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Attachment B

Analysis of Potential Freight Alternatives to the Proposed Cross Harbor Freight Tunnel

Submitted to

North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, Inc.

Prepared by

TransTech Marine Co.

September, 2004 Contents

Introduction

NJTPA Deliverables:

Analyze the adequacy of the analysisof the Expanded Float 1-1 Option considered in the Cross Harbor DEIS as an alternative to the proposed freight rail tunnel.

Identify differences between float alternatives in the DEIS and in the MIS.

Review and evaluate assumptions relating to capital and operating costs, operational feasibility and other relevant factors that were used in evaluating these alternatives.

4. Sketch alternative freight ferry systems using state-of-the-art 4-1 marine technologies currently under design or in operation that could be implemented in the New York freight movement corridor.

5. Identify existing freight ferry systems elsewhere in the country 5-1 and world that demonstrate the feasibility of this technology and its successful use in freight .

6. Provide summary estimates of capital and operating costs for 6 -1 modem freight ferry systems in the and contrast those costs to existing ferry operations and the proposed cross-harbor tunnel options.

7. Provide recommendations for policies and further research needed to realize the potential for freight ferry systems.

Appendixes:

to Deliverable 4 Appendix 4

to Deliverable 5 Appendix 5

to Deliverable 7 Appendix 7 Introduction

In August 2004, NJTPA, Inc. retained TransTech Marine Company to prepare an Analysis of Potential Freight Ferry Alternatives to the Proposed Cross Harbor Freight Tunnel. The analysis is to assist NJTPA in formulating its response to the Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project DEIS issued by the EDC in April 2004. Responses to the DEIS are due by 30 September 2004.

This report is organized according to seven deliverables listed below that ware in the Draft Scope of Work provided by NJTPA to TransTech. Appendixes are included, where appropriate. Appendixes are keyed to deliverables and consequently, are not numbered sequentially.

1. Analyze the adequacy of the analysis of the Expanded Float Option considered in the Cross Harbor DEIS as an alternative to the proposed freight rail tunnel.

2. Identify differences between float alternatives in the DEIS and in the MIS.

3. Review and evaluate assumptions relating to capital and operating costs, operational feasibility and other relevant factors that were used in evaluating these alternatives.

4. Sketch alternative freight ferry systems using state-of-the-art marine technologies currently under design or in operation that could be implemented in the New Jersey New York freight movement corridor.

5. Identify existing freight ferry systems elsewhere in the country and world that demonstrate the feasibility of this technology and its successful use in freight ferries.

6. Provide summary estimates of capital and operating costs for modem freight ferry systems in the New York Harbor and contrast those costs to existing ferry operations and the proposed cross-harbor tunnel options.

7. Provide recommendations for policies and further research needed to realize the potential for freight ferry systems.

TransTech Marir&Co. would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Herbert Landow in the preparation of this analysis 1 review. Mr. Landow generously shared of his time and work done by his firm for the New York Sate Department of Transportation on the technical and economic viability of rail freight ferries in NewYork Harbor. The assistance of many others too numerous to mention is also recognized and appreciated. Any errors of omission or commission in this analysis 1 review are solely the responsibility of TransTech Marine Co. Deliverable #I

Analyze the adequacy of the analysis of the Expanded Float Option considered in the Cross Harbor DEIS as an alternative to the proposed freight rail tunnel.

Various interests have studied the merits of building a freight rail tunnel under New York Harbor or under the in the past. The proposed it in 1893 and again in 1903, and it resurfaced in the 1920s and again in 1941. None of the proposed tunnels were built, though construction on one was started. One study in particular (actually, a series of studies) speaks to the question of "... adequacy of the analysis of the Expanded Float Option..." and is summarize below.

The Metropolitan New York Intermodal Study

In the late 1970s the New York State Department of Transportation sponsored a series of investigations to improve east-of Hudson River TOFC rail service into New York City. The studies are collectively known as the Metropolitan New York Intermodal Study.

The firm of Landow Consulting Associates, Inc. managed the Metropolitan New York Intermodal Study and all sub-contractors on behalf of NYS DOT. The study team included:

Reebie Associates Market Analysis Parsons, Brinkerhoff - Centec Tunnel Engineering Island Designed Products Ferry engineering Seatrain Corp. Ferry pricing

A total of ten technical approaches from an initial universe of fourteen possibilities were selected for detailed analysis to improve TOFC rail service to New York City via three geographic gateways. The gateways considered were: 1) improve access via the existing rail bridge at Selkirk, New York; 2) reopen the railroad bridge at Poughkeepsie, New York, and 3) cross directly into New York City proper from New Jersey via a tunnel or ferry.

The four technical approaches not considered after the initial investigation phase were as follows: (All page numbers below refer to the Metropolitan New York Intermodal Study, Summary Report).

(ft) TransTech Marine Co. 1. Penn Station Tunnel: The study found that over 80% of trans-Hudson railroad traffic could not use the Penn Station route due to physical clearance problems. lowering, the only feasible solution, was rejected as too costly and as taking too many years to complete under traffic. (p. 19)

2. Greenville, NJ - Bay Ridge Freight Rail Tunnel: The initial study phase excluded this tunnel alignment on grounds that its cost was "far too high to be economic in terms of the operating savings contemplated". (p. 20)

3. - Bay Ridge Freight Rail Tunnel. (IBID)

4. TOFC Operations via : Car floating is a method dating from the 1gth century of transporting individual railroad cars or groups (cuts) of rail cars aboard fitted with tracks propelled by (Figure 1-1). Car float service was not considered sufficiently time sensitive to attract TOFC freight (p. 25), nor were the car floats large enough to efficiently handle full trainload operations (p.26), an objective of the study.

The remaining ten technical approaches divided into:

1. Seven different new freight rail tunnel alignments under the Hudson River.

2. Re-opening the Poughkeepsie Railroad Bridge and assessment of the amount of traffic likely to be attracted to this gateway.

3. Improvements to existing railroad on the Hudson Division of (now) Metro North to enable movement of TOFC traffic.

4. Examination of the technical feasibility and economics of using modern, efficient, self-propelled ferries (Figure 1-2) to entire across from Greenvile, NJ to Bay Ridge, .

New York State adopted option three soon after completion of the Study, as it represented the best short-term (partial) remediation of the problem. However, concerning a longer-term solution, the Study concluded that a modern, efficient system operating between New Jersey and Brooklyn "... has sufficient positive economic merit to warrant further investigation." (p. 34).

The NYS DOT study speaks to the adequacy of the EDC DEIS analysis on three counts:

1- NYS DOT approached the subject of east-of-Hudson TOFC as a comprehensive intermodal study, whereas a stated goal of the EDC DEIS is

I... to divert freight shipments in the future (2025) from truck to rail." (Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project, DEIS, Executive Summary, p. S -1 2).

(Q) TransTech Marine Co. 1-2 Both studies share the goal of diverting truck traffic onto rails, but the wider lens through which NYS DOT viewed the challenge included naval architecture and building expertise on the study team. This enabled identification and validation of a more innovative and economically viable solution to tunnel construction. Notably, the train ferry advocated by the NYS DOT study varies only in scale and level of automation from many successful predecessor vessels of thistype in America.

The NYS DOT studies were not designed for or intended for publication, and hence, all engineering and economic analyses were conducted in the absence of external political or regional economic influences. A ". .. strong public participation component ..." as cited in the EDC DEIS (IBID p. S - 5) can work two ways in the early planning stages of large, publicly funded projects. On one hand, a good project can be made better, but on the other, external pressures can be introduced that place parochial and political interests above broader societal interests.

The traffic volume estimates used to rank the technical approaches in the NYS DOT studies were based on actual freight traffic records provided by Conrail, totaling 6,818,777 individual rail shipments during ten months of 1977. Using the study's measure of merit of avoided cost from reduced circuity of travel, only identifiable trans-Hudson rail freight (449,933 shipments) that could be expected to use a given gateway based on costs saved was used as the volume on which to measure the economic benefits of that gateway. By contrast, the findings in the EDC DEIS are based on projected rail freight volumes in 2025. Implicitly, basing conclusion on real shipment records is more conservative than using estimates or projections.

Conclusion:

The DEIS is incomplete because the effectiveness of train ferries around the world and in America's past is not cited. Hence, accurate quantitative assessment of their potential contribution to today's challenges is unrecognized (Deliverable # 4).

The DEIS is inaccurate because it describes train ferry technology as "...new and experimental in nature." (DEIS Chapter 2, p. 2 - 37). As point in fact, no new technology is needed to build and operate a modern train ferry. All systems and components are proven "off the shelf technologies (Deliverable # 5).

The DEIS is inconsistent with the EDC's MIS . The MIS determined the benefit - to - cost ratio (B / C)of car floating to be more than twice the B / C ratio of the best tunnel option (Deliverable # 2). Extending that finding to incorporate the far greater productivity of train ferries viz. a viz. car floats further increases the B / C disparity in favor of the maritime alternative to the tunnel. (Deliverable 6).

Therefore, the EDC DEIS analysis of the Expanded Float Option is inadequate.

(H) TransTech Marine Co. 1-3 Figure 1-1

The last remaining car-float service in New York Harbor varies little from technology that was developed over a hundred years ago. Today, the tugs are diesel powered.

Figure 1-2

Large self-propelled ferries like this have been proposed to transport entire freight trains across Upper New York Bay from Greenville, NJ to Bay Ridge, Brooklyn.

TransTech Marine Co. Deliverable #2

identify differences between float alternatives in the DEIS and in the MIS.

Findings in the MIS:

The Cross Harbor Freight Movement Major Investment Study (MIS) commissioned in 1998 by the NYC EDC examines alternatives to move freight more efficiently across New York Harbor and reduce truck congestion on New York City's roadways and bridges. Stated goats of the MIS are to decrease the region's excessive dependence on trucking, and subsequently improve air quality, lessen deterioration of local roadways and reduce the costs of goods for consumers in the New York City region.

In its findings released in May 2000 the EDC MIS recommends construction of a cross- harbor freight rail tunnel as the best means to achieve its stated objectives. Also significant, however, is the fact the MIS advocates upgrade of the car float system as an interim solution:

"The expansion of cross-harbor "car float" operations is a significant opportunity for several reasons. First, float operations can be improved relatively quickly to address existing freight mobility problems and allow for near-term expansion of marine industrial activity along the New York waterfront. Second, float operations are far less capital-intensive than major infrastructure projects such as tunnels or interstate highway improvements. Third, float operations can "bridge the gap" while a tunnel is being planned, designed, approved and constructed, or can substitute permanently for a tunnel if that option is found infeasible."

Cross Harbor Freight Movement Major Investment Study (MIS), p. 5 - 40.

The investment cost to improve 1 expand float operations was put at $150 million with annual operating cost of $7.0 million. Diversion of truck freight to rail, the primary objective, was put at 2.2 million tons per year.

The investment cost of the least-cost rail tunnel option (single track alignment between Jersey City, NJ and Bay Ridge, Brooklyn) was put at $1.34 billion, with annual operating cost of $3.28 million. Diversion of truck freight to rail was put at 8.6 million tons per year.

Cross Harbor Freight Movement MIS, p.7 -3 & p. ES - 5.

Side-by-side comparison of the least-cost rail tunnel option in the MIS and improved I expanded railcar float operation appears on page ES - 5 of the MIS. This comparison is reproduced in Table 2 -1 below.

(H) TransTech Marine Co. 2-1 - . Summary of MIS Analytical Findings Improved Railcar NJ - Bay Ridge Float System Single Track Tunnel Diversion Truck Freight to Rail 2.2 Million TPY 8.6 Million TPY Capital Cost $150 million $1.34 billion Annual OPEX $7.0 million $ 3.28 million Total Annualized Cost $ 23.5 million $ 11 1 million Annual Benefits* $1 97 million $ 416 million Benefit / Cost Ratio (*) Monetized value of decreased air pollution emissions, reduced fuel consumption, fewer accidents, lower highway maintenance costs, decreased travel time for drivers. Cross Harbor Freight Movement MIS, p. ES - 5, p. 7-3. Table 2 - 1 The large disparity in Benefit I Cost Ratio between float operations and tunnel construction increases further for the other three tunnel options / alignments under investigation in the MIS. Findings in the DEIS: The DEIS differs radically from the MIS both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative data in the DEIS is not presented as completely nor in the same format as in the MIS. Table 2 - 2 below is constructed from data extracted from numerous places in the DEIS Executive Summary to enable comparison to the data in Table 2 - 1. Notable ifferences between the DEIS and the MIS include: + The DEE decreases truck traffic diverted to the upgraded car float system by 80 percent, from 2.2 million TPY in the MIS to 459,000 TPY in the DEIS. The DEIS increases projected diverted truck traffic of the least cost tunnel system by 10 percent, from 8.6 million TPY to 9.5 TPY. + The DEIS reduces investment in improved float operations by 47 percent, however, operating expenses of the scaled down float system are increased by 257 percent. The DEIS increases the investment cost of the least cost tunnel by 356 percent to almost $5 billion, and annual operating costs of the least cost tunnel are increased almost 1000 percent, from $3.28 million in the MIS to $30 million in the DEIS. + The DEIS (Executive Summary) does not show Total Annualized Costs (Annualized CAPEX + OPEX) as does the MIS. Nor does the DEIS (Executive Summary) show the derivation of Annual Benefits in dollar terms as does the MIS. Absent these figures, the Benefit / Cost Ratios in the DEIS are impossible to interpret. The DEIS awards a B I C ratio to

TransTech Marine Co. 2-2 the least cost tunnel option that is more than six times the 6 / C ratio awarded to train floating (i.e., 1.9 : 0.29) The MIS awarded a B 1 C ratio to train floating more than twice the B - C ratio awarded to the least cost tunnel option (i.e. 8.38 : 3.75). Comparison of Some Analytical Findings in DEIS and MIS Improved Railcar Pct. NJ - Bay Ridge Pet. Float System +/- Single Track Tunnel +/- Diversion Truck Freight to Rail 0.459 MTPY -80% 9.5 MTPY +I0% Capital Cost $80 m -47% $4.77 b +356% Annual OPEX $18 m +257% $30 m +914% Total Annualized Cost (1) NA NA Annual Benefits - regional (2) $1.7 m NC $15.1m NC - national $3.3 m $ 69.8 m B 1 C Ratio - regional (3) 0.29 NC 1.90 NC - national 0.27 0.70 (1) Total Annualized Cost is not provided in DEIS Executive Summary. (2) Computation of Annual Benefits in the MIS and DEIS are not directly comparable. The differences in Annual Benefits are so great between MIS and DEIS as to not be considered directly comparable. NC = not comparable. (3) B 1 C ratios between the MIS and DEIS are not directly comparable since the DEIS does not derive Annual Benefits in the same manner as the MIS. Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project DEIS, p. S - 8, S -10, S - 11, S - 18, S - 21. Table 2 - 2

The DEIS reverses findings in the MIS qualitatively as well as quantitatively regarding the rail car floating alternative. To justify reduction of the geographic scope of expanded float operations the DEIS says:

I' A float connection at Oak Point Yard was later dropped because it became apparent that float operations were only viable along a limited number of short, direct routes and that only a destination on the south Brooklyn waterfront could serve as a viable float destination."

(HI TransTech Marine Co. This statement is inconsistent with the history of car floating in New York Harbor. Figure 2 - 1 shows part of the extensive route system over which more than 4,000 car floats of all types operated in the harbor and surrounding waterways.

Source: Columbia University archives Figure 2 - 1 In justification of rejecting use of "a high-speed loading and unloading float bridge alternative ..." the DEIS says: "Specialized vessel design as well as advanced loading and unloading equipment would have to be designed at a scale that has not been successfully realized to date. The technology involved is new and experimental in nature." BID This statement is inaccurate and misleading on several counts and directly contradicts findings in the MIS (Figure 2 - 4, below): 1. Virtually all freight ferries are built to dedicated routes over which they operate their entire economic lives. Hence, "specialized vessel design" in the form of optimization of vessel size, speed, capacity, cargo handling equipment to accommodate the particular traffic mix, and berthing system are the norm in ferry design, not the exception. The statement implies that all large train ferries are unique and complex, which is not the case (Deliverable 5 + Appendix 5). For instance, unlike the of that took entire railroad trains to distributed over four decks (Figure 2 - 2), the train ferry for Upper New York Bay that was advanced by the NYS DOT study loads all railcars onto the main deck. The only notable loading / unloading equipment of such a design is a ballasting / deballasting system to adjust vessel draft to compensate for vessel trim and heel and stage of during train loading / unloading operations.

(Q( TransTech Marine Co. - . .- SEATRAIN METHOD OF LOADING AND STOWING RAILROAD CARS

Source: New York Harbor Railroads, V. 2, p. 25, T. Flagg, Morning Sun Books, Scotch Plains, NJ, 2002. Figure 2 - 2 3. Nor is the statement correct that the technology involved is new and experimental. Figure 2 - 3 is a roll-on / roll-off ferry of very similar design to the train ferry recommended in the NYS DOT study. This particular vessel operates year-round in , Canada and is able to break through ice three feet thick (Deliverable 4).

Source: KMM - Canada, used by permission. Figure 2 - 3

(ft) TransTech Marine Co. -. Apparent inaccuracies in the DEIS regarding the viability of train ferries are surprising because they contradict findings on this subject that were reported in the MIS: 'The high-speed vessels do not employ new technologies that are untested, however they do incorporate applications of technologies that have never been implemented. The vessel itself can be extremely large. One concept which has been reviewed is a vessel which is 800 feet in length with a width of 140 feet."

Cross Harbor Freight Movement MIS, Task 6, Alternative 4

The 800' x 140' vessel referenced in the MIS is the train ferry that was developed in the NYS DOT study in 1979. That vessel size is used in this current review for reference, and is not necessarily the size ferry that would be recommended today, subject further market analysis. However, it should be noted the NYS DOT effort did advance from concept design to a detailed bid package that included complete drawings and technical information on the vessel and on the economics of modern-day train ferrying (Deliverable 4). Train ferries were rated acceptable on all seven of the criteria used in the MIS to rank cross-harbor alternatives (Figure 2 - 4).

Alternative 4 - High Speed Loading I Unloading Vessels For Freight Movement

1 Is the alternative feasible from an engineering or Yes construction perspective? 2 Can it be constructed using technology that is raedily Yes available or available in the foreseeable future? 3 Can the alternative overcome regulatory challenges? Yes 4 Will the alternative have a positive impact upon the Yes regional goods movement system? 5 Does the alternative resuly in a better balance between Yes railroad and truck for the transport of freight east of the Hudson River? 6 Does the alternative have a reasonable likelihood of Yes improving air quality? 7 Does the alternative promote regional economic Yes benefits and development?

Source: MIS, Task 6, Table 2.2, Alternative 4.

Figure 2 - 4

(Q( TransTech Marine Co. Conclusion: In so far as train or car floating is concerned, enormous discrepancies exist between the MIS and DEIS. The MIS awarded car I train floating the highest benefit - to - cost ratio by a wide margin (8.38 for train floating, vs. 3.75 for least cost tunnel alternative). The MIS recommended improvement 1 expansion of the existing car floating system as attractive interim solution during construction of a cross-harbor tunnel, the recommended long-term solution. The DEIS ranks car I train floating below tunneling on benefit - to - cost ratio (0.29 for train floating, vs. 1.90 for least cost tunnel alternative). The DEIS Executive Summary does not present the Annualized Cost figures for the technical alternatives, as does the MIS; nor does the DEIS Executive Summary present numeric derivation of the dollar Annual Benefits, as does the MIS. The latter figures are found deep within the body of the DEIS (Volume 2, p. 20 - 11) but not in a format that is directly comparable to the MIS. Absent consistency of these figures, reconciliation of B I C ratios between the MIS and DEIS is impossible. The DEIS Executive Summary anticipates that the Final EIS "...will present a comparison of the following alternatives: No Action Alternative, the TSM (Transport System Management) Alternative, the New Jersey alignment of the Single Tunnel System, and the New Jersey alignment of the Double Tunnel System." (DElS, p. S - 16). By inference, the Expanded Float Operations Alternative is not presently contemplated by the EDC for inclusion in the Final EIS. Absent review 1 reinstatement of the train floating alternative at this time, this solution will be lost in subsequent planning stages of cross harbor rail freight transportation.

(Q) TransTech Marine Co. Deliverable #3

Review and evaluate assumptions relating to capital and operating costs, operational feasibility and other relevant factors that were used by the EDC team in evaluating these alternatives.

(Addressed elsewhere in this review)

(Tb TransTech Marine Co.

In 1998 the train ferry design that had been developed for NYS DOT twenty years earlier was presented to the Transportation Research Forum of New York. Two aspects of the design warrant special emphasis:

A train ferry is not simply a scaled up car floating operation. Similarly to conclusions reached recently by the EDC study teams in the MIS and DEIS, the NYS DOT team concluded car floats would not economically meet the time constraints and throughput requirements of large scale cross harbor train operations. The self-propelled train ferry design that evolved is intended to transport one full trainload (up to 140 cars) across Upper New York Bay in no more than 180 minutes cycle time. One cycle is the time needed perform a complete round trip. The result is a highly productive system able to handle up to 16 trains per day (eight in each direction) at cost per unit throughput far below those of a tunnel or less productive car floats.

The dramatic difference in unit throughput cost, and in system cost structure, between the train ferry and tunnel is illustrated in Figure 4 - 1. This graph was created using the best cost information available at the time. While revision of some cost elements in both systems is warranted based on newer data (Deliverable 6),this does not radically change the relative difference in unit cost between the systems. This is best illustrated by two examples:

i) Assume throughput of ten trains per day. At this volume the fully absorbed cost (all CAPEX divided by throughput + variable or out-of-pocket cost per unit) of moving a rail car through a single track tunnel is about $400 (assuming cost of capital is 9%, the mid-range in Figure 4 -la). A single train ferry could move this same volume at roughly $45 per railcar. Were two train ferries mandated for the purpose of redundancy, the unit throughput cost would rise to about $80 per railcar.

ii) Assume throughput of 36 trains per day. Even at this high volume, train ferries are still more economical than the tunnel. At 36 trains per day it costs between $150 and $200 per car to move via the tunnel, depending on whether the tunnel is single or double track. To move the same volume by a three - ferry fleet (to allow for redundancy) would again cost about $45 per rail car (Figure 4 - 1b).

0 TransTech Marine Co.

The economics of the train ferry option are superior to those of the tunnel because of the difference in capital costs. In 1998 when Figure 4 - 1 was created the estimated cost of the train ferry was put at $70 million (plus $33 million for land - side improvements) compared to $2 billion for the tunnel. Today, lacking current shipyard price indications, the cost of each train ferry is put at $75 million, but the EDC consultants now put the cost of the least cost tunnel at $4.77 billion. These are the capital cost figures used in the cash flow statements that are developed for train ferry and least cost tunnel in Deliverable 6.

2. There is not presently and there never was anything experimental or revolutionary about the train ferry design developed for the NYS DOT study. All systems proposed in the design are in use in hundreds of vessels operating around the world today. The validity of the specific integration of systems in the NYS DOT design approach has been demonstrated by success of the roll-on I roll-off ferry Williston Transporter (Figure 4 - 2), which conceptually is very close to the NYS DOT design, differing only in size. Comparison of principal dimensions of the NYS DOT design and Williston Transporter are shown in Table 4 - 1. Profile drawing, plan view and midship section drawings of the ferry advanced by NYSDOT are shown in Appendix 4.

5,000 L.Ton DWT Transporter

Source: KMM, Canada, used by permission.

Figure 4- 2

<0 TransTech Marine Co. Comparison of NYS DOT Train Ferry to Williston Transporter

NYS DOT Train Fenv Williston Transporter

Length 800.0 Beam 140.0 Depth 25.5 Draft (full load) 13.3 Speed (knots) 9.5 Power (BHP) 9,600 Propellers (Steerprops) 4 Propulsion Diesel-electric Capacity (short tons) 9,000 Track 1 Truck lanes 10 @ 800' each 53' Trailers with Tractor 110 all lanes 50' RR Cars wl Engine 140 all tracks FEU (max.) 280 double stack

Table 4- 1

From the foregoing, it can be surmised that a train ferry designed today to move railroad trains and large trucks across Upper New York Bay economically and expeditiously would probably not differ materially from the design developed by the NYS DOT Study. Three significant design developments that have occurred over the twenty-five years since the original design was proposed are:

1. Improved Main Engines:

The main engines in the ferry designed today would be more efficient and less polluting than their predecessors. Hybrid diesel-electric propulsion would be investigated, since a ferry intended to reduce vehicular pollution should itself be as non-polluting as possible.

2. Better Electronics:

A train ferry built today would use GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) navigation technology that was unavailable in the 1970s. Dynamic positioning using GPS is how oil wells are drilled in 10,000 feet open-ocean water. Aboard a train ferry equipped with SteerpropsQ3, (four in all) GPS would simplify and expedite vessel berthing, enabling very fast vessel turn-around, regardless of current and wind conditions.

Since the early 1990s, all vessels operating within New York Harbor are monitored 24 17 by the US. Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic System (VTS). VTS is a shore- based safety system that basically reduces the risk of collision between vessels. Excellent maneuverability, advanced navigation aids and VTS would enable large train ferries to operate safely in Upper New York Bay in all conditions.

O) TransTech Marine Co. 3. Faster Train Loading I Unloading:

A train ferry built today would benefit from the operations research and computer algorithms developed over the past two decades that have enabled freight transportation companies around the world to vastly improve efficiency through greater equipment utilization. Computerized car classification and string (groups of cars) switching would speed turn-around time by direct train exchange - that is, each track aboard the ferry would mate with a dual set of tracks ashore connected by a switch. Exchange of entire strings of cars would thus be accomplished in minutes. This system of ferry loading I unloading is described more fully in "In Support of an Expanded Brooklyn", below.

In Support of an Expanded Port Brooklyn

In the EDC's MIS, the incremental contribution of benefits from an expanded Brooklyn port is put at $1 13 million. This is included in the report's "Forecast Monetary Benefits by Alternative" (EDC MIS, Figure 4.1, p. 4 - 7).

The proposed expanded Brooklyn port is a new containership terminal that has been advocated for a number of years. The need for this terminal is based on forecasts that show new containership handling capacity will be needed in the port within ten years. Advantages attached to constructing the terminal in Brooklyn include naturally deeper water (than Newark Bay) for large ships, proximity to the port's sea buoy, and the desire among policy makers in the bi- state region to "balance" the economic benefits of cargo handling operations on both sides of the harbor. Disadvantages attached to building the terminal in Brooklyn include the limited availability of upland space to store containers and the question of how west - of - Hudson cargo will gain access to / egress from Brooklyn, given already congested highways and currently limited rail service.

Figure 4 - 3 illustrates how a highly productive train ferry would help mitigate the two main obstacles to building a new containership terminal in Brooklyn. Direct, automated discharge of containers from ship to railcars to train ferry would expedite movement of cargo through the terminal, thus lessening upland space requirements. And, direct, frequent transfer of containers on flat car (COFC) by train ferry to I from New Jersey would be faster and more economical than backtracking by rail deep into Brooklyn to reach a tunnel portal. Further advantages of the train ferry are its ability to work containers from two vessels simultaneously and its ability to accommodate out-size cargo (such as yachts, electrical generators, etc.) that is often shipped as deck cargo aboard containerships.

Description of Train Ferry Working between Two Super Containerships

By using a 20 track yard adjacent to each super containership and a ferry berth between them, containers would be evacuated from Brooklyn by rail and ferry with no usage of trucking, except for local .

1 TransTech Marine Co. 4 -5

a. Track Layout

The train ferry has 10 parallel tracks that are not tapered at the end of the vessel. The Float Bridge has 10 tracks, also parallel, that mate with the tracks on the ferry.

Shoreward of the float bridges (one at each end of the ferry), a small is located with 20 tracks. Ten switches expand the 10 tracks from the float bridge to the 20-tracks in the yard.

b. Operation

Ten simultaneous train movements can be made between the yard and ferry. The ten moves do not interfere with each other. Odd and even numbered tracks in the yard are used for off-loading and on-loading strings of cars from / to the ferry.

Prior to arrival of the ferry, odd numbered tracks hold railcars to be loaded aboard the ferry, even numbered tracks are empty. On arrival of the ferry, the railcar sets are exchanged; arriving cars are unloaded onto the empty tracks, waiting cars are then transferred onto the ferry.

c. Productivity

The train ferry would have minimal dwell time to load / unload, enabling it to spend most of its day in harbor crossings producing useful output. Transport of 12 trains per day (24 one-way transfers) is well within the theoretical capability of one ferry and is close to the 14 trains per day in DEIS' current long-term volume forecast for 2025. Twelve COFC trains per day is equivalent to 6,720 FEUs or 13,440 TEUs. The productivity of the train ferry is thus equal to or better than the productivity of the most efficient terminals working large containerships.

It is here noted that unit throughput costs for the train ferry alternative that are developed in Deliverable 6 do not use the ferry's theoretical productivity rates discussed above. To be conservative, ferry cycle time of three hours is assumed, instead of two hours. This equates to 8 train per day (16 one-way-transfers, equivalent to 4,480 COFC FEUs or 8,960 TEUs). The financial projections in Deliverable 6 are based on building and operating two ferries to accommodate the DEIS' projected volume of 14 trains per day. This provides excess ferry capacity and redundancy. The more likely scenario is to build one ferry initially which, via growth in productivity, could handle 14 trains per day by 2025, if indeed that level of traffic volume materializes.

1 TransTech Marine Co. Deliverable #5

Identify existing freight ferry systems elsewhere in the country and the world that demonstrate the feasibility of this technology and its successful use in freight ferries.

Train ferries are a specialized form of roll-on 1 roll-off . Appendix 5 contains copy of an entire issue of MacGregor News that was devoted to these unique ships in 1985. MacGregor is the global leader in supplying ship cargo access equipment. The second inclusion in Appendix 5 is a more recent article about a new train ferry now operating between and Island.

The literature reveals that most train ferries today are short sea vessels, rather than intra-harbor craft. However, the current paucity of intra-harbor train ferries should not be taken as prima fascia evidence of their non-utility or noncompetitiveness. Research by famed economists Nikolai Kondratieff, J. A. Schumpeter, and others demonstrated the existence of industrial and technological cycles of varying time lengths. As a consequence, some technologies thought to be obsolete do return, but never in the exact form of their. predecessors due to technological progress. A technology that is currently out of favor may be heading for re-emergence. A good example of this phenomenon is the reincarnation of privately operated commuter ferries in New York Harbor and elsewhere in the U.S. and around the world. The new ferries provide the same service as did their predecessors, but most of them today are built of aluminum instead of steel, diesel engines have replaced steam, speeds are faster and outfit is usually more luxurious.

The MIS and DEIS researched only current train floating operations, such as Aquatrain that operates seasonally from Canada to (Figure 5 -1). Research spanning a longer time period might have revealed huge, enormously productive train ferries like Solano (Figure 5 - 2) and (Figure5 - 3) that might have altered some of the researcher's conclusions about the viability of shorter intra-harbor train ferry services. Figure 5 -1

Ferries like Solano (Benecia - Porta Costa, CA) and Detroit (Detroit - Windsor) were called transfer steamers, since they transferred entire train sets across water. Describing the Southern Pacific Railroad's service across the Carquinez Strait, Pacific Maritime magazine noted in 2003,

"In its heyday, the railroad's ferry, Solano and later her sister ship, the Contra Costa, shuttled an average of 30 transcontinental trains per day across the Carquinez Strait, two locomotives and 36 freight or 24 cars."

SOU~C~?:Pacific Maritime, November 2003, p. 30)

Q TransTech Marine Co. Railroad Transfer Steamer Solano Figure 5 - 2

Railroad Transfer Steamer Detroit

Figure 5 - 3

Q TransTech Marine Co. Solano and Detroit offer some insight into the current challenge of efficiently transporting freight trains between New Jersey and Brooklyn:

The transfer steamers were very large, larger in fact than most deep-sea freight ships of their day. Size was dictated by the need to transport entire train sets en bloc.

Where rail car flows were concentrated, transfer steamers were preferred to car floats. Where rail car flows were fragmented, such as service from several rail / marine terminals in New Jersey into New York City in the early 2oth century, car floating dominated.

Excellent ferry maneuverability was essential to maintaining tight schedules. Solano had four rudders at each end that operated in tandem.

Berths for transfer steamers were parallel to the shore to minimize the effect of currents when docking and when berthed.

Railroad bridges and tunnels replaced most transfer steamers in the U.S. by the end of the 1930s Great Depression. By then, the ships were aged, costly to maintain and required large crews. Tunnel and bridge projects financed by government put a lot of people back to work and could be built comparatively cheaply.

Three quarters of a century later, reversal of economic forces again favors train ferries in certain freight markets. U.S. shipyards are particularly efficient at building large roll-on I roll-off barges like the ones used by (Figure 5 - 4) and Crowley Maritime (Figure 5 -5) in their respective services to Puerto Rico. Competitive U.S. vessel price can be leveraged with low cost vessel financing available via the Title XI program of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation. Highly automated vessels would require only small crews. Andit can allbe put in place in a few years. This contrasts markedly to the enormous cost, complexity and time required today to build a new tunnel, which is documented explicitly in the EDC's MIS and DEIS.

Source: www.trailerbridre.com Trailerbridge Roll-on 1 Roll-f

Figure 5 - 4 i0> TransTech Marine Co. Source: www.crowley.com Crowley Roll-on 1 Roll-off Barge Entering San Juan Harbor

Figure 5 - 5

9 TransTech Marine Co. Provide summary estimates of capital and operating costs for modem freight ferry systems in the New York Harbor and contrast those costs to existing ferry operations and the proposed cross harbor tunnel options.

Cost of Capital

The cost of capital is critical to projects of this size, as is its amortization term. To give the tunnel every possible advantage its cost of capital is put at 4.5%. This is approximately equal to the U.S. 30 year T - bond rate. The finance term is put at 100 years. These are the absolutely most generous terms any publicly funded capital project might hope for, and, as a practical matter, these terms might be overly optimistic. Capital projects financed by bonds issued by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, for instance, carry coupons of around 6.5%.

Unlike the tunnel, the train ferry is assumed financed on commercial terms. Cost of capital, using the Title XI mortgage Guarantee program of the Maritime Administration, USDOT, is assumed at 7.5%, amortized over twenty-five years. Different costs of capital and amortization terms were used for the tunnel and ferry system to more accurately reflect the finance terms each solution might. anticipate receiving.

Freight Throughput Volume

The unit cost of a transportation system is inversely proportional to the volume of freight put through it. To enable comparison of the tunnel and ferry systems, both analyses use the projected traffic volume in the DEIS of 14 trains per day (28 one-way trains per day) in 2025. This volume level requires two ferries. However, given that a train / truck ferry system can be put in place in about three years time, near-term traffic volume could initially be accommodated by a single ferry.

The Single Track Tunnel Alignment

The capital investment of $4.77 billion (DEIS Executive Summary, p. S -10) for a single-track tunnel, plus annual cost of $30 million to operate the tunnel, again from the DEIS (IBID), are used to derive a total annualized tunnel system cost Of $247,313,531 (Table 6 - 1). This is 100 year financing at 4.5% which equates to $677,000 per day. Were 6.5% bonds issued over 40 years, the annualized cost would be $367,209,073 or over $1 million per day. Annual OPEX of $30 million is optimistic in view of the costs to provide security for a tunnel costing $5 billion.

0 TransTech Marine Co. 6-1 New Jersey Single Tunnel Alignment

Number of Tunnel Alignments Total One Way Trains per Day Operating Days per Year

CAPEX: Investment Cost ( DEIS, p. S-10) Investment in Ancillary Facilities Total System Investment Cost Amortization of Capital - years Cost of Capital (Title XI Financing) Annual CAPEX (Tunnel) Annual CAPEX (Ancillary Facilities) Annual System CAPEX OPEX: Annual System OPEX (IBID)

TOTAL ANNUAL SYSTEM COST

Table 6 - 1

Upper New York Bay Ferry

The annualized cost of operating a fleet of two self-propelled train ferries across Upper New York Bay would be $30.5 million (Table 6 - 2). This is equivalent to $84,000 per day. As noted previously, a single ferry could be put in service initially. Putting the near-term traffic volume at half of the 2025 figure (i-e. seven trains per day or fourteen one-way trains per day), the annualized cost of a one train ferry system would be $17.65 million. This is equivalent to $48,000 per day.

Comparison of Unit Throughput Costs

Per unit throughput costs were developed for the tunnel and train ferry systems using the DEIS volume of 14 trains per day. Train length is put at 140 cars, the maximum capacity of the ferry. FEU capacity of 280 is also defined by the ferry based on double stacking on COFC rail cars. Finally, since with relatively small modifications train ferries can also transport heavy trucks, 53' trailer capacity is also included and is also defined by the ferry capacity. Load in all cases is assumed at 100 percent to produce the lowest theoretical unit cost. As can be seen in Table 6 -3, the cost to move one rail freight car, or one 53' tractor trailer, - or one FEU by train ferry between New Jersey and Brooklyn would be one eight the cost of moving the same freight through the least cost tunnel financed on charitable terms (100 years, 4.5% cost of capital). If the tunnel is financed on terms closer to other Port Authority of New York and New Jersey major capital investments (40 years, 6.5% cost of capital), then the unit throughput cost by train ferry is one twelfth of the cost of moving the same freight through the tunnel.

!Q TransTech Marine Co.

,'. ,.Z..' .. . Single Track Tunnel Unit Throughput Costs

Annual Assumed Tunnel Max. Thruput Load Factor Unit Cost

Railcars (140 per one-way train) 1,430.800.00 100% $172.85 53' Trailers (1 10 per one-way train) 1,124,200.00 100% $219.99 FEUs (280 per one-way train) 2,861,600.00 100% $86.42

Upper New York Bay Train I Truck Ferry Unit Throughput Costs

Annual Assumed Train Ferry Max. Thruput Load Factor Unit Cost

Railcars (140 per one-way trip) 53' Trailers (1 10 per one-way trip) FEUs (280 per one-way trip)

Table 6 - 3

0 TransTech Marine Co.

Deliverable #7

Provide recommendations for policies and further research needed to realize the potential for freight ferry systems.

The following five policies I recommendations are offered as a result of this analysis and review.

1. NJTPA should file strenuous objection to the implied elimination of further consideration of the train floating option as reported in the EDC DEIS (Executive Summary, p. S - 16).

Findings in the DEIS relating to the train floating option (as distinct from car floating) are incomplete, inaccurate and inconsistent with the EDC's MIS and with other research on the subject. Unilaterally or in concert with a multi-agency organization such as CPIP, NJTPA should endeavor to ensure that the train floating option remains in consideration. Further, NJTPA should endeavor to ensure that qualified researchers and adequate resources are provided to revisit the train floating option in the context of information that is presented in this current analysis I review.

2. NJTPA should request that MARAD (Maritime Administration, US DOT) be invited to join FHWA (Federal Highway Administration) and FRA (Federal Railroad Administration) as a joint lead agency for the preparation of the Final Environmental Impact Statement. The US Coast Guard should be invited to join the team as advisor.

The need to move more vehicular traffic onto other transport modes is a priority nationally. MARAD is actively attempting to move highway trucks onto water via its Short Sea Shipping initiative. Success of a cross harbor train ferry that is also equipped to accommodate heavy trucks in Upper New York Bay would be an important development towards establishing a vital Short Sea Shipping presence in the Port of New York and New Jersey. By familiarizing more shippers with the benefits of waterborne transport, an Upper New York Bay train ferry would also contribute to the PIDN (Port Inland Distribution Network) being developed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Participation of the US Coast Guard would ensure that any train ferry contemplated for this service is consistent with their regulations for operating within New York Harbor.

The future that is brought closer if the cross-harbor rail freight maritime solution is developed can be appreciated in Figure 7 -1. This is a design for a U.S. flag coastal rail car 1 truck transport vessel based on articulated tug-barge technology. Successful cross-harbor rail I truck ferry service would form the base for expansion into longer coastal routes.

0 TransTech Marine Co. Source: TransTech Marine Co. files.

U.S. Coastal Rail Car 1 Truck Transport 1 Container Feeder Vessel

Figure 7 -1

3. NJTPA should encourage efforts to preserve and rehabilitate the last remaining car float operator in New York Harbor.

This analysis / review has emphasized, as have previous studies, that car floats are not the solution to transporting large volumes of rail cars expeditiously across water. Train ferries can do it. To the extent that a viable extant car float operator could grow into the larger of operating train ferries, or attract a larger partner to enable doing so, government in the bi-state region should endeavor to Figure 7 - 2 preserve and sustain the last remaining car float operation in New York Harbor. In 1986 the New York Times described how the Koch Administration planned to spend $1 1 million on improved facilities for the New York Cross Harbor Railroad

Q TransTech Marine Co. (Appendix 7, first article). Improvements were to include construction of two new float bridges at 65thStreet Brooklyn. These were completed during the Giuliani Administration (Figure 7 - 2). However, two years into the Bloomberg Administration the New York Times reported that the new float bridges had yet to be used (Appendix 7, second article). NJTPA should bring to the attention of counterpart agencies around the port that the investment in new car floats has already been made. To not make use of them when they are indeed needed (Appendix 7 Inspection Report: Cross Harbor Railroad Pontoon at 43rdSt., Brooklyn) is inconsistent with the stated goals of the EDC's MIS and DEIS. Any increase in cross- harbor freight transport by water represents immediate reduction of highway truck traffic and its concomitant pollution. NJTPA should support efforts by the New York Cross Harbor Railroad to gain access to the new, unused float bridges at 65thStreet in Brooklyn.

4. NJTPA should advocate and co-sponsor in partnership with other appropriate agencies / authorities continued research and development of the train floating option.

Building upon this analysis I review and previous research, the following are recommended to advance the train floating option:

Train Ferry Technical Development

+ Update train ferry design to incorporate new market size information and modern vessel technologies. + Define optional vessel features to extend market range, such as to enable simultaneous transport of rail cars and heavy trucks. + Revise vessel specification and preliminary drawings. Prepare new bid package. + Solicit price indications and delivery from potential vessel builders. + Develop detailed capital and operating costs for ferry service.

Terminals and Operations

+ Develop the plan for "short train" operations aboard the ferry. Consult with New York and Atlantic Railroad / others. + Establish dialogue with labor interests I others to implement "short train" strategy at New Jersey ferry terminal. + Identify best locations for ferry terminals; establish suitability to accommodate projected freight volumes. + Identify vendors of train ferry 1 terminal transfer bridge systems. + Obtain price indications from vendors, services providers.

i0> TransTech Marine Co. 5. NJTPA should advocate a public / private partnership as the preferred alternative to build and operate a cross-harbor train ferry service in New York Harbor.

Successful precedent exists in the RFP put out by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey in 1985 to elicit interest from the private sector in building and operating commuter ferries to run between Hoboken, New Jersey and the World Financial Center in lower . Response to the RFP by reputable vessel builders and operators was high. Success of that initiative is largely credited as a major catalyst of the resurgence of private commuter ferry services in New York Harbor that has occurred over the past twenty years.

Subject findings of Recommendation 4 in this analysis I review, NJTPA should advocate that a public 1 private partnership build and operate a cross-harbor train ferry service (with the possibility of also transporting heavy trucks). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's successful commuter ferry RFP in 1985 should be the model for this partnership. Public / private partnership offers the potential to produce an efficient cross-harbor freight transport system, at small fraction of the time and cost of building a tunnel, with immediate benefits and virtually no adverse social and environmental impact, and with greater flexibility and potential expandability and less vulnerability than a tunnel. This requires comparatively small investment and offering proper incentives. By doing so, government would preserve scarce resources to fund essential infrastructure projects that are unable to attract private sector participation.

TransTech Marine Co. Appendix to Deliverable 4

NYS DOT Proposed Train Ferry:

Outboard Profile Inboard Profile Plan View Midship Section (reverse side)

Appendix to Deliverable 5

A Survey of Current Train Ferry and Float Bridge Technology

Appendix to Deliverable 7

"Using Barges to Revive a Rail Route", NY Times, May 4,1986.

"Riding the Bounding Rails", NY Times, March 2, 2003.

"Inspection Report: Cross Harbor Railroad Pontoon at 43rd Street, Brooklyn", TransTech Marine Co., Nov. 10,2003.

TransTech Marine Co. Est. 1979 Sfiippiw ~esearch/Investment Counsel

J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Building Office: (71 8) 638-2034 774 Carroll Street, Floor 2 Residence: (7 18) 857-6601 Brooklyn, NY 11215-1462 USA Email: transtech(%att.net

10 November 2003 Inspection Report

Cross Harbor Railroad Pontoon at 43St., Brooklyn

Introduction:

At the request of the East-of-Hudson Task Force, TransTech informally inspected the pontoon at the 43rd Street Brooklyn terminus of the Cross Harbor Railroad. This inspection was requested because the pontoon leaks and has recently' been subject to sinking, necessitating suspension of car floating operations until it isrefloated. The Task Force requested TransTech to comment on condition of the pontoon and on the proposed solution by the Cross Harbor ail road to increase the pontoon's buoyancy to effectively render it unsinkable. The inspection was conducted on Sunday, 9 November in the company of Mr. Howie Samelson, vice president of Cross Harbor Railroad. The inspection was performed pro bono on behalf of the East-of-Hudson Task Force. The following remarks are informed opinions only and are not formal technical recommendations, which can only be made after more detailed analysis of the structural integrity of the pontoon and the various, numerous loads placed upon it.

The Pontoon:

The pontoon supports the seaward side of an approximately 90' rail car transfer bridge. The floating pontoon enables Cross Harbor's car floats (flat deck barges fitted with rails to transport railroad cars) to mate with the transfer bridge over the range of in New York harbor.

Cross Harbor Railroad 43rd Street Pontoon (Dimensions are Approximate and Note to Scale)

Cross Section

Figure 1 Approximate dimensions of the pontoon in cross-section are shown in Figure 1. The pontoon's length (not shown) is approximately 26'. The pontoon consists of three separate floatation chambers permanently joined together. The main chamber is approximately 50' in beam, 26' in length, 6.5' in depth. Because of the use of welded construction, the main pontoon is believed to have been built after WW 11. Some time later, additional floatation 'boxes" were welded port and starboard to the main deck of the original pontoon. A wooden trestle system is installed in the 32' wide channel formed by the wing float boxes on which two sets of tracks ride. A switch built into one of the tracks enables the two track trestle to load a three track car float without shifting the car float.

Pontoon Condition:

Internal examination of the main pontoon revealed leakage, structural deterioration from age 1 elements and damage from wear and tear. The internal space is divided into six compartments, all accessible, created by one transverse and two longitudinal bulkheads. The inner bottom and underside of the main deck of the pontoon are strengthened by longitudinal angles 4" x 6" on approximately 27" centers. The sides Of the pontoon are flat plate steel of unknown thickness with no additional structure.

Access was not available to the inside of the float boxes added at a later date.

Without drydocking, it is impossible to render complete opinion on condition of the pontoon. On one hand it clearly shows its estimated half century of use; on the other, its scantlings indicate it was overbuilt in anticipation of rugged use.

Proposed Solution:

Removal of the pontoon to drydock it would be extremely costly because the transfer bridge that it supports would have to be lifted to free the pontoon. This would necessitate suspension of car floating operations until the pontoon is returned to service.

Less complex and costly solution proposed by Cross Harbor is to fill the pontoon with blocks of styrofoam. The permeability (percentage of available volume that can be occupied by water) of the pontoon's compartments is currently almost 100 percent. Seawater weighs 64 Ibs.1 cu. ft. whereas styrofoam weighs about 1 Ib. / ft. and is chemically stable (does not dissolve) in seawater. By occupying sufficient internal volume of the pontoon with styrofoam, it will therefore be possible to render it effectively unsinkable.

TransTechls view is that this proposed solution is a technically feasible interim solution until the pontoon can be rebuilt or replaced.

Recommendations:

The following recommendations are offered, subject to further validation:

Styrofoam is so buoyant, Cross Harbor need concentrate only on filling the main pontoon, not the wing boxes which were added later. . . Only the lowest layer of styrofoam need be put down horizontally to fit between the longitudinals that run along the inside of the bottom plating. Above this layer, styrofoam cut in columns wedged beneath the main deck longitudinals will create a tighter fit and reduce the number of individual pieces of foam to be fitted.

Preliminary calculations suggest it will not be necessary to completely fill each compartment with foam to achieve the desired added buoyancy. Hence, the judicious placement of foam would not impede future access to areas of the pontoon that may warrant repair in the future.

When the pontoon is removed to a drydock for more extensive repairs, TransTech recommends that jacking up the transfer bride should be investigated, rather than lifting it with a . This would put less stress on the bridge, would cost lessand would be easier, especially if the jacking coincided with a spring tide.

TransTech Marine Company believes car floating is and s'hould remain an essential component of New York Harbor's freight distribution system. We hope these comments are helpful to the East of Hudson Task Force and to the Cross Harbor Railroad.

Respectfully submitted.

Geoffrey F. Uttrnark MM, MSc, BSc