuss heterodox and non-Muslim groups contribute in paving the ground of suspicion so as to perceive the other as the one who falsified the truth and who splinted from the community? Putting more precisely in the Indonesian context, questions as to whether Indonesian Muslims have experienced such religious division and what it takes for this division to become a real category of state-sanctioned exclusion would be of importance for further discussion surrounding the rise of groups or aliran-aliran considered as deviant or sesat in contemporary Indonesia.

Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Islam: A Brief Survey In Islamic history, the idea of religious orthodoxy was not always as clear as that in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and was in fact developed later in Islamic scholarship.2 Lewis rightly points out that, as it is borrowed from Christian tradition, there is no equivalent expression in Arabic word except the word ‘hartaqa’ used in Arabic since the nineteenth century.3 For scholars like Knysh, while the word orthodoxy is used as an interpretive category to differentiate various divisions in Islamic movement, from the beginning it has failed to grasp the complexities of Muslim religious life since there is no generally accepted religious authority, nor hierarchy, or ecclesiastical office that would decide for all Muslims what the right belief is.4 In the paucity of appropriate concepts to understand the nature of orthodoxy in Islam and to capture the plurality of Islamic movement, the word ‘orthodoxy’ is commonly used as an implicit or explicit opposition to a number of disparate notions, such as orthopraxy, folk religion, minority view, heresy, or heterodoxy as pointed out by Talal Asad.5 Hence, it is not

1 See for example the story on Siti Jenar in Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Syekh Siti Jenar: Pergumulan Islam Jawa (Syaikh Siti Jenar: The Struggle of Javanese Islam) (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya, 2000). 2 Robert Langer and Udo Simon, “The Dynamics of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Dealing with Divergence in Muslim Discourses and Islamic Studies,” Die Welt Des Islams 48 (2008): 273-288. 3 Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islam,” Studia Islamica 1 (1959): 51. 4 See Alexander Knysh, “‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Heresy’ in Medieval Islam: An Essay in Reassessment,” Muslim World 83, 1 (1993): 46–67. 5 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Georgetown University, 1996), p. 6.

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 519 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 simply about the opposition of what is ‘genuine’ vis-a-vis what is ‘corrupted’ teaching or belief but also about what belief is ‘right’, as stated by Lewis,6 in order to generate ‘the omnipresence of public control’.7 To this stance, orthodoxy has also been closely related to various aspects such as power network as argued by Asad, who maintains that “orthodoxy is always the product of a network of power.”8 It is about public control according to Josef van Ess so that he firmly concludes that the decisive factor in orthodoxy is not a specific set of doctrines or a body of opinions but a relationship of power.9 It stands for a specific ‘scripturalist genealogy’ based on a number of narratives, creedal articles, and rules of ritual observance as the tokens of religious correctness that may preserve different levels of authority in Muslim community as once argued by Al-Azmeh10; it should not be surprising if then orthodoxy in Islamic history has been used mostly to be parallel with Sunnism, according to Melchert.11 Speaking broadly, Gibb once concludes that orthodoxy is crucial in Islamic movement for two reasons: “firstly, to maintain its universalism against internal and external challenges, and secondly, to realize the widest possible measure of religious, social and cultural unity throughout the Islamic world.”12 In this vein, orthodoxy may equate with the ‘right belief’ and ‘right behavior’ in line with following the sunna of the Prophet. Throughout the long history of Islam, the majority of Muslims have also agreed to incorporate the line of the four rightly guided caliphs (khulafā al-rāshidūn) as the basis for orthodoxy for the majority of Muslim groups. Later, they started to also refer to the acceptance of generally acknowledged legal schools (madhāhib). Hence, most of all, the principle of ijmā’ (or consensus) on certain points across the borders of the schools later serve as the guideline of orthodoxy as argued by Calder and Steward.13 As Calder and Stewart do, Henderson also sees ijmā’ as the touchstone of orthodoxy serving as ‘a middle way between heretical extremes.’14 In fact, he points out further that social benefit of the dynamic interaction between orthodox and heretical groups helps develop solidarity within the in-group,15 or preserves other such unwitting catalysts for social unity

6 See Lewis, “Some Observations,” 47. 7 Josef van Ess, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra, vol 1. (Leiden: Brill 2016). 8 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology, 21 9 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology, 15. 10 Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism,” Arabica 35 (1988): 254-259. 11 Christoph Melchert, “Sectaries in the Six Books: Evidence for Their Exclusion from the Sunni Community,” The Muslim World 82, 3-4 (1992): 287. 12 H.A.R. Gibb, “Interpretation of Islamic History,” Cahiers d’Histoire Mondiale I (1953/54): 40. 13 Norman Calder, “The Limits of Islamic Orthodoxy,” in Farhad Daftary (ed.), Intellectual Traditions in Islam (London: Tauris, 2000), 83; and more information on Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998): 45 14 John B. Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish, and Early Christian Patterns (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 85. 15 Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy, 175.

520 © 2020 Hartford Seminary Against All Heteredoxies according to Berlinerblau.16 Suffice it to say here that the concept of orthodoxy aims at defin- ing the boundaries and determining acceptable theological interpretations of various sects and groups in Islam. It functions as a ‘category of exclusion’ to maintain internal coherence and avoid further split or division within Muslim community. The counterpart or the opposite of orthodoxy is heterodoxy. The word has begun to appear in common usage since the seventeenth and especially in the eighteenth century in West European referring to any ‘schismatic’ or ‘heretic’ groups in Protestantism and Catholicism respectively. In the beginning, it corresponded with any groups spitted from the mainstream in a more neutral tone. In turn it might mean sectarianism or factionalism arising from the intentional choice of a ‘false’ doctrine or faith. In Islamic discourse, many scholars see that the Islamic notion of heterodoxy is strongly based on the idea of ‘firqah’ (pl. firāq), which is usually translated as ‘sect’. The concept of firqa found its theological basis in the famous ‘Hadith of Dissension’ (ḥadīth al-iftirāq). The hadith refers to the split among major religious communities (particularly the Muslims, the Jews and the Christians) into various religious groups (millah or nihlah) and religious sects (firqah or tāifah) with only one of them being the ‘saved’ group. By the same token, the hadith also refers to the eschatological concept of nājiyah (‘who is saved’ or ‘redeemed’) that is then applied to determine other various existing religious groups and sects. This hadith (with several versions of its matans) has in turn been widely used by numerous sects throughout history to identify themselves with what the hadith itself calls the rightly-guided community (al-jamā’ah) as the saved sect (al-firqah al-nājiyah). Accordingly, the term firqah as discussed above (or later infirāq or iftirāq) is fairly close to the idea of heterodoxy in Islam that points out to various groups apart from the mainstream or the jamā‘ah as the rightly-guided community. This is likely the very context of publication of some earlier Muslim historico-theological manuals serving to define and codify the nature of schism in Islam such as Maqālāt Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn (the Discourses of the Proponents of Islam and the Differences Among the Worshippers) by Abū al-Hasan ʿAlī ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Isḥāq al-Ash‘ārī (d. 324/936), Kitāb al-Maqālāt (the Book of the Discourses) by Abū Mansūr al-Maturīdī (d. 332/944) or Al-Farq bayna al-Firāq (The Differences between the Splinters) by Abū Mansūr al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) or Al-Fasl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwa wa al-Niḥal (The Distinctions in Religions, Heresies, and Sects) by Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Hazm (d. 452/1064) or Faysal al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa (The Criterion of Distinction between Islam and Clandestine Unbelief) by Abū Hamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 499/1111). Those scholars mostly considered the small internal groups as the ahl al-firāq for being separated, or split, from the large group of Muslims. It must be underlined here that in the beginning of the concept of al-firāq tended to be of a neutral notion. The general impression is that those works have mentioned some of the groups within the Muslim community without giving any theological judgment or pointing them as deviant from mainstream Islamic teachings. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that, to some extent, those works have also functioned as a foundation for ‘mild’ exclusion

16 Jacques Berlinerblau, “Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa,” History of Religions 40 (2001): 343.

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 521 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 of various sects and groups in Islam that have been considered against the boundaries of the so-called determining acceptable theological interpretations of the mainstream. Within this framework, this is increasingly no longer only a matter of theological challenge, but also a problem of public safety since correct belief and worship will ensure the unity and stability of society. Here being an orthodox group or disseminating an orthodox point of view is very important as a means to establishing or maintaining common boundaries. Hence, those works unarguably serve as the way to preserve the orthodoxy, particularly for the Sunni community in maintaining internal coherence and avoiding further split or division. The concept of al-firāq shifted gradually following the publication of Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal (Religions and Sects) by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153). This book not only portrayed various internal Islamic groups such as schools and sects, but also discussed a general overview of various religious groups such as the Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Manichean, Hindu and Sabian (Sabean) groups. It is then the beginning of the installment of the concept of al-firāq in referring various words such as tāifah, millah and niḥlah to small religious groups outside Islam into Islamic theological dictionaries. This is the beginning of what Brodeur called the ‘formative generic system of religious others’ played in the initial stages of Islamic identity construction over the first four centuries.17 Hence the predominant usage of the term in Muslim discourse until the modern times–and later its con- nection with harsh persecutions. In the following phase throughout Islamic history, unprecedented literature on the issue was entwined with the expansion of bureaucracy and laws on religious orthodoxy. Hence, the literary genre of Muslim heresiological works shifted to pave a way for increasingly sophisti- cated theological definitions and concepts such as irtidād (heretics), sabb (blasphemy), shat- ama (vilification against the holy people), and zindīq.18 Those works, then, could only be read as political and religious claims of an exclusive truth. In the end, this work (and other similar books) functioned not only to delineate the Muslim group from other religious communities such as the Christian and the Jews, but also to define the borders against persons or groups who falsely claimed the truth of Islamic teachings. It is a milestone in the furtherance of heresiological works publication in Islamic world. Later in the Indonesian context, it is clear that those books, especially that of Shahrastānī’s, have inspired many Muslim scholars to write manuscripts or books about various sects of religions that exist outside Islam. The model of Shahrastānī’s book inspired al-Raniri (d. 1046/1658) in seventeenth century’s Aceh to write his famous book of Tibyān fī Ma’rifat al-Adyān (Explication on the Knowledge of Religions) to uncover the nature of various religious groups in the archipelago. This book is the first manual of Islamic heresiology in the Indo-Malay world.

17 Patrice Claude Brodeur, “From an Islamic Heresiography to an Islamic History of Religions: Modern Arab Muslim Literature on ‘Religious Others’ with Special Reference to Three Egyptian Authors,” PhD Dissertation Harvard University, 1999. 18 See Lutz Wiederhold, “Blasphemy Against the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (sabb al-rasul, sabb al-sahabah): The Introduction of the Topic into Shafi’i Legal Literature and its Relevance for Legal Practice under Mamluk Rule,” Journal of Semitic Studies 42, 1 (1997).

In the modern times, the term ‘heterodox’ is used to denote various Islamic religions, alongside ‘utopian’ or ‘millenarian’ movements such as the Ahmadiyah and the Shiite or Sunni, which are considered as ‘ultra conservative’ like the Wahabi. Those the later groups are placed within the broader framework of ‘sectarianism’ as argued by Eisenstadt.19 Hence, considering the fact that orthodox movements can be seen as heterodox in so far as they represent only a minority of all Muslims, the differentiation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy comes out once more as matters of perspectives and power relations rather than discussions of right or wrong doctrines.

The State and Orthodoxy in Contemporary Indonesia Josep van Ess has emphasized that political power or the regime plays an important role in endorsing particular model of orthodoxy vis-à-vis heterodoxy as a way for public control, and Indonesia is not an exception to the case. The state policies, apparatus, agencies or its other state representative organizations evidently support various works on heresiography or heresiology either directly or indirectly. Putting orthodoxy into Indonesian contexts, various literatures and books dealing with accusing heterodox groups are, in many respects, part of the ways to endorse the state’s mainstream religious orthodoxy. It is observable that since the beginning of Suharto’s New Order, the Indonesian government has become obsessive in controlling its citizens’ religious behavior. In this stance while the regime recognized the important place of religion in national development and in the construction of an Indonesian identity, religious activities were also seen as a possible source of social unrest. Control of religious activities and regulation of religious affairs in accordance with the regime’s strict standards were justified in the name of restoring or maintaining stability and order.20 As a result, the regime issued a number of policies to maintain harmony between religious groupings of Indonesia and to preserve orthodoxy within particular religious denominations as well as to prohibit activities of particular religious groups or doctrines. The regime displayed certain principles, or typologies, in its religious policies. The first principle was to encourage tolerance among religions through dialogues and discussions and by prohibiting members of the society from discussing or expressing unacceptable views related to the topics of SARA (suku, agama, ras dan antar-golongan/ethnicity, religion, race and class) in public. SARA, according to the regime, contained sources of conflict and thus presented potential causes for socio-political instability.21 The second principle was to endorse religious piety by supporting religious ceremonies, or providing technical assistance and guidance for the performance of other religious activities. The third was to oversee heterodox

19 Samuel N. Eisenstadt, "Sectarianism and the Dynamics of Islamic Civilization," in Georg Stauth (ed.), Islam, Motor or Challenge of Modernity: Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam (Hamburg: Lit Verlag 1998). 20 See Ismatu Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia (Singapore, London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017). 21 Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia’s Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics (Cornell University Press, London, 1976), 224.

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 523 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 groups. The fourth was to require all citizens to embrace one of the state recognized religions. Following these principles, the regime’s policy of controlling and developing religion was measured not only in the growing number of places of worship; in the efficiency of the management of the hajj pilgrimage, for example; in the introduction of compulsory religious subjects in public schools, or; in the improvement of state and private religious education and institutions; but also in the state’s endeavors to standardize religious groups and religious attitudes. While giving support to religious festivals in public, it tightly controlled overseas funding for religious missions and was highly restrictive in allowing missionaries to preach on the Indonesian soil.22 It is safe to say that the regime’s determination to standardize religion was similar to what it sought to do across society. It abolished all regional differences in the local adminis- tration and sought to regulate cultural differences in the name of national identity and culture. Within the context of overseeing heterodox groups in the society, it seems understandable if the regime issued a number of restrictions and prohibitions to aliran sesat (deviant groups) or aliran sempalan (splinter groups). These groups termed aliran sesat or aliran sempalan allegedly preached and dissemi- nated teachings at variance from those of the religious mainstream. They made their public appearance as early as the 1950s but they were given more serious attention by the New Order regime and the established religious communities from the early 1970s. For many, the unprecedented rise of these non-mainstream groups was seen as a potential source of social disorder, national disintegration and religious ‘confusion’ in society. To the general public, the major problem with such groups was their perceived misuse or misinterpretation of particular teachings from established religions for their own purposes while at the same time attacking other professed doctrines in an offensive manner. It should be noted that as early as 1962, Sukarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia, issued a presidential decree to prohibit six religious groups allegedly deviants from Indonesia for the reason that the presence of these heterodox groups had created unrest among the established religious communities.23 This was the government’s first legal prohibition toward any non-mainstream groups in Indonesian history. However, it was only in 1971 that the New Order regime began to take decisive steps to deal with the problem by maximizing the role of the Ministry or Religious Affairs (MORA) and the State Attorney to serve as institutional watchdogs for all religious movements. MORA was then responsible for watching over individual freedom to ‘promote healthy religious movements’ as the main argument for overseeing religious sects. Thus, the monitoring of heterodox religious sects was not

22 See Departemen Agama RI, Kumpulan Peraturan Perundang-undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama [Compilation of State Regulations on Religious Harmony Among the Communities] (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1998). 23 “Keputusan Presiden No. 264 Year 1962 tentang Larangan Organisasi Liga Demokrasi: Rotary Club, Divine Life Society, Vrijmetselaren-Loge (Indonesian Lodge of Free Masons), Moral Rearmament Movement, the Ancient Mystical Organization of Rosi Crucians (AMORC) dan Baha’isme,” in Departemen Agama RI, Kumpulan Peraturan Perundang-undangan, 3-8.

524 © 2020 Hartford Seminary Against All Heteredoxies undertaken simply for the sake of social order but also as a way for keeping orthodox norms intact in the society. In later development, the New Order under Suharto, the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, strengthened the state orthodoxy by lifting previous regulations into a new Statute No. 5/PnPs/1969 on the Prevention or Misuse and/or Religious Vilification in order to give guidance (memberikan bimbingan), to administer (pengurusan) and to control (pengawasan) religious activities in Indonesia.24 This Statute, usually referred to as the Indonesian Law on Blasphemy, was chiefly a means of forbidding Communism and, at the same time, of controlling any religious activities allegedly deviant from mainstream traditions. Thus, as far as this Statute was concerned, the regime preserved the doctrines of the established mainstream groups as the models to follow. The regime was vigilant in its monitoring of any group seen as ‘different’ from the mainstream so as to set up an inter-departmental body known as the BAKORPAKEM (Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan di Masyarakat/ Coordinating Body for the Supervision of Local Beliefs in Society). In practice, this Statute gave certain authority to BAKORPAKEM consisting of three ministerial offices (the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Attorney) to take further steps if a particular group is seen as harming the common good, harmony or security. Yet the way this inter-department institution worked to ban the so-called deviant groups was in fact problematic. The regime lacked any clear and feasible measurement for what constituted a ‘deviant teaching’ except in the matters pertaining to security and order. As a result, not only were certain teachings or doctrines banned, but also books, pam- phlets and other printed materials such as calendars, comics or parodies. In other circum- stances of social significance, the regime withheld permission to marry from those individuals who neglected to declare and register their religious affiliation before the ceremony. There were more than 50 cases of prohibitions on deviant religious groups and doctrines according to MORA’s publication Peraturan Perundangan-undangan Kehidupan Beragama (Regulations on Religious Life).25 Within such a framework it was clear that the impact of the government on religious activism was pervasive, and the government itself served as the main promoter of certain model of religious orthodoxy.

Heterodox Groups and Indonesian Muslim Literature Maria Isabel Fierro argues that, in most cases, political power and religious authority coop- erate and support each other in forming religious orthodoxy. It might not be possible to maintain orthodoxy in permanent contrast to political power. There is a more general usage of the

24 Ichtijanto, Pengamanan Negara Melalui Pengendalian Kegiatan Kerochanian [State Safety through Religious Activities Management] (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI Direktorat Djenderal Bimbingan Masjarakat Islam Projek Pengawasan Kegiatan Keagamaan dan Aliran2/Faham2, 1969), 24-26. 25 Departemen Agama RI, Kumpulan Peraturan Perundang-undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 13-180.

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 525 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 word covering all kinds of contexts and denoting, as a rule, a combination of ‘authority’ and ‘right belief’.26 It is worth noting that not only does political power such as government put religious authority in the position of orthodoxy, but religious authority itself also implies political power. Thus, in many cases, the power of orthodoxy is not necessarily allied with political power or bound to offices and institutions since it rests upon the hidden rules that determine what can or cannot be said and thought. As mentioned previously, accusation of being heterodox is a combative theological genre for asserting true Islamic doctrines through hostile defi- nition and exclusion.27 In this very case, the role of religious majority institutions acting as ‘religious regime’ is important to endorse a particular model of orthodoxy. In the beginning, differences among sects or groups within particular religious communities did not match the analytical clarity of the good-or-bad binary category. Rather, it was merely a problem of different outlook to understand religious teachings and to practice religious observance. In fact, throughout Islamic history, the differences between the orthodox and heterodox often simply constituted a creative theological exchange in a continual construction of Muslim identity. The exchange was about theological negotiation over current and local cultural problems of multiplicity and differences among Muslim society. The increasing classification of various groups, therefore, reflected the dynamism of the theological tradition among Muslims, and the classification, to some extent, was not based on theological judgment pointing them as deviant from the teachings of mainstream Islam. Nevertheless, the emergence of unprecedented religious heterodox movements was entwined with religious orthodoxy. For many, this phenomenon of heterodoxy was increasingly no longer only a matter of theological challenge, but a problem of public safety since correct belief and worship ensured the unity and stability of society. Here, being an orthodox group and disseminating an orthodox point of view are very important and are often a means to establish or maintain common boundaries. Hence it is about the ‘right belief’, as stated by Lewis in the earlier part of this article, in order to generate the omnipresence of public control. As such, one may understand why mainstream religious organizations take the matter of heterodoxy as a very serious concern. The position of MUI is an example of this. MUI is a government-initiative organization established in 1975 with its main functions being to formulate religious advice in the form of fatwās for the government and for the Muslim community in Indonesia. MUI consists of various Muslim organizations in Indonesia.28 In 2007 it issued a fatwa on the criteria of aliran sesat (deviant sects) in Indonesia containing ten major principles to prohibit any action, teaching and movement that have ‘exceeded the bounds’ of legitimate dissent and entered the realm of offence against the

26 See Maria Isabel Fierro, “Heresy in al-Andalus,” in Salma KhadraJayyusi (ed.), The Legacy of Muslim Spain (Leiden, New York, Brill, 1992): 895-908. 27 J. Rebecca Lyman, “Heresiology: The Invention of ‘Heresy’ and ‘Schism’,” in Augustine Casiday and Frederick W. Norris (eds.), The Cambridge History of Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 296-314. 28 See for example Moch. Nur Ichwan “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto,” Islamic Law and Society 12, 1 (January 2002): 45-72.

526 © 2020 Hartford Seminary Against All Heteredoxies sacred according to Islam doctrines. This legal statement was issued in response to certain actions of individuals and groups allegedly seen to cross the boundary line of acceptability or to violate sanctity of the Prophet Muhammad.29 The fatwa states that a group is considered deviant if it (1) disagrees with the six principles of the Islamic faith; (2) believes and acts outside the teaching of the Qur’an and hadith; (3) believes in a decree that comes after the Qur’an; (4) disputes the authenticity of the Qur’an; (5) interprets the Qur’an differently from Qur’an principles; (6) disagrees with hadith as a source of Islamic teaching; (7) humiliates, despises, or looks down on the Prophets and the Messengers; (8) disagrees that the Prophet Muhammad is the last Prophet and Messenger; (9) changes, adds, or reduces principles concerning religious rituals that have been set down by shariah, such as the beliefs that ‘the hajj (pilgrimage) is not to Mecca and that prayers do not have to be performed five times a day; or (10) the claims other Muslims are infidels without justification by shariah; for instance, they are infidels because they do not come from the same Islamic group.30 For many scholars, the above MUI principles on the deviant groups represent all the attributes of religious orthodoxy for a precise dogmatic expression. It con- cerns the tendency of orthodoxy embedded in Islam as way to preserve authority and define the right belief.31 Using Al-Azmeh terminology, those principles come for a specific ‘scripturalist genealogy’ based on a number of narratives, creedal articles and rules of ritual observance as tokens of religious rectitude against what to be labeled as heterodox groups in Indonesia.32 Broadly speaking, many scholars argue that what MUI has done in the case of deviant groups in Indonesia is maintaining orthodoxy that used to be in parallel with Sunnism.33 It is the way to preserve Islamic universalism against internal and external challenges, and to realize the widest possible measure of religious, social and cultural unity throughout the Islamic commonalities. Hence within this vein, orthodoxy may equate with the ‘right belief’ and the ‘right behavior’ in line with following the sunna of the Prophet. It is heretical to oppose the Prophet and the opposite of his sunna is bid‘a (uncalled-for innovation) that may lead to kufr (unbelief). In another usage, MUI’s endorsement to this model of orthodoxy would mainly refer to the generally acknowledged madhāhib (legal schools) often labelled as “the four orthodox schools of thought” without any possibilities for crossing out from the schools’ “legal” border. The usage of sources from Sunni nomenclatures is understandable since the eschatological concept of al-firqa al-nājiya (‘who is saved’ or ‘redeemed’) is very popular

29 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Mengawal Aqidah Umat: Fatwa MUI tentang Aliran Sesat di Indonesia [Guarding the Faith of Muslim Community: MUI Fatwa on the Deviant Sects in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2002). 30 “MUI: 10 (Sepuluh) Kriteria Aliran Sesat [MUI: 10 Criteria of Deviant Groups],” article at http://www. media-islam.or.id/2007/11/09/mui-sepuluh-kriteria-aliran-sesat. Accessed on 23 September 2017. 31 Sherman A. Jackson, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu Hamid al-Ghazhali’s Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 25-30. 32 Al-Azmeh, “Orthodoxy,” 254-259. 33 Melchert, "Sectaries in the Six Books,” 287.

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 527 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 within the Sunni circle–including in Indonesia; hence the traditional reference to those terms to determine their identities in the protracted Islamic history in Indonesia. How does the orthodox endorsement from MUI affect Indonesian Muslim literatures on deviant groups? Although objection and opposition to the existence of heterodox groups have occurred on various occasions in Indonesia since the period of Suharto’s New Order, it is the very fact that gave the campaign its strong boost from the Fourth Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia IV (Indonesian Muslim Community Congress IV) sponsored by MUI held in April 2005. This Congress paid extra close attention to the recent flourishing of heterodox groups particularly following the open air of Reformasi era that, for many, had provided a fertile ground for any model of religiosities to burgeon. According to Olle, the 2005 congress has strengthened a previous decision in the 2000 national meeting of MUI to give special attention to the development of deviant groups over other major social problems such as corruption, bribery, abortion, pornography, gambling, destruction of the environment, violence and enmity. It is the fact as well that attacks to minority heterodox groups like Yusman Roy and Ahmadiyah occurred shortly after the congress has directly or indirectly taken its religious justification from that MUI fatwa.34 The attacks towards the groups may have theological justifications as when any certain model orthodoxy has been taken into serious consideration, it serves in people’s mind as a set of the standard of value and attitude to measure the extent of someone or group religiosity to be accepted into the mainstream religious grouping. Furthermore, pursuant to the congress, MUI’s fatwā on deviant groups inevitably gave a strong inspiration for a number of orthodox Muslim writers to produce a vast array of books and articles to portray varieties of heterodox groups existing in the country. Thus, not only did those writers depict the deviant in line with those ten principles–such as Ahmadiyah, Shiite or LDII that for many decades became internal disputes among Muslims in Indonesia–but also enlarged it into discussion of more recent various groups along with ‘utopian’ outlooks such as al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, Lia Aminuddin’s Salamullah or Kerajaan Eden, which will be briefly discussed in the next section. In the following phase of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, the unprecedented literatures and works on heterodox groups were entwined with the general expansion of influences of semi-state agencies like MUI. Within this framework, the very context of any thought and movement against heterodox groups is no longer only a matter of theological challenge, but also a problem of public safety since correct belief and worship are believed to ensure the unity and stability of Indonesia’s Muslim society. Here being part of a mainstream group or disseminating an orthodox understanding of religious doctrines is very important as a means of maintaining common boundaries of who are inside and who are outside the Muslim community. It may take symbolic forms such as polemical works and their rebuttals as well as

34 John Olle, “The Campaign against “Heresy” – State and Society in Negotiation in Indonesia,” Paper presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Wollongong 26 June-29 June 2006.

528 © 2020 Hartford Seminary Against All Heteredoxies actual psychical assaults to the heterodox groups as exemplified in numerous cases such as attacks towards the Ahmadiyah and Shiite in various provinces throughout Indonesia.

Ahmadiyah and Shiite Groups Despite the fact that the Ahmadiyah group’s first Indonesian mission began more than eighty years ago,35 the relationship between the Ahmadiyah group and other Indonesian Muslim organizations has been complex and marked by long-lasting contention and disputa- tion in Indonesia’s modern history.36 In the works of Muslim writers, the major themes found on the Ahmadiyah are mostly in regard with the belief that the founder of this movement was as false prophet as can be read from the works by M. Amin Jamaludin,37 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz38 and Ahmad Lutfi Fathullah,39 which were published long before the controversy over the Ahmadiyah in the Indonesian public in 2006, and which predated the issuance of the MUI fatwa as discussed earlier. For Muslims, it is an insult if one group within the Muslim community believes the possibility of the coming of any new prophet after Muhammad. It is also discussed in those works how the Ahmadis have intentionally damaged the foundation of Islamic principles by claiming the meaning of certain Qur’anic verses, and have advocated the inapplicability of the doctrine of armed jihad in modern times.40 It is also the opinion of the Muslim writers that the origin of the Ahmadiyah goes back as a British colonial initiative now serving imperialistic and Zionist political interests. Moreover some works accuse the Ahmadiyah group of having operated in Muslim countries with the help from ‘anti Islamic forces’ by building mosques, schools and orphanages while at the same time disseminating misleading doctrines and carrying out anti-Islam campaigns. In addition, the works also charge the Qadiani group of publishing and circulating corrupted versions of the Qur’an in

35 See Ismatu Ropi, “Islamism, Government Regulation and the Ahmadiyah Controversy in Indonesia,” Al- Jamiah (December 2010): 281-320. 36 Margaret Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Its Early History and Contribution to Islam in the Archipelago,” Honours Sub-thesis, The Australian National University [ANU], 1974. On the detail history of Indonesian Ahmadiyah groups see Herman L. Beck, “The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya, ”Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) 161-2/3 (2005): 210-246; Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia [Ahmadiyah Movement in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005); Wahyu Muryadi (et.all), Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang Digugat [Ahmadiyah: the Disputed Faith] (Jakarta: Pusat Data dan Analisa TEMPO, 2005); and M.A. Suryawan, Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih: Kontroversi Pemahaman Ahmadiyah [It’s not Simply about Black and White: the Controversy in Understanding Ahmadiyah] (Jakarta: Azzahra Publishing, 2005). 37 M. Amin Djamaludin, Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan Al-Quran [Ahmadiyah and the Quran Hijacking] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam [LPPI], 2002); Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data [Ahmadiyah Denigrates Islam: Compilation of Facts and Data] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam [LPPI], 2004; 38 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran and Paham Sesat di Indonesia [Deviant Schools and Sect in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2002) and his new extended version in Nabi-Nabi Palsu & Para Penyesat Umat [False Prophets and the Deceits of the Muslim Community] (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2008). 39 Ahmad Lutfi Fathullah, Menguak Kesesatan Aliran Ahmadiyah [Uncovering the Heretical Nature of Ahmadiyah] (Jakarta: Pustaka Array, 2004). 40 Yogaswara and Maulana Ahmad Jalidu, Aliran Sesat dan Nabi-Nabi Palsu [Deviant Sects and False Prophets] (Yogyakarta: Penerbit MedPress, 2012).

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 529 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 different languages. Others point to Ahmadi’s ‘exclusive sectarian attitude’ towards Indonesian fellow Muslims as demostrated in their congregational prayers and intramarriages. In this sense, once an orthodox view on heterodox groups like the Ahmadiyah took shape in the minds of community, it became a set of standards to measure who is right and who is wrong. In turn, oppression toward those who hold different opinions or practices of religion would not only be symbolically portrayed in literatures, but also take in its actual accounts in practice. Suffice it to conclude here that persecution to the Ahmadiyah group in Indonesia has been the result of this contest. Indonesian Muslim writers also pay serious attention to the development of Shiite in Indonesia, and many of these writers strongly believe that all branches of Shiite teachings, including the Twelve Imam group, deviate from the mainstream Islamic faith–the Sunni as practiced in Indonesia–and violate Indonesian norms.41 Some books try to uncover a number of deviations of the Shiite for their acceptance to the doctrine of ma‘sūm or infallibility of their spiritual leaders of Imam42; for their accusation of the companions (sahāba) of Prophet Muhammad as infidels43; their negligence to the Friday prayer considering it as not a manda- tory prayer44; and their permission to combine the obligatory daily prayers in all situations without any reason; their practice of nikah mut’ah (short-term contract marriages)45; their denigration and rejection to the views of Sunni ulamās; and their over-revering of Ali as on a par with Prophet Muhammad; and importantly their utmost political ambition to seize power.46 Above all, it should be borne in mind that Indonesian popular Muslim’s works on the Shi’a should be put in the context on the prolonged division particularly between the Sunni and the Shi’a as the most obvious division in Islamic world. In this token, those works should be seen as an indirect impact of the hostilities prevailing between those two groups that has provided fertile ground to continuously perceive each group as being the one who falsified the truth and the one who splinted from the community. With a few exceptions in some local areas like in Madura, East Java, their rivalry has not been violent as there have only been very few Sunni-Shi’a clashes.47 It seems right to conclude that in contemporary Indonesia, the history of anti-Shiite is “one of a changing mix of personal rivalries, political interests and international developments, overlaid by the constant of Salafi antipathy.”48

41 Tim Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI), Mengapa Kita Menolak Syiah [Why We Oppose Shiite] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 1998). 42 Mohammad Achyat Ahmad, Sejarah Hitam Sekte Syiah [Dark History of Shiite Sect] (Jawa Timur: Sindogiri, 2016). 43 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Catatan Hitam Agama Syiah [Black Note of Shiite Religion] (Yogyakarta: Ihya’ As- Sunnah, 2015). 44 Tim Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI), Kesesatan Aqidah, Ibadah, dan Akhlaq Syiah [The Perversion of Shiite Belief, Practice and Ethics] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI), 2016). 45 Amin Muchtar, Hitam di Balik Putih [Black beyond White] (Jakarta: al-Qalam, 2014). 46 Raghib As-Sirjani, Syahwat Politik Kaum Syiah [Political Ambition of Shiite] (Solo: Multazam, 2014). 47 See more info on the issue in Ahmad, Sejarah Hitam Sekte Syiah. 48 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), “The Anti-Shi’a Movement in Indonesia,” IPAC Report 27 (2016).

The rhetoric of anti-Shiite reaches its new level following the establishment of an organization named ANNAS (Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah/the National Anti-Shiite Alliance) in Bandung, West Java, 2014, whose main mission is to spread awareness and do social campaign through social media and sermons on the danger of Shiite. Thus, the increased public attention to the issue of anti-Shiite doctrines that have been manifested in the works of Muslim activists, in combination with the rise of popular religious orthodoxy in the country, have resulted in an atmosphere in which extreme violence will more likely happen.

Other Various Heterodox Groups The works of some Indonesian Muslim scholars have taken serious attention to the rise of new heterodox groups. Some writers have even included Sunni radicalism movements such as the radical Wahhabi as can be read in the work of Faqih Maskumbang49 and the Sunni textual and scriptural movements. The approaches in those books are worth noting as they revealed the prolonged division within internal Sunni groups. Their division then shifted into discussion of their heterodox nature perceived as being the one who falsifies the truth. This is clearly outlined in the work of Abdul Hakim.50 Other works also attempt to uncover the origin of some utopian and millenarian Islamic sects and its deviances to Islamic teaching like Kerajaan Eden (Eden Kingdom) of Lia Aminuddin51 and LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Mission Organization)52 as discussed in Djamaludin’s books. These two sects are well known for their charismatic leaders and their hierarchical structures akin to traditional religions and having religious doctrines that tend to be different from conventional mainstream Islam. It seems important to highlight the emergence of some new religious movements like Lia Aminuddin in Indonesia. Lia Aminuddin’s (or Lia Eden’s) community has been branded such a new age movement trying to awaken new model of spirituality following the decline of the established

49 Muhammad Faqih Maskumbang, Menolak Wahabi, Membongkar Penyimpangan Sekte Wahabi: Dari Ibnu Taimiyah hingga Abdul Qadir At-Tilmisani [Opposing Wahabism and Uncovering Wahabi Deviation: From Ibn Taymiyah to Abdul Qadir at-Tilmisani] (NP: Sahifa, 2015); A. Shihabuddin, Kamus Syirik: Telaah Kritis atas Doktrin Faham Salafi/Wahabi [Idolatry Dictionary: Critical Analysis on Salafi/Wahabi Doctrines] (NP: Penerbit Basma, 2010) 50 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Keshahihah Hadits Iftiraaqul Ummah; Firqah-Firqah Sesat di Dalam Islam: Aqidah Salaf Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah [The Reliability of the Prophetic Tradition Regarding Muslim Communities Division: Ahl Sunnah’s Creed (Jakarta: Pustaka Imam Muslim, 2005). 51 M. Amin Djamaluddin, Kesesatan Lia Aminuddin dan Agama Salamullahnya [the Deviance of Lia Aminuddin and Her Salamullah Religion] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2004). 52 M. Amin Djamaluddin, Kupas Tuntas Kesesatan dan Kebohongan LDII [Uncovering the Deviance and Lies of LDII] (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 2008).

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 531 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 religious groups in overcoming the modern human crisis accordingly.53 And like LDII, this community also isolate themselves from mainstream society by building alternative life styles. Some writers seek to relate conspiracy theory to the emergence of Indonesian heterodox groups. They argue that heterodox groups are deliberately set up and encouraged by ‘certain outside forces’ in order to ‘discredit’ or weaken Indonesia’s Islam. This is particularly obvious, for example, in the work of Nasrul Koharuddin when discussing the emergence of Gafatar (Gerakan Fajar Nusantara/Fajar Nusantara Movement) as one of the more recent controver- sial heterodox groups in Indonesia.54 This utopian and millenarian movement has been declared by the MUI in 2016 as a heretical sect spreading deviant religious teachings. The MUI’s fatwa also concluded that Gafatar was a successor to the al-Qidayah al-Islamiyah group that the MUI had previously declared heretical. It is then warned against the people who had followed Gafatar and accepted its teachings and charged them of being apostates (murtad) and infidels (kafir) according to Islamic teachings. Such religious stand is lucidly exemplified in the book of Amin Djamaluddin.55 Interestingly, some scholars take ‘mild’ positions on the issue of heterodoxy and adopt more general approaches by producing books with the intention to give general guidelines for the Muslim community so they would be fully aware of the development of those deviant groups in the country.56 While some pay a close attention to the founders of the new deviant groups being labelled ‘para nabi palsu’ (the false prophets),57 other books ‘adopt’ a model of classical-heresiographical works, such as Shahrastani’s Al-Milal wa al-Nihal, by compiling various heterodox or deviant groups and describing each one of them in term of its origins and its founders as well as major teachings in order to draw lines between the mainstream creed

53 Among the most recent studies on Lia Aminuddin’s movement is Almakin’s book Challenging Islamic Orthodoxy: Accounts of Lia Eden and Other Prophets in Indonesia (Switzerland: Springer 2016). See also Mohammad Takdir, “New Spiritual Movement: Menelisik Visi Transformatif Komunitas Lia Eden sebagai Embrio Lahirnya New Age di Indonesia [New Spiritual Movement: Tracking the Transformative Vision of Lia Eden Community as the Embryo of Indonesian New Age],” Jurnal Theologia 29, No. 1 (June 2018): 1-24. 54 See Nasrul Koharuddin, Ahmad Mushaddeq dan Ajaran al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah [Ahmad Mushaddeq and his al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah’s Doctrines] (Jakarta: Media Pressindo, 2010) 55 M. Amin Djamaluddin, Mewaspadai Gafatar: Gerakan Pemurtadan terhadap Umat Islam [Keeping Eyes on Gafatar’s Heretical Movement toward Muslim Community] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2016) 56 Tim Ulin Nuha Ma’had Aly An-Nur Surakarta, Dirasatul Firaq: Kajian Tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat dalam Islam [Studies of Muslim Disunity: Analysis on Deviants Sects in Islam] (Surakarta: Pustaka Arafah, 2003); Muhammad Sufyan Raji Abdullah, Mengenal Aliran-Aliran Islam dan Ciri-Ciri Ajarannya [Understanding Islamic Sects and its Doctrines] (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Riyadl, 2003); and Muhammad Umar Jiau Al-Haq, Mencermati Aliran Sesat: Rekontruksi Pemahaman Islam [Discerning Deviant Sects: Reconstructing Islamic Understanding] (Bandung: Pustaka Islamika, 2009); and Ahmad Sahidin, Aliran- aliran dalam Islam [Islamic Sects] (Bandung: Salamadani Publishing, 2012). 57 See for examples Jaiz, Nabi-Nabi Palsu, and Yogaswara dan Jalidu, Aliran Sesat dan Nabi-Nabi Palsu as mentioned above.

532 © 2020 Hartford Seminary Against All Heteredoxies and to define the borders between them and the mainstream.58 Suffice it to reiterate here that most of those works would merely function as a ‘category of exclusion’ to define clear boundaries and to determine acceptable theological interpretations of Islam as well as to preserve internal coherence and to avoid split or division among Muslim community.

Conclusion This article has provided an introductory survey on Indonesian Muslim literatures on religious heterodoxy. Initially, differences between the orthodox and heterodox occurred simply as creative theological exchanges constructing their own religious identities. The differences constituted theological negotiation over current and local cultural problems of multiplicity and differences among Muslim society. In the following phases, like in other parts of Islamic worlds, the unprecedented literatures on religious heterodoxy were entwined with the general expansion of bureaucracy and laws on religious orthodoxy. Since then, heterodoxy has no longer been a mere matter of theological challenge, but has also concerned the problem of public safety given the prevailing notion that correct teachings and correct worship underpin unity and stability in society. In the Indonesian context, writing and publishing literatures and books that deal with–or that accuse–heterodox groups are the way to endorse the mainstream religious orthodoxy. The government, unsurprisingly, has also been involved in the preservation of religious orthodoxy. It is observable that since the beginning of Suharto’s New Order, the Indonesian government has developed an obsession to control its citizens’ religious behavior. In this stance, while the regime recognized the important place of religion in national development and the construction of an Indonesian identity, religious activities were also seen as a possible source of social unrest. Control of religious activities and regulation of religious affairs in accordance with strict regime standards were to be justified in the name of restoring or maintaining stability and order. Furthermore, the MUI’s fatwa regarding aliran sesat inevitably sparked strong inspiration for a number of orthodox Muslim writers to produce a vast array of books and articles to portray varieties of heterodox groups existing in the country. Given the context, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that campaign against heterodox groups is in fact part of a wider movement towards what some scholars, like Olle as mentioned in earlier part of this article, have called the ‘creeping shariatisation’ of Indonesia. Those groups are soft easy targets for the

58 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran dan Paham Sesat di Indonesia [Deviant Sects and Schools in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pustaka Kautsar, 2002); Aceng Zakaria dan Irfan Nur Hakim, Studi Pemikiran Aliran Sesat & Menyesatkan [Studying on Deviant and Deviating Sects] (Jakarta: Azka Press, 2012); Arifin Surya Nugraha, Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia [Deviants Sects in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: Bayu Media, 2007); M. Yuanda Zara, Aliran-aliran Sesat di Indonesia [Deviants Sects in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: Banyu Media, 2007); M. Mukhsin Jamil, Agama-Agama Baru di Indonesia [New Religions in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008); and IGM Nurdjana, Aliran Sesat di Indonesia [Deviants Sects in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2009).

© 2020 Hartford Seminary 533 The Muslim World • Volume 110 • Autumn 2020 purpose of uniting Muslims behind ‘shariatisation’ or Islamization and stricter orthodoxy as found as well in other parts of the Muslim world, like Iran, Sudan and Pakistan. This model of campaign seems to be part of an attempt by a diverse range of orthodox Muslim groups in Indonesia to re-negotiate their positions both with the Indonesian state and with each other, not only over who has the right to be the arbiters of religious truth but also over the wider issue of who possesses the political and cultural legitimacy and power to regulate social life.