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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs January 4, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary The United States and its partner countries are gradually reducing military involvement in Afghanistan as the Afghan government and security forces assume ever greater responsibility in preparation for the end of international mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Afghan forces are to assume much of the security lead nationwide by mid-2013. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20, 2012, and will likely continue to draw down as the transition proceeds. No U.S. decision has been announced on the rate of that drawdown, or on the size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014. U.S. military recommendations for the post-2014 force reportedly range from 6,000 to 20,000, mostly advisors and trainers but including some forces that will continue to combat Taliban forces. The drawdown and post-2014 size decisions will likely hinge on assessments of the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), insurgent strength, and the progress of reconciliation talks with Taliban figures, resiliency. The post-2014 U.S. presence is dependent on finalization of a bilateral security agreement, currently under negotiation with the Afghan government, pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. In keeping with that agreement, on July 7, 2012 (one day in advance of a major donors’ conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo), the United States named Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” further assuring Afghanistan of long-term U.S. support. The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, Afghan stability after the 2014 transition is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, will be not experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. A potential contributor to stability would be a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but, by the end of 2012, began to evolve into a discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing. To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success. Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2012, the Afghan intervention has cost about $557 billion, including all costs. About $9.7 billion in economic aid and $82 billion in additional U.S. military costs are requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1 Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 8 Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 9 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ............................................................... 11 Security Policy, 2011-2014 “Transition, and Beyond” .................................................................. 13 Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others ............................................ 13 Groups: The Taliban/“Quetta Shura Taliban”(QST) ......................................................... 13 Al Qaeda/Bin Laden .......................................................................................................... 14 Hikmatyar Faction ............................................................................................................. 15 Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15 Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 17 Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 17 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 18 The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 19 Perception of “Victory,” Followed by Setback and Deterioration..................................... 20 Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 21 McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement ........................... 21 Progress of the Transition and Drawdown .............................................................................. 23 Tranches of Territory in Transition: ................................................................................... 23 Unwinding of the Surge Announced June 22, 2011 .......................................................... 24 Surge Implementation and Results/Current Security Assessments ................................... 24 Beyond 2014: Size of Residual Force, Strategic Partnership Agreement, and Bilateral Security Agreement .............................................................................................................. 27 Likely Size and Structure of Post-2014 Force ................................................................... 27 Strategic Partnership Agreement/Legal Status of Post-2014 Force ................................... 29 Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .............................. 32 Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force........................................................................... 33 Training Overview ............................................................................................................ 35 The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 35 Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 36 Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 37 Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 40 Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 41 Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit..................................................................
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