EDDIE LEE RICHARDSON Aka ) HOTWIRE the PRODUCER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION EDDIE LEE RICHARDSON aka ) HOTWIRE THE PRODUCER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 19 C 02321 ) v. ) ) JuDge EDmonD E. CHang KARIM KHARBOUCH aka FRENCH ) MONTANA; and EXCUSE MY FRENCH, ) ) DefenDants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In 2012, when Eddie Lee Richardson was 16 years olD, He createD an instrumental song consisting of “a unique and artistic array of digital sounds and rhythms.” See R. 1, Compl. ¶ 13.1 He named it “*Hood* Pushin’ Weight.” Id. Seven years later, Richardson brought this lawsuit, alleging that Karim Kharbouch—who performs under the name French Montana—infringed on Richardson’s work in violation of federal copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 106.2 Compl. ¶¶ 25-32. THe Complaint also names as a defendant Excuse My French, which is allegedly an unincorporated music-publishing company owned and controlled by Kharbouch. Id. ¶ 3. THe Defendants now seek to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, anD failure to aDequately state a claim. R. 19, Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3), and (6)). In the alternative, the defense wants 1Citations to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket number. 2The Court has federal-question jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Richardson to provide a more definite statement of his claim under Rule 12(e). Id. For the reasons explained below, the Defendants’ motion is denieD in its entirety. I. Background For purposes of tHis motion, tHe Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). As mentioneD earlier, in 2012, tHe then-teenaged Richardson produced *Hood* Pushin’ Weight wHile at home in Lake County, Illinois. Compl. ¶ 13. AltHougH tHe song Does not Have lyrics, RicHarDson—wHo is also known as Hotwire tHe ProDucer— used a music-industry method called “tagging” to mix the song “with a single and repeating electronic vocal ‘Hotwire’” in order to mark it as his original work. Id. ¶ 16. After creating the song, in early October 2012, he uploaDeD it to Sound Click, “a well- known online audio distribution platform and music sharing website that enables its users to upload, promote, and share audio.” Id. ¶ 14. In uploaDing it to tHe platform, Richardson “adopted Sound Click’s restricted license,” wHicH tells users tHat auDio, video, and other intellectual property on the website is protected by copyright laws, that this property may only be accessed and useD for personal or eDucational purposes, and that users “may not otherwise reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, modify or create derivative works of the [intellectual property], unless authorized by the appropriate copyright owner(s).” Id. ¶ 15. A few months later, in May 2013, Richardson also registered the song with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. ¶ 17. 2 Sometime between October 2012 anD April 2013, Richardson alleges, the Defendants accessed *Hood* Pushin’ Weight from SounD Click. Id. ¶ 18. Soon after, in mid-April 2013, without Richardson’s permission “the Defendants reproduced, published, performed, and distributed a derivative work” of *Hood* Pushin’ Weight with other well-known artists and producers, including Rick Ross and Diddy, under the song title Ain’t Worried About Nothin. Id. ¶ 19. A few months later, in October 2013, the Defendants also releaseD a remix of Ain’t Worried About Nothin, this time with artists Wiz Khalifa, Lil Wayne, T.I., anD Miley Cyrus—again witHout Richardson’s permission. Id. ¶ 21. BotH versions of Ain’t Worried About Nothin are allegedly identical to Richardson’s song, with tHe exception of aDDeD lyrics anD vocals. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. According to Richardson, “the Defendants continued to reproduce, publish, perform, and distribute derivative works” of the song through July 11, 2017. Id. ¶ 23. II. Legal Standard When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that jurisdiction is proper, at least by a prima facie case. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiffs must generally only make a prima facie case of personal jurisDiction). But if important facts necessary to decide the issue are in dispute, the Court must grant discovery and, if need be, hold an evidentiary hearing. Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, when facts are disputed, the plaintiff must prove that personal 3 jurisdiction applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Hyatt Int’l Corp., 302 F.3d at 713; Purdue Research Found., 338 F.3d at 783. This makes review of jurisdiction quite different from dismissal motions that challenge the merits, in which the Court “accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true.” Hyatt Int’l Corp., 302 F.3d at 713. On tHat note, a motion to Dismiss “under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). THis sHort and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of wHat tHe … claim is anD the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).3 THe SeventH Circuit has explaineD tHat tHis rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). Ultimately, under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017). 4 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. III. Analysis A. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue—Rules 12(b)(2), (3) THe DefenDants seek to Dismiss tHe case for both lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. See Mot. to Dismiss at 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3). In copyrigHt actions, personal jurisdiction and venue are closely connected. On venue, federal law permits plaintiffs to bring copyright actions “in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (emphasis added). A defendant in a copyright action “may be found” in a district where he is subject to the district court’s personal jurisdiction—thus the connection between personal jurisdiction and venue. The Seventh Circuit has further clarified that proper venue under § 1400(a) is district-specific, that is, venue requires that the “defenDant’s amenability to personal jurisdiction … relate to the judicial district in wHicH tHe action was fileD … .” Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld Mfg. Co., Inc., 8 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). In other words, venue would be improper if the defendant has insufficient contacts to the particular district in wHicH tHe action was brougHt; it is not enough that the defendant have contacts with the wider State in which the district lies. Id. at 447-48. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts generally may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the state court in which the district court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 5 In Illinois, that means this Court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over [the Defendants] if it would be permitted to do so under the Illinois long-arm statute.” uBid, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). “Because Illinois permits personal jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements merge.” Id. UnDer tHe feDeral Constitution, personal jurisdiction requires a defendant to have made “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (cleaned up). Personal jurisDiction can be eitHer general or specific. The Court may exercise general jurisdiction if the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “so continuous and systemic as to render them essentially at home” there, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (cleaned up), even if the lawsuit has no relationship to the defendant’s contacts to that state. In contrast, specific jurisdiction only allows courts to hear lawsuits wHere tHe defenDant’s contacts with the forum state give rise to the plaintiff’s claims. See Curry v. Revolution Labs., LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 395 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, RicHarDson fails to sufficiently allege, let alone offer evidence, that the Defendants’ contacts with Illinois are so extensive that general jurisdiction applies.