Niger in 2013 The government charted its way through the minefield of challeng- es posed by the war between Islamist groups and French-led forces in neighbouring Mali and Boko Haram’s revolt in Nigeria. Although Niger was seen by the outside world as a beacon of relative stability, the country’s vulnerability showed itself in attacks on a military base and uranium mine by Islamists driven out of Malian territory, as well as in a jail-break in the capital, Niamey, involving Boko Haram fight- ers. A boost in defence spending was followed by massive troop de- ployment along the Malian border, the dispatch of soldiers to assist in the French- and Chadian-led reconquest of north-east Mali, and the closure of the border with Nigeria. The attacks in Niger height- ened popular anxiety and led to new security measures. In August, the appointment of a government of national unity led to the first political crisis since President Mahamadou Issoufou had taken of- fice in 2011. Defended as a security measure, the reshuffle was part of the manoeuvring between Issoufou and his main coalition partner, National Assembly chair Hama Amadou, ahead of the 2016 presi- dential polls. Insufficient rainfall further compounded the fragile food supply. Uranium output suffered from the attack on mining installations. With its contract set to expire on 31 December, French nuclear energy group Areva got involved in tense negotiations with the government over the renewal of the agreement. Talks had not been concluded by year’s end. Fresh delays in the completion of the hydro-electric Kandadji dam, in addition to the worst power failures in years, exposed the country’s rickety infrastructure. Domestic Politics While President Issoufou enjoyed a comfortable majority with the backing of five of the Assembly’s eight political parties united in the © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004401440_007 62 niger in 2013 ‘Mouvance pour la Renaissance du Niger’ (MRN), he repeatedly ex- pressed his desire for a government of national unity. Now presented in the context of national security, the idea was linked to manoeu- vres ahead of the presidential elections due in 2016. A national gov- ernment might be able to discourage the defection from the MRN by the second largest party, the ‘Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien’ (Moden-Lumana) led by Issoufou’s main rival for the presidency, Hama Amadou (also National Assembly chair), and prevent the de- velopment of an opposition block from which Amadou could make his bid. The urgency of the need for action imposed itself on Issoufou as Amadou-oriented newspapers began to criticise Issoufou’s gov- ernment, triggering fears that Amadou was preparing a censure mo- tion, the dissolution of the Assembly and early elections. Members of the largest opposition party, the ‘Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement’ (MNSD), were interested in Issoufou’s overtures, but an initial attempt to lure them to the government side came to nothing. In the end, the cabinet reshuffle announced on 13 August led to internal divisions in both the MNSD and Moden. While the Tuareg Prime Minister Brigi Rafini was reappointed and key portfolios remained in the hands of presidential loyalists, six MNSD mem- bers entered the cabinet – without their party’s permission. On 17 August, Hama Amadou announced the withdrawal of seven of his cabinet ministers, but three of them, including Minister of Mining and Moden Secretary-General Omar Hamidou Tchiana, refused to leave. The country’s first government of national unity included no fewer than 35 ministers (of whom only five were women). Of the major departments, only the interior ministry changed hands, but it remained under the control of a presidential loyalist, Massoudou Hassoumi. If in consequence the presidential majority in the Assembly fell to three, the result for the opposition was worse. While Hama Amadou retained control of the influential Assembly presidency, he had no choice but to join a reduced opposition block renamed ‘Alliance pour .