Drought, Democracy and Disaster in 2017 Senior Thesis

Aidan Snyder

ABSTRACT This paper explores the effects of on the . Ultimately it will become clear that, although the Arab Spring provided a spark for the conflict, water scarcity was responsible for putting the nation on the path that resulted in revolution. Climactic, population, and economic data all serve to support the argument. An extended period of drought led to extreme water scarcity, and ultimately a collapse of the nation’s agricultural industry. This resulted in widespread migration of the population from rural to urban areas, and ultimately widespread discontent that facilitated the nation’s descent into Civil War.

2

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION 3

2. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 7 2.1 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND MINORITY RULE 7 2.2 ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND GETTING ON THE RIGHT TRACK 12

3. DESPERATE REVOLUTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 15

4. SYRIA’S WATER WAR 19 4.1 AGRICULTURAL BOOM 20 4.2 THE REPEATED SYRIAN DROUGHTS 24 4.3 AGRICULTURAL COLLAPSE 28 4.4 MASS INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 31 4.5 SYRIA’S PATH TO CIVIL WAR 33

5. THE DROUGHT ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST 36 5.1 THE CASE OF JORDAN 38 5.2 THE TURKISH QUESTION 41

6. CONCLUSION AND LOOKING FORWARD 44

7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 47

8. WORKS CITED 48

3

Aidan Snyder Paulina Ochoa Espejo – Advisor

1. Introduction

Since the Arab Spring of March 2011 Syria has been embroiled in a bitter civil war, pitting government forces against rebel militias and the Islamic State (also known as

Daesh, ISIS, and ISIL)[CNN Library, 2016]. Conventional wisdom, and the majority of research, indicates that this Civil War is the result of ideological and religious clashes as the population seeks to dethrone Bashar al-Assad and establish democracy [Hof, FAO,

Jenkins, Bellin, Fearon, Lynch, Rich, Cederman et al]. This explanation for the conflict is echoed through the majority of the scholarship about the Syrian Civil War, and alternative explanations largely explain the conflict as the result of economic grievances perpetuated by the corruption present in the Assad regime [Wimmen, 2016][Haddad, 2012]. Both of these explanations focus on economic and political causes of the conflict, and they provide valuable knowledge about how the nation descended into Civil War. Despite the valuable insight these explanations provide they continue to miss one of the most important causes of the conflict.

Given the relatively stable nature of Syria until the Arab Spring, it is easy to attribute the conflict to the majority of a population pushing against minority rule. In

2007 an article published by the American Political Science Journal, “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset,” indicated that nations with minority leaders were 2.75 times more likely to experience civil war each year that the minority ruler stayed in power [Fearon et al, 2007]. This type of research displays that there is a tendency in Political Science to 4 attribute conflicts to familiar and historically studied factors. Lars-Erik Cederman published a 2015 book, “Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War,” that discusses the historical causes of civil wars and water is not mentioned as one of the possible causes

[Cederman et al, 2015]. It is within this realm of political science that much of the existing research exists, and as a result there has been a gap in research about the important causes of the Syrian conflict, namely water scarcity.

The area where Syria is today has been populated for over 5,000 years, which was made possible by the invention of water irrigation technologies to permit agricultural production in the extremely arid region. Irrigation permitted these early civilizations to flourish, and the area came to be known as the . Water has remained the most important resource for this arid nation, and the first historical example of a water war in Syria happened almost 2,500 years before the birth of Jesus Christ. In this war the kingdoms of Lagash and Umma went to war as a result of conflict over an irrigation canal from the River [Hammer, 2013]. The conflict today has little in common with the water wars of thousands of years ago, but the importance of water in the region cannot be exaggerated and the influence of water scarcity on the Syrian state needs to be explored.

In recent history there has been a precedent for war over limited water resources around the world, and the issue is only magnified in the extremely arid Middle East. As recently as 1990 Syria threatened neighboring Turkey with military action over the construction of damn on the Euphrates River, a conflict that eventually led to the signing of a treaty concerning water usage between the two nations [Gleick, 2008]. In Sudan, students opposing the construction of the Jonglei Canal were killed during protests, the 5 population responded with violence that halted the construction of the canal [Gleick,

2008]. In this Sudanese example it is accurate to say that the construction of the canal led to the violent protests because of the clear chain of causation, a chain that has not been fully explored in the Syrian conflict. In 1979 Anwar Sadat was quoted as saying that the

“only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.” Although these examples do not prove that the Syrian conflict was caused by water scarcity, they show a trend indicating the important role that water can play in conflict. Why, however, is it important to understand the influence of water scarcity on conflicts? If the conventional scholarship is only missing one of the multitudes of factors that caused the Syrian Civil War is it really even a big deal?

The issue of water scarcity is becoming increasingly important as time progresses and the world changes. Since the mid 1990’s scientists have been evaluating the possibility that will cause increased drought and in semi arid to arid regions [Le Houérou, 1996]. Evidence shows that these areas are far more susceptible to the drying impacts of climate change than other areas around the world.

The entirety of Syria is described as semi arid or drier, putting it at an extreme risk for desertification and drought [Le Houérou, 1996]. Unless major steps are taken in the future to reduce the impacts of climate change then this is a process that may repeat itself around the world. As a result research into the effects water scarcity is having on nations around the world is becoming and will continue to become more important to the academic and international communities.

Climactic changes in the region led to a decrease in the amount of stored water, resulting in a failure of the agricultural industry that had grown dependent upon 6 groundwater reserves to satisfy irrigation needs. There was mass internal displacement, as a direct result of water scarcity, which led to widespread discontent with the regime and desperation among the population. This economic collapse, caused by water scarcity, is what drove the Syrian population to the streets, and put the nation on a path that has led to a continuing Civil War. Once a full examination of Syria is complete it becomes clear that by the time the ideals of the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East, providing a spark, the Syrian state was already on the path to Civil War as a direct result of water scarcity.

7

2. Existing Explanations

2.1 Ethno-Religious Conflict and Minority Rule

By comparing the Syrian situation to neighboring countries with more responsible

water policies, and examining how the drought affected the stability of the Syrian state,

this paper will show that there is a direct connection between water scarcity and Syria’s

current Civil War. Before the question of how water scarcity impacted the stability of

Syria can be explored it is vital to discover why the existing explanations for the Syrian

conflict are coming up short, and missing the most important cause of the war.

1 Most of the academic literature about the

Syrian Civil War is focused on the conflict as the

result of democratization or ethno religious

conflict [Hof, Lawson, Fearon, Cederman,

Jenkins, Bellin]. Any understanding of this

argument requires knowledge of Syria’s

demographics. The ruling sect, the Alawites, is a

Figure 1: Syrian Demographics minority that makes up only 12% of the

population, but it controls virtually the entire government [Library of Congress, 2005].

The Alawites are a specific sect of Shia Islam, which has dominated the majority Sunni

(74%) population for almost 50 years [Library of Congress, 2005]. Before the Civil War

10% of the population was Christian, with the remaining 4% made up by Druze, Judaism,

or various other religions [Library of Congress, 2005]. Ethnically, 90 % of the population

1 Figure taken from: US State Department. 2012. Web. https://sperglord.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/syrian-demographics-updated.png 8 is Arab, while 9% are Kurds, who are concentrated in rural Northeastern Syria [Library of

Congress, 2005]. On the surface this diverse mix of religions and ethnicities seems to be a reasonable explanation for the recent conflict, and one that fits well within the existing realm of political science research [Fearon et al, 2007]. This has resulted in researchers focusing on the ethnic and religious aspects of the conflict rather than the environmental factors that drove the population to desperation.

Researchers, including Frederic Hof and Eva Bellin, among others, believe that the

Civil war was caused by protests for reform and the Assad regime’s violent crackdown on what began as peaceful protests [Hof, 2013]. This ignores the fact that not all countries affected by the Arab Spring went on to engage in Civil War, so even if the Arab Spring provided the spark there must have been another factor driving the population to the point of revolution. In this kind of discussion of the Syrian Civil War, the importance of the ethnic divides in the country cannot be overstated. Hof focuses on how the majority of the protesters in Syria’s streets were of the majority religion, Sunni Islam, while the regime consisted primarily of the minority Alawite sect [Hof, 2013]. This sentiment is echoed by many of his peers, but ignores the fact that the protests were not entirely occurring along sectarian lines [Bhardwaj, 2012][Bellin, 2012]. Furthermore, James Fearon, of Stanford

University, attributes the conflict to ethnic minority rule, but acknowledges that the Civil

War would likely continue even if all Alawites were to disappear from the conflict because of the fragmentation of the nation’s Sunni population [Fearon, 2013]. Given that Fearon is one of the strongest proponents of revolutions as a result of minority rule, it is enlightening that he acknowledges that the conflict would continue even without the minority population in power [Fearon et al. 2007][Fearon, 2013]. Beyond the ethnic 9 explanation there could have been other factors that were inordinately effecting the rural

Sunni population, such as water scarcity, that drove the population into the streets and could result in the ethnic differences being identified as the causal factor of the conflict.

Questions remain about whether or not the protesters in the streets were pushed there due to ethnic differences rather than environmental factors, and more digging is necessary to determine what was more influential.

The gap in the research would not be that important, except the argument that ethnic differences and democratization caused the Syrian Civil War falls short in explaining why the Syrian population was pushed to the edge of the war. The majority of

Alawites and others in and the nation’s other western cities have remained loyal to the regime, and this is used as evidence to describe the conflict as an ethno- religious one [Hof, 2015]. Superficially this makes a lot of sense, but it ignores the fact that this Alawite population was not the group of who were most acutely affected by the drought and that not all Alawites continued to support the regime [Fiorillo et al,

2003][Hinnebusch, 2012]. The Alawite population has, in Syria’s recent history, been the nation’s urban elite and thus insulated from the negative environmental affects that resulted from the drought and water scarcity. As a result they were not pushed to the same point of desperation as the rest of the population, and did not have the same amount of incentive to rebel against the regime. The Alawite population’s loyalty to the regime can be explained as more than just an ethnic issue, and could have similarly been caused by their insulation from the effects of water scarcity.

Additionally the Alawite population is not the only part of the Syrian population who has continued to support the regime throughout the conflict, large portions of the 10

Sunni Arab population have emigrated to government controlled areas of the nation and pledged their allegiance to the regime [Wimmen, 2016]. Furthermore influential Alawites, including actress Fadwa Suleiman and writer Samar Yazbek, supported the revolution and were widely admired by protesters [Wimmen, 2016]. In the city of Homs, dubbed the

“Heart of the Revolution”, Alawite activists stood alongside Christian and Sunni populations to declare their support for the revolution, indicating that the revolution was the result of grievances that went beyond ethnic conflict [Wimmen, 2016]. Although not all Alawites were supportive of the revolution, there is a portion of this minority population that lost faith in the government and took to the streets in protest. Logically, if the war has been caused by ethnic or religious origins these two contradictory sects of

Islam would be in opposition to one another rather than protesting side by side.

Another challenge to the ethnically based scholarship on the Syrian Civil War arises during the exploration of Syria’s Kurdish community. Historically Kurdish and Arab relations in Syria have been sour, at best. However, during the recent Civil War many

Sunni Arab militias have aligned themselves with the Kurdish armed forces in the region

[Wintour, 2016][Al-Khalidi et al, 2015]. The Democratic Forces of Syria, as they are known, is an alliance between the Kurdish YPG forces and the Arab rebel groups known as the Syrian Arab Coalition [Al-Khalidi et al, 2015]. This alliance, along with other inconsistencies in the ethnic and religious lines of the conflict, creates enough doubt in this explanation for the conflict that it is necessary to evaluate alternatives.

A good historical comparison, for the argument that the Arab Spring caused the

Syrian Civil War, is the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as the cause of World

War I. In that case many reference the June 1914 assassination of the heir to the Austro- 11

Hungarian throne by a Serbian national as the immediate cause of the conflict, or the spark. However, the war was truly caused by a series of alliances and nationalism that meant that once war began between Serbia and Austro-Hungary their allies had to get involved in the conflict. There was a powder keg scenario, where the only thing necessary to start war was a small spark. In Syria water scarcity played the same role as these alliances and nationalism, putting the nation on the path towards Civil War. The Arab

Spring simply acted as a spark to allow the underlying causes of the conflict to come to the forefront.

12

2.2 Economic Pressures and Getting on the Right Track

The second most common explanation for the Syrian conflict is built around economic grievances, resulting from corruption among the government and policies that were meant to favor the Alawite population [Haddad, 2013]. These policies promoted commercialism and urban development, neglecting the rural population [Haddad, 2013].

Syria’s economy continued to grow throughout the early part of the 2000’s, but the growth rate in the agricultural sector had slowed since the 90s and other industries were starting to catch up in importance as a result of the nation’s increasing industrialization

[Hinnebusch et al, 2011]. However, the agricultural industry continued to be the single largest industry in Syria and was responsible for supporting 40% of the Syrian population

[Hinnebusch et al, 2011]. Similarly Heiko Wimmen, of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, explores the economic collapse in Syria in the decade preceding the war as the immediate cause of the conflict [Wimmen, 2016]. The existing research attributes this economic collapse to government policies that co-opted the wealthy, urban elite, while ignoring the impacts these policies were having on the rest of the nation’s population [Wimmen,

2016]. As a result the population who was most desperate on the eve of the revolution was not the Alawite elite, it was the rural population who was simultaneously being impacted by the drought and water scarcity.

Despite the apparent validity of this economic argument, it does not push far enough into the issue. The research attributes the economic collapse to government policies and cronyism, instead of environmental factors. The role of economic collapse in the conflict is undoubtedly important, but the causes behind the collapse of Syria’s economy still need to be explored. Depending on what caused the collapse of Syria’s 13 economy, it remains possible that water scarcity caused the economic collapse and ultimately the Syrian Civil War. However, there is a concern that the economic collapse could be the result of bad government rather than water scarcity, which aligns with an existing area of study, the resource curse.

The resource curse has recently become one of the most common explanations for why so many resource rich countries do not experience economic growth. The resource curse leads to a downward spiral of debt and inflation resulting in the development of an unstable petro-state. Long term, the resource curse prevents the development, both economically and democratically of nations, leading to economic stagnation, social unrest, and weakened state capacity [Shaxson, 2007] [Karl, 1997]. For a nation to develop after a large oil discovery it must be able to avoid the negative affects of the resource curse, and often the state’s capacity to make and enforce its decisions has already disintegrated to the point that this is impossible [Karl, 1997]. The disintegration of state capacity and onset of the resource curse lead to the development of a petro-state, where the weakened state cannot evade the corruption and conflict brought on by oil, wasting the chance for an economic boom [Karl, 1997]. In this case the bad government is responsible for the inability to harness the potential of oil deposits, and the question of whether bad government or water scarcity is responsible for the economic collapse of Syria becomes important to analyze.

The most important takeaway from the existing research on the topic is that the

Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters was the spark that led to armed conflict.

Where it goes wrong is its analysis of why the protesters were in the streets. It was not the result of ethno-religious conflict, as the opposition forces in the armed conflict are not 14 aligned along ethnic or religious lines. Historic enemies, the Arabs and Kurds, are fighting side by side in pursuit of regime change and to improve their own lives. It becomes clear that it is necessary to take a step back and examine what drives populations to rebel against their government, and find how the Syrian population was pushed to a point of such desperation that it would risk everything for a better life. The economic pressures, supposedly resulting from the Assad regime’s favoritism of the Alawite elite, on Syria’s rural population were extremely important in driving the population to this point of desperation. However, it will ultimately become clear this economic collapse was more directly caused by water scarcity than bad governance by the Assad regime.

15

3. Desperate Revolutions in a Changing World

Since it is clear that the existing explanations for the conflict are not telling the whole story, the next is to explore why water scarcity was responsible for putting the nation on a path that could only end in Civil War. Before this is possible it is vital to form an understanding of why and how populations reach the point where revolution is a viable option. It is not everyday that a population risks everything to overthrow its government, and there must be a reason that the Syrian population was willing to take this risk.

Throughout history there have been many different explanations for why a nation would experience a revolution, and it is difficult to decipher which is the most accurate. In general a revolution requires a large dissatisfied population, but it must have enough resources and hope that they believe revolution will lead to a better future rather than solely destruction. Theories of revolution must be established to ground the argument that water scarcity was indeed the factor pushing the Syrian population to the brink of war. By evaluating the Syrian conflict through these two theories it becomes clear that water scarcity put Syria on the path to Civil War, creating a powder keg for revolution that was sparked by the ideals of the Arab Spring and the government’s violent backlash to the initial protests for reform. The two theories of revolution, created by James C.

Davies and Marcus DuBois King, combine to make it clear that the most influential factor in driving Syria towards Civil War was the drought and resulting water scarcity in the region [King, 2016][Davies, 1962]. 16

2 The first important

theory in evaluating the

Syrian conflict is that of

James C. Davies, and it is

one that has existed for

decades. According to

Davies revolution does not

Figure 2: James C. Davies Theory of Revolution Visually arise when the population

is poor and apathetic, it arises when the population experiences economic growth and

then a collapse that results in a large gap between their expectations and the life they are

experiencing [Davies, 1962]. This results in a population that is politically active, but

desperate for new and improved opportunities. So, it logically follows that if the Syrian

population had experienced sustained economic growth followed by an abrupt economic

collapse, they would be ready to rebel against their regime. However, this theory supports

the existing research that the Civil War was caused by economic collapse, making further

research into the conflict redundant. However, given the second theory, which posits that

climate change can significantly impact human systems, it becomes vital to explore

whether or not water scarcity caused the economic collapse that put the nation on the

path towards war. With this in mind it is necessary to analyze Syria’s recent history to

explore whether or not this theory of revolution could be applied to the Syrian conflict

and whether water scarcity played a role in the economic collapse that made the

2 Table taken from James C. Davies article, “Towards a Theory of Revolution”, published by the American Sociological Review in 1962 17

population desperate enough to revolt. First a deeper exploration of the second theory of

revolution is necessary.

This complementary theory focuses on the effects climatic changes, such as

drought, can have on human systems. Ultimately, King believes that climactic changes can

cause migration and worse, civil conflict [King, 2016]. In his theory King discusses the 4

levels of impact that climactic changes can have on human systems [King, 2016]. The first

level effect is a change in the physical environment, e.g. higher temperatures; this is

followed by a second level effect, one on an ecological system, e.g. drought, water scarcity,

or fires [King, 2016]. The third level effect is on human systems, which may mean the

collapse of agriculture or forest fires cutting off roadways and damaging homes [King,

2016]. Whatever the impact on human systems a response will be necessary, this

response is considered the fourth level effect of climate change. King argues that this

response will usually come in the form of either conflict or mass migration, indicating that

it is possible that the Syrian conflict was caused by the drought and resulting water

scarcity [King, 2016]. Given these two theories about why revolution can occur, it

becomes clear that the researchers of the Syrian conflict are missing important

Effect Example in the Syrian Conflict Changes in Physical Higher temperatures and changing wind 1st Level Environment patterns 2nd Level Changes to Ecological Systems Drought, desertification, and water scarcity Stress on Agricultural Systems, food scarcity, 3rd Level Changes to Human Systems Poverty 4th Level Human Response Migration, Civil Unrest, Civil Conflict 3

Figure 3: Marcus DuBois King’s 4 Level of Climate Effects

3 Table created using information from Marcus Dubois King’s 2016 article, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq”, published by the Washington Quarterly 18 information and failing to evaluate the impacts of climactic changes on the nation.

It has become increasingly clear that there is something missing from the existing research on the Syrian Civil War. Although the Arab Spring provided a spark for the conflict, there must have been a reason why the population was so primed for a revolution. The ethnic divisions in the nation are, on the surface, a viable explanation, but once more examination is done it becomes clear that the ethno-religious aspect is blown out of proportion [Wimmen, 2016]. The economic pressures seem to provide a viable explanation for the conflict, and it is one that fits with existing theories of revolution.

Where the existing research departs from the facts on the ground is by missing the cause of this economic collapse, and failing to evaluate the impacts of environmental changes on the population. As will soon become clear water scarcity was the main cause of the economic collapse that led to the discontent and migration of the population. This population took to the streets in protest, the government responded violently and the population became fed up, and within a year the nation descended into war.

19

4. Syria’s Water War

The two theories discussed in the previous chapter must be kept in mind when evaluating the Syrian conflict, and are briefly summarized in the next few senteces. Given that revolutions occur when the population experiences sustained economic increases, followed by a sudden decrease in their economic situation it follows that water scarcity could have been a cause of the Syrian Civil War if water scarcity played a direct role in the nation’s economic collapse and falling quality of life for a large portion of the population

[Davies, 1962]. Since it is unclear how environmental factors interact with human systems, it is difficult to connect the economic collapse in Syria to water scarcity without the aid of the second theory. Given that climactic changes can have a large impact on human systems, such as agriculture, which necessitates a response, it becomes clear that the environmental changes and subsequent effect on human systems must be evaluated to find the true cause of the Syrian conflict [King, 2016].

The application of these theories to the Syrian conflict requires some historical analysis of the state, in order to determine that the economic rise and subsequent collapse were truly caused by drought and the subsequent water scarcity. This exploration will focus on the Syrian state since 1970, when Hafiz al-Assad and his Alawite regime first came to power [Hof, 2013]. He implemented policies that resulted in a massive growth of

Syria’s economy, making it one of the most prosperous and stable nations in the Middle

East [Library of Congress, 2005]. However, there was a dark underside to Syria’s economic boom that made it extremely susceptible to drought and foreshadowed the nation’s collapse.

20

4.1 Agricultural Boom

In 1970, current president Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafiz al-Assad, and his Alawite sect rose to power in a bloodless coup that brought the nation into an era of political stability [Library of Congress, 2005][Hof, 2013]. Importantly, the Alawites were a small sect of Shia Muslims, who knew that they would be a minority group if political parties were drawn along religious lines. In response to this concern the regime implemented policies that were meant to co-opt the rural population and government employees into supporters of the regime [Hof, 2013]. Although this period was marked by political stability, Hafiz al-Assad and his Alawite regime dominated important government positions, creating a divide between the elite Alawites and the rest of the nation’s population. This divide would become increasingly important in his future policies, as the government attempted to grow the nations economy and become self-sufficient for a selection of strategic crops.

During this era Syria had one of the highest growth rates in the world, at 3.5% a year in 1985, due in large part to improvements to the nation’s healthcare system, and in response the government implemented agricultural policies to help Syria achieve self- sufficiency for several staple agricultural products [Fiorillo et al, 2003] [Friedman, 2013].

These staple products included wheat, barley, sugar, cotton, and lentils, among others and were selected based upon the trade advantages the products provided [Fiorillo et al,

2003]. Despite the value of food self-sufficiency and economic growth these policies were not built for long-term sustainability, and did not consider possible negative effects that could haunt the nation in the future. 21

Among the policies meant to expand food production and co-opt the rural population were quotas, diesel fuel subsidies, and land redistribution [Kelley et al, 2015].

The land redistribution policy was a holdover of the pre-Assad socialist regime, and encouraged farmers to join together in cooperatives to maximize production [Haddad et al, 2008]. These laws resulted in heavy state involvement in the purchasing and marketing of staple products, including wheat and barley among others, making the agricultural market increasingly stable and productive [Haddad et al, 2008]. On the flip side, they regulated the prices of the staple products, making the profitability of farms extremely reliant on the size of the operation [Haddad et al, 2008]. Under the Assad regime the cooperatives were backed by policies that guaranteed the farmers certain prices and provided them with machinery necessary for efficient production, meaning small farmers had little choice but to join these cooperatives [Haddad et al, 2008]. On the flip side these cooperatives and associated policies reduced the number of rural farmers stuck in cycles of debt and allowed the rural population to flourish [Hinnebusch et al,

2011]. This had two important effects, increasing the average quality of life and giving the rural population increased opportunity for political involvement and influence

[Hinnebusch et al, 2011]. As a result the nation’s rural population grew to support the government regime, enjoying their newfound political influence and relative prosperity.

As part of their plan for self-sufficiency the government implemented a widespread irrigation plan that doubled the amount of irrigated land in Syria between

1985 and 2000 [Fiorillo et al, 2003]. This policy was implemented alongside the others in order to achieve self-sufficiency in the staple crops, and was successful in its goals of land reclamation and irrigation expansion [Fiorillo et al, 2003]. These policies greatly 22 increased Syria’s agricultural productivity, but were completely unsustainable and over the years drastically reduced Syria’s groundwater resources [Kelley et al, 2015]. The irrigation expansions were largely utilizing pumped groundwater, facilitated by the government’s diesel subsidies to power pumps [Fiorillo et al, 2003]. Although these policies were unsustainable they were not “bad” policies. They were implemented with the hope of helping the nation achieve food self-sufficiency and improving the lives of4 their rural population.

Agriculture in Syria grew to be the nation’s largest water consuming industry, contributing 87 to 89 percent of the nation’s total water usage depending on the source, as compared with the global average of around 70%

[Haddad et al, 2008][MunlaHasan, Figure 4: Table Showing Syria’s Water Usage from Groundwater and Surface water sources during the years 1990 2008]. This began to put the Syrian to 2004 state in a precarious position, making its agricultural industry extremely susceptible to drought. This industry had become a vital pillar of both the nation’s economy and the government’s constituency. In 2000, Syria’s agricultural industry accounted for 29% of

Syria’s GDP, up from 26.8% in 1985, indicating the vital and growing role it played in the

Syrian state [Fiorillo et al, 2003]. Agriculture was the most important industry to the

4 Table taken from Working Paper No 26 “Water Use Efficiency In Syrian Agriculture” by Abeer MunlaHasan (see works cited for full citation) 23

Syrian economy, and the nation was able to achieve self-sufficiency of staple crops by the mid 1990’s.

Given that nation’s experience revolutions when there is a sudden decrease in the prosperity of a large segment of the population, it follows that if Syria experienced a sudden agricultural failure caused by water scarcity then the ensuing revolution would have been caused by water scarcity [Davies, 1962]. It is clear that Syria’s agricultural growth of the late 20th and early 21st century improved the quality of life for its rural population. They experienced a growth in their political influence and economic standing, coinciding with the growth of Syria’s agricultural industry and increased involvement of the government, but the population was in a precarious position. The agricultural policies were unsustainable, but they were not responsible for the agricultural collapse.

Furthermore the government began attempting to remedy their policies, implementing new laws to promote more responsible water usage, but the damage to the nation’s water resources had already been done. On the surface the nation was on a path towards food security and life as one of the Middle East’s agricultural powers. If only the nation had been able to see storm clouds brewing on the horizon, they may have been able to change the nation’s course.

24

4.2 The Repeated Syrian Droughts

In 1975 Turkey began a large-scale dam and irrigation building program that cut the water flow to Syria from the Euphrates River Basin by 40%, however the treaty guaranteed that Syria be allowed to use 40% of the water that flowed into their territory

[Hammer, 2013]. The deal also allowed for increased cooperation over the flow of the river and during years of drought the nations were able to continue this cooperation

[Kelley et al, 2015]. It would seem that this treaty would help assure Syria’s water resources, by guaranteeing its supply from the Euphrates River, but this does not take into account the unpredictability of the world today. One very important note is that

Syria’s agricultural industry is far more dependent on year-to-year rainfall and pumped groundwater than neighboring Turkey and Iraq, and is limited to the use of 40% of the water that runs in its largest river [Kelley et al, 2015]. This meant that an extended period of drought would’ve had an extremely more acute impact on the stability of the Syrian state than its neighbors.

During the 1990’s two multi-year droughts struck Syria, severely depleting the amount of stored water in the nation [Mourad, 2011]. The combined droughts, including those of the 1990’s and late 2000’s, were the worst to affect the region in at least 900 years according to researchers [Cook et al, 2016]. However, the droughts of the 1990’s were not, alone, considered exceptional [De Chatel, 2014]. Some rural farmers were forced to seek emergency food aid or liquidate assets in order to survive, but the industry was able to recover, and this was seen as the status quo in a region where water resources were naturally scarce [De Chatel, 2014]. It is within this context that the Syrian 25

Civil War needs to be evaluated, where the rural population was experiencing economic growth, but were struggling with an extremely unforgiving environment.

Without irrigation Syria would not be able to have such a strong agricultural industry, but the irrigation systems were built in order to maximize the nation’s production of agricultural products rather than water use efficiency. The nations limited water resources were challenged by the droughts of the 1990’s, but the industry was able to stay successful, largely because of government incentives and support. The government provided farmers with the resources necessary to hold out during drought, giving food aid and resources necessary to assure that crops would not fail. Even with the government’s support of the agricultural industry, the most important asset Syrian agriculture had was its stored groundwater reserves, which supplied many of the newly constructed irrigation systems. From 1990 to 2004, the area of irrigation supplied by groundwater reserves roughly tripled, indicating how quickly the nation’s reliance on groundwater reserves for agriculture was growing [MunlaHasan, 2007]. These reserves allowed the agricultural industry to continue its growth and preserve prosperity through the early 2000’s.

Throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s economic growth, water reserves, and the government’s expansion of irrigation systems allowed the agricultural industry to continue to flourish, but not all was well under the surface [Fiorillo et al, 2003]. Each year during the initial drought period Syria was using 160% the sustainable amount of groundwater that could be used, this rate of use was higher than any of its neighboring nations and was completely unsustainable [Kelley et al, 2015]. By 1997 more than 60% of

Syria’s water for irrigation system was pumped groundwater, an extremely troubling amount for a nation with limited groundwater reserves [Haddad et al, 2008]. The 26 increasing utilization of groundwater in irrigation systems would come back to have dire consequences for the Syrian state, as it depleted its reserves in pursuit of short-term self- sufficiency. Continued economic growth and the return of rainfall masked the water issue through the early 2000’s, but it needed to be confronted and dealt with, and continued to be seen bubbling under the surface in rural areas [Hammer, 2013]. Furthermore the nation’s groundwater resources had been so badly depleted that the country would be hard pressed to withstand another drought.

Despite all the challenges it was facing, by the mid 2000’s Syria’s agricultural sector was a strong and growing part of the nation’s economy. It officially employed 20% of the nations population, but other estimates go as high as 50% due in large part to informal employment in the industry [De Chatel, 2014][Hammer, 2013]. This makes agriculture the nations single most important industry by a significant margin, and any failure of the agricultural industry would have a major ripple effect throughout the rest of

Syrian society.

The Syrian Government took note of the difficulties its water supply was facing, and during Bashar al-Assad’s rule it began to take steps, albeit small, to reduce the negative impact on their water supply. In 2005 Bashar al-Assad attempted to stem the irresponsible water use by implementing a law requiring permits for the drilling of new wells, but the law was implemented on the eve of a renewed drought, meaning that it would not be able to have any immediate impact [Kelley et al, 2015]. Beginning in the winter of 2006 another drought struck Syria, adding to the pressure placed on Syria’s already reduced groundwater resources [Kelley et al, 2015]. The combination of the nation’s increasing reliance on stored water reserves and extended periods of drought 27 placed too much stress on Syria’s water resources, foreshadowing the inevitable impacts of water scarcity on the stability of the state.

Following the renewed drought of 2006, Syria began to spiral towards Civil War. In

2007/08, rainfall across the nation dropped an average of 66% from the long-term average, with some agricultural areas receiving no rainfall at all [De Chatel, 2014]. Some areas of the nation recovered the following year due to increased rainfall, but Syria’s northeastern breadbasket continued to experience a prolonged drought that lasted until

2010 [De Chatel, 2014]. This did not bode well for the Syrian agricultural industry, as this was the heart of Syria’s production of staple products, namely wheat [Kelley et al, 2015].

The drought struck Syria at a time when it was especially vulnerable, and the effects it would have on the Syrian economy and population would prove to be disastrous.

Given the agricultural industry’s importance to the Syrian economy, and the extended periods of drought that were affecting Syria, it is clear that Syria’s economy and population was in precarious positions. The drought is what Marcus DuBois King considers a second level effect of climate change, and the next effect would be on human systems. In the Syrian context agriculture was the most vulnerable industry, and water scarcity’s impact on the nation would soon be at the forefront of the nation’s challenges.

28

4.3 Agricultural Collapse

On the eve of the conflict the Syrian rural population was becoming extremely concerned with the years of drought. One Syrian well driller experienced the drop of the

Syrian water table first hand [Wendle, 2015]. In 2006 Kemal Ali had to drill 60 or 70 meters for a new well, and by 2010 this depth had increased to between 500 and 700 meters to find the water table [Wendle, 2015]. Although this story is anecdotal it indicates how impactful the drought was on Syria’s water supply. The water table had dropped immensely, and farmers throughout the nation were being affected. Some nations have been able to implement responsible water usage policies, like Jordan, that have allowed them to avoid negative effects in similar situations, but the Syrian government focused on different priorities. It was still seeking to satisfy the needs of its growing population and reduce its trade deficit, and as a result it continued to pursue agricultural growth and irrigation expansion. This put immense pressure on Syria’s already reduced water supply and put the nation in an extremely perilous position.

After just two years of renewed drought agricultural production, measured as a percent of the nation’s GDP, fell from 25% to just 17% [Kelley et al, 2015]. This fall included a near complete failure of the nation’s wheat industry, one of the staple crops in

Syria’s agricultural plan [De Chatel, 2014]. In the absence of a successful wheat harvest, the Syrian state was unable to achieve its goals of self-sufficiency and was forced to import large amounts of food to satisfy its population. Had the drought ended here the nation would have likely been able to recover, as the government continued to provide support to the rural population in an attempt to help them recover. However, the drought 29 continued to last for several years, and eventually the government could do no more to help.

The drought did not end in 2008, and as a result the situation within Syria continued to get worse. Syria was forced to begin importing wheat in 2008, for the first time since self-sufficiency in that crop had been declared in the mid-1990s [Kelley et al,

2015]. That same year, the Syrian government cancelled its subsidy on diesel fuel, in an attempt to promote sustainable water usage, which farmers relied on to pump groundwater for use in irrigation systems [De Chatel, 2014]. When these simultaneous challenges were presented to Syria’s rural population, it became too much for them to handle. The population, which had for years been flourishing, both economically and politically, in the Syrian countryside was confronted with deepening hardship. The drought affected over 1.3 million people and caused more than 800,000 Syrians to completely lose their livelihoods and turn to the government for support [Solh, 2010]. For a time the government provided food and other forms of aid to these farmers, but as the drought continued the chances for a better future were worsening.

This failure of the agricultural industry had significant ripple effects that could be felt through other areas of the population, which will be explored further in the following section. Simultaneously the relaxing of anti-corruption rules in the government increased the discontent among the rural and displaced populations, giving them incentive to look elsewhere for support [Hinnebusch, 2012]. Since the rural population was largely made up of long-term supporters of the regime, they were extremely disheartened when they felt the government ignored their troubles during the drought, and the prospects of a better future were quickly disappearing. Given the theories of revolution, set forth by 30

Marcus DuBois King and James C. Davies, it is quickly becoming clear that water scarcity caused the economic collapse in Syria, pushing the population to a point where revolution was a viable option [King, 2016][Davies, 1962]. King cautions that the response to changes on human systems was rarely peaceful, and oftentimes manifested itself in the form of migration or revolution, both of which would be seen as Syria descended into war

[King, 2016].

31

4.4 Mass Internal Displacement

Syria’s once flourishing agricultural industry had been reduced to just a remnant of its former glory. It had been decimated by the extended years of drought and dwindling stored water reserves. Given that the agricultural industry supported roughly 40% of

Syria’s population, it is clear that the results of the agricultural failure would be devastating to the nation. Not only would its economy crumble, a large portion of the population would be unemployed and struggling to support themselves or searching for new opportunities. More than 800,000 people, in the northeastern part of the country, were “severely affected” by the drought, and were subsisting on a diet of just sugared tea and bread [De Chatel, 2014]. The nation’s small-scale farmers and herders were most severely affected by water scarcity, and many were forced to kill off their livestock to feed themselves [Solh, 2010]. This meant that the rural population would be unable to recover without extensive support from the government, in the form of either seeds or new livestock, which they never received. According to Femia’s Center for Climate Security

“…changing weather patterns are likely to drive farmers, fishermen and herders away from affected areas…as has already happened in Syria [Baker, 2015].”

From 2002 to 2010 Syria’s urban population grew from 8.9 million to 13.8 million, causing extremely high levels of and unrest in urban areas [Kelley et al,

2015]. This is a nearly 50% increase in the nation’s urban population in just 8 years, a rate much faster than the rest of the nation indicating that the nation’s rural population was migrating into the cities [De Chatel, 2014]. This mass migration of Syria’s population, from the nation’s agricultural regions, was directly caused by water scarcity. Marcus

DuBois King, describes this phenomenon as a 4th level effect of climate change in Syria; 32 with the first level being the environmental changes, the second referring to the effect of the ecological system, the third being the effects on human systems, and the fourth and final level referring to the human responses to the effects [King, 2016].

Aaron Wolf, a water management expert at Oregon State University, in an interview with the Smithsonian magazine, attributed the Civil War to the angry young men displaced by water scarcity, “You had a lot of angry, unemployed men helping to trigger a revolution,” [Hammer, 2013]. The migrants were largely from the nation’s Sunni dominated, rural, regions that led to the widespread misinterpretation of why the population was in the streets. They were not there because of ethnic or religious minority rule; it was because water scarcity had forced them to lose everything. The population had reached the point where, given Davies theory of revolution, they had a large enough gap between their expected circumstances and their actual circumstances to engage in a revolution to improve their lives [Davies, 1962].

This rural population was clearly displaced and has its economic standing ruined by water scarcity, which, given James Davies theory of revolution, indicates that this portion of the population had already been primed for revolution. For years they had been experiencing improving livelihoods, which were torn out from underneath them as a result of water scarcity. However, they still maintained the connections that had formed during their time working on the cooperatives. In essence, this was the perfect group to form the heart of a revolution. They had the motive, ability, and human resources to achieve their goals, and the only necessary analysis remaining is how this population contributed to the nation’s path to Civil War. 33

4.5 Syria’s Path to Civil War

Syria’s cities were swelling, as drought challenged migrants searched for new opportunity. This growth put increasing pressure on the nation’s essential services, during a period of economic contraction, meaning that an even larger portion of the population would have falling standards of living [De Chatel, 2014]. The drought most directly impacted the rural population, but when they migrated to cities the issues permeated to other parts of the population. By the time protesters took to the streets, as a part of the Arab Spring, the nation was already well on its way to revolution as a result of the growing portion of the population dissatisfied with their quality of life. Given that revolutions occur when the population experiences a steady growth of its prosperity followed by an abrupt fall, creating a large gap between their expectations and actual quality of life, it is clear that the Syrian population had already reached the point where revolution was their only viable option [Davies, 1962]. When this is combined with the knowledge that climate change can have drastic impact on human systems, such as agriculture, it becomes clear that water scarcity created a powder keg scenario where only a small spark was necessary to make the nation descend into Civil War [King, 2016].

The spark came in the form of the Arab Spring, which swept across the Middle East in

2011, and the Assad regime’s crackdown on free speech and protesters.

The conflict escalated when the government began to crack down on protesters in

Dara’a and other cities throughout Southern Syria [Slackman, 2011]. The government forces opened fire on peaceful civilian protesters, resulting in several casualties and sparking more protesters to take to the streets against the regime [Slackman, 2011].

These protesters were hoping to restore true democracy to the nation, just as several 34 neighboring Arab nations were able to do at the same time [CNN Library, 2016]. The protesters were largely young Syrians, who had moved to the city as a result of drought and had found it difficult to make new lives for themselves [Kelley et al, 2015]. The young

Syrians who were integral to the demonstrations against the Assad regime were in the streets because of the gap between the actual quality of life, and the one they expected caused by water scarcity and the ensuing collapse of Syria’s agricultural industry.

In response to the increasing protests Bashar al-Assad began trying to appease the protesters, granting an immediate salary increase to state employees and allowing the licensing of opposition political parties [CNN Library, 2016]. These concessions continued throughout April of 2011, when the long-standing state of emergency, which was first implemented by the Ba’ath party in 1963, was lifted [CNN Library, 2016]. Despite these concessions fighting intensified throughout the year, as the people pushed for democratic reform and increased opportunity and Assad refused to step down.

Soon Syria was falling deeper and deeper into Civil War, and multiple factions entered the fighting. The main factions engaged in the fighting are the government forces, the Islamic state, the Kurdish peshmerga fighters, and various armed Syrian militias that all loosely support the Syrian National Coalition. These regional powers are not organized strictly upon religious or ethnic lines, with Sunni Arabs broken up into several different factions, including the Al Nusra Front, ISIS, and the forces supporting the Syrian National

Coalition [Zorthian, 2015]. The Kurdish peshmerga fighters and the Arab Syrian militias are fighting side by side in places to defeat the Islamic State, and they both oppose al-

Assad’s return to power [Wintour, 2016]. This unlikely alliance, due to the violent history between Kurds and their Arab neighbors, reiterates that the conflict goes beyond 35 religious and ethnic differences.

Since the existing explanations for the conflict appear to come up short in fully explaining the conflict, and water scarcity and the resulting failure of the agricultural industry appears to be a viable reason for the Syrian population’s willingness to revolt against the regime it becomes vital to explore why water scarcity only pushed Syria into

Civil War. Neighboring nations, such as Turkey and Jordan, were similarly affected by drought and had their own protests that could have led to revolution, but the population was not willing to take the risk. The following chapter will explore why neighboring nations were able to avoid the worst effects of water scarcity, and avoid Civil War.

36

5. The Drought Across the Middle East

Figure 5: Water Resources in the Comparison Countries 5

The droughts that put Syria on the path to Civil War did not solely affect Syria, but of these nations only Syria descended into an extended period of Civil War. There is a variety of reasons why Syria was closer to revolution than its neighboring states, due in large part to the fact that Syria presently has the most challenged water resources in the region [Chenoweth et al, 2011]. This does not necessarily mean that Syria has the least water of any nation in the region; it means they had the most reliance on their historically adequate water supply. Syria, unlike some of its neighbors, never took steps to build desalination facilities or water reclamation facilities, which meant that it was by far the most reliant on year-to-year rainfall and groundwater reserves. Furthermore, agriculture is Syria’s most important industry and is the most directly susceptible to water scarcity, meaning that water scarcity would have the most direct impact on the Syrian economy.

With this in mind, two neighboring nations with limited water resources will be compared to Syria.

5 Table Excerpted from 2011 article, “Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region: Modeled 21st century changes and implications”, by Jonathan Chenoweth et al. 37

There are two valuable reasons to explore these neighboring states; to help prove that water scarcity in Syria was responsible for the nation’s Civil War and to provide information about how the conflict could have been avoided. Two nations appear ripe for exploration, and were able to evade the negative effects of water scarcity through extremely different means. These nations are Jordan and Turkey, which utilized infrastructure developments, extensive stored water reserves, and incredible efficiency to maintain water security and prevent the rise of armed conflict in their states.

38

5.1 The Case of Jordan

Jordan neighbors Syria directly to its south, and the two nations share many of their water resources. For example, the most important river to Jordan’s water supply is the Yarmouk River, which originates and runs through Syria. Additionally both nations experienced the same spark, protests resulting from the Arab Spring, but Jordan did not follow the same path to Civil War, and for water scarcity to have been the cause of Syria’s conflict there must be significant differences regarding the two nation’s water resources

[Tobin, 2012]. Jordan actually has more limited water resources than Syria, and as of

2009 Jordan was using 91% of its renewable water resources [Chenoweth et al, 2011].

That same year, Syria was only able to utilize 61% of its renewable water resources, due in large part to inefficiency and illegal wells that were not included in the study

[Chenoweth et al, 2011]. Through the establishment of government organizations, such as the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the Water Authority of Jordan, and the Jordan Valley

Authority, the nation has been able to monitor and implement responsible water usage policies to assure the water supply of their population [MOWI, 2017]. Even with these improvements, however, Syria naturally has more extensive water resources than Jordan, so the question arises why Syria was so much more acutely affected by water scarcity

[Chenoweth et al, 2011]. The answer is twofold; the nation has taken more steps to prepare for waning water supplies and agriculture is less important to the nation’s economy.

Jordan has not been forced to face the challenge of water scarcity on its own, receiving extensive assistance from international experts and financial support. In cooperation with the United State agency for International Development, Jordan has 39 taken steps to modernize and rehabilitate its wells and irrigation systems [USAID, 2017].

These improvements allow for more efficiency in irrigation systems, and positioned the nation to reduce the amount of water withdrawn from reserves without reducing the amount of water available to the population. These steps have allowed the nation to maintain some semblance of water security, despite its extremely limited resources. In contrast with Syria, where the government encouraged the expansion of irrigation from groundwater reserves, through the implementation of diesel subsidies to power water pumps, Jordan was implementing policies that were meant to assure responsible use of the nation’s water supply [MunlaHasan, 2008]. Since 2000, the Jordanian government has received over $700 million in international aid, from the United States, to improve the nation’s water management system [USAID, 2017]. Although the nation has more limited water resources, it was able to prevent the of these resources, assuring that the nation’s water supply would remain stable even in years of drought.

Furthermore, Jordan’s agricultural industry uses just 60% of the nation’s water supply, and is far less important to the nation’s economy than Syria’s agricultural industry

[Mayrhauser, 2012]. This means that the nation would logically be less susceptible to the negative effects of water scarcity, and more insulated from a failure of the agricultural industry. Given that revolutions occur as the result of economic growth, followed by a sudden fall in the population’s fortunes, it would appear obvious that decreasing water supplies would have less impact on Jordan than Syria [Davies, 1962]. The biggest difference between Syria and Jordan’s issues with water scarcity comes down to a simple fact. Jordan developed with water scarcity as a fact of life, insulating itself from the effects through infrastructural and economic developments. 40

In recent years Jordan’s population has increased drastically, as refugees from war torn Syria have fled across the border for safety. This has increased the stress placed on

Jordan’s water supply. Even with the influx of refugees from Syria Jordan has been able to maintain the water security of its population due to infrastructure and resource development dating back to the 1950’s [USAID, 2017]. Syria neglected to make similar reforms and investments, making the nation extremely prone to drought. The combination of the agricultural industry’s importance to the nation’s economy and failure to implement infrastructure upgrades put Syria in a position where water scarcity would have a much more direct impact on the nation than in Jordan. As a result drought and water scarcity pushed the Syrian state down the path to Civil War, while Jordan was able to maintain its relative stability.

41

5.2 The Turkish Question

Neighboring Turkey has similar demographics, including a large Kurdish population, and has experienced a similar drought to Syria in the Southeastern, rural, part of the country [Trigo et al, 2010]. Additionally both nations are technically democratic, but their presidents have spent over a decade in power with no peaceful end to their power in sight. However, when, in July 2016, there was an attempted coup in Turkey the people did not come to the support of rebel forces and consequently President Erdogan remained in power [Cizre, 2016]. He then responded to the coup attempt with authoritarian toughness, imprisoning political rivals, journalists, and anyone associated with the coup attempt [Cizre, 2016]. Although a half decade later than the Arab Spring, this is very similar story to how the Civil War began in Syria. Given that revolutions occur when a portion of the population experiences improving fortunes, followed by a sudden reduction in their fortune, and that water scarcity can affect human systems it is clear that

Turkey’s extensive water resources may have played a role in maintaining the stability of the nation.

The July 2016 coup is seemingly a very similar story to how Syria descended into its own Civil War, but the Turkish population was unwilling to engage in revolution. If water was indeed responsible for the Syrian Civil War, then as a neighboring nation similarly impacted by drought, it must have played a role in preventing Turkey’s population from reaching the point where revolution was viable. Unlike Jordan, however, agriculture is very important to Turkey’s economy employing roughly a quarter of the population [ISPAT, 2014]. Turkey is the 7th largest agricultural producer in the world, indicating that the industry is vital to the nation’s stability [ISPAT, 2014]. This means that 42 water scarcity would similarly impact the nation’s agricultural industry, possibly sending the nation into a spiral towards Civil War. The vital question remaining to answer shifts how Turkey was able to avoid the path to Civil War, and whether or not water resources played a role.

The exact reason why Turkey did not go to war can be debated, and could be the subject of its own study, but one important thing is clear. Turkey has far more extensive water resources than Syria, which played a role in the maintenance of stability (See Figure

5)[Chenoweth et al, 2011]. Turkey has a per capita water supply of 2,890 m3 per year as compared to Syria’s 791.4 m3 per year [Williams, 2012]. This water supply allowed

Turkey to maintain its agricultural production despite the impact of the drought. As a result Turkey’s economy remained strong, and their population was not significantly affected by water scarcity. In fact, Turkey’s agricultural industry grew despite the years of drought, with the industry’s GDP growing from 36.6 billion Euros in 2009 to 48.5 billion

Euros in 2012 [ISPAT, 2014]. This means that their agricultural population was continuing to improve in their quality of life, and not experiencing the same fall in fortunes that Syria’s rural population did. Given the established theories of revolution, it becomes clear that the Turkish population did not have enough incentive to push for regime change, indicating the vital role that water resources played in the stability of the

Syrian state.

Granted, Turkey and Syria are not the same country, and have extremely different levels of development. However, they are extremely similar nations geographically and demographically, and were both impacted by extended periods of drought [Trigo et al,

2010]. Syria’s desperate water scarcity pushed its population over the edge, making 43 revolution a viable option. Turkey’s stored water reserves and agricultural investments allowed the nation to avoid these same effects, and the nation was able to avoid a devastating Civil War. 44

6. Conclusion and Looking Forward

As with any conflict, it is difficult to fully attribute the Syrian Civil War to any single cause. The researchers who are studying the conflict as a result of democratization or ethno religious conflict are making valid observations, which are necessary to fully understand the conflict. However, it has become increasingly clear that water scarcity played an integral role in causing the conflict. The worst drought in 900 years drastically reduced the amount of surface water available, and Syria’s agricultural policy promoted irresponsible withdrawals from groundwater sources [Hinnebusch et al, 2011]. The drought, and ensuing collapse of the agricultural sector, forced many young men to leave rural areas in search of new opportunities in Syria’s cities [Kelley et al, 2015][De Chatel,

2014]. Cities expanded rapidly, placing increasing pressure on essential services and reducing the overall quality of life in urban areas [De Chatel, 2014]. When displaced rural farmers came to the nation’s urban areas they experienced an even more pronounced gap between the actual and expected standards of living, and as the Assad regime continued to ignore this problem they grew restless. Given that revolutions occur when the population experiences sustained economic increases, followed by a sudden decrease in their economic situation, and that climactic changes can directly impact human systems, it is clear that water scarcity played an important role in pushing the nation to the edge of

Civil War [Davies, 1962][King, 2016].

When the Arab Spring of 2011 swept through the Middle East these displaced young men, and dissatisfied farmers, saw the opportunity to regain their relative economic and political prosperity taking to the streets in protest against the Assad regime

[Davies, 1962]. Unlike other countries that had taken steps to protect their water 45 resources, like Jordan, Syria had failed to support its rural population creating a powder keg situation that meant the nation was ready for war. Once the protests began the Assad regime responded violently, and the conflict escalated, eventually leading to widespread support for regime change [CNN Library, 2016]. As the nation plunged into war, researchers quickly began to point to the Arab Spring and democratic ideals as the primary cause, without paying enough attention to the influence of drought and water scarcity on the nation.

Research into the effects water scarcity, and other environmental pressures, is having on nations is becoming increasingly important, as the effects of climate change continue to grow [Le Houérou, 1996]. Nation’s must take heed of the warning that is provided by the Syrian conflict, and take steps to assure that their nation will be able to adapt to the changing world. Some nations have already begun taking these steps, as can be seen in the analysis of Jordan, developing their infrastructure and improving water use efficiency [USAID, 2017]. Taking these steps will allow nation’s to assure the security of their water resources, and prevent the situation in Syria from repeating itself around the world. It is not yet fully understood what steps could have been taken by the Syrian regime to reduce the impact of water scarcity. Further research into steps that could be taken to mitigate the affects of water scarcity would be a valuable use of time and energy, especially in light of the fact that the world is warming at an increasing rate [Le Houérou,

1996]. Given that increasing temperatures can cause drought and desertification, it is clear that these rising temperatures will increase the likelihood of extended periods of drought in both the Middle East and around the world [King, 2016]. Furthermore those attempting to find way to solve the Syrian Civil War would stand to benefit from 46 knowledge about how to mitigate the effect of water scarcity, to help address the most important underlying cause of the conflict.

47

7. Acknowledgements

Thank you to Professor Paulina Ochoa-Espejo for her help during the thesis writing process. An additional thanks to the rest of my thesis group: Julian, Gabe, and

Ethan for their ideas during the process. Thank you to my parents and friends for other support. 48

8. Works Cited

Al Khalidi, Suleiman and Perry, Tom. “New Syrian Rebel Alliance Formed: Says Weapons on the Way.” Reuters News. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds- idUSKCN0S60BD20151012

Amnesty International. “The Arab Spring: Five Years On.” Amnesty International. Web. 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/arab-spring-five-years-on/

Baker, Aryn. “How Climate Change is Behind the Surge of Migrants to .” Time. Web. 7 September 2015. http://time.com/4024210/climate-change-migrants/

Bellin, Eva. "Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring." Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127-149.

Bhardwaj, Maya. "Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War." Washington University International Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 76-97.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. Inequality, grievances, and civil war. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Chenoweth, J., P. Hadjinicolaou, A. Bruggeman, J. Lelieveld, Z. Levin, M. A. Lange, E. Xoplaki, and M. Hadjikakou (2011), Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region: Modeled 21st century changes and implications, Water Resour. Res., 47, W06506, doi:10.1029/2010WR010269.

Cizre, Ümit. “Turkey in a Tailspin: The Foiled Coup Attempt of July 15.” Middle East Research and Information Project. Web. August 10, 2016. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero081016

CNN Library. “Syrian Civil War Fast Facts”. CNN. 26 September 2016. Web. http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/

Cook, B. I., K. J. Anchukaitis, R. Touchan, D. M. Meko, and E. R. Cook (2016), Spatiotemporal drought variability in the Mediterranean over the last 900 years, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., 121, 2060–2074, doi:10.1002/2015JD023929.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "ISIS is not a terrorist group: why counterterrorism won't stop the latest jihadist threat." Foreign Aff. 94 (2015): 87.

Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review 27, no. 1 (1962): 5-19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089714.

FAO. “Syrian Arab Republic” AQUASTAT. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 2008. Web. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/index.stm

Fearon, James D. “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s Civil War”. Foreign Policy. December 10, 2013. Web. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-to-ending-syrias-civil-war/ 49

Fearon, James D., Kimuli Kasara, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnic minority rule and civil war onset." American Political science review 101, no. 01 (2007): 187-193.

Fiorillo, Ciro and Vercueil, Jacques. “Syrian Agriculture at the Crossroads.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome. 2003. http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4890e/y4890e00.htm#Contents

Francesca De Châtel (2014) The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution, Middle Eastern Studies, 50:4, 521-535, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2013.850076

Friedman, Thomas. “Without Water, Revolution.” New York Times. May 18, 2013. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/opinion/sunday/friedman-without-water- revolution.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Gleick, P.H., 2014: Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. Wea. Climate Soc., 6, 331– 340, doi: 10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1.

Gleick, Peter H. “Water Conflict Chronology” Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security. Web. 11 October 2008. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/conflictchronology.pdf

Haddad, George, Ivett Szeles, and J. Sandor Zsarnoczai. Water management development and . No. 47546. Szent Istvan University, Faculty of and Social Sciences, 2008.

Hammer, Joshua. “Is a Lack of Water to Blame for the Conflict in Syria.” Smithsonian Magazine. June 2013. Web. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/is-a-lack-of-water-to-blame-for- the-conflict-in-syria-72513729/?no-ist

Hinnebusch, R., Hindi, A., Khaddam, M., & Ababsa, M. (2011). Agriculture and Reform in Syria. Syria Studies, 3(1), 1-79. Retrieved from https://ojs.st- andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/716

Hinnebusch, Raymond. “Authoritarian Upgrading and the Arab Uprising: Syria in Comparative Perspective” British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. 2012. https://brismes2012.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/raymond-hinnebusch-syria-authoritarian- upgrading.pdf

Hof, Frederic. “Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations for Mitigation”. The Center for the Prevention of Genocide: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 2013. https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20130325-syria- report.pdf

ISPAT. “Food and Agriculture in Turkey.” Republic of Turkey Prime Minister Investment Support and Promotion Agency. March 2014. Web. http://www.invest.gov.tr/en- US/infocenter/publications/Documents/FOOD.AND.AGRICULTURE.INDUSTRY.pdf 50

Jenkins, Brian Michael. The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE115.html

Karl, Terry Lynn. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Kelley, CP, Mohtadi, S, Cane, MA, Seager, R, and Kushnir, Y. “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought.” Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015; 112: 3241–3246

King, Marcus DuBois. “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq” The Washington Quarterly. Winter 2016. Web. https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2016_King.p df

Lawson, F.H. “Syria's mutating civil war and its impact on Turkey, Iraq and Iran.” International Affairs, 90: 1351–1365. 2014. Web. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12173

Le Houérou, Henry N. "Climate change, drought and desertification." Journal of Arid Environments 34.2 (1996): 133-185.

Library of Congress. “Country Profile – Syria” Library of Congress – Federal Research Division. April 2005. Web. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Syria.pdf

Lynch, Marc, Deen Freelon, and Sean Aday. "Syria’s socially mediated civil war." United States Institute Of Peace 91, no. 1 (2014): 1-35.

Mayrhauser, Melissa von. “Water Shortages in Jordan.” Colombia University Earth Institute. June 20, 2012. http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/06/20/water-shortages-in-jordan/

Mourad, Khaldoon. “Syrian Water Resources Between the Present and Future” Libertas Academica. 2011. doi: 10.4137/ASWR.S8076. Web.

MOWI. “Water Policy” Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 2017. Web. http://www.mwi.gov.jo/sites/en-us/SitePages/Water%20Policies/Water%20Policy.aspx

MunlaHasan, Abeer. “Water Use Efficiency in Syrian Agriculture.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Working Paper No 26. January 2007.

Rich, Ben, and Dara Conduit. "The impact of jihadist foreign fighters on indigenous secular- nationalist causes: Contrasting and Syria." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2015): 113-131.

Rich, Ben, and Dara Conduit. "The impact of jihadist foreign fighters on indigenous secular- nationalist causes: Contrasting chechnya and syria." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2015): 113-131. 51

Rodriguez A, Salahieh H, Badwan R, Khawam H (1999) Groundwater Use and Supplemental Irrigation in Atareb, Northwest Syria (Int Cent Agric Res Dry Areas, Aleppo, Syria), Soc Sci Pap 7.

Shaxson, Nicholas. Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) . Vol. 83, No. 6, and Security. (Nov., 2007) , pp. 1123-1140. Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4541914

Slackman, Michael. “Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities”. New York Times. 25 March 2011. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html

Solh M (September 27, 2010) Tackling the drought in Syria. Nature Middle East. Available at natureasia.com/en/nmiddleeast/article/10.1038/nmiddleeast.2010.206. Accessed November 17, 2012.

Stathis, M. "ISIS, Syria, and Iraq: The beginning of a fourth gulf war." Critical Issues in Justice and Politics 8.1 (2015): 1-19.

Tobin, Sarah A. “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution.” Middle East Policy Council. 2012. http://mepc.org/journal/jordans-arab-spring-middle-class-and-anti-revolution

Trigo RM, Gouveia CM, Barriopedro D (2010) The intense 2007–2009 drought in the Fertile Crescent: Impacts and associated atmospheric circulation. Agric Meteorol 150(9):1245–1257.

USAID. “Jordan: Water Resources and Environment”. US Agency for International Development. 2017. Web. https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/water-and-wastewater-infrastructure

Vidal John. “Water Supply Key to Outcome of Conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn” The Guardian. 2 July 2014. Web. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/02/water- key-conflict-iraq-syria-isis

Vidal, John. “Water Supplies is Syria Deteriorating Fast Due to Conflict, experts warn” The Guardian. 7 September 2016. Web. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/07/water-supplies-in-syria- deteriorating-fast-due-to-conflict-experts-warn

Wendle, John. “The Ominous Story of Syria’s Climate Refugees” The Scientific American. 17 December 2015. Web. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ominous-story-of-syria- climate-refugees/

Williams, Paul. "Euphrates and Tigris Waters-Turkish-Syrian and Iraqi Relations." 2012): Water resource conflicts and international security: a global perspective, Maryland (2012): 19-51.

Wimmen, Heiko. “Syria’s Path From Civic Uprising to Civil War.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 26, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/22/syria-s- path-from-civic-uprising-to-civil-war-pub-66171 52

Wintour, Patrick. “US Seeks Turkish Backing for Kurdish-led Operation in Raqqa” The Guardian. 6 November 2016. Web. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/06/kurdish-led-forces- plan-retake-raqqa-isis

Zorthian, Julia. “Who’s Fighting Who in Syria”. TIME. 7 October 2015. Web. http://time.com/4059856/syria-civil-war-explainer/