Miscegenation: the Courts and the Constitution
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William & Mary Law Review Volume 8 (1966-1967) Issue 1 Article 7 October 1966 Miscegenation: The Courts and the Constitution Cyrus E. Phillips IV Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons Repository Citation Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Miscegenation: The Courts and the Constitution, 8 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 133 (1966), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss1/7 Copyright c 1966 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr MISCEGENATION: THE COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION Miscegenation is generally defined as the interbreeding or marriage of persons of different races, but the term will here be used in refer- ence to miscegenetic marriages only. That is, this paper will concern itself only with the aspects of the marriage laws of various states that relate to miscegenation. The purpose of this paper will be to show the antecedents of miscegenation in the American legal system, the meth- ods of constitutional justification of miscegenation statutes in state courts, and the change in regard to their validity given by the federal judiciary. BACKGROUND Prohibitions against miscegenation date back to the earliest colonial times, and the first record of sanctions imposed for this act in the Virginia colony appears in Hening's extract from the judicial proceed- ings of the Governor and Council of Virginia: September 17th, 1630. Hugh Davis to be soundly whipped, before an assembly of negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a negro; which fault he is to acknowledge next Sabbath day.' That prohibitions against miscegenation have been widespread in the United States can be seen in the fact that they have appeared in the statutes of some forty states. Of these forty, twenty-three have repealed their statutes,2 half of these having been repealed within the last two decades as a result of the movement for Negro equality as well as the publicity occasioned by a 1948 decision of the California Supreme Court which struck down that state's miscegenation statute.3 1. 1 Laws of Virginia 146 (Hening 1823). Other representative miscegenation laws of the American colonies: Maryland, 1692- Acts of Md. 76 (Bisset 1759); North Caro- lina, 1741- 1 Public Acts 1715-90, at 45-46 (Martin's Revisal of Iredell 1804); South Carolina, 1717- 3 Star. at Large of S.C., No. 383, at 20 (Cooper 1838). 2. These states and the date when the statute was repealed are: Arizona (1962), California (judically) (1948), Colorado (1957), Idaho (1959), Indiana (1965), Iowa (1851), Kansas (1857), Maine (1883), Massachusetts (1840), Michigan (1883), Montana (1953), Nebraska (1963), Nevada (1959), New Mexico (1886), North Dakota (1955), Ohio (1887), Oregon (1959), Pennsylvania (1891), Rhode Island (1881), South Dakota (1957), Utah (1963), Washington (1867), Wyoming (1965). 3. Perez v. Sharp, sub. nom. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948). [ 133 ] WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:133 Nontheless, it is indeed surprising that seventeen states still retain their miscegenation statutes.4 Of these seventeen states, six make express provisions in their constitutions either forbidding the passage of laws validating such marriages or else maling them void ab initio.5 Miscegenation is an entirely statutory crime, generally considered to be of the grade of a felony, the penalty for which ranges up to im- prisonment for ten years and fines up to $2,000. All miscegenation statutes contain general provisions against the intermarriage of Negroes and Caucasians, but others have expanded their scope to include Malays,' American Indians,7 Mestizos," and Half-breeds.' Although these statutes in the main do not prohibit in- termarriage between members of races other than white, all prohibit intermarriage between a white person and a member of the designated non-white group or groups. And just as the groups with which intermarriage is prohibited vary from state to state, so also does the definition of "Negro." One state classifies a Negro as any person of one-eighth or more Negro blood,' while others define Negroes as any person of Negro descent to the third generation inclusive."' Two states include every person in whom there 12 is any ascertainable Negro blood within the prohibited group. That these statutes are an anomaly in this period of constitutional and social reform is readily apparent. Nevertheless, their antecedents run deep in the American legal system. 4. A". CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-104,-105 (1947); DEi.. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 101,-102 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. H9 741-11-.12 (1961); GA. CODE §§ 53-106, -214, -312, -9903 (1933); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 402.020, .040, .990 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 9.201, .221, 14.79 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 459, 2002, 2234 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.020 (Supp. 1963), § 563.240 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1950); OKcLA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 12, 13 (1961); S.C. CoDE ANN. S§ 20-7, -8 (1962); TEN. CoDE ANN. §§ 36-402,-403 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4607 (Supp. 1960), Trx. PN. CODE arts. 492-93 (Supp. 1960); VA. CODE ANN. 9 20-58,-59 (1960); W.VA. CODE ANN. S§ 4695, 4697 (1961). 5. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 102; FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 24; Miss. CONET. art. 14, § 263; N.C. CoNsT. art. 14, § 8; S.C. CosT. art. 3, § 33; TENN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 14. 6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957). 7. S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7 (1962). 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Florida. 11. E.g., Maryland. 12. Georgia, Virginia. 19661 MISCEGENATION MISCEGENATION AND THE STATES The highest courts in some fourteen states have passed upon the question of constitutionality of miscegenation statutes and have uni- formly upheld their validity under both state and federal constitutions. "' The avenues upon which these statutes have been attacked range from violation of various state constitutional provisions to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.-' However, the most frequent points upon which the stamtu have been challenged are the impairment of contracts," priv- ileges and immunities, 17 due process,'8 and equal protection 9 clauses of the United States Constitution. The state courts seem to have vindicated their miscegenation statutes on three bases: (1). contract, (2). equal application of a reasonable regulation, and (3). exclusive state institutionality. The contractual viewpoint seems to be the oldest in point of time and the simplest in its outlook. That is, the courts approached the problem by concluding that these statutes had nothing to do with reg- ulating the social status of the citizen and stood upon the same footing as laws controlling other contracts, but to hold that "(m)arriage is a 13. See Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 232 (1869); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Lonas v. State, 3 Heiskell (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); In re Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 P. 911 (1921); Kirby v. Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 206 P. 405 (1922); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 296, 231 P. 483 (1924); In re Atkins, 151 Okla. 294, 3 P. 2d 682 (1931); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942); In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. 2d 217 (1942); Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942); Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948); Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, 260 Ala. App. 698, 72 So. 2d 116, cert. den., 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Rogers v. State, 37 Ala. App. 638, 73 So. 2d 389 (1954); Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E. 2d 749, remanded, 350 U.S. 891, aff'd., 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1955); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966). 14. See, e.g., Scott v. Georgia, supra note 13. 15. Civil Rights Bill of April 9, 1966, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964). See Lonas v. State, supra note 13; Green v. State, supra note 13; Dodson v. State, supra note 13. 16. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10. See State v. Gibson, supra note 13; Lonas v. State, supra note 13. 17. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. See Lonas v. State, supra note 13; State v. Jackson, supra note 13; Dodson v. State, supra note 13. 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 1 1. See Jackson v. Denver, supra note 13; Naim v. Naim, supra note 13. 19. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See State v. Gibson, subra note 13; see generally State v. Brown, supra note 13; Naim v. Naim, supra note 13; Loving v. Commonwealth, supra note 13. 136 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:133 civil contract, regulated by law . ..," 20 left the states open to appeal to the federal courts on the ground of impairment of contract, and thus this avenue of approach was soon discarded. Another rather simplistic attempt to resolve the problem was for the court to assume arguendo that prohibition of miscegenetic marriages was a reasonable regulation and then to justify the statute on the ground that it applied equally to both races.2' This arguendo approach to the problem saved several courts from the tenacious ground of Brandeisian jurisprudence as illustrated by the following judicial observation: It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, inter- marry, they cannot possibly have any progeny ....22 The argument most frequently applied in the defense of miscegena- tion was that marriage is a civil status23 and as such is subject to the exclusive power of state regulation.