“Selling Consent”: From Authoritarianism to Welfarism at David Jones, 1838-1958

Bradley John Pragnell

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Industrial Relations and Organisation Behaviour, Faculty of Commerce at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

2001 i

ABS TRACT

This thesis investigates the history of labour management at David Jones, the major Australian retailer and manufacturer, between the years 1838 and 1958. This thesis examines the development of consent-based approach to labour management at David Jones, in particular the development of paternalism and welfarism.

In doing so this thesis explores both general questions regarding the factors that influence why certain firms adopt a consent-based approach to labour management, as well as informing debates around the existence of nineteenth century paternalism and the origins of twentieth century welfarism.

The historical material contained at the David Jones Archives and elsewhere reveals little evidence of paternalism as a deliberate management strategy. This brings into question the usefulness of paternalism as a concept in the historical study of Australian labour management. The inability to trace paternalism also undermines explanations of twentieth century welfarism premised on the pre- existence of nineteenth century paternalism.

The historical materials, however, do note that twentieth century welfarism was a deliberate labour management strategy adopted by David Jones management. Welfarism, combined with systematic management and training, was initially adopted following the First World War to deal with the threat of industrial turmoil. However, in the 1930s, welfarism increasingly became a pro-active strategy designed to create skilled selling and raise the profile of the firm within the community.

Further, welfarism at David Jones in the inter-war period was more than merely a new form of paternalism, somehow transformed by being in a larger, more bureaucratic setting or a result of employers confronted an increasingly feminised workforce. Welfarism at David Jones was a deliberate strategy, informed by overseas experiments, management consultants and the new science of psychology.

Welfarism at David Jones continued into the post World War Two period. However, new forms of retailing, in particular self-service, undermined attempts to create skilled selling. Elements of welfarism remain at David Jones and continue to support the firm’s corporate image as a provider of high-quality customer service. ii

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgment is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

I also declare the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Bradley John Pragnell iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Like most other written work, the appearance of an individual author masks a more complex reality where it is only through a collective effort that such a work is completed. This author, while the sole producer of the written text, could not have completed this work without the active support of family, friends and colleagues.

Thanks are due to my supervisors, Bradon Ellem, Chris Wright and Michael Hess, for provision of support and assistance.

Special thanks must also go to the staff at the Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training (ACIRRT) at the University of Sydney, where the author worked between 1993 and 1996. Director Ron Callus and Deputy Director John Buchanan are to be thanked for their support, assistance, insights and humour. Special thanks are extended to my ACIRRT co-workers of that period, particularly Richard Pickersgill, Kathryn Heiler, Shannon O’Keeffe, Paul Ronfeldt, Linda Cowan, Michelle Spartalis, Michelle Schumacher and, in particular, Merilyn Bryce, who kindly proof read a final version of this thesis.

Staff and fellow graduate students at both the School of Industrial Relations and Organisation Behaviour at the University of New South Wales and the Department of Industrial Relations (recently retitled “Work and Organisational Studies”) at the University of Sydney, provided intellectual and emotional support throughout the long days. In particular, my friend and collaborator, Dr Michael O’Donnell at UNSW is to be thanked for his support.

Special thanks go to Barbara Horton, Archivist for David Jones Limited, without whose assistance, support and good humour this thesis would have never been completed.

The author would like to thank family and friends for their support and encouragement through this process; including, my three sons, Lachlan, Finn and Seamas, who were all born while this thesis remained in vitro, the Dawson family, and my parents, Wally and Diane Pragnell.

Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank my partner, Michelle Dawson, for her tireless and unceasing support, sacrifice, encouragement and love.

iv

TABLE O F CO NTENTS

Abstract i

Declaration ii

Acknowledgments iii

Table of Contents iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE Towards a Historical Understanding of Employers’ Consent-Based Approaches to Labour Management 6

CHAPTER TWO Consent-Based Approaches to Labour Management: Defining, Analysing and Theorising Paternalism and Welfarism 30

CHAPTER THREE Nineteenth Century Labour Management at David Jones & Co., 1838-1887 68

CHAPTER FOUR David Jones & Co. and the Politics of the Early Closing of Shops in NSW, 1830-1900 101

CHAPTER FIVE The Tailors’ Strike of 1891-92 at David Jones & Co. 133

CHAPTER SIX Early Welfarist Experiments at David Jones Ltd., 1900–1914 153

CHAPTER SEVEN Introduction of Welfarism and Systematic Labour Management at David Jones Ltd., 1914-1926 183

CHAPTER EIGHT The Consolidation of Welfarism at David Jones Ltd., 1927-1939 239

CHAPTER NINE Welfarism Challenged, 1939-1958 272

CONCLUSION 295

Bibliography 302 INTRODUCTION

David Jones brings about an emotional response from many Australians. For many older

Sydneysiders who frequented the David Jones’ stores in Sydney’s Central Business

District, the firm represented the height of sophistication and service. For many younger

Australians, there is but a dull glimmer of the past sophistication and service at David

Jones’ scattered throughout suburban malls and “shopping towns”. Currently, the firm is more likely to be associated in the public imagination with its television and print ads, the “There’s no other store” jingle and the ever-present houndstooth. Yet in a world where many Australian “icons” have disappeared, David Jones remains, having been in business since 1838, a tangible link to a distant colonial past.

This thesis investigates the history of labour management at the major Australian retailer,

David Jones, from its founding in 1838 until 1958. It documents the labour management practices and policies adopted by David Jones throughout this period. This includes how management sought to organise work, how labour was recruited and selected, how employees were rewarded and punished and how the firm dealt with the demands of employees, their organisations and governments, all the while attempting to maintain the firm’s standing in the broader community.

This thesis will seek to answer several questions concerning labour management at David

Jones. First, “Did paternalism exist at David Jones in the nineteenth century and if it did what were its origins?”. Second, “Did welfarism exist at David Jones in the twentieth century and if it did, what were its origins, in particular, was welfarism

1 merely an extension of paternalism?”. Third, “Did welfarism ‘survive’ its initial introduction and what was its’ long-term legacy?”.

From a single drapery store in 1838, David Jones & Co. (renamed David Jones Ltd. in

1907) became one of Australia's premier retailers with department stores in four states and the Australian Capital Territory. The company also has a considerable history as a clothing manufacturer in its own right. David Jones is important in regards to labour management for several reasons. Since the 1870s and up until the present, it has been one of Australia's largest private sector employers. As well, the firm stands as a pioneer of formalised labour management in Australia and an important example of an employer adopting a “consent-based” approach to labour management.

This history will seek to inform debates within the emerging labour management historiography. On the one hand, this history will contribute to the on-going reappraisal within the Australian literature, further questioning the view that Australian employers have historically been "weak" and "reactive" in relation to labour management. It will be noted that David Jones was highly pro-active in its approach to labour management particularly through its embrace of welfarism in the first decades of the twentieth century.

As well, by examining David Jones, this thesis seeks to complement recent historical literature on the development of labour management in Australia. As such this thesis will help in providing a fuller picture of Australian labour management

2 practice, by investigating a firm outside mining, transport, and pastoral industries which have dominated much of the analysis of labour history and industrial relations study in this country.

This thesis further seeks to broaden debates concerning the development of modern labour management in Australia, in particular focussing on "consent-based approaches" to labour management in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Studies of firms and industries that adopted approaches such as “paternalism” and “welfarism” have increasingly been the subject of research in both Britain and America. This thesis contributes an Australian example to this expanding literature. However, most work in

Australia has focussed on control-based approaches, in particular the introduction of

"Taylorism" or scientific management. In examining David Jones and focussing on the consent-based approach to labour management adopted by the employer, this thesis will seek to illuminate an important yet understudied area in order to correct the existing imbalance within the Australian literature. Such an example becomes increasingly important as the service sector expands at the expense of primary and secondary industry, and contemporary Australian employers’ display a keen interest in adopting

“consent-based” approaches to labour management. Several issues in relation to the emergence of a "consent-based approach" within labour management at David Jones will be examined, including the factors and rationale surrounding the adoption, practice and maintenance of such an approach.

3 This thesis relies on a historical case study approach. Most of the documentation used is that contained within the David Jones Archive (DJA), one of the few open company archives left in Australia. This provides a detailed account of management decision- making and specific events. Other primary sources, such as industry journals, government records and newspaper accounts have been used to supplement materials from the DJA.

This thesis is structured into several periods, and will investigate different aspects of labour management at David Jones. The periods have been chosen because they reflect both epochs within Australia's economic and political development, as well as different approaches to labour management within the firm. The first major section of the thesis includes two chapters that investigate the recent literature. The first chapter investigates recent attempts, both within Australia and overseas, to develop a historical understanding of labour management. It has long been recognised that having a historical basis is critical to contextualise and understand contemporary developments. This chapter will explore the literature and the theoretical and methodological issues arising out of the recent literature. The second chapter focuses on the issue of consent-based approaches to labour management, and reviews much of the overseas research in this area. In particular, this chapter will seek to investigate the key concepts used in this thesis, namely “paternalism” and “welfarism”. The second major section of the thesis

(Chapters Three, Four and Five) examines the evolution of nineteenth century labour management at David Jones. It will seek to answer the question whether paternalism existed and, if it did, how it was manifest in practice. Particular events examined will include the practice

4 of work and employment relations throughout the century; the early closing movement and its impact on David Jones; and the major industrial dispute of the firm's history, the

1891-92 Tailors’ Strike, which the firm decisively won. The third major section of this thesis (Chapters Six through Nine) tracks the emergence of twentieth century welfarism and systematic labour management at David Jones. In particular, these chapters examine the origins of welfarism, how it operated in practice and its trajectory throughout the middle decades of the twentieth century. Importantly, this section attempts to explain why David Jones adopted this specific form of labour management and examines the links between nineteenth century “paternalism” and twentieth century welfarism.

This thesis examines an important yet understudied sector and set of employer practices.

In doing so, this thesis will contribute to a series of debates, including the historical study of labour management in Australia, the factors influencing management strategy and the reasons behind the uptake of a “consent-based” approach to labour management.

It will also provide guidance for future research on both the history of consent-based labour management amongst Australian employers as well as future studies on the development of labour management in the retail industry.

5 CHAPTER ONE

Towards a Historical Understanding of Employers’ Consent-Based Approaches to Labour Management

This thesis is an historical case study of labour management at David Jones. It seeks to trace the development of a consent-based approach to labour management by this employer. In particular, this thesis seeks to determine the existence of nineteenth century paternalism and twentieth century welfarism and why such strategies were adopted.

This chapter investigates literature that deals broadly with the historical study of labour management. It begins with Marx’s conceptualisation of the labour process and the emphasis within the “labour process” literature more generally upon employers’ use of control-based approaches to labour management. The chapter then investigates the recognition by researchers of alternative, consent-based approaches to labour management that are available to employers. This chapter further examines the need to consider employer discretion in their selection of an approach to labour management and what factors contribute to an employer favouring a control- or consent-based approach to labour management. Lastly, the chapter examines the benefits of historical case study methodology in both tracing the development of such approaches to labour management and, importantly, the advantage of this methodology in understanding why employers adopted certain approaches.

This thesis uses concepts such as labour management, strategy, control and consent, which require a degree of explanation. The acquisition, allocation, maintenance and

6 management of a workforce are critical problems confronting any employer. Such activities within the firm have been broadly labelled “labour management” to distinguish them from others activities within the firm, such as finance and marketing.

This does not mean that these other activities do not impact on labour. Research has shown that decisions in these other areas often have a dramatic effect on employees.1

However, "labour management" will refer to those activities deliberately focussed on the management of labour.

If labour management is a distinguishable aspect of the activities of the firm, in what way is it different? M arx identified a central dilemma for the employer within capitalism, namely the open-endedness of the employment contract.2 The capitalist employment contract differs, for instance, from slavery, in that the subordinate is not the property of the superordinate. What the superordinate purchases is the potential labour of the subordinate. The actual amount of labour supplied is often indeterminate, particularly if the subordinate is paid a time-based wage. The employment contract also differs from other commercial contracts in that the relationship is not necessarily a discrete and finite exchange of goods or services. The employment relation may be on-going with no particular date or time when the relationship ceases.

Marx believed that employers sought to resolve these problems within what he described as the “labour process”. Marx noted that what is "purchased" and

“managed” by the capitalist employer is the potential labour of living human beings

1 Purcell, J. and Ahlstrand, B. (1994). Human Resource Management in the Multi-Divisional Company. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1; Gospel, H. (1992). Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 7 (“labour”), not guaranteed production (“labour power”). In agreeing to be employed, the worker does not necessarily guarantee a specific amount of productive labour.

The employer attempts to convert “labour” into “labour power” through management of the “labour process”. This management could include supervision, discipline, and the application of new technologies. However, given the open-endedness of the employment contact, there is no guarantee that the employer can fully convert

“labour” into “labour power”, particularly if the worker seeks to withhold their full productive capacity. Marx argued that this dilemma could never be fully resolved. 3

How then do employers manage the labour process? How are they able to convert

“labour” into “labour power”? Writers, both within and outside the Marxist tradition, have noted the importance of employers seeking to control their workers as a means of seeking to convert the potential productive capacity of labour into real productive power.

Control-based approaches to labour management are where the employer attempts to explicitly command and direct employees in an effort to convert labour potential into real labour power. Often this is through the use of threats, intimidation and surveillance or through the introduction of forms of work organisation where the employer directs the pace and content of work. Through such control, the employer may be able to realise the potential productive labour of the employee. For the employer, labour is viewed instrumentally, merely as a factor of production. Such an

2 Marx, K. (1954). Capital, Volume One. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 164-72. 3 Marx (1954), Capital ; See also Thompson, P. (1990). “ Crawling from the Wreckage: The Labour Process and the Politics of Production”, in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.), Labour Process Theory. London: Macmillan, 99 for a contemporary analysis that places the “ indeterminacy of labour potential” at the centre of labour process theory. 8 approach has been alternatively described as "Theory X Management"4, "low trust"5,

"direct control"6 or "despotic"7.

Braverman, building upon Marx’s concepts of labour, labour power and the labour process, cited Taylorism as the archetypal control-based approach to labour management.8 In his 1974 work, Labor and Monopoly Capital, Braverman sought to apply Marx’s concepts to the introduction of scientific management within the

American workplace in the first decades of the twentieth century. Braverman focussed on the writings of F.W. Taylor, the American engineer whose main work was the Principles of Scientific Management (1905). Taylor’s writings and ideas

(often referred to as “Taylorism”) noted that workers engaged in “soldiering”, in other words they would collectively seek to limit the amount of work to be done. This was to their collective benefit, and the detriment of the employer. Workers, in particular skilled workers, could do this due to their workplace-based knowledge and the skills that permitted them to control the labour process. What employers wanted to do was control the labour process (and control workers), by accessing the knowledge of skilled workers. This would be accomplished by monitoring and recording the tasks involved, breaking them down into discreet tasks, and then reapplying the tasks so that discretion and skill were no longer needed.

4 McGregor, D. (1987). “ The Human Side of Enterprise”, in L. Boone and D. Bowen (eds.), The Great Writings in Management and Organisational Behaviour (Second Edition). New York: Random House, 126-138. 5 Fox, A. (1985). Man Mismanagement (Second Edition). London: Hutchinson. 6 Friedman, A. (1987). “ The Means of Management Control and Labour Process Theory”. Sociology, 21(2): 287- 294. 7 Burawoy, M. (1985). The Politics of Production. London: Verso. 8 Braverman, H. (1974). Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.

9 Braverman used Taylorism to explain what he perceived as the lack of industrial militancy and political awareness among American workers, especially when compared to their European counterparts. In his work, Braverman concluded that the application of Taylorism had been used by employers to degrade the skilled trades, undermining their strategic position within the labour process and effectively undermining working-class militancy in America. In doing so, Braverman wrote what amounted to a new history of twentieth century American capitalism and inspired a whole school of inquiry known as the “labour process literature”.9

Braverman's work was widely hailed a watershed in the critical investigation of the workplace and led to both theoretical developments and further historical research.

However, Braverman’s work also came under considerable criticism.10 Some argued that Braverman had overemphasised the extent of Taylorism and the degree to which this had led to widescale deskilling during the early twentieth century.11 Other writers noted that Braverman largely ignored worker resistance, which may have mediated the effects of Taylorism's impact, although Braverman explicitly notes that worker resistance was beyond the scope of his study.12 Ot hers raised serious questions about the degree to which Taylorism was implemented in its pure form, citing variations

9 Braverman (1974), Labor and Monopoly Capital; Marx (1954), Capital, 173-92. 10 One of the more provocative readings of Braverman's work and the response of his "critics" is that of Burrell, G. (1990). “ Fragmented Labours”, in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.), Labour Process Theory. London: Macmillan, 277. He notes that Labor and Monopoly Capital acted as a "m eta-narrative", "a text which served to unify, explain and unite a whole series of disparate phenomenon within a total framework" (277). More conventional reviews of the labour process literature include Littler, C. (1990). “ The Labour Process Debate: A Theoretical Review 1974-1988”, in Knights and Willmott (eds.), Labour Process Theory, 46-94. 11 Wood, S. (ed.) (1982). The Degradation of Work?: Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process. London: Hutchinson. 12 Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the W orkplace in the Twentieth Century. New York: Basic. See also Montgomery, D. (1987). The Fall of the House of Labor; The Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10 between firms, industries and national economies.13 In addition, critics noted the widespread persistence of "craft-based" work organisation into the twentieth century, in particular outside of the United States.14 Some writers noted that concepts such as the subjective experience of work, its impact on the individual and their identity, mediated through past experiences as well as through culture, class, race and gender need to be considered.15 Certain critiques of Braverman similarly rested upon the notion that in focussing upon the point of production, he ignored the broader capitalist employment relationship and the wider societal dynamics that reinforced it.16

Many labour process writers argued for the need to integrate the worker’s subjective experience of work and in turn the potential for worker resistance. As well, historical studies led many labour process writers to note the variety of techniques used by managers to control the labour process well beyond Taylorism.17

13 Burawoy (1985), Politics of Production; Littler, C. (1986). The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Aldershot UK: Gower; Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J (1991). “ Conclusion; National models and international variations in labour management and employer organizations”, in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.), The Power to Manage?. London: Routledge, 273-343; Jacoby, S. (1991). “ American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of Management”, in S.Jacoby (ed.), Masters to Managers. New York: Columbia University Press, 173-200. 14 Friedman, A. (1977). Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism. London: Macmillan; Kealey, G. (1986). “ Work Control, the Labour Process, and Nineteenth Century Canadian Printers”, in C. Heron and R. Storey (eds.), On the job; Confronting the labour process in Canada. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 75-101; Reid, A. (1991). “Employers’ strategies and craft production: The British shipbuilding industry 1870-1950”, in Tolliday and Zeitlin (eds.), The Power to Manage?, 35-51. Patmore, G. (1994). “ ’American Hustling Methods’ - The Lithgow Small Arms Factory 1912-1922”. Labour History, 67, 42-56. 15 Knights, D. (1990). “ Subjectivity, Power and the Labour Process”, in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.), Labour Process Theory, 300-5.; West, J. (1990). “ Gender and the Labour Process: A Reassessment” in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.), Labour Process Theory, 244-273. Also Cockburn, C. (1983). Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change. London: Pluto Press. 16 Salaman, G and Littler, C. (1982) “ Bravermania and Beyond: Recent T heories of the Labour Process”. Sociology, 16(2), 267-8.

11 These critiques of Braverman provide a useful point of departure for concepts central to this thesis. One development has been the need to recognise the role of consent; namely that some level of consent may be required from the employee to realise their labour potential and, importantly, that the employer may actually seek to elicit this consent as part of a deliberate labour management strategy. Second, if there are alternatives available to the employer in realising labour potential, then there needs to be some consideration of the discretion afforded to the employer, how they might seek to choose and what factors would affect that choice.

Consent-based approaches to labour management are, therefore, typically posited as the alternative to control-based approaches for the employer within capitalism. This approach has been alternatively described as "Theory Y management”18, "high trust"19 and "responsible autonomy".20 In adopting this approach to labour management, the capitalist employer seeks to elicit the co-operation of the employee to provide their productive labour. Through mutual agreement, the employer will seek to realise the potential productive labour of the employee. In exchange, the employer will supposedly treat the employees more humanely, rather than as mere factors of production. For instance, there may be an emphasis on training and the development of employees as "human resources", or the employer may permit employees to have or maintain some control over work organisation. These initiatives, within a broader consent-based approach, are argued to engender a more co-operative rather than

17 The critiques have been discussed in amongst other places, Burawoy (1985), Politics of Production, 21-84; Thompson, P. (1989). The Nature of Work. London: Macmillan; Knights and Willmott (eds.) Labour Process Theory. 18 McGregor (1987), “ The Human Side of Enterprise”. 19 Fox (1985), Man Mismangement. 20 Friedman (1977), Labour and Industry. 12 conflictual work environment. And such a work environment will supposedly result in a loyal and productive workforce. 21

Despite the strong focus of the labour process literature on Taylorism and other manifestations of control, dualist models incorporating consent-based approaches, were developed as a result of some of the critiques of Braverman’s work. Within the labour process literature there was a renewed appreciation of both the role of employee consent in the workplace and employers’ attempts to elicit such consent in a less confrontational fashion.22 M ichael Burawoy noted that consent was critical in the operation of a workplace and that management would create choices and foster participation in such choices to garner worker consent.23

Andrew Friedman’s research on the British car industry, noted alternative regimes of control operating for skilled workers and machine operators. He adapted earlier dualistic models, identifying what he called “direct control”, to describe work organisation on the assembly line and “responsible autonomy”, to describe work organisation in skilled areas.24 The work of Michael Burawoy further expanded upon the work of Antonio Gramsci, describing workplace regimes in capitalist nations as

“hegemonic” and those in the former Communist nations as “despotic” (though he

21 Guest, D. (1987). “ Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations”. Journal of Management Studies, 24(5), 507;. Purcell and Ahlstrand, Human Resource Management. 22 Legge, K. (1989). “ Human resource management: a critical analysis”, in J. Storey (ed.), New Perspectives on Human Resource Management. London and New York: Routledge, 19-40; Guest, D. (1992). “ Employee Commitment and Control” in J. Hartley and G. Stevenson (eds.), Employment Relations: The Psychology of Influence and Control of Work. Oxford: Blackwell, 111-135; Sturdy, A., Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds.) (1992). Skill and Consent, London and New York: Routledge. 23 Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing Consent. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 27. 24 Friedman (1977), Labour and Industry. 13 saw the breakdown of the post-war accord between capital and labour as leading to the emergence of a “hegemonic despotism” in the West).25

The concept of consent was injected into the labour process debate through other intellectual, often sociological, debates. The writings of Michel Foucault, in particular, influenced many with his view that even in the most authoritarian relationship, an element of consent is required on behalf of the subordinate if that relationship was to persist. Control and consent, rather than being distinct, were deeply interwoven within the employment relationship and with all approaches to labour management.26

While developments within the labour process and sociological literature fuelled a renewed focus on consent, changes in actual labour management practice also informed this debate. During the 1970s and 1980s, managers experimented with consent-based approaches to labour management, ranging from human resource management to employee involvement and work redesign. 27

Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, industrial relations scholars identified what was variously called the “paradigm shift”, the “revolution” or “transformation” of the workplace, arguing that a full-scale conversion of employers from a control-based to consent-based approaches was occurring.28 In adopting this new consent-based

25 Burawoy (1985), Politics of Production, 122-208. 26 Sturdy, Knights, and Willmott (eds.) (1992), Skill and Consent. 27 Cappelli, P. (1999). The New Deal at Work: Managing the Market-Driven Workforce. Cambridge MA: HBR Books; Weisbord, M. (1991). Productive Workplace; Organizing and Managing for Dignity, Meaning and Community. S an F rancisco C A: Jossey-B ass P ublishers; Niland, J. and Clarke, O, (eds.) (1991). Agenda for Change: An International Analysis of Industrial Relations in Transition. North S ydney: Allen & Unwin; Kochan T., Katz, H. ,and McKersie, R. (1986). The Transformation of American Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books; Walton, R. (1985). “ From control to commitment in the workplace”. Harvard Business Review, March-April 1985, 77-84. 28 Ibid. 14 strategy, an employer would promote flexible team-based work practices, consultative decision-making, performance-based pay systems, additional training, flexible leave, flexible arrangement of work hours and so forth.29 Often this change has been seen as a necessity, driven by forces such as globalisation and niche marketing.30

However, there has been considerable debate as to the extent of these workplace changes.31 Further, the “paradigm shift” literature often relies upon a simplistic pseudo-history that masks an essentially ahistorical approach, emphasising the newness of such initiatives. The documented past, with its own diversity, is not considered.32 For instance, earlier experiments in “consent-based” approaches to the management of labour, such as eighteenth and nineteenth century experiments by

Quaker entrepreneurs in Britain, and early twentieth century American welfare capitalism, are generally ignored by much of the “paradigm shift” literature, in lieu of an idealised history based on the history of leading thinkers.33

Management Strategy

While there was an increasing appreciation within the labour process literature of consent-based approaches to labour management being adopted by employers, this

29 Piore, M. and Sable, C. (1984). The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York NY: Basic Books; Mathews, J. (1994). Catching the W ave: W orkplace Reform in Australia. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin. 30 Reich, R. (1983). The Next American Frontier. New York: Times Books. 31 Hyman, R. (1975). Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: Macmillan; Fox, Man Mismangement; Fieldes, D. and Bramble, T. (1992). “ Post-Fordism: Historical Break or Utopian Fantasy?”. Journal of Industrial Relations, 34(4), 562-79; Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training (1999). Australia at Work: Just Managing?, Sydney: Prentice Hall. 32 Licht, W. (1992). Getting Work: Philadelphia, 1840-1950. C am bridge M A: Harvard University Press.

15 diversity within employer practice raised certain conceptual issues for the labour process literature. Notably, there needed to be an understanding of the factors contributing to why employers might choose between competing approaches.

The need for the labour process and associated literature to grapple with employer strategy led to a renewed appreciation of business history outside the Marxist tradition. One such writer was business historian, Alfred Chandler. Chandler argued that classical economics was flawed in that it could not account for developments such as the emergence of large firms. Chandler posited that the "visible hand" of the manager making conscious decisions had to be placed alongside the "invisible hand" of the market, to explain economic developments.34 Chandler argued that the history of managerial decisions could be analysed in terms of "strategy" and "structure".

"Structure" referred to the organisational form chosen to facilitate and administer strategies. "Strategy", on the other hand, referred to long-term objectives of the firm.35

These terms have gained considerable popularity throughout sociological inquiry.

Crow notes that the popularity of "strategy" as a concept, stems from its usefulness in overcoming the dichotomy between "agency" and "structure" within sociological analysis. He notes the strength of "strategy" as a concept, in that it rejects

33 Weisbord (1991), Productive Workplaces ; Brandes, S. (1976). American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940. Chicago IL and London: University of Chicago Press; Cohen, L. (1990). Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939. New York: C am bridge University Press, 159-212; Gospel, H. (1992). Markets, firms and the management of labour in modern Britain. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press; Brody, D. (1993). “ The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism” in W orkers in Industrial America, Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University P ress, 48-81; Jacoby, S. (1997). Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 34 Chandler, A. (1962). Structure and Strategy: Chapters in the History of American Business. Cambridge MA: MIT Press; Chandler, A. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. New York: Belknap Press.

16 determinism, while simultaneously acknowledging the operation of social agency within certain constraints. 36

However, despite its popularity, shortcomings in "strategy" were also identified.37 It has been noted that strategy implies clear-cut objectives, rational decision-making and an internally coherent set of actions aimed at achieving these objectives. Critics argue that the concept of "strategy" has difficulty explaining subjectivity, "non-rational" behaviour, multiple objectives (especially within groups), and fragmented, uncoordinated and conflicting activities. Lastly there is a certain "linear rigidity" within the concept of “strategy”, in that it has difficulty in accommodating important ad hoc decision-making with a dynamic situation.38

Within contemporary industrial relations research, the Chandlerian concept of

"strategy" has become popular within the literature investigating labour management issues.39 "M anagement strategy" has emerged as an important concept within the study of industrial relations and labour history. In the area of industrial relations, this approach has been promoted through new models such as the "strategic choice" model

35 Gospel, H. (1983) “ New Managerial Approaches to Industrial Relations: Major Paradigms and Historical Perspectives”. Journal of Industrial Relations, 25(2), 169; Chandler, Structure and Strategy, 13. 36 Crow, G. (1989). “ The Use of the Concept of ‘Strategy’ in the Recent Sociological Literature”. Sociology, 23(1), 1-24. See also Child, J. (1972). “ Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance: the Role of Strategic Choice”. Sociology, (6)1 for an early exposition of “strategic choice” within the management literature. See also the work of noted sociologist Anthony Giddens for reflections on strategy, structure and action within the sociological literature, for instance Giddens, A. (1982). Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction. London: Macmillan. 37 Those who adhere to a notion of "strategy" in the labour management literature have acknowledged some of these types of critiques Gospel (1992), Markets; P urcell and Ahlstrand (1994), Human Resource Management. Gospel believes that it is important to distinguish between "intended strategies", those which are deliberate, and "enacted strategies", where the strategy "accumulates incrementally" through the repetition of particular practices Gospel, Markets, 10. 38 Hyman, R. (1987). “ Structure and Strategy? Capital, Labour and Control”. Work, Employment and Society, 1(1), 25-55. 39 Kochan, T., Katz, H. and Cappelli, P. (1984). “ Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations Theory”. Industrial Relations, 23(1), 16-39. 17 of Thomas Kochan, Robert M cKersie, Harry Katz and Peter Capelli.40 This work has become among the most influential within contemporary American industrial relations research.41

In the United Kingdom, similar research was conducted with early collections such as

Thurley and Wood, Gospel and Littler and in the Australian context, Bray and

Taylor.42 Howard Gospel’s work drew heavily upon the work of Chandler. While

Gospel has sought to not only map the historical changes and continuities in the labour management practices and policies of British employers, culminating in his

1992 work, Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain, but he has also sought to link firm-level developments back to broader market developments.43 Other recent historical literature referred to in this chapter uses conceptualisations of management strategy and focuses on managerial decision- making to understand developments within particular employers.44

Managerial strategy serves as a useful starting point for understanding why firms adopt different approaches to labour management. Further, the management strategy literature notes the need to identify the role of both exogenous and endogenous factors in shaping the development of any such strategy.

40 Ibid. 41 See Adams, R. and Meltz, N. (eds.) (1993). Industrial Relations Theory; Its Nature Scope and Pedagogy. Metuchen NJ and London: ILMR Press / Rutgers University and The Scarecrow Press, for evaluations both pro and con of the impact of this research on North American industrial relations research. 42 Gospel, H. and Littler, C., (eds.) (1983). Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations. London: Heinemann Educational Books; Thurley, K. and Wood, S. (1983). Industrial Relations and Management Strategies. New York: C am bridge University P ress; B ray, M . and T aylor, V. , (eds. ) (1986). Managing Labour?. Sydney: McGraw-Hill. 43 Gospel (1992), Markets. 44 See for example, Jacoby (1997), Modern Manors, 4. 18 Those writing within the “post-Fordist” school have identified exogenous economic factors outside of the firm as driving change in management practice. For example, the emergence of an affluent working-class in the post-World War II period created the mass consumer market that made mass production and the associated control- based approaches possible. However, product market competition, changing consumption patterns, technology and globalisation have been cited as driving the need for firms to abandon these old control-based approaches and adopt new consent- based approaches.45

Writers such as Gospel have also attempted to link differences in labour management to conditions external to the firm. For instance, Gospel has argued that, along with small firm size and family ownership, the lack of product market competition in the

United Kingdom “permitted” British manufacturers to eschew widescale adoption of innovative control-based approaches and accommodate existing craft-based production.46

Similarly, labour market conditions are often cited as an important exogenous factor driving the adoption of certain labour management practices within a national economy or industry. A tight labour market, it has been argued, will make employers more competitive in acquiring labour and possibly more likely to adopt consent-based approaches to attract and retain staff. Alternatively, a labour market with high unemployment is likely to see a greater reliance on control-based schemes.47

45 Reich (1983) Next American Frontier; Piore and Sable (1984) Second Industrial Divide; Mathews (1993) Catching the Wave. 46 Gospel (1992) Markets. 47 Kalecki, M. (1971). Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 140-1 19 When looking at exogenous factors, economic conditions generally dominate the analysis, though many have also noted the importance of political and cultural determinants.48 Some studies have noted how wider cultural tendencies have been distilled through the firm to inform labour management decisions.49 Other studies have noted the impact of non-employer bodies such as unions or governments in shaping the choices available to management.50

Despite the prevalence of explanations for labour management strategy strongly informed by an economic centred view of the firm buffeted by market forces, others such as Tolliday and Zeitlin have critiqued such an approach as reductionist and determinist. Tolliday and Zeitlin critique models that implicitly or explicitly grant the market primacy in determining what firms actually do. In their critique of this approach, Tolliday and Zeitlin argue that the institutional economics of Coase, the business history of Chandler and even the labour process literature, all rely upon such a conceptualisation of the firm. Little or no room is given to managerial agency or the influence of non-economic factors. Tolliday and Zeitlin argue that throughout much of this literature, firms are driven by economic forces (be it increased competition or declining rates of profit) to rationalise structures and processes, increase surveillance and control of employees, and intensify work. They note that much recent historical

48 Harris, H. (1982). The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Jacoby, S. (1985). Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945. New York: Columbia University Press. 49 Zahavi, G. (1988). Workers, Managers and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners of Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 50 Gospel (1992), Markets; Wright, C. (1995). Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 20 research has brought into question this conclusion, noting the importance of culture, ideology and chance in shaping management decisions.51

There also needs to be an understanding and appreciation of the decision-making processes within the firm.52 This includes a need to realise the relative decision- making power exerted by ownership, senior executives, technical specialists, labour management managers and line managers.53 Further the impact of ideology and experience on the decisions made by managers needs to be considered.54

In understanding decision-making, there needs to be an understanding that firms are organisations, and organisations are by nature political.55 For instance certain groups within the firm may be struggling for power, an oft-cited example of which was the struggle at the beginning of the century between personnel managers, engineers and foremen for control over the workplace.56 Often various departments, units or

"factions" within management itself can come into conflict.57 Generational changes within management can also generate conflict as a new group of managers attempt to

51 Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J (1991). “ Introduction: Employers and industrial relations between theory and history”, in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.), The Power to Manage?, 1 -3 1 . For an Australian example, see Taksa, L. (1992). “ Scientific Management: Technique or Cultural Ideology?”. Journal of Industrial Relations, 34(3), 365-395. 52 Simon, H. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan. See also Mintzberg, H. (1971). “ Managerial Work: Analysis from Observation”. Managerial Science, 18(2), 97-110 for a somewhat more recent version of Simon’s empiricism. 53 Flanders, A. (1964). The Fawley Productivity Agreements: A Case Study of Management and Collective Bargaining. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.; Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994) Human Resource Management. 54 See for example Hunnicutt, B. (1992). “ Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day: A Capitalist Vision of Liberation through Managed Work Reduction”. Business History Review, 66, 475-522. 55 Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Princeton NJ: Prentice Hall. See for example Smith, C., Child, J, and Rowlinson, M. (1990). Reshaping Work: the Cadbury Experience. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 56 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 6; Littler (1986), Development of the Labour Process, 97; Armstrong, P. (1986). "Management Control Strategies and Inter-Professional Competition: the Cases of Accountancy and Personnel Management", in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.), Managing the Labour Process. London: Gower. 57 Sheridan, T. (1981). “ A Case Study in Complexity: The Origins of the 1945 Steel Strike in New South Wales”. Labour History, 41, 106-7. 21 remake labour management to suit their perceived objectives.58 Therefore, both endogenous and exogenous factors should be considered when attempting to understand what influences management strategy.

Historical Case Study Methodology

As noted, the labour process and associated literature appreciated that employers could develop strategies and choose between competing approaches to labour management. This raises a series of questions that need to be addressed. First, when were control-based and consent-based approaches to labour management actually adopted by employers? And second, why was one or the other approach chosen?

In this context, the detailed, long-term historical case study has certain advantages.

Specific long-term developments within a firm can be tracked, noting not only new initiatives as they emerge but also changes as they occur. As well, the long-term and detailed perspective afforded by the historical case study permits the researcher to examine certain approaches or strategies were adopted, rejected or changed.

Given the historical nature of Braverman’s work, historical approaches to understanding labour management have, not surprisingly, been popular.59 In

Australia, Patmore argues for a historical approach to understanding labour management. He notes that the historical approach, with its own multi- methodological approach and search for meanings and processes (rather than cause and effect) is in some ways better suited for the study of labour management, than use of starkly empiricist social science methodology. Through gathering empirical data,

58 Hunnicutt (1992), “ Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day”, 502-520. 22 understanding can be based on historical fact rather than perception, myth or conjecture.60 At the same time, locating data within a theoretical framework (even a relatively simple one) enables a better understanding of the past and present.

For instance, Richard Hyman has noted that "historical sensitivity is a keynote of

'alternative' studies of industrial relations ... the present is historically conditioned and historically contingent".61 In addition, as critics of the new social-labour history have argued, historical research should retain some degree of contemporary relevance to avoid sliding into antiquarianism or reductionism.62 Historically-based research can maintain a modern day relevance through reference to theory and contemporary debates.

However, the heavy attention on Taylorism in the historical literature, again inspired by Braverman, has inadvertently distorted the picture of actual labour management developments over the past century.63 This skewed picture, of a landscape solely occupied by large manufacturing workplaces structured around Taylorist principles, also reinforces the pseudo-history of the paradigm shift literature, of a past practice dominated by Taylorism and an emerging present where Taylorism has been abandoned in favour of consent-based approaches to labour management.

59 Jacoby (1991) Masters to Managers; Tolliday and Zeitlin (1991) The Power to Manage. 60 Patmore, G., (ed.) (1990) History and Industrial Relations. Sydney: ACIRRT. 61 Hyman, R. (1982). “ Contribution to Review Symposium”. Industrial Relations, 21(1), 108. 62 Zeitlin, J. (1987). “ From labour history to the history of industrial relations”, Economic History Review, (Second Series), 40(2), 159-184; Morton, D. (1988). “ Labour and Industrial Relations History in English- Speaking Canada”, in G. Hebert, H. Jain, and N. Meltz, N, (eds.), The State of the Art in Industrial Relations. Kingston: IRC Press, 255. 63 Patmore, G. (1988). “ Systematic Management and Bureaucracy: the NSW Railways Prior to 1932”. Labour and Industry, 1(2), 306-21; Wright (1995) The Management of Labour. 23 A more expansive and grounded history of labour management is needed, in particular, the emergence and development of consent-based approaches requires critical examination. Histories of earlier developments can redress the imbalance within the present historical record and place recent developments in a better historical perspective.

During the 1980s and 1990s such work began to emerge.64 In the United States, historians such as Nelson, Harris, Schatz, and Jacoby have written well-documented his t ories t hat examine emp loy ers and t heir role in s hap ing t he A merican w orkp lace.65

In Great Britain, Gospel, Zeitlin and Tolliday have similarly challenged the traditional

“industrial relations / labour history” notion that employers were somehow passive players in constructing the workplace. 66 In Australia, Patmore has focussed on particular industries and enterprises, questioning the conventional industrial relations view that Australian employers were passive and, indeed, noting the key role played by employers in shaping the workplace.67 Wright builds on such work to develop a broader critical history of labour management in Australia, identifying the important role played by employers, as well as consultants and the state, in developing the

Australian workplace.68

64 Jacoby (1991), Masters to Managers, 1-15. 65 Nelson, D. (1975). Managers and Workers: the Origins of the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920. M adison W I: University of W isconsin P ress; Harris, H. (1982). The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Politics of American Business in the 1940s. M adison WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Schatz, R. (1983). The Electrical Workers: A history of labor at General Electric and Westinghouse, 1923-60. Chicago IL and Urbana IL, University of Illinois Press; Jacoby (1985) Employing Bureaucracy. 66 Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J. (1991). “ Introduction: Employers and industrial relations between theory and history”, in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin, (eds.), The Power to Manage?. London: Routledge, 1-31; Gospel (1992) Markets. 67 Patmore (1988), “ Systematic Management”. 68 Wright (1995), The Management of Labour. 24 However, in t he Aust ralian cont ext , t here are few st udies of emp loy ers who favoured consent-based approaches. Sheridan, in his discussion of Australian labour historiography has noted:

More generally, most non-legal historians have traditionally been selective in another way. They have tended to choose for study the more dramatic, the more conflictual areas of industrial relations. In my own case, for example, I have largely concentrated on militant blue collar workers, on aggressive employers, on large industrial disputes, and on turbulent time-periods. Yet how typical of Australian industrial relations history are studies of proud metal tradesmen, of militant coalminers, of the autocratic steel monopoly, of the post-war strike wave? In any case what is the research to contemporary industrial relations? In 1990 the great majority of the workforce is to be found in the tertiary sector and union coverage is shrinking. The histories of a number a white collar unions have been written but, if contemporary relevance were the aim, should not more labour historians follow the recent isolated example of M ichael Hess and study some of the many, many small pockets of unorganised white collar workers lacking both industrial clout and any tradition of unionism, let alone militancy.69

Patmore notes that welfarism was more widely used than Taylorism, despite the lack of major studies in the area.70 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, over a dozen articles in Labour History and The Journal of Industrial Relations, two of Australia’s main journals in this area, have investigated the history of Taylorism in Australia. Yet, only

Reekie’s study of welfarism at Sydney’s “big stores” constitutes a significant historical study of Australian welfarism during this period.71

In grappling with these questions, this thesis involves a study of the labour management at a single firm; David Jones & Co. (later David Jones Limited) through the use of historical case study. Jacoby notes that the study of a single firm has been a

69 Sheridan, T. (1990). “ Of Mind-sets and Market Forces: The Contribution of Historical Research to Industrial Relations”, in Patmore, G., (ed.), History and Industrial Relations. Sydney: ACIRRT, 46. 70 Patmore, G. (1991). Australian Labour History. Melbourne: Longman Chesire. 71 Reekie, G. (1987). “ Humanising Industry: Paternalism, Welfarism and Labour Control in Sydney’s Big Stores 1890-1930”. Labour History, 53, 1-19. 25 strongly favoured approach in the study of the history of labour management.72

Longitudinal single firm histories have proven popular in the United States and have been carried out on firms as diverse as Chrysler, Endicott Shoes, and General Electric and Westinghouse.73 Within Australia, studies which have focused on long-term developments have been industry or economy-wide in their focus. Single firm studies have been conducted on BHP, New South Wales Government Railways, and the

Lithgow Small Arms Factory though often the time frame has been narrow.74

Jacoby notes that the use of single firm case studies tends to emphasise the particular over the general, internal factors over external.75 Therefore it is important for the researcher to be aware of the potential bias within such a methodology, being cognisant of the world outside of the firm, of external factors and general trends.

Another advantage of a long-term study of a single firm is to identify the long-term sustainability of certain trends. Other methods, such as large-scale surveys, are designed to capture considerable data from many subjects over a short period of time.

They function to provide an empirical "snapshot" of what is happening in a particular moment in time. So for instance, while a survey may capture the current popularity of certain practices across a large number of workplaces, such a tool cannot be expected to measure the relative impact at the micro-level. Nor can it be expected to measure the long-term “survivability” of certain practices, unless follow-up surveys are

72 Jacoby (1991), Masters to Managers, 8. 73 Schatz (1983), The Electrical W orkers; Jeffreys, S. (1986). Management and Managed: Fifty years of crisis at Chrysler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Zahavi (1988), Workers. 74 Patmore (1988), “ Systematic Management”; Patmore (1994), “ American Hustling Methods”. 75 Jacoby (1991), Masters to Managers. 26 conducted. Even then, micro-dynamics, such as meaning and process cannot be broadly comprehended.

David Guest has noted that a difficulty with much of the current human resource management literature is that little evidence exists to assess the long-term prospects of such initiatives.76 While John Purcell argues that the Workplace Industrial Relations

Survey (WIRS) data points towards a revolution within British workplaces, others such as Karen Legge are not yet willing to agree that human resource management has transformed the British workplace.77 The newness of human resource management in Australia similarly presents a problem. How sustainable are these new initiatives? In the Australian context, the recent work of M ichael O'Donnell would suggest that such initiatives are often short-term and fail to survive.78 Chris

Wright’s research also notes the prevalence of cyclical experiments and fads in

Australia.79

A long-term study of David Jones provides a unique Australian case of a firm that appears to have had a long-term commitment to a consent-based approach to labour management. Another advantage of studying David Jones is the existence of the

David Jones Archives, one of the few surviving company archives in Australia. This is a substantial source of previously unused primary material, much of which has contributed substantially to this thesis. For all its strengths, historical research is not

76 Guest, D. (1991). “ Personnel Management: The End of the Orthodoxy?”. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(2), 169. 77 Purcell, J. (1993). “ The End of Institutional Industrial Relations”. Political Quarterly, 64(1), 6-23; Legge, K. (1989) “ Human resource management: a critical analysis” in J. Storey (ed.) New Perspectives on Human Resource Management. London and New York: Routledge, 19-40. 78 O’Donnell, M. (1996). “ Into the Mystic: Cultural Change and TQM Teams in the NSW Public Sector”. Journal of Industrial Relations, 38(2), 241-263.

27 without its own particular difficulties and this is the case with this thesis. One notable gap is the lack of archival material relating to firm-level industrial relations after

World War I. The heavy reliance upon solicitors to deal with even the slightest industrial trouble post-1919, may mean that such documentation was housed off-site with those advisers and thus never made its way into the David Jones Archives.

Further, discussions with officials from the Shop Distributive and Allied Workers

Unions noted that many of the historical documents from the New South Wales

Branch were destroyed or lost in the 1970s.80

Another difficulty has been sourcing interviews. While existing interviews and quotes have been used, the focus upon the nineteenth century and early twentieth century meant that few of the main participants were still alive. Several former senior managers were approached for interviews but declined, something the writer of this thesis originally found perplexing. However, it may have been that the rumour and revelations around Charles Lloyd Jones II’s personal life, for instance those recently made public during the John Marsden – Channel Seven defamation trial, has led to a strong hesitancy among ex-David Jones managers to speak to researchers or journalists.81

Nonetheless, the David Jones Archive and other documentary material has proven to be highly useful in informing this thesis and answering the research questions regarding paternalism and welfarism.

79 Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 214 ; see also Huczynski, A. (1993). “ Explaining the succession of management fads”. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 4(2), 443-463. 80 Communication with Mark Bishop, former secretary of WA SDA and current Labor Senator from Western Australia, December 1992. 81 “ Marsden: passing parade of names” Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 2000. 28 Research Questions

This thesis seeks to answer a series of specific questions and, in doing so, contribute to more significant debates. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis aims to build upon the work of Marx, Braverman and labour process writers in order to better understand how employers realise the potential labour of their employees. In particular, the thesis will track the development of a consent-based approach at David

Jones and seek to explain when, how and why such an approach was adopted.

To analyse this development, the thesis will examine nineteenth century paternalism and twentieth century welfarism as particular manifestations of a consent-based approach to labour management. The concepts “paternalism” and welfarism”, that are central to this thesis, will be explored in the next chapter.

This thesis will seek to answer several questions in regards to labour management at

David Jones: First, “Did paternalism exist at David Jones in the nineteenth century and if it did what were its origins?”. Second, “Did welfarism exist at David Jones in the twentieth century and if it did, what were its origins, in particular, was welfarism merely an extension of paternalism?”. Third, “Did welfarism ‘survive’ its initial introduction and what was its’ long-term legacy?”.

29 CHAPTER TWO

Consent-Based Approaches to Labour Management: Defining, Analysing and Theorising Paternalism and Welfarism

Studying and understanding the choices made by employers is central to this thesis, and to understanding the trajectory of labour management within specific firms. The decisions made by employers, including the constraints and influencing factors, are important considerations, as are the unintended consequences of decisions and difficulties with implementation, that often hinder the realisation of certain approaches. These must be considered in understanding both the nature of employer choice and the actual outcomes in the workplace. Choice also means employers may choose very different approaches and create diversity.

Diversity within labour management practice raises certain questions. For instance, how can such diversity be analysed? As noted in the previous chapter, a popular method of analysis has been to identify and classify the broad approach adopted by the employer. This has resulted in dualistic models of labour management, based on two ideal types.1 These models describe alternative approaches to labour management which are available to

1 However, it is important to note that this dualism ignores other forms of work organisation, particularly non-capitalist and non-statist forms of work organisation. While such topics may be less “ fashionable” in the 1990s than the 1970s, experiments such as worker-owned co-operatives, Israeli kibbutz and Yugoslavian worker self-management all provide recent examples of radically different forms of work organisation. Such initiatives should question the current omnipresence of the “ capitalist firm” and “ labour management” within much of the recent industrial relations literature.

30 the employer, who is reliant either on controlling employees or eliciting their consent.2

Two consent-based approaches identified within the historical literature have been “paternalism” and “welfarism”.3 They share certain attributes, though they are often differentiated.

Paternalism

Paternalism has been used in a number of different ways within the labour management literature. In the more historically-based literature, it is used to describe a particular, informal type of “consent-based approach” to labour management. However, in some of the literature, paternalism has been used quite broadly to describe all consent-based approaches to labour management.

It is the former, narrower definition that is used within the context of this thesis. Although welfarism, human relations or human resource management may all be described as somehow “paternalistic”, this broader, descriptive usage will not be used in this thesis.

2 Some industrial relations scholars have attempted to break out of the apparently tautological dualism of such as models. Gospel for instance has conceptualised the importance of "internalisation" and "externalisation" within labour management, relying heavily on Coase's notion of transaction costs and the boundary between the market and the firm (see Gospel, H. (1992). Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain. Melbourne: Cambridge University, 12; Coase, R. (1991). “ The Nature of the Firm (1937)” in O. Williamson and S. Winter (eds.) The Nature of the Firm. New York: Oxford University Press, 1-33). Purcell and Ahlstrand have similarly created a model which sees "individualism" (the degree to which the firm recognises employees as "commodities" - low individualism or "resources" - high individualism) and "collectivism" (the degree to which the firm recognises collective representation among employees) (see Purcell, J. and Ahlstrand, B. (1994). Human Resource Management in the Multi-Divisional Company. Oxford: Oxford University Press).

3 Gospel (1992), Markets; Wright, C. (1995). The Management of Labour. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

31 In the narrower, historically-specified definition, paternalism has often been used to describe the earliest identified consent-based approach to labour management, emerging alongside modern capitalism in eighteenth century

Britain, continuing into the nineteenth century. While the concept of paternalism has been commonly used within British history and research, the concept has also been used in relation to the early development of capitalist workplace relations within French, Japanese and to a lesser extent, American,

Australian and Canadian historical research.4

Alternatively, welfarism describes what was often a coherent and articulated strategy deliberately applied by employers. It was also a term often used by employers themselves, through titles such as “welfare officers” or “welfare work”.5 By contrast, “paternalism” was a term that emerged from late nineteenth and early twentieth century political and sociological writings to explain social phenomena. M ax Weber’s writing on authority contained the seeds for the development of “paternalism” as a sociological concept. For

Weber, three ideal types of authority existed: traditional, legal/rational and charismatic. According to Weber, within traditional authority, which existed throughout pre-capitalist society, societal power was an extension of familial power and reinforced “patrimonialism”, namely the passing of property and title from father to son. Just as familial power often rested with the father,

4 Craven, P. and Traves, T. (1986) “ Dimensions of Paternalism: Discipline and Culture in Canadian Railway Operations in the 1850s” in C. Heron and R. Storey (eds.) On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process in Canada. Kingston ON and Montreal PQ: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 47-74; Littler, C. (1986). The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Aldershot: Gower, 146- 160; Licht, W. (1991). “ Studying Work: Personnel Practices in Philadelphia Firms, 1850-1950” in S. Jacoby (ed.) Masters to Managers. New York: Columbia P ress, 50-52; Gospel (1992), Markets. 5 Jacoby, S. (1985). Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945. New York: Columbia University Press.

32 societal power rested with individuals, who held a similar position, for instance, elders, kings and priests.6

Richard Sennett has distinguished paternalism from the traditional authority bound up with patrimonialism or the even broader term “patriarchy”. Within patriarchy, a term also used within contemporary feminism, societal power rests with men, notably older men and fathers, over women. In patrimonialism, property and power are passed to the eldest son. E.P.

Thompson described paternalism as a “softer” term than “patriarchy”. 7

“Paternalism” has notions of face-to-face dealings, warmth and mutuality attached to it, while patriarchy has a more authoritarian tone. Paternalism has been used to describe the replication of familial relations (notably the parent/child relationship) in a fundamentally different social environment.

Hence, unlike patriarchy or patrimonialism, the concept of paternalism identifies the power of the father figure as more metaphorical than real.

Sennett has described paternalism as "a legitimation of power outside the family by appeal to the roles within the family".8 In this definition, paternalism, in attempting to replicate familial relations, is on the one hand, authoritarian and hierarchical, with the metaphorical father figure assuming the unquestioned role of the superordinate. However, it also places obligations on the father figure to care for the subordinate, and may temper

6 Giddens, A. (1971). Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 156-7. 7 Thompson, E.P. (1991). Culture in Common. London: The Merlin Press, 19. 8 Sennett, R. (1993). Authority. London: Faber and Faber, 78.

33 the exercise of authority with notions of mutuality, responsibility and respect.9

In this sense, paternalism may be used to describe the way national governments, churches and employers adopt the metaphorical convention of the family, and importantly the parent/child relationship to legitimise or support their power.

In the history of labour management, the concept of paternalism has been applied to employers. “Paternalism”, as such, has often been used to describe a particular “consent-based approach” to labour management and has most commonly been applied in studies of eighteenth and nineteenth century

British employers. Like the use of paternalism as a concept to explain broader social and historical phenomenon, in the labour management literature the parallels are noted between the parent/child relationship and the employer/employee relationship.

However, unlike “scientific management” or “human resource management”,

“paternalism” has not been considered a definable school of labour management thought. Indeed, those employers who have been described as

“paternalists” may not have ever identified themselves as such. To deal with this, writers such as Gospel conceptualise paternalism as an “enacted strategy”, something that emerges organically through deeds and actions rather than through any conscious, premeditated strategy. 10 P at ernalism may be thought of as a constellation of “enacted practices”, that with the benefit of hindsight, can be seen as a unified approach. By contrast, other researchers

9 Ibid., 82-3.

34 such as Smyth and M orris do see paternalism as an explicit employer

“tactic”.11

What then are the characteristics of paternalism in the workplace? Firstly, it can be typified by its personal nature. The relationship between the employer, in the person of an owner or even manager, and the worker are often personal and mutual, with the employer providing moral (as well as material) support to the worker. The worker, in turn, provides loyalty. Secondly, paternalism often includes non-wage benefits provided by the employer. This would most likely include housing or accommodation. Thirdly, as Smyth and Morris suggest, the arbitrary nature of benefits distinguishes paternalism from the more defined and deliberate employment practices of welfarism. 12 As noted by Gospel, within paternalism, the benefits provided are “gifts”, not entitlements.13 Further the underlying authoritarian nature of paternalism must be recognised. The mutual support, respect and loyalty of paternalism, unlike the ideal of the family, are often conditional. Sennett has noted that paternalism promises “love” but that for the employee, it is often a “false love”.14

Did Paternalism Flourish or Flounder under Capitalism?

What therefore are the origins of paternalism in the workplace? The development of paternalism in the workplace has often been seen as merely

10 Gospel (1992), Markets. 11 Morris, B. and Smyth, J. (1994). “ Paternalism as an Employer Strategy, 1800-1960” in J. Rubery and F. Wilkinson (eds.) Employer Strategy and the Labour Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199. 12 Ibid. 13 Gospel (1992), Markets, 25-28.

35 an extension of the use of paternalism elsewhere in the community, by political, church or community leaders who assume the role of the metaphorical father.15 Workplace paternalism, in this sense, similarly involves a marshalling of familial roles in a different setting. Importantly, in the workplace, paternalism has often been seen to have a crucial cultural dimension that operates alongside identifiable employment practices.16

Often linkages have been made between the existence of paternalism in pre- capitalist social relations and its continuation within capitalist labour relations.

In his work, Customs in Common, E.P. Thompson claimed that British capitalists were able to marshal earlier feudal paternalism for their own purposes. This resulted in paternalism's survival and growth within a British social order that continued to emphasise order and hierarchy, an argument supported by historians such as Patrick Joyce.17 As well, M ichael M iller claimed in a slightly different fashion, that the leaders of late nineteenth century French institutions adopted a paternalistic approach to “ease the transition” to a rational and potentially alienating modernity. These institutions included the Bon Marché department store and other new,

14 Sennett (1993), Authority, 82-3. 15 Joyce, P. (1980). Work, Culture and Politics: The culture of the factory in late Victorian England. Brighton: The Harvester Press: Ram, M. and Holliday, R. (1993). “ Relative Merits: Family Culture and Kinship in Small Firms”. Sociology, 24(4), 629-648. Sennett distinguishes paternalism from patriarchy and patrimonialism. Patriarchy is where male blood ties determine the transmission of power across the generations. Patrimonialism is where property is passed through generations of male relatives (Sennett (1993), Authority, 52-3). For many feminist writers, patriarchy carries a broader definition, signifying a more general, systemic domination of men over women within both the public and private spheres of society (see Walby, S. (1990). Theorizing Patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd).

16 Craven and Traves (1986), “ Dimensions of Paternalism”, 68-70. 17 Thompson (1991), Culture in Common; Joyce (1980), Work, Culture and Politics.

36 “modern” bureaucracies in nineteenth century France such as the railways, military and state bureaucracies.18

Sennett similarly noted the survival of paternalism within liberal, capitalist society. He remarks that liberal thinkers such as John Locke, believed that the breaking down of feudal ties and patrimonialism (the passing of property from father to son) would see a growth in individual liberty within a liberal society.19 Yet as noted by Sennett, "What he and other liberal idealists did not anticipate is that what can be materially destroyed could be imaginatively rebuilt: metaphors linking father and bosses, fathers and leaders".20

For historians such as Thompson and sociologists such as Sennett, there is the acceptance that paternalism, despite its pre-capitalist origins, survived capitalism. Indeed such writers have argued that paternalism was deployed by a new generation of capitalists and landowners to legitimise and support their power, position and practices.21

However, other writers have questioned this hypothesis concluding that paternalism did not survive into the modern, capitalist era. Instead, it was displaced by a new, modern world of impersonal bureaucracies and isolated individuals. Notable in this respect is the work of Max Weber, who broadly argued that secular rationalism and legal-rational authority, demanded by

18 Miller, M. B. (1981). The Bon Marché; Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869-1920. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 19 Sennett (1993), Authority, 57. 20 Ibid.

37 capitalism, displaced other traditional forms of authority.22 David Roberts, for instance, claimed "paternalism deteriorated" within British society throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, weakened by "the constitutional victory of parliament over Stuart absolutism, the intellectual triumph of the Newtonian world picture, and the economic ascendancy of capitalism".23 Gerald Friedman similarly claimed that paternalism declined among French employers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, owing to a hostile political and social environment. He has noted that

"paternalistic firms were perceived as enemies of the Republic and islands of

Royalist feudalism, by Republicans who opposed hierarchy and were committed to equality of rights, universal male suffrage and social reform".24

Generally, these critiques have relied upon a narrower definition of paternalism than used by writers such as Thompson.

In America, the existence of paternalism, both within the work environment and broader society, is much less of a theme in historical research. The closest approximation to feudal arrangements were “imported”, namely with the enslavement and forced migration of west Africans to America.25 Given this lack of any long-established feudal environment, the British debate as to whether paternalism (and other elements of feudalism) were incorporated or

21 There exists a considerable secondary literature that considers Thompson’s contribution to historical and theoretical debates on paternalism. See Palmer, B. (1981). The Making of E.P. Thompson: Marxism, Humanism and History. Toronto: New Hogtown Press. 22 Weber, M. (1987). “ Legitimate Authority and Bureaucracy” in L. Boone and D. Bowen (eds.) The Great Writings in Management and Organizational Behaviour. New York: Random House, 5- 17. 23 Roberts, D. (1979). Paternalism in Early Victorian England. London: Croom Helm, 16. 24 Friedman, G. (1991). “ The Decline of Paternalism and the Making of the Employer Class: France, 1870-1914” in S. Jacoby (ed.) Master to Managers. New York: Colombia University Press, 159-60. 25 Genovese, E (1974). Roll, Jordan, Roll; the world the slaves made. New York: Pantheon Books.

38 banished within capitalism would appear, prima facie, less relevant in the

American context.

Paternalism, the Religious Employer and Reformism

An alternate, but not unrelated, explanation for the emergence of paternalism within the capitalist workplace, is the emergence of employers with religious or reformist conviction, aimed at ameliorating the perceived negative effects of industrialisation. For instance, paternalism is often noted in connection with employers of a particular religious conviction, particularly Quaker employers. 26 Recent research has sought to find a link between paternalist and later welfarist labour management practices and the rise of Quakerism in

Britain during the nineteenth century.27

In both the American and British context, the earliest manifestation of paternalism often saw religiously minded employers offering housing and other basic conditions to employees. In America, at his Rhode Island mill,

Samuel Slater operated a Sunday school and hired a teacher in order to recruit young workers in the 1790s. Another New England mill, the M errimack

M anufacturing Company in Lowell, M assachusetts similarly built a school, church and hospital for employees. Shortly afterwards, many mill towns provided inexpensive housing for employees.28

26 Raistrick, A. (1977). Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare: The London (Quaker) Lead Company, 1692-1905 (Revised Second Edition). Hartington UK: Moorland Publishing Company

39 Similar developments took place in the United Kingdom. The London Lead

Company, which was founded in 1690, operated coal and lead mines, and lead smelting operations throughout northern England, Wales and Scotland.

Its Quaker leadership built communities with churches, schools and hospitals for employees throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the isolated communities near its mines and smelters.29

Other more ambitious experiments, often driven out of reformist zeal, similarly emerged throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Robert

Owen's New Lanark and Saint-Simon's co-operative workshops, represented radical early nineteenth century experiments to forge a humane industrialism, founded on deeply-held political ideals. More pragmatic paternalists followed such leads. For example, the early nineteenth century Quaker firms of Britain enacted welfarist-like experiments of housing, schools, libraries and churches which contained elements of Owen's and Saint-Simon's experiments. Such experiments continued into the “early” welfarism of the late nineteenth century of Cadbury’s and at Lever’s Port Sunlight.

Paternalism as “Good Business”

While the religious or moral views of certain entrepreneurs and pre-existing paternalistic relations have been seen as part of the emergence of paternalism, other, more pragmatic rationales have been speculated, including attempts by

27 Smith, C., Child, J, and Rowlinson, M. (1990). Reshaping Work: the Cadbury Experience. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press; Jeremy, D. (1990). Capitalists and Christians: Business Leaders and the Churches in Britain, 1900-1960. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Jeremy, D. (1991). “ The Enlightened Paternalist in Action: William Hesketh Lever at Port Sunlight Before 1914”. Business History, 33(1), 58-81. 28 Raistrick (1977), Two Centuries.

40 employers to deal with difficult labour market conditions and to affect turnover, productivity and employee discontent. Many writers have noted that while religious or moral ideals may have influenced their views, the paternalistic owners of mills, mines and forges were also pragmatic, with paternalism used as a means of attracting and maintaining labour. Similarly, such employer-built and funded institutions and services also acted as a means of social control, acting to stifle dissent and monitor employees in their

“private” lives outside the workplace.

Within more recent history of labour management literature, paternalism has been considered important for many reasons. For Gospel, it represented the

“state of nature” out of which twentieth century British labour management arose. For those firms that came to embrace welfarism and sought to internalise their labour management practices, paternalism was a crucial counter-weight to the fragmenting effect of an impersonal wage labour relationship and growing firm size. While he surmised a link between broader societal contours and specific labour management practices, Gospel does not strive to conceptualise such links.30 Along similar lines, Littler, while somewhat circumspect about the importance of paternalism within the employment relations of nineteenth century Britain, argued pre-existing paternalistic ideology in Japanese society fundamentally shaped Japanese labour management in the pre-World War II period.31 As well, despite a large non-conformist Protestant community in the United States of America, the achievements of paternalistic employers are far less known than those of the

29 Ibid.

41 Quaker firms of Britain. The mill towns of M assachusetts do provide an example of early welfarist experiments, however overt paternalism in nineteenth century America appears concentrated among smaller, family firms.32

In contemporary analysis, paternalism is also used to describe certain labour management policies and practices. Purcell and Ahlstrand have argued that the “paternalist” style of labour management continues within contemporary

British multi-divisional companies. They describe paternalistic labour management as:

(S)eeking to project a welfare-orientated, caring image, couched in terms of stability and order, with employees knowing their place in the firm... (It involves) restricting the freedom of the individual through well-meant regulation.33

Purcell and Ahlstrand noted the use of this "style" of labour management in the banking sector and, not surprisingly, in a large London department store.34

For Purcell and Ahlstrand, paternalism is therefore not merely about regulating the relationship between the employer and employee along the lines of a parent \ child relationship, it is also about “projecting an image”. In this sense, paternalism is not only about reinforcing or legitimising the internal order within the firm, but also about projecting an image of stability and order to those outside.

30 Gospel (1992), Markets. 31 Littler (1986), Development of the Labour Process, 146-160. 32 Licht (1991), “ Studying Work”, 50-52. 33 Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994), Human Resource Management, 191-3. 34 Ibid., 193.

42 The contradictions within paternalism stand starkly in the recent ethnographic work of Ram and Holliday, who investigated family firms in Britain, operated by ethnic entrepreneurs. They noted that the paternalism within these firms was actually a “negotiated paternalism”, a term that echoes that used by

Zahavi.35 According to Ram and Holliday, commercial concerns were both reinforced and under-cut by family loyalties and obligations. They note the

“family” was both a resource and a constraint for management. Of course, the firms often benefited from cheap and often unpaid labour of family members, as well as a sense of commitment and loyalty. Yet the firm was also restricted in what it could do. For instance, family members could not be easily “fired” for poor performance. Similarly, there was an expectation that the firm would provide family members with jobs regardless of the needs of the firm or the skills and abilities a family member could bring.36

Despite attempts to locate and describe paternalism, using the term to describe a type of labour management practice is potentially problematic. There does not appear to be a reasonably coherent and identifiable set of formal practices that equate to paternalism. As well, there is the potential for tautology, “x firm was paternalist, hence their practices were paternalistic, thereby proving x was a paternalistic employer”. However, an authoritarian employment relationship (somehow tempered with personal contact), mutuality and a replication of familial relations within the firm appear to be key elements. As well paternalism may be linked to religious beliefs held by the firm’s owner or manager, though recent research, such as that of David Jeremy, questioned

35 Zahavi (1988), Workers.

43 these links, arguing that religion (and quasi-religious beliefs) were used by

“paternalists” to promote and legitimatise tried and true practice.37 As well, certain non-wage benefits and magnanimous practices appear prevalent amongst supposedly paternalistic firms, but care must be taken in using such practices as overwhelming evidence. It has also been argued that what distinguishes paternalism from welfarism is that within paternalism the non- wage benefits are provided in an ad hoc, gift-like manner, while the provision of non-wage benefits within welfarism are more systematic and bureaucratised.38

In line with the critical views put forward by writers such as Jeremy, was paternalism a functional "false consciousness" constructed by nascent capitalists to legitimise their operations, with their good deeds merely carrots intended to attract and control labour? Sennett has noted that such metaphors seeking legitimacy for authority are more than merely the work of "false consciousness". He cites the Italian Communist, Gaetano Mocsa in his work

The Ruling Class:

(It is false to say that) political formulas are mere quackeries aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience...the truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of moral principle, has beyond any doubt a practical and real importance.39

In simplest terms paternalism needs to be seen as Janus-faced, at once authoritarian and hierarchical, but also tempered with a notion of mutuality,

36 Ram and Holliday (1993), “ Relative Merits”. 37 Jeremy (1990), Capitalists and Christians; Jeremy (1991), “ The Enlightened Paternalist”. 38 Morris and Smyth (1994), “ Paternalism “, 196-7. 39 Quoted in Sennett (1993), Authority, 22.

44 responsibility and respect. E.P. Thompson, who offered a critical view of the use of the term paternalism, succinctly sums up its strengths and weaknesses as an analytical term:

(P)aternalism is a loose descriptive term. It has considerably less historical specificity than such terms as feudalism and capitalism; it tends to offer a model of social order as seen from above; it has implications of warmth and of face-to-face relations which imply notions of value; it confuses the actual with the ideal. This does not mean that the term should be discharged as utterly unfit for service. It has as much and as little value as other generalized terms – authoritarian, democratic, egalitarian – which cannot in themselves, and without substantial additions, be brought to characterize a system of social relations. No thoughtful historian should characterize a whole society as paternalist or patriarchal. But paternalism can, as in Tsarist Russia, in M eiji Japan and in certain slave-holding societies, be a profoundly important component not only of ideology but of the actual institutions of social relations.40

Paternalism, as a useful concept, is not without its problems. Yet its usage within the historical literature related to labour management, particularly in the context of a renewed, contemporary interest in “consent-based” approaches to labour management, heralds a need to further explore paternalism in the workplace. This thesis explores paternalism within one prominent Australian firm and attempts to identify paternalism, find its origins and to separate the myth from the reality. It will examine whether paternalism truly was the first attempt to construct a different type of workplace and to what degree it informed or evolved into welfarism. By testing the term against the reality, it can be seen whether paternalism, to paraphrase

Thompson’s quote is “fit for service” within the historical study of labour management.

40 Thompson (1991), Culture in Common, 24.

45 Welfarism

Welfarism is another “consent-based approach” to the management of labour often identified within the historical literature. “Welfarism” is used because of its common usage within the Australian (and British) literature. 41 The term

“welfare work” has been used occasionally within the literature, though

“welfare capitalism” is generally used to describe the interwar experiments of

American firms.42 The common use of “welfarism” within the Australian literature and “welfare capitalism” being linked to a specific locale and era, have meant that “welfarism” is used in this thesis, though the terms could be considered interchangeable.

Welfarism, like paternalism, is a key concept within this thesis. Welfarism is used to conceptualise and explain the historical development of consent-based approaches to labour management at David Jones, particularly in the period after the First World War. This thesis closely explores the links between paternalism and welfarism.

41 Anthony, P. D. (1977). The Ideology of Work. London: Tavistock Publications, 214-229; Reekie, G. (1987). “ Humanising Industry: Paternalism, Welfarism and Labour Control in Sydney’s Big Stores”. Labour History, 53, 1-19; Gardner, M. and Palmer, G. (1992). Employment Relations: Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management in Australia. Crows Nest and South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 44-46; Frances, R. (1993). The Politics of Work; Gender and Labour in Victoria, 1880-1939. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 140-1; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 21-4. Others have described welfarism in terms that more explicitly denote the links between it and paternalism; for instance "systematic paternalism" (see Licht (1991), “Studying Work”, 50-2.

42 Fox, A. (1985). Man Mismanagement (Second Edition). London: Hutchinson.; Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 52 ; Brandes, S. (1976). American W elfare Capitalism, 1880-1940. Chicago IL and London: University of Chicago Press; Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books, 91-98; Zahavi (1988), W orkers; Cohen, L. (1990). Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939. New York: Cambridge University Press, 159-212; Brody, D. (1993). “ The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism” in D. Brody (ed.) Workers in Industrial America, Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 48-81.

46 Defining welfarism has proven difficult for researchers and commentators.

Gardner and Palmer described welfarism "not as a well defined school of management thought ...but a diffuse set of management practices".43 They, and others such as Brandes, noted the diversity of actual practices that generally include non-wage benefits, such as social and sporting activities, housing, medical care, pensions, performance pay, and employee representation.44 However, such attempts to define welfarism have been criticised for homogenising what was a wide set of practices.45

In searching for a suitable definition, the origins of “welfare work” itself appear useful. The term “welfare work” appears to have arisen out of

American experimentation with improved working conditions and innovative non-wage benefits at the turn of the last century. By the First World War,

“welfare work” or “welfare capitalism” had entered the lexicon, covering a diverse range of programs. A US government study from 1916 defined

“welfare work” as “anything for the comfort and improvement, intellectual or social, of the employees, over and above wages paid, which is not a necessity of the industry and is not required by law”.46

While a precise definition will always remain elusive, within the Australian context, Wright's definition of welfarism as employer efforts “to win the loyalty of the workforce through various non-job related incentives” is, to

43 Gardner and Palmer (1992), Employment Relations, 44. 44 Brandes (1976), American Welfare Capitalism; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour. 45 Raff, D. (1991). “ Ford Welfare Capitalism in Its Economic Context” in S. Jacoby (ed.) Masters to Managers. New York: Columbia University Press, 100-1. 46 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 49.

47 date, within the Australian literature, the most comprehensive attempt to define welfarism.47

The diffusion of welfarism in the nineteenth century took place within both

American and British industry, though different trajectories can be noted.

Interestingly, firms led by non-conformist Protestants appeared to have been at the forefront of such initiatives in both countries. However in Britain the adoption of welfarism was pronounced amongst employers who were

Quakers. As well as the London Lead Company, the food processing empires of Cadbury’s and Rowntree, also operated by Quaker capitalists, adopted welfarism.48

However, welfarism also found favour among new and widely-owned railways and the large gas companies of Great Britain. Such firms implemented systematic management and welfarist policies and practices in the late nineteenth century. The railways for instance, required references and proof of the ability to write for recruitment and established formal grades and classifications. As well, some of the railway companies established sick pay and pensions schemes. Similar developments took place within the large

London gas companies in the last decades of the nineteenth century. They also began to experiment with insurance, profit sharing and internal representation schemes.49

47 Wright, C. (1990). “ The Rise of Modern Labour Management: The Formalisation of Employment and Work Relations in Australian Manufacturing Industry, 1940-1972”. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis: University of Sydney, 29. 48 Fox (1985), Man Mismanagement, 77; Gospel (1992), Markets, 28. 49 Fitzgerald, R. (1988). British Labour Management and Industrial Welfare, 1846-1939. London: Croom Helm; Gospel (1992), Markets, 27.

48

In t he Unit ed St at es, firms such as Filenes’s Dep art ment St ore in Boston, H.J.

Heinz Company, Proctor and Gamble and National Cash Register were all leading experimenters in welfarism in the later decades of the nineteenth century.50 New “company” towns, such as the cotton mill towns of the

Carolinas, also embraced welfarism before the First World War.51 In the

United States, the "golden age of welfarism" occurred during the 1910s and

1920s. In this period, welfarism spread beyond the mine and mill towns, the food and soap processors and big city department stores, to the heartland of industrial America. The large American employers such as the Ford Motor

Company and US Steel adopted welfarism with surprising zeal, often as a direct response to trade unionism and industrial troubles.52 By 1920, for instance, Cohen noted that all of the major industrial firms of Chicago, including US Steel, International Harvester, Swift, Armour and Western

Electric, had adopted similarly "comprehensive" approaches to welfarism.53

Welfarism and Paternalism

Welfarism has often been linked directly with paternalism. Some writers claim that within welfarism, employers attempted to replicate familial relations, with a mixture of authoritarianism and mutuality, as with paternalism. Many historians of labour management emphasise the continuity, rather than the difference, between welfarism and paternalism.

50 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 49-64; Zahavi (1988), W orkers, 2. 51 Hall, J.D., Leloudis, J., Korstad, R., Murphy, M., Jones, L. and Daly, C. (1987). Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press. 52 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal; Raff (1991), “ Ford Welfare Capitalism”.

49 Gospel for instance used the term “bureaucratic paternalism” to capture the early welfare experiments in Britain.54 Licht similarly described such an approach to labour management as “systematic paternalism”.55 Rinehart described such twentieth century attempts as “new paternalism”, as opposed to the “old paternalism” of the eighteenth and nineteenth century capitalism.56

All of these definitions explicitly link “welfarism” with earlier forms of paternalism, described as “traditional paternalism”, by Gospel and

“unsystematic paternalism” by Licht. These continuities are a theme that runs through much of the literature.

The continuity drawn between paternalism and welfarism has been noted in studies of firms such as Cadbury's.57 Such firms are often seen as a bridge between the two approaches, as eighteenth and nineteenth century paternalists that evolved into welfarist employers. Here, welfarism relies on leading employers maintaining their “soft touch” approach to labour management.

Even as these employers grew, they adopted bureaucratic structures, with family owners being replaced by corporate owners and professional managers. Similarly, the large and spatially dispersed workforces of the new railways (which demanded bureaucratic structures, as argued by Chandler) often adopted welfarism.58 This notion of welfarism evolving out of

53 Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal. 54 Gospel (1992), Markets. 55 Licht (1991), “ Studying Work”. 56 Rinehart, J. (1985). The Tyranny of Work: Alienation and the Labour Process (Second Edition). Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 53-55. 57 Smith, Child and Rowlinson (1990), Reshaping Work. 58 Craven and Traves (1986), “ Dimensions of Paternalism”.

50 paternalism is common within the literature, including as will be noted, the work of Gail Reekie.59

In this analysis, the overlaying of new bureaucratic structures and new ownership regimes on top of previously paternalist employment practices, generated a more bureaucratic and less personal form of paternalism, namely welfarism. M orris and Smyth have argued that despite welfarism being described as paternalistic, they have distinguished welfarism as having

“processes (are) always guided by rule-based procedures within a bureaucratic structure”.60 While their claim that this is always the case may be questioned,

Morris and Smyth do provide a certain characterisation, in particular, that

“rule-based procedures within a bureaucratic structure” enable us to distinguish paternalism from welfarism.

Gospel identified this evolution of paternalism in welfarism as a critical element of the historical and cultural context within which modern British employment practices were developed. He noted that “traditional paternalism

(in British industry) was commensurate with the owner-controlled single- factory or at least single-locality enterprise where an ideology of personal attachment and community could be fostered. It was difficult to sustain this in larger, multi-unit, national companies, thus creating the need for new approaches and systems in the enterprise”.61 While some firms took an increasingly instrumental view of labour, others recast their paternalism within bureaucratic structures.

59 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”.

51

The view that welfarism is some “natural” outgrowth of previously paternalistic employment relations within larger firms has been strongly articulated within the retailing literature. In his history of the Bon M arché department store in Paris, M iller noted that familial, paternalistic imagery was rife within the store even though it was a huge bureaucracy that employed thousands. Miller argued that the use of this imagery was crucial within many of the new secular bureaucracies in nineteenth century France, such as the state and private enterprises, providing an “acceptable face” to institutions that were new and ominous.62 Reekie argued along similar lines “that twentieth century welfarism evolved gradually out of nineteenth century paternalist social relations largely as a result of material changes in class and gender relations between 1890 and 1930”. 63

This continuity has been used to explain the origins of welfarism. As paternalism somehow represented earlier social values of family and mutuality, welfarism is often seen as a further continuation of these values.

Jacoby noted that welfarism, like paternalism, further “attempted to evoke a sense of family within the firm itself”.64

In his history of labour-management relations at the Endicott Johnson shoe factory, Gerald Zahavi similarly noted that welfarist policies were deeply laced with familial imagery, of the company as a “happy family” and senior

60 Morris and Smyth (1994), “ Paternalism”, 196. 61 Gospel (1992), Markets, 26. 62 Miller (1981), The Bon Marché. 63 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”, 1.

52 management as “father figures”. Zahavi concluded that use of such imagery by management was the product of both cynical manipulation and genuine concern.65 Regardless of the intentions, the attempt to recreate familial relations within the firm is identified as a strong theme within welfarism.

Welfarism and Culture

Labour historians have identified other cultural influences on welfarism which, as firms grew and evolved, contributed to its development. Some of the literature has noted the deeply-held philosophical or religious beliefs of certain employers, as being not only the wellspring for paternalism but for welfarist practices, as well. In the British literature, Quaker-owned undertakings such as the London Lead Company and Cadbury's have been identified as firms where the deeply held religious convictions of management translated into welfarist employment practices.66 The British food processing giant, Cadbury Ltd., has been a noteworthy example of this.67

In the United States, “social gospel” Protestantism, New England radicalism and the ideal of Jeffersonian yeomanry have all been identified as philosophical tributaries which fed into the origins of nineteenth century welfarism.68 A strong proponent of a “cultural” foundation to American welfarism is Jacoby. He has strongly argued that late nineteenth and early twentieth century American welfarism had deep roots within American

64 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 50. 65 Zahavi (1988), W orkers. 66 Raistrick (1977), Two Centuries; Fox (1985), Man Mismanagement; Smith, Child and Rowlinson (1990), Reshaping Work. 67 Smith, Child and Rowlinson (1990), Reshaping Work. 68 Zahavi (1988), W orkers.

53 “progressivism” and that the early advocates of employer-based welfarism were actually a mixed bag of middle-class reformers, progressive politicians and trade unionists.69

Indeed Jacoby believes employer welfarism emerged from the same deep- seated reformism that arose in response to the excesses of nineteenth century industrialisation and eventually bred the New Deal, a view echoing earlier historians such as Richard Hofstadter.70 Alternatively, Brandes claims employer welfarism and state welfarism were effectively “competitors” and that the state welfarism of the New Deal effectively displaced employer welfarism.71

Yet Jacoby, who notes the long-term survival of welfarism even after state programs were introduced, sees the relationship between the state and employers in the provision of welfare as more complex and at times often symbiotic.72 In a similar vein, Sass notes that American employers initially opposed social security as a competitor to their own welfaristic occupational pension plans in the first few decades of the twentieth century. However once a state-run social security program was introduced in 1935, employers pragmatically recast their own plans to complement state benefits their employees were now entitled to.73

69 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy. 70 Hofstadter, R. (1956). The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 71 Brandes, S. (1976), American Welfare Capitalism. 72 Jacoby, S. (1985), Employing Bureaucracy. 73 Sass, S. (1997). The Promise of Private Pensions: The First Hundred Years. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

54

Even within some of the inter-war American experiments, employers may have been driven by such high-minded goals. Hunnicutt, for instance, claimed that the “six hour day” experiment of W.G. Kellogg at his Battle Creek,

Michigan cereal plant during the 1930s was informed by a fundamentally humanistic conceptualisation of work and leisure. Hunnicutt argued that

Kellogg truly believed and hoped for a modern, technological utopia of leisure and self-fulfilment.74

The impact of feminism on such research has led to a gendered analysis of welfarism, though competing arguments have arisen. Within the Australian literature, Reekie noted in her earlier work, that welfarism arose as male managers attempted to cope with an increasingly feminised staff in the department stores of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Sydney.75

Reekie and Allen also identified feminist, middle-class reformers as pressuring paternalist employers and contributing to the emergence of welfarism.76 Joan Sangster, in a similar vein, noted in her analysis of inter- war welfarist experiments in North American manufacturing, a link between rising feminisation of the workforce and the increased adoption of welfarism.77 Sangster also noted the importance of not only familial metaphors, but also managers engaged in a metaphorical linking of the workplace to team sports and community in order to manufacture and

74 Hunnicutt (1992), “ Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day”. 75 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”. 76 Allen, J. (1994). Rose Scott: Vision and Revision of Feminism. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Reekie, G. (1993). “ The Sexual Politics of Selling and Shopping” in S. Magarey, S. Rowley and S. Sheridan (eds.) Debutante Nation: Feminism Confronts the 1890s. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 59-70.

55 disseminate their unitarist conception of the workplace. Harsh control-based approaches to labour management (such as Taylorism) were viewed by both managers and the broader community as somehow “inappropriate” for women. In such analyses of welfarism in a feminised workforce, the prominence of health and hygiene are noted, often being linked back to women’s supposed primary role as child-bearer.78 Yet such gender-based analysis often appear to assume that welfarism and Taylorism were mutually exclusive.

However, Lisa Fine has argued that welfarism was also aimed at male workers. She believed that inter-war American welfare capitalism at Reo

M otors in Lansing, M ichigan was “a cross-class alliance of men, as an episode where management males were able to appeal to working-class men as men, thereby obscuring class differences”.79 Fine argued that Taylorism undermined traditional masculinity. In its place, managers introduced welfarist policies aimed at reconstructing and bolstering a working-class masculinity that was under threat. Policies such as the family wage, “man-to- man” personnel policies, job security and organised leisure all sought to maintain a masculine identity that had been emasculated by Taylorism.80

While Fine’s work shares with the work of Reekie and Sangster the notion that managers see their labour management policies through a gendered lens,

77 Sangster, J. (1993). “ The Softball Solution: Female Workers, Male Managers and the Operation of Paternalism at Westclox, 1923-60”. Labour/Le Travail, 32, 167-199. 78 Valverde, M. (1993). The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885- 1925. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 79 Fine, L. (1993). “ ’One Big Factory Family’: Masculinity and Paternalism at the Reo Motor Car Company at Lansing, Michigan”. Labor History, 34(2-3), 276.

56 her research, plus the existence of welfarism in other male-dominated workplaces, brings into question any strict linking of welfarism and workforce feminisation.

Regardless of whether some broader social ideals underpinned attempts by employers to introduce welfarism, some have argued that regardless of the intent, such initiatives were constrained by the reality of capitalism. Fox noted:

It was possible for a man with sincere religious convictions to want to succeed in business and to treat his employees kindly at the same time. If he was lucky he could do both and it was naturally these happier coincidences which are likely to be recorded in the history of welfare.81

Fox's reflections articulate an aspiration that may have been held by many employers who instituted welfarism, to reform the low trust, cash nexus of the capitalist employment relationship. Yet as he also noted, the promise of welfarism to resurrect high trust relations between employer and employee often proved to be difficult to sustain within the harsh environment of capitalism.82

While noting the continuity, what distinguishes welfarism from paternalism within this literature is the period, locale and nature of the firms which adopted each. The first difference is the era in which both arose, with

80 The argument that progressive policies were motivated out of a concern over threatened working- class masculinity and the disastrous political consequences thereof, by ruling-class men and male intellectuals, has echoes in the Australian historical literature. See Lake, M. (1986). “ Socialism and Manhood: the Case of William Lane”. Labour History, 51, 54-62. 81 Fox (1985), Man Mismanagement, 77. 82 Ibid., 77-81.

57 welfarism often located in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, while paternalism is generally located earlier.

M uch of the research has focussed upon welfarism (or welfare capitalism) in

American manufacturing during the 1920s, while the literature related to paternalism has focussed on nineteenth century British employers. The

American historical work focuses on the emergence of welfarism within larger bureaucratic firms in the 1920s. Innovations and non-wage benefits originated in the 1890s, such as job structures and use of seniority, improved working conditions and social and sporting initiatives are often traced back to the welfarism of Filene’s in Boston and National Cash Register in Dayton,

Ohio and the more sophisticated “company towns” such as Pullman, Illinois.

The welfarist experiments of Filene’s and National Cash Register (with assistance from government, academics, consultants, and the media) quickly disseminated throughout large American firms in the 1920s.83

While such innovations were less diffused in the British context, the ICI, with its use of workplace consultation, is often seen as the main promoters of modern welfarism. As well, the introduction of the Whitely Councils after the

First World War is often seen as a critical development in the promotion of modern British welfarism.84 Retailing firms such as M arks and Spencer and

John Lewis would later prove to be leading welfarist firms in Britain, often

83 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy. 84 Fitzgerald (1988), British Labour Management.

58 adopting practices such as training, participation, welfare benefits (such as cafeterias and nurses) and in the case of John Lewis, employee-ownership.85

Despite the impact and level of innovation, much of the literature on welfarism has focussed upon the continuities between paternalism and welfarism. The analyses that link welfarism and paternalism, often focus on a supposed desire by some managers to maintain or resurrect a notion of familial authority and mutuality in a changing workplace. As noted above, such literature centred on the broader social, cultural and political context and has often looked at the attempts by managers to maintain a stable status quo.

From this perspective, welfarism is not necessarily a new initiative, it is merely a continuation of older practices (as paternalism is also often thought of) within a newer environment of the corporate ownership, professional management, bureaucratised firm, and a larger, often feminised workforce.

Welfarism as a New Initiative

However, there does exist a different explanation for welfarism that highlights its newness and represented it as a break from paternalism. The most common thread in such explanations for the rise of welfarism is that it was a deliberate attempt by employers to stem the growth of trade unions. American labour historians have devoted considerable attention to the emergence of welfarism in the 1920s. For many of these writers, the importance of welfarism is derived from its location (alongside the open-shop campaign and scientific management) in the “employers’ offensive” of the 1920s, designed

85 Rees, G. (1973). St Michael: A History of Marks and Spencer. London: Pan Books; Bradley, K.

59 to dampen the labour militancy of the 1914-1919 period.86 Much of the earlier work on welfarism, such as that by Brandes, viewed welfarism as little more than a crude attempt by employers to undermine trade unionism.

M ore recently, analyses have emerged which look at the relationship between welfarism and the rise of industrial unionism, the New Deal and collective bargaining in the 1930s and 1940s, notably those by Cohen and Jacoby.87

Such work has posited that welfarism in the 1920s raised the expectations of employees about what was possible in creating a safer and fairer workplace.

The withdrawal of welfaristic schemes by employers in the early days of the

1930s depression fuelled a desire by employees to recoup such a workplace, but on their terms.88

Reekie argued that a growing and feminised workforce within the big stores of Sydney necessitated new forms of control. As trade union, state and middle-class reformists pressured the stores for improvements to working conditions, retailers responded by placing a “human face” on paternalism in the form of welfaristic policies and practices.89 The state is also noted as an important external force facilitating the growth of welfarism. Jacoby and

Wright both highlight the pro-active role played by governments in promoting

and Taylor, S. (1992). Business Performance in the Retail Sector: The Experience of the John Lewis Partnership. Oxford: Clarendon Books. 86 Brandes (1976), American Welfare Capitalism; Edwards (1979), Contested Terrain; Montgomery (1987), The Fall of the House; Brody (1993), “ The Rise and Decline”. 87 Schatz (1983), The Electrical W orkers; Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal. 88 If one accepts the diversity of experience in labour management across firms and industries, this view can exist alongside Jacoby’s more recent work that notes the survival of welfarism well after the New Deal and post-war period in certain major firms such as Eastman Kodak and Sears Roebuck. Jacoby, S. (1997). Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 89 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”.

60 such practices, particularly during wartime, when demands for industrial peace took precedence over employers’ concerns for controlling labour costs and production.90

From this review of recent literature, different explanations for the emergence of welfarism begin to emerge. The first is an explanation based on

“continuity” in the context of changing material circumstances. Often this explanation noted the existence of a paternalistic past, (along with large or isolated operations, often with a highly feminised workforces) as the key determinants of where welfarism arose.91 Yet despite the neatness of such an explanation, it essentially renders management as passive. Further, the explanation is deterministic and does not explain differences or changes. In this context, firms are prisoners to both their past and external market forces.

A second explanation focuses on welfarism as “siege mentality”; a “knee- jerk” reaction by employers to the threats presented by trade unions and the state. Works, such as those of Brandes, which present this view have been criticised as portraying welfarism as merely a defensive reaction to external threats, with little acknowledgment of the diversity of experiences between firms.92 The identification of management reacting to external pressures, does consider the possibility of management’s actions being a crucial element. If such an explanation does not attempt to explain how and why certain firms attempt to insulate themselves from external forces, it becomes reductionist.

90 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Wright (1995), The Labour of Management.

61 A third, and more recent explanation, is to increasingly question arguments that welfarism can be seen in such a determinist or reductionist manner.93

Fine’s welfarism as masculinist experiment, Hunnicutt’s welfarism as a utopian experiment, or Harris’s and Jacoby’s linking of welfarism to

American progressivism via the new breed of personnel managers, have all brought managers more to the fore in understanding welfarism.94 Jacoby and

Zahavi note that, despite decades of research attempting to pinpoint the hidden agenda(s) of welfarism, managers may have sincerely thought they were creating better, more productive workplaces.95 This empirically grounded research which focuses on the role of managers has been championed by others, notably Zeitlin and Tolliday, who reject such mechanistic models of evolving labour management approaches.96

This empirically grounded research with its focus on managers has questioned earlier explanations of welfarism. Jacoby, for instance, rejected the traditional argument of Brandes and Brody, that welfarism was undermined first by the

Depression and then by the New Deal and collective bargaining. Instead,

Jacoby argued that welfarism was an early expression of systematic labour management and an important precursor of modern personnel management.97

91 Gospel (1992), Markets. 92 Raff (1991), “ Ford Welfare Capitalism”. 93 Ibid. 94 Harris, H. (1982). The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Hunnicutt (1992), “ Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day”; Fine (1993), “ One Big Factory Family”. 95 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Zahavi (1988), Workers. 96 Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J. (1991). “ Introduction: Employers and industrial relations between theory and history” in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin, (eds.) The Power to Manage?. London: Routledge, 1-31. 97 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Zahavi (1988), W orkers.

62 He noted that through collective bargaining, industrial unions often sought to resurrect and guarantee the welfarist promise of fair and decent workplaces.

Another important difference between paternalism and welfarism is the impact of the social and psychological sciences. The new schools of psychology and in particular the “human relations” approach of Elton Mayo has been noted as contributing to the rise of welfarism. 98 In this context, the human relations school (and by extension, welfarism) can be seen as a

“competing managerial strategy” with Taylorism.99 Some critics of human relations argue that it was as focussed on control as Taylorism. Human relations, in reality, was focussed on more subtle and covert social and psychological controls, a seemingly benign, indeed beneficial, initiative wrapped in humanistic rhetoric.

Rejecting the determinism and reductionism implicit in the “continuity” or

“siege mentality” explanations does not per se reject either the importance of past practice, on the one hand, or the possibility that employers may desire to insulate themselves from external influences, in particular trade unions and the State. What it does reject is an analysis that does not attempt to understand managerial policies and practices within the context of managerial decision-making. The marginalisation of managers in an understanding of welfarism may be a worse instance of the “missing subject” than any like

98 Weisbord, M. (1991). Productive Workplace; Organizing and Managing for Dignity, Meaning and Community. San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 99 This, however, does not mean any endorsement of the view that welfarism, human relations school or any other consent-based approaches are somehow diametrically opposed or done to the exclusion of control-based initiatives. Indeed, this thesis demonstrates that control-based initiatives and work rationalism operated in conjunction with consent-based approaches.

63 transgression Braverman may have committed by not including workers in his analysis of Taylorism. Managerial choice must be central in understanding the emergence of developments such as welfarism.

Obviously, to account merely for employer decisions will not provide the entire answer. Despite the considerable power of employers, they do not have a totally free hand in introducing certain practices in the workplace.100

Decisions made by other players such as the state, trade unions and workers

(both individually and collectively, with or without a trade union) need to be considered in understanding the trajectory of welfarism. Indeed if welfarism is about eliciting employee consent in the workplace, then employee reaction to such initiatives is an important element. Zahavi, in particular, noted that welfarism was informally negotiated, with benefits being considered as rights by long-serving employees.101

Does welfarism, then, have a greater legacy than earlier writers such as Brody and Brandes presumed? In his earlier work, Jacoby noted how despite the inability of welfarism to remake employment relations and to constrain the drive system, it did mark the beginning of personnel departments in the

United States. Similarly, Jacoby as well as Cohen and Schatz, noted that in raising expectations, welfarism taught workers what was achievable within capitalism.102 While welfarism demonstrated that incremental improvement within the firm was possible, management could not be relied upon to provide

100 Fox (1985), Man Mismanagement. 101 Zahavi (1988), Workers. 102 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy; Zahavi (1988), W orkers; Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal.

64 it. The unrealised potential of welfarism, notably humane, fair and safe conditions of employment, found new life in the demands of the new industrial unions.

In his more recent work, Jacoby challenged labour historians, such as Brody, who argued that welfare capitalism disintegrated in the 1930s as a result of the

Great Depression, to be replaced by collective bargaining, strong industrial unions and the welfare state. Jacoby has argued that welfare capitalism survived well after the New Deal period in the United States and has informed current non-union, consent-based approaches to labour management such as human resource management.103

Jacoby also argued that mid-century American welfare capitalism was not necessarily crude or reactionary, as often described by labour historians and industrial relations scholars. He noted that welfare capitalism, as practiced by the three firms he studied, was often deliberate and sophisticated. Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century experiments in welfare capitalism were “re-tooled” in the 1940s and 1950s. These approaches proved useful for maintaining employee morale, supporting productivity, and most importantly, keeping unions out.104

In a similar vein, Zahavi noted that reports of the death of welfarism may have been greatly exaggerated. At Endicott Johnson, welfarism survived well after the Second World War. It helped to keep the firm union free and

103 Jacoby (1997), Modern Manors.

65 remained an essential legacy within Endicott Johnson, well into the 1960s.105

Gardner and Palmer argued that welfarism provided the first example of the potential for "the soft option" within the organisation of work.106 Richard

Edwards similarly noted how the experiments of welfarism would find new life in post-war "human resource management" experiments, designed to exclude unions and co-opt employees.107 While the adoption of welfarism needs to be linked with employer decisions, the “staying power” of welfarism must also indicate that employers saw benefits to such an approach.

While a generally acceptable definition of welfarism appears elusive, there have been key features identified within the literature. On the one hand, welfarism shares common features with paternalism, namely a reflection and replication of familial ties within the employment relationship and the creation of mutual bonds.108 Alternatively, while paternalism has generally been seen as an unreflective manifestation of broader social dynamics within the workplace, welfarism is more often seen as a more deliberate attempt by employers to deal with labour management problems such as isolation from existing labour markets and/or high turnover, low productivity, poor morale and militancy among employees.109 Similarly, welfarism is often linked to employers responding to an external political and industrial environment which is potentially hostile, rather than a manifestation of personal or

104 Ibid. 105 Zahavi (1988), Workers. 106 Gardner and Palmer (1992), Employment Relations. 107 Edwards (1979), Contested Terrain. 108 Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 50-1; Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”; Zahavi (1988), Workers.

66 religious principles.110 As well, the provision of non-wage benefits is assumed to be on a more systematised and bureaucratic basis within welfarism, whereas such benefits are supposedly provided on a more ad hoc and “gift-like” basis within paternalism.111

Welfarism, while appearing to share characteristics with paternalism, does retain its own unique qualities. While there are temporal and geographic variations, it is the systematic, bureaucratic and considered approach to the generation of consent by employers within the workplace, that links these variations. These characteristics also distinguish welfarism from the more elusive paternalism. Further, the conceptual genealogy that places paternalism as the supposed progenitor for welfarism is assumed, rather than demonstrated, throughout the literature. It is this gap that will be closely examined in this thesis.

109 Brandes (1976), American Welfare Capitalism; Edwards (1979), Contested Terrain, 91-95; Jacoby (1985), Employing Bureaucracy, 49-54; Zahavi (1988), W orkers, 2; Gardner and P almer (1992), Employment Relations, 44-6; Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal; Patmore, G. (1991). Australian Labour History. Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 149; Brody (1993) “ The Rise and Decline”; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 20-4. 110 Jacoby (1985) Employing Bureaucracy, 50-1; Zahavi (1988), W orkers; Cohen (1990), Making a New Deal. 111 Morris and Smyth (1994), “ Paternalism”, 196-7.

67 CHAPTER THREE

Nineteenth Century Labour Management at David Jones & Co., 1838-1887

The history of David Jones & Co., drawn primarily from materials held in the David

Jones Archives, provides an example of how this prominent Australian firm managed its labour throughout much of the nineteenth century.

This chapter investigates the events leading up to the foundation of David Jones & Co. in 1838, and the labour management practices utilised by David Jones & Co., until 1887.

Particular attention is given to considering whether “paternalism” was a significant feature of labour management at David Jones & Co. As noted in the previous chapter, paternalism has been described as a conscious attempt to replicate familial relations in a non-familial context such as the workplace. Paternalism is the extension or preservation of mutuality and support into a non-familial environment, often involving the provision of non-wage benefits on an ad hoc or “gift-like” basis.

As noted, several writers have argued that a founder's religious or moral beliefs are important in fostering paternalism, particularly in department stores.1 Consequently, special attention will be paid to David Jones’ personal background and beliefs in an attempt to determine whether these influenced the firm's labour management policies and practices. In particular, the chapter evaluates the impact of the founder’s Methodism on the firm’s management of labour. Some commentators have claimed that a religious/reformist commitment from the employer lay at the roots of

1 Thurley, K. and Wood, S. (1983). Industrial Relations and Management Strategies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 205-6. 68 nineteenth century welfarism.2 This argument has also been used to explain the existence of welfarism at David Jones Ltd. during the twentieth century.3

In addition, the demands created by a growing firm and changing market conditions will also need to be considered in determining what influenced labour management policies and practices at David Jones & Co.

Materials from the David Jones Archives and secondary sources will be used to trace the labour management polices and practices of the time. Aspects of labour management examined include recruitment, selection and compensation practices. These policies and practices are evaluated in order to establish whether any discernible paternalism existed during this formative period of the Company’s development.

David Jones, the Firm’s Founder

David Jones was born in 1793 outside Llandilo in the county of Dyfed in southwest

Wales. He was the second child of seven children, who survived into adulthood, raised by Thomas and Anne Jones.4

Wales, at that time, was a society undergoing dramatic transition. Between 1770 and

1850, Wales underwent a massive population explosion, rising from 500,000 to

2 Jeremy, D. (1990). Capitalists and Christians: Business Leaders and the Churches in Britain, 1900-1960. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3 Raferty, P. (1980). “ The House Built on Service: David Jones Limited During the Inter-War Years: 1919- 1939”. Unpublished B.Comm (Hon) Thesis. Sydney: University of Sydney.

69 1.2 million.5 The exploitation of the south Wales’s coalfields and the emergence of the iron industry in the first three decades of the nineteenth century saw south Wales shaken by the full force of the industrial revolution.

Family mythology infers that David Jones’ parents, Thomas and Anne, were farmers.6

However, more recent research has noted that Thomas Jones alternatively described himself as “pedlar”, “shopkeeper” and “farmer” in his legal and commercial dealings.7

David Jones and his three brothers, all of whom spent some of their adult lives working as warehousemen or shopkeepers, were likely to have been exposed to retailing throughout their formative years. Yet whether Thomas and Anne Jones consistently had a permanent shop is debatable. Prior to purchasing their four acres at Llwyn-y-piod in

1795, Thomas described himself as a “pedlar”, the title generally used to describe itinerant retailers.

Shopkeepers, as a distinct group in Western Europe and Britain, emerged slowly between the late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution as markets, fairs and itinerant traders declined in importance and the more regular patterns of permanent shops arose.

Shopkeepers, Braudel argues, were a motley collection of tradesmen and pedlars retailing from their homes.8 Similarly, M ui and M ui, commenting on the British debate, noted that it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that

4 Spurway, J. (1992). Australian Biographical and Genealogical Record, Series One, 1788-1841. Sydney: Society of Australian Genealogists, 228. 5 Davies, J. (1993). A History of Wales. London: Allen Lane / Penguin Press, 349-355. 6 Jones, C.L. (1955). “ The History of David Jones Limited”. Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 41(5), 226. 7 Horton, B. (1992). “ Brief History of David Jones Limited”. Unpublished Mimeograph. David Jones Archives. 8 th th Braudel, F. (1982). The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism, 15 –18 Century, Volume 2. London: Collins, 670. 70 itinerant trading gave way to permanent shops in rural areas such as Wales, northern

Scotland and southwest England.9

It can also be surmised from Thomas’ use of a mark rather than a signature for his contracts that he was likely illiterate.10 While not at all surprising for someone of his social standing in this era, it is noteworthy that his sons were literate and appeared to have a firm grasp of mathematics.11 While the oration given at David Jones' funeral implies he received formal schooling, it is not clear how much, if any, formal schooling the Jones children received. It is also likely that Welsh was David Jones’ first language.12

Similarly, twentieth century portrayals of David Jones identify him as having been brought up in a strict Methodist household and that "these beliefs enforced a stern and rigid family discipline".13 Recent research also throws this into question. Horton's research has found nothing to suggest that Thomas and Anne Jones were themselves strictly Methodist or necessarily influenced the religious development of their children.

It would appear that Thomas and Anne, who were married and their children baptised at

St. Leilo, the Church of England Parish Church of Llandeilo Fawr, Wales, were more than likely part of the established Anglican Church.14 David Jones himself noted in a letter written in 1857 that religion began to influence his life around 1817, when he would have been about 24 years of age and living

9 Mui, H. and Mui, L. (1989). Shops and Shopkeeping in the 18th Century. London and Montreal/Kingston: Routledge and McGill/Queen's University Press, 3-7. 10 Horton (1992), “ Brief History”, 3. 11 Ibid., 6. 12 Davies (1993), A History of Wales. 13 Jones (1955), “ The History”, 226. 14 Horton (1992), “ Brief History”, 2. 71 away from home in north Wales.15 Horton suggests that David came to Methodism as an adult and that the spiritual influence on his life was in fact, his first father-in-law John

Williams, a successful shopkeeper and Methodist lay preacher.16 That David Jones came to embrace M ethodism while working for John Williams in the north, rather than from his parents, coincides with the fact that Methodism was much more pervasive in the north of Wales than in the south.17 Whether David Jones was given a strict

Methodist upbringing appears uncertain, though as an adult his religion played an important role in his life, most notably in his heavy involvement in the Pitt Street

Congregationalist Church in Sydney.18

In 1807, at the age of fourteen, David Jones began an apprenticeship with a grocer in

Carmarthen, Wales, a town of several thousand at that time.19 Though few details emerge from his six or seven years in Carmarthen, it is likely that he learned the basic elements of retailing here, in addition to those he may have acquired from his father, and here possibly gained both literacy and numeracy skills.20 Similarly, Carmarthen's position as a town of wealth and distinction during this period may have given the illiterate pedlar's son a working knowledge of the tastes of the emerging middle-class.21

Following his apprenticeship in Carmarthen, David Jones served shortly as a manager in a small general store in Pembrokeshire in far south-west Wales.22

15 Ibid., 6. 16 Ibid., 6. 17 Davies (1993), A History of Wales, 424-5. 18 Spurway (1992), Australia Biographical Record, 228. 19 Horton (1992), “ Brief History”; Davies (1993) A History of Wales, 318. 20 Horton (1992), “ Brief History” , 6. 21 Davies (1993), A History of Wales, 318. 22 Spurway (1992), Australian Biographical Record, 228. 72 The period from age twenty-four (1817) to twenty-nine (1822) appears to have been an eventful time for David Jones. Horton suggests that during this period David Jones journeyed to north Wales and possibly came into the employ of John Williams, a highly successful shopkeeper. As mentioned above, Williams' M ethodism appears to have affected David Jones. Jones would also have met Williams' daughter, Elizabeth.23 David and Elizabeth were to move to London some time between 1819 and 1822, and would be married in Holborn, London in September of 1822.24

Records show that it was very likely David Jones was working in London by 1822, and perhaps as early as 1819.25 Davies notes that many of the rural Welsh who were not drawn into the collieries, quarries and mills along the south coast of Wales, migrated to

London or across the Atlantic to America during this period.26 The Jones would have been one family among thousands from Wales finding their fortune along the Thames in the 1820s. Elizabeth had two daughters by David, however both died in infancy.

Elizabeth herself died of consumption at the age of thirty in 1826.27

Little is known with whom David Jones was employed throughout the 1820s, although it appears likely he was employed in either a drapery or warehousing enterprise in the

City of London, which was then a hub of retailing. It is known that in 1831 he was in the employ of the warehousemen, R. and N. Nicholls of

23 Horton (1992), “ Brief History”, 6. 24 Spurway (1992), Australian Biographical Record, 228. 25 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 227; Horton (1992) “ Brief History”, 7. 26 Davies (1993), A History of Wales, 323. 27 Horton (1992), “ Brief History”, 7. 73 Cheapside, City of London.28 Having spent most of his early training in the shops in rural and small-town Wales, in London he would have specialised in the “trade” of drapery.29

By the early nineteenth century, old boundaries between sellers of clothing as cloth known as woollen drapers, linen drapers and haberdashers, had began to blur. “Draper” was becoming a generic term for a shop that dealt in cloth and clothing.30 Within the sector, drapers generally catered to a class-specific, as well as gender-specific, clientele with drapers ranging from “the high class tradesmen selling the finest damasks, muslims and shawls ... to the cutting shops of the working-class districts, selling off job-lots of cheap goods”.31

Dramatic changes were, however, taking place in the drapery trade of London of the

1820s and 1830s, where David Jones worked. It was here that significant innovations within retailing were developed and adopted, leading to what Alexander calls the "retail revolution".32 Within manufacturing there were innovations such as ready-made clothes - a product of increased industrial production. In retailing, the steadier supply of merchandise, improved distribution and a more established and less self-sufficient clientele meant that the old methods were being re-examined. Old policies such as requiring customers who entered the premises to buy were being abandoned, permitting customers to browse without purchasing. Fixed prices and standardised credit policies allowed retailers to eliminate some of the more

28 Spurway (1992), Australian Biographical Record, 228. 29 Australian Encyclopaedia, Fourth Edition (1983). Sydney: Grolier Society of Australia, 284; Alexander, D. (1970). Retailing in England during the Industrial Revolution. London: Athalone Press. 30 Alexander (1970), Retailing in England, 129 31 Ibid., 138.

74 abhorrent practices of the past. M any shops began to embrace cash only sales. Further the size of stores also increased with "monster" drapery stores.33

An environment of increasing industrial production and improved distribution networks underpinned many of these developments within British retailing. M any drapers embraced new methods. The eighteenth century approach to retailing of "buy cheap, sell dear" was being replaced with a new approach based on "low inventories, high turnover".

While the high mark-ups of buying cheap and selling dear occasionally meant quick and often spectacular profits, they were also difficult to maintain in increasingly competitive markets, such as London. Buying cheap and selling dear also meant that retailers built up large, chaotic and ultimately unsaleable inventories that often led to serious financial problems. The new approach, which emphasised stock turnover, meant that retailers could be price competitive while maintaining their profitability, remain liquid and avoid having their capital tied up in inventories. 34

Retailers also fought back by attempting to improve their image as economic and social

“parasites”.35 Chambers of commerce and employer associations were

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Alexander (1970), Retailing in England; Davis D. (1966). A History of Shopping. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 35 Allen, J. and du Gay, P. (1994). "Industry and the Rest: The Economic Identity of Services". Work, Employment and Society, 8(2), 255-271 note the manner in which much of economic theory has dismissed retailing and the services as “ parasitic” and unproductive. See also Flaubert, G. (1962). Madame Bovary. Ringwood: Penguin and Zola, E. (1954). Germinal. Ringwood: Penguin for classic literary representations of shopkeepers as greedy villains. 75 established, and retailers increasingly involved themselves in politics.36 Claims of profiteering, lack of respectability and poor working conditions were ruthlessly parried.37 When the concerns of middle-class reformism arose around the issue of labour exploitation, many retailers voluntarily introduced early closing and become involved in early closing associations.38

However, personal developments soon caused David Jones' to leave R. and N. Nicholls in London to go to the new colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. In

London, the newly widowed Jones continued to attend the Independent (later

Congregationalist) Church. Here he presumably met his second wife, Jane Mander, whom he married in 1828.39 Through his new father-in-law, Jones was introduced to

William Wemyss, a fellow M ethodist and former Deputy Commissioner General in

Sydney, New South Wales. It was Wemyss who introduced Jones to his future business partner, Charles Appleton.40 The new in-laws of David Jones were also involved in the

London Missionary Society which, in the words of Charles Lloyd Jones, turned "David's eyes to Australia".41 Appleton also had retail interests in the colonies of New South

Wales and Van Diemen's Land. Appleton apparently convinced his young partner of the opportunities in the remote

36 However, the political activity of shopkeepers during the nineteenth and early twentieth- century appears to have been much more active on the Continent than in Britain at this time. See Gellately, R. (1974). The Politics of Economic Despair: Shopkeepers and German Politics 1890-1914. London and Beverley Hills: Sage Publications; Nord, P. (1986). Paris Shopkeepers and the Politics of Resentment. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; Morris, J. (1993). The Political Economy of Shopkeeping in Milan, 1886-1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 37 Winstanley, M. (1983). The shopkeeper’s world, 1830-1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 38 Holcombe, L. (1973). Victorian ladies at work; middle-class working women in England and Wales, 1850- 1914. London: Newton Abbot, David and Charles. 39 Horton (1993), “ Brief History”, 7. 40 Pollon, F. (1989). Shopkeepers and Shoppers: A Social History of Retailing in New South Wales from 1788. Sydney: The Retail Traders' Association of NSW, 166. 41 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 227. 76 colony and the partnership of Appleton and Jones was established in 1832 with a buying office in St. Benet's Place, London.42

By the time David Jones decided to enter business with Charles Appleton and then to

Van Diemen's Land in the early 1830s, it would appear that Jones had success as draper and warehouseman in London. In 1831, he had purchased the family property Llwyn-y- piod for £200 from his eldest brother John, who had inherited it in 1829. This property was used as a residence for their recently widowed mother, Anne, who lived there until

1841. The buildings were supposedly in ruins when David Jones returned to Wales in the late 1840's. He eventually sold this property to his brother in law, John Burrowes

Rose, for £210 in 1850.43

In 1834, David Jones and his young family, along with a shipment of goods for the new

Hobart store, had departed from England on the Thomas Harrison. After spending most of 1835 in Hobart, the Jones family moved to Sydney, where David continued working in partnership with Appleton.44

Establishment of David Jones & Co, 1838

Sydney in the 1830s was in the midst of transition from a penal settlement to a destination for free settlers and from a colony dependent on overseas supplies to one which was becoming increasingly self sufficient, as the agricultural potential of the

Sydney basin was exploited.45

42 Horton (1993), “ Brief History”, 8. 43 Horton (1993), “ Brief History”, 11. 44 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 166.

77 The first regular produce market had begun in 1803 and permanent shops were appearing in the first decade of the nineteenth century.46 Industry remained small, though commerce was expanding. Sydney had already produced a new class of successful merchants such as Robert Campbell and Simeon Lord.47

The retail environment David Jones entered into was reasonably developed. Kingston notes that by the 1830s, "descriptions of the Sydney shops...often compared them to those in the larger provincial towns of Britain".48 She further notes that contemporary commentators were impressed with the quality and breadth of merchandise in Sydney at the time:

C.J. Baker, a barrister who spent a few weeks in Sydney in 'three well-furnished roome' (sic) over a shop, also commented on how like an English provincial town Sydney was. He found the shops' numerous, and many of them handsome and plentifully stocked with wares at moderate prices'. Another visitor, George Bennett, returning to Sydney in 1832 after ten years' absence, commented on the 'neat and even elegant shops; the press sends forth their cards and circulars, and larger posting bills, printed in a neat and even superior manner, equal to any similar production in our country towns in England'.49

Kingston notes that the wealthy residents of early nineteenth century New South Wales, generally preferred higher-quality British-made goods to inferior locally made products.

Retailers such as Charles Appleton grew wealthy importing such goods from Britain and then retailing them to Sydney’s wealthy, who longed for the good things from “home”.50

45 Clark, M. (1966). A Short History of Australia. New York: Mentor. 46 Kingston, B. (1994). Basket, bag and trolley: a history of shopping in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 7-11. 47 Clark (1966), A Short History; Kingston (1994), Basket, 9. 48 Kingston (1994), Basket, 17. 49 Ibid., 18. 50 Ibid., 13-4. 78 In the mid-1830s, Jones worked at the Appleton and Jones drapery store located at 30

Pitt Street, near Circular Quay. Their partnership, however, was not to last. In early

1838, David Jones severed his business ties with Appleton and established his own retail establishment. According to the Australian Encyclopedia, Jones’s quarrel with

Appleton stemmed from Appleton's appointment of a manager to the Appleton and

Jones store in Sydney.51 An angry exchange of letters between the two men which was published in the Sydney Morning Herald highlighted that the dispute arose from differing ideas about business strategy, with Appleton accusing Jones of over-buying and being too lenient in the granting of credit.52 Whatever the cause of the dispute, Jones apparently became so enraged that he physically threw Appleton and the newly appointed manager from the store, an incident that resulted in an assault charge.53

On 24 May 1838, after severing his partnership with Charles Appleton, the doors of

David Jones & Co. were opened to the public with only Jones and two assistants at work.54 Jones was able to lease the site on the corner of Barrack and George Streets,

Sydney from Jones Simmons, a former convict.55 The building, a two storey brick and stone structure, with eleven rooms, had formerly operated as the "Jerusalem

Warehouse". Before that, it supposedly had functioned as a dairy.56

The strength of the location, however, was probably not in the building itself but in its position. David Jones & Co. was located on George Street, opposite Sydney's

51 Australian Encyclopaedia (1983), 284. 52 Horton (1993), “ Brief History”, 9. 53 Australian Encyclopaedia (1983), 284. 54 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 227. 55 Horton (1993), “ Brief History”, 9.

79 General Post Office. This, the development of George Street as Sydney’s major thoroughfare and the commercial heart of the city, have been mentioned as key factors for the early success of David Jones & Co.57

In addition to the advantageous location of David Jones & Co., another factor in its success appears to have been its selection of merchandise. While it is difficult to fully assess the merchandise carried by the drapery establishments of Sydney in the 1830s, from secondary sources, a few observations lead to the conclusion that most drapers of the period carried imported luxury items (such as gloves, umbrellas, beaver fur hats, etc) or bolts of raw cloth.58

David Jones & Co., on the other hand, placed a strong emphasis, "unrivalled" in Pollon's terms, on ready-made clothing, known at that time as "slops".59 M any British retail historians note the importance of "slops" in the revolution that shook mid-nineteenth century retailing. Ready-made clothing harnessed the industrial might of the industrial revolution and, although often of poor quality, was usually considerably cheaper.60

Whether slops occupied the lower end of the market in Australia is questionable. First, the considerable cost of importing goods such as ready-made clothing from Britain, would have made it far less economical to import clothing at the lower end

56 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 166-7, 177. 57 Ibid., 167. 58 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers; Hordern, L. (1985). Children of one family: the story of Anthony and Ann Hordern and their descendants in Australia, 1825-1925. Sydney: Retford Press; Kingston (1994), Basket, 5-20. 59 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 167-8. 60 Alexander (1970), Retailing in England. 80 of the market. Second, it would appear that in the Australian context, ready-made clothing was aimed not at the urban poor but at a wide audience including customers from the country who required moleskins and riding outfits.61 It would appear that the convenience of ready-made clothing enabled the visiting "squattrocacy" to purchase their wares quickly during short visits to Sydney.

Store location and merchandise choice were important factors which allowed David Jones

& Co. to flourish in the coming decades. David Jones himself had moved into the circles of modest bourgeois respectability, having been elected to the Council of the City of

Sydney in 1842 and established himself as deacon in the Congregational Church in

Sydney. The Church provided the opportunity for Jones to develop personal ties with other notable Congregationalists such as John Fairfax, founder of the Sydney Morning

Herald.62

In nineteenth century Britain, the relationship of the master draper and the assistant, appears more along the lines of a master-apprentice relationship in craft production than any other analogy.63 Drapers' assistants often "lived on the premises of the draper's household while they learnt the trade".64 However, the relationship appears to have been harsh and authoritarian. The master draper maintained strict control over their assistants with harsh supervision, strict rules regulating behaviour and a system of fines.65

61 Maynard, M. (1994). Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial Australia. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 130-3. 62 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 229. 63 Indenture, plus many other features of nineteenth century British retailing, are keenly satirised in Wells, H.G. (1905). Kipps. London: Collins. 64 Reekie, G. (1989). "The Shop Assistants' Case of 1907 and labour relations in Sydney's retail industry" in R. Mitchell and S. Macintyre (eds.) Foundations of Arbitration. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, p.272. 65 Ibid., 272. 81 Alexander estimated assistants in Britain worked between 12 and 16 hours a day.66 In

British shops of this period, 15 to 20 minute breaks for meals, crowded conditions, poor ventilation and fumes from gaslights were also common features. As summed up by

Alexander, "the stunted, sallow and tubercular shop assistant was a reality, not a sentimental creation of Victorian novelists".67

While labour management in Sydney shops such as David Jones & Co. may have maintained some of the features of British retailing of the same period, primary sources regarding employment matters at David Jones & Co. between the 1830s and 1860 are scarce. More generally, the employment relationship in colonial New South Wales as one typified by harsh and authoritarian approach by employers emerges from other evidence. In her research M erritt notes that the only piece of legislative protection for employees, the Master and Servant Act, was often of little use and was generally only used by employers.68 Others, similarly, note that before the emergence of effective unionism and arbitration, employees were often at the mercy of harsh and cruel employers in colonial New South Wales.69

Charles Lloyd Jones does claim that David Jones & Co., within a few years of opening, was employing twenty assistants, described as "all well trained and most of them selected in England".70 The earliest surviving advertisements notes attempts were made to hire British-trained staff in Sydney. This advertisement was placed in

66 Alexander (1970), Retailing in England, 190. 67 Ibid., 191. 68 Merritt, A. (1982). “ The Historical Role of Law in the Regulation of Employment”. Australian Journal of Law and Society, 1(1), 56-86. 69 Fitzgerald, S. (1987). Rising Damp: Sydney 1870-90. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 163-4.

82 the Sydney Morning Herald only a few months after the opening of David Jones & Co. in 1838.

Wanted, by the Undersigned, one or two young men in the above capacity. None need apply unless they have been well acquainted with drapery and Haberdashery at home. D. Jones & Co. George Street.71

English-trained, skilled, male employees were to be an important component of David

Jones & Co.'s workforce throughout the century. They often appeared to have been apprenticed at reputable retailers in Britain, and brought with them skills in both the selling and construction of men's clothing items. As the advertisement above notes,

David Jones & Co. did make attempts to recruit such employees within the local labour market and often assistants moved between several retailers. Yet the apparent shortage of appropriate skills meant that skilled labour was often directly recruited in Britain.

In 1848, David Jones & Co leased the former Star Hotel, just south of the “Old

Jerusalem Warehouse” on George Street. The three storey brick and stone construction, gave David Jones & Co., a further fifty feet of frontage along George Street.72

In 1853, at age 60, David Jones retired from active management. He did remain a partner in the firm until 1856. During this first retirement, Jones no doubt enjoyed the serenity of his mansion "Barncleuth" in Elizabeth Bay. He remained active in the

70 Ibid., 229. 71 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June 1838, p.1. 72 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 176. 83 Congregationalist Church, and was appointed to the Legislative Council of New South

Wales in 1856.73

The business was left in the hands of Frederick Ford, T. J. Thompson, both of whom were sons-in-law of Jones, and their business associate, S. Symonds. Despite revisionist history that paints Jones as totally severing his business ties with the firm it appears that in 1856, Jones remained a silent partner in the firm that began operating under the name of Thompson Symonds & Co.74

However, Thompson Symonds & Co. faced difficult economic times and, by certain accounts, bad management.75 The boom created by the gold rushes of the mid-1850s had ended and the economy of New South Wales slumped in the late 1850s. In 1860,

Thompson Symonds & Co. failed, crushed beneath a mountain of debt.76

With the company on the verge of bankruptcy, David Jones came out of retirement.

M eeting with the creditors, Jones allegedly offered to pay 10 shillings for every pound of debt. He sold "Barncleuth", his horses and carriages, borrowed heavily and, with support from the creditors, reasserted control over his former company in 1860. At this time, David Jones made his youngest son, Edward Lloyd Jones (1844-1894) a partner.77

73 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 180; Spurway (1992), Australian Biographical Record, 228. 74 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 180. 75 Ibid., 169. 76 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 233. 77 Ibid. 84 From Horton's account, the 1860s were a difficult period for the reconstituted David

Jones & Co.78 In this time of dire need, Jones senior and his new partner, James E.

Woodward, apparently took a hands-on approach to management. Jonathon Youdale, who was hired in 1864, remembered David Jones, at the time in his early seventies, appearing at the store on a daily basis.79 However, Youdale also claimed that it was the new partner, James E. Woodward, who was "the real head of the Firm".80

The company was able to trade its way out of difficulty, and to stay out of the clutches of creditors. By 1868, the company had repaid its loans, was readmitting partners and

David Jones, one would suspect more confident of the company's prospects, retired for a second and final time.81 Five years later, in 1873 at age 80, David Jones died. His son

Edward Lloyd Jones and James E. Woodward now managed the company that bore his name.82

As noted, only fragmentary evidence has survived from the early nineteenth century to give a hint of the actual conduct of labour management at David Jones & Co. What evidence has survived would paint any paternalism at David Jones & Co. as heavily coloured with harsh and authoritarian labour management.

One incident, recounted by Charles Lloyd Jones displays David Jones in a rather harsh and authoritarian light. Charles recounts the story as such:

78 Horton (1989), “ A Brief History”, 1. 79 David Jones Ltd. (1988). 150th Anniversary Commemorative Booklet. David Jones Archives (DJA), 5. 80 Youdale Personal Recollection, David Jones Archives (DJA), BRG 1/577. 81 th Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 169, David Jones Ltd. (1988), 150 Anniversary Booklet, 4-5; Horton (1989), “ A Brief History”, 1.

85

There is a record of David Jones, usually a kindly employer, losing his temper in a big way with a smart young assistant, for his transaction with a country woman who wanted ' the best the Store can show me' in the way of an evening gown, but wasn't at all impressed by the more restrained styles that had just arrived from Paris. So the young man sold her, for more than its right price, an over-trimmed ornate frock of two-years-ago vintage and took the matter gleefully to David Jones personal notice.

'You did that, sir! You dared to do that' was the reception he got. 'Leave my employ at once, sir - at once, do you hear?'

The lady never got that dress. She was taken into the Store again and the whole matter was explained to her by David Jones in person. She was tactfully invited to make a further choice.83

While the anecdote itself may have been subject to some embellishment, Charles appears to have told it to illustrate David Jones as possessing integrity and David Jones & Co. as a firm where "the customer is always right". Yet from the view of employee relations, the persistence of this anecdote (and the lack of any surviving anecdotes which offer a picture of David Jones as a "kindly employer”) suggests harsh and authoritarian employment relations.

Recollections from the 1860s

There were, however, a few labour management practices that point to the existence of a kinder, more paternalistic approach. One is the provision of on-site accommodation for staff at David Jones & Co. throughout the 1860s and 1870s, and the support for early closing.

82 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 180. 83 Jones (1955), “ A History”, 231-2. 86 Both the recollections of O'Connor and Youdale note that accommodation was provided on site throughout the 1860s and 1870s.84 Youdale noted that upon his arrival in 1863 that "we had but one shopwalker in these days Mr. Goldsmith, a married gentleman who lived on the premises".85 He further noted that "a dozen young men slept on the premises".86

It would appear that accommodation was negotiated on an individual basis between the employee and the firm, often upon their appointment in London. In Edward Lloyd

Jones’s journal of 1862, provision of accommodation appears to have been negotiated on an individual basis. 87 In negotiating the appointment of a Miss Goodfellow, Edward notes that accommodation was to be provided upon arrival until more suitable accommodation was found. Alternatively, in the negotiations with a Mr. Howell, it was agreed that he was to "live out" upon his arrival. Indeed rather than a paternalistic condition imposed on staff so that their behaviour could be monitored and controlled, it would appear from Edward Lloyd Jones's journal the provision of accommodation was often requested by new staff.88 While O'Connor notes that on-site accommodation was provided up until 1870s, this practice appears to have ended during this decade.89

If there was any paternalist intervention it was in its earliest agitations surrounding the early closing of shops in Sydney. As will be discussed in the next chapter, David Jones, along with several other prominent shopkeepers, submitted a petition to the

84 Youdale Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577; O’Connor Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577. 85 Youdale Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577. 86 Ibid. 87 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA, PRG 1/7A. 88 Ibid.

87

newly formed Sydney City Council calling upon it to "take into consideration the propriety of closing the various drapery and other business establishments at 7 o'clock through the year - Saturday excepted".90 Yet, as will be explored in the next chapter, it would appear that despite these early agitations, it would be another three decades before David Jones & Co. itself instituted early closing.91

The 1860s do yield detailed evidence of certain labour management policies and practices of David Jones & Co. Journals kept by Edward Lloyd Jones while at the London Office during 1862, contain details on recruitment and selection practices and conditions of employment.

During the 1860s, skilled labour, both male and female, was regularly engaged for the store in Sydney through the London Office. The partners who were at the London

Office during 1862, Edward Lloyd Jones and Charles Edwards, were involved throughout the process; from drafting the advertisements, to interviewing the applicants and finally negotiating terms of employment. These functions were done in addition to what appears to have been the primary function of the London Office, namely buying British merchandise for sale at the George Street store in Sydney.92

Recruitment of skilled labour was done through both advertisements in London newspapers and by informal networks. In his journal, Edward Lloyd Jones noted an

89 O’Connor Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577; Selected Contracts, DJA, PRG 1/8. 90 Harris, H. (1938). “ 100 Years Old Today, The Story of David Jones Limited”. Rydge’s, 1 May 1938, 335. 91 MacCulloch, J. (1980). "'This store is our world' Female Shop Assistants in Sydney to 1930" in J. Roe (ed.) Twentieth Century Sydney: Studies in Urban and Social History. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 173. 88 advertisement that David Jones & Co. placed in a London newspaper to hire a

"saleswoman" in May 1862:

A saleswoman for a 1st class Australian House, a young person of considerable experience in M illinery, also a knowledge of Mantles. Unquestionable references.93

In relation to the use of informal networks within the London retailing community to recruit labour, Edward Lloyd Jones’s journal noted that often the issue of where suitable employees might be found was raised in discussions with both suppliers and other drapery firms in London.94

While there is no record of the applicants, successful or otherwise for the female millinery position mentioned above, Edward Lloyd Jones's journal does provide us with other glimpses of how other employees were hired through the London office in 1862.

The cases of a Miss Goodfellow, a Miss Lockyer and a Mr. Howell, all mentioned in

Edward Lloyd Jones's 1862 journal, will be used to illustrate the procurement of skilled labour.

Both Miss Goodfellow and Miss Lockyer applied for a job as saleswoman that was advertised in a London newspaper in June 1862. Both, along with several other applicants, had called into the London Office of David Jones & Co. on 20 June. On that day, Edward Lloyd Jones noted that both Miss Lockyer and Miss Goodfellow appeared to be "the most likely" for employment.95

92 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA. PRG 1/7A. 93 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA. PRG 1/7A, p.5. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid., p. 12. 89

Both women were interviewed three days later on the 23 June by Edward Lloyd Jones and Charles Edwards. They appear to have been the only two interviewed. Miss

Lockyer is identified as being aged 26 and is described by Edward as "a young lady of style, good figure and address". She had been previously employed at the firm of Swan and Edgar, one of the major drapery stores in London of the time.96 The other interviewee, Miss Goodfellow is described as a "young lady with considerable experience", previously having been employed in millinery in Bath.97

During the interviews, it would appear that several issues regarding remuneration arose.

Both women were offered a salary of £130 per annum, a considerable amount for the period. However rather idiosyncratic terms of employment appear for each woman.

M iss Lockyer agreed (or was expected) to pay her own passage to Australia, while M iss

Goodfellow was to have half of her passage paid for by the firm. Miss Goodfellow was also offered accommodation at George Street until she found suitable lodging. No reference to a similar arrangement with M iss Lockyer is mentioned. Lastly, it appears that M iss Lockyer's salary was not to commence until she reached Australia. Edward laments that "many have asked for it to commence on arrangement".98

It would appear that both Miss Lockyer and Miss Goodfellow were successful in their attempts to gain employment with David Jones & Co. Only a week and a half after her interview, Miss Lockyer departed from London aboard the 'Prince of Wales'

96 Davis (1966), A History of Shopping, 289. 97 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA. PRG 1/7A., p.12. 98 Ibid. 90 for her new life in Sydney, New South Wales with her new employer David Jones &

Co.99

Miss Goodfellow, who appeared to have better conditions offered namely half passage paid for and accommodation in Sydney, appeared to have fortune on her side. She was engaged on 4 July after Mr. Edwards "found her references so good and believing her thoroughly suitable".100 Not only did Miss Goodfellow have the benefit of good references but also the entry for 10 July identifies her as the "niece of Dean, of Brieley

Dean and Company".101 It would appear that good references and good family connections may have influenced Edward Lloyd Jones and Charles Edwards to pay for half her passage while not such offer was made to Miss Lockyer. Miss Goodfellow signed the agreement on 15 July, where she promised 12 months with David Jones & Co.

The next day, 16 July 1862, less than a month after her initial application, Miss

Goodfellow set sail for Sydney aboard the 'Sarah Neuhman'.102

The case of Mr. Howell appears to be a less happy story than those of Miss Lockyer and Miss Goodfellow. Mr. Howell, together with about six others, applied for a job in mantles which had been advertised by David Jones & Co. on 25 July 1862. Another suitable applicant, a Mr. Goodrich, who had been employed with Forrest and Company in Dublin, notified Edward Lloyd Jones that David Jones & Co.'s offer was unacceptable. This left M r. Howell who had experience in mantles. The interview with

M r. Howell reached the agreed conditions of employment to be £200

99 Ibid., 16. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid.

91 per annum, no accommodation and he would pay for his own passage to Sydney.103 Mr.

Howell responded four days later, on 28 July, that he would agree to those terms if £50 were advanced.

Advancing £50 obviously became a point of contention. Mr. Howell met with Charles

Edwards and Edward Lloyd Jones on 31 July to discuss the advance. Edward Lloyd

Jones's journal noted that Mr. Howell "pressed hard for the 50 (pounds) to be advanced as he intended marrying".104 Charles Edwards offered to pay for part of Mr. Howell's passage but refused to advance £50 outright. At this point, Mr. Howell "became rather bouncable (sic) on the question and said he must resign if the sum was not advanced".105

As Edward Lloyd Jones's journal notes, "the result was so".106

The dealings of Miss Goodfellow, Miss Lockyer and Mr. Howell with David Jones &

Co. provide us with examples of how skilled labour for a growing Sydney firm was obtained in the mid-nineteenth century. Great Britain provided the source of this skilled labour and London, a city of over one million residents at the time and with a large drapery-retailing industry, was where David Jones & Co. hired skilled labour well into the twentieth century. The comparatively small population, lack of skilled labour in

New South Wales and an apparent reluctance to train apprentices required David Jones

& Co. to draw upon a large pool of skilled and experienced buyers, milliners, cutters and dressmakers who worked and resided in London. As

102 Ibid. 103 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA. PRG 1/7A, 23. 104 Ibid., 23. 105 Ibid., 23. 106 Ibid., 23. 92 with other skilled workers, the high wages, opportunities for advancement and the dry, mild Australian climate (which was seen as healthier for certain physical ailments and individuals with weak constitutions) attracted these workers to accept employ with

David Jones & Co.107

This did not mean that meeting its skilled labour requirements was easy for the firm.

Several entries in Edward Lloyd Jones's journal, in addition to the incident with Mr.

Howell, indicate some difficulties in obtaining appropriate skilled labour. A Miss Scott, described as a most suitable candidate with great deal of experience, was offered employment with David Jones & Co. as a milliner/saleswoman on 15 May 1862. On 3

June, Miss Scott responded to the offer "declining the engagement as she had accepted another".108

The 1870s and 1880s

Having weathered the difficult times of the 1860s, the company rode the crest of the

Long Boom throughout the 1870s and 1880s. A variety of managerial innovations were made during the 1870s, despite business continuing to operate from the original collection of convict-era buildings on the corner of Barrack and George. These changes took place within a context of an increasingly prosperous Sydney. As well, they saw the encroaching influence of overseas ideas in merchandising and store organisation.

107 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA. PRG 1/7A. 108 Ibid., 5-9. 93 By 1877, Edward Lloyd Jones, son of the original David Jones, had become the senior partner in David Jones & Co. During the 1870s, David Jones & Co. placed an increasing emphasis on women's, as opposed to men's clothing and greatly expanded women's accessories, such as millinery (the making of women's hats) and corsetry. The expansion into millinery accompanied a move into production, as opposed to merely importation, and by 1876, the millinery workroom at David Jones & Co. employed 20 people.109 The firm instituted both a mail order and Sydney delivery service during the 1870s.110 This expansion meant that by the late 1870s, as recalled by J. Gamble, David Jones & Co. employed nearly 200 people.111 This made David Jones & Co. among the largest private employers in Sydney at the time.112 David Jones & Co. expanded into the area of home furnishings in 1880, leasing another establishment further south along George Street.

Within this environment of growth, David Jones & Co. underwent certain changes, most notably "departmentalisation", with the existence of 19 departments in David Jones &

Co., by 1876.113 Organising stores into departments was an important innovation within the growing stores of the nineteenth century. Such units were organised along types of similar merchandise. Benson perceives such innovations as merely a response to growth, a bureaucratic response to increasingly large stores.114 Reekie sees a similar development, yet notes a gendered agenda, which creates male

109 Reekie, G. (1987). “ Humanising Industry: Paternalism, Welfarism and Labour Control in Sydney’s Big Stores”. Labour History, 53, 1-19. 110 th David Jones Ltd. (1988), 150 Anniversary Booklet, 6; Horton (1992), “ A Brief History” , 1; Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 306 111 th David Jones Ltd. (1988), 150 Anniversary Booklet, 6. 112 Fitzgerald (1987), Rising Damp, 154-8. 113 th David Jones Ltd. (1988), 150 Anniversary Booklet, 6. 114 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 94 and female departments.115 The department became the critical organisational component of the emerging mass retailers, who were increasingly being called

"department" stores. The buying and selling of stock would be carried out on a department by department basis. Each department would have the "buyer" whose main function was to purchase the merchandise and in some instances, would supervise the sales staff.

By the 1880s, most of the large drapery stores of Sydney had social activities for employees such as staff cricket teams. Indeed, a cricket competition of the major stores of Sydney, including David Jones & Co., began at Clontarf Picnic Ground at this time and continued throughout the twentieth century.116 However such early initiatives were intermittent and often organised by staff. It was not until the establishment of welfarism in the twentieth century, that management at David Jones Ltd. would provide formal support for such teams.

The economic expansion encountered throughout the 1870s continued through the 1880s.

David Jones & Co. grew along with this economic expansion. By the mid- 1880s it had been decided that the collection of shops strung along George Street where David Jones

& Co. had operated for nearly half a century had outlived their usefulness. In 1886, one of David Jones' chief rivals, Anthony Hordern & Sons, under the watchful eye of Samuel

Hordern, opened their Palace Emporium in Haymarket. Sydney had seen nothing like it.

It was six stories high, taller than the smaller structure built by Farmers several years before. Horderns expanded their

115 Reekie, G. (1993). Temptations: Sex, Selling and the Department Store. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin. 116 th David Jones Ltd. (1988), 150 Anniversary Booklet, 8 95 workforce to over 500, making them probably the largest single private employer in all of

Australasia at the time.117

In 1887 David Jones & Co. battled back. The "Old Jerusalem Warehouse" and the adjoining buildings on the corner of Barrack and George Street were demolished. In their place arose the new home of David Jones & Co., a large, single four-storey structure, very much a modern department store.118

Paternalism and Nineteenth Century Labour Management at David Jones & Co.

By all accounts, religion was very important to David Jones on a personal level. He was deeply involved with the Pitt Street Congregationalist Church in Sydney for much of his adult life. However, there is nothing to indicate that his religious beliefs affected his firm’s management of labour or engendered paternalism.

The evidence that does exist hints at a working environment that was harsh and authoritarian. There is no evidence that this was affected by any attempt to replicate familial relations in the workplace. Indeed, the evidence supports the view of Shirley

Fitzgerald, that for other than hours, “there is no evidence that the large shops (of

Sydney) provided conditions any more satisfactory than did small establishments.”119

Two conditions of employment that do hint at the possibility of paternalism were early closing and the provision of accommodation. Early closing will be looked at

117 Hordern (1985), Children. 118 Pollon (1989), Shopkeepers, 179. 119 Fitzgerald (1987), Rising Damp, 164. 96 in more detail in the next chapter. However, in respect of accommodation, the historical evidence reveals that it was often staff who requested accommodation. Accommodation appears to have been considered a benefit that David Jones & Co. grudgingly provided.

There is little evidence that the provision of accommodation by David Jones & Co. was primarily done to monitor staff behaviour, particularly senior staff.

Unfortunately, from the available material, it is difficult to determine what proportion of staff were hired from Britain. However, the hiring of skilled labour from Britain by

David Jones & Co. highlights aspects of labour management at the firm. This characteristic leads to certain conclusions about the way in which the firm was organised in the nineteenth century, and brings differences into relief with similarly-sized American and British firms operating at the same time.

One difference would appear to be the lack of a highly developed apprenticeship system at David Jones & Co. This was in stark contrast to similarly sized British firms which were highly reliant on such systems.120 Indeed, the hiring of skilled overseas labour appears to have partially replaced the need for apprentices.

Another interesting characteristic that can be surmised from the evidence is that often the same skilled person both manufactured and sold the merchandise (as one would expect in a modern-day tailoring shop). Tailors, milliners and dressmakers who would have worked at David Jones & Co. in the nineteenth century had highly desirable skills.

These workers appeared to have been able to negotiate individually,

97 from a position of considerable strength, good salaries and conditions. There also appears to have been little attempt at negotiating collectively, other than on matters such as early closing.

Lastly, hiring of skilled staff was done centrally and later evidence indicates that this continued even after departmentalisation. This is in stark contrast to hiring practices with American department stores where the departmental buyer often maintained this responsibility. The “buyer run” store was a major problem for American department store managers, and seeking to centralise decision-making was a main objective at the turn of the century.121

The experience at David Jones & Co. indicates this may not have been as much of a problem for Australian managers as their American counterparts. As well, the more centralised labour management in the nineteenth century may have made it easier to adopt storewide innovations and actually facilitated the introduction of systematic labour management and welfarism at David Jones & Co.

The other characteristic of note was that David Jones & Co. maintained a significant manufacturing component. In the United States, for instance, very few large retail firms retained any manufacturing interests throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Marshall Field of Chicago being the notable exception.122 However, the immature domestic manufacturing industry gave Australian retailers, which sought to expand, little choice but to import from overseas and, later,

120 Alexander (1970), Retailing in England. 121 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures. 122 Ibid. 98 establishing their own manufacturing arm. This may have hampered the development of the strong buyer-controlled store culture that was found by Benson in American stores, as “home-brand” goods made by Australian retailer’s manufacturing arm would have restricted the freedom of the buyer to acquire merchandise from their preferred personal provider.123

Documentary evidence from the 1860s and 1870s also hints at the possible existence of a dual internal labour market within David Jones & Co. On the one hand, skilled labour in the production and sales areas, was hired at the London Office. These individuals came over in areas such as millinery and mantles. They appeared to be engaged on short-term contracts, were often provided with accommodation and passage and paid substantial wages.124

On the other hand, while evidence of this is circumstantial, there appears to be a more peripheral workforce that was hired in Sydney. M ost likely these workers would have been engaged as carters, cleaners, and dog wallopers and, in some instances, as junior staff on the sales floor. Unfortunately little record of their conditions of employment exists, but they were likely to have had less security of employment, poorer conditions and wages and little likelihood of advancement, unless related to a partner of the firm.125

However, a highly segmented internal labour market would be a continuing feature of

David Jones & Co. throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century.

123 Ibid. 124 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA, PRG 1/7A; Youdale Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577; Selected Contracts, DJA, BRG 1/8.

99 Conclusion

While innovations such as departmentalisation and very modest forays into organised sporting teams took place in the 1880s, there is little evidence of a deliberate consent- based strategy to labour management or of attempts to build familial relations within the workplace. Indeed, the examination of the David Jones material indicates that

“paternalism” remained an elusive concept and a loose descriptive term of limited usage in explaining nineteenth century Australian labour management.

One matter of significant concern of many retailers and their employees throughout the nineteenth century and linked to paternalism was early closing. This was an important industrial issue at David Jones & Co. during this period. It provides another window into testing whether paternalism existed at David Jones & Co. and, if it did, what were the factors that drove it.

125 Selected Contracts, DJA, BRG 1/8. 100 C HAPT ER FO UR

David Jones & Co. and the Politics of the Early Closing of Shops in NSW, 1830-1900

"Our class of trade never was an evening trade." – Edward Lloyd Jones, 1892

The previous chapter dealt with labour management practice at David Jones & Co. during much of the nineteenth century and found little evidence of paternalism. However, one issue not dealt with in Chapter Three was that of the early closing of shops. The closing time of shops, in particular for shops not to trade in the evenings, was a contentious and controversial workplace issue throughout the Sydney retail industry during the nineteenth century.

This chapter investigates the issues surrounding David Jones & Co. and the early closing of shops. During the twentieth century, David Jones’ personal support of early closing was used as an example of his, and the firm’s, paternalism towards its employees.1 However, the historical record again raises serious questions about the degree to which there was paternalism at work and to what degree such decisions were in response to normal commercial and related considerations. Once again, paternalism’s “fitness for service” as a concept and its usefulness in explaining the rise of welfarism in the twentieth century will be questioned.

1 Harris, H. (1938). “ 100 Years Old Today, The Story of David Jones Limited”. Rydge’s, 1 May 1938, 334-6; Jones, C.L. (1948). “ Speech Delivered on 28 May 1948”. McNeill Papers, David Jones Archives (DJA), 3-4. 101 David Jones personally supported the principle of early closing from the 1840s onwards.

However, employees at David Jones & Co. were not to benefit from voluntary early closing and a Saturday half-holiday until the 1870s. While support for early closing was presented by some as evidence of David Jones & Co.’s paternalistic benevolence, the historical record reveals the critical role of collective agitation by shop assistants in securing this change. As well, the introduction of early closing by competitors and other normal commercial considerations were important factors in the adoption of Early Closing at David Jones & Co.

David Jones & Co.’s policy of voluntary early closing which commenced in the 1870s did not isolate the company from the later debates of early closing, reaching a climax with the passage of the New South Wales Early Closing Act in 1899. This important piece of legislation effectively restricted most late night shopping in New South Wales until the

1970s. As well, the unfolding of the events surrounding early closing demonstrated how a firm such as David Jones & Co. could use debates over the treatment of its employees to improve its public standing and commercial position.

Brody has argued that shorter hours were not an intrinsic part of twentieth century

American welfare capitalism.2 However, more recent writers such as Hunnicutt believe that consent-based approaches to labour management gave prominence to reduced working hours.

In his work on Kelloggs' introduction of the 30 hour week during the 1930s, Hunnicutt argues that welfarists such as Kellogg had a perspective on time and

102 work different from their non-welfarist counterparts; a view where work was perceived as a

means to an end, not an end in itself. In addition to a humanistic benevolence, Hunnicutt

notes that shorter working hours meant not only happier but also less fatigued and more

productive workers.3

Early closing of shops, however, had been an issue for retailers throughout the nineteenth century. Prior to the nineteenth century, the operating hours of retailers corresponded to the natural rhythms of the day and the seasons. For instance, Davis notes that seventeenth century markets in Britain generally began at approximately 6 a.m. in the summer and at sunrise in the winter, and were generally "raised" (closed) by the late afternoon.4 Shops

similarly had their hours restricted by the hours of daylight with store hours ranging from

between 10 to 12 hours a day.5 Candle light and crude oil lamps proved ineffective for the

internal lighting of shops. In the growing cities and towns, dark, unlit streets were seen as

unsafe.

The introduction of gas lighting, during the first three decades of the nineteenth century,

facilitated the expansion of shop operating hours in urban centres where gas was introduced.

Many shop owners took advantage of gas lighting to dramatically extend their trading hours.

Where introduced, interior gas lighting often permitted opening

2 Brody, D. (1993). “ The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism” in Workers in Industrial America, Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 59. 3 Hunnicutt, B. (1992). “Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day: A Capitalist Vision of liberation through Managed Work Reduction”. Business History Review, 66, 475-522. 4 Davis D. (1966). A History of Shopping. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 78. 5 Ibid., 101. 103 hours to be pushed back as late as midnight.6 Shop assistants, who had worked ten and

twelve hour days in eighteenth century Britain, were working an eighteen-hour day by the

1830s. Alexander notes that assistants were often expected to prepare for the store opening

at 6 a.m. and were expected to stay to clean after closing, often leaving after midnight.7

While gas lighting permitted many shop owners to introduce longer hours, this often proved

self-defeating. Estey notes longer opening hours often meant a longer day for the owner, in

some cases increased labour costs and employee discontent. If competition amongst local

shops broke out around hours, a mutually debilitating "hours war" could ensue with shops

open until past midnight hoping to elicit the patronage of a handful of potential customers.

Long hours did not necessarily mean more business nor necessarily make a shop more

profitable. The emerging strategy of increased stock turnover rather than mark-up meant

that the key to retail success was the rapid movement of stock not the sheer volume of

business.8

Similarly, Benson notes that "managers ... perceived that shorter hours were in their self- interest".9 For management, staying open for evening shopping was often more

6 Davis (1966), A History of Shopping, 262; Holcombe, L. (1973). Victorian Ladies at Work: Middle Class Working Women in England and Wales 1850-1914. London: David & Charles, Newton Abbot,108; Roberts, D. (1981). “ The movement for the early closing of shops in New South Wales, 1890-1899”. Unpublished BA (Hon.) Thesis. Kensington: University of New South Wales, 8-9. 7 Alexander, D. (1970). Retailing in England during the Industrial Revolution. London: Athalone Press., 190. 8 Estey, M. (1972). “ Early Closing: Employer-Organized Origin of the Retail Labor Movement”. Labor History, 13(4), 560-570. 9 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 196. 104 trouble than it was worth, with evening customers often "lookers" rather than shoppers, and

exhausted assistants proving ill-tempered and inefficient.10

In the United States, early closing was primarily instituted by retailers entering into voluntary arrangements to close their shops at an agreed hour.11 Crossick, similarly, argues

that in Britain large shopkeepers often use local Early Closing Associations to manage

voluntary early closing agreements amongst themselves.12

The propensity to institute early closing voluntarily appears to be linked to the class of

customers. The majority of middle-class custom took place during daylight hours.13 Only

retailers who relied on working-class customers, who were more likely to shop on Friday

and Saturday night, benefited from late opening hours.14

Shop assistants, too, often agitated for early closing, sometimes in concert with retailers in

Early Closing Associations but also in their own organisations. The earliest moves by shop assistants to agitate for early shop closing emerged in Britain in the 1820s and 1830s. Shop assistants in centres such as Birmingham and Sheffield gathered petitions and issued pamphlets requesting the early closing of shops and reduced working hours.15 Such efforts

were local and short-lived and were often without any

10 11 Ibid. Estey (1972), “Early Closing”. 12 Crossick, G. (1984). “ Shopkeepers and the state in Britain, 1870-1914”, in G. Crossick and H. Haupt (eds.), Shopkeepers and Master Artisans in Nineteenth Century Europe. London: Methuen, 252-6. 13 Counter Cultures 14 Benson (1986), , 76-7. MacCulloch, J. (1980). “’This store is our world’ Female shop assistants in Sydney to 1930”, in J. Roe (ed.), Twentieth Century Sydney: Studies in Urban and Social History. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 173. 15 Holcombe (1973), Victorian Ladies, 108; Alexander (1970), Retailing in England, 191. 105 organisational continuity. It would appear these early efforts also had little success. More formalised attempts at limiting shop hours developed in the 1840s and 1850s as a wide assortment of local "Early Closing Associations" sprang up throughout Britain. Assistants often initiated these efforts, but these associations also attracted clergy, middle-class reformers and, as noted above, shop owners.16

Early closing agitations also took place in American cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago,

Baltimore and New York during the 1830s and 1840s. However, in the United States, Estey notes that it was often shop owners who instigated the campaign for early closing. Though shop owners often argued they were motivated by Christian charity, Estey believes that commercial considerations ultimately drove employers to adopt early closing. He notes that employers would ultimately benefit from shorter hours, as long as their competitors did the same. As noted above, employers also had an interest in early closing. Shorter hours meant a shorter day for the owner, reduced labour and overhead costs, and prevented self-defeating

"hours wars" between competitors. If applied to all shops, early closing had minimal impact on the flow of business, especially for shops whose middle-class clientele rarely shopped in the evening. As Estey notes, "so long as the early closing was uniformly and generally observed, the individual (shopowner) could close early without fear of losing business to a late closing competitor".17

16 Crossick (1984), “ Shopkeepers and the state”, 252-6. 17 Estey (1972), “Early Closing”, 568. 106 The other group that often expressed interest in the early closing issue were middle-class

reformers. Reekie believes that the move for legislated early closing in New South Wales

shops was the product of interventions made primarily by middle-class feminist reformers,

such as Rose Scott and Belle Golding.18 This line of argument is echoed by Roberts who

notes that the introduction of the Early Closing Act 1899 in New South Wales was a product

of native egalitarianism, nationalist sentiment, religious conviction in addition to a middle-

class feminist reform agenda.19 Holcombe, to a certain degree, follows a similar explanation

for the success of both early closing and shop assistant unionism in nineteenth century

Britain.20 Less explicitly, Benson also notes that middle-class social reformers pressured

American department stores to curtail long hours.21

Unlike many other labour management issues, the early closing of shops was often played out in the public forum and involved not only employers and employees but other interested parties. However, despite explanations by Reekie and Roberts that place middle-class and feminist reformers at the heart of the victory for early closing in New South Wales, the role of large employers such as David Jones & Co. cannot be ignored. Indeed, the ability of established stores such as David Jones & Co., Farmer & Co. and Anthony Hordern’s to maintain early closing throughout the 1870s and 1880s meant that the major stores of

Sydney could play a role in supporting legislative early

18 Reekie, G. (1993). “ The sexual politics of selling and shopping”, in S. Magarey, S. Rowley and S. Sheridan Debutante Nation: Feminism contests the 1890s (eds.),19 . St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 67. Roberts (1981), “ The movement”. 20 Holcombe (1973), Victorian Ladies. 21 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures. 107 closing in the 1890s. However, again the concern appears to have arisen from commercial

considerations rather than any notion of paternalism.

In Sydney, gas lighting was introduced in the 1830s. Before, only the odd whale oil lamp,

burning outside hotels and taverns, provided any street light. The Australian Gas Light

Company, a private concern established in 1836, aggressively pursued the introduction of

gas lighting. By 1841, street lamps created the "lines of light" which stretched the length of

George and King St reet s.22 The respectable citizens of Sydney, including the middle-class customers of fine drapers, could now safely walk the evening streets. Interior gas lighting was also quickly adopted. By the 1850s, draperies such as Farmer’s had installed ornate gas lighting within their departments.23 As a result, shop assistants in Sydney were working

twelve hours and more a day by the mid-1850s.24

As in Britain and the United States, early closing became a matter of social and political debate in Australia.25 In Melbourne, as early as 1841, drapers and grocers attempted to

regulate opening hours, with little success. A decade later, in 1851, the Young Men's Early

Closing Association was formed in Melbourne.26 However, according to Mr. Hindle of the

New South Wales Legislative Assembly, the Melbourne Early Closing

22 First Light: 150 Years of Gas 23 Broomham, R. (1987). . Sydney: Hale & Iremonger. Ibid., 60. 24 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1856, p. 5. 25 While early closing literature in English, not surprisingly, focuses on the English speaking world, early closing movements also sprung up in countries such as France. For instance, in October 1868, two-thirds of Paris’ 12,000 shop assistants struck for a twelve hour day. See Miller, M.B. (1981). The Bon Marche. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 89-90. 26 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 10. 108 Association “became a kind of club. It gave annual banquets but cared little for the real

results which was to be obtained for shop assistants.”27

In Sydney, individual shopowners such as David Jones were also involved in early closing.

Employers had already organised with the formation of an Australian Drapers' Association in 1841.28 David Jones the person was elected as a member of the Association’s first

committee. The association's membership were to be “persons connected with the Drapery

and other Trades and Professions in Sydney". Among its early modest objectives was the

establishment of a library and reading room for members.

While from early official accounts the Australian Drapers' Association had modest aims, its

membership provided the foundation for the earliest organised action around early closing.

This was in the form of a petition submitted to the Mayor of Sydney in 1846. The names

of prominent drapery owners including David Jones, whose name was at the top of the

petition, requested the Lord Mayor "take into consideration the propriety of closing the

various drapery and other business establishments at 7 o'clock through the year - Saturday

excepted".29 There was a precedent for such government intervention. Public houses in New

South Wales had their opening hours restricted since 1838.30 Yet these early attempts appear to have had little impact since there appears to have been no genuine attempt by the authorities to pursue the issue. The early closing of shops

27 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.55, First Series, 14 December 1891, p.3631. 28 The Australian, 23 February 1841, p.1. 29 Harris (1938), “ One Hundred Years Old Today”.

109 continued to be an issue of intermittent political activity throughout the nineteenth century

in Sy dney .

The first recorded meeting of an organisation dedicated solely to Early Closing in Sydney

took place in 1856. It was held at the Sydney Mechanics Institute and School of Arts on

Pitt Street on the evening of Wednesday 11 June. Though the exact number of attendees is

not recorded, the Sydney Morning Herald reported "the new lecture hall was crowded, the floor being occupied for the most part by ladies, and the gallery by gentlemen".31

The elite, middle-class leadership of Sydney's first Early Closing Association (ECA) is

unmistakable. The main addresses were delivered by the Premier, Stephen Donaldson and

the Anglican Bishop of Sydney, the Reverend O.H. Stanley. Those who sent their support

included such bourgeois luminaries as businessman Thomas Mort and future Premier Henry

Parkes. The content of addresses notes the middle-class reformist agenda of this first ECA,

drawn heavily from the British experience. Both Donaldson and Stanley focused on the

plight of male shop assistants, noting that assistants were working 12 hours a day in

Sydney's shops. Their demands for shorter hours rested on the argument that shorter hours

would provide assistants with the opportunity for moral and intellectual improvement.

Indeed many of their statements appear to be counter-arguments aimed at shop owners, who

appear to have claimed that long hours were good because they kept assistants away from

pubs and theatres. The linkage between

30 Lewis, M. (1992). A Rum State: Alcohol and State Policy in New South Wales. Canberra: AGPS, 54.

110 the early closing of shops and the early closing of pubs was also drawn by many. Other

speakers, who identified themselves as assistants or former assistants spoke more plainly

and forthrightly of the conditions endured by assistants. Yet the speeches of middle-class

reformers such as Donaldson and Stanley portray assistants as victims who needed to be

freed from the gaslit cage of the shops they toiled in.32

The injuries brought about by the "late closing system" were many . However most of the

speakers appeared wary of blaming shop owners. Criticism of shopkeepers was muted and,

in many instances, the speakers portrayed shopkeepers as much the victim of long hours as

the assistants. If a villain was identified, it was unfortunately but not surprisingly, "the

ladies" who shopped in the evening. This misogynist reading was successfully challenged

by feminists, such as Rose Scott, who joined the movement for early closing later in the

century.33

The strategy for moral suasion to bring about a voluntary agreement among Sydney's shopkeepers, and a campaign to dissuade “the ladies” from shopping after 5 o'clock appear to have been the strategies agreed to by the meeting. Such motions were heartily endorsed by the audience.

Yet the more ambitious strategies that were to emerge later in the century such as legislative reform were not even mentioned. There is a strong possibility that legislative

31 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1856, p.5. 32 Ibid. 33 Reekie (1993) “ The sexual politics”. 111 intervention was not even a part of the political agenda. For instance, while Stephen

Donaldson was Premier of NSW, he was simultaneously Vice President of the NSW Early

Closing Association, but there is not one reference to the plight of the shop assistant, in his contributions to Legislative Assembly debates during this period, nor any move to legislate early closing. The Sydney Early Closing Association of 1856, like many other Early Closing

Associations throughout the world at this time, appears to have slid into oblivion. The organisation resisted the temptation to consider legislative restrictions (as was done to public houses) and their promotion of voluntary early closing arrangements appeared ineffective.

If anything this conservative strategy, which was strongly supported by shop owners, began to drive a wedge between old allies. Holcombe notes that many British shop assistants and more radical social reformers began to depart from the mainstream Early

Closing Associations in the 1860s, many voicing the view that voluntary agreements were ineffective. These differing strategies, a voluntaristic effort based on moral suasion or a mandatory legislative approach, were issues which ran throughout debates within the early closing movement. Often these differences resulted in organisational divisions between competing early closing organisations within the same locale, one preaching moral suasion the other advocating legislative restrictions on shop hours.34

Despite David Jones being personally involved in supporting early closing from the 1840s, according to evidence given before a 1891 Parliamentary Select Committee, it

34 Holcombe (1972), Victorian Ladies. 112 was not until the mid-1870s that David Jones & Co. instituted 6 p.m. weekday closing with

a Saturday half-holiday for its own employees.35 The length of the day prior to that is

difficult to determine precisely. Evidence pointed to a later weekday closing, possibly 9

p.m. though it appears that carters did not end their day until 11 p.m. when they returned

from their deliveries.36

As noted, later revisionist histories of David Jones & Co. argued that early weekday closing was instituted out of the goodness of the employer’s heart, based on a genuine paternalism.37 Yet upon closer examination, the link between early closing and the religious or genuinely paternalistic view of the owner remains difficult to establish. Indeed David

Jones himself, a strong Congregationalist, appears to have maintained longer shop hours throughout most of his tenure as the senior partner.38 It also appears that, in the 1850s,

there was little "Christian consensus" around closing hours of shops. Some claimed that

long hours were beneficial for the shop assistants' salvation since it kept them out of

theatres, coffeehouses and other late night temptations.39 While David Jones did help

instigate the first early closing petition, it appears that his own commitment to such moves

were not necessarily strong as such a policy was not implemented until after his active

retirement from the firm!

35 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.6908. 36 Youdale Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577. 37 38 Harris (1938), “ One Hundred Years Old Today”. Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.6908; Youdale Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577. 39 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1856, p.5. 113 In spite of any paternalistic motives that shopkeepers and their supporters assigned to early closing, other, more commercial, motives may have underpinned the moves to institute such practices. One is that high-class drapers such as David Jones & Co. noted that the bulk of their custom was during the daylight hours. Most of their clientele had always been middle- class women who shopped during the day, a point that further brings into question the view put forward at the Early Closing Association meeting that late night women shoppers were to blame for late closing.40 In his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1890,

Edward Lloyd Jones when asked if his business would support early closing, noted;

Yes; but then our experience may not apply to other smaller houses in the suburbs and elsewhere, which are, perhaps, largely dependent on the evening trade. Our class of trade never was an evening trade. It was done in the ordinary hours of the day.41

The other commercial reason why the major drapers instituted early closing and Saturday half-holidays may have been more closely aligned to the effective display of their wares.

Kingston notes that many drapers felt that artificial light distorted the true colour of drapery products and hampered effective selling.42

The major drapers of Sydney appear to have been able to come to some informal consensus or arrangement over early closing. In addition to the moves by David Jones & Co. in the mid- 1870's, the other major shops such as Anthony Hordern and Sons and Farmer & Co. instituted similar hours in the same period. For instance, Farmer’s

40 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 172. 41 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.6908.

114 introduced the Saturday half-holiday in 1866, and Anthony Hordern and Sons initiated

weekday closing at 7 p.m. in 1869, to be followed by others such as David Jones & Co.43

It may have also been that the major firms of Sydney, David Jones & Co., Anthony Hordern and Sons, Farmer & Co., and Lasseters, had secured enough of an oligopoly within the

Sydney market to make taking hours out of competition of little consequence for their overall performance. The introduction of a Saturday half-holiday and early weekday closing at David Jones & Co. may have occurred because of a broad range of internal factors such as commercial and philanthropic considerations. Given the experiences elsewhere, it appears that similar moves by its closest competitors may have made the decision easier to arrive at.

Lastly, David Jones & Co., along with the other major stores may have restricted their hours due to organised pressure from shop assistants themselves. In Sydney, a second Early

Closing Association was organised in June 1869. Unlike the first Early Closing Association of 1856 that attracted significant middle-class interest , this new Early Closing Association was convened by a group of over twenty King Street shop assistants (with invitations sent out to the assistants of Brickfield Hill) and met in the lower room of a public house in Surry

Hills.

42 Kingston, B. (1994). Basket, Bag and Trolley: A history of shopping in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 41. 43 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 173. 115 A Mr. Brennan chaired the meeting and an Early Closing Association was established, with a

committee of management and a subscription rate of one shilling per month for membership.

The first resolution of the meeting was "That, in the opinion of this meeting, it is desirable

that an effort should be made to induce the drapers of the city generally to close their shops

at an earlier hour." A debate ensued concerning an appropriate opening times for shops. It

was finally moved and passed,

That the committee be requested at once to wait upon the proprietors of the drapers' shops in King-street, as well as neighbouring proprietors, and endeavour to obtain from them a promise to close at 6 o'clock in the evening during the week, with the exception of Saturday, at 9 o'clock.44

Despite the fact that there are few references to this Early Closing Association, during this period, many stores began to introduce early closing around the same time that this second

Early Closing Association was founded. Further, King Street was located near David Jones

& Co. on the corner of George and Barrack Street in Sydney. The impact of employee pressure for early closing can also be drawn from statements made by A. J. Riley, a member of the NSW Legislative Council, during the 1892 debate over the proposed Early Closing

Bill. He stated:

When I came to Sydney in 1859, large shops in Sydney, which now close at 6 o'clock, kept open until 9 o'clock. It was only by strong, well-directed efforts on the part of employees, in which I took an active and prominent part; that the shops were closed at 6 o'clock on ordinary days and at 1 o'clock in Saturdays.45

This statement coincides with the timing of the shop assistant’s agitation and the institution

of early closing by major stores such as Anthony Hordern and Sons and David Jones & Co.

This suggests this group of shop assistants may have been

44 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 1869, p.4; Sydney Mail, 3 July 1869, p.10.

116 successful in their efforts to bring about early closing. Organised activity among assistants,

combined with the other factors, may have helped to usher in the first widespread

implementation of early weekday closing and the Saturday half-holiday in the late 1860s and

early 1870s.

Collective activity in the local retail sector continued during the 1880s. A newer Sydney

Drapers' Association was formed in 1883, with membership among both assistants and

owners. Lesley Hordern notes that this “organisation (was) founded not so much on the

basis of ‘employees versus employers’ as ‘supporters of the 8 hour day versus the rest”.46

While not noting whether David Jones & Co. was involved Hordern does note, its

membership included shopkeepers “who had already introduced shorter hours and were now

hopeful of persuading their competitors to do the same”.47

This association had, at best, a modest impact. It appears to have attempted a wider voluntary arrangement for 6 p.m. closing amongst its members in 1883.48 If any arrangement

did have any lasting effect, it failed to survive the decade. Similarly, shop assistants “were

beginning to wield power” within stores during the buoyant years of the 1880s, according to

Hordern, though she provides no specific instances.49

45 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 30 March 1892, p.7198. 46 Hordern, L. (1985). Children of one family: the story of Anthony and Ann Hordern and their descendants in Australia, 1825-1925. Sydney: Retford Press, 243. Pollon, F. (1989). Shopkeepers and Shoppers: A Social History of Retailing in New South Wales from 1788 47 . Sydney: The Retail Traders' Association of NSW, 307. Hordern (1985), Children of one family, 243 48 Ibid., 244. 49 Ibid. 117 The early closing issue, which had bubbled along throughout the second half of the

nineteenth century in the Sydney retail sector, reached a head in 1890s. In the early 1890s,

shop assistants began to express their frustration with the continuous failure of voluntary

early closing arrangements outside the major stores. They found a new vehicle to express

their collective dissatisfaction, namely trade unionism, and a potential new ally, the nascent

labour movement. The early 1890s also saw the rise of a new generation of “pushing

shops”, new large retailers such as Grace Brothers and Mark Foys, which opened late. All

the while, this took place within the wider political and economic turmoil of the early 1890s.

The newly formed Shop Assistants Union of New South Wales was established in 1889.50

The objective of the organisation was:

to promote the interests of its members by fostering and promoting a fraternal and sympathetic co-operation with each other and use its united influence to effect an abbreviation of the hours of labour to the eight-hour system and to use legitimate means to advance the best interests of its members, morally, socially and intellectually. 51

The first Secretary of the union, Mr. J.L. Longbottom, told the Royal Commission that the union “regards the early closing of shops as its primary business”.52 The union grew

quickly, with an estimated 2500 to 3000 members by March 1891, including several of the

“fairer sex” located in not only central Sydney but also in suburban areas such as

50 Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes (1891) Parliamentary Papers of New South Wales, 23-A, p.151. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 118 Newtown and Balmain.53 A Newcastle union was formed in May 1890 with 100 members.54

The emergence of shop assistant trade unionism and its relationship to the wider early closing movement is quite problematic. The two movements were far from identical, though they shared similar concerns. Many commentators believe that the early closing movement facilitated the development of shop assistant trade unionism. Holcombe and Roberts argue that shop assistant trade unionism was essentially a reaction to the ineffective measures of the early closing strategy of voluntary agreements.55 Indeed, in Victorian England, the differences between those who favoured voluntary agreements and those who supported legislative intervention led to splits in the early closing movement. The new National

Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and Clerks (NAUSA), formed in

1891, and Amalgamated Union of Co-Operative Employees (AUCE) formed in 1895, maintained strong links with elements of the early closing movement which supported legislative means to early closing while many clergy and middle-class social reformers continued to support moral suasion and voluntary agreements. These British unions expanded their concerns to include not merely working hours, but living-in, fine systems and minimum wages.56

Yet others, such as Estey, have wondered if the wider early closing movement actually blunted the development of strong, oppositional unionism among shop assistants rather

53 The Australian Workman 54 , 7 March 1891, p.2. Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes (1891), p.152. 55 Holcombe (1972), Victorian ladies; Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 10-11.

119 than fostering it. In studying the development of the main American retail union, the Retail

Clerks International Association, in 1890, Estey considers whether the "alliance" struck

between shop owners and shop assistants regarding early closing "postponed the day of

labour-management conflict in the retail trades" and "delayed the development of effective

retail unions".57

The New South Wales Shop Assistants’ Union affiliated with the New South Wales Trades

and Labor Council and sought to lobby for the introduction of an Early Closing Bill into the

New South Wales Parliament.58 The union leadership noted the relative failure of voluntary

agreements and believed legislative reform was the only solution.59 On 14 December 1891, an Early Closing Bill, that would require 6 p.m. weekday closing for shops that employed “a number of young people”, was introduced into the New South Wales Legislative Assembly by Mr. Alfred Allen, the Member for Paddington.60

On the day it was introduced, a lively debate occurred around the bill. The failure of earlier

voluntary closing arrangements featured in arguments for supporting the measure. Mr.

Danahey, the Member for Canterbury noted:

I know that a short time ago it was agreed at Petersham to close the shops on Wednesday afternoon. The shopkeepers found that people went to Sydney on that

56 Holcombe (1972), Victorian ladies. 57 Estey (1972), “ Early Closing”, 570. See also Harrington, M. (1961). The Retail Clerks. New York: John Wiley. 58 59 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 11. The Australian Workman, 1 November 1890, p.3. 60 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.55, First Series, 14 December 1891, p.3628; Roberts (1981) op.cit., p.13. 120 day for their goods; one man kept open on Wednesday afternoon, a fortnight afterwards every shop was open.61

Other arguments such as the need to extend the principle of the eight-hour day to those workers who lacked the industrial strength of groups such as carpenters and stonemasons, and the inability of shop assistants, particularly young women, to form strong unions featured strongly in the debate.62

In 1892, when the New South Legislative Assembly resumed from its Summer Recess,

debate on the bill had changed as numerous petitions had been lodged in favour of the

measure. The Hon. John Davies noted:

Petitions in favour of the bill have come in from all quarters. Petitions have come from the largest employers of labour in connection with the drapery establishments and stores; and t hose petitions have been signed by those who are at present enjoy the greatest boon which the bill proposes to secure to all alike – such as the firm David Jones & Co who employ over 400 persons. Their establishment closes every night at 6 o’clock.63

The strong support of large shops such as David Jones & Co became the main point of debate on the bill. M ember after member rose to argue that the bill would benefit large city shops at the expense of smaller suburban shops. For instance, the Hon. George H. Cox rose and noted:

The Hon. Member in charge of the bill said that many of the large establishments are in favour of early closing. Many of them close early as it is, and they are no doubt, desirous that the others should be compelled by law to close too; but when we find these large establishments closed at an early hour, it is not at all desirable in the interest of the general public that the smaller shopkeepers should be compelled

61 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.55, First Series, 14 December 1891, p.3636. 62 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.55, First Series, 14 December 1891, p.3628-3636. 63 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p. 6900. 121 to close at an early hour. The customs of large establishments like those of David Jones & Co and Farmers & Co are quite unlike those of smaller shopkeepers.64

The effect of the measure on smaller suburban shopkeepers and their customers versus the

effect on David Jones & Co and other large city firms was further reinforced. Mr. R.

Burdett Smith noted:

Of course a bill of this kind will not affect such houses as Farmers & Co and David Jones & Co or Lasseter’s, which close at 6 o’clock, but it would interfere with the thrifty people who buy the provisions for cash in the evening.65

Indeed, the motive of the large shops supporting the measure was questioned. Mr. Simpson

rose and noted:

I can quite understand large shopkeepers like David Jones & Co and Farmers & Co and other sending their petitions to the House in favour of the bill, because if the smaller shops are closed at a certain hour in the evening a large amount of trade will be directed to their shops.66

The lobbying efforts of smaller shopkeepers had worked, and the earlier support for the bill

expressed in late 1891 had evaporated. When the bill went before the Legislative Assembly

for a vote on 30 March 1892, it was soundly defeated, with 7 “ayes” and 25 “noes”.67

Some in the wider community, who might be expected to support the measure, appeared not to mourn the defeat of the bill. The Bulletin, a strong supporter of the eight-hour day and trade unionism, reported upon the defeat of the 1891-92 bill:

64 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales 65 , Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.7115. Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.7120. 66 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 24 March 1892, p.7121. 67 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.58, First Series, 30 March 1892, p.7202. 122 New South Wales doesn’t want a Bill to make any man close his shop when he doesn’t feel that way; what it wants is a measure to prevent him working any employee more than eight hours per diem, and when that is provided for, the boss should be allowed to keep open all day and all night, and thereby furnish employment for three separate shifts of workers, if he is so inclined.68

The issue of early closing remained a matter of debate throughout the 1890s, at times treated

as an issue in its own but other times considered alongside other reforms. In June 1895, Mr.

Smailes, the Labor member for Granville introduced an early closing bill that was modelled

on the 1891-92 bill that failed. However, an intervening election saw the bill make little

progress.69

While an Early Closing Act was still a few years away, in 1896, the Factories and Shops Act

was passed in New South Wales. This was an important reform that introduced the first

significant state intervention into the employee standards in New South Wales. The

Factories and Shops Act included safety and hygiene provisions for most workplaces. For

shops, females and males under 18 could work a maximum of 52 hours a week. Shops were

also required to close at 1 p.m. on one day per week and to provide one seat for every three

female assistants.70

However, the Factory and Shops Act did not stem the support for an Early Closing act, which was still being advocated by a public coalition of shop assistants unions, led by male assistants who benefited little from the Factory and Shops Act, and middle-class reformers, but also quietly supported by large retailers such as David Jones & Co.

68 The Bulletin, 9 April 1892 as quoted in Roberts (1981), “ The Movement”, 20. 69 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 28.

123 By 1899 the political momentum to pass the Early Closing Bill was nearly overwhelming. In

1898, the Newcastle Shop Employees Association, strongly supported by the Miners’

Association and other local unions, pressured local shops to abide by a 6.30 p.m. closing

arrangement. This arrangement survived for several months, though began to break apart

when shops in the port area began to open late to cater to local sailors.71 In Sydney, middle-

class feminist activists such as Belle Golding and Rose Scott began to agitate for early

closing.72

Scott, in particular, appears to be a critical figure in the arguing for a new Early Closing Bill.

On the one hand, she organised and regularly addressed meetings on the topic. She acted as

an important liaison between the Parliamentary Labor Party and the Protectionists of Sir

William Lyne who were in coalition in New South Wales. Scott claimed “we got Sir William

Lyne’s sympathy because we induced Lady Lyne to come to my house and talk to the

girls”.73 She worked closely with B.R. Wise from the Protectionists and Billy Hughes and

William Holman from the Parliamentary Labor Party for support and, indeed, Miles

Franklin claimed the 1899 bill was drafted by Scott, Holman and Wise on “M iss Scott’s rosewood table”.74

70 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 29-30. 71 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 35-37. 72 73 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 39. Ibid. 74 Franklin, M. (1988). “Rose Scott: Some Aspects of Her Personality and Work”, in F. Eldershaw (ed.), The Peaceful Army. Ringwood: Penguin Books, 98. 124 The debate over this bill was much more muted than over the earlier 1891-92 bill. The bill was a more considered document, addressing the concerns of certain small shopkeepers and country areas. The bill provided for a half-holiday on either Wednesday or Saturday with late night shopping on either Friday or Saturday. Certain types of shops could remain open much later: chemists until 9.00 p.m., restaurants and fish shops until midnight and many other small shops such as greengrocers and newsagencies. Controversially, public houses to be permitted to remain open until 11 p.m. Country districts also had the flexibility to determine how the act applied to local shops.

Opposition came primarily from George Reid, leader of the Free Traders. Reid, in particular, ran a strong line that the bill was being driven by shops such as David Jones &

Co. and Farmers & Co. to hinder upstart city competitors such as Grace Brothers and the smaller suburban drapery and clothing shops that generally opened late. During the debate,

Reid observed:

If David Jones & Co., and Farmer & Co., stayed open all night, they would not pay for the gas consumed. I suppose they have an enlightened self-interest as much as anything else in closing at 6 o’clock.75

Reid, ever the eloquent orator, stridently attacked the major shops of Sydney and their role in supporting the Bill.

The House…ought to pause before it injures hundreds and thousands of deserving colonists – until, at any rate, it tries to suppress this abuse without interfering with those who are no party to it. That is why the bill is getting such a suspicious amount of support from the large shopkeepers of Sydney. They are men of great intelligence, and they are men keenly alive to their own interest, and we should have

75 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.100, First Series, 1 November 1899, p.1908. 125 heard a great deal of them in the course of the agitation in connection with this bill, but for one thing, and it is this: that whilst, as a rule, the city trade is a day trade, and they gain nothing by keeping open after 6 o’clock, all those great shopkeepers must look upon a law which will shut all the smaller suburban shopkeepers at 6 o’clock as one of the finest pieces of legislation in the way of making the big shops bigger and the big trade bigger and starving out the smaller people who are living from hand to mouth.76

Despite Reid’s attacks, the Bill was strongly defended in Parliament by both Labor and

Protectionist members. The strongest counter to Reid was Labor’s Billy Hughes, later to become a friend of the Jones family, who argued that the Bill helped rather than hindered small shops.77 Together the Protectionist and Labor members passed the measure on 22

December 1899.78

Lyne, in his summation of the 1899 session, noted “the Government bills which have been

passed number thirty. Amongst them is the Early-closing Bill, one of the most important

measures passed in this colony for many years.”79

A wide range of interested parties supported the passage of the NSW Early Closing Act. The

shop assistants of Sydney and their union were not only joined by the fledging

Parliamentary Labor Party but also by middle-class reformers and, importantly, many shop

owners themselves, including the senior partners of David Jones & Co. This

76 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.100, First Series, 1 November 1899, p.1910. 77 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.100, First Series, 1 November 1899, p.1917. 78 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 45. Markey notes that some in the New South Wales Parliamentary Labor Party of the 1890's considered early closing of shops as important a political issue as the eight hour day. See Markey, R (1988). The Making of the Labor Party in NSW, 1880-1900. Kensington: UNSW Press, 223. 79 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.102, First Series, 22 December 1899, p.3791. 126 echoes how Benson saw the relationship between shopowners/managers, middle-class customers, reformers and assistants as "a kaleidoscope of shifting alliances".80

It is relatively easy to see what shop assistants themselves gained from supporting such a change, normally shorter working hours. Similarly their union, the Labor Council and the

Parliamentary Labor Party’s support of such a measure seems to be a reasonably clear cut call for better working conditions.

However, the relationship between the shop assistants and the rest of the working-class was problematic. The "shabby gentility" which Markey claims made effective unionism less than attractive to shop assistants, also made shop assistants questionable members of the wider working-class struggle, as viewed by certain members of the wider labour movement.81

Similarly the conciliatory strategies of the Shop Assistants' Union and their willingness to accept support from middle-class reformers and employers, put them into the firing line from other fronts of the labour movement. Criticism of shop assistants’ tactics produced attacks on their “manliness”. The tension can be noted in this letter from "J.S" to The

Australian Workman:

Sir, - As an Eight Hour man, I often feel sorry and disgusted with the plaintive, child-like cries of the shop employes (sic). Their babyish attempts to reduce the hours of labour are really contemptible. ... I ask how long would working men have been in getting their privileges of shorter hours and higher wages if they had fought in such an effeminate manner. No, Mr. Shop Employe (sic), you must change your silly pranks, act and work like men for you have a worthy cause. I say to the shop employes (sic) first of all unite yourselves in what ought to be the strongest Union in

80 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 283-5. 81 Markey (1988), The Making of the Labor Party , 223. 127 New South Wales then state the day and come out and fight like men, rest assured all working classes will back you up.82

Early closing shaped the politics of shop assistant’s collective activity. Like the issue of the eight-hour day among manual workers, the early closing of shops served as a rallying cry for shop assistants. Requiring shops to close early (thus reducing their own hours of work) was the key issue around which shop assistants and their supporters organised both politically and industrially. It fostered shop assistant unionism, yet did so on such a basis that it fostered unionism that often collaborated with large employers and the middle class to bring

83 smaller employers into line.

The involvement of feminist middle-class reformers and clergy does not necessarily lend itself to such an easy understanding. While a desire for improved working conditions for the workers may have underpinned their support for early closing, underlying their concerns was a broader agenda of social reformism. Reekie identifies the efforts of middle-class feminists, such as Rose Scott, towards improving the employment conditions among female shop assistants in 1890s New South Wales. She sees such efforts as gender-based political mobilisation that transcended class lines.84 Similarly Roberts perceives the coalition of working-class and middle-class forces

82 Australian Workman 83 , 19 September 1890, p.6. The classic historical study of lower middle class identification with the middle class is David Lockwood’s The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness (Second Edition 1988). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lockwood claims that clerks lacked working class consciousness because the status of non-manual work, good labour market situation and a work situation where they are in close proximity to their employer. Another classic study of the false consciousness of the white collar worker is Mills, C.W. (1951) White Collar: the American Middle Class. New York: Oxford University Press. 84 Reekie (1993), “ The sexual politics”. 128 around early closing as an expression of native egalitarianism, nationalist sentiment, religious

and feminist conviction.85

Yet the agenda of middle-class reformers may not have been as strictly altruistic as

contended by Reekie and Roberts. Some of the comments made by the speakers at an Early

Closing Association meeting in Sydney in the 1856, for instance, reveal the possible

motivations behind the involvement of middle-class reformers and clergy in the Early

Closing Movement. Many articulate a desire to "liberate" shop assistants from their "gilded

cage" so as they could pursue moral and intellectual betterment. Though the plight of the

shop assistant is often mentioned, it is usually within the middle-class ideals of individual

and community betterment, founded on the twin pillars of scientific rationalism and

Christian virtue.86

Another agenda also appears at work, one that may explain middle-class support for the

early closing of shops. Interestingly, many speakers at the first Sydney Early Closing

Association believed that the early closing of shops was a step towards what may be a more

important goal in their eyes, the early closing of public houses.87 Indeed, the linking of movements for the early closing of shops and the early closing of public houses, taverns and hotels has been noted in the social history of the temperance movement and the regulation of alcoholic drinks by the state.88 Public houses were among the first businesses to have their hours regulated by state intervention. As early

85 86 Roberts (1981), “ The movement”, 49-51. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1865, p. 5. 87 Ibid.

129 as 1838, public houses in New South Wales were restricted to 4 a.m. to 9 p.m. in the

summer and 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. for the rest of the year.89 While "local option", namely use of local plebiscites in the granting and renewal of licenses, was the preferred objective of the

Temperance Movement in NSW throughout the later half of the nineteenth- century, early closing of pubs was also viewed as a key political objective. After the passage of the Early

Closing Act 1899, the New South Wales Temperance Alliance called upon the government to extend 6 p.m. closing to pubs as well.90 The efforts of Temperance reformers for early

closing in New South Wales would finally come to fruition by 1916, with the institution of 6

p.m. closing for public houses.91 In this context, the support for the early closing of shops by middle-class reformers and clergy appears may have actually been a tactic to establishing a precedent for the early closing of public houses, the actual political agenda of this group.

Employers such as David Jones & Co. strongly supported early closing legislation throughout the 1890s. This was not unique, as noted by Estey and Crossick, as employers who already closed early regularly supported employee attempts to bring about wider and stronger acceptance of such arrangements.92 Their high profile on the matter ultimately

killed off such reforms in the early part of the decade but by the turn

88 Lewis (1992), A Rum State. 89 Ibid., p.54. 90 91 Ibid., p.62. The campaign for the early closing of pubs culminated in 1915 when a petition with over a 100,000 signatures and a half-mile procession brought Sydney to standstill as Temperance supporters demanded 6 p.m. closing of pubs. Within a year, their wish would be granted. Drunken soldiers rioted in south-west of Sydney in January 1916 and the political tides would shift in Temperance's favour. The forces for early pub closing easily won the June 1916 referendum called by the Holman government and "the 6 p.m. scull" would become a New South Wales institution until 1954 (Lewis (1992), A Rum State, 79). 92 Estey (1972) “Early Closing”; Crossick (1984) “Shopkeepers and the state”. 130 of the century, they had taken on a much lower profile, better ensuring the passage of such a

measure. For shops such as David Jones & Co., legislated early closing had obvious benefits

as it had already instituted voluntary early closing decades before. As a large city-based

store with a strong female, middle-class clientele, it had little potential custom in the

evenings.93 Legislated early closing was a convenient way to contain the new breed of

“pushing shops” such as Mark Foys and Grace Brothers, that sought to challenge the traditional dominance of stores such as David Jones and Farmers.94

David Jones & Co. as a significant player in the Sydney retail market with 400 employees

by the 1890s was able to ride out the turmoil surrounding early closing throughout the

nineteenth century.

However, it is difficult to find paternalism or any deliberate labour management strategy as

being at the heart of the firm’s adoption of early closing in the 1870s, as Hunnicutt claimed

the 30-hour week at Kellogg’s was. T here is no evidence t hat early closing was int roduced

to foster familial relations in the workplace or was intended as a non-wage benefit for staff.

Further, the three decade gap between David Jones, the person, identifying early closing as

an issue, and the store bearing his name actually adopting the policy undercuts latter day

claims that that early closing was introduced as a result of David Jones’s strong religious

beliefs.

93 Kingston, B. (1988). The Oxford History of Australia, Vol. 3 1860-1900. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 274-5. 94 Parliamentary Debates of New South Wales, Vol.100, First Series, 1 November 1899, p.1908. 131 The adoptions of early closing in the mid-1870s appeared to be driven by a series of factors.

These included the nature of the David Jones’ clientele who did not generally shop at night and the fact that most of David Jones’s main competitors had already introduced such a policy. Agitation by shop assistants during this period, however, may have played a role in pressuring stores such as David Jones & Co. to adopt early closing.

As the early closing issue continued throughout the nineteenth century, David Jones & Co. supported moves to introduce legislated early closing, very much motivated by economic self-interest. This public support in the early 1890s actually saw a backlash against legislated early closing, with it being seen by many as an attempt by large shops to hinder their smaller competitors.

David Jones & Co. would have been able to build up its reputation as a good employer, amongst both its own employees and the wider buying public as a result of its policy of early closing. However, the early closing struggles may have been a lesson for the management of David Jones & Co. of the importance of managing the firm’s image as a quality store, included managing its image as a “good employer”. The seeds of twentieth century welfarism may have been planted not by some organic paternalism but by the lessons of early closing, where the firm’s public image as a good employer became an important component of its overall marketing strategy.

132 CHAPTER FIVE

The Tailors’ Strike of 1891-92 at David Jones & Co.

“Like getting out of a close stifling atmosphere into the clear bracing air.” – William Newman, 18

January 1892

The agitation for early closing was not the only workplace conflict that confronted David

Jones & Co. in the nineteenth century and, in turn, shaped labour management at the firm into the twentieth century. Employee discontent also took place in the company's expanding clothing manufacturing operations where employees organised collectively and agitated for improvements in working conditions. These activities culminated in the bitter thirteen-week Sydney Tailors’ Strike which took place between October 1891 and

February 1892.1 Unlike early closing in the 1890s, around which employers such as

David Jones & Co. would support and co-operate with employees, disputes in areas such as tailoring became highly confrontational.

Both politically and economically, the external and internal pressures around the demands of tailors were very different from those of shop assistants for early closing.

Similarly, the partners at David Jones & Co. made different choices in how they dealt with each. While paternalist views among some of the David Jones & Co. partners may have tempered their choices, in the end the economic circumstances were such that David

Jones & Co. was in the forefront of Sydney's employers who were determined to break the strike. The tailors’ strike was unlike the early closing situation where the firm could portray itself as a caring employer with commercial

1 Ellem, B. (1989). In Women’s Hands?. Kensington NSW: UNSW Press, 50-53. 133 benefits conveniently overlapping. Indeed, the two events map out very different trajectories in the firm’s management of its workforce in the retailing as opposed to its manufacturing side.

Yet the David Jones' management did not make their choices on a crude economic cost- benefit basis. Managerial attitudes changed, indeed hardened, throughout the strike, especially as the Tailors’ dispute was increasingly seen through the context of the wider political, industrial and economic turmoil of 1890s New South Wales.

While early closing may have provided an early lesson informing future welfarist experiments by David Jones & Co. partners for its retailing staff, the tailors’ strike indicated a willingness to adopt modern technologies and work reorganisation, including feminising the workforce, on the manufacturing side. The strike and its aftermath confirmed David Jones & Co’s strong resistance to trade unionism.

David Jones & Co. expanded into clothing manufacturing operations during the 1860s.

While the firm was established as a wholesaler and retailer, it integrated backwards, increasingly manufacturing the products it sold such as millinery, mantles, dresses and trousers.

As noted in Chapter Three, many of those employed in these areas during the nineteenth century were skilled and highly paid individuals who had been apprenticed in England,

Wales or Scotland. Both men and women with specialist skills in areas such as millinery, mantles and tailoring were often hired through

134 David Jones & Co.'s London Office. If a suitable arrangement was reached, the employees would sail from London to Sydney for several years employment with David

Jones & Co.2 For tailoring and cutting for men, and millinery and dressmaking for women, were potentially lucrative endeavours. Frances notes that a few individual workers in these areas received exceptionally high wages through the 1870s and 1880s.3

David Jones & Co's manufacturing operations grew considerably during the last four decades of the nineteenth century. M illinery and mantles were established in the 1860s and 1870s, and dressmaking, tailoring and upholstery were established in the 1880s.4

Recollections from the mid-1870s placed the number of David Jones & Co. staff between

200 and 300, and much of the growth in employment during the last quarter of the nineteenth century appears to have been manufacturing staff.5 By the opening of the new building on George and Barrack Street in 1887, staff numbers were around 400, a sizeable portion of this growth coming from an expansion in manufacturing.6

Considerable numbers were employed in the manufacturing areas of the firm by the

1890s. By the time of the tailors’ strike in 1891, David Jones & Co. was employing between 80 and 90 tailors, nearly one-fifth of the entire complement of David Jones staff.7

2 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA, PRG 1/7A; Letters of Appointment, DJA, PRG 1/8. 3 Frances, R. (1993). The Politics of Work. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 25. 4 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, DJA, PRG 1/7A; Letters of Appointment, DJA, BRG 1/8. 5 Youdale’s Personal Recollections, DJA, BRG 1/577; H.D. Williams Between Ourselves 1(5) May 1919 p.8, DJA, BRG 1/463. 6 Ibid. 7 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 8 February 1892, p.2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 135 Some of this manufacturing took place on site at the George and Barrack Street locale.

Workrooms were in areas segregated from the selling areas; either in "the back" behind partitions or else on the upper floors. Some of the manufacturing operations took place in workrooms established off-site, nearby on Clarence and York Streets in Sydney.8

Much of this manufacturing was aimed at "the higher class of trade", on which David

Jones & Co. prided itself. In selling, customers were given personal attention. The salesperson was in many instances also the skilled artisan. They would closely consult with the customer about the design and the materials to ensure a stylish and attractive ensemble, would measure the client to ensure the perfect fit, then cut and assemble the final product.9

Once the customer agreed to the style, design and materials used, the product would be made, often by hand, to those specifications. Production by hand was perceived in the

1880s and 1890s as the sign of superior work. In his evidence before the 1891 NSW

Royal Commission on Strike, Peter Strong, President of the Tailoresses' Union noted quite clearly that "there is no machine work done in a first-class shop".10 For those from

Sydney's growing urban middle-class, only hand-sewn garments would do; machine- produced goods were still perceived as being of lower quality.11 At David Jones & Co. on the eve of the 1891-2 tailors’ strike, rows of

8 Board Minutes, 5 May 1911, DJA, BRG 1/32/1, p.251. 9 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work, 25. 10 Report of the NSW Royal Commission on Strikes (1891), Parliamentary Papers of NSW 23-A, 14 May 1891, p.395. 11 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work, 25. 136 skilled male tailors still sat on their work tables or on the floor in crowded work rooms, wielding needle and thread in the making of coats and trousers as had been the case for years. As well they did pressing while seated "with a small board held in place with one foot and the other knee".12 Similarly, skilled female milliners and dressmakers worked with their hands, sewing and attaching materials together to the customer’s specification.13

This system of craft production for clothing came under increasing pressure throughout the nineteenth century. Ellem and Frances note the rise of mass production techniques, the introduction of machine operatives, and the expansion of "sweated labour" in the

Australian clothing industry in the late nineteenth century. The Singer sewing machine was the key technological innovation, permitting basic sewing functions, once done through hand sewing, to be done by machine. While certain aspects of tailoring, such as finishing work, still had to be done by hand and only certain firms could afford to do so, the introduction of sewing machines permitted a quick and cheap alternative to the basic hand sewing of dresses, shirts, coats and trousers.14

The introduction of sewing machines was generally accompanied by the hiring of female operatives. Economic, political and social circumstances were such that female operatives received substantially lower wages, despite their attempts to organise collectively for improved wages and working conditions.15 Peter Strong

12 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 1 May 1891, p.3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1; T.O. Hansen Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, 19 May 1936, DJA, MacNeill Papers. 13 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work. 14 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work; Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?. 15 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work; Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?. 137 noted in 1891 that the average tailoress in Sydney made 25 shillings a week while the average male tailor made 42 shillings a week.16

These changes within the clothing industry did not go unnoticed in David Jones & Co.

While still relying upon craft production methods up to the early 1890s, David Jones &

Co. was one of Sydney's largest clothing manufacturers.17 The partners of David Jones

& Co. identified “M achine shops” as a threat on the eve of the Tailors’ Strike. In his letter to Edward Lloyd Jones, William Newman noted that giving in to the demands of tailors would drive work to "the machine shops".18 If developments in Melbourne were any indication, it was large manufacturers that also retailed or wholesaled, such as Foy &

Gibson, who found the shift towards machine work and a factory system most attractive.19 This was despite the fact that, according to Peter Strong, the "majority of employers, object(ed) to machine work, not as good as hand work"20

There were also product demand considerations that were placing pressure on elements of craft production at David Jones. On the one hand, mass production became increasingly attractive for David Jones & Co. as cost-conscious middle-class customers demanded cheaper products at a reasonable price. As well, large government contracts, for instance, were attractive sources of mass produced clothing. The colonial government of New South Wales was a potential customer

16 Report of the NSW Royal Commission on Strikes (1891), Parliamentary Papers of NSW 23-A, 14 May 1891, p.393. 17 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?. 18 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 19 October 1891, p.6, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 19 Frances (1993), The Politics of Work, 30. 20 Report of the NSW Royal Commission on Strikes (1891), Parliamentary Papers of NSW 23-A, 14 May 1891, p.398. 138 for the provision of clothing to the militia and police. Firms such as David Jones & Co. tendered for such lucrative contracts. It appears that the demand of the New South

Wales Government for clothing made the consideration of mass production more attractive and viable in the small market of colonial New South Wales.21

Another demand side pressure came from the very upper end of the market, to which

David Jones & Co. had catered. It was becoming harder to satisfy as competition intensified. William Newman in 1891 noted that the "higher classes" of Sydney were increasingly going to an elite of private dressmakers and tailors and were avoiding larger established shops such as David Jones & Co. "We have observed it in both for several years", noted Mr. Newman, "the counteracting power is in good stocks, first class ability and perhaps some more moderate charges".22 For William Newman, the time had come for David Jones & Co. to consider repositioning itself. This changing set of product market conditions and the increasing availability of new production technologies combined with the Depression of 1891 to create an ominous backdrop at David Jones &

Co against which the 1891-92 Tailors’ Strike was played out.

The Depression of 1891-92 was one of the most dramatic downturns in the history of the Australian economy. It was also a period of intense labour militancy.23 This militancy spread to areas such as the clothing industry. The Pressers’ Union struck earlier in 1891 for improved piece rates. Their strike ended in victory for the

21 Journal of Edward Lloyd Jones, 1862, p.11, DJA, PRG 1/7A; Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 2 December 1891, p.4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 22 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 28 December 1891, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 23 Kingston, B. (1988). The Oxford History of Australia, Vol. 3 1860-1900. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 139 pressers, who saw their piece rate rise from £ 2 /10 to £ 3.24 As well tailors struck at

Collins and Perry & Core in Sydney before mid-1891 over issues such as wage cuts and putting out work.25

It appears that the victory of the Pressers inspired the Tailors to strike also. However, two factors were working against them. First, pressers were perceived as the skilled male elite in the clothing industry with highly sought after skills.26 This was unlike the position of tailors who were being threatened in the late nineteenth century by machine work.

Second, the economic situation had deteriorated dramatically in the period between the two strikes. The collapse of the building and land societies in September 1891 had dragged the sliding economy from recession into depression.27 In his letter from the day following the commencement of the Tailors’ Strike, 1 November 1891, William Newman noted, "We cannot remember a similar collapse of the trade, the counters during some days appear quite deserted".28 These circumstances and the dogged determination and solidarity among employers like David Jones & Co to break the strike, ultimately doomed the tailors’ cause.

The main point of dispute between the employers and tailors was the existing piece rate.

Mr. Newman noted, "The devil strike is now among the tailors and there is the possibility of our men being called out - this is consequence upon our refusing, with

24 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 50-51. 25 Report of the NSW Royal Commission on Strikes (1891), Parliamentary Papers of NSW 23-A, 14 May 1891, p.395-6. 26 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 50. 27 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 28 September 1891, pp.1-2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1.

140 others, to accept a New Time Statement which increases the price for making trousers

40% and on coats about 20%".29 M r. Newman realised that the 40% increase on the piece rate for a pair of trousers (from 10/- to 14/-) was an ambit claim, but he believed that the tailors were hoping for a compromise of a 20% increase on trousers (from 10/- to

12/-).30 However, a letter by John Thompson at the same time noted that "Mr.

Newman always writes to you in a very optimistic strain. Things present themselves to me, as an outsider, not so rosily as to him."31

Increased costs were at the heart of the employers’ resistance, despite public pronouncements to the press that "freedom of contract" was the employers’ main concern.32 "We are firmly resisting the demand on the ground that the prices at present paid will enable competent men to earn splendid wages", wrote William Newman to

Edward Lloyd Jones on the eve of the strike.33 For David Jones & Co. increased costs would mean higher prices, ultimately jeopardising the growing lower middle-class clientele. "Compliance (to the tailors’ demands)" noted Mr. Newman, "means that we charge the same as Holle & M illett". And M r. Newman felt that "government officials and clerks were not in position to pay 38/6 for a pair of tweed trousers at David Jones &

Co.".34

As the strike commenced on 31 October 1891, employers, including David Jones, Farmer

& Co., Peapes, Holle & Millett, Smith, Bond and Chorley "plus three or four

28 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 1 November1891, p. 2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 29 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 19 October 1891, p.6, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 30 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 4 December 1891, p.9, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 31 Letter from John Thompson to Edward Lloyd Jones , 21 December 1891, p.8, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 32 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 51. 33 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 19 October 1891, p.6, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 34 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 1 November1891, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 141 others" maintained a solid front resisting the claim.35 This "bold, kind, united and determined front" was, from Mr. Newman's view, a key to defeating the strike.36 While the employers agreed to conferences with the tailors in the strike's first few weeks, by

December, M r. Newman "doubt(ed) that any of the Employers will even consent to a conference with the men. The Employers are so disgusted...".37 He also noted that the united resistance of the employers brought about "a more moderate tone" amongst the tailors.38

While the piece rate paid on trousers was the key issue for M r. Newman, the battle waged in the media took on a more political tone. Mr. Newman took on a high profile role during the strike. In the media, he adopted the rhetoric of the pastoralists that the issue at hand was "freedom of contract".39 Indeed Mr. Newman felt that the newspaper coverage of the strike provided David Jones & Co's tailoring department with

"magnificent advertising" that would more than compensate for the losses during the strike.40

While Mr. Newman expressed concern throughout the course of the Tailors’ Strike, it appears that David Jones & Co. survived quite well despite the horrific conditions of the

Depression. However, Mr. Newman did note to Edward Lloyd Jones that the strike had done harm to the December 1891 results.41

35 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 16 November1891, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 36 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 16 November1891, p. 2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 37 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 4 December 1891, p.9, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 38 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 16 November1891, p. 2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 39 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 51. 40 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 21 December 1891, pp.3-4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 41 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 21 December 1891, p.4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 142 David Jones & Co. responded to the strike in a variety of ways. In the first instance, considerable work was sent to outworkers "as far as Blacktown", a community located

30 kilometers from central Sydney. Mr. Newman noted that the product was "turned out quite satisfactorily".42

The other, and more profound, response to the strike was the total reorganisation of the tailoring department through the introduction of sewing machines, and hiring of female operatives.43 M r. Newman did note early in the dispute that "if wisely dealt with may prove a blessing".44 He went on to elaborate that "the strike will probably lead to a reconstruction of the working of the Tailoring department and the introduction of machine work on an extensive scale".45

By early December 1891, Mr. Newman was confident that the introduction of machine work was the best course of action. "I find on careful inquiry", he noted describing the benefits of machine sewing over hand sewing to Edward Lloyd Jones, "that these garments (trousers) can be produced splendidly, made at a cost of from 5/- to 6/-."46

This was about half the cost for hand-sewn trousers. A portion of the tailoring room was partitioned off for the women and the sewing machines, a new skylight was installed, and a new platform built "for the mens room so that when they return there will be plenty of room for the coat makers". However, this meant "no men trouser hands being required".47

42 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 16 November1891, p. 3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 43 T.O. Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, 19 May 1936, DJA, MacNeill Papers. 44 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 1 November1891, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 45 Ibid. 46 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 4 December 1891, p.9, DJA, BRG 1/24/1.

143 While attempting to portray the benefits of machine work positively to Edward Lloyd

Jones, William Newman was well aware that this represented a drastic shift for the firm, by abandoning the upper end of its men's clothing trade which was increasingly under pressure. "You know as a matter of fact I have striven to maintain the legitimate hand made trade but now I am forced to abandon it," he regretfully wrote to Edward. "I shall throw my best energies into perfecting a system which will enable us to do the trouser trade well and ask a much lower price".48

By mid-December 1891, about six weeks into the strike, David Jones & Co. began its introduction of sewing machines and began hiring female operators in the tailoring department, primarily for the assembly of trousers. Mr. Newman noted that "the new machine room is answering well - the first week 38 pairs of trousers were turned out most satisfactorily at the cost of 6/3 per pair."49 Within a few weeks, the cost per pair of trousers had been reduced to 6/-.50

Mr. Newman was not merely impressed by the cost of machine-made trousers, but also by their quality. "They cannot be told from handmade garments", he proudly declared on the 11th of January.51 Within a week, he was convinced that the decision to introduce machine work and female operatives into tailor production had been correct, noting "The garments are made much better by the women than the men".52

47 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 11 January 1892, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 48 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 4 December 1891, p.9, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 49 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 28 December 1891, pp.4-5, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 50 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 11 January 1892, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 51 Ibid.

144 The male tailors on strike protested loudly about the employment of female machine workers at David Jones.53 The Tailors’ Union demanded that the female machine workers be dismissed at the end of the strike. These threats, which made the female workers "shy" about working at David Jones, originally prevented a full complement of machine workers joining David Jones when machine work began in December 1891.54

By mid-January 1892, with the strike dragging on and the employers holding fast, Mr.

Newman declared that "our machine room is a thorough success".55 M r. Newman stated several times in his letters that the tailors’ strike presented David Jones & Co. with an unexpected opportunity to introduce machine work and female operatives.56 "If we had attempted to accomplish these changes under other circumstances they would have caused a strike against ourselves only," noted Mr. Newman.57

Besides the industrial disputes over the piece rates for trousers, the Tailors’ Strike took on an increasingly political dimension for Mr. Newman. The strike appears to have raised his political consciousness, as he reinterpreted the dispute from another industrial skirmish into something that was part of the far more significant industrial and political battle being played out in New South Wales. "The labour party and the strikes of last year are mainly responsible for the present depression. It is clearly the

52 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 18 January 1892, p.3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 53 Reekie, G. (1993). “ The sexual politics of selling and shopping”, in S. Magarey, S. Rowley and S. Sheridan (eds.), Debutante Nation: Feminism contests the 1890s. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 64. 54 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 28 December 1891, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 55 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 11 January 1892, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 56 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 21 December 1891, p.4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 57 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 11 January 1892, p.7, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 145 duty of employers to keep this element in its place," M r. Newman gravely noted in his letter of 28th of December at the height of the Tailors’ Strike.58

Mr. Newman's politicisation can be noted as the strike wore on. His initial analysis of the poor economic conditions in early 1891 within the colony was the poor weather and an outbreak of influenza. However, as noted above, his blame was soon directed at the newly established Parliamentary Labor Party and the trade unions.

By mid-January, Mr. Newman declared that "the tailors’ strike has not been declared off yet, theoretically it is still alive, but practically it is dead - they are badly beaten and thoroughly deserve it". Yet despite the defeat, Mr. Newman noted certain advantages of holding out further, hoping to get the machine operation up to full capacity. "In another fortnight we hope to be quite independent of the strikers and then no more thraldom", he noted triumphantly.59

The Tailors’ Strike dragged on for 13 weeks, up until February 1892. David Jones & Co. began to engage some of the former strikers. "During the past few weeks", Mr. Newman wrote on 8 February 1892, "we have taken on about 30 of the best workers. When they went out we were employing about eighty or ninety.... Our trousers are now all made by women". This rehiring of some staff was magnanimous compared to what happened elsewhere. "From personal enquiry we find that all the other shops together have not reengaged more than thirty".60

58 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 28 December 1891, p.4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 59 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 18 January 1892, p.3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 60 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 8 February 1892, p.2, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 146 The crushing defeat at the depth of the Depression led to humiliation, despair and poverty amongst the tailors. "(N)ow the strike is over, two thirds of the men are still out of employment, most of whom are in a wretched state of poverty and distress."

This state of affairs turned M r. Newman from triumph to sympathy. "We had an idea of getting up a subscription for those in distress but the Associated Employers would not listen to the suggestion - the Administration of the funding this particular case would be very difficult".61

For David Jones & Co., the strike proved to be an overwhelming success. Trouser production was successfully reorganised with the introduction of machine work and female operatives. The tailors themselves were far less militant and confrontational by the end of the dispute, striking a positive change in attitude. "The jaunty self confident and even insolent attitude which at first they (the tailors) manifested has given place to a more solicitous and respectful bearing", noted Mr. Newman near the end of the strike.

"(T)o be rid of the former is like getting out of a close stifling atmosphere into the clear bracing air".62 Lastly, the tailors’ strike proved to be a positive marketing tool, advertising the firm's tailoring operation through Sydney's media, with the employers receiving positive support in the Sydney Morning Herald, owned by the Fairfax family, and the Telegraph.63 On 21 December 1891, for instance, Mr. Newman noted, "It is admitted on all hands that our Tailoring

61 Ibid. 62 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 18 January 1892, p.3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 63 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 1 November 1891, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 147 department has had magnificent advertising and we shall abundantly compensate for the present loss".64

For David Jones & Co. the primary reason for resisting the Tailors’ claim was simply a fear that increased labour costs would mean trade lost to competitors. The male lower middle-class trade, which was becoming increasingly important, would be lost if trouser prices rose. Indeed, the decision to abandon hand sewing was also part of a deliberate strategy by David Jones & Co. to abandon the difficult to hold trade of the "higher classes" and to embrace the emerging middle-class trade.

In analysing the success of the employers, M r. Newman noted on several occasions that the maintenance of a common front among the employers ultimately defeated the strikers. Similarly the depressed economic conditions, the less strategic position of the tailors as opposed to the pressers, and, importantly, the ability of employers such as

David Jones & Co. to introduce sewing machines and female operatives to replace male tailors all saw the strike end in the utter defeat of the tailors.

The political context was also an important consideration for David Jones & Co.'s mounting resistance to the demands of the tailors. For Mr. Newman the Tailors’ Strike evolved from a dispute about piece rates for trousers to a skirmish in what appeared to be a broader conflict between the employing and employed classes in the colony. By standing up to the tailors, David Jones & Co. acted in the interests of all employers to stand firm against demands from employees and their organisations, indeed to save the colony from ominous political developments.

64 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 21 December 1891, p. 3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 148

Mr. Newman's role within the dispute appears to have been that of a key spokesperson of not only David Jones & Co. but for the "associated employers".65 He also presented himself as a key decision-maker in the move to oppose the tailors’ demands and to institute the machine work. Mr. Newman's role was not without him being on the receiving end of the strikers' disdain, noting that he had "been roundly abused by the men at their meetings".66

While the tailors who lost their livelihoods were the main victims of the strike, it also took its toll on management including Mr. Newman. On 7 November 1892, nine months after the end of the Tailors’ Strike, John Pomeroy, another partner of the firm, wrote to

Edward Lloyd Jones of Mr. Newman's state:

You will be sorry to learn that M r. Newman is far from well, for the last six weeks or two months he has suffered very considerably in his head. Mrs. Newman having written to you will doubtless be describing his symptoms. I think the Tailors’ Strike, the gradual shrinkage of business, the many disappointments connected with our accounts, has had the effect of depressing him and causing a little brain pressure, he has had Medical advice and urged to withdraw from all study theological, political and social... Apparently he seems robust and equal to his old energy but now and then he has the look of despondency upon his face.67

Mr. Newman passed away several months later. The differing responses the partners of

David Jones made to the agitations of the shop assistants for reduced working hours and the tailors for increased piece rates bring into question the existence of a truly magnanimous paternalism. At best, the firm’s managers displayed a highly conditional paternalism, strictly bound by commercial goals.

65 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 51. 66 Letter from William Newman to Edward Lloyd Jones, 16 November 1891, p. 3, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 67 Letter from John Pomeroy to Edward Lloyd Jones, 7 November 1892, p. 1, DJA, BRG 1/24/1. 149 Mr. Newman’s steadfast refusal to consider the tailors’ demands brings into question the magnanimous notion of paternalism. Mr. Newman’s concern over the fate of the tailors came well after the firm had effectively dismissed them. He did attempt to organise a fund to assist the out-of-work tailors but appears to have abandoned the idea when the other employers rejected it. There is no record of David Jones & Co. instituting such a measure on its own.

The differing approaches to the shop assistants and the increasingly manufacturing-only workers, may explain why welfarism was eventually adopted for shop assistants yet not employed for manufacturing staff.

The demands for early closing, for instance, won the support of David Jones & Co. because the introduction of such legislation clearly benefited city stores such as itself over suburban stores. By supporting early closing in the 1890s, David Jones & Co. was at no commercial disadvantage and was able to portray itself as a good employer to the wider community. This perception as a “good employer” would become increasingly important for a retailer such as David Jones & Co. that would come to rely upon its reputation among customers for its business.

On the other hand, the demands of the tailors were vehemently resisted because of the potentially dramatic commercial ramifications. David Jones & Co.’s partners, in particular, M r. Newman, believed that an increase in tailoring piece rates would see a loss of business to other shops. Similarly, the availability of new technology and alternative sources of labour which could produce similar goods much more cheaply

150 and with less militancy permitted the partners of David Jones & Co. to turn the strike into an opportunity rather than a threat.

However, in addition to the immediate commercial concerns that underlay the differing reactions to tailors and shop assistants, there also lay broader political considerations.

The non-confrontational and respectable shop assistants, increasingly isolated from other sections of the working-class, found allies among shopkeepers and middle-class reformers. By supporting them, firms such as David Jones raised their reputation among middle-class reformers who supported early closing, both as an issue in its own right and as a tactic to bring about desired changes in the regulation of alcohol. The Tailors’ Strike, however, was increasingly viewed through the lens of the industrial turmoil of the 1890s.

Senior managers at David Jones resisted the strike both because it adversely affected the immediate commercial objectives of the firm and because of what the strike stood for, a wider struggle to be resisted.

A further matter that highlights the respective legacy of each event is the manner in which each was recalled within the firm. Indeed, even into the 1930s, the legacy of the

Tailors’ Strike was recalled. In his speech on the David Jones Marlborough Street

Factory dated 19 May 1936, the Factory Manager T.O. Hansen noted the 1891 strike as having a "particular significance in the story of this Factory's growth, because it developed two progressive changes in organisation and manufacturing methods, namely the introduction of female labour and sewing machines”.68

151 However, other than in internal managerial discussions, the Tailors’ Strike receives no mention in the later-day “histories” of the firm. This is in stark contrast to the firm’s support for early closing that is mentioned in early twentieth century histories of the

Company as support for the existence of nineteenth century paternalism and twentieth century welfarism.69

The strike has a profound legacy, as noted by Mr. Hansen over 40 years after the event.

It swept away the male craft-based production of shirts, one of the firm’s main product lines, and replaced it with a mechanised process with female sewing machine operators.

As will be noted later chapters, it was among the manufacturing staff at David Jones where the higher proportion of feminisation took place. However, manufacturing staff were the least likely to receive the benefits of welfarism, most of which were directed to sales staff. Unlike sales staff, manufacturing staff were not in the public view, counted little for the firm’s public image and had a far more structured labour process.

This dynamic, where manufacturing experienced the bulk of workforce feminisation, yet the retailing side received the benefits of welfarism, brings into question the explanation of welfarism at David Jones & Co. based upon workforce feminisation. Indeed the benefits of twentieth century welfarism were to be the preserve of retail staff, for a variety of reasons that will be explored in later chapters.

68 T.O. Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936. 69 Harris, H. (1938). “ 100 Years Old Today, The Story of David Jones Limited”. Rydge’s, 1 May 1938, p. 334-6.

152 CHAPTER S IX

Early Welfarist Experiments at David Jones Ltd., 1900 – 1914

The Tailor’s Strike severely weakened one of the few pockets of craft unionism at David

Jones. The introduction of machine work and female operatives brought about a new approach to manufacturing that would effectively modernise the firm. On the one hand, the firm would embrace the use of modern production techniques as it increasingly became a major clothing manufacturer in its own right. This would facilitate the growth of the retail side as it increasingly sold less expensive, mass–produced items to a considerably wider market. The move to mass production would also sever the old links between craft production and selling that influenced the types of assistants that were hired during much of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, rather than skilled craftspeople who both made and sold certain items, the shop assistant who only sold the product, would emerge. By the end of World War I, the firm had embraced strategies of welfarism and systematic labour management particularly amongst the selling staff. This adoption of a consent-based approach at David Jones Ltd. was driven by a new generation of managers, and was informed by external challenges and new, often overseas derived management experiments and ideas.

Between 1906 and 1914, the foundation of this more systematic and welfarist approach to labour management began to emerge at David Jones Ltd. Commissions, leave provisions and lunch rooms were all implemented. The first dabbling in formal in-house training began together with serious consideration of many welfarist

153 initiatives that were implemented during and immediately after the end of World War I.

These initiatives were the product of a new generation of senior managers, most notably

Charles Lloyd Jones (1878-1958), who sought to respond to a range of new challenges including concerns over employee loyalty and turnover, as well as external threats from the state and trade unions.1

While a more considered and strategic welfarism did not emerge until later, between 1906 to 1914, the firm engaged in a series of often short-term labour management experiments.

Few survived but more than a year or two, some initiatives, such as paid sick and annual leave as well as the matron, acted as the foundation for the Company’s later welfarism.

Economic, Political and Social Context

The first two decades of the twentieth century saw considerable change within Australia.

Sydney, for instance, experienced enormous growth, doubling its population from

496,000 in 1901 to one million in 1922.2 Prior to World War I, economic growth between 1906 and the commencement of World War I was at nearly 4 per cent per annum, a rate that would not be replicated until the 1950s. This period also saw a dramatic expansion and consolidation of government intervention in the economy, including consolidation of the system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration and/or wages boards at both the State and Commonwealth levels and the protection of primary and secondary industry through tariffs and duties. In

1 Reekie, G. (1989). “ The Shop Assistants case of 1907 and labour relations in Sydney’s retail industry”, in R Mitchell and S. Macintyre (eds.), Foundations of Arbitration. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 269- 290. 2 Macintyre, S. (1988). The Oxford History of Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 28. 154 addition, government intervention accelerated in other areas; expanded access to primary and secondary education, introduction of payments for new mothers, seniors and invalids and increased regulation and direct intervention in sectors such as banking.3

David Jones Limited 1906

In 1906, the partnership of David Jones & Co. was dissolved and in its place arose

David Jones Limited, a limited liability company. Shares were issued to the previous partners and included the sons of the late Edward Lloyd Jones, Edward Lloyd Jones II and Charles Lloyd Jones. The senior partner throughout much of the 1890s, John G.

Thompson, also received a considerable number of shares as did his son, Percival Edgar

Thompson, and a brother-in law of the Jones’s, Frederick Percy Ford. All were appointed to the new Board of Directors with Edward II being appointed the first

Chairman of the Board and M anaging Director. Yet according to Charles, Edward II

"never took kindly to a business life" instead preferring to return to the family's rural properties.4 Board minutes would imply that John Thompson continued to play a major role in decision-making, as did the General Manager, Clarence Edwards.5

Edward Lloyd Jones II increasingly devoted his energies to cattle breeding, first at

Singleton then at the Tarcutta Station and became one of the most prominent cattle breeders in the State. Although, he remained on the Board until 1920, however he

3 Ibid., 99-113 4 Jones, C.L. (1955).“ The History of David Jones Limited”. Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 41(5).

155 spent less time in the active management of the firm after 1915.6 In addition, the death of John G. Thompson in 1909, who had been the key figure in the firm after the death of

Edward Lloyd Jones I, left the Board of Directors without experienced leadership.7

It was in this situation that Edward's middle son, Charles Lloyd Jones, emerged as the dominant figure in the firm. Charles was born on 28 May 1878 in Burwood, then a prestigious middle-class community in the inner-western suburbs of Sydney. An unremarkable academic career (in sharp contrast to the brilliance of the youngest son,

Phillip Sydney Jones, the noted surgeon), Charles displayed an early love of art, an interest he would continue throughout his life. As a young man, Charles studied with

Julian Ashton in Sydney and later at the Slade School of Fine Art in London. He was a competent but unremarkable painter, favouring impressionistic oil landscapes. Though painting would never be his main vocation, it was in his role as a major art patron where he made a mark in the art world, for instance as co-founder of the Art Gallery of NSW, and Art in Australia and Home Magazines, and patron to such notable painters as Sir

William Dobell.8

Failure to exhibit at the Royal Academy of Art in London led him to embrace a career in the family firm. He qualified as a tailor and cutter while in London and, on a return visit to Sydney in 1900, at age 22, was married to Winifred Ethelwyn.9 In 1902, at age 24,

Charles returned to Sydney permanently. He began working in the

5 Board Minutes, 1907-1912, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 6 “ Friend of All; The Late Mr. Edward Lloyd Jones", Sydney Morning Herald, 3 February 1934. 7 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 September 1909, p.6. 8 Thompson, R. (1983). “ Jones, Sir Charles Lloyd”, in B. Nairn and G. Serle (eds.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 9, 1891-1939. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 507-8.

156 manufacturing side of David Jones and Co. applying the skills that he had acquired in

London. In 1905 he was appointed advertising manager and was appointed a director when the company became a limited liability firm in 1906.10 Throughout the 1910s

Charles took on an increasingly prominent role on the Board of Directors and within the firm.11

By 1920, when Edward II resigned as a member of the Board of Directors, Charles became the key figure within the senior management of David Jones Ltd. Charles was both Managing Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors. Yet he also maintained a very active role in the management of the firm, with a keen interest in labour management. Ownership of the firm became increasingly concentrated, by 1919-1920 nearly two-thirds of the company stock was controlled by Charles and his immediate family.12

Charles' commercial success in public life belied a far more tumultuous personal life. He was married three times; widowed in his first marriage, his second marriage ending in a bitter and messy divorce, including public accusations of adultery.13

Charles was far from a two-dimensional patrician or grim authority figure. He was described in Valerie Lawson's biography of Sydney newspaper editor Connie Robertson as "modest, self-depreciating and approachable", as well as witty and

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Board Minutes 1907-1912, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 12 Board Minutes, 16 October 1919, DJA, BRG 1/32/3, p.86. 13 Lawson, V. (1990). Connie Sweetheart: The Story of Connie Robertson. Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 270-2. 157 cultured.14 Handsome, firm-chinned, and silver-haired at an early age, he looked the part of the department store mogul, though his sparkling eyes and easy smile hints far more at a self-proclaimed modern man of the early twentieth century than a stuffy nineteenth century autocrat. Charles, nonetheless, ruled David Jones Limited with a firm hand especially through the inter-war period when his power within the firm was at its zenith.

In the period from 1906, when the firm became a limited liability company, and the commencement of World War I in August 1914, the firm expanded vigorously. First was the addition of two stories to the George Street store in 1906 to accommodate expanded trade.15 At the same time, the firm expanded and modernised its manufacturing capacity.

A factory was established in 1908 on Clarence Street, Sydney to complement the

George Street workrooms. The Clarence Street Factory appears to have operated between 1908 and 1914. In 1908 it employed 335 people and had a total output of £

39,465.16

The Board agreed in 1908 to proceed with the building of a new factory.17 This culminated in the opening of the purpose-built M arlborough Street Factory in Surry

Hills, the garment making district several kilometers south of central Sydney, in May

1914. When opened, it was among the largest single workplaces in the Commonwealth.

Slightly under 700 people, "the majority of whom are girls"

14 Ibid., 269. 15 Harris, H. (1938) “ 100 Years Old Today; The Story of David Jones Limited”, Rydge’s, May 1938, p. 335. 16 Chairman's Address 23rd Annual General Meeting, 16 October 1929, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.158. 17 Board Minutes, 7 January 1908, p. 72, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 158 according to The Draper of Australasia, were initially employed at Marlborough Street.18

There was little that was not made at this "cathedral of industry";

the most exclusive model gowns to the boxes in which they are packed, and included knitted goods (made from Australian wool), coats, skirts and costumes of all kinds, mantles, blouses, tea gowns, bathing gowns, underclothing, collarettes, embroideries and fancy work of all kinds..tie making, shirt making, trunk and bag making, printing and box making.19

The construction of a new retail store to replace the increasingly crowded George Street premises was also decided upon prior to the beginning of World War I. References to a new store first appeared in 1911, when the Board directed Charles to investigate purchasing land for such a purpose.20 In early 1914, the firm purchased property at the cost of £ 80,000 at the northeast corner of Market and Castlereagh Streets in central

Sydney, which unfortunately proved to be too small to develop.21 It was not be until after the War that further land purchases enabled the construction of a new modern store on nearby Elizabeth Street, Sydney.

The decisions to expand retailing space in Sydney were driven by the Directors who increasingly realised that the firm's future lay in appealing to customers in Sydney rather than the country. In the Board meeting of 15 October 1908, the Directors agreed that the business should "particularly endeavour to capture a larger portion of town customers, and also alter the policy of the country trade by cutting off as far possible unprofitable business".22 Similarly the Directors made a commitment to

18 The Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1914, p.202. 19 Ibid. 20 Board Minutes, 5 May 1911, p.251, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 21 Board Minutes, 5 February 1914, p.355, DJA, BRG 1/32/1.; Jones (1955), “ The History”, 236. 22 Board Minutes, 15 October 1908, DJA, BRG 1/32/1, p.126. 159 "prevent the sale of any goods we cannot guarantee, and laying greater stress in our advertising on the quality rather than on the low price".23

By 1906, David Jones Ltd. employed approximately 800 employees, a considerable rise from the approximate 400 that had been employed in the early 1890s. This workforce was divided between 335 employees at the Clarence Street Factory (a figure from 1908) and 415 employees at the George Street store (a figure from 1907).24

Employment growth accompanied the feminisation of the David Jones workforce which had begun in the nineteenth century. Reekie notes from census data that women's share of drapery employment rose from 17 per cent in 1891 to over 50 per cent in 1911.25

Reekie notes the expansion of women's departments as explaining part of this growth.

However, the growth of women's employment on the manufacturing side appears to have been more dramatic, at least in the case of David Jones Ltd.

While a considerable portion of the pre-1890s manufacturing workforce were men (for instance, male tailors), the Tailors’ Strike of 1891 and the introduction of female labour and sewing machines, noted in the previous chapter, appears to have been an important turning point for the firm. The vast majority of manufacturing staff were women who were engaged in the manufacturing and assembly of clothing under

23 Ibid. 24 Chairman's Address 23rd Annual General Meeting, DJA, BRG 1/3/24, p.158; Figures for Arbitration Court – 1907, DJA, BRG 1/22/2, p.1-2. 25 Reekie (1993), “ The sexual politics”, 62. 160 factory conditions.26 Evidence suggests that this was also the case at Clarence Street well before the outbreak of World War I.27

On the other hand, the retailing side at David Jones Ltd. appears to have feminised far more gradually. Figures from 1907 indicate that 272 males were employed as shop assistants while only 143 females were employed at George Street.28 Even as late as

1938, 1087 men were employed at the three stores in selling positions compared with

2904 women.29 On the other hand, 1125 women and only 175 men were employed at the Marlborough Street factory at the same time.30

Indeed while feminisation was a general trend in both areas from the 1890s onwards, the data points to a more gradual, incremental feminisation on the retailing side. On the other hand, it appears that feminisation of the manufacturing side had been swift and dramatic, with only handful of men directly employed in manufacturing by the opening of

Marlborough Street factory in 1914. Not surprisingly though, men dominated the senior, managerial and specialist positions throughout the firm during this period. However women on the retailing side could see the possibility of promotion to buyer. In 1916, nine of the firm's 39 buyers were women.31

Reekie has argued that the feminisation of the workforce and the patriarchal views held by retail owners and managers informed the adoption of welfarism. 32

26 Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1914, p.202. 27 Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1914, p.202. 28 Figures for Arbitration Court – 1907, DJA, BRG 1/22/2, pp.1-2. 29 David Jones News, 6 July 1938, DJA, p.1. 30 Ibid. 31 MacCulloch, J. (1980). “ ’This store is our world’ Female shop assistants in Sydney to 1930”, in J. Roe (ed.), Twentieth Century Sydney: Studies in Urban and Social History. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 175. 32 Reekie (1987), “ The Shop Assistants Case”. 161 M acCulloch similarly has pointed to welfarism as a means of attracting female employees during difficult economic periods such as the First World War.33 Yet, the unevenness of workforce feminisation and its greater prevalence on the manufacturing side is an unmistakable dynamic at David Jones Ltd. The welfarist experiments of this period, and the more developed welfarism of later periods, were heavily focussed on the retailing staff. While growth and feminisation may have roughly coincided with certain changes in labour management practice, the primary materials point to other internal and external factors at work; notably, a new generation of senior management seeking to solve a suite of labour problems by the application of new overseas ideas. Indeed, most other

Sydney department stores, such as Farmer’s, had a much higher proportion of female employees, yet had far less developed welfarist practices.34

The "Labour Problem"

A significant reason underpinning many of the early welfarist experiments in the 1900 to

1914 period appears to be a desire to deal with the emerging "labour problem". These changes were also part of a broader rationalisation of the firm's operation which touched all parts of the firm as it became less "personality-driven" and more "system-driven"; less a speciality house and more of a trader for the masses.35

33 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 174-5. 34 Draper of Australasia, 27 January 1916, p.10. 35 The Future Policy of the Company Report of the Executive, 12 June 1916, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 162 The "labour problem" seized the imagination of managers in the Australian retailing sector up until World War I. For retail managers, the labour problem was multi-faceted;

The Draper of Australasia, a leading trade journal, became filled with anecdotes of major department stored staffed with inattentive and rude assistants, lacking in a basic knowledge of the goods they sold or what their customers would like.36 High levels of staff turnover were similarly identified as a problem.37 It also arose in concerns over labour shortages, fears of labour radicalism, and what appeared to be increasing levels of employee theft of both merchandise and money.38

The labour problem appears to have informed moves among retailers such as David

Jones Limited, towards systematic management and welfarism. David Jones Limited's new generation of managers, in particular Charles Lloyd Jones, would eagerly embrace many of the new techniques and technologies from America and Britain, which sought to resolve the labour problem.

At David Jones, employee theft and labour shortages appeared as aspects of the emerging labour problem after 1906 and intensifying during World War I, in particular during 1916. Employee theft was a serious matter at David Jones during this period. In one example, in 1908, a theft was reported from David Jones' George Street store of approximately £ 400 of merchandise (equal to several years’ salary for a junior).39 The initial investigation by the authorities proved futile. In February 1909, a former David

Jones employee was found on a steamer that had arrived in

36 Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1916, p.146 ; Draper of Australasia, 27 Sept 1916, p.283. 37 Draper of Australasia, 17 November 1916. 38 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 1916, p.12; Draper of Australasia 27 January 1916, p.3.

163 San Francisco with about £ 200 of the stolen merchandise. While the merchandise was recovered and returned to Sydney, the former David Jones employee eluded the local police on the wharves of San Francisco, only to disappear and never be heard from again by Australian authorities.40

The “labour problem” was to take many forms over the coming decades. During tight labour markets, this would involve staff shortages and high labour turnover. However the threat of employee theft and poor workplace performance would also be identified as problems that need to be addressed.

State Intervention

Turn of the century legislative reforms, such as the 1896 Factories and Shops Act, the

1899 Early Closing Act and, importantly, the 1900 New South Wales Industrial

Arbitration Act, also had a major impact on labour management at David Jones. during this period. The Factories and Shops Act, for instance, required shops in New South

Wales to provide seats for female shop assistants, and was primarily driven by middle- class concerns that constant standing would adversely affect the reproductive health of female assistants.41 Government inspectors, an important component of the Factories and Shops Act, proved effective in requiring David Jones to improve basic amenities for staff, particularly on the manufacturing side. The 20 January 1909 Board minutes note that the New South Wales Department of Labour and Industry, responsible for the

Factories and Shops Act, had notified David Jones Ltd.

39 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 1908, p.7. 40 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1909, p.5. 41 Pollon, F. (1989). Shopkeepers and Shoppers: A Social History of Retailing in New South Wales from 1788. Sydney: The Retail Traders' Association of NSW, 309. 164 that 17 additional lavatories be provided for the Clarence Street Workroom staff.42 This was carried out at a cost to the firm of a substantial £ 380.43

By 1907 wages for assistants were subject to a New South Wales industrial award. The actual impact of this is very hard to discern from the materials in the David Jones

Archive. There is the possibility that David Jones Ltd. used the opportunity of the introduction of award rates to actually cut the existing salaries and wages of some employees. M inutes from 3 December 1907, soon after the introduction of the award, ominously note “It was decided that reductions of the salaries and wages of the staff are to be put in force at the discretion of the Chairman (Edward Lloyd Jones II)”.44

However, the wages of many employees at David Jones Ltd. would have been below the

2 / 10 for males and the 1/7/6 for females.45 However, there is little wages data until

World War I period to determine what impact the award changes actually had.

The 8 March 1907 Board minutes note that Percy Thompson reported that the award case “is coming on and that if an award is made a common rule, we will be bound. We submitted certain replies be made on our behalf.”46 David Jones Ltd. did make an “in camera” submission of existing wage rates to the Arbitration Court. Yet this is the only reference to this hearing or the 1907 award in the Board minutes. Indeed, later evidence would confirm that, for the most part, David Jones Ltd. management rarely dealt with industrial relations matters itself, regularly referring such matters to

42 Board Minutes, 20 January 1909, p. 153, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 43 Board Minutes, 25 February 1909, p. 159, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 44 Board Minutes, 3 December 1907, p. 67, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 45 Ryan, E. (1984). Two-Thirds a Man: Women and Arbitration in New South Wales. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 63.

165 the employer association, namely the Master Retailers Association of New South Wales, or to the firm’s solicitors. For instance, when the Shop Assistants’ Union made a summons to David Jones for work performed on Anniversary Day in 1909, the matter was instantly referred off to the Solicitors, Read and Read.47 Directly negotiating over- award agreements with unions, which did happen during World War I, was a very rare occurrence at David Jones Ltd. and only affected manufacturing staff. The firm consistently expressed a desire to keep union involvement to a minimum. Charles would later express a personal dislike for trade unions on several occasions. The firm used the centralised and legalised nature of New South Wales’ industrial relations system to insulate itself from unions first through reliance on solicitors and sought employer associations to keep from even having to talk to union officials and later on welfarism to further “protect” the firm from union influence.

Labour Management and Early Welfarist Experiments at David Jones, 1906 - 1914

Charles Lloyd Jones was an important figure in modernising labour management at David

Jones Ltd., with most of the changes commencing from 1906 onwards. Over this period, the groundwork was being laid for the firm to begin the introduction of fully-fledged welfarism. In the first decade of the twentieth century, many of the harsh nineteenth century policies and practices still remained, such as fining or instant dismissal of staff for breaching store rules. As well, additional non-wage benefits for employees were few and overall staff management remained haphazard.

46 Board Minutes, 8 March 1907, p. 24, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 47 Board Minutes, 4 March 1909, p. 160, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 166 Yet some experiments were trialed at David Jones Ltd. in this period. Some such as training, bonuses, paid sick leave and annual leave, employee share purchase plans and physical amenities, eventually became part of the future strategy. Other initiatives such as an “employee bank” was trialed and abandoned, while a “provident (superannuation or pension) fund”, house discounts, and abandonment of the fine system were considered but not introduced until later.

Treatment of basic staff management issues such as recruitment, hiring and dismissal remained similar to the manner identified in earlier chapters, with senior management still involved in day-to-day decisions. Between 1906 and 1908, the Board considered matters such as placing advertisements for the Head of Furniture Department and responding to an application from a Mr. Haup from New Zealand (it was decided not to offer him a position but to cover his expenses to travel for an interview).48

As had been the case throughout much of the nineteenth century, the firm often went further afield than Sydney in search of skilled labour. This included the continuing use of the London office to recruit some labour, for instance on 2 July 1907, upon the recommendation of the General M anager, M r. Clarence Edwards, the Board agreed to engage a M r. Evans in the Carpet and Lino Section for £ 5 a week.49 Mr. Edwards was also very active in hiring labour from Melbourne. At the 27 May 1907 Board meeting, he reported that following his recent trip to Melbourne, a Mr. McRae was engaged as

“Hat Man” to begin on 24 June 1907 while a Miss Graham

48 Board Minutes, 26 July 1907, p. 46, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 26 August 1907, p. 50, DJA, BRG 1/32/1 49 Board Minutes, 2 July 1907, p. 43, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 167 was offered a position as a M illinery Saleswoman. However he was less successful in obtaining the services of a “Furniture Man”, despite seeing two candidates, “the first was good but not available, the second he could not recommend”. Finding Millinery

Workers was similarly frustrating for M r. Edwards. “Very unsatisfactory. Only able to secure 2 and a possible 2 more,” he reported to the Board.50

Hiring senior and skilled staff remained with the Board and the General M anager, M r.

Edwards. However, hiring more junior staff was haphazardly devolved throughout the organisation. In 1908, the Sub-Manager, Mr. A. H. Giles (who became the first Staff

Manager in 1919) had responsibility for staff including “Engagement of Boys under 10/- and cleaning staff”. M r. E Whitelaw was Pay Clerk for the workroom staff and

Timekeeper for the whole staff. M r. Whitelaw was also responsible for the engagement of the workroom staff and, by early 1909, was also Manager of the Clarence Street

Workrooms.51 M r. Whitelaw appeared to be an enthusiastic supporter of welfarism, though a bit ahead of his time. His unrecorded recommendations for the Sick Pay Fund were rejected by the Board in 1911 as was his recommendation for a “Provident Fund” for retired staff.52 It was not until 1935 that David Jones established a superannuation

(or staff pension) fund.53

The direction over the Departmental Assistants was a vexatious question. As noted by

Benson, there was a considerable struggle between the Floorwalkers,

50 Board Minutes, 25 May 1907, p. 39, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 51 Board Minutes, 23 July 1908, p. 111-1, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 4 March 1909, p. 161, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 52 Board Minutes, 3 August 1911, p. 256, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 28 November 1911, p. 269, DJA, BRG 1/32/1.

168 Departmental Heads/Buyers and General Management over who was ultimately responsible for supervision of selling staff. As fining diminished and more enlightened forms of labour management were introduced in the early twentieth century, Benson noted that first the all-powerful floorwalkers were eclipsed by departmental heads/buyers and then systematic management reduced the power of the departmental heads/ buyers in favour of general managers and specialist staff managers.54

Until the appointment of the Staff Manager in 1919, the supervision of selling staff at the George Street store remained a fluid issue at David Jones Ltd. However, the power of floorwalkers likely declined in the early decades of the century as fining was eventually abolished and more subtle forms of staff surveillance such as cash registers and store detectives were introduced. In 1909 the Board decided that “general selling departmental assistants” be controlled by Mr. Edwards, the General Manager.55 In addition, Mr.

Townsend was given the responsibility of “controlling the boys of the house” for which he received £ 26 per annum.56 It appears that a concession was given to departmental managers in 1912 when they were given the authority to indenture apprentices on behalf of the Company, a practice that was not very common.57

Some harsh and haphazard characteristics of nineteenth century labour management remained. Instant dismissal for not abiding by certain rules remained. The 10

53 Board Minutes, 20 March 1935, p. 453, DJA, BRG 1/32/4. 54 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 55 Board Minutes, 22 April 1909, p. 172, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 56 Board Minutes, 25 June 1909, p. 179, DJA, BRG 1/32/1.

169 December 1908 Board Minutes noted that “a further circular be sent out to the employees intimating that failure to carry out the rules of the house particularly in regard to credits and the use of special red carriers will lead to instant dismissal”.58 The notorious fine system, whereby the employer could fine employees for even minor breaches of house rules, continued throughout this period. However, by 1907, the Board appeared to be considering rescinding the fine system, though it was not carried through until 1916.59 Harsh requirements of engagement also continued. Despite senior and skilled staff being engaged for fixed terms, the Board noted in M arch 1907 that

“assistants be engaged upon the understanding that one day’s notice on either side be accepted”.60

This authoritarian and unsystematic approach to labour management saw the Board, which was still involved in selection and recruitment matters, directly involved in determining staff responsibilities and sacking staff. A M adame Faveau (who, given her substantial salary, was likely a senior dressmaker or milliner), for instance, was requested by the Board in 1907 “to gradually drop the business of engaging domestics for country clients”.61 The 18 February 1907 Board minutes note “Mr. C L Jones recommended that

Mr. Birch be requested to retire from his position on the mail order staff at 25th

February; requested to take one week’s holiday and one week’s notice, which was agreed to.”62

57 Board Minutes, 11 June 1912, p. 296, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 58 Board Minutes, 10 December 1908, p. 140, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 59 Board Minutes, 28 January 1907, p. 14, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 60 Board Minutes, 26 March 1907, p. 27, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 61 Board Minutes, 26 March 1907, p. 27, DJA BRG 1/32/1. 62 Board Minutes, 18 February 1907, p. 19, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 170 The Board also became involved in negotiating remuneration for certain individual staff members. Once again, M adame Faveau stands as our example. The Board minutes of 2

January 1907 note that she was approached with an annual salary of £ 300 “being mentioned”.63 However on 28 January “it was decided to offer Madame Faveau a salary of £ 350 per year for a one year agreement.”64 One week later on 2 February 1907, the

Board minutes noted “M r. C L Jones reported that M adame Faveau had accepted our offer of £ 350 per annum”.65 However, as noted above, Madame Faveau was somewhat of a problem employee. Throughout late 1908 and into 1909, the retention of her services was a matter for Board discussion.66 By early 1909, Charles Lloyd Jones himself was involved in renegotiating her salary down from £ 350 per annum to £ 300, a reduction she accepted.67

The salaries for senior and skilled staff continued to be individually negotiated as they had been in the nineteenth century, despite the introduction of the 1907 Shop Assistants

Award. There continued to be a massive disparity in the wages paid to staff. This runs counter to the accepted wisdom that Australian wages have been historically compressed due to state intervention and a small, tight labour market. The table below notes the weekly wages paid to staff, a document produced as “in camera” evidence presented to the 1907 Shop Assistants arbitration case.

63 Board Minutes, 2 January 1907, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 64 Board Minutes, 28 January 1907, p. 13, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 65 Board Minutes, 2 February 1907, p. 15, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 66 Board Minutes, 17 December 1908, p. 142, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 7 January 1909, p. 148, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 67 Board Minutes, 12 January 1909, p. 150, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 20 January 1909, p. 152, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 171 Table One: Weekly Salary of David Jones Employees, Male and Female, 1907

Weekly Salary Males Females Total receiving receiving wage wage 10 shillings or 66 40 106 less

10 to 20 42 36 78 shillings (under 1 pound)

22 to 40 71 52 123 shillings (1 to 2 pounds)

42 to 60 48 7 55 shillings (2 to 3 pounds)

65 to 80 28 2 30 shillings (3 to 4 pounds)

4 to 5 pounds 11 2 13

5 to 6 pounds 4 2 6

6 to 7 pounds - 1 1

7 to 8 pounds 1 - 1

8 to 9 pounds 1 1

9 to 12 pounds 1 - 1

TOTAL 272 143 415 Source: “Figures for Arbitration Court – 1907” DJA BRG 1/22/2.

This table presents an insight into the fragmented salary structure that had arisen at David Jones Ltd. by 1907. Despite having only 415 staff, the original table notes 16 “salary bands” at David Jones Ltd., effectively one band for every 25 employees. The table does not indicate separate salaries within each band, but evidence from Board minutes of a multiplicity of individual salary arrangements, points to a somewhat chaotic salary system.

172 There was a considerable spread of wages between the lowest and highest earners. And women generally earned less than men. Indeed the median male salary is between 22 and

30 shillings a week while the female median weekly wage is between 12 and 20 shillings.

This would note an overall wage gap, where, using the median, women might receive between 50% to 90% of the male wage. This fits well with the argument of many scholars that arbitration merely reinforced pre-existing wage gaps between men and women.68 However, the table also notes that many women received a substantial wage.

Indeed, two of the four highest wages paid were to women, one of whom was likely the aforementioned Madame Faveau.

On top of the chaotic salary system at David Jones Ltd., there existed a system of bonuses and commissions for senior and skilled staff. David Jones Ltd. introduced commissions as early as 1907. Commissions (also confusingly called bonuses) were paid to senior staff, predominantly departmental heads, when their department reached certain performance targets. The targets used in the first decade of the twentieth century confirm the acceptance of increased stock turnover and net sales rather than gross sales as the key indicator of retail success. Such commissions were part of the remuneration agreement of some Departmental Heads and included specific performance targets. For instance, in 1907 the salary of a Departmental Head, Miss Dunshea, was set at a salary of £ 300 plus a 2 ½ per cent commission on the net profit of her Department provided the turnover had increased by at least 20 per cent.69 Similarly another Department Head,

M r. Harper, received a 1 ½ per cent

68 Bennett, L. (1984). “ The Construction of Skill: Craft Unions, Women Workers and the Conciliation and Arbitration System”. Law in Context, 2, 118-132. 69 Board Minutes, 3 March 1907, p. 23, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 173 commission of net profit if his Departmental turnover shows an increase of 15 per cent and a 2 ½ per cent commission if it shows an increase of 20% or more.70

Despite the use of commissions, such practices remained difficult to administer in a way that maintained the perception of equity and fairness. The basis of commissions was altered on what seemed like an annual basis throughout the first few decades as certain formulae proved too costly or created undesirable anomalies. For instance, in May 1907 there was an attempt to standardise commissions for most Departmental Heads. Mr.

Thompson reported to the Board that commissions were to be determined as a

“percentage on increase in turnover subject to showing a satisfactory increased turnover and gross profit, calculated on the nett profit – which means gross profit less departmental salaries.”71 By September 1907, a new basis for departmental heads’ commissions was agreed to. It was a sliding scale where an annual commission of between £ 25 and £ 100 would be paid. The basis for determining the commission to a departmental head was a percentage of net profit (between ½ and 2 ½ per cent) tied to an increase in annual turnover between 10 per cent and 50 per cent.72 However, the Board maintained discretion to pay out the commission noting that it would only be paid

“where the Directors are satisfied with the rate of Gross Profit and with the percentage of Salaries to Turnover.”73 If a departmental head left the employ of the firm, the payment was “at the discretion of the Board”.74

70 Ibid. 71 Board Minutes, 27 May 1907, p. 38, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 72 Board Minutes, 13 September 1907, p. 54, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 174 The payment of the commissions for 1907-08 under this system produced some interesting results. A total of £541 was paid out to 13 department heads. The commissions ranged from £ 8 to £ 143 and nearly half of the commissions paid out were made to only two departmental heads; a £ 103 commission to Miss Haddon and a £ 143 commission to M iss Dunshea. M iss Dunshea’s performance was extraordinary gaining a commission that was close to 50 per cent of her annual salary of £ 300. In addition to her extraordinary commission, the Board decided to raise Miss Dunshea’s annual salary from £ 300 to £ 400.75

Depressed trading conditions in 1908 and the heavily skewed results under the old system saw a reworking of commissions for 1908-09. Rather than a sliding scale paid on net profit where an increase in turnover occurred, there was to be a flat ½ per cent commission paid on turnover where turnover exceeded the previous year by 10 per cent, a gross profit target was also met and a percentage of salaries to turnover did not exceed a target set by the Board.76

This would indicate that the first commission system likely saw some departmental heads boost turnover but partially by reducing prices and employing more staff / boosting salaries, things they would have had some control over, yet would have harmed profit levels. While turnover was the new goal, it would appear that it was ruthlessly sought out by some departmental heads at the expense of profit, something that would not have sat well with the Board of Directors.

75 Board Minutes, 26 August 1908, p. 118, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 76 Board Minutes, 11 September 1908, p. 122, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 175 Fewer commissions were paid out for 1908-09 under this new flat system, only £ 398 rather than £541 that was paid out the previous year.77 Commissions obviously proved to be more trouble than they were worth. Following the payment of the 1909 commission, it was decided “to discontinue the practice of paying bonuses to Heads of

Departments as from 1st August last and in lieu thereof the principle instituted of increasing the rate of salary proportionate with increased turnover, profits and stocks being maintained at a satisfactory proportion.”78 The reference to stock levels indicated that even the new flat system created the problem of departmental heads running thin inventories. However, performance-based remuneration such as commissions and bonuses were not finished at David Jones Ltd., they regularly reappeared in various guises, only to disappear with the same regularity.

Commissions for general selling staff do not appear to have been as common. However, in an effort to boost sales in departments where the firm traditionally had trading difficulties, such as Furniture, consideration was given, for instance, to a 5 per cent commission for employees who introduced business to the Furniture department.79

Another innovative measure was the decision to permit employees to purchase shares in

David Jones Limited. The matter was first considered as policy in 1907 while accepting a sum of £ 250 from an employee, Mr. J Hughes, for shares. 80 Discerning the motivation of the Board on this matter is somewhat difficult. Unlike some other issues introduced as part of welfarism after 1916, that were part of a

77 Board Minutes, 21 October 1909, p. 190, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 78 Board Minutes, 31 October 1909, p. 192, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 79 Board Minutes, 18 March 1909, p. 165, DJA, BRG 1/32/1.

176 deliberate strategy of generating employee consent, it appeared that other motivations may have been at work. One was the need for the firm to raise capital as it expanded.81

Employees appear to have been seen as a more trustworthy pool of potential shareholders than external investors. However no form of formal employee share ownership was formally introduced until 1913.82

The firm also had a policy for payment of sick leave and annual leave well before any such requirements existed in the relevant awards or legislation. By 1907, David Jones provided for all employees to have their wages reduced for absence and for them to be refunded upon application through a “Sick Fund”, an amount that appears to be half pay. Yet it appears that payment from the Sick Fund was not an automatic right conferred on employees, and like many other benefits created in this period, was subject to the discretion of the Board. For instance the 30 July Board M inutes note that the

Board “agreed to pay Mr. Buchanan £ 5 from the Sick Fund”, implying receipt of payment from the Sick Fund was a privilege not a right.83 As well, David Jones provided a fortnight’s paid annual leave.

By 1908, sick leave was capped at a maximum of 4 weeks pay for general staff, though special undescribed conditions existed for departmental heads.84 The paid sick and annual leave provisions were further tightened up in December 1908 so those employees needed 2 years’ service with the firm to be eligible.85 By 1910, eligibility for the paid

80 Board Minutes, 21 November 1907, p. 8, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 81 Board Minutes, 11 October 1912, p. 311, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 82 Board Minutes, 30 July 1913, p. 335, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 83 Board Minutes, 30 July 1909, p. 181, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 84 Board Minutes, 14 May 1908, p. 94, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 85 Board Minutes, 10 December 1908, p.140, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 177 fortnight of annual leave only required 1 rather than 2 years’ service.86 Though these benefits were temporarily suspended during the Depression of the early 1930s, the paid annual leave in particular was a major benefit, as it was not law in New South Wales until

1944.

In addition to the Sick Fund, an Accident Fund was established in 1907. The Board decided that the normal £ 100 made towards an accident insurance premium would instead go towards a special fund.87 However, the Board decided to take out an insurance policy in 1911 to meet its Workman’s Compensation requirements under the new Workman’s Compensation Act.88

In addition the firm increasingly formalised its financial assistance to the sporting and artistic activities of the staff. As noted in earlier chapters, a David Jones cricket team had existed since the 1860s. Yet there does not appear to have been any formal management support for such amateur sporting or cultural initiatives of the staff through the nineteenth century. By 1910, a Board decision was made to grant £ 250 towards an employee Sports Fund.89 A board of trustees appointed by the Board of Directors would administer the fund. The trustees of the Sports Fund included middle managers and senior staff. Mr. Giles, the Sub-Manager with some staff management responsibilities, was elected chair and the Pay Clerk, M r. Whitelaw, was chosen to be the Honorary Treasurer.90 Funding continued to the David Jones

86 Board Minutes, 12 December 1910, p. 240, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 87 Board Minutes, 4 September 1907, p. 51, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 88 Board Minutes, 17 January 1911, p. 241, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 89 Board Minutes, 12 December 1910, p. 240, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 90 Board Minutes, 1 February 1911, p. 243, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 178 Sports Fund and was extended to the David Jones Musical and Dramatic Society in

1912, with a subsidy to be at the discretion of Mr. Ford, one of the Directors.91

Charles Lloyd Jones also proposed several very overtly welfarist initiatives during this period. In 1907 he “pointed out the necessity of properly providing for Employees a

Luncheon Room”.92 The initial plan was for the lunchroom to be on the roof of the

George Street store but proved to be difficult given the nature of the lease. However by

1912, the firm had already introduced a staff lunch room with meals offered at cost.93 In addition to the lunchroom, by 1914, the firm had also introduced a Matron, who performed a nursing and counselling role that was designed “to look after the welfare of our girls” and free medical advice, both were initiatives of Charles.94

Another early welfarist initiatives, which was implemented but appeared to have a short life, was an “employee bank” recommended by a Mr. Morrison, a senior employee.95

Established in 1908, employees could deposit an amount up to £ 100 with David Jones and receive a 5% interest rate, calculated monthly.96 However, the long-term survival of the employee bank is doubtful with no further reference to it after 1909.

91 Board Minutes, 17 July 1912, p. 299, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 92 Board Minutes, 4 September 1907, p. 51, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 93 The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 1912, p.8. 94 The Future Policy of the Company, Report to the Executive 12 July 1916, DJA, BRG 1/32/2, p.104. 95 Board Minutes, 3 November 1908, p. 138, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 96 Ibid.; Board Minutes, 10 December 1908, p. 140, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 7 January 1909, p. 148, DJA BRG 1/32/1. 179 There was serious consideration of further changes such as the introduction of “house discounts” (namely discounted prices on David Jones merchandise for David Jones staff) and abolition of the dreaded fine system.97 However, it was not until 1916, and the more thorough welfarist reforms of later, that these policies were implemented.98

Interest in in-house training also began in the pre-World War I period at David Jones Ltd.

In May 1912, David Jones introduced bookkeeping classes, which were available to both male and female staff, free of charge. Window-dressing classes were also offered.

Plans were also made for one or two of the more promising juniors to be sent to England for two, three or four years to learn the trade.99 Yet it was not until the mid-1920s that training was fully established within the firm, and not until the mid-1930s that a significant training strategy was adopted.

Conclusion

The 1900-1914 period presented a new series of challenges to the control and discipline of the workforce. State and trade union intervention increased dramatically in this period, though the actual impact was modest, the potential for its acceleration was likely to concern the David Jones Ltd. management. As well, dealing with the labour problem, for instance, the rise in employee theft, were also likely to have informed the thinking of

David Jones Ltd. management.

97 Board Minutes, 28 January 1907, p. 14, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 15 April 1909, p. 169, DJA, BRG 1/32/1; Board Minutes, 10 February 1914, p. 357, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 98 The Future Policy of the Company, Report to the Executive 12 July 1916, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 180 However, much of the Company’s labour management remained unsystematic and under the control of the Board. It was not until the creation of a Staff Manager’s position after

World War I, that many of the previously chaotic labour management practices were systematised and consolidated.

There were many welfarist experiments, often championed by Charles Lloyd Jones, in the period prior to World War I, including paid leave, the provision of a matron and lunchrooms. However, there does not appear to be any coherent, deliberate strategy underpinning such initiatives. In this pre-1914 period, initiatives appear to be have been adopted as reactive “quick fixes”, as much driven by a growing concern over the new challenges presented by the state, trade unions and the labour problem.

These early welfarist experiments at David Jones blossomed into a more deliberate welfarism during the 1914-1920 period. New challenges in the post-1914 period included new political and industrial threats. In the post-1914 period, Charles Lloyd

Jones would gain authority within the firm and provide increasing leadership on welfarism at David Jones.

Indeed his notion of welfarism was an interesting desire to use modern methods to recreate a bygone, but mythical, familial past. Charles noted overseas developments and the new science of psychology and noted their possibilities in creating a different kind of workplace, one that brought together the best of the past and of the present. What had once been reactive and defensive was becoming more strategic.

99 “ The Modern Way”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 1912, p.8. 181 At the outset, the challenges of the state and trade unions, and indeed the wider ideological challenges informed welfarism. However, as welfarism matured at David

Jones throughout the 1920s and 1930s, it was increasingly informed by a sophisticated notion of the selling process and by a desire to market the firm to a wide audience.

182 CHAPTER S EVEN

Introduction of Welfarism and Systematic Labour Management at David Jones

Ltd., 1914-1926

“To cope with the complexities of today we need new traditions in place of old discarded ones” –

Charles Lloyd Jones

The First World War and the period immediately following the war saw the emergence of welfarism and systematic labour management at David Jones Ltd. During this period, the firm introduced a senior management position responsible for labour management matters; eliminated the fining of employees; adopted formal recruitment, selection and training procedures (and new technologies, such as cash registers); and introduced welfarist experiments which included a newsletter, a consultative committee and stock purchase plans for staff. This increasingly formal and coherent approach to labour management had emerged from the turmoil surrounding World War I. Heavily receptive to new American and British ideas about labour management, senior David Jones management under Charles Lloyd Jones chose to embrace many of these experiments.

While some of these changes proved short lived, many persisted to create a fundamentally new working environment at David Jones.

Economic, Social and Political Context

The entry of Australia into World War I in 1914 had a profound effect throughout

Australian society. Thousands of young Australians fought in Europe and the Middle

East, many never returning, and thousands of women entered paid

183 employment for the first time.1 The "ANZAC legend", in particular the tragedy at

Gallipoli, became interwoven with the emergent nationalism of the 1890s and Federation to produce a new Australian national identity which stressed egalitarianism and resilience.

The World War I created enormous economic turmoil, disrupting the growth of the earlier period and intensifying class and political conflict within Australia. Trade between

Australia and Great Britain was disrupted, and the small size and isolation of Australian industry limited its ability to expand through a war economy.2 Unlike the World War I where considerable expansion took place, World War I accompanied economic decline and stagnation.3 World War I similarly ushered in considerable labour shortages, with the enlistment of 300,000 prime age men, equivalent to 15 per cent of the labour force.4 The tight labour market coupled with the social disruption of war, the political challenge of left-wing radicalism and influx of new technologies and forms of work organisation created the circumstances for widespread industrial turmoil.5

Strike activity during the War peaked in 1917 with 5 million working days lost, nearly ten times the days lost to industrial action in 1913.6 While strikes tapered off in 1918, they surged again in 1919 and 1920. This level of industrial action was not experienced again in Australia until the mid-1940s.7

1 Macintyre, S. (1988). The Oxford History of Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 154. 2 Boehm, E. (1979). Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia. Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 21. 3 Boehm (1979), Twentieth Century Economic Development, 21; Patmore, G. (1991). Australian Labour History. Melbourne, Longman Chesire, 145. 4 Boehm (1979), Twentieth Century Economic Development, 21. 5 Patmore (1991), Australian Labour History, 148. 6 Macintyre (1988), Oxford University, 194 7 Jackson, M. (1987). Strikes: Industrial Conflict in Britain, USA and Australia. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 31. 184 The post-1914 period ushered in a period of experimentation in the area of labour management for Australian employers. The experiment which has since attracted the most attention was the "scientific management" of American engineer Frederick W.

Taylor.8 Taylor's recommendations found their way into larger firms, such as the clothing manufacturer, Pelaco and the automakers, Holden, which manufactured consumer goods on a large scale.9 Some Australian researchers, in particular Nyland, believed the emergence of scientific management during this period heavily influenced arbitral decision-making, shaped future generations of managerial thought and indeed became the most profound factor shaping the twentieth century Australian economy.10

Other research questions the impact of scientific management, both during the critical period surrounding the First World War and in the longer term.11 Historical research from the World War I period notes that trade unions often successfully challenged the introduction of scientific management.12 In many instances attempts to introduce reforms were abandoned after World War I, for instance at the Lithgow Small Arms

Factory.13 Indeed most industries and workplaces, apart from large-scale manufacturing, remained relatively untouched by scientific management, with

8 Wright, C. (1995). The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 9 Ibid., 26-27 10 Nyland, C. (1987). Reduced Worktime and the Management of Production. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mathews, J. (1989). Tools of Change: New Technology and the Democratisation of Work. Leichhardt: Pluto Press. 11 Wright (1995), The Management of Labour. 12 Patmore, G. (1994). “ ’American Hustling Methods’ - The Lithgow Small Arms Factory 1912-1922”. Labour History, 67, 42-56. 13 Ibid. 185 traditional forms of production often continuing relatively untouched.14 The extent and impact of Taylor's scientific management during this period, remains hotly debated, within the historical literature.

Other experiments were investigated and introduced by Australian employers. The bonus schemes of F.A. Halsey, a contemporary of Taylor, often found more fertile ground in Australia, in areas such as the NSW Government Railways.15 Later, in the

1930s, the work of Charles Bedaux, who combined elements of scientific management with fatigue studies was employed in Australian clothing manufacturing. Indeed David

Jones Ltd. was among the first employers in Australia to employ Bedaux techniques, using them in the Marlborough Street Factory in the 1930s.16

Welfarism became prominent in the post-1914 period. Australian employers experimented with a variety of welfarist initiatives in the post-1914 period, ranging from physical amenities for employees, such as lunchrooms, libraries and clinics, to more sophisticated schemes which involved company unions, consultative committees and profit-sharing.17 Welfarism often accompanied more systematic approaches to recruitment, selection and training, as was the case at David Jones Ltd.18 While Patmore argues that welfarism had a greater impact than scientific management on Australian workplaces prior to 1939, Wright cautions against an

14 Patmore (1994), “ American Hustling Methods”; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, .28. 15 Patmore, G. (1988). “ Systematic Management and Bureaucracy: the NSW Railways Prior to 1932”. Labour and Industry, 1(2), 306-21. 16 Patmore (1991), Australian Labour History, 148; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 27. 17 Reekie, G. (1987). “ Humanising Industry: Paternalism, Welfarism and Labour Control in Sydney’s Big Stores 1890-1930”. Labour History, 53, 1-19.; Patmore (1991), Australian Labour History, 148-150; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 20-25 18 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 20-1. 186 overstatement of the impact of welfarism, believing that welfarism's impact was similarly limited.19

While the turmoil of World War I carried over into 1919, the level of industrial turmoil had moderated by the early 1920s. In some instances, employers abandoned their war- time experiments.20 Yet for many employers, the 1920s were a "golden era". The economy grew steadily, with good international conditions, and a concerted policy of import substitution underpinned Australia's domestic prosperity. Economic expansion, mergers and an increased influx of British and US capital saw many firms expand their operations throughout the 1920s. Huge industrial complexes that employed thousands, such as the Newcastle steel works, dominated the industrial landscape.21

The expanding economy, rising incomes, accelerating urbanisation as well as the increasing cultural influence of the USA further saw the emergence of mass consumption in Australia during the 1920s and 1930s.22 While mass consumerism did not develop as quickly or dramatically as it had done in the United States, new mass consumables such as automobiles, radios and electrical household appliances became increasingly available, and were purchased by the growing number of middle-income Australians. Similarly, urban working-class Australians, many of

19 Patmore (1991), Australian Labour History, 148; Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 23 20 Patmore (1994), “ American Hustling Methods” . 21 Boehm (1979), Twentieth Century Economic Development, 65; Macintyre (1988), Oxford History, 211-1. 22 Whitwell, G. (1989). Making the Market: The Rise of Consumer Society. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 11- 5; Kingston, B. (1994). Basket, Bag and Trolley: A history of shopping in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 52-76. 187 whom who could not afford the new consumables, increasingly frequented stores for ready-made clothing and food.23

The 1920s was a period when employers became increasingly involved in politics, both to defend the status quo and to counter perceived threats from the "left"; be it in the form of International Workers of the World (IWW), the newly established Communist

Party of Australia (CPA), radical trade unionism or the left populism of NSW Premier

Jack Lang. This involvement ranged from new social clubs such as the Rotary Club, the centre-right Nationalist Party, to far-right machinations of the All-for-Australia League, the Argonauts or later the New Guard.24 The sympathetic Bruce-Page government of the

1920s further underpinned the emergence of an Australia that was safe for capitalist economic expansion.25

David Jones Limited and Responses During and After the First World War

The Jones family increasingly asserted a greater proportion of the ownership over the firm. However Edward Lloyd Jones II and Eric David Lloyd Jones focussed more time on “rural pursuits”.26 Charles Lloyd Jones rose to prominence and by 1920 was

Chairman of the Board as well as M anaging Director and the firm’s largest shareholder.27

Charles Lloyd Jones stands as the crucial figure in determining the reason why David

Jones embraced welfarism with greater fervour than any of its contemporaries.

23 Whitwell (1989), Making the Market, 14-5; Kingston (1994), Basket, 47-8, 52-3. 24 Macintyre (1988), Oxford History, 217; Mathews, T. (1970). “ The All for Australia League”. Labour History, 17, 136-147. 25 Macintyre (1988), Oxford History, 222-8. 26 Board Minutes, 12 October 1920, p. 176, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 188 In a 1916 document, "The Future Policy of the Company", the executive under the direction of Charles outlined the company's future. The need for standardisation and the creation of systems dominate the document. In doing so, the firm would gain efficiencies, and reduce losses, which were often incurred through overordering and errors. It was acknowledged that, once again, some "upper end trade" would be lost but in return the firm would maintain and strengthen its wider appeal. The report illustrates the dilemma:

Perhaps the M anagement can give no better illustration of the methods that must now be adopted than to illustrate our meaning by taking an individual department.

The Mercery Section and particularly the Men's Underwear Section - here we were in the practice of carrying a great many different lines of Underwear; the Customers had their likes and dislikes; these were catered for, and small stocks were ordered to suit individual needs, resulting in some serious stock losses as time went on. The endeavour of the Management now is to put in standard makes of our own name and to sell those propriety trade mark lines that the public demand.

Where we had a stock of say 200 lines, we now have one of a 100 lines, instead of ordering 50 dozen of an individual line, we are now in a position to order 100 dozen. In the process we eliminate the speciality customers, but we hold the majority of men, we become Traders, not a speciality house, tending to less loss, more stable profit and bigger turnover.28

This strategy for a greater focus on the city trade and a focus on an expanding mass rather than a specialist trade, coupled with a desire to expand, necessitated change - namely enlarged selling premises for local customers, accessing mass-produced goods.

27 Board Minutes, 13 October 1920, p. 177, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 28 The Future Policy of the Company, Report to the Executive 12 July 1916, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 189 In February 1920, the firm purchased the Sydney Girls' School site, a much larger block of land bounded by Elizabeth, Market and Castlereagh Streets, for £124,000. Adjoining the land purchased in 1914, the combined site gave David Jones Ltd. more room than it needed for its new store. In the wake of the 1921-22 property boom, the Company sold a moderate northern slice of the property for £100,000, leaving it with the property upon which it would build its new store.

Crowding was a problem in George Street store, built in 1887, which was inadequate to cope with the expanding inter-war trade. As well, the proposed opening of the new underground railway was expected to shift Sydney's retail trade away from George Street towards the new underground railway stations, located a few kilometers east at Museum and St. James.29 Indeed Wolfers claims that the proximity of shops in Sydney to the new underground railway stations appears a key determinant as to whether they survived the Depression.30 Another reason for establishing a new site was that David

Jones Ltd. did not own the George Street site, which was actually a leasehold. A new site, owned outright by the firm, would better guarantee security and freedom to develop the site as they liked.

Staff numbers rose, too, during this period of rapid expansion. Though it is difficult to precisely track the rate of growth of the number of employees, it appears that

29 Wolfers, H. (1980). “ The big stores between the wars”, in J. Roe (ed.), Twentieth Century Sydney: Studies in Urban and Social History. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 18-33. 30 Ibid. 190 between 1906 and 1926 the number of employees at David Jones Ltd, in all parts of the business, grew from around 800 to over 2000.31

However, the growth in the workforce was not steady. At the Marlborough Street factory, in particular, the staffing levels between 1914 and 1926 appear highly volatile, rising and falling with the business cycle.32 The 694 employees noted in 1914 grew to a high of 974 in 1918 but fell back to 657 in 1925.33 By 1929 the number employed at

Marlborough Street had increased again to 1082.34

The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 brought an immediate reaction from the

Board of David Jones. At its meeting on the 3 August 1914 the Board decided to cable the London Office that no more goods be ordered and to cancel those that had been ordered.35 The war would initially disrupt the importation of both goods and skilled labour from Great Britain.

The War had an impact on the firm despite the fact it was being fought a world away.

The Directors showed their patriotism by forming a David Jones “Rifle Club” and suspending buying from “any local German firms whether naturalised or not”.36

31 “ 86th Birthday", Daily Guardian, 27 May 1924; MacCulloch, J. (1980). “ ’This store is our world’ Female shop assistants in Sydney to 1930”, in J. Roe (ed.), Twentieth Century Sydney: Studies in Urban and Social History. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 167; Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”, 3. 32 T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936, p. 20. 33 Ibid., p.20. 34 T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936, p. 20; Board Minutes, 16 October 1929, p.355, DJA, BRG 1/32/4. 35 Board Minutes, 3 August 1914, p. 380, DJA, BRG 1/32/1. 36 Board Minutes, 28 January 1915, p. 30, DJA, BRG 1/32/2; Board Minutes, 30 September 1915, p. 30, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 191 Yet more problematic matters were thrown up by the declaration of war and the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. By late August 1914, the Board was considering wage reductions for all staff but they decided instead that economies could be found elsewhere.37 But by September 1914, the trading situation has deteriorated even further and drastic action had to be taken. It was decided that from 1 October there would be a

10 to 15 per cent reduction in the salaries of all non-award staff whose salaries were £

200 or more. This would save the firm approximately £ 4000 per annum. However,

“general staff”, who would have been covered by various awards, did not have their wages cut. Instead, in departments such as Furnishings that were suffering considerable loss of business, they were stood down on the recommendation of the Executive or, as euphemistically described in the minutes, “given holidays at their own expense”. This measure would save the firm £ 4300.38 Late 1914 saw continuing poor trade, and the

Board considered and instituted further unspecified reductions.39

In addition to wage cuts and “voluntary unpaid holidays”, some staff were dismissed.

To deal with this a special relief fund was established at the cost of £250. Administered by Charles Lloyd Jones, relief was to be paid to dismissed employees, at the Company’s discretion.40

37 Board Minutes, 31 August 1914, p. 7, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 38 Board Minutes, 25 September 1914, p. 14, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 39 Board Minutes, 13 October 1914, p. 18, DJA, BRG 1/32/2; Board Minutes, 8 December 1914, p. 22, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 40 Board Minutes, 10 November 1914, p. 21, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 192 In 1915 trading conditions for David Jones improved. The 10 per cent salary reductions of 1914 were reversed first for employees in non-sales areas in June 1915, and for managers and departmental heads in October 1915.41

But the most dramatic blow for the year would be the 1915 NSW Shop Assistant’s

Award. Implementing the wage changes at David Jones would cost £ 4576, more than was saved cutting managerial and departmental head salaries by 10 percent.42 For the first time, industrial awards were becoming a matter for serious concern at Board meetings, and were having a serious impact upon the firm’s bottom line. David Jones attempted to maintain control over the situation by allocating a further £ 624 paid “to those sales assistants who are receiving more than the Award and who have been selected on account of their own special merit”.43 The Board also continued to award individual pay rises, as recommended by the executive of Charles Lloyd Jones and Edward Lloyd

Jones II.44 The 1918 Shop Assistants Award also proved costly, though less dramatic than the 1915 award, costing David Jones £ 2107 per annum. The Board minutes noted that while the award would be abided by, it was also noted that “the practice of individual merit (was) not to be interfered with”.45 It could be surmised that this meant that ad hoc remuneration, over and above the award minimum, was to continue.

The industrial awards, in particular, the Shop Assistants Award was now an important concern. It had restricted the ability of David Jones to cut wages in 1914

41 Board Minutes, 4 June 1915, p. 45, DJA, BRG 1/32/2; Board Minutes, 19 October 1915, p. 76, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 42 Board Minutes, 4 June 1915, p. 45, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 43 Ibid. 44 Board Minutes, 9 October 1917, p. 152, DJA, BRG 1/32/2.

193 and had delivered considerable increases in pay to sales staff in 1915, making it increasingly difficult to maintain individual “merit based” salaries.

Unions were, increasingly, a pressing concern that had to be dealt with at David Jones.

1917 was a year of considerable industrial turmoil in both Sydney and across the country. Statistics complied by Markey indicate that more working days were lost due to strikes in New South Wales in 1917 (3.3 million) than at any other time between 1907 and the present.46 The 1917 General Strike, in support of the striking railway workers at

Eveleigh and Randwick who were resisting the introduction of a time-card system, marked a high water point for industrial action in the Sydney metropolitan area.47

Indeed, the David Jones Board attempted to show sympathy to its employees who were inconvenienced by the strike by refunding “the amount deducted from salaries of those of the staff who were asked to take holidays at their expense”.48

In 1917, David Jones signed industrial agreements with two manufacturing unions. The first agreement was with the Australia Saddlery and Leather Workers’ Trades

Employees’ Federation, who represented leather workers at the Marlborough Street factory.49 The second industrial agreement was between David Jones and the Women

Worker’s Union of NSW. This agreement provided for hours, wages and other conditions of workers engaged in making costumes, mantles, skirts and blouses. The

45 Board Minutes, 9 January 1918, p. 157, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 46 Markey, R. (1994). In Case of Oppression: The Life and Times of Labor Council of New South Wales. Leichhardt: Pluto Press, 573. 47 Ibid., 105-6. 48 Board Minutes, 28 August 1917, p. 145, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 49 Board Minutes, 21 February 1917, p. 126, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 194 Board appears to have been reasonably satisfied with the agreement, since it chose to congratulate Mr. Johnson from the Marlborough Factory Staff Office on the outcome.50

Department store managers, such as those at David Jones, would have had cause for concern as more radical groups such as the International Workers of World (IWW) advocated not merely militancy but full-scale revolution. Reporting on an IWW pamphlet entitled Sabotage, the Sydney Morning Herald reporter “Demos” noted:

Another phase of sabotage is that of the ‘open mouth’ (see IWW publication ‘Sabotage’ by E.G. Flynn). This form consists in decrying the qualities of the goods for sale and may be used in shops, hotels, restaurants etc. A draper may inform a customer that the line asked for is not of good quality and should not be purchased, preventing a sale.51

While there is no evidence of any IWW support at David Jones Ltd., it seems likely that the mere suggestion of such ideas would have alarmed David Jones management.

For firms such as David Jones Ltd. this changing environment with a strong economy, state and trade union interventions, and political and social changes all impinged on the

Company’s labour management approach. These broad conditions manifested themselves immediately as a continuation of the "labour problems" with labour shortages and trade union activity, joining employee theft as a concern. In response to these

“labour problems”, David Jones Ltd. management embraced new managerial ideas and new technologies, often from the United States. Importantly, this period saw the emergence of welfarism and a more systematic approach to labour management. It also saw a continuation of the firm’s attempts to maintain

50 Board Minutes, 20 November 1917, p. 153-4, DJA, BRG 1/32/2. 51 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 1916, p.12. 195 control through highly individualised employment practices. Between 1914 and 1926, the management of labour underwent its most profound transformation at David Jones

Ltd.

The “labour problem”

The evidence of an intensification of employee theft throughout the industry during the

First World War is primarily anecdotal. A Draper of Australasia article from 1917 noted that a M agistrate, hearing another case of employee pilfering, stated that such activities were “increasing at an extraordinary rate, and something would have to be done to stop it”.52

However, pilfering was not restricted to individual employees. In early 1918, The

Draper of Australasia reported on a “pilfering ring of 13 female employees” which had been in operation in one city department store. The employees stole articles for exchange with each other. The M agistrate hearing the matter was lenient and imposed a

25 pound good behaviour bond.53

The Draper of Australasia similarly identified high levels of staff turnover as an industry wide problem.54 For David Jones, labour shortages had reached a critical

52 Draper of Australasia, 27 January 1917, p.6. 53 Draper of Australasia, 27 February 1918, p 39. 54 Draper of Australasia, 27 February 1918, p 39. 196 stage with the executive prepared a memorandum related "to the scarcity of male and female labor" in February 1916.55

As a solution to the scarcity problem, the firm looked overseas for labour. In the nineteenth century importation of labour from Great Britain was relatively unregulated for a firm such as David Jones. However, war conditions required the firm to approach the Department of External Affairs for permission to import labour from England including, "four female collar makers and two female laundry hands".56

Trade magazines, such as The Draper of Australasia, made no attempt to blame low wages or war-time shortages for the rise of pilfering or labour market conditions for labour shortages. It was psychologists who attempted to explain the cause of this rise of staff pilfering. One psychologist, S.S. Porteous from the Laboratory of Educational

Psychology at University of Melbourne, wrote in the pages of The Draper of

Australasia that the three causes of pilfering were “feeble mindedness”, “mob action or imitation” and “adolescence”. Keeping with the crude sex-typing of early industrial psychologists identified by Reekie, Porteous further notes “women lacked moral sense of property”.57 To address the problem, Porteous prescribed intelligence tests to keep the feeble-minded from “positions of trust”.58

55 Memorandum, DJA, BRG 1/32/2, 22 February 1916, p.87. 56 Letter to Department of External Affairs, 23 May 1916, DJA, BRG 1/32/2, p.97. 57 Porteous, S. (1918). “ Pilfering in Shops: Three Causes and the Cure”. The Draper of Australasia, 18(2), 43-4. 58 Ibid., 44. 197 However, Porteous’ views were not shared by all the early psychologists. Progressive psychologists such as Bernard M uscio were to have a more significant impact on progressive employers. Muscio was among the leading figures in early industrial psychology in Australia in the inter-war period. In an early article written for The

Draper of Australasia in 1918, Muscio, then Acting Lecturer in Mental and Moral

Philosophy at University of Sydney, did not demonise pilfering as mentally or morally weak, but argued that pilfering was a product of failed management destroying employee morale.59

As a prescription, Muscio advocated a series of changes to raise employee morale, including shorter hours coupled with higher wages, congenial surroundings and the creation of satisfaction in daily work. He noted that such initiatives were not philanthropy, but an investment.60

The interaction between the proponents of the new science of psychology and large retailing firms went beyond the pages of industry publication such as The Draper of

Australasia. On the evening of 14 January 1921, Professor Elton Mayo, who would decades later be regarded as the father of “human relations” and the intellectual fountainhead of Human Resource Management, addressed the staff and management of

David Jones Ltd. At that time, a professor at the University of Queensland, Mayo spoke on the topic of “The Forces Within Us”. As reported in the Daily Sun:

He (Mayo) did not think that the present industrial unrest which was wracking the world could be traced to a question of wages and working conditions… the world

59 Muscio, B. (1918). “ Is Your Success Less than It Might Be?”. The Draper of Australasia, 18(2), 40-42. 60 Ibid., 42. 198 was suffering from a sort of ‘nervous breakdown’ and regeneration could only come through understanding the natural, psychological forces which were at work.61

The prescriptions proposed by psychologists like Mayo and Muscio were reinforced by other developments. One important influence was the Whitley Report from Great

Britain which recommended the implementation of workplace committees to solve the problem of industrial disputation. While Whitleyism did not become Government policy in Australia, it did generate interest in workplace committees as a solution to industrial discord. Whitleyism was warmly received by the Draper of Australasia. It encouraged retailers to voluntarily introduce such committees to solve problems such as industrial disputation, pilfering and labour turnover.62

Other overseas developments were also noted in the pages of The Draper of Australasia.

The leading Boston department store, Filene’s, was identified as an important leader in welfarism, in particular its introduction of staff representatives on the Board.63

American developments in modern store layout and heightened customer service were held out by many as the model on which Australian department stores should model themselves. Yet not all contributors to the pages of The Draper of Australasia were enthralled with American methods. Just as Edward Lloyd Jones was taken aback in

1878 by the almost exclusively female salesforce at Macy’s in New York, an anonymous local contributor ‘50/20’ to The Draper of Australasia noted that in the USA

“salesmanship is reduced to an almost negligible

61 “ Forces Within Us - Speech by Professor Mayo”, Daily Sun, 15 January 1921. A study of Mayo’s Australian writings from this period can be found in Bourke, H. (1982). “ Industrial Unrest as Social Pathology: The Australian Writings of Elton Mayo”. Historical Studies, 20(79), 217-233. 62 “ Editorial – Industrial Relations: the War Cabinet’s Plans” (1918). The Draper of Australiasia, 18(4), 120-1; “ The Human Material of Business” (1918). The Draper of Australasia, 18(6), 165; “ The British Government’s Most Important Document” (1918). The Draper of Australasia, 18(15), 404.

199 quantity” with the customer confronted by “a languid, gum-chewing ‘sales lady’”.64

“50/20” also commends the Australian industry as fair and respectable with its good wages and early closing, in contrast with the situation in England where he claimed becoming a shop assistant was rarely a desired career move but usually a “result of family misfortune, resulting in almost immediate poverty”.65

The American ideas from stores such as Filene’s were not just being discussed in industry journals such as The Draper of Australasia but appear to have been known to managers at stores such as David Jones. Indeed the David Jones staff magazine, Between

Ourselves included a report on a paper given by the Education Director of Filene’s,

Bernice Cannon on “Training the Workers” given at the National Society for the

Promotion of Industrial Education. According to the report, “the lecturer emphasised the importance of well-trained salespeople and the vital necessity of organisation and training in every department.”66

The new psychology, Whitleyism, and welfarist experiments from overseas were important new ideas exposed to the local retail industry through publications such as The

Draper of Australasia. At David Jones Ltd. welfarist experiments from the United

States and the new psychology, in particular, were embraced. Any impact from

Whitleyism is hard to identify and in any sense was short term, and was limited to a modest experiment with workplace committees.

63 Jacoby, S. (1985). Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945. New York: Columbia University Press also noted the perception of Filene’s as a leader in welfarism. 64 ‘50/20’ (1918). “ What Made Me a Departmental Head”. The Draper of Australasia, 18(12), 339. 65 Ibid., 337-8.

200 However, overseas welfarist experiments (both inside and outside retailing) and psychology appear to have informed the new labour management strategy which was adopted by senior managers such as Charles Lloyd Jones, and by the post-war Staff

M anager, David M cNeill, whose collections of papers is filled with clippings and articles on overseas experiments. Initiatives, such as the creation of the Staff Manager position, were important indication of this new approach. Old ideas such as the fine system were abandoned. They were replaced by new initiatives including the introduction of formal recruitment, selection and training procedures, in-house magazines and recreational activities, workplace committees, staff discounts, pension schemes and share ownership.

Some of these initiatives were initially seen as part of the solution to pilfering, staff turnover and the prospect of industrial turmoil. Later, they would comprise a more considered, “scientific” strategy to “rationalise” the selling process. This was part of a much wider shift, which was outlined in the Company’s 1916 Policy, where there was a greater appreciation of mass selling and increased stock turnover, rather than mark up and individualised selling, as the way for the firm to succeed.

The reform of labour management policies and practices were not the only solution to the “labour problems”. New technologies such as the cash register, permitted employers like David Jones to contain pilfering and to more closely monitor staff sales performance.

While welfarism was not unique to David Jones Ltd. among the major department stores of Sydney, the depth of its commitment to and continuation of such initiatives

66 Between Ourselves, 1(4), April 1919, DJA, BRG 1/463. 201 was unparalleled.67 On the evidence of materials drawn from the David Jones Archives senior management, in particular Charles Lloyd Jones, were committed to making welfarism work. Indeed, David Jones appears to have gone further in implementing welfarism, than any other significant Australian firm of its era. Other stores flirted with welfarism during the 1920s, but most abandoned their initiatives during the Depression.

David Jones, however, maintained its commitment for much of the twentieth century.68

Introduction of Cash Registers, 1916 - 1920

David Jones Ltd., like many other retailers in Sydney, adopted a series of measures which were designed to cope with the changes brought about by the War. While the introduction of systematic and welfarist employment policies and practices were the key changes, other changes took place on the sales floor. At David Jones, one of the most important was the introduction of cash registers in the George Street store between 1916 and 1920.

While today we see cash registers as a common place, almost innocuous, aspect of retailing, their origins in part lay within retailers attempts to solve "the labour problem" - in particular theft by employees. The modern cash register was first invented and patented by John and James Ritty in Dayton, Ohio, USA in 1878. John Ritty was a publican who had apprenticed as a machinist and his brother James was also a machinist.

According to Isaac M arcosson, a journalist who wrote an early

67 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”. 68 Ibid. 202 history of the National Cash Register Company, John Ritty had his first inspiration for the original cash register from steam powered odometers on ships. These first registers had no drawers or docket making capability, merely a dial that showed the amount of the purchase. This monitored the sales transaction for the merchant, increasing "protection

... because it shed the light of publicity on every transaction".69 It made any "fiddle" by the shop assistant more difficult. Further innovations, such as docket making capability and the closed drawer, were also designed to guard the merchant's money and integrity from potentially thieving shop assistants. "The open cash drawer was an ever-present temptation for the weak-willed", notes M arcosson.70 However the paper roll of sales receipts were produced by the machine and kept track of sales ensured both easier bookkeeping, and also allowed the merchant to monitor whether the cash drawer had been tampered with.71

In 1883, the Ritty brothers sold their patents and small workshop to a group of

Cincinnati businessmen. This company, the National Cash Register Company, quickly gained a virtual monopoly on the manufacturing and sale of cash registers, using legal challenges to defend its patents and ruthless tactics to drive any potential competitor out of business. By the beginning of World War I, National Cash Register had grown from a small workshop with 10 craftsmen to a huge plant in Dayton, Ohio employed several thousand and produced cash registers that were used on every continent, effectively monopolising the world's cash register trade.72

69 Marcosson, I. (1945). W herever Men Trade; the Romance of the Cash Register. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 14. 70 Ibid., 11. 71 Ibid., 14. 72 Ibid. 203 In the United States, the cash register's introduction coincided with a new period of labour militancy in the US. In retailing, the first national shop assistants union in the

US, the Retail Clerks Protective Association was established in 1890.73 While early closing was a crucial issue, the introduction of cash registers (or "thief catchers", as called by some retailers) was actively resisted. However, their weak industrial position, determined employer and unsupportive legal and political environment meant that the union proved unsuccessful in keeping cash registers out.

National Cash Register (later to be known by its initials NCR) was also an important firm in the promotion of welfarism and systematic management in retailing internationally. They promoted their own welfarist employment practices as a model for other employers, and provided training materials for the teaching of selling techniques.74 NCR's impact was most dramatic in the United States where it, along with trade journals such as The Dry Goods Economist, were the main diffusers of new ideas within American retailing.75 Indeed, NCR's John Henry Patterson has a central place as an innovator in modern marketing.76 However, NCR's impact within Australian retailing is harder to discern. Senior managers such as Charles Lloyd Jones and David McNeill consulted overseas literature on work rationalisation, including the work of the Alexander

Hamilton Institute and Herbert Casson, but there appears to be little evidence in the

David Jones Archives that NCR's materials had the impact they did with American retailers.77

73 Harrington, M. (1961). The Retail Clerks. New York: John Wiley. 74 Marcosson (1945), W herever Men Trade, 109-32. 75 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 76 Tedlow, R. (1990). New and Improved; The Story of Mass Marketing in America. New York: Basic Books, 172. 204 NCR did make itself felt within Australian retailing through the introduction of cash registers. Yet while there is little evidence of the specific motives underlying the adoption of cash registers at David Jones Ltd., the firm aggressively purchased and introduced the machines. In September 1913, David Jones Ltd. purchased its first 4 cash registers from NCR and, in July 1914, purchased another single register.78 In November

1919, David Jones Ltd spent £7455 on the purchase and installation of 26 cash registers for the basement and ground floor.79 By August 1920, David Jones Ltd. had 39 cash registers at the George Street Store.80

This was followed by a further expenditure of £12,521 on cash registers in 1921.81

Additional registers, of an unspecified amount, were purchased in 1922 from NCR.82

Cash registers represented David Jones Ltd.’s most significant capital expenditure between 1919 and 1922, even overshadowing the amount spent on production machinery at the new M arlborough Street Factory, and is evidence of the importance the Company attached to them.83

Emergence of Welfarism, 1916-1920

An interview with Charles Lloyd Jones, undated by likely from the early 1920s, brings into sharp relief the key elements of welfarism at David Jones: a desire for business efficiency by fostering employer-employee co-operation, co-operation

77 MacNeill Papers, DJA. 78 Draper of Australasia, 8 October 1920. 79 Board Minutes, 25 November 1919, p. 105, DJA, BRG 1/32/3; Draper of Australasia, 8 October 1920. 80 Draper of Australasia, 8 October 1920. 81 Board Minutes, 5 January 1921, p. 198, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 82 Board Minutes, 8 November 1922, p. 295, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 83 Board Minutes, 5 February 1918 - 6 October 1926, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 205 brought about through application of industrial psychology fused with a romantised reconstruction of a paternalist past. Charles appeared to be a true believer in such an approach, a genuine enthusiast who stamped his views on the firm that employed thousands of Australians.

Quotes from the interview encapsulate his view:

I quite agree with Henry Ford when he says, ‘we need more artists in industrial relations’. 84

When asked the best means of acquiring staff efficiency, Charles states his belief in psychology, or at least in a discerning eye:

Well to begin with, the chief of staff needs to be a student of psychology, for unless he understands human nature pretty well, he won’t be able to pick the right man for the right job. The placing of the staff in the departments for which each member is best suited is both a science and an art which calls into play a man’s best faculties. One unhappily-placed member of a department is apt to upset the others, so that there will be no real efficiency in that section of the business. But it is the staff- manager’s special province to see that there are no members of the staff in any of the departments who give no promise of ever becoming efficient.85

He remarked freely on the need for staff co-operation:

And here, I would like to remark that the great spirit of co-ordination and co- operation must make both the staffs and the heads of the various departments in a business house work as one. To do this, they must be imbued with that whole- hearted loyalty and devotion to their work and to each other without nothing of any consequence has ever yet been achieved.86

And when asked to explain how to generate staff efficiency, Charles replied emphatically:

If some of the mid-Victorian ideas of conduct and morality were adapted to modern life, it would greatly facilitate the acquisition of efficiency. This would

84 “ Phlox” (n.d) “ Business Efficiency. How to Maintain it” DJA. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 206 give folk a greater interest in their work and instead of looking upon it as a more or less distasteful duty they would get a good deal of joy out of it. To cope with the complexities of today we need new traditions in place of the old discarded ones.87

The “Future Policy of the Company” document, presented by Charles and Eric Lloyd

Jones to the Board in July 1916, set out a desire to bring about sweeping reforms. In it,

Charles and Eric proposed increased standardisation, with the intention of requiring standard practices from buyers and department heads. The document proposes standardised docket writing, a more focussed buying strategy based on fewer but more popular lines and, importantly, buying based on principals set down by senior management not based on the “personality of the buyer”. An important component of this document was welfarism or as defined in this document “The Discipline of

Freedom”.88 For the first time, the treatment of staff is considered a matter of managerial policy and the term “welfare” is used.

In this document, Charles Lloyd Jones made a number of concrete proposals that were carried out. These changes mark an embrace of welfarism at David Jones, both in rhetoric and practice. His first proposed change was the abolition of the fine system.

The fine system, which had its origins in the nineteenth century retailing practice, permitted management to levy fines on employees who breached house rules. It was increasingly criticised throughout the industry by both shop assistants and social reformers. This decades old policy at David Jones was abolished from 1 August 1916.89

87 Ibid. 88 Charles Lloyd Jones and Eric Lloyd Jones (1916) The Future Policy of the Company, 12 July 1916, DJA BRG 1/32/2. 89 Ibid. 207 Another proposal that came from this policy document was the need to train shop assistants in their duties rather than leaving it to the Buyer. Once again this proposal appears to seek to contain the authority of the departmental head / buyer by appealing directly to shop assistants. Yet the training and abolition of the fine system were not mere philanthropy, as it is noted “these ideas are established to make a Staff that will as time goes on, be more able to carry out the aims of the Company before, being more conscious of them”.90

However, the tumultuous events of 1917, such as the NSW General Strike, preceded the introduction of many welfarist innovations between 1918 and 1920. One measure introduced was a Staff Discount on house purchases. This was a popular initiative also introduced by other Sydney department stores throughout the 1920s. 91 From 1 August

1918, the Board of David Jones Ltd. approved a 10 per cent discount for all staff purchases.92 This became a 15 per cent discount for all staff by February 1920, a measure that continues to this day.93

The house discount was not without its problems for the employer. However, despite becoming a site of employee-employer struggle, it was less of a strictly philanthropic gesture than an attempt to bring about employee commitment and assist in the

“gentrification” of working-class assistants. As Benson notes, a major problem for

American department store managers was that working-class shop assistants did not project the modest refinement expected by their middle-class

90 Ibid. 91 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 175. 92 Board Minutes, 31 May 1918, p. 13, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 93 Board Minutes, 24 February 1920, p. 120, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 208 clientele. Finding the right balance in dress was difficult as the shabbily dressed assistant and the opulently dressed assistant both sent the wrong signals. It would appear that

David Jones may have used the house discount to assist in finding the balance so that their assistants would be well dressed but in a discreet and understated fashion. This can be surmised by the fact that the 15 per cent discount was extended to showroom assistants who worked in the higher class ladies departments such as Costumes to Order,

M illinery and Ladies Tailoring in September 1918, a full 18 months before it was extended to the rest of the staff.94 On the other hand, the additional concession could have reflected the strong labour market position of such skilled staff and have actually been negotiated.

Any benevolent component of the discount seems doubtful given that use of the discount by recently retired employees was suspended.95 In the emotionally-charged post-war environment, a discount for returned soldiers was also a vexed question. When the matter was raised at the Board in January 1919, a 10 per cent discount for returned soldiers was rejected as “being contrary to the company’s definite policy of the subject of Discounts”.96 However by April 1919, the Board had changed its mind and approved a 10 per cent discount for soldiers in uniform.97

In 1918 David Jones also introduced the first in a long line of staff magazines. Entitled

Between Ourselves it lasted until 1921. It was published monthly for all David Jones staff, but was focussed towards selling staff. The magazine contained information on births, marriages, deaths and staff movements. There was also

94 Board Minutes, 3 August 1918, p. 24, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 95 Board Minutes, 24 August 1920, p. 157, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 96 Board Minutes, 28 January 1919, p. 50, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 97 Board Minutes, 8 April 1919, p. 65, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 209 considerable coverage of social events and store policy, particularly the many new welfarist initiative such as in-house training, staff discounts and staff committees. But the magazine itself also was a site for management-staff conflict.98

The magazine had the support of management and did form a part of the new welfarist approach. The first editor, Miss Founeridiner, noted that the magazine aimed to inform new staff of the companies’ policies, bring about an “esprit de corps”, keep the

Directors in close contact with staff and to act as a forum for disseminating ideas - both serious and entertaining - between staff.99

During 1919 and early 1920, Between Ourselves had a decidedly irreverent and breezy approach. Miss Founeridiner cast herself as the court jester, “permitted to say things that other people would have had their knuckles rapped for, and nobody minded”.100

During her editorship, anonymously submitted poems and limericks appeared and many articles satirised management's welfarist schemes. The Staff Cafeteria, for instance, was dubbed both "the Profiteeria", as staff complained of high prices, and “the Chaff

Luncheon Room”, a jab at the strict hierarchy that existed within the firm.101 Similarly cartoons mocked the existing facilities for instance the poor performance of the staff lifts at George Street.

However in January 1920, it appears that senior management may have reasserted a degree of editorial control. Miss H. Callan whose editorial approach was much less

98 Between Ourselves, DJA, BRG 1/463. 99 Between Ourselves, 2(1), January 1920, p. 5, DJA, BRG 1/463. 100 Between Ourselves, 1(8), August 1919, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/463. 101 Between Ourselves, 1(10), October 1919, p. 14, DJA, BRG 1/463. 210 irreverent replaced M iss Founeridiner as Editor. The front page of Miss Callan’s first edition was given to a homily about hard work attributed to Edward Lloyd Jones II.

Miss Callan’s tone was also set by a lengthy cautionary tale “What Might Happen” that looks at the village of “Aswethinkitoughttobe” where on 1 January 1925 every citizen is given £ 5000 as a result of the “complete victory of Socialism.” Famine and social discord breaks out as the butcher, baker and grocer lounge about and nothing is produced.102 Strongly worded critiques of Bolshevism and crude attempts to discredit

M arxist economics also appeared in the pages of Between Ourselves during 1920.103

The staff magazine may have lost its irreverent editorial tone, but anonymous employees continued to criticise certain managerial practices. Employees wrote in letters complaining about store policies regarding the use of customer lifts by staff, and on access to public telephones for private calls.104 More serious employment matters were also raised, for instance, suggestions about the use of “voluntary unpaid holidays” when there was a slowdown. An employee suggested that the “entire workroom work three quarter time instead of certain girls being picked out and given, some two days, some three days, and others a week, or even two weeks’ holiday”. 105 Mr. Giles, the newly appointed Staff Manager responded:

When work is scarce in the workrooms, the total period of which is about two weeks in the whole year, the least proficient are, of course put off first. Employees who observe punctuality both in starting and knocking off, and pay strict attention to their work during working hours, will not have any cause to complain of an undue proportion of holidays.106

102 Between Ourselves, 2(1), January 1920, p. 19-20, DJA, BRG 1/463. 103 Between Ourselves, 2(5), May 1920, p. 4, DJA, BRG 1/463; Between Ourselves, 2(9-10), September- October 1920, p. 16, DJA, BRG 1/463. 104 Between Ourselves, 2(5), May 1920, p. 11, DJA, BRG 1/463. 105 Between Ourselves, 2(7), July 1920, p. 5, DJA, BRG 1/463. 106 Ibid., 5. 211 The protest of the past continued but now management was responding, laying the blame for the inadequate tea allowance for workroom staff at the feet of the union and the Wages Board. For instance, a workroom employee contributed to Between Ourselves the following poem and prayer:

Hickory, dickory, dock It’s striking six o’clock; I’m sure you will agree We can’t have much of a spree On sixpence at six

Now, little Miss Muffet, She sat on a tuffet A’ eating a hearty tea She counted it up, and discovered her “sup” Would cost her one-and-three.

Hey, diddle, diddle! Come, thread up your needle, And begin on your work straight away; Sixpence for tea Much do you and me Though we’ve had a very little all day

A Prayer

O, Nature, please take heed, When I must work at night. And it’s time for us to feed. Please control my appetite.107

It seems unlikely that these pieces would have attracted editorial comment in the 1919 edition of Between Ourselves, but by 1920 things had changed and management felt compelled to respond.

The above effusions were forwarded to this office evidently by a member of our Workroom Staff. We would mention that 6 d for tea money is the amount allowed by the Workrooms’ Award, and this sum was evidently passed as

107 Between Ourselves, 2(2), February 1920, p. 19, DJA, BRG 1/463. 212 sufficient by the representatives of the Union present on the Board at the time when the case was considered in all its aspects.

That the amount is inadequate cannot be denied, but the remedy lies in the employees’ own hands, as they can , if they wish, apply to the Wages Board for an increased allowance.108 .

Like some of the other new welfarist initiatives, such as the Management Committee,

Between Ourselves survived only until 1921. A staff magazine was not reinstituted until the early 1930s with the short-lived Dajonian). A regular staff magazine that continued for many years, David Jones News, would finally appear in1936.

After World War I, David Jones Ltd. also briefly experimented with consultative committees. As noted, Filene's had long had a staff committee, and The Draper of

Australasia strongly advocated voluntary Whitleyism to cure the ills of industrial turmoil.

In his monthly report to the Board of Directors meeting on 30 December 1919, Charles

Lloyd Jones proposed the addition of staff representatives to the Management

Committee.109 At the February 1920 Board meeting, Mr. C. J. Buchanan was selected as the Buyers representative, Mr. Townsend to represent George Street staff, and Miss L.

Evans to represent M arlborough Street staff.110 These appointments were published in

Between Ourselves with accompanying

108 Ibid, 19. 109 Board Minutes, 30 December 1919, p. 111, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 110 Board Minutes, 20 February 1920, p. 116, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 213 photos of the new appointees.111 The reason for the appointments was given by

Charles Lloyd Jones in Between Ourselves:

The object of having employees and buyers sitting on the Committee is to make staff feel that they have a direct interest in the management of the Company, and to give the various Sections represented an opportunity of putting forward their views on matters that they are more closely in touch with than the Management and Directors. The Company sincerely desire to have the whole-hearted co-operation of the staff in matters relating to the business.112

Yet this experiment in Whitleyism was short-lived. By July 1920, only six months after the appointment of the staff representatives to the Management committee, the

Committee itself was wound up.113 No reason for its termination was given by management.

However, some of the older unsystematised methods continued into the mid-1920s. The payment of pensions upon retirement or death remained an ad hoc process and continued to be decided by the Board on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, there was no apparent pattern in how such payments were to be made. Some staff were given lifetime pensions, such as D. Low who was to receive a pension of 30/-, payable for life.114

Others, such as Miss Bannon, were given a lump sum. After 27 years as an employee of the company, she received a cheque for 12 months salary.115 Sometimes, the Board made a decision regarding a pension, often granting discretion to the Managing Director. This was the case with Miss Ryan, who, after 32 years of service, was to receive a payment of between 1 pound and 30/- per week.116 Interestingly, in some instances, the Board provided loans (“at current rates” and

111 Between Ourselves, 2(2), February 1920, p. 6, DJA, BRG 1/463. 112 Ibid, 7. 113 Between Ourselves, 2(7), July 1920, p. 9, DJA, BRG 1/463. 114 Board Minutes, 20 September 1918, p.32, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 115 Board Minutes, 20 September 1918, p.32, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 116 Board Minutes, 22 July 1919, p.73, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 214 repayable in 5 years) to retiring employees for starting up their own businesses. C.J.

Kennett was one of those. After 30 years of service, he received a 500 pound loan to finance the purchasing of a business, in addition to a cash payment of £ 500.117

Occasionally, the firm made payments to a deceased employee’s family. Following the death of Mr. Manners from the Regalia Department, the Board considered a report from the Staff Manager and decided to pay Mr. Manners’ widow a sum of 30/- per week for 2 years from the date of the last payment of salary.118 However, it was not just widows who sometimes received death benefits. Board minutes read that M iss Derwent, the sister of the recently deceased Leslie Derwent, received a cash payment of £ 50.119

The payment of retirement and death benefits was not without its difficulties. These matters appear to have been decided on a continuing ad hoc basis by the Board, and consumed considerable resources now that the firm had approximately 2000 employees.

In 1923, the Board considered a report on a staff superannuation scheme, to be provided by the Colonial Mutual Life Society. The proposed superannuation scheme provided for a superannuation payment when retiring at age 60, a life insurance policy and a welfare fund from which sickness benefits were to be paid.120 This scheme, however, was rejected for unspecified reasons, and a formal superannuation scheme was not introduced until the 1930s.

117 Board Minutes, 11 May 1920, p.130, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 118 Board Minutes, 27 May 1919, p.68, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 119 Board Minutes, 15 March 1922, p.262, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 120 Board Minutes, 20 June 1923, p.313, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 215 Other schemes were also deliberated upon for many years and demonstrate that Charles did not always get his way at the Board level. For instance, in correspondence from the

United Kingdom, Charles proposed the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme for staff.

The Board was of the view, that “the time for instituting profit sharing in connection with the business has not yet arrived.”121

Introduction of the Staff Manager, 1919

Part of both welfarism and the new, systematic approach to labour management at David

Jones was the appointment of a Staff Manager in 1919. By 1917, appointing a person to act as a “staff welfare manager” was strongly endorsed in trade publications such as

The Draper of Australasia.122 Indeed many of Sydney’s major department stores such as Grace Brothers, Farmers and Anthony Horderns were appointing “welfare workers”.123 Mr. Alfred H. Giles was the first person to take up the newly created position of Staff Manager at David Jones in March 1919. The notion of the appointment of a "Staff Controller" position was deferred at Board Meetings at the end of 1918.124 Charles became M anaging Director and gained full control over the appointment and dismissal of managerial staff from the Board of Directors in March

1919, a power he quickly acted upon.125 Within two weeks he had authorised the appointment of Alfred H. Giles as Staff Manager at a salary of

121 Board Minutes, 20 September 1918, p.32, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 122 Editorial “ Improved Service! The Greatest Advance Now Possible. Difficulties in the Way” (1917). The Draper of Australasia, 17(1), 3. 123 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 175. 124 Board Minutes, 22 October 1918, p. 38, DJA, BRG 1/32/3.; Board Minutes, 26 November 1918, p. 44, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 125 Board Minutes, 12 March 1919, p. 61, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 216 800 pound per annum, along with the appointment of a Chief Accountant and a

Controller of Mail Order both at the same salary.126

Giles had been with the firm since 1895, previously employed at a rival firm Thompson and Giles located across George Street from David Jones. He was hired into the Mercery

Department and was soon appointed Floor Superintendent in Mercery. By 1906, Giles had become an Assistant Manager.127

However, Giles reign as Staff Manager was short as he retired in September 1920, receiving a handsome payment of £ 1500 and a £ 50 annual allowance promised for the next ten years.128 Management gave no reasons for the quick departure of Giles after his elevation to Staff M anager. Alfred Giles would be replaced by a younger man who would be Staff Manager at David Jones until the mid-1960s, David McNeill.

M cNeill had been born in Victoria and moved from Melbourne to Sydney as a young man in 1911. He worked at both David Jones and Farmers in a variety of roles but enlisted for the war in 1914. He returned to Australia in 1920 where he rejoined David

Jones Ltd. as supervisor, ground floor. In 1923, he was appointed as staff manager.129

M cNeill appeared to have a close personal relationship with Charles Lloyd Jones and indeed one would suspect he owed considerable personal loyalty to Charles. Similarly they appeared to continually communicate on matters relating to staff management and share similar ideas.

126 Board Minutes, 25 March 1919, p. 63, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 127 Between Ourselves, 1(4), April 1919, p. 11, DJA, BRG 1/463. 128 Board Minutes, 30 September 1920, p. 170, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 129 McNeill Papers, DJA. 217 This development shows David Jones Ltd. further in front of its other stores. McNeill, in particular, was at a senior management level and was heavily involved in major policy decisions. His role was much larger than that of the “welfare officers” at other stores, whose job was to provide a friendly authority figure.130

Systematic Labour Management; Selection and Recruitment at David Jones Ltd., 1920s

The appointment of a Staff M anager was the critical initiative in the development of systematic management. David M cNeill, like Charles Lloyd Jones, was a relatively young man and saw himself as open to new ideas. The haphazard nature of nineteenth century labour management was soon to be replaced by a more rational approach.

With his oval face, thinning hair and glasses, David M cNeill looked more like a boyish headmaster than a captain of industry, when he began his new role as Staff Manager in

1923. He was to spend the rest of his career at David Jones Limited, and played a critical role in the development and implementation of the Company’s labour management policies and practices.

In a memo from the late 1920s, David McNeill described his responsibilities as follows:

130 Ibid. 218 The Staff M anager has jurisdiction over the whole of the Staff – selling, office, productive workers, despatch (sic), mail order, cleaning and general staff. All members of the staff are engaged and dismissed by the Staff Manager. All holidays and special concessions are obtained through him, and it is on his recommendation that merit increases and rewards are considered by the Directors. Such workers as plumbers, cleaners, carpenters, electricians, are under the Works Department, but the Work Superintendent is directly responsible to the Staff Managers for all matters relating to his workers.131

Further, M cNeill had sought to establish the Staff M anager as more than just an administrator of staff records. This role meshes with the adoption of welfarism and an attempt to distance this new form of labour management from the autocratic past. He notes:

The relationship between the Staff Manager and other executives and the Staff is friendliness and confidence without familiarity. The Staff M anager acts as a mediator between the Company and the staff and they look upon him not as a judge or taskmaster, but as someone who will listen to their worries or troubles and give them a fair and sympathetic hearing without prejudice. He is the instrument with which the Company moulds the staff to their ideals and ideas, and the Floor Supervisors are his “lieutenants” who carry out his orders and convey them to the Staff while co- operating with the Heads of Departments. The Staff Manager is in close touch with the Departmental Heads who give him their assistance and co-operation in all matters of staff.132

An important aspect of M r. M cNeill’s position was recruitment, selection and the maintenance of employee records. The firm only advertised externally during sale periods. In the late 1920s, McNeill noted:

New members of staff are almost invariably engaged through our system of Application Forms, except during Sale periods when we resort to advertising after we have exhausted the files of applicants on record. These application forms are kept near the Staff Office where applicants fill them in and hand them to the Staff M anager when they are interviewing him. These forms are marked in a distinguishing way and filed away under their respective departments. When a vacancy occurs in any section, these files are referred to first. Many vacancies are filled also from our staff records of assistants who have been previously employed.133

131 McNeill, D. The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 219 Another important aspect of the systematisation of labour management was the keeping of staff records. In his memo M cNeill noted the detail contained in records of existing staff.

Extensive records are kept in the Staff Office of the personal history of employees. The application forms filled in when first seeking employment embrace such questions as to whether married or single, age, date of birth, number of dependents, where educated, date leaving school, father’s occupation, details of previous experience (if any) whether previously employed by the company, and if related to any of our employees. These forms are recorded and filed away in special folders bearing such information as the name, address, age, department, demerit or merit reports, reports of departmental head when leaving our employment of each assistant. All references submitted to us are verified by enquiry. A card system of all temporary employees is kept along the same lines, and we find this to be invaluable when re-engaging staff for our Sales and Christmas periods, as a report to conduct and capabilities and appearance is recorded on these cards, together with their age salary etc.134

Wright noted that a similarly elaborate application form was used at the Marlborough

Street factory in the 1940s.135 Only a few of these cards survive in the David Jones

Archive, but it appears that a version of this staff card was used until the 1960s.136

While the creation of staff records was part of systematic management, it also appears that the age-based wages contained in the new awards necessitated the retention of accurate records of date of birth to ensure the firm did not breach the

134 Ibid. 135 Wright, C. (1991). The Origins of Australian Personnel Management: Development in Employment, Selection and Training Procedures in Manufacturing Industry, 1940-1960. Working Paper No.8, Sydney, ACIRRT – University of Sydney, 6 136 McNeill Papers, DJA. 220 award. It appears that David Jones Ltd. requested a birth certificate from all new staff to confirm their age.137

The introduction of individual staff records did result in some employee, and union, resistance. The January 1922 issue of The Dry Goods Economist, in an interview with

Mr. Lachlan from David Jones Ltd., who was visiting the USA at the time noted that;

Individual performance records were not kept in the store when Mr. Lachlan first went there. The employees regarded them as directly reflecting on their honour. It seemed outrageous that they, or any of them, might possibly be suspected of giving less than their best efforts. As store employees of Australia are strongly unionised, it was difficult to introduce a new system.138

The selection of new staff did change somewhat during this period as well. In the early

1920s, senior managers at David Jones Limited displayed considerable interest in the new psychology, going so far as to invite Professor Elton Mayo address staff and managers in 1921.139 And there are indications that the firm did experiment with formal testing but that this was short-lived. David M cNeill noted in the late 1920s:

In one or two cases we have had Vocational tests made, but have found that the expenditure of time and money has not been justified with the results. In our class of business, and in the selling sections more especially, it is only the employees themselves who can prove their worth to us. They have, judging them on face value, every qualification desirable as well as a good personality and address, but when confronted with certain aspects and situations in every day routine, they fail to meet them with any initiative or resourcefulness, and in many cases are content to rest on whatever laurels they possess without making any effort to retain them. We have found it more expedient to rely upon the judgment of our Staff Manager, in engaging new staff, and in very few cases have we found this judgment to be wrong.140

137 “ Australian Retailing Varies Widely from American Ideas” Dry Goods Economist, 21 January 1922, p.26. In looking at the award system from a US point of view the Dry Goods Economist noted: “ The way employees’ wages are raised would make an American retailer fold up and ask to be measured for a coffin. Pay for boys and girls is raised by Government ruling… There is no way of evading this increase.” 138 Ibid. 139 “ Forces Within Us - Speech by Professor Mayo”, Daily Sun, 15 January 1921. 140 McNeill, D., The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 221 David Jones Ltd. continued to recruit staff from Britain until the 1920s. A letter writer to the Sydney Morning Herald believed this was evidence of Charles Lloyd Jones being

“anxious to see Australia populated with British stock”.141 However Charles responded that advertising in Britain was as a result of labour shortages for the manufacturing side of the business.142

Systematic management in areas such as recruitment, selection and records appears to have been introduced for several reasons. These included the need to keep employee records for award payments, and an apparent desire to maintain more formal control and monitoring of staff performance. However, centralisation may have also been in response to problems with buyers, managers and supervisors. One such case involved

Leslie Edwin Ford, who had been managing the tailoring room for 10 years. Mr. Ford collected weekly amounts from various employees and told them he would bank the money for them. However, M r. Ford used the money for betting on horse races and buying presents. Not surprisingly, Mr. Ford was dismissed, convicted of fraud and

David Jones Ltd. reimbursed the employees for the money lost.143 One would think there would a desire to control such activities, due to loss of employee trust, reputation and, indeed, money.

Training in the Department Store Industry

Thompson identifies the emergence of training at David Jones in the inter-war period.

While her analysis is brief, she argues that the main reason for formal

141 Sydney Mornng Herald, 26 June 1925. 142 Sydney Mornng Herald, 29 June 1925. 143 Evening News, 25 January 1924. 222 training procedures being introduced at David Jones was a belief among senior management of the potential for formal training to improve performance. She also notes that improving the store's prestige as a "good employer", the creation of both an internal labour market and an “esprit de corps” also underlay the introduction of training.144

In her study, Benson identified three types of formal training within American department stores; "general", "merchandise" and "salesmanship" training.145 "General" training involved orientation and instruction in store policy and practice, for instance, proper docket writing, wrapping and arrangement of deliveries and special orders.

"General" eduction also focussed on building up basic competencies, such as spelling and grammar, as well as adding a sheen of middle-class respectability through training in

"proper" class diction and posture. In some instances, "general" education could extend to training in such areas as foreign languages, in particular French, fencing and music appreciation. Such training, according to Benson, was aimed at "remaking" or at least masking the class origins of many shop assistants. The most conspicuous and

"offensive" aspects of their working-class and petit bourgeois identity, such as "poor" taste in clothing and speech, ignorance of high culture and French, gum chewing, and calling bourgeois customers "dearie", could be hidden from view.146

144 Thompson, R. (1980). “ David Jones in War and Peace”. Unpublished MA Thesis. Ryde: Macquarie University, 40. 145 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 150. 146 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 147. 223 “Merchandise” and “salesmanship” training were aimed directly at improving performance on the selling floor, according to Benson. Merchandise training was aimed at providing assistants with some degree of knowledge of the merchandise they were selling.147

Besides increasing merchandise knowledge, the creation of "salesmanship” and “skilled selling" were the main objectives of much training in the inter-war period. According to

Benson, employers attempted to marshal the perceived gender-based characteristics of their increasingly female workforce. This included employers cajoling female assistants to use such supposedly "feminine attributes" like persuasiveness and empathy to increase sales and therefore the turnover of stock.148

The training of skilled selling often used "psychological" jargon in identifying customer needs and types of customers. Yet as Reekie perceptively notes, such training materials had little basis in genuine psychological research of the time, instead consisting of old, generally gender-biased, "rules of thumb" dressed up in pseudo-scientific terminology.149

Training at David Jones Ltd., 1914 - 1926

As noted in Chapter 3, David Jones' core nineteenth century staff were highly skilled tradespeople who had received apprenticeships primarily in Britain. The adoption of factory production techniques between the early 1890's and World War I saw the

147 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 147-8. 148 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 147. 149 Reekie, G. (1991). "Impulsive Women, Predictable Men: Psychological Constructions of Sexual Differences in Sales Literature to 1930". Australian Historical Studies 97, 359-377. 224 Company’s reliance upon such skills diminish. As well, apprenticeships at David Jones

Ltd., which were rare to begin with, had all but disappeared by the turn of the century.

Many industry commentators claimed that for drapery proper, apprenticeship was dead in Australia, and that other means of training needed to be developed.150

The shift from craft to factory production on the manufacturing side, also “split” production from selling. Shop assistants now had little, if any, knowledge of the product they were selling, the materials used in its manufacture or how it was made. As well, management claimed that shop assistants had become increasingly inattentive, rude and untrustworthy. Training was seen by many within the retail industry as a solution to resolving these problems.

At the end of World War I, David Jones Ltd. initiated formal training. As noted in the previous chapter, the company had experimented with formal training prior to World

War I. In May 1912, David Jones instituted courses on window dressing and bookkeeping.151

The first two training initiatives included basic training intended for juniors, and a series of lectures for seniors entitled "How to be a Buyer".152 The basic training for juniors was modelled on Filene's training program.153 Introduced in 1919, the David

150 Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1916, p.152. 151 Draper of Australasia, 27 February 1914, p.47; Sydney Morning Herald,14 June 1912, p.8. 152 Between Ourselves, 1(4), April 1919, p.14, DJA, BRG 1/463; Between Ourselves, 2(1), January 1920, p.17, DJA, BRG 1/463; Between Ourselves, 2(5), May 1920, p.10, DJA, BRG 1/463. 153 Indeed a speech given by Bernice Cannon, Filene's Education Director to the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education in Philadelphia on the need for training in retail prefaced the article announcing the introduction of David Jones' junior training programme.

225 Jones Ltd. program involved elementary tutorial courses in Salesmanship and Business

Ethics. The article in Between Ourselves mentions that this program was restricted to those aged 17 or younger. The desire for training among staff could be seen by the program being taken up by many older employees, who "voluntarily requisitioned for home-work".154 However the program also exposed shortcomings within the existing staff with "writing, spelling and geography (being) the greatest stumbling-blocks".155

In January 1920, Charles Lloyd Jones launched a second training program, this one aimed at older staff. This program consisted of a series of lectures offered under the title of

"How to Become a Buyer", and was directed "at those who were desirous of learning something of the duties of a Buyer; in other words, who hoped, finally, to become

Buyers".156 Charles Lloyd Jones announced that the program "dwelt on the first essentials of a buyer and the need for Imagination, Knowledge, Courage and

Enthusiasm".157 Charles Lloyd Jones, hinted at the program playing a role in future internal promotions, confidently announcing that "the Assistants of to-day are the

Buyers of tomorrow".158

This program consisted of a series of seven evening lectures organised by Mr. Giles, the

Staff Manager. Lectures on the following topics were given by managers and buyers at

David Jones;

-Development of the Departmental Store – Mr. Charles Lloyd Jones

154 Between Ourselves, 1(4), April 1919, p.14, DJA, BRG 1/463. 155 Ibid. 156 Between Ourselves, 2(1), January 1920, p.17, DJA, BRG 1/463; Between Ourselves, 2(5), May 1920, p.10, DJA, BRG 1/463. 157 Between Ourselves, 2(1), January 1920, p.17, DJA, BRG 1/463. 158 Ibid. 226 -Arithmetic of the Buyer - Mr. B. S. Lachlan

-Keeping Track of Your Purchases – M r. L. Weetch

-Mail Orders and How to Cater for Them - Mr. H. Johnson

-Silks and How They are Made - Mr. A. H. Conybeare

-Points to Watch When Buying – Mr. J. S. Denny

-The Responsibilities of a Buyer - M r. Kingston

The lectures were well attended with between 50 and 60 assistants attending each lecture. An exam, based on the lectures, was held in May 1920. However, the exam results were less than heartening for management, with only 3 of the exam takers receiving the minimum pass mark of 30 out of 50, the highest mark of 35 going to a Miss

Shoesmith.159

Despite these training initiatives, some managers continued to preach self-reliance on the sales floor. A 1920 article in Between Ourselves by Mr. Toomey, a senior manager at the time, provided scant help for assistants who were confronted with a knowledgeable and persistent customer. He assures assistants that David Jones Ltd. "sells good goods at fair prices" and that this should be communicated to the customer160. The assistant was expected to "inspire confidence in your customer", that David Jones has the best buyers who only deal in the best stock.161 Any practical knowledge of the merchandise, its origins or pricing was the reserve of the buyer "who are experts in their own department and know all there is to known

159 Between Ourselves, 2(5), May 1920, p.10, DJA, BRG 1/463. 160 One also suspects that such statements were made to counter accusations and suspicions, which were rife at the time, of war-time profiteering leveled by large retailers such as David Jones.

161 Between Ourselves, 2(2), February 1920, DJA, BRG 1/463. 227 about their goods".162 According to Mr. Toomey, communicating trust and confidence in

David Jones Ltd. buyers was enough to parry the customer who questioned the quality or price of an item. Other articles in Between Ourselves similarly preached self-reliance and personal motivation as the road to success.163

More sophisticated exhortations for improved output on the shop floor included a 1920 lecture by a M ademoiselle D'Allroy entitled the "Gospel of Enthusiasm". Speaking to a group of female assistants at David Jones, Mademoiselle D'Allroy spoke of the need to apply "psychology" when dealing with female customers. She told the assistants that female customers could be played like "pianos" by realising that all women were "a mixture of Vanity and Humility, of Selfishness and Self-Sacrifice, intensely tolerant and trustingly simple".164 The female shop assistant, by using her own womanly attributes of charm and influence, as well as possessing knowledge of the merchandise she was selling, could close the sale.165 Mademoiselle D'Allroy also used the "actress" metaphor for sales work, a metaphor that would become increasingly popular in retail and service work training166.

162 Ibid. 163 Between Ourselves, 1(1), January 1919, DJA, BRG 1/463. 164 Between Ourselves, 2(2), February 1920, p.16, DJA, BRG 1/463. 165 Between Ourselves, 2(2), February 1920, p.17, DJA, BRG 1/463. 166 While the obvious example of Disney theme park employees being called "cast members" is well known, the acting metaphor has become all pervasive in labour management of service sector work. It raises interesting questions on the nature of service work. In her seminal work on airline flight attendants, Hochschild, A. (1983). The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, raises the issue that this metaphor is extensively used by employers to both "mask" the extraction of emotional labour and to "manage" its damaging consequences to the worker's sense of identity. She notes that the increasing sophistication of the service sector clientele means employers want "deep" as opposed to "surface" acting from employees, making methods of labour management increasingly intrusive into the worker's sense of identity. See Leidner (1993) for an alternative, and somewhat more circumspect, view on the impact of routinised interactive service sector work on the worker's sense of identity. Leidner, R. (1993). Fast Food, Fast Talk: Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life. Berkeley and Los Angeles CA: University of California Press.

228 By the mid-1920s training was well established. The position of the Staff Instructress, was established, under the supervision of David McNeill. This position was usually filled by a woman, with her main responsibility being the orientation of new staff. By the early 1920s this was mandatory for all new junior sales staff. McNeill described the role of the Staff Instructress:

We have a Staff Instructress whose duties are to coach all junior assistants from the Selling sections in the business methods and routine of the Company. Instruction classes are held every morning for a half hour, and are attended by a percentage of juniors from each Department. A test is held every year and prizes donated by the Company awarded to the boy and girl attaining the highest percentage of marks for the year’s work, and also for the best essay on a selected commercial subject chosen by the Instructress. We find these classes of great benefit and value to the training of our juniors. All new assistants and extra hands for busy periods are taken through a preliminary instruction by the Staff instructress, which serves as groundwork for the further knowledge imparted by the Heads of Department.167

However the enthusiasm shown for training in the early 1920s was waning throughout the decade. By the mid-1920s, the ambitious "How to Become a Buyer" program was whittled down to talks by departmental heads and an irregular offering of "lantern lectures" organised by David M cNeill, and the window of opportunity for upward mobility closed. “How to Become a Buyer” offered the potential for internal promotion.

168 Despite a strong endorsement of internal advancement within the firm, there was an increasing acceptance of external training, increasingly available in this area. For instance, in 1924, the Board approved a policy of “training young men from the Great Public

Schools and the University for Administrative positions in the business”.169

167 McNeill, D., The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 168 Ibid. 169 Board Minutes, 12 March 1924, p. 358, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 229 In addition, industry support for formal training appeared to wane throughout the 1920s, as labour market conditions weakened. For instance, The Draper of Australasia, which had been a strong advocate of training throughout the war and immediate post-war period had changed its position. Whereas once it promoted the virtues of staff training, by

1925, its message for effective labour management was the need to remove inefficient employees and troublemakers or as it said to "weed the noxious plant".170

The Rituals of Welfarism

However, welfarism was more than the introduction of systematic management, training and non-wage benefits. It was a series of initiatives that also sought to create a familial relationship within the workplace and to demonstrate that working at David Jones Ltd. was somehow better than elsewhere.

This attempt to create a familial environment between the firm and staff had several dimensions. On the one hand, there was an attempt to create a notion of David Jones as an egalitarian community, in particular to create a strong sense of camaraderie among the staff. M cNeill noted that through sports teams such as baseball, tennis, hockey, football, cricket and golf (which were essentially self-supporting), the firm took an active interest in these activities and occasionally provided assistance.171

170 Draper of Australasia, 25 May 1925, p.156. 171 McNeill, D. The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 230 There was also the increasing identification of Charles Lloyd Jones as the firm’s father figure within literature directed at David Jones’ staff. He had significant formal authority within the firm, as M anaging Director, Chairman of the Board and the largest shareholder, throughout the inter-war period. Being the grandson of the firm’s founder, even though the firm had passed through many partnership changes, including long stretches in the nineteenth century where the Jones family had little input in the firm, conferred a symbolic legitimacy that was reinforced in communications with staff.

This linkage with the past was also reinforced at events involving management and staff, for instance, at the 1920 staff ball, Charles Lloyd Jones and his wife appeared dressed as colonial-era David Jones and his wife.172 The firm organised increasingly lavish rituals surrounding the departure and arrival of Charles and his family from overseas trips. In

1923, 2500 staff attended a lavish ball and reception at Town Hall to greet Charles and his wife upon their return from 10 months in Europe. Songs were sung and all staff signed a commemorative “grey book” presented to Charles.173 The commemoration of history intensified in 1924 when the annual staff ball was moved to the end of May to coincide with the firm’s founding and termed the “Milestone Ball”.174

Charles began to develop an almost regal air in his daily tours of the main store. Rod

Hodgson, a former employee noted,

172 Between Ourselves, 2(6), June 1920, DJA, BRG 1/463. 173 Evening News, 22 August 1923; The Bulletin, 30 August 1923. 174 Bystander, 6 May 1924. 231 Every day, founder’s grandson and the stores’ chairman, Sir Charles Lloyd Jones, would go through the store with a cluster of retainers and staff scurrying after him, checking that everything was up to its usual standard.175

A personal relationship was fostered between Charles and the individual employee. Mr.

M cNeill noted:

We take every possible step to inculcate into the minds of our employees the necessity for giving service always and in all ways, to Customers and fellow assistants alike. This is done by means of Inspiration notes, personal notes from Mr. C.L. Jones, and talks by the Heads of Departments. 176

Welfarism and division

The benefits of welfarism were not, apparently, equally distributed throughout David

Jones. The selling staff had a far wider range of non-wage benefits than the manufacturing staff at Marlborough Street. This differential treatment is an important consideration in determining the reasons why David Jones Ltd. implemented welfarism.

M cNeill noted for instance, that selling staff had a reading room, access to the

Restaurant, greater proportional representation in regards to the Mutual Aid Society and

Committee management, a surgery with a matron, and personal interaction with Charles.

On the other hand, manufacturing staff were effectively punished for having better unpaid leave conditions under the award as they were denied the two weeks’ paid holidays granted to the selling staff.177 References to the welfare benefits of

175 Dando, C. (1988). “ Counter Intelligence: Confessions of DJs staff made good”. Good Weekend, 21 May 1988, 31. 176 McNeill, D., The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 177 Ibid.; Board Minutes, 2 December 1925, p. 453, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 232 manufacturing staff at the Marlborough Street factory note the existence of a well-lit and ventilated factory, a luncheon room and a lavatory on each floor.178

Selling staff enjoyed other perks denied to the manufacturing staff. This differential compounded a view held by many staff that the selling staff had more status. Edith

Molloy who worked as a salesperson in city tailoring department in the 1920s noted:

The store was absolutely lovely and made me feel exclusive. The girls felt very glamorous being able to make appointments to have their hair done in the beauty salon during their lunch hour.179

As noted above, some welfare benefits were available to selling staff and were not necessarily offered to the manufacturing staff. On the one hand, this may have reflected the long-standing difference of status between "waged" and "salaried" staff, but it may have also been the result of a deliberate targeting of a more developed welfarism, aimed at selling staff at David Jones. 180

MacCulloch also notes the existence of this division at David Jones Ltd., noting that

M arlborough Street staff felt selling staff considered themselves socially superior.

M acCulloch analysed this as the response of selling staff to the lack of employment- related opportunities within the firm, and the consequent focussing of their energies on elevating themselves socially.181

178 The Draper of Australasia, 27 May 1914, p.202; T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936, p. 19. 179 Stewart, V. (1990). “ The Way They Were: A Sydney Department Store in the 1920s”. Heritage Australia, 9(4), 22. 180 Lockwood, D. (1989). The Blackcoated Worker; A Study in Class Consciousness (Second Edition). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 181 MacCulloch (1980), “ This store”, 176-7. 233 If this is the case, and the evidence from the inter-war period at David Jones strongly suggests that it is, then it forces a reconsideration of many of the reasons put forward explain why employers introduced welfarism during this period.

Feminisation of the workforce has been an explanation for welfarism.182 Yet,

M arlborough Street had a far more significant female workforce than the George Street store. In 1938, 1125 women were employed at Marlborough Street and only 175 men.183

On the other hand, the retailing side appeared to have feminised far more gradually.

Figures from 1907 note that 272 males but only 143 females were employed as shop assistants at George Street.184 Even as late as 1938, 1087 men were employed at the three stores in selling positions while 2904 women were.185

Another popular argument has been that welfarism was a direct response to trade union activity and industrial unrest.186 Yet Marlborough Street appeared to have been the site of much more concerted trade union activity and industrial unrest, with disputes in 1917 and 1920, while no industrial activity is recorded at the city stores during this period.187

The introduction of welfarism did coincide with a period of industrial turmoil and a concern amongst the David Jones Ltd. management over the possible outcomes

182 Reekie (1987) “ Humanising Industry”; Sangster, J. (1993). “ The Softball Solution: Female Workers, Male Managers and the Operation of Paternalism at Westclox, 1923-60”. Labour/Le Travail, 32, 167-199. 183 David Jones News, 6 July 1938, DJA, p.1 184 Ibid.;.Figures for Arbitration Court – 1907, DJA, BRG 1/22/2, pp.1-2. 185 Ibid. 186 Brandes, S. (1976). American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940. Chicago IL and London: University of Chicago Press; Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books, 91-98; Brody, D. (1993). “ The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism” in D. Brody (ed.) Workers in Industrial America, Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 48-81. 187 Board Minutes, 21 February 1917, p. 126, DJA, BRG 1/32/2; Board Minutes, 20 November 1917, p. 153- 4, DJA, BRG 1/32/2; Board Minutes, 26 August 1920, p. 155, DJA, BRG 1/32/3. 234 appears to have triggered, to some degree, the introduction of welfarism. However, as time passed and with it the threat of revolutionary industrial action that seemed very real in 1919-1920, welfarism appears to have been motivated increasingly by other factors.

Even the role of the external labour market in precipitating the Company’s welfarist practices is questionable, with clippings from 1925 noting that the firm was encountering greater difficulty securing manufacturing staff that selling staff. 188

Yet another explanation for welfarism, is that it was merely a formalisation of a pre- existing tradition of paternalism.189 However, as noted in previous chapters, there is little evidence of a pre-existing paternalist culture at David Jones. The only truly generous benefit was early closing, yet evidence suggests that this was initially brought about by employee agitation, and that it was eventually supported by the firm as being in its longer term commercial interests. The linkages to a paternalist past appear to be an

"an invented tradition", an attempt by David Jones Ltd. to legitimise new practices, that owed far more to the new psychology and overseas experiments than they did to earlier practice at David Jones Limited.

However, there do appear to be other factors at work that could explain why welfarism was more developed at the city stores than at the Marlborough Street factory. One was that welfarism does appear to be a response to the nature of the selling process. The indeterminacy of the selling process was increasingly being

188 Sydney Mornng Herald, 29 June 1925. 189 Reekie (1987), “ Humanising Industry”. 235 recognised, and managers sought to control it.190 As well, the handling of money, as noted by the massive investment in cash registers, appears to have been of concern to

David Jones management in managing those who worked in the stores.

Further, the assistants at David Jones, unlike the manufacturing staff at Marlborough

Street, were in the public eye and their behaviour, both real and as presented in advertising material, would increasingly become an important part of the firm’s public profile. In this sense, welfarism at David Jones would increasingly be part of how the firm marketed itself as a source of service.

In the 1920s, as the fear of a genuine revolution receded, there was the rise of anti-chain sentiment and accusations in the media of profiteering, as well as the escalating importance of advertising and marketing.191 For firms such as David Jones, its public face was becoming increasingly important, both in the commercial and political arena.

Welfarist initiatives themselves and the “quality” of the David Jones shopping experience, underpinned by a trained, committed and professional salesperson, increasingly made their way into advertising and promotional materials for David

Jones.192 By the mid-1920s, David Jones had adopted the motto “For Service” that appeared as part of its promotional and advertising materials for decades.193

190 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures. 191 Evening News, 19 February 1920; Smith’s W eekly, 28 February 1920; Smith’s W eekly, 1 April 1920. 192 For example, see Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May 1927, p.9. 193 McNeill, D., The Ideal Staff Policy for a Departmental Store, circa 1928, DJA, McNeill Papers. 236 This injection of its labour management approach into the public arena contributed to broader political and ideological debates. Charles Lloyd Jones, himself active in non-

Labor politics, held up his firm as proof that Labor and Socialist critics were wrong, that the problems of the economy would not be fixed politically but rather by promoting growth and opportunity.194

Yet underneath the veneer of welfarism, training and systematic management, harsh and, occasionally arbitrary, employment conditions still persisted. Decisions affecting individual employees continued to be carried out in an individual basis; for instance, the payment of pensions and sick benefits or the differential treatment between city store and M arlborough Street staff. Nor did welfarism necessarily translate into a commitment to providing job security. In response to declining trading conditions, there were drastic cuts at Marlborough Street where staff numbers were reduced by 40 per cent between

1918 and 1925.195

The early welfarism of the immediate post-War period survived but in a somewhat diminished form when the firm opened its new Elizabeth Street Store in 1927. The

Depression of the 1930s was a test of the firm’s commitments. By the end of the 1930s, however welfarism had not been abandoned and had consolidated into a much more mature form. Yet, World War II would prove to be an even-greater challenge to the maintenance of welfarism, as its expense and efficacy were challenged by even newer labour management strategies.

194 Sunday Times, 11 November 1921. 195 T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936. 237 The once informal rituals and events that brought staff together appeared to be increasingly formalised. The Staff Ball and the overseas departure or arrival of a member of the Jones family, which at one time may have seen a more spontaneous greeting or farewell by staff, were now increasingly elaborate "events" organised and managed by

Staff Office. Sport clubs, picnics and later the David Jones Christmas Choir were similarly formally managed and supported by Staff Office. These provided much of the cultural aspect of welfarism and in many instances were part of the firm's welfaristic

"public face", appearing prominently in the firm's advertising and promotional materials.

This “linkage” with the past was frequently reinforced in communications and events involving the staff. Indeed, the past was used to legitimise welfarism, though there existed almost no evidence of any deliberate paternalism. Twentieth century welfarism at David Jones was almost a romanticised and ritualised but inaccurate recreation of a mythical past, a thoroughly modern response to the anxieties of post-war modernity.

238 CHAPTER EIGHT

The Consolidation of Welfarism at David Jones, 1927-1939

“Each and every one of us, on our job, is David Jones.” – David Jones News, 1937

On Monday 28 November 1927, the new Elizabeth Street Store of David Jones was opened. It was to be a landmark event for the firm as it positioned itself in what was to be a golden era during the late 1920s and 1930s. However, this period was not without its troubles, most notably the Great Depression. This saw a severe scaling back of many of the benefits within the firm and widescale staff cuts. As the Depression of the early

1930s receded, the firm enjoyed a period of substantial growth out of which emerged a fully developed welfarism. As the firm moved towards its centenary and the opening of yet another store in Sydney’s Central Business District on Market Street in 1938, developments and innovations from overseas, hastened by the Second World War would see inter-war welfarism challenged by new retail strategies.

Economic, Social and Political Context

The economic landscape of the period was critical in shaping many of the labour management developments of David Jones. Welfarism in the Company blossomed in the relatively robust economic environment of the late 1920s and late 1930s. The

Depression, however, had a devastating impact on the economy of Australia. The value of manufacturing dropped by one-third between 1920 and 1932, and the

239 official unemployment rate rose to nearly 30 per cent by 1932.1 Despite the

Depression, some of the elements of the early welfarism were retained.

The Second World War had a complex effect on labour management. Components of this included an increasingly active state and resurgent labour movement, alongside the promotion of new retailing initiatives in a tight labour market. Government became involved in promoting modern labour management techniques.2 While David Jones Ltd. remained in the forefront of this, other developments in retailing challenged the role of welfarism as a deliberate labour management strategy.

The late 1920s and early 1930s also saw political turmoil in Sydney and New South

Wales, often focussed around the NSW Labor Government of Jack Lang and enveloping both the right and left.3 Charles Lloyd Jones himself became increasingly politicised during this period, flirting with far right politics but also holding up his firm as an example of what was right with the current system. This turmoil would carry through into World War II, as a tight labour market brought about a level of strikes not seen since the end of World War I.

From the late 1920s onwards there was also considerable urban expansion and consolidation within Sydney. This included modernisation of the transport infrastructure including development of the tram system, the completion of several

1 Ellem, B. (1989). In Women’s Hands?. Kensington: UNSW Press, 156. 2 Wright, C. (1995). The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 3 Nairn, B. (1986). The “Big Fella”: Jack Lang and the Australian Labor Party 1891-1949. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 240 new underground city railway stations and, most spectacularly, the completion of the

Sydney Harbour Bridge in 1932.4 These developments together with the rise of the motor car, made it easier for suburban customers to reach city-based stores such as

David Jones.

New Elizabeth Street Store

The modern David Jones store, completed on the corner of Elizabeth and Market Street in 1927, was the firm’s showpiece. The new store, designed by noted Sydney architect

Charles Mackellar, drew its inspiration from Selfridge's in London. The store was nine stories high, not including the basement and sub-basement. It was a thoroughly modern structure, constructed on a steel frame, purpose-built and including full electricity, air conditioning, lifts and telephones.5 Found inside were carpeting on the upper floors and only the finest fixtures. Construction on the new Elizabeth Street Store, which cost nearly £1 million, began in 1924 and ended in 1927.6

Its completion was not without its difficulties however. A shop fitters’ strike almost delayed the opening of the store prior to the 1927 Christmas season. Fitting out of the shop had been contracted out to John Grant & Co, whose staff went on strike 7

February 1927 and did not recommence work until April.7 The Board sought to

4 Spearrit, P. (2000). Sydney’s Century. Kensington: UNSW Press. 5 Electrical Trade of Australasia (1932). Electrical and Allied Equipment in a Modern Store. Glebe NSW: Simmons Limited. 6 Jones, C.L. (1955). “ The History of David Jones Limited”. Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 41(5), 236; "Angry Pawnbroker" Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April 1924; "Pawnbroker vs. Workmen", Daily Telegraph, 2 April 1924. 7 Board Minutes, 9 March 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.28. 241 secure outside services and remained in constant contact with Mr. Clarence Edwards, the

General Manager, who happened to be in London at the time.8 The Board noted with trepidation that “Grant thinks further industrial difficulties probable – should they happen we will not be able to occupy the store for Xmas.”9 However, further industrial conflict was avoided and the intended 1 November 1927 opening was delayed by only 4 weeks.10

Considerable attention was given to the Elizabeth Street store’s luxurious design, with its mirrors and marble, and its adoption of new technology, with steel-frame construction, air-conditioning, electric lifts and internal telephone system.11 Another technological innovation that received much less publicity but cost the organisation nearly £3000 was the introduction of employee time clocks, designed to better monitor the arrival and departure of staff. Upon the recommendation of M r. M cNeill, the firm had 21 clocks installed throughout the new Elizabeth Street store.12 The adoption of new technologies was matched by modernisation elsewhere within the firm at this time. The last of horse- drawn delivery vehicles were phased out in 1927 and replaced with by seven M orris trucks at a total cost of £ 2700.13

The new Elizabeth Street store also provided an opportunity to introduce certain improvements in the physical, working environment. The traditions of an on-site surgery with a matron, as well as a subsidised staff cafeteria, both which had begun

8 Board Minutes, 29 March 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.34. 9 Board Minutes, 14 April 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.34. 10 Board Minutes, 4 April 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.34. 11 Electrical Trade of Australasia (1932). Electrical and Allied Equipment in a Modern Store. Glebe NSW: Simmons Limited; Stewart, V. (1990). “ The Way They Were: A Sydney Department Store in the 1920s”. Heritage Australia, 9(4), 21. 12 Board Minutes, 3 September 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.54; Board Minutes, 31 September 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.58; Board Minutes, 14 April 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.34. 13 Board Minutes, 3 June 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.44. 242 at George Street were also included at the Elizabeth Street Store. Another bonus of working at Elizabeth Street was that staff could order meals from the prestigious “Great

Restaurant on the Seventh Floor” and eat those meals at the cafeteria during their lunch or dinner break. At Elizabeth Street there was also a staff lounge where, according to

M r. M cNeill, “staff may smoke, sew, read or otherwise amuse themselves during their lunch and dinner hour”.14 Such benefits were strongly promoted in magazines, with photos of glamourous assistants relaxing in the well-lit and well-presented staff room.

Yet for all its modernity and glamour, the basic design of the workspace and the manner in which selling took place were unchanged from the end of the nineteenth century.

Assistants continued to work behind counters, where merchandise was stocked in display cabinets or drawers. In most departments, the customer still needed to approach the counter and request assistance from the sales staff before inspecting items.

Once again Marlborough Street factory staff were given far less attention in the creation of a better working environment. Although the Marlborough Street staff lobbied hard for the building of tennis courts on the premises, the Board “decided with regret that the cost was too great for the proposition to be entertained.”15 The matter was again raised in 1932 and was once again rejected by the Board.16

14 McNeill, D. (1934). “ The Essentials of a Staff Organisation Plan”. Rydge’s, 1 June 1934, 552-3. 15 Board Minutes, 12 December 1928, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.121. 16 Board Minutes, 28 September 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.309. 243 The building of the new store was at least informed by an increasing focus on turnover rather than mark-up. In his report to the Directors only weeks before the move, Charles

Lloyd Jones noted:

The transfer of the business to its new home is being arranged for at an early date, and the increased trading facilities then at our command will undoubtably ensure a still greater expansion in turnover… Most departments will be equipped with practically double their present floor space, and that fact, combined with the facilities for the display of stock which will be available, must have its effect on the turnover. 17

And in his address to the 22nd Annual General Meeting, Charles thanked the staff for their co-operation in the opening of the new Elizabeth Street store.

This move could only have been accomplished by the unfailing co-operation of the Staff. If our Shareholders could have seen with what a will they worked, with what enthusiasm and untiring effort, they would realise what a splendid work they performed. We have further cause to make comment on the good-will of our Staff, for we entered a busy Christmas season, and as soon as the Christmas season was over, we had a long January sale. Every demand made by the Company was responded to splendidly, and the success of the year’s operation was largely due to their co-operation and good-will, and the Directors are anxious that the shareholders know the debt we owe them.18

In his address the following year, Charles further complimented the staff:

We are happy in our staff, we have a splendid team who in the main carry on the tradition of David Jones. Service, service, service is our motto, to make our customers satisfied, to tender them our consideration and courtesy is our aim. We feel our staff sets an example to like organisations in the city.19

The completion of the Elizabeth Street store was accompanied by a significant increase in staff numbers. Prior to 1927, the firm employed 1600 employees, of whom about

1000 were at Marlborough Street and the remainder at George Street.20 An additional

2700 staff were engaged as a result of the opening of Elizabeth Street.

17 Board Minutes, 12 October 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.63-4. 18 Chairman’s Address to the 22nd Annual General Meeting, 17 October 1928, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.112. 19 Chairman’s Address to the 23rd Annual General Meeting, 16 October 1929, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.158. 20 McNeill, D., Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store, Lecture given 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.1. 244 The opening of the Market Street store in 1938 resulted in the employment of another

1000 people. By the beginning of the Second World War the firm employed nearly 6000 people.21

However, the prosperity of the late 1920s did not to last, with the Depression came the collapse of trading conditions in 1930. Several policies were introduced to cut expenditure on staff, including both wage and staff cuts. In March 1930, the Board resolved that all staff including senior management, buyers and wage earners were to take one week off in ten without pay.22 Similarly, production employees were to be employed “according to the demand in their own particular calling.”23 At Marlborough

Street, this meant significant staff reductions. 115 employees from a staff of slightly over

1000 lost their jobs.24 Yet again, the factory staff were disproportionately disadvantaged, as it appears that few elsewhere in the organisation actually lost their jobs.

Selling and administrative staff did not experience the same staff cuts. However, they were subject to substantial cuts in wages and conditions as a response to the Depression.

In August 1930, the Board decided to cuts the salaries of all executive, buyers and administrative staff by 20 per cent. Other staff also had wage cuts of about 20 per cent but they took the form of each general staff member having to take a week’s

“compulsory holiday without pay” every five weeks.25 In addition, all staff

21 Ibid. 22 Board Minutes, 5 March 1930, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.172. 23 Ibid. 24 Buckley, K. and Wheelwright, T. (1998). A False Paradise. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 114; T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936, p. 20. 25 Board Minutes, 23 August 1930, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.188. 245 who had previously enjoyed the two weeks paid annual leave, had this benefit cut to a single week of unpaid leave.26 As well, commissions to sales assistants were suspended in December 1931. There appears to have been a further 5 per cent salary reduction in

1930-31.27

When discussing the changes at the 1931 Annual General Meeting, Charles, not surprisingly, noted that the cuts were shared throughout David Jones Ltd. but sought to emphasise the sacrifices made by those “at the top”. However, there was no mention of the employees at Marlborough Street who had lost their jobs.28

Beginning in mid-1932, the cuts to wages and conditions were gradually reversed. The five per cent wage reductions were reversed from 1 August 1932.29 The restoration of the fortnightly paid annual leave took effect in September 1933, however the benefit was only extended to those who had worked for five continuous years with the firm.30

Reductions in wages and benefits were not the only means by which the firm sought to respond to the economic conditions of the Depression. In 1931, the Board agreed to the introduction of the Bedaux system in the shirt workroom at the Marlborough Street factory. Promoted by “second generation” scientific management advocate, Charles

Bedaux, this was a popular form of work reorganisation similar to scientific management that incorporated physiological factors (such as fatigue) into time and

26 Ibid. 27 Board Minutes, 23 December 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.264; Board Minutes, 24 August 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.303. 28 Chairman’s Address to the 25th Annual General Meeting, 14 October 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.251. 29 Board Minutes, 24 August 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.303. 30 Board Minutes, 20 September 1933, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.357. 246 motion studies.31 After a seemingly successful twelve-month trial, the Board considered the extension of the Bedaux system elsewhere in the factory.32 Although the Bedaux system seems to have been used throughout the Marlborough Street factory, it generated considerable opposition. In 1934, the Clothing Trades Union commenced action against

David Jones over Bedaux. This was a long-simmering dispute that continued throughout much of the decade.33 In considering the matter, the Board noted that it had been handed over to their solicitors.34

However the Company, while struggling like most others, was far from being on the brink during the Depression. Despite staff reductions and other cuts, the Board authorised considerable spending on new equipment for Marlborough Street during this period. In the depths of the Depression between 1931 and 1934, thousands of pounds were spent on knitting machines, knitting looms and steam presses.35

The Depression also saw a continued simmering of industrial disputation at Marlborough

Street in areas other than the introduction of Bedaux. In November 1931, the Board decided that overtime rates for factory and workroom employees would be paid at

“salary rates not award rates”, indicating a deliberate decision to not pay the higher award overtime rate.36

31 Board Minutes, 29 April 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.225. 32 Board Minutes, 30 April 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.284. 33 Board Minutes, 21 March 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.386; see also Wright (1995), The Management of Labour, 27 and Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 171. 34 Board Minutes, 21 March 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.386. 35 Board Minutes, 18 November 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.258; Board Minutes, 27 July 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.299; Board Minutes, 16 May 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.395. 36 Board Minutes, 25 November 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.260. 247 Charles Lloyd Jones’ noted in his Chairman’s address to the 1932 Annual General meeting, the frustration encountered by the firm in dealing with both Federal and State awards:

The time is long overdue for a complete review of existing industrial legislation of both Commonwealth and State. At the present time it is not unusual in our organisation for two persons working side by side doing the same class of work to be subject to different rates of pay, for instance, an alteration hand in dress making under the State Award gets 39/- a week, sitting beside a girl under a Federal Award at 44/7d doing the same work. Under the same awards the junior under the State commences at 12/- per week and under the Federal 7/3d. Under the Millinery Awards the position is reversed the State awarding 44/- per week and the Federal 38/9d thus showing that there is no common basis for arriving at these Awards. These varying conditions are most harassing to trade and in some instance the position is intolerable. This is not a plea for lower wages but for uniform conditions of working so that all parties throughout the Commonwealth may be on an equal footing.37

The firm adopted several strategies to deal with the problems presented by award coverage. One was to resign from the Retail Traders’ Association of New South Wales and join the Clothing Manufacturers’ Association. This appears to have been done primarily to shift the existing award coverage, which was determined by firm’s employer association membership.38 By 1935, David Jones had rejoined the Retail Traders’

Association, a body it had been instrumental in establishing.39

The social and political uncertainty of the period spilled over into the industrial arena and was felt first hand by industrial action at Marlborough Street. Indeed, the Board’s concern over the social state of New South Wales in 1931 and 1932 can be

37 Chairman’s Address to the 26th Annual General Meeting, 12 October 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.6. 38 Board Minutes, 10 June 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.232. 39 Board Minutes, 11December 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.493. 248 seen by the taking out riot and civil commotion insurance on the Elizabeth and George

Street stores as well as on the Marlborough Street factory.40

Government intervention continued to be an issue for the firm. In several of his speeches at Annual General Meetings’ Charles Lloyd Jones declared the problems with “big government”.41 Government inspectors from the New South Wales Department of

Labour and Industry demanded the installation of a fire escape between the 6th and 7th floor at Marlborough Street Factory as well as painting of the lavatories in May 1932.

This cost the firm a sum of £ 212.42

Indeed, the surviving elements of welfarism for sales staff became sites of conflict throughout the Depression. The much-cherished 15 per cent “house discount” became one such area of conflict. Charles took it upon himself to explain to staff the conditions behind the discount.43 David M cNeill and another manager, M r. Bradford, scrutinised house purchases and made reports to the Board to eliminate abuses.44 The abuses appear to have been the use of the house discount for make purchases for friends and family. In response a recommendation was made by M r. M cNeill and adopted by the

Board that “house discount be allowed only when members of the staff shop personally or where a dependant produces a duly signed permit issued from Staff Office.”45

Commissions also appear to have been a cause

40 Board Minutes, 24 December 1930, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.208; Board Minutes, 9 December 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.262. 41 Chairman’s Address to the 23rd Annual General Meeting, 16 October 1929, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.158; Chairman’s Address to the 26th Annual General Meeting, 12 October 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.6. 42 Board Minutes, 25 May 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.291. 43 Board Minutes, 20 April 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.284. 44 Board Minutes, 27 April 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.286. Board Minutes, 4 July 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.405. 45 Board Minutes, 18 July 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.407. 249 for conflict during the Depression as the store sought to stop selling staff from

“splitting” commissions with customers in order to secure a sale.46

The Depression, combined with industrial turmoil and encroaching Government regulation, hardened the politics of Charles Lloyd Jones in particular. Charles had flirted with right-wing politics including making donations to anti-Lang and anti-Communist organisations such as Sane Democracy League and the NSW Constitutional

Association.47 He even advocated policies that would seem rather odd to the wider political and business community, but echoed his support for welfarism. For instance,

Charles made a generally ignored proposal that Anzac Day 1930 should be a working day, not a public holiday, and that the wages and profits be used for job creation.48

Increasingly Charles used his Chairman’s Addresses launch attacks on big government and to advocate the need for business and government to play their respective roles. At the 1929 Annual General Meeting, he said:

Year by year the burden of taxation becomes heavier and heavier and it is desirable that shareholders should realise these facts and assist the Directors in endeavouring to influence the various Governments to ease the burden. There is too much Government in business and not enough business in Government.49

Charles further articulated his views on the need for small government in the 1930

Annual General Meeting:

I would like to make the economic position generally – the future of all business is now so bound up with the financial stability of Australia that it needs no apology to introducing the subject. Financial stability is bound up with

46 Board Minutes, 31 May 1933, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.342. 47 Board Minutes, 31 May 1933, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.342; Wheatley, N. (1988). “ All the Same Boat?: Sydney’s Rich and Poor in the Great Depression”, in V. Burgmann and J. Lee (eds.), Making a Life: History of Australia since 1788. Fitzroy: McPhee Gribble / Penguin, 214. 48 Buckley and Wheelwright (1998), A False Paradise, 114. 49 Chairman’s Address to the 23rd Annual General Meeting, 16 October 1929, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.158. 250 confidence in Government action. The people of Australia have, through their respective Government, National and Labour (sic) alike, unanimously pledged themselves to balance their budget, and to pay their way, and upon the honouring of this pledge depends the success of all, shareholders, employer and employee alike. There is no easy way out, and must be prepared for sacrifices in one way or another. This company, with its army of employees, something over 3000, in common with all other trading companies in Australia, is virtually concerned with honouring the pledge of balancing the Budget.50

By 1935, the worst effects of the Depression were over and overall Australian economic output returned to the levels of prior to the crash of 1929.51 This was reflected at the

Marlborough Street factory, where staffing and output rose to pre-1929 levels.52

The mid-1930s also saw the return of a much more robust welfarism which was primarily aimed at sales staff. Building upon existing measures, initiatives such as the superannuation fund were resolved, the in-house staff magazine was restored, and there was a new emphasis on training underpinned by the notion of “skilled selling” that was promoted by management consultants. The culture of welfarism, built upon ideals of co- operation and history, was further developed, especially as the firm moved towards its hundredth anniversary in 1938.

Charles Lloyd Jones signalled this renewed post-Depression commitment to staff in his address to the 1935 Annual General Meeting, where he noted:

We place our responsibility to our staff even before our shareholders for without our staff their ability, help, understanding and co-operation we would be unable to successfully run the Company or make profits.53

50 Chairman’s Address to the 24th Annual General Meeting, 15 October 1930, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.199. 51 Ellem (1989), In Women’s Hands?, 156. 52 T.O Hansen, Lecture on the Marlborough Street Factory, DJA, MacNeill Papers, 19 May 1936, p. 20.

53 Chairman’s Address to the 29th Annual General Meeting, 15 October 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.3. 251 The resurgence of welfarism and training, and the intensification of systematic management, at David Jones Ltd. was based upon several developments. One was the reintroduction of a staff magazine, first a short-lived publication call the Dajonian

Monthly from 1932 to 1934, then the David Jones News in April 1936.54 The David

Jones News was a monthly 4-page tabloid publication for staff. It contained gossip and news about staff and managers but there was also more serious pieces about David

Jones’ policy and how sales staff, in particular, could improve their selling skills. The

David Jones News maintained this format well into the 1960s and survived in a diminished form up until the late 1990s.

David M cNeill’s systematic management also continued strongly into the 1930s. He maintained a key role in areas such as recruitment, selection and record keeping. In a lengthy 1934 article in the business magazine, Rydge’s, he summarised some of the labour management policies and practices at David Jones.55

In this article, M cNeill noted that the firm continued to avoid use of newspaper advertising for job vacancies, even as unemployment was receding. Rather, he would normally interview applicants on the spot when they made their application.56 He was confident that he could judge applicants more or less on the spot: firstly, by their walk, appearance and clothes; secondly, by their voice, manner and mode of address; thirdly, by their experience and personality.57 From these impressions, M cNeill felt he could categorise people into three groups; the “peak” class, who

54 The Dajonian Monthly, October 1932, and David Jones News, (hereafter referred to as “ DJN”) 7 April 1936, DJA. 55 McNeill, D. (1934). “ The Essentials of a Staff Organisation Plan”. Rydge’s, 1 June 1934, 549-53,63. 56 Ibid. 57 The Sun, 28 June 1931. 252 were of seemingly high intelligence and strong personalities, the “intermediate” class, who required further investigation of their education and experience and the “zero” class, who were of a “low standard of intellect and personality”.58 He noted that the majority of applicants were in the intermediate category, while the other two were in the minority, however he also noted that this system was used for filling 90 per cent of job vacancies at David Jones.59

M cNeill noted that following any initial impressions, he would generally judge the applicant from the intermediate class on the basis of experience and education. Different screening criteria were used to judge younger and older applicants:

In the selection of the younger staff there are several important factors in their background which should not be overlooked, namely, their home environment (by which an estimate of their conduct can be obtained), their school environment and the standard of education reached. These factors are of infinite assistance in summing up the child’s character and the developments it is likely to make under the new regime.

With senior applicants, naturally the character has become mature and the personality has lost much of the naive frankness of the child (who displays little self- consciousness). It is more difficult to analyse them in many ways. Their experience naturally assists in the assessing of their value as a prospective employee. Those who have held positions in reputable firms are chosen in preference to others, unless, of course, exceptional qualifications are exhibited.60

M cNeill, as noted in the previous chapter, remained ambivalent about the use of psychological testing in an environment such as David Jones. Its use, in the period immediate after World War I, had proven costly and of limited use.61 However, M cNeill saw the value of consulting psychological texts in selection, having in his

58 McNeill (1934), “ The Essentials”, 551. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 However it should be noted that the 1934-35 Annual Report of the Australasian Institute of Industrial Psychology noted David Jones as a user of its services. 253 personal library books such as K. Blackford’s Character Analysis by the Observational

Method (1920) and W.G Fern’s Analysed Personality (1933).62 Despite McNeill’s personal interest in and enthusiasm for psychology and his desire to dress up his personal approach in pseudo-psychological jargon, selection remained an “art” rather than a “science” at David Jones.63

M cNeill had also built up the employee records initiated after World War I, so that by the 1930s the records had become an increasingly sophisticated and oppressive tool for monitoring staff. M cNeill noted:

An annual stocktaking of employees is a distinct advantage in a large business; in fact, it is almost a necessity if efficiency is desired. A stocktaking of entire staff should be taken and the records kept so that comparisons may be made with previous years; in this way progressive as well as retrogressive assistants can be singled out and the discarding of inefficient employees becomes a simple matter.

The selling staff of a modern store should be under constant review. Every passing day is important and can show a remarkable difference in the sales of an assistant. By means of figures and records the fluctuations in sales can be observed, individually as well as departmentally. When any particular employee shows signs of retrogression, an interview with the staff manager points this out, the fault is eliminated and possibly the cause of it as well. Allowances are made for circumstances which may prevent the assistant from maintaining a certain standard continuously, but the value of such a review will be recognised. Observation should never be allowed to become or be mistaken for a suspicious surveillance. The effect of suspicion is almost invariably the direct antithesis of what is desired. Interested supervision and observation, however, impress the staff and stimulate them to make special efforts to keep ‘on the right side of the ledger’.64

By the mid-1930s, the record keeping and monitoring of individual sales staff performance was done in considerable detail. A daily tally was used to monitor the amount of merchandise sold by each individual sales assistant. This information

62 McNeill Papers, DJA. 63 Reekie, G. (1991). “ Impulsive Women, Predictable Men: Psychological Constructions of Sexual Difference in Sales Literature to 1930”. Australian Historical Studies, 97, 359-377 similarly notes the existence of “ pseudo-psychological jargon:” to legitimise pre-existing prejudices. 64 McNeill (1934), “ The Essentials”, 563. 254 was used for several purposes. If an individual’s sales performance was considerably below the Departmental or Store average, then the Staff M anager would arrange an

“interview” to resolve the situation. If not resolved satisfactorily, the sales assistant would likely be dismissed. Buyers and department heads were also expected to track the net profit, being calculated as gross sales minus labour costs for their department.65

One area that was far from systematised was the paying of retirement benefits. The firm continued to make ad hoc payments to certain staff on their retirement. The Depression made a severe impact upon what was paid, and highlights the seemingly arbitrary decision-making in this area. The treatment of three long serving retiring employees, Mr.

Muckleton, Mr. Giffard and Mr. Thompson, is illustrative of this. At the Board meeting of 17 August 1927, retirement allowances of £2 a week (or £104 a year) were authorised for M uckleton and Giffard, while Thompson was to receive an allowance of £65 per annum.66 However by the end of 1928, it was decided to halve the payments made to

Muckleton and Giffard to £1 per week, while Thompson’s payments were maintained.67

The Board decided to continue the payments of £52 per annum to Giffard and

Muckleton and £65 per annum to Thompson for 1930.68 However, it was decided at the end of 1930 to cease the payments to Giffard and Muckelton effective December 1930, while Thompson’s payment continued at £65 per annum.69 Thompson’s payment continued throughout

65 McNeill, D. (1936) “ There’s More to Buying than Merchandise: A Lecture on the Records Used by a Staff Manager in a Modern Store” 23 September 1936, McNeill Papers, DJA. 66 Board Minutes, 17 August 1927, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.57. 67 Board Minutes, 14 November 1928, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.118. 68 Board Minutes, 13 November 1929, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.161. 69 Board Minutes, 26 November 1930, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.203. 255 1931, though it was reduced from £65 per annum to £1 per week (or £52 per annum) effective 1 January 1932.70

In the Depression, the payments were much less generous than in the 1920s. In 1931,

M iss Sheridan received a gratuity of £25, after 35 years service in the Dressmaking

Workroom.71 M r. Albert Jones “as a mark of appreciation of his long service” of 20 years also received £25.72 Others were far less fortunate than Miss Sheridan or Mr.

Albert Jones. Miss Daisy Dent’s retirement allowance was “left in the hands of the

Chairman”.73 There was no record of Charles’ decision but it was ominously minuted at the 16 March 1932 Board meeting that it was decided “not to reopen this matter”.74

A formal superannuation scheme, with benefits to be paid to employees retiring or otherwise leaving the firm, had been considered in 1923. At that time, the Colonial

Mutual Life Society presented a formal proposal to David Jones for a scheme that would provide benefits when retiring at age 60, life insurance cover and sickness benefits.75

This proposal appears to have been rejected.

Changes to taxation law that provided for company profits to receive concessional status when contributed to a superannuation fund, gave the Board the impetus to finally introduce such a fund. In August 1934, the Board resolved to transfer £ 5000 from the profits from the 1933-34 financial year into “a special fund to provide

70 Board Minutes, 6 January 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.266. 71 Board Minutes, 2 February 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.211. 72 Board Minutes, 7 October 1931, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.250. 73 Board Minutes, 6 January 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.266. 74 Board Minutes, 16 March 1932, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.279. 75 Board Minutes, 20 June 1923, DJA, BRG 1/32/3, p.313. 256 retiring allowances, pensions or other individual personal benefits for the employees of the Company and such fund to be placed entirely with the control and under the administration of trustees to be duly appointed.”76

The establishment of the superannuation fund took several months to complete. In

March 1935, a trust deed was drawn up and submitted to the Board by the David Jones’ solicitors, Norton Smith & Co. This deed was then submitted to the Federal and State

Commissioners of Taxation for the fund to receive its tax-exempt status.77 In the following month the trustees of the superannuation fund were appointed by the Board.

They were M r. David M cNeill, the staff manager; M r. R.A. Brindley, the chief accountant; and the long-serving head of the Mail Order Department, Mr. Herbert

Johnson.78 David Jones Ltd. made substantial contributions to the newly established superannuation fund. In August 1935, £10,000 was paid into the fund followed by a further £10,000 in August 1936.79

The establishment of the superannuation fund did not end ad hoc payment of retirement allowances as it was not open to membership or paying benefits.80 Indeed, the better trading conditions of the mid-1930s saw the return of much more substantial retirement allowances. M r. Elliot, an employee of 28 years, received a retirement gratuity of £100

“in recognition of his long service”.81 John Flynn received a considerably more generous

£100 gratuity for his relatively short tenure

76 Board Minutes, 29 August 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.414. 77 Board Minutes, 20 March 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.453. 78 Board Minutes, 10 April 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.457. 79 Board Minutes, 21 August 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.474; Board Minutes, 26 August 1936, DJA, BRG /32/4, p.523. 80 Chairman’s Address to the 30th Annual General Meeting, 21 October 1936, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.561. 81 Board Minutes, 12 December 1934, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.433. 257 of 13 years of service.82 Weekly retirement allowances continued throughout the mid-

1930s, with a more standardised informal policy of payments ranging from £1 to £3 per week authorised at six month intervals by the Board or a delegated senior manager.83

Training

The most significant change of this period in relation to labour management appear to have been in the area of training. The ambitious training program of the immediate First

World War period declined during the mid-1920s and the depression of the early 1930's saw little advance in formal training. An article attributed to Charles Lloyd Jones for

Rydge's magazine in 1933 preached the virtues of enthusiasm and self-motivation for the assistant, and implicitly condoned the reliance of selecting the "right employee" and the belief that good employees were born and not made. 84 For Charles, there were two types of assistants; the quick and the dead. The successful assistant had to be able to make "lightening quick mental adjustments" and to "use (their) heads".85 Just as important, sales people, stated Charles, "have to be vital, interested and enthusiastic".86

Yet by 1935, he had modified his earlier claims that enthusiasm and self-motivation were enough. In a talk given to floor supervisors in 1935, Charles outlined the "new training policy" and acknowledged the problems with the existing training regime.

82 Board Minutes, 6 February 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.444. 83 Board Minutes, 29 April 1936, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.517; Board Minutes, 7 October 1936, DJA, BRG /32/4, p.553; Board Minutes, 21 October 1936, DJA, BRG /32/4, p.561. 84 Jones, C.L. (1933). “ Behind the Counter with a Shop Assistant”. Rydge’s, 1 November 1933, 967-8. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 258 He used an anecdote, coincidentally involving industrial psychologist Dr W.G. Fern, to illustrate what was seen as the problem that needed to be addressed through training:

As an example of the impression which can be made by the human element, I will tell you of a well-known gentleman from Overseas who came to Sydney. On the way over from New Zealand, he had received an invitation to come to this Store. He had heard of me, and so thought he would like to meet me when he came to the Store. He asked for the Office and the lift Controller said ‘To the right’. Dr. Fern walked a little to the left, and the Controller called out ‘To the right, I said’. Dr. Fern, recognising the man’s misguided attempts at service, smiled and said ‘All right, Sgt- Major, I understand’. Now we get thousands and thousands of people in this Store, and we want them to come back again and again. This man might never have wanted to come here again after such treatment.87

Charles relayed another anecdote, noting that on his walk through the store he came upon five assistants talking together and he was sure “they were not discussing the day’s work”.88

Obviously there were concerns about the quality of service and Charles further noted that “M r. M cNeill has urged the Company for many years to give greater attention to

Staff training, and the Company have now decided to carry out this thoughts in this connection”.89

In outlining the new strategy, M r. M cNeill noted how important it was for the staff to render service to secure and hold customers. It was critical for customers to find that their experience of service met the image being marketed by the firm. M r. M cNeill noted to the Floor Supervisors, “Impress upon your Staff that each one

87 Meeting with the Floor Supervisors, 9 March 1935, McNeill Papers, DJA. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 259 represents THIS organisation so far as their customers are concerned – that the impression made by them on the Customer is the impression she retains of David

Jones.”90 He further noted that “We can advertise and talk about Service, but it will not mean anything – will not accomplish anything unless each and every one of us shows, by our individual effort and spirit, that we feel our responsibility as part of the

Company.”91

The new training policy expanded beyond the initial orientation and buyer education, with a distinct focus on raising the level of service. With the motto of “David Jones for

Service” and an increasing reliance on print advertising through local newspapers, service was the cornerstone of the firm’s marketing and needed to be ensured throughout the organisation. As part of the new policy, the Staff Instructress’ office was expanded and renamed the Staff Training Office, through still under the direction of the Staff Manager,

M r. M cNeill. Regular, compulsory training was introduced to all sales staff on matters such as merchandise knowledge and selling skills.92 To facilitate this in 1935, the firm built a special purpose training room at a cost of £165.93

The critical factors leading to this renewed interest in training appear to have been managerial dissatisfaction with current practice on the sales floor and David M cNeill’s view of training as the solution. McNeill read widely in the writings of contemporary management consultants and his personal library contained books by writers such as

Herbert Casson, who in the 1920s promoted training of sales staff as

90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Board Minutes, 30 January 1935, DJA, BRG 1/32/4, p.440. 260 the key to improved trading. Casson was a London-based self-made management consultant and a journalist who was editor of Efficiency - a magazine that was liberally referred to in the David Jones News of the 1930s. David McNeill's shelves were lined with books by Casson such as More Net Profit (1927) and Men at the Top (1929). These books were given to David McNeill by none other than Charles Lloyd Jones himself.94

Casson strongly argued the case for "skilled selling" in the retail industry. He believed that selling, like other economic activities, could be systematised along scientific lines. In the Preface for Up-to-Date Salesmanship (1929), Casson writes:

Plainly, all of us who profess to understand Salesmanship, must be talking of something that we do not understand. Plainly, we must begin to study Salesmanship and find out what it means. Our selling is archaic. It is amateurish. It has not yet become professional. In a word, it is out of date. It is not up to the level of our knowledge in other matters of trade and commerce. Certainly, it is not in any sense scientific.95

Casson strongly argued for what could be considered a “productivity enhancement” rather than “cost minimisation” strategy for retailing. He rejected vending machines, self- service and leased departments as short-term solutions that would ultimately prove to the long-term detriment of retailers. He considered that such initiatives, which were designed to reduce operating costs (including labour costs), would, ultimately, fail because they "failed to secure the loyalty and goodwill of the customer".96 He argued strongly against price-cutting, believing it to be a sign of "incompetent and lazy" management, unable to improve the quality of their service delivery. Casson even likened price-cutting by retailers to cocaine. "You begin with

94 McNeill Paper, DJA. 95 Casson, H.N (1929). Up-to-date Salesmanship. Sydney: Cornstalk Publishing, 10. 96 Ibid., 157. 261 a little, and you take more and more," he noted ominously. "Eventually it kills you."97

Instead of cost-cutting or price-cutting approaches, Casson advocated better display, improved customer service and, most importantly, a trained salesforce as the keys to success in retailing. Casson argued that a motivated staff was not enough. Staff had to be properly trained in both merchandise and selling techniques. These expenditures and effort, Casson felt, would be recouped by both employer and employee, through more sales and most importantly a "better" clientele who would remain loyal.98

M cNeill’s library also included works by other retailing industry management consultants, such as the Alexander Hamilton Institute from the United States that similarly spread the gospel of skilled selling, mixing elements of scientific management, psychology and self-motivation.99 M cNeill’s personal library also included a copy of

Henry Ford’s 1923 biography My Life and Work, that was signed by Charles Lloyd

Jones with the inscription “M cNeill to wish you success in our new mission”.

Regardless of whether M cNeill and Charles Lloyd Jones had “internalised” what they read in these books and articles, it is difficult to deny they believed in their underlying premise, namely the superiority of productivity enhancement (skilled selling and customer service) over a cost minimisation approach (namely cost and

97 Ibid., 163. 98 Ibid., 164-9. 99 McNeill Papers, DJA. 262 price cutting). Such a view appears to have informed both the marketing strategy of the firm and, in turn, its labour management strategy. Participants in the market itself reflected these different strategies, especially as US-inspired chain stores, such as G.J.

Coles, had adopted a cost-cutting and price-cutting approach and were beginning to make their mark in Australian retailing.100

From 1935 on, the training policy at David Jones Ltd. had four components: orientation of new staff, basic training, merchandise training and sales training. Orientation for new staff had been in place since the end of World War I and continued under the new training policy. The new Staff Instructress, Mrs Abraham, was given an assistant, Miss James, increasing the level of staffing in this area.101 Basic training at David Jones was very much an extension of orientation with existing staff receiving refresher courses on docket writing, wrapping and store rules.102

Merchandise training was very much a focus of the new training policy. It involved training staff to be knowledgeable about the products they were selling, as well to communicate the “romance “ of the product to a customer. Training was done predominantly through lectures on new merchandise or current fashions, and sales staff were often required to attend.103

100 Kingston, B. (1994). Basket, bag and trolley: a history of shopping in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 47-9. For details of how G.J Coles was inspired by his visits to the United States see McLaughlin, J. (1991). Nothing Over a Half Crown: A personal history of the founder of G.J Coles store. Main Ridge VIC: Loch Haven Books. 101 Meeting with the Floor Supervisors, 9 March 1935, McNeill Papers, DJA. 102 DJN, 7 March 1938, DJA, p.4. 103 DJN, 2 March 1937, DJA, p.4. 263 Responsibility for much of the merchandise training for assistants was given back to the departmental heads and buyers. Given the diversity of the merchandise sold by David

Jones, such a strategy made sense but was not without its problems. Charles Lloyd

Jones requested all buyers to prepare reports on the measures that they had taken to train assistants on their merchandise.104 The constant request for these reports in the

David Jones News may indicate that many buyers may not have made this priority.105

Another way in which merchandise training took place was through the training provided to assistants by the manufacturer’s or supplier’s representative. While not common at

David Jones, there are instances of this taking place. One example was a presentation by the managing director of Beau Monde Hosiery, Mr. L.R. McFarlane, and a tour of the plant.106 Another example is of pamphlets being provided to staff by the Cannon Towel

Company. These publications sought to explain the importance of “the underweave, the loops and the threads” when comparing different quality towels. The pamphlet also had selling strategies such as “No matter what price towel your customer looks at, bring out the next one in price” and “Suggest a related item or an overlooked need.”107

The David Jones News exhorted staff to educate themselves about the merchandise they were selling. Books on merchandise, with titles such as The Romance of Fur

104 DJN, 25 August 1937, DJA, p.3. 105 DJN, 18 October 1937, DJA, p.2. DJN, 15 November 1937, DJA, p.1. 106 DJN, 15 November 1937, DJA, p.2. 107 DJN, 1 August 1939, DJA. 264 and The Human Foot, were provided in the Staff Lounge, with staff being informed of their availability through the David Jones News.108

Sales training was also offered by the Staff Training Department. It generally involved lectures and tests on "sales psychology" (including the categorisation of “types” of customers) and sales technique, including “suggestive” selling, where a related item is suggested to complement the intended sale, and making “friends” with the customer.109

Books on sales technique, often with a motivational or self-help angle and with titles such as Creative Salesmanship and The Miracle of Right Thought, were made available to staff in the David Jones staff lounge.110 A writer given considerable coverage and praise in the David Jones News of the late 1930s was the twentieth century’s most successful

“self-help” author, Dale Carnegie, author of How to Win Friends and Influence People.111

In his early evaluation of the new training policy, Charles was unequivocal. In a speech made to buyers and supervisors in 1938, he claimed that there had been “decreases in routine errors as a result of staff training and tangible proof of its efficacy.”112 He also noted that training was having a significant impact on the psychological well-being of staff. He noted, “Then there’s the other side of staff training work – the mental adjustment of the individual employee, a question which is becoming, more and more, an important consideration.”113 He further postulated

108 DJN, 20 December 1937, DJA, p.2. 109 DJN, 23 March 1937, DJA, p.1; DJN, 7 March 1938, DJA, p.4. 110 DJN, 20 December 1937, DJA, p.2. 111 DJN, 6 July 1938, DJA, p.2. 112 DJN, 23 March 1937, DJA, p.1. 113 DJN, 23 March 1937, DJA, p.1. 265 that, “We have a matron to look after physical health. Why not a mentor to unburden their mental ills?”114

The training policy was not without problems. Training was resisted by buyers and supervisors, who considered that staff attendance at training diverted resources from their own departments. In a lecture given on 23 September 1936, David McNeill noted:

Staff Instruction is another aspect of modern store life apt to be misunderstood by some buyers. To them it is something which takes their assistants away from their department at inconvenient times. They cannot, or will not, see that this time spent in moulding the staff to the Company's ideas, is going to be of infinite value to them in the future.115

In a talk to floor supervisors, M cNeill sought to parry potential resistance to the new training policy:

In this Store there is still a feeling of antagonism, a belief that the time spent in Staff Training is not beneficial. This is entirely incorrect. Every minute of time so spent is of upmost value, not only to the Departments concerned but to the whole organisation. We want you to realise this...116

The thrust of new training policy from the 1930s would continue until well after the

Second World War, with elements surviving until the 1980s. Despite significant rationalisation during the 1940s, commitment to training at David Jones would continue well into the 1980s, where David Jones maintained one of the largest in-house training departments in Australia.117

114 DJN, 23 March 1937, DJA, p.1. 115 McNeill, D., There's More to Buying than Merchandise, Lecture given 23 September 1936, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.26. 116 Meeting with the Floor Supervisors, 9 March 1935, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.3. 117 Mundy, J. (1987). "How to tackle staff training". Rydge's Business Management Monthly. August 1987, 72-4. 266 Rituals of Welfarism

Training from the mid-1930s onwards sought to provide selling staff with technical skills and to create an emotional and psychological bond between the firm and staff. On this cultural level, employees, both individually and collectively, were to identify and internalise the ideals of the firm. In this sense training was both about the “head” and the

“heart” of the employee.

This cultural component, in trying to get employees to effectively internalise the firm’s ideals of proper service was strongly informed by overseas management consultants, such as Herbert Casson, who recognised, as did individuals such as David McNeill, the indeterminacy and social nature of the selling process. Selling was more than merely a simple transaction of cash for goods, particularly if the merchandise was behind a counter. As recognised by Benson, counter selling required social interaction between the customer and the shop assistant.118 Such interactions were not to be carefully scripted, as retailers of this era often argued that “pleasant robots” would be wholly rejected by customers.119 Assistants should be trained and generally managed in such a way as to make the selling process a positive experience for the customer. This positive experience was considered to be critical in reinforcing the firm’s marketing strategy of service and ensuring return custom. As noted by David M cNeill:

The training of the modern selling assistants in retail stores is a long, sometimes arduous, yet always interesting work from every aspect. Their training must be

118 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 119 In contrast, the post-World War Two embrace of “ scripting” in personal service employment is investigated in Leidner, R. (1993). Fast Food, Fast Talk: Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life. Berkeley and Los Angeles CA: University of California Press. 267 thorough, patient and continuous to produce satisfactory results and it must contain just so much of humaneness that they will be much more than just efficient robots. Their goodwill must be won, for it is through them to a large extent that the good will of the store’s customers is procured and held.120

Welfarism was more than a collection of policies and practices related to non-wage benefits and training. Welfarism at David Jones Ltd. had a significant cultural component that integrated these initiatives. This cultural component was about winning the hearts of the employees, in particular, sales staff.

One cultural aspect of 1930s welfarism which resembled that seen in post World War

One welfarism was the appeal to the recreation of an ideal past, in part through the use of new techniques and technologies. The linkages with the past were still made through the Jones family. The Hundredth Anniversary of the firm in 1938 provided an excellent opportunity to further construct the relationship between the Jones family “dynasty” and the staff. At the staff ball celebrating the 100th anniversary, David M cNeill, on behalf of the staff, presented Charles a silver loving cup as a sign of appreciation.121

However, in the 1930s a newer and more sophisticated cultural appeal emerged. This rejected the more familial model seen at the end of the First World War and sought to address employees more as peers than as “children” or “subjects”. An important component of the later approach was to persuade selling employees to closely identify with the firm, and to recognise that they were its public face. An article from David

Jones News in 1937 noted:

120 McNeill (1934), “ The Essentials”, 549. 121 “ Silver Loving Cup” newspaper clipping 1938, DJA. 268 When an assistant promises to do something for a customer, she is David Jones. Each and every one of us, on our job, is David Jones, and each of us, every day, has in our keeping the prestige of that name. Did it ever occur to you that no matter what your name be outside the store, to the general public, while on duty, your name is David Jones?122

The appeal for identification with David Jones appeared to be equally about challenging loyalty to one’s own department. In the 25 August 1937 David Jones News, it was noted:

M ore than once lately we have seen again in the Store evidence of the extraordinary outlook which cannot see beyond the boundaries of one department and which selfishly places a Department before David Jones.123

The culture of welfarism ascendant in 1938 was capped by the opening of the new

M arket Street Store that was built on the corner M arket and Castlereagh Streets opposite the Elizabeth Street store. The new store was a smaller 5 storey structure that was to act as a men’s store and to complement the Elizabeth Street store, which was primarily given over to women’s fashion. The rituals surrounding the anniversary spilled over into the opening of the new store, with Charles’ young son, Charles Junior, deemed to be playing the role of “prince regent” and officially opening the Market Street store on

2 May 1938.124

Conclusion

Through welfarism, with its cultural component, non-wage benefits and training, the firm sought to bind the selling employee on an emotional and psychological level

122 DJN, 22 June 1937, DJA, p.1. 123 DJN, 25 August 1937, DJA, p.1. 124 “ Opening of New Store”, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 1938. 269 with the firm and the firm’s ideals. This was not some unintended extension of past strategies but a deliberate strategy in its own right. The employees’ consent was sought to bring about better outcomes for the firm. However, control aided by systematic labour management and increasingly detailed data on individual employee performance also underpinned the firm’s ability to reward and punish staff. Further ad hoc decision- making remained, likely raising a degree of fear amongst staff in regards to their future with the firm. David Jones used both consent and control strategies for selling staff, while focussing much of its use of control only on manufacturing staff at Marlborough

Street.

The consolidation of the use of welfarism among selling staff can be explained by a series of factors, most notably the way in which management sought to understand and manage the indeterminate nature of sales work. As well, the role of welfarism in both the wider marketing strategy of the firm cannot be underestimated. The firm marketed itself on the basis of “service” and customer expectation for that service, generated from the marketing, needed to be satisfied or at least not undermined. This required sales staff who were knowledgeable about the merchandise, had good “interpersonal” skills and had internalised, to some degree, the firm’s ideals and identity. Increasingly, the sales assistant at David Jones, and the service they provided, would figure prominently in the firm’s marketing in its own right.

Training, in particular, was seen as a response to poor standards on the sales floor.

Managers recognised that there was a significant lack of merchandise knowledge among sales assistants. Yet this was as much a result of previous decisions where

270 the production and selling aspects, previously unified, had been split in the move to factory production of merchandise and mass selling.

271 CHAPTER NINE

Welfarism Challenged, 1939-1958

"Tradition had dictated the way lots of things were done at David Jones"- Chris Tideman, Managing

Director, David Jones Ltd., 1994

Economic, Social and Political Context

Unlike World War I that yielded little in the way of economic growth, the Second World

War created the groundwork for the post-war “long” boom that continued for the next three decades. During the War, the Commonwealth Government also became involved in the direct regulation of labour allocation. The tight labour market and rapid social change also saw the return of industrial militancy. Following the War, the economic downturn was relatively short and by the early 1950s, the Korean War resulted in a wool boom that drove the Australian economy to even greater heights.1

This domestic prosperity, while not shared equally, did raise the overall standard of living conditions. Home ownership became a reality for many working-class families, who a generation earlier would not of dreamt of owning their own home. Many of these families moved to newer suburbs and increasingly relied on the motor car for transport.

Suburbanisation and rising car ownership dramatically affected retailing patterns in

Australian cities, including Sydney where much of the retailing

1 Patmore, G. (1991). Australian Labour History. Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 88-91, 150-1. 272 had been concentrated in the city, with customers reliant upon the train and tram system to reach the major city department stores.2

Advertising also became more pervasive and sophisticated. Advertisements in local newspapers were no longer enough for retailers, as new mediums including glossy magazines, radio and television, became ever more important channels for disseminating marketing messages and were increasingly embraced by large retailers such as David

Jones.3

Like the First World War, the Second World War had an enormous impact on the

Australian labour market. Unemployment fell to a mere 1 per cent of the workforce as enlistment and the war effort soaked up excess labour capacity. The state also took on an even more expanded role in this period, as the war effort was centrally co-ordinated.

Commonwealth Manpower controls severely restricted movement between employers and sought to allocate labour in way that would meet the wartime labour needs of

Australia.

Impact of the Second World War on David Jones Ltd.

Manpower controls and the tight labour market created greater turnover at David Jones during World War II. M cNeill noted that the number of Staff “dealt with in one year – which is leaving and commencing” had been 8600 (out of a total staff of about 6000) just prior to the outbreak of the War. By 1943, this “staff turnover”

2 Spearrit, P. (2000). Sydney’s Century. Kensington: UNSW Press, 153. 3 Kingston, B. (1994). Basket, bag and trolley: a history of shopping in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 64-9. 273 figure exceeded 10,000. According to McNeill, “due to War conditions – principally the calling up of manpower for Services and essential War work.”4

Though enlistment and the Manpower restrictions contributed to higher staff turnover, the M anpower restrictions, in particular had a series of effects. McNeill noted, for instance, that having detailed employee records made it easier for David Jones to comply with request from Manpower authorities for information.5

The Manpower restrictions were, however, an imposition on the firm. Sections, such as the Workrooms, Cleaning and Pressing, and the Restaurants and Bakehouse had strategic importance and all were considered “protected undertakings”. Employees in these sections could not leave without the permission of both David Jones and the Manpower authorities. This severely restricted voluntary turnover and, in a tight labour market, greatly benefited the firm.

However, the administrative and sales sides of the firm were not considered protected undertakings. With labour in short supply, this meant considerable problems for the firm and prompted a search for new solutions. M cNeill noted:

Like all Retail Stores, this Company operates on a Quota system. That is, our Staff is pegged at a certain figure and – even if it were possible – we are not allowed to exceed this number.

As the pegged figure is, naturally, considerably below our normal strength, you can understand the need for the internal reorganisation and mobility of Staff which we introduced some time ago.

4 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.2. 5 Ibid., 2. 274 Under today’s conditions, it is no longer possible to allocate Staff exclusively to any one department. They must be under the control of one central authority, so that they can be moved at short notice to sections where they are most required.

I have told you that we cannot increase our Staff beyond the pegged figure but, lest you have the wrong impression I hasten to assure you that our Staff is at present well below even that number, and due to the lowness of our priority and the insufficiency of labour, we cannot even bring it to the permitted figure.6

Other aspects of the M anpower controls also affected the firm. One was “diversion” namely the practice of Government authorities transferring workers from low to high priority organisations. M cNeill expressed his concern that the retailing arm of David

Jones Ltd. was considered low priority but Peters’ Ice Cream, as a food manufacturer, was high priority.7 The “permit” system was another headache. All adult males and all females under 45 years were issued with permits that enabled them to work in certain industries. Permits were not issued to allow a person to work in a retail store unless they were found unsuitable for work elsewhere, a restriction that McNeill considered onerous.8

Overall, the M anpower regulations created a challenging environment for the firm, particularly on the retailing side. Other disruptions included the occupation of the practically new Market Street Store by the Commonwealth Department of Munitions, which it used as offices.9

Overall, the store saw service decline. The results of a questionnaire given to David

Jones customers in 1942 caused considerable concern to David Jones’ management.

When asked whether they were satisfied or unsatisfied with service at David Jones,

6 Ibid., 6. 7 Ibid., 7. 8 Ibid., 7. 9 Post-War Planning Meeting Minutes, 16 October 1945, McNeill Papers, DJA. 275 only 53 per cent of respondents said “satisfactory” while 47 per cent said

“unsatisfactory”. The survey found that 71 per cent of customers felt that David Jones sales assistants provided “courteous, interested service” while 29 per cent expressed concern over the service. The breakdown of those receiving poor service was 20 per cent receiving “disinterested, mechanical service” 20 per cent; 2 per cent receiving

“supercilious” service; and 7 per cent receiving service that was “too friendly”, for instance being called “dearie” by the assistant. Even more disconcerting for the management was that the majority of customers surveyed (52 per cent) believed that assistants were not helpful with merchandise problems, and that 59 per cent felt assistants had poor stock knowledge.10

The declining quality of service in Sydney’s shops even became an issue for Sydney’s tabloids. An article in David Jones News from May 1943 noted:

Shops Short of Civility – Thus reads the heading on a slightly vituperative article in one of the Sunday tabloids. After a sort of ‘gallup’ poll of women shoppers, the writer concludes that Sydney shop assistants are becoming ‘rude, careless, inefficient, gum-chewing, wisecracking and unpicturesque’. It couldn’t happen HERE! – but could it? Yes we know it’s been pretty tough for you, too- selling on limited quotas, and the maddening business of having to repeatedly refuse cajoling or angry would-be purchasers.11

Employee discipline was breaking down in other areas. Since the end of the First World

War, David Jones, like most other major department stores in Australia, the United

States and United Kingdom, had instituted dress restrictions for sales assistants.12 At

David Jones, female assistants were required to wear simple black dresses. However, it would appear that war-time rationing and changing social

10 DJN, 27 August 1942, DJA, p.1. 11 DJN, 28 May 1943, DJA, p.2. 12 Benson, S. P. (1986). Counter Cultures; Saleswomen, managers and customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940. Urbana IL and Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press. 276 attitudes put pressure on the long-held dress restrictions. Further, the most senior female manager at the time, Advertising Manager, Eleanor Donaldson, argued against the dress restrictions.13 M r. M cNeill noted staff opposition to the restrictions, but felt that highly coloured or floral dresses or other unsuitable attire would lower the general tone of the store and affect staff morale.14

An external threat came in the form of award improvements during the early years of

World War II. Significant improvements to the Basic Wage and Federal Clothing Trades

Award raised the firm’s wages bill considerably. Basic Wage increases raised the wages bill at David Jones by approximately £16,000 in 1940, £15,000 in 1941, £13,000 in

1942.15 The 1940 Federal Clothing Trade Award improvements added £13,731 to the wages bill. In 1942, David Jones payroll was slightly over £1 million. The 1944 Clothing

Trade Award increased it by a further £14,982.16

Despite the Wartime award improvements, the management at David Jones tried to maintain “merit-based” over-award payments, by passing on the 1942 Basic Wage improvements to employees who were either not on, or above, the award rates. Breaches of the awards often created their own costs.17 In 1944, a breach of the

13 Dando, C. (1988). “ Counter Intelligence: Confessions of DJs staff made good”. Good Weekend, 21 May 1988, 31. 14 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.4. 15 Board Minutes, 31 July 1940, p. 215, DJA, BRG 1/32/5; Board Minutes, 26 February 1941, p. 252, DJA, BRG 1/32/5; Board Minutes, 22 July 1942, p. 343, DJA, BRG 1/32/5. 16 Board Minutes, 20 November 1940, p. 238, DJA, BRG 1/32/5; Board Minutes, 26 January 1944, p. 433-4, DJA, BRG 1/32/5. 17 Board Minutes, 29 April 1942, p. 331, DJA, BRG 1/32/5. 277 New South Wales Shop Assistants’ Award required a payment by the firm of £550, an amount equivalent to the annual salary of several employees. 18

State-based employment legislation also began to erode the additional benefits provided under welfarism at David Jones. Since 1910, David Jones had been providing 2 weeks paid annual leave for most employees, though this benefit was suspended during the

Depression. When paid annual leave was reintroduced in the mid-1930s, only those employees with more than 5 years with the firm were entitled to the 2 weeks, a policy that continued during the Second World War.19 In 1944, New South Wales passed legislation that effectively granted most employees in the state one week paid annual leave, a measure that reduced the previously existing gap between what David Jones employees received and that received by many other employees in the community.20

However, there were some state interventions that were of somewhat greater assistance.

For instance, Wright notes that psychologists from the Department of Labour and

National Service (DLNS) assisted in the development of psychological testing at David

Jones and many other large firms.21 This continued after the Second World War. DLNS officials suggested both motor skill aptitude tests and intelligence tests should be used to aid selection at the Marlborough Street factory. Managers at Marlborough Street were discriminating about which tests they

18 Board Minutes, 9 February 1944, p. 435, DJA, BRG 1/32/5. 19 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, p.17. 20 Markey, R. (1994). In Case of Oppression: The Life and Times of the Labor Council of New South Wales. Leichhardt: Pluto Press, 326. 21 Wright, C. (1995). The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 53. 278 supported, informing DLNS officials that David Jones Limited would only use tests seen as useful and appropriate. Intelligence tests, such as the Otis Higher Examination, were seen as useful, particularly in association with other tests.22

Responses to the War

The Second World War created a unique environment for the firm. It placed service levels and indeed the firm’s existing strategy of service, skilled selling and welfarism under pressure. The tight labour market, Manpower restrictions and other state interventions required a series of responses to retain existing staff, and to maintain a semblance of service. These changes included an intensification of welfarism, including non-wage benefits, while also temporarily abandoning some of the harsher elements of systematic labour management. However, the War also opened up a new set of strategies, notably self-service departments and part-time work, that seriously challenged the basis of welfarism and skilled selling as a strategy.

There were modest additions to welfarism during the War. In addition to the Surgery with Matron, an Advisory Dentist’s service was provided. The firm also offered a banking service to staff and broadened its sick leave provisions. By 1944, an employee could be on half-pay for up to a month and, in exceptional circumstances, would have their medical expenses paid. Once these benefits were exhausted, the

22 “ Aptitude Testing at David Jones’s Factory Surry Hills” (1948) Department of Labour and National Service, Australian Archives series SP 146/1, item 575/9/2. 279 employee could draw up any entitlement they had by being a subscriber to the Mutual

Aid Fund.23

Perhaps the most interesting wartime development was the “mothballing” of McNeill’s elaborate system for tracking individual sales performance. Publicly, M cNeill argued that the changed trading conditions, the Manpower restrictions and the need to transfer sales employees between departments meant that this system was of limited use.24

Privately, however, he argued strongly against their elimination. He felt that the abolition of the detailed records keeping system, though saving the firm £500 a year, was a “false economy”. He felt that the records permitted close monitoring of individual sales staff and he argued that without such records the firm would lose a “bird’s eye picture” of the store, could not deal with deficiencies with individual staff, and could not trust figures provided by buyers as these were gross, as opposed to net figures.

However, M cNeill lost this struggle and, despite his optimism, such detailed record- keeping of individual sales not connected to commissions was abandoned.25

Another response to the difficult conditions was the introduction of self-service in certain departments. Self–service had first been used in grocery stores and in chain stores such as G. J. Coles.26 It was often seen as part of a cost minimisation strategy where customers handled and selected the merchandise themselves, with little or no assistance from an assistant. Retailing commentators such as Herbert Casson argued

23 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.16-7. 24 McNeill, D. ”A Lecture on the Records and Systems Used by a Staff Manager in a Modern Store”, Circa late 1940s. McNeill Papers, DJA, p.1. 25 McNeill, D. “ Memo – Statistical Records – Selling Departments”, 10 June 1940, McNeill Papers, DJA. 26 Kingston (1994), Basket, 58-61. 280 that self-service, together with other cost minimisation strategies for retailing was a harmful strategy, as opposed to a strategy focussed on skilled selling and service.27 For years, David Jones Ltd. had resisted introduction of self-service, deliberately building the

Elizabeth and Market Street store with formal counters rather than tables and racks, despite the embrace of self-service throughout the wider retailing industry.

However, the labour shortages and rising costs of the War, as well as the competition from self-service chain stores, forced the hand of the firm. In 1943, as a direct response to the difficult external labour market, David Jones opened its first major self-service department, drawn upon a “proven success” from New York.28 David Jones News described the new self-service dress department as follows;

All the dresses are displayed on racks, with sizes and prices clearly marked. M iss (or Mrs.) Customer selects the styles she fancies, under her own steam, untrammelled by the attentions of a salesgirl. She then checks herself and the chosen Robes de Style in a Fitting Room. If she wants an opinion as to fit, or desires any alterations done, there is a mobile fitter whose attention she can hail in a jiffy. Finally, she checks out again, paying for the dress or dresses or, of course, returning them, if she wills, at the exit, where an assistants will pack them for her.29

Another strategy that began during the Second World War and redefined post–war retailing at David Jones Ltd. was the increasing use of part-time employees. Prior to the

Second World War, the firm had no part-time staff. Casual staff were employed, although only during busy sale times such as Christmas. However, the labour market conditions of the Second World War necessitated the introduction of permanent part- time workers. M cNeill noted that during the Second World War,

27 Casson, H.N (1929). Up-to-date Salesmanship. Sydney: Cornstalk Publishing, 157. 28 DJN, 28 May 1943, DJA, p.1. 29 Ibid. 281 David Jones Ltd. employed a “considerable” number of part-timers.30 However, the

New South Wales Shop Assistants’ Award required that part-timers be 30 years of age or older, not to have worked in a retail store over the past 3 years, and to be married with children or to have other domestic responsibilities. Further, part-timers were to receive a higher rate of pay, could not work more than 33 hours in a week and could not work after 5 p.m.31 Nonetheless, the use of part-timers, which was adopted as a short-term solution to some of the problems thrown up by the War, soon become an integral part of retailing at David Jones Ltd.

Despite the challenges and responses produced by the Second World War, McNeill remained optimistic about the firm’s prospects to succeed.

In the past we have used all our resources to sell as much merchandise as possible. We have considered ‘Service’ more important than any other single factor.

It is my firm and unchangeable belief that we cannot depart from that policy of Service, because it is the foundation upon which the growth and success of this Company rest.

This Service had, of necessity, been much curtailed by National Service Regulation, and whether we will return to the conditions we know as normal, is beyond conjecture at this stage.

It will, however, be our firm and undeviating policy to give the maximum Service, consistent with the times, to those people who entrust themselves to our care.32

M cNeill also believed that labour management at David Jones retained its unique strategy and culture during the Second World War, despite certain compromises. He noted:

30 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p.6-7. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 20. 282 We as a Company have always recognised that our obligation to an employee extended beyond the payment of weekly wages, so that no new policy is needed here – but rather an intensification of the present one.

We must acknowledge that we, in this great Store, are one big family, with a sense of responsibility to each other and the Company to all. Whatever the nature of an assistant’s problems, facilities will be available so that he can come along and discuss them, with the certainty of sympathetic understanding.

More than anything else, - this new order of things requires spontaneous good will, quick and genuine responsiveness, and inspirers loyalty, from those people united for one purpose – in this case, the well-being and advancement of this great Company.

This can only be achieved by the Company’s broad outlook, developed along similar lines.33

In enunciating what he thought should be the firm’s post-war approach to labour management, M cNeill highlighted a few key elements; security of employment, the responsibility of the employer for the well-being of staff, stability, unity, flexibility and planning. Indeed, M cNeill believed that the labour management strategy of the firm should assist the firm’s overall retailing strategy, hinting at the need to meet head-on developments such as self-service. He noted:

Various beliefs are held as to the trend that Post-War merchandising will pursue. In some quarters it is felt that the whole of Retail selling will be streamlined. If this is so, then the Staff M anager will also require to streamline his Staff – educate them to the new conditions – so that they thoroughly understand the changed policy of the Company.34

While welfarism had been developing since before the First World War, it would appear that M cNeill was, in 1944, articulating very modern sentiments. Indeed if the “new orthodoxy” of human resource management in the 1980s and 1990s was about

33 Ibid., 21. 34 Ibid., 19-25. 283 quality, commitment, flexibility and strategic integration, by the 1940s, welfarism at

David Jones was a similar articulation of such a vision.35

Indeed, even in the conditions brought about by the Second World War, considerable staff training remained. M cNeill noted the several layers of in-house training at David

Jones. Training for all sales staff consisted of “Elementary” training, conducted twice daily to introduce new staff to the store, “Psychology” training that provided insights into “the science of selling” and “the handling of certain types of customers” and

“M erchandise” training, which appeared to have been increasingly centralised by Mr.

M cNeill rather than provided by buyers and department heads. As well, the firm provided “Advanced” training for selected employees who might become buyers or executives. Further there was ad hoc assistance to employees studying at university or college.36

Through the David Jones News and events such as birthday celebrations, David Jones continued to construct a culture of unity, based heavily on the presentation of the firm’s history. While the war diminished some of the pageantry seen at the end of the 1930s, new technologies were utilised for such purposes. For instance, by 1943, the firm had installed an in-house public address system that linked the Elizabeth Street store, George

Street store and Marlborough Street factory. Charles Lloyd Jones used the system to deliver an address to staff on the occasion of the

35 Guest, D. (1991). “ Personnel Management: The End of Orthodoxy?”. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(2), 147-75. 36 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, pp.25-34. 284 firm’s 105th birthday in 1943 and marvelled at the use of technology when compared to the humble origins of the firm in 1838.37

However, the Marlborough Street factory was often ignored as part of this official culture. Mrs Artlett, a personnel administrator at the factory, noted to the DLNS official that “the Marlborough Street branch sends contributions in to the main journal issued by the store, but as so little space was devoted in it to their interests, they enlarged their own suggestion bulletin to include news items.”38 Therefore, Marlborough

Street personnel staff produced its own “K” Branch News, to supplement the David

Jones News.

As the Second World War drew to a close, McNeill expressed concern about the post- war trading environment, in particular the threat presented by self-service chain stores.

Indeed he acknowledged that within David Jones “some departments in the future will be obliged to follow substantially the methods of the Chain Stores”.39 While arguing the best way to meet the fierce competition presented by chain stores was through a strategy based on service and the widespread training of staff, he also recognised that the Second

World War had brought to the fore new ideas. 40 M cNeill noted:

The present conflict has taught us to stream line our business, - to strip the veneer, yet retain the essentials – to make profit with less turnover – to-co-ordinate our merchandise and service to the best advantage. It has shown us

37 DJN, 28 May 1943, DJA, p.1. 38 “ Record of Contact – David Jones Limited” (1948) Department of Labour and National Service. Australian Archives Series SP 146, item 597/4/2. 39 McNeill, D., “ Staff Control: The Nerve Centre of a Retail Store”. Address delivered 29 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA, p. 25. 40 Ibid. 285 how to simplify our system of trading, and eliminate the idle and wasteful practices which had accumulated and been self-imposed throughout the year.41

New non-wage benefits were introduced at the end of the Second World War. In 1944, the Superannuation Fund, originally established in 1934-35, was finally open to membership. The Superannuation Fund was opened to all employees with 10 or more years’ of service with the firm. The fund provided a series of benefits including a lump sum upon retirement for male employees’ aged 60 and female employees aged 55, as well as death and disability benefits.

The fund had the obvious function of providing incentives for employees to remain with the firm. However it also had other uses, for instance, a fund member who resigned from the employ of David Jones would receive a benefit, while those dismissed for misconduct would forfeit all their entitlements. The David Jones Superannuation Fund, which still exists, was used to promote the firm as a decent employer that took care of its employees.42

In 1945, the firm established a David Jones Staff Club. The Club was funded by employee subscriptions and took over some of the social functions that had been carried out by M r. M cNeill and his staff. This included support for sporting and dramatic clubs. David Jones Ltd. provided the Club with its own rooms at George Street. The rooms, conveniently located for city staff, contained billiard tables and

41 Ibid., 43. 42 Jones, C.L. (1955). “ The History of David Jones Limited”. Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 41(5), 239. 286 table tennis facilities, as well as showers and ironing rooms.43 Beginning in 1947, the

Staff Club took over the running of the Annual Birthday Ball.44

The Staff Club contributed to staff training, offering classes in fencing and French, as well as organising dramatic performance by professional drama groups, for instance a performance of Moliere’s The Imaginary Invalid starring Peter Finch in 1948.45 While these activities were organised by the Staff Club, according to Benson, similar training was offered by American department stores, specifically to add a “middle-class” coating to working-class shop assistants.46

The location of the Staff Club in Sydney’s central business district made this benefit of little use for Marlborough Street staff. Marlborough Street staff had to remain content with a cafeteria and library (which charged them three pence to borrow a book).47

However, Marlborough Street did experiment with staff committees in the post-war period. By 1948, there were three staff committees at M arlborough Street: a Cafeteria

Advisory Committee, a Welfare Committee and a Section Committee. The Section

Committee was introduced in direct response to industrial turmoil. The DLNS inspector noted:

The dry cleaning section was very militant and the formation of a committee was an attempt to create harmony and reduce discontent. At first it only voiced complaints and Mr. Smith, the associate director (of Marlborough Street), felt that it was useless. Mrs Artlett (personnel officer at Marlborough Street) insisted that judgement must be withheld for at least twelve months and the

43 Post-War Planning Meeting Minutes, 23 March 1944, McNeill Papers, DJA; DJN, 1 November 1948, DJA, p. 2. 44 DJN, 2 August 1948, DJA, p.6. 45 Ibid. ; DJN, 7 September 1948, DJA, p.4. 46 Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 147. 47 “ Record of Contact – David Jones Limited” (1948) Department of Labour and National Service. Australian Archives Series SP 146, item 597/4/2. 287 results of have proved the truth of this. Now criticism is constructive and useful suggestions for improvements are put forward.48

David Jones’ significant commitment to the training of selling staff would continue in the post-war period but would be increasingly contentious as differences of opinion appeared within the managerial ranks of David Jones.

In 1947, David Jones launched its highly publicised and ambitious Bursary Program.

This included a series of lectures and discussion groups present by Mr. McNeill and

W.J. Caples, who at the time, was the Lecturer in charge of the Industrial Management

Department at Sydney Technical College and was also a part-time lecturer in

Management at the University of Sydney. A final examination was given and the staff person with the best result was to study in England and Continental Europe for six months. The first winner of the Bursary was John Burke, a 27 year old returned serviceman who had been with the firm since the age of 15 and was the Buyer in the

Boys’ Hat department.49

Since the early 1920s, training had firmly been under the control of David McNeill.

However in 1948, the firm hired Lance Naylor as Executive Training Officer, giving him control over all of the company’s advanced training. Unlike M cNeill who was self- taught, Naylor had studied Management and Accountancy at Sydney Technical College and Sydney University. He was also an Associate M ember of the British Institute of

Industrial Administration and an Associate Fellow of the Institute of Industrial

Management. During the war, Naylor had worked at the Commonwealth

48 Ibid. 49 DJN, 7 September 1948, DJA, p.1. 288 Aircraft Corporation in a traditional personnel management, with a strong industrial relations emphasis.50

On the one hand, Naylor’s appointment displayed the firm’s increasing interest in advanced training. As well, Naylor displayed a very different view of training than David

M cNeill. Naylor, for instance, criticised the attempts to centrally train all staff on merchandise issues. He also argued for there to be a greater emphasis on executive training than on training the mass of selling staff, as was the position supported by

M cNeill.51

The commitment of Charles Lloyd Jones and David M cNeill to training meant that by

1952 the Training Department at David Jones Ltd. had 10 staff and offered a subsidised program of training. All new employees received several days of instruction on the history of the store, store policy and selling techniques. This was followed up with refresher training after 3 months. As well, the Bursary program continued in an increasingly formal manner, with four units (Management, Buying, Sales Promotion and

Financial Control) offered over 12 months. As well, salesman training, with 80 students a week, was provided to juniors on salesmanship,

50 DJN, 2 August 1948, DJA, p.8. 51 Letter from L. Naylor to C.L. Jones II, 24 November 1953, McNeill Papers, DJA. Benson similarly noted that despite the high hopes for training, by the Second World War, many American department store managers became cynical of the efficacy of training. Benson believes that there were two main reasons why training "failed" in American department stores. First, despite the high expectations of formal training, the best training was done on-the-job on the selling floor. Secondly, despite the lofty goals they had for training, managers continued to hold the selling function in disdain. Many managers felt that selling "could be done by anyone" and that the best strategy was to minimise costs, rather than invest heavily in training that produced less than overwhelming results. Rarely, notes Benson, did managers truly put their money where their mouth was on the issue of training. Benson (1986), Counter Cultures, 153-9, 165-6.

289 including 36 employees a week participated in Executive Training. Training on major system changes and special events was also offered.52

Training was closely aligned with a desire to improve staff performance. All errors with docket writing or cash registers, for instance, were referred to the Training Department, which contacted the employee and investigated the mistake. This could result in follow- up training or discipline.53

However training, with its breadth and depth, was not without its problems in the post- war period. In a memo from David McNeill to Lance Naylor from 1953, McNeill noted:

There have been a number of cases recently where new employees have left the Company immediately after they have completed their initial Staff Training. These people have given the reason that they feel they could not work for a firm where they are required to observe so many rules and regulations.54

Other observers, who may have overestimated the amount of training actually provided, were also cynical about the nature of the training. Assistant Secretary of the Federated

Clerks’ Union, New South Wales Branch, R.B. Gray noted that:

These people are being constantly told of the privilege that is their’s because they work for David Jones Ltd. When they are given employment with the Company, they are given three weeks training. In one week they are instructed how to approach the customer and the remaining two weeks is devoted to telling them what a privilege has been placed upon them to be employees of David Jones Ltd.55

52 Letter from L. Naylor to C.L. Jones II, 24 November 1953, McNeill Papers, DJA. 53 Ibid. 54 Memorandum from D. McNeill to L. Naylor, 30 September 1953, McNeill Papers, DJA. 55 Minutes of Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch Central Council, 25 June 1955, University of Melbourne Archives. 290 Following the Second World War, new training initiatives were also introduced at the

Marlborough Street factory. The Commonwealth Department of Labour and National

Service (DLNS) officials promoted the benefits of training, as a means of dealing with staff turnover and poor performance, to the managers at Marlborough Street. In 1948, the only formal training at Marlborough Street was a two-month course for junior machinists. However, DLNS officials recommended formal training for both production staff and supervisors at Marlborough Street. In 1949, under the eye of the DLNS, short training courses for sewing machine operators and supervisory staff were designed with the assistance of the Sydney Technical College.56

The training courses considered by the DLNS official, N.K. Waldron, to be a success, particularly the training for production staff where “the learning period” was reduced from “three years to nine months”.57 However, the new training initiatives at

Marlborough Street also experienced opposition in some quarters. Waldron acknowledged that “supervisors were at first sceptical and in fact in some cases resentful because they were being robbed of their juniors”.58 Supervisors also complained that juniors returning from training were not fast enough. Supervisors often sought to get their staff to focus on speed rather than the quality of their work. This generated frustration among personnel officers such as Mrs Artlett, who noted that once the juniors returned to departments from training “the girls seemed to lose all the value of their initial training and to pick up bad work habits”.59

56 “ Record of Contact – David Jones Limited” (1948) Department of Labour and National Service. Australian Archives Series SP 146, item 597/4/2. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 291 By the mid-1950s, the consent-based approach to labour management was flourishing.

Systematic management was firmly under the control of Mr. McNeill. His ambitious plan to monitor all staff had fallen by the wayside but by the early 1950s the store was again flirting with commissions. Welfarism and non-wage benefits, such as the staff newsletter, the David Jones Staff Superannuation Fund, the Mutual Aid Fund, Staff

Club and related social activities, 15 per cent House Discount, above award leave entitlements all remained and most would carry on up until the present day. Training was well established and even up until the 1980s, David Jones had one of the largest training departments in Australia.60

Charles Lloyd Jones continued to preach to employees, the special bond between David

Jones and its staff. In his speech to staff at the 110th anniversary of the firm, he addressed this issue with trademark pride and humour, intertwining the themes of identity, history, family and difference that underpinned welfarism at the store, noting:

Now I want to talk to you for a moment about David Jones. Now you are David Jones today. This is a family gathering. You are the people who have been here for 10 years and more with this organisation, and it is on you that the future of this great organisation is going to depend. Now there is something about David Jones we feel, and you feel, that you don’t find in other Stores. It is some spirit that makes it different. I’ll tell you a little story to illustrate it. The girl at the Information Desk told me this the other day. She said a lady was passing her, and her little boy wasn’t behaving very well, and she hit him on the appropriate place where you hit little boys, and she said to him. ‘Georgie, behave yourself, remember you’re at David Jones. This is not Woolworths.’61

60 Mundy, J. (1987). "How to tackle staff training". Rydge's Business Management Monthly, August 1987, 72-4. 61 Jones, C.L. (1948) “ Speech Delivered on 28 May 1948” McNeill Papers, DJA, pp.3-4. 292 Charles Lloyd Jones’ last significant symbolic initiative was the establishment of an institution that survives to this day; the David Jones Choir, established in 1951.62 The

Choir was organised to sing Christmas Carols at the Elizabeth Street store and drew its members from across the organisation. Its powerful symbolism functioned on several levels. On one level, the choir evoked the past, namely the Christmas choirs of English country manors, where the servants sang carols for the amusement of the lords and ladies. However, it also pointed to the future, of disparate voices drawn from throughout the organisation, from senior managers to junior staff, signing together in unison.

Most of the benefits that remain at David Jones today were initiated under welfarism, which developed in this period between 1920 and 1950 and was spearheaded by Charles

Lloyd Jones and David M cNeill. What had worked in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s appeared to be integral to the firm’s success in the post-war period. Welfarism was used to assist the firm to reach many objectives; improved service, allow it to generate employee goodwill and enable the firm to portray itself as a decent employer. The firm also kept unions at bay, maintaining its public status as a “good employer”, while acting efficiently and pragmatically to restrict any form of effective union representation to pockets of production staff. This was accomplished both by welfarism that promoted the benefits associated with staff loyalty and through effective use of legal advisers and employer associations to insulate the firm from having to deal directly with unions.

While not necessarily forestalling further government intervention, Charles played a

62 Memorandum from D. McNeill to L. Naylor, 27 November 1951, McNeill Papers, DJA. 293 supporting role against state intervention, using David Jones Ltd. as an example of a caring, decent and profitable private-sector employer.63

However the mid-1950s also represented a turning point for the firm. Charles received his knighthood in 1951 and, as was now in his 70s, stepped down from active management.64 The firm would also extended beyond the stores in Sydney’s central business district and acquired established department stores in Adelaide, Brisbane and

Newcastle in the mid-1950.65

This represented David Jones moving into a new, corporate and interstate phase that raised a new series of issues for managers to confront in shaping their labour management policies and practices.

On 30 July 1958, Sir Charles Lloyd Jones passed away at the age of 80. Almost his entire adult life was spent with David Jones Ltd., including 38 years as Chairman of the

Board, much of that time also as M anaging Director. The passing of Sir Charles meant the passing of an era at the firm named after his grandfather.66 The inter-war generation of managers also moved on, most notably David McNeill, who retired in 1968, after four and half decades as Staff M anager (retitled Personnel Director in 1960).67

63 DJN, 28 May 1943, DJA, p.1. 64 Thompson, R. (1983). “ Sir Charles Lloyd Jones (1878-1958)”, in B. Nairn and G. Serle (eds.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 8, 1891-1939. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 507-8. 65 Wild, D. (1996). “ Tracing a Tradition”. DJ: The David Jones Lifestyle Magazine. Autumn / Winter 1996, 116-7. 66 Ibid. 67 Address by Mr Charles Lloyd Jones II in Honour of Mr and Mrs David McNeill, 19 December 1968, McNeill Papers, DJA. 294 CONCLUSION

In examining the history of labour management at David Jones, this thesis has sought to answer three questions. First, “Did paternalism exist at David Jones in the nineteenth century and if it did what were its origins?”. Second, “Did welfarism exist at David

Jones in the twentieth century and if it did, what were its origins, in particular, was welfarism merely an extension of paternalism?”. Third, “Did welfarism ‘survive’ its initial introduction and what was its’ long-term legacy?”.

In answering the first question on the existence of paternalism, the evidence yields little to confirm that paternalism was, in any way, a deliberate labour management strategy.

The fragments of anecdotal evidence on the firm’s founder, David Jones, provide little to suggest his Methodism influenced how he managed his staff. Indeed, the apocryphal stories indicate a rather stern and harsh disciplinarian rather than a caring father figure.

Later evidence, for instance, from Edward Lloyd Jones’s diaries of hiring labour in

London, points towards nineteenth century labour management at David Jones as arbitrary and individualistic and as strongly influenced by external market conditions.

On closer examination, one possible element of welfarism, namely the adoption of early closing in the 1860s, is revealed as driven by commercial factors and employee agitation, rather than paternalistic philanthropy. By the end of the nineteenth century, larger

Sydney shops such as David Jones had much to gain from a tight government regulation of shop hours. The support of early closing legislation by the

295 large shops garnered them positive attention by middle class reformers and shop assistants alike. However, paternalism again appears absent as a significant factor.

The Tailors’ Strike of 1891 further reinforces the limited nature of nineteenth century paternalism. The harsh economic and tumultuous industrial times of the early 1890s meant that David Jones & Co. was prepared to take harsh action against its employees when its commercial interests were threatened. Solidarity with other employers was of far greater importance than concern for employees.

As noted by Thompson, while paternalism may be of use when examining and seeking to understand Tsarist Russia or Meiji Japan, its usefulness in unraveling the history of labour management in the workplaces of Australia may be limited. When the primary material from a supposedly paternalistic employer such as David Jones yields little that links religious or ideological commitment to everyday policy and practice, one must question the usefulness of paternalism as a concept in this field of investigation.1 When seeking to understand the origins of modern labour management it may be of greater use to rely on the actual experience of nineteenth-century work, with its harsh, arbitrary nature.

The second question of this thesis seeks to confirm or deny the existence of welfarism, the drivers leading to its adoption if it did exist and determining whether welfarism was merely an offshoot of paternalism. The questionable existence of paternalism in the nineteenth century would lead us to conclude that welfarism was actually a new approach to labour management.

296 Welfarism does appear to have been a far more considered approach. David Jones’s managers, in the first instance, implemented early welfarist experiments in reaction to external factors, such as rise of the interventionist state (including compulsory conciliation and arbitration), the threat of trade unionism and radicalism, and internal threats, such as employee theft. The years of 1919 and 1920 were a particularly important time. Many welfarisitic policies were introduced, and soon welfarism would be articulated as a distinct labour management strategy.

Following on from this period, a new generation of young managers, in particular Charles

Lloyd Jones and David M cNeill, agreed with the emerging consensus within parts of the retailing industry that simple control and authoritarian management resulted in poor staff performance internally, and a poor public image for the firm. A continuation of such practices would hurt the firm commercially through declining staff performance and a poor public perception of the store. This could lead to further infringements of managerial prerogative such as unionisation and further state intervention.

At David Jones Ltd., welfarism was about winning the hearts and minds, but not just of the staff, but of current and potential customers, politicians and the wider community.

Welfaristic activities complemented other activities. On the one hand, it complemented

David Jones advertising which promised customers "quality service" from assistants. It also complemented Charles Lloyd Jones' political

1 Thompson, E.P. (1991) Culture in Common. London. The Merlin Press, p.24. 297 activities of arguing that humane labour management practices were possible without state or union intervention.

The historical evidence points to twentieth century welfarism arising from managerial strategy rather than merely being an articulation of pre-existing paternalism or a mechanistic response to workforce feminisation. Indeed, welfarism at David Jones appears to be surprisingly modern, being heavily influenced by both the new science of industrial psychology and by overseas, particularly American, experiments.

While welfarism itself relied upon the application of modern methods and techniques, there was an element of it whereby individuals such as Charles Lloyd Jones hoped to recreate the best elements of a mythical past of mutuality. Much of this came about through both the rhetoric of welfarism and the many references to the firm’s history. In this sense, welfarism at David Jones appears to conform with elements of Miller’s argument that department store welfarism was a manifestation of a wider cultural anxiety over modernity.2 “New” bureaucracies, such as employers and government, deliberately sought to project an image of familial ties and stability to alleviate concern over the transition to a world of huge and depersonalising bureaucracies.

While welfarism at David Jones appears to have had such a wider cultural agenda, it was also influenced by management’s recognition of the indeterminacy of the retail

2 Miller, M. (1981) The Bon Marché; Bourgeoise Culture and the Department Store, 1869 - 1920. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 298 labour process. Only by adopting a consent-based approach to labour management, so went much of the management thought within the industry in the interwar period, could the potential for the employee to sabotage the sale be prevented. Further, the prospects for a sale could be improved, so went the commonly accepted wisdom of the time, if the consent of the sales assistants and their identification with the firm’s objectives was secured through a humane and supportive approach to labour management.

The third question was, “Did welfarism ‘survive’ its initial introduction and what was its’ long-term legacy?” Indeed, welfarism survived well after the Second World War and continued to inform the practice of labour management at David Jones Ltd. up to the end of the twentieth century. However, welfarism came under increasing pressure as self- service and other elements of post-Second World War retailing, such as suburbanisation and brand name advertising, undermined the perceived centrality of the interaction between the customer and the sales assistant. David Jones adopted certain elements that undermined welfarism, such as self-service, however the firm has continued to seek to distinguish itself in the marketplace as a provider of service. M any of the initiatives from inter-war welfarism survive to this day, much to the chagrin of shareholders who have been pressuring the firm to modernise and cuts costs.

The experience at David Jones during the twentieth century contradicts notions of the

"weak" or "reactive" Australian employer. The consent-based approach at David Jones was sophisticated and deliberate. However, the consent-based approach of

299 labour management at David Jones operated together with the use of control-based techniques. M anagement fashioned increasingly sophisticated forms of surveillance and strongly resisted attempts to contain or diminish managerial prerogative.

What does the example of David Jones indicate about the factors influencing why an employer may adopt a consent-based approach? The evidence from this thesis confirms the centrality of management decision-making in understanding the development of labour management. While wider political, economic or social forces may have been at play, these pressures must be considered through the lens of how they are perceived by the actual decision-makers with large employers. In the case of David Jones, for instance, political and industrial threats sparked welfarism in the period immediately after the First World War. However in the 1930s, the firm’s need to market itself to the wider community, including prospective customers, appears to have been an increasingly important reason for welfarism.

What does the experience of David Jones indicate about the long-term survivability of the consent-based approach? At David Jones there is no clear pattern. Some initiatives were short term, such as the consultative committee. However, many survived for decades, such as the superannuation fund, staff discounts and a commitment to training.

The experience of David Jones does assist us in understanding some of the contemporary debates referred to earlier in this thesis. On the one hand, the sophisticated, deliberate and strategic nature of welfarism at David Jones confirms

300 the findings of those such as Sanford Jacoby who questions the supposed brief existence of welfarism and the supposed newness of consent-based approaches such as Human

Resource Management.3

This thesis also brings into question the confidence with which the promoters of modern-day consent-based approaches believe that such an approach will solve the problems presented by labour management. For instance, while welfarism appears to have been part of David Jones’ commercial success in the middle decades of the twentieth century, by the end of the century it was clearly identified as part of the firm’s uncommerciality, over-committed to higher than average staffing levels and staff conditions. This would lead one to reflect whether, like welfarism, HRM, for some firms may change from today’s solution into tomorrow’s problem.

The partial success of welfarism at David Jones highlights one core issue within the understanding of labour management, the seeming inability of managers and researchers to find a “final solution” to realising the labour potential of employees. Despite endless attempts to find such a solution, one constant is the ability of employees, both collectively and individually, to resist such attempts to completely control them or completely elicit their consent. This tension, built into the very nature of capitalist employment relationship, will drive labour management at David Jones for decades to come, just as it has since David Jones himself hired his first employees to work beside him in that small shop on the corner of George and Barrack Street, Sydney over 160 years ago.

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