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Chad and the West: Shifting the Security Burden? Celeste Hicks

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Chad and the West: Shifting the Security Burden? Celeste Hicks No. 13 July 2015 #1 September 2009 Chad and the West: Shifting the Security Burden? Celeste Hicks 4x4 vehicles in a matter of days. After a series of Chad’s decision in January 2015 to send confrontations with the Chadian army (Armée troops into northern Nigeria to fight the Nationale du Tchad, ANT), a small rebel militant Islamist group Boko Haram column was able to break through the capital’s brought the country into the defences and arrived within a few kilometres of international spotlight. Early successes the presidential palace where they clashed with in regaining territory from the group the presidential guard. Hundreds were killed and raised important questions about why thousands displaced by the fighting. According Chad was seemingly able to do a better to contemporary accounts, President Idriss job than Nigeria’s own army, which had Déby Itno was within hours of being unseated, failed to protect lives and contain the and was only saved by aerial intelligence support insurgency for several years. Chad’s from France and divisions within the rebels at campaign followed two other military the decisive moment. interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), which had This was the second such attack on N’Djamena varying levels of success. This policy in two years, and the rebels had also briefly brief will discuss how such a poor occupied the eastern town of Abeche. President country has managed to improve its Déby’s position seemed precarious. The armed forces to the point of being able Chadian rebellion began over domestic power to launch numerous adventures abroad, struggles after Déby made his intention clear to and the risks and opportunities change the constitution to allow him to stand associated with the current intervention for re-election in 2006. It was further in north-eastern Nigeria. exacerbated by the crisis in Darfur, which sent some 250,000 Sudanese refugees, rebels and weapons flooding into eastern Chad. Frustrated INTRODUCTION at Chad’s tacit support of the Darfur rebel groups (several prominent leaders of the Justice In February 2008, a Chadian rebel group, the and Equality Movement (JEM) were from the ‘Union of Forces for Democracy and same Zaghawa clan, although from a different Development’ (UFDD), launched a lightning sub-clan, as President Déby), Sudanese assault against the capital N’Djamena. Armed President Omar al-Bashir retaliated by mostly with machine guns and rocket launchers, sponsoring a motley collection of Chadian rebel they crossed 1000 kilometres of semi-desert in groups, including the UFDD, many of them EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations #1 September 2009 former Déby allies who opposed his plans to ensure that oil revenues would be spent on change the constitution. This dangerous spiral of development and not pocketed by unscrupulous proxy war ended only when the Chadian rebels officials. This unique plan was sponsored by the suffered a catastrophic defeat at the battle of World Bank and provided that all royalty Am Dam in May 2009 and Chad and Sudan payments from the developing Consortium agreed to a rapprochement. (Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Petronas) would be transferred through a transparent off-shore Up until 2009, Chad’s army, which on paper escrow account where payments could be numbered some 17,000 soldiers, had been monitored, and that around 80% of that money woefully unequipped and was characterised by would be spent on five ‘priority’ development disloyalty and power struggles. One of the sectors, including health and education.i leading generals of the UFDD rebel group Mahamat Nouri was a former army officer and a However from the very beginning money was series of defections had been crucial to the diverted towards military spending. A significant rebels’ success. The ANT was also accused of proportion of an initial $25m signature bonus human rights abuses and using child soldiers. It on oil contracts was spent on weapons. In 2006 was barely better equipped than the rebel forces as the rebel threat from the UFDD increased, mostly fighting with 4x4 ‘technical’ vehicles with Chad ripped up the original agreement with the machine guns mounted on the back, and World Bank allowing it to change the list of soldiers’ salaries were often late or not paid at ‘development priorities’ to include ‘national all. President Déby had long feared the greatest security’ which in reality meant arms. From threat to his position would come from the 2006-9 Chad spent an estimated $600m on six army – there were many rival Zaghawas within reconditioned Sukhoi fighter jets, attack its ranks and other groups such as the Gorane helicopters and armoured personnel carriers. A vying for power and influence and who felt the systematic review of the armed forces was also ANT had been neglected during the 2000s – and launched, ensuring salaries were paid and ‘ghost’ there were regular clampdowns on purported soldiers and those who had shown disloyalty in ‘coup plotters’. However by the battle of Am the past (particularly those from troublesome Dam in 2009 the ANT was well on the way to clans such as the Gorane) were purged. being transformed and reorganised into an effective and well-equipped fighting force. As This increased spending with oil money which the vulnerabilities of the ANT and its inability to should have been put towards development was protect the president became obvious during the a crucial factor in the ANT’s decisive victory war, President Déby became determined to against the rebels in 2009 at Am Dam. This ensure that such a crisis would not occur again. defeat effectively signalled the end of the face- Thanks to the start of the exploitation of Chad’s to-face combat in lightly armed 4x4 vehicles oil deposits in 2003, he now had unprecedented which had characterised Chadian military amounts of cash at his disposal to achieve this. strategy for decades. CHAD’S OIL The volte face on the development spending priorities made the World Bank’s position When Chad became an oil producer in 2003, untenable and in 2008 the loans were repaid and elaborate plans were laid to help the country the project closed. However Chad’s military avoid the so-called ‘resource curse’ and to spending continued. By 2013 it had reached an EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2 #1 September 2009 estimated $4bn of just over $10bn known to over-run large swathes of northern Mali and was have been earned from oil, according to figures now making direct threats against the capital, from the IMF. Much of this spending – Bamako. As the UN, African Union and particularly in the crisis years from 2006-11 – neighbouring African countries stalled on plans was approved by extraordinary budgetary to implement a peacekeeping force to protect procedures known as DAO (depense avant the civilian population from daily exactions, ordonnancement), effectively a presidential decree Chad sent about 2000 troops to join Serval. which bypassed parliamentary approval. And as Within weeks Operation Serval chased the Chad’s oil continues to be developed, the jihadists out of the northern town of Timbuktu, opportunities for military spending are still and made good initial progress in securing Gao.iv present. In 2011 the Ronier field owned by the Chadian troops with their vast experience in Chinese National Petroleum Corporation desert warfare were able to fight the jihadists in (CNPC) was brought into production, and other Mali’s Adrar des Ifoghas mountain range, and fields owned by the commodities giant Glencore even killed one of their top commanders. also began to export in 2014. National production increased from around 100,000bpd A partial withdrawal of Chadian troops from in 2010 to 140,000bpd today.ii Although Chad is Mali was announced soon after – perhaps a a member of the Extractive Industries canny appreciation from Déby of the Transparency Initiative (EITI) and a number of importance of not getting bogged down in an revenue management provisions still remain essentially unwinnable war against jihadist from the original World Bank project, around groups in such a vast, unpoliced region – but 75% of what the country earns is spent without Chad had already turned its attention to the effective civil society or parliamentary scrutiny. Central African Republic. Chad’s long It is largely due to this increased spending that involvement in its troublesome southern Chad has been able to transform its armed neighbour - driven principally by self-interest as forces into the outfit scoring victories in CAR’s northern provinces which border Chad northern Mali, and now against Boko Haram.iii are essentially out of the control of the Bangui government and are often used as safe havens CHAD’S REGIONAL INTERVENTIONISM by various Chadian rebel groups - was typified in its support for General Francois Bozizé’s coup As Chad’s military strength increased, President in 2003. However in late 2012 as the ‘Seleka’ Déby committed the country to a series of coalition of rebel groups threatened the capital regional military interventions which served to Bangui, the Chadian leadership appears to have both project the image of a strong and stable decided not to help their former ally. Bozizé was country in the heart of a dangerous overthrown by the rebels in March 2013. The neighbourhood, and to bolster Déby’s own precise nature of Chad’s involvement in this position by attracting the support of murky story is hard to know, but the country international players who seemed unwilling or has long had groups of ‘irregular’ soldiers unable to comprehensively tackle complex operating in CAR. These troops’ role has been Sahelian security questions alone. to patrol the border region, and to chase out Chadian rebel groups which were often In early 2013, France announced the launch of infiltrating displaced and refugee populations.
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