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2009 Carlos Montemayor ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS By CARLOS MONTEMAYOR A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Philosophy Written under the direction of Prof. Alvin Goldman And approved by ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ New Brunswick, New Jersey October, 2009 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Psychology of Time and its Philosophical Implications By CARLOS MONTEMAYOR Dissertation Director: Alvin Goldman This dissertation offers new proposals, based on a philosophical appraisal of scientific findings, to address old philosophical problems regarding our immediate acquaintance with time. It focuses on two topics: our capacity to determine the length of intervals and our acquaintance with the present moment. A review of the relevant scientific findings concerning these topics grounds the main contributions of this dissertation. Thus, this study introduces to the philosophical literature an empirically adequate way to talk about how the mind represents time at the most fundamental level. In order to account for our immediate acquaintance with the duration of intervals, a theoretical framework for classifying clocks is used to explain why the representational outputs of the circadian clock and the stopwatch have metric structure. A philosophical analysis of these outputs is proposed to classify them and explain their properties. With respect to our immediate acquaintance with the present, a novel two-phase model of the present is proposed. This model shows that there are two forms of acquaintance with the present, which has consequences for contemporary debates in the philosophy of time. ii Acknowledgements I owe the deepest debt of gratitude to Alvin Goldman, whose careful guidance was crucial for the completion of this dissertation. Many of the ideas behind the proposals I present here became clear only after thinking about his comments to drafts of this text, which he read with great diligence. I also owe a great deal to Frankie Egan and Dean Zimmerman for suggestions that led to critical improvements. Likewise, I owe a lot to Randy Gallistel, whose work inspired many of the proposals I offer, and who was always ready to help me with clarifications and comments. I first started thinking about the topic of this dissertation because of conversations with Zenon Pylyshyn, whose work has heavily influenced the way in which I think about issues in the philosophy of mind. My interest in timing-mechanisms and metric representation greatly increased because of conversations with Rochel Gelman, Fuat Balci and Harry Haladjian. I am very grateful to all of them. I would like to thank Joseph Levine for allowing me to quote his manuscript on demonstrative thought. Thanks to Jerry Fodor, Barry Loewer, Bob Matthews and Brian McLaughlin for helpful advice. And thanks to Geoff Anders, Kate Devitt, Susan Carey, Richard Dub, Jeff Engelhardt, Carrie Figdor, Justin Fisher, Michael Johnson, Jonathan Ichikawa, Matt Katz, Dimiter Kirilov, Tania Lombrozo, Kelby Mason, Alex Morgan, Alex Jackson, Iris Oved, Georges Rey, Susan Schneider, Karen Shanton, Jason Turner, Kristy vanMarle and Stephanie Wykstra for comments to portions of this material. Thanks to my mother and sister for their unconditional support. And finally thanks to Michele for her love and constant encouragement. iii Table of Contents Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………...ii Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………iii List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………………………vii List of Illustrations …………………………………………………………………..viii Introduction …………………………………………………………………………….1 Chapter 1: Minding Time 1.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………….……...3 1.2. Time: the most primitive representation …………………………………………..10 1.3. Outline of proposals ……………………………………………………………….15 Chapter 2: Periodic and Interval Clocks: The Cases of the Circadian Clock and the Stopwatch 2.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..17 2.2. Records of time ……………………………………………………………………19 2.3. Periodic clocks …………………………………………………………………….22 2.4. Interval clocks ……………………………………………………………………..27 2.5. A comparison between periodic and interval clocks ……………………………...37 2.5.1. Disadvantages of periodic clocks ……………………………………………...37 2.5.2. Disadvantages of interval clocks ……………………………………………...42 2.5.3. Hybrid and semi-hybrid clocks ………………………………………………..48 2.6. The circadian clock ………………………………………………………………..51 2.6.1. Entrainment ……………………………………………………………………54 iv 2.6.2. Circadian clock representations ………………………………………………58 2.6.2.1. Navigation and the solar ephemeris function ………………………….59 2.6.2.2. Time of occurrence ……………………………………………………61 2.7. The stopwatch ………………………………………………………………….….66 Chapter 3: Sensory-Motor Representations of Time: Outputs of the Clocks 3.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..76 3.2. Representation and isomorphism ………………………………………………….77 3.3. Metric structure ……………………………………………………………………88 3.3.1. The metric structure of the outputs of the circadian clock …………………….90 3.3.2. The metric structure of the outputs of the stopwatch ………………………….95 3.4. Analog clock-representations …………………………………………………….101 3.4.1. First criterion: loss of information …………………………………………...105 3.4.2. Second criterion: continuity and density ……………………………………..108 3.4.3. Third criterion: approximate representation …………………………………111 3.4.4. Fourth criterion: analog misrepresentation …………………………………..114 3.4.5. Fifth criterion: cognitive integration …………………………………………120 Chapter 4: A Two-Phase Model of The Present 4.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………125 4.2. Simultaneity windows ……………………………………………………………127 4.2.1. Sense-specific simultaneity windows ………………………………………..129 4.2.2. The multi-sensory integration window ……………………………………….131 4.2.3. The multi-sensory integration window and the clocks ………………………135 4.2.4. The sensorial specious present ……………………………………………….139 v 4.3. Meta-semantic mechanisms and the temporal indexical ………………………...144 4.3.1. The need for meta-semantic mechanisms ……………………………………148 4.3.2. The temporal direct-meta-semantic mechanism ……………………………..150 4.4. The phenomenal present …………………………………………………………153 4.4.1. The phenomenal specious present …………………………………………...157 4.4.2. The relation responsible for P-Unification …………………………………..163 4.5. The two-phase model of the present ……………………………………………..173 Chapter 5: Implications of my Proposals for Debates in the Metaphysics of Time 5.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………177 5.2. The ‘present’ in the metaphysics of time ………………………………………...181 5.3. Two senses of ‘subjective present’ ………………………………………………193 5.4. Implications of the SSP for the A-theory ………………………………………...206 5.5. Main conclusions of my dissertation …………………………………………….215 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………218 Curriculum Vitae ……………………………………………………………………228 vi List of abbreviations (In Alphabetical Order) A-O: Action-Outcome Associations CMIP: Cross-Modal Integration Processor DMM: Direct Metasemantic Mechanism IS: Intuitive Strength (of the A-theory) OR: Openness and Retentiveness PB: Phenomenal Binding PS: Periodic Segmentation PSP: Phenomenal Specious Present RA: Representational Advantage Argument RAA: Representational Advantage of the A-theory Argument SBF: Striatal Beat Frequency Model SC: Stream of Consciousness SCN: Suprachiasmatic Nucleus SP: Scientific Plausibility (of the A-theory) S-R: Stimulus Response Associations SSP: Sensorial Specious Present TH: Truly Hybrid TMD: Temporal Mental Demonstrative TPMP: Two-Phase Model of the Present vii List of illustrations Figure 1. The Sensorial Specious Present: First component of the two-phase model: page 152. Figure 2. The Sensorial Specious Present without the Phenomenal Specious Present: page 174. viii 1 Introduction Our awareness of time permeates our lives. It is so familiar to us that we take it for granted. It is always there in our decisions and actions. It accompanies our emotions, struggles and pleasant or unpleasant experiences. Our awareness of time is, metaphorically speaking, a constant companion. Not only humans, but also animals seem to be immediately acquainted with time because they are able to effortlessly calculate intervals and perform time sensitive tasks with great accuracy. With the development of ever more precise clocks and techniques for measuring time we have become much better at representing and calculating time. Technology has had a significant impact on the way in which time dictates the rhythms of our lives. Scientific and cultural representations of time are more complex than ever before and this has made possible the intricate web of synchronized interactions that are characteristic of our times. But how does the mind represent time? How should one characterize our awareness of time, which is the origin of other, more complex representations of time? Until very recently, these questions needed to be answered only by intuitive insight and philosophical analysis. Theses about how the mind represents time were offered by philosophers, which I will assess in this dissertation. But no evidence in support of these theses was available. The psychology of time—particularly the study of how the mind estimates the duration of intervals and is acquainted with the present—has become a very important area of research in cognitive science. Experiments with animals that are very